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1006

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|--|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 7523 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i> | 3 | 7/18/1985 | B1 |
| 7524 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE HOROWITZ TRIP TO MOSCOW: "MESSAGES" FROM SOVIETS <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> | 7 | 7/19/1985 | B1 |
| 7525 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL BEFORE AND AFTER GENEVA <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> | 2 | 7/19/1985 | B1 |
| 7532 | MEMO | PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL BEFORE AND AFTER GENEVA <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> | 1 | 7/16/1985 | B1 |
| 7526 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE REFLECTIONS ON HOROWITZ MESSAGE <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i> | 6 | 7/20/1985 | B1 |
| 7527 | MEMO | SAME TEXT AS DOC #7526 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i> | 6 | 7/20/1985 | B1 |
| 7528 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MARTIN RE REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN NOVEMBER 19-20, 1985 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 7529 | MEMO | MARTIN TO NSC STAFF REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN NOVEMBER <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> | 1 | 7/22/1985 | B1 |
| 7530 | PAPER | SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY: SOME COMMON TRAITS BY MATLOCK <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> | 8 | ND | B1 |
| 7531 | PAPER | SAME TEXT AS DOC #7530 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> | 8 | ND | B1 |

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July 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Regarding the State Memo with a draft of a letter from the President to Gorbachev and your profs note on the subject, the background is as follows:

The President now has two unanswered letters from Gorbachev, one of June 10 which was in reply to his long letter which touched on items on the entire agenda, and one of June 22 in reply to the President's letter on his interim restraint decision (copies are at Tabs IV and V). Pursuant to your decision, State was also tasked to prepare the invitation to send nuclear testing experts to our test site in the form of a Presidential letter. They felt, and I concur, that it would not be a good idea for the President to send a letter on this subject and ignore the unanswered letters he has received.

As for the non-paper, I don't believe State considered the President's letter as an answer to it. Rick in effect answered it on the spot when he told Sokolov that it was acceptable to us.

COMMENT:

I believe it is appropriate for the President to react to the Gorbachev letters of June 10 and 22 when he makes his nuclear testing proposal. However, I agree with you that the State draft is defective in some basic aspects. First, it does not really answer the two Gorbachev letters. And second, as you point out, by concentrating on the possibility of agreements in advance of the Geneva meeting, it is likely to leave the impression that we are panting for them.

I have redrafted the letter totally, except for the section on nuclear testing which I have left intact. In doing so, I have tried to do several things: (1) Answer some of the more egregious claims made by Gorbachev in his letters, since the Soviets tend to consider failure to answer charges as tacit confirmation of their accuracy; (2) Avoid extensive and detailed polemics, while reserving the President's position on all those matters not mentioned; (3) Include the testing invitation in the context of meeting an expressed Soviet concern, with the

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suggestion that Gorbachev must show comparable regard for the concerns we have expressed; (4) Eliminate all talk of possible agreements before the Geneva meeting, while leaving the door open for some if the Soviets wish; (5) Put the Geneva meeting in the context of an agenda-setting exercise.

This redraft is at Tab I. I believe it meets your concerns. I would note, however, that I have not shown it to State, and anticipate a good bit of pain when they see it. (They will cite the last paragraph of Gorbachev's letter of June 10, in which he expressed an interest in using the time before November "to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting". In my opinion, however, we should just let this stand and let the Soviets move toward some agreements if they really want them.)

Before spreading my draft further, I will need your reaction -- and your instructions in this regard. Perhaps it would be best, if you concur that my redraft is preferable, to deal directly with Secretary Shultz on the matter. I believe that it allows the Secretary full scope to discuss the whole range of issues with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, but at the same time positions the President well tactically. In effect, he will be saying, if you guys want some agreements, you know what you have to do. It's no skin off my back if you hang in tough and we don't have any for the meeting in November.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve or amend the draft at Tab I, subject to any coordination you may direct.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

2. That you approve my coordinating the arms control sections with Bob Linhard.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

3. That you either handle the State clearance directly with Shultz, or authorize me to provide the draft to Rick Burt.

A. I'll handle with Shultz ___

OR

B. Supply the draft to Rick and get their reaction ___

Attachments:

- Tab I Matlock redraft of Presidential Letter
- Tab II Memo and draft from State
- Tab III Your profs note
- Tab IV Gorbachev letter of June 10
- Tab V Gorbachev letter of June 22

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Chron — 7/20/85
(JFM07)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

July 19, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Horowitz Trip to Moscow: "Messages" from Soviets

Larry Horowitz briefed me today on his trip to Moscow this week, with the caveat that the information should be held very closely. Essentially, he meant to you and John Poindexter, plus -- of course -- the President and Secretary Shultz to the degree you feel ~~they~~ would be interested. Horowitz, as you know, is a member of Senator Kennedy's staff, and said that only the Senator has been briefed and that Kennedy gave instructions that no other members of his staff, or anyone else on Capitol Hill, should be briefed on the matter.

Horowitz passed on a very specific and detailed message from Shevardnadze's Special Assistant, the comments of several other senior officials (including Academician Velikhov), and shared several of his impressions as to the general atmosphere in Moscow and regarding the persons who are playing important roles now in foreign affairs.

The Shevardnadze "Message"

The most detailed comment on U.S.-Soviet relations came from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's new special assistant, one Alexei Bukin, who was described as a very bright 29-year-old who speaks perfect English. Bukin read his points from a prepared paper, and insisted that Horowitz take notes (even supplying the pad for that purpose), in an apparent effort to stress the importance of what he was saying. While Bukin asked only that Senator Kennedy be informed of this statement, Horowitz assumes that it was also intended for us.

Bukin made the following points, which I have reproduced virtually verbatim from Horowitz's reading of his notes:

-- Shevardnadze was personally aware of Horowitz's visit, and recalled his meeting with Senator Kennedy in Tbilisi in 1974. This meeting had made a deep impression on him, and he recalled several of the things Kennedy had said to him at that time.

-- Preparations are underway for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in November. The U.S. seems to want to cover

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

systematically every problem in the relationship, but the Soviets feel that before we can solve problems, we must have an agreement on the framework of our future relations, some "rules of the road," so to speak.

-- The Soviets also believe that we both need to agree first on some of the more important problems, such as the Stockholm CDE and Vienna MBFR, before we can make much headway otherwise.

-- Dobrynin's discussion with Shultz July 3 was considered not very constructive; in fact in some respects it represented a step backward.

-- While Shultz agreed that arms reduction is a central area for our relationship, he stated that he did not see the prospect of progress before November and turned his attention to other matters. Dobrynin had called his attention to MBFR, but Shultz had said that no immediate progress is likely there.

-- The Stockholm CDE presents a different picture. It seems that both sides wish to reach an agreement involving a non-use-of-force declaration and CBM's. We have scheduled a very important meeting in Moscow in September, and it should be possible to wrap up an agreement in time to announce at the meeting in November.

-- [A statement was then made on CW, but Horowitz's notes were not clear and he did not remember precisely what was said.]

-- Regarding non-proliferation, the U.S. has offered an outline of an understanding and the Soviets are prepared to agree and to announce this at Geneva.

-- Regarding the Geneva negotiations, however, the U.S. has changed its position since the January agreement. It is the Soviet understanding that the U.S. wants to conclude an agreement on just one of the three areas -- which would be inconsistent with the January agreement. Also the Soviets will not enter into an agreement which "legalizes" SDI.

-- The Soviets were struck by the fact that Shultz did not mention the TTBT or PNET, and that he refused to discuss a testing moratorium, and consider this disturbing.

-- On regional issues, Shultz said the U.S. is willing to discuss bilaterally various regional issues, including the Middle East, Afghanistan, East Asia, Southern Africa and Central America. The Soviet position is that all are discussable, including and particularly Afghanistan.

-- In regard to Afghanistan, if the U.S. would suspend temporarily and publicly assistance to the resistance, there would be a solution. Gorbachev has decided to solve the problem.

[Horowitz asked what solution he had in mind, and Bukin said that he was not prepared to describe the solution, but that one is possible and desirable and that Gorbachev had made the decision to proceed with it.]

-- Regarding human rights, the Soviet Union will ignore U.S. demands in this area since they constitute impermissible interference in internal affairs.

-- Regarding trade, there are upcoming discussions with Block and the Soviets are willing to enter into further agreements in this area [NB: It is not clear whether this refers to the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement or something else.]

-- Shultz also cited a "package" of bilateral questions: North Pacific Air Safety; a Civil Air Agreement, Consulates and an Exchanges Agreement. The Soviets are prepared to wrap these up and announce them at the November meeting.

-- Therefore, there seems to be the prospect of six agreements for announcement in November: CDE, non-proliferation, and the four bilateral ones named.

-- If the White House wants to settle for this as the concrete results of a meeting, then the Soviets will agree.

-- However, from the Soviet point of view, such a result would mean that the meeting had failed, since none of the main problems would have been touched.

-- Several high-level meetings are coming up, but the White House has been derelict in not preparing adequately in regard to the issues under negotiation in Geneva and Vienna.

-- The Soviets expect the Gorbachev-Mitterand meeting to be much more productive. They expect good agreements in the economic area and substantial agreement on major topics such as SDI, Eureka and INF.

-- The U.S. should be aware that November is the terminal date for the Soviet moratorium on INF deployments. If there is no agreement in a significant area at the November meeting, there will be dramatic and sudden additions to the Soviet INF deployments. This will be necessary to show the world that any interpretation of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting other than a failure is impossible.

-- In addition to ending their moratorium on INF deployments, the Soviets will also consider terminating the Geneva negotiations, although no final decision on this has yet been made, as is the case in regard to substantial new INF deployments.

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-- They hope Senator Kennedy could use his influence to encourage "more serious" preparations on the American side for the November meeting.

-- Regarding the Geneva negotiations, the Soviets are confused about some aspects of the current American position. The Soviet delegation had asked Kampelman whether, if the Soviet Union proposed deep reductions, this would have a positive effect on the American position in regard to space weapons. Kampelman had replied that significantly lower levels of offensive weapons would help both sides to lower the levels of space weapons.

-- However, when Soviet negotiators asked what the American reaction would be to a Soviet proposal to cut offensive weapons by 50%, Kampelman replied that no decision had been made regarding deployment of space weapons; that this would depend on the outcome of the negotiations. The Soviets regard these two statements as inconsistent with each other.

-- Furthermore, the Soviets were disturbed when, following these exchanges in Geneva (which they considered encouraging even if not fully consistent), they read a speech by Gen. Abrahamson in Europe which stated that even if there were a 50% cut in offensive weapons, SDI would be necessary. This was regarded as a calculated answer to the Soviet probe at Geneva.

-- The U.S. says that there have been no sound Soviet proposals and that the U.S. has proposed a reduction to 5000 warheads. But the Soviet Union believes that the American number is unacceptable because it ignores cruise missiles. The Administration refuses to discuss an overall concept for reductions which includes cruise missiles.

-- The Soviets, however, think there may be some promise in looking at the ASAT question. It is clear that there is an integral link between ASATs and ABMs, since satellites are necessary for the latter -- for detection and targeting if nothing else.

-- The Soviets are prepared to discuss an agreement on "rules of the road" for satellites -- something analogous to the Incidents at Sea Agreement. They proposed something like this in 1983 and think the time may be ripe to return to it. If agreement could be reached in this area, it would be seen as a major first step in resolving the SDI problem.

* * * * *

This was the extent of the "message," which I will comment on later, but Horwitz also reported on an interesting conversation with Velikhov.

Velikhov's Comments:

When Horowitz arrived at the airport he was taken directly to Velikhov's house, without even stopping at the hotel to change. A conversation ensued which went on until 1:00 A.M. The salient points Velikhov made were the following:

-- The next "crisis" in U.S.-Soviet relations is likely to occur over Midgetman. The Soviets cannot accept that the U.S. should have the MX, the D-5 and also the Midgetman and hold to the SALT-II quantitative limits.

-- When Horowitz mentioned the Soviet two new types, Velikhov denied that a second "new type" was involved, claiming it was only a permissible upgrade, and reiterated that the SALT-II limits will not be observed if the Midgetman is deployed.

-- Horowitz reminded Velikhov that Senator Kennedy is a strong supporter of Midgetman, which seemed to take Velikhov by surprise.

-- As for the contours of a possible agreement, Velikhov stated that the key to solving the impasse at Geneva may be to define the boundary between SDI research and testing. If the boundary can be defined, SDI research could be allowed to continue.

-- If this definition could be achieved, he stated, the Soviets would be willing to offer deep reductions in warheads -- up to 50% if this can be applied flexibly with each side determining the distribution among systems.

-- In return for this, the Soviets would accept a time-limited moratorium on SDI testing (as defined by negotiation). The time limit could be in the range of 4-5 years.

-- Velikhov commented on the time-limited moratorium with the observation that this would get them past the Reagan Administration, and they would have to take their chances with his successor.

-- Horowitz brought up the problem of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Velikhov, somewhat to his surprise, stated that the Soviets would accommodate our concern in this regard if we could reach an agreement on the central issues. [He did not, however, describe how, except to say that on-site inspection would be possible in the context of an agreement to reaffirm the ABM Treaty.]

Other Observations:

Horowitz made several interesting observations about the current mood and role of individuals:

1. The atmosphere was totally businesslike and non-polemical; there was no railing against the U.S. in emotional terms as was the case during his visit last year.
2. His contacts told him that Alexandrov-Agentov is in full charge of U.S.-Soviet relations in Gorbachev's immediate office. He has very close ties, including a long-standing personal relationship, with Shevardnadze. Horowitz spoke to Alexandrov on the telephone -- he was on vacation in Riga (Horowitz added that he was staying with Mike Bruk there).
3. Gorbachev's other key staffer is Nikolai Kruzina, who was described by Soviets as his "Don Regan" -- the chief of staff. They stated that all paper going to Gorbachev passes through him. He does not seem to have a formal substantive role, but obviously has the opportunity to give advice as he sees fit.
4. Zagladin was out of the country when Horowitz was there. He was told that Zagladin is "in close" with the Gorbachev group and also plays an important role. (He is now in East Germany receiving treatment for a liver ailment, but Horowitz was told that it was not serious.)
5. All of Horowitz's contacts expressed delight that Gromyko is "out" -- and some stated "even if we had to make him President to get rid of him." There seemed no doubt that he will have no effective role in foreign policy in the future.

COMMENT

I will provide more detailed comment when I have had time to digest all of this, but I can think of two possible motivations -- not mutually exclusive -- for the Soviets to pass so much information to Horowitz:

1. They want to make points with Kennedy, both to stimulate Democratic opposition to some of the President's policies, and also because they see him as a possible Presidential candidate in '88.
2. They genuinely wished to get some of these messages to the Administration.

My hunch is that both motivations are present. I would by no means discount the second; I think it may be as important to them as the first.

Several situations were of course presented in distorted fashion, in their characterization of U.S. policy and the Administration's attitudes. [I tried to set Horowitz straight on the more important of these.] There is also a major element of special pleading, and transparent threats. Nevertheless, I believe that

we would be remiss if we did not give careful thought to some of the nuggets here.

The basic message may well be authentic. That is, that the Soviets will go out of their way to portray the November meeting as a failure if they feel they get nowhere on any of the issues they consider the key ones. The comment on the INF decision (to deploy many new weapons suddenly) would explain their current activity in constructing numerous new bases.

Though the most extensive in detail, this is just one of many "messages" we are getting these days. Either the Soviets are genuinely probing to see if a deal is possible in the nuclear/SDI area, or else they are going to enormous efforts to confuse us. We need to find a way to smoke them out without going out on a precarious limb ourselves.

~~Matlock~~₁₂
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July 19, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jan*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Travel Before and After Geneva

RCM HAS SEEN

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from State dealing with the question of whether the President should make other stops before or after his meeting in Geneva with Gorbachev. On balance, State believes that it is better for the President not to make additional stops.

At this point, I agree. However, I believe we should hold open (in our own minds) the possibility of an additional visit or two following the meeting in Geneva, depending upon how Gorbachev's schedule shapes up and, of course, the President's own wishes in this regard.

I concur with the State view that a meeting with Allied leaders after the meeting, to brief them, is not a good idea. It would simply inflate expectations for "results" in a manner which could be damaging, and furthermore might seem presumptuous to invite the other chiefs of state and government to travel to a central location just for a briefing. I believe the briefing can be done either at the NAC, or if more seems needed, by sending out emissaries as we did following the Geneva meeting in January.

I also believe that it would be unwise to schedule any other visits before the meeting. The President will want to use his time immediately before to rest from the trip to Europe and prepare for the meeting.

There may turn out to be good reasons to make at least one stop following the meeting, however. For example, the President has a long-standing invitation to visit Yugoslavia. He can expect a very warm welcome there, and good TV media events could be arranged. A visit there would not smack of briefing one Allied leader to the exclusion of the others. Another possibility might be Rome, where he could see the Pope. (He has not been to Rome, I believe, since 1981.) There would be the problem of seeming to give Craxi the edge in getting briefed on his meeting with Gorbachev, but I do not think this would create the problems associated with seeing one of the "big three" without the others.

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Don Fortier has raised another possibility that we think should perhaps be taken even more seriously -- a short visit to Turkey. It's an unconventional suggestion but would have some real advantages. Visiting a lonely outpost of the alliance (on the Soviet border, after all) would strengthen a crucial point we'll be trying to make anyway, that the focus of the summit isn't only on arms control issues, on which most other NATO members are too fixated. It would also have an electrifying effect in Turkey itself, which no President since Eisenhower has visited. Some of the political capital thus generated could help us to deal with some problems that, although still very small, are beginning to creep into the relationship. We can give you more on this idea if you wish.

Peter and I agree that a visit to Turkey would be useful but fear that visiting Turkey without also stopping in Greece would be viewed as an anti-Greek gesture (beyond just anti-Papandreou). A Turkey-only visit, thus risks playing into Papandreou's hands and would probably create further problems with him. Obviously there would be problems visiting Greece given the current state of our relations (unless some key problems could be resolved in advance). And furthermore, two stops might be more than the traffic could bear given the pressures of preparing the President for the Geneva meetings.

In sum, I believe we should operate for the time being on the assumption that Geneva will be the only stop, but retain some flexibility in the President's calendar for the days just following the meeting in case subsequent developments make it desirable to add a visit elsewhere.

Peter Sommer, Steve ^{CPA} Stanovich and Paula ^{NA} Dobriansky concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Platt-McFarlane Memorandum of July 16, 1985



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~ 14

July 16, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Travel Before and After Geneva

We do not believe it is a good idea to schedule any meetings with Allied leaders before (or on the way to) the November Summit. Although such sessions might help moderate expectations, they would tend to distract from the central task of preparing for the Summit. Even worse, such meetings could weaken our hand by revealing a degree of Western disarray and lack of consensus. The President could well find himself in the undesirable posture of being pressured to go along with Allied demands for the sake of maintaining the facade of unity.

The question of meetings in the Summit's aftermath is more complex. Meetings with Western European leaders would demonstrate our commitment to close consultations on East-West issues. Such meetings could help us manage reactions to the summit in Europe. Meetings in Western Europe might also balance meetings Gorbachev has already scheduled, i.e., Paris in early October, or may yet schedule either before or after Geneva. Meetings by the President in Belgrade or Budapest would send more pointed signals to Moscow.

But meetings between the President and Allied leaders in the wake of the summit also would pose problems. Any such meeting, whether with a group of European heads of state or singly, would invariably be a let-down, distracting from the main event. It would also be not without risk, as signs of Allied discord would detract from anything that might have been accomplished in Geneva. The President would doubtlessly be tired from the summit, and would do better to marshal his energies for the task of shaping congressional and public reaction back home. (European reaction could be shaped at a suitably high level by senior officials.) The prospect of meetings with individual heads of state (or the Pope) adds the additional complication of whom to schedule. Overall, we believe the arguments against scheduling the President carry the day. Should it be decided otherwise, however, we are prepared to suggest possible stops in both Eastern and Western Europe for the President.

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07*BMCKmley*for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary~~SECRET~~

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NOT FOR SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

July 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Reflections on Horowitz Message

My overall reaction to this, as well as the plethora of other indirect "messages" we have been getting of late is that this is one helluva way for great powers to communicate (or mis-communicate).

Many of the particulars of this "message" must be treated with great caution for several reasons:

a. One of the Soviet motivations was doubtless to sow seeds of dissension (or water the growths already present) in our own political system.

b. Even if we discount this factor, we must recognize that Horowitz (who I believe is acting in good faith) is not a specialist on the various issues involved and also is not a stenographer. He may well have missed critical details and in some cases misunderstood the point being made. (For example, there are some inner contradictions in the points made, which may not have been in the original presentation. In particular I do not grasp (and Horowitz could not explain) the contradiction they say they found in the positions Kampelman was said to have taken in Geneva.)

c. There is clear and obvious misrepresentation in some of the details given Horowitz (e.g., that the Soviets discussed warhead reductions down to 50% at Geneva).

The Message

Having noted these caveats, however, I believe that in this and other messages we have received, the Soviets are trying to convey to us the impression -- either for constructive purposes or for disinformation -- the following basic points:

1. Gorbachev needs to come out of the November meeting with a breakthrough on at least some of the key issues as they define them.

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

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2. He is willing to take a hard look at existing Soviet positions, whether they be on Afghanistan, SDI, or the extent of offensive nuclear weapon reduction, but must have something significant in return if he alters the Soviet position.

3. If he doesn't get this in at least one of the areas they deem critical, he will do all he can to make the meeting seem a failure. (And he knows we know about the SS-20 base construction, therefore can be counted on to grasp the plausibility of the threat to increase the number substantially after November.)

Gorbachev's Real Position

My hunch is that this basic message is authentic, and not disinformation, although its utility in pressing for unilateral concessions is obvious. I believe it fits with the facts as we know them of Gorbachev's internal position, and also with the typical way Soviet Russians look at issues. The most salient perceptions which give rise to my hunch are the following:

-- It is clear that Gorbachev's fundamental aim is "to get the country moving again." He faces an enormous task in this, since it will require replacement of the great majority of personnel in key position.

-- As he proceeds down the road of internal reform of management and leadership style (not of the system itself, which he has no intention of changing), he needs fewer pressures on the international scene, and in particular an excuse to refuse to throw a steadily increasing proportion of investment resources into the military sector. (The question is not whether to cut back -- they won't do that -- but only how much more will be required.)

-- Imagery is vitally important to him, as a Russian, as a communist, and as the leader of a superpower. He cannot be seen making concessions from a position of weakness.

-- Therefore, with all his relative pragmatism (and I believe he has proved to be pragmatic by Soviet standards), he is quite capable of following an irrational course in military terms, just to make a political point. For this reason, I do not believe the SS-20 threat is a bluff. (Whether we need to worry much about it is another question.)

The Specific Issues

With these assumptions in the background, I have the following thoughts on the specific issues raised by Bukin and Velikhov:

1. The reference to the need for an "agreement on the framework of future relations" is a very typical Soviet attitude of trying to find a conceptual framework within which actions can be taken

without carrying overtones of compromise with principles. (In formulating them, of course, the Soviets try to derive maximum advantage, but that is a separate matter.)

This compulsion to agree on a theoretical framework first, then proceed to details, is not fundamentally inconsistent with the President's desire to set an agenda, priorities and map out a game plan for the future. In practice, if the Soviets are willing to proceed in good faith, the two could amount to the same thing. We need to explore this concept further to find out what, precisely, the Soviets have in mind.

2. The comments on CDE and on the four bilateral issues probably do not mean that the Soviets are prepared to agree to our terms. I believe that what they are saying is, "If you want these agreements to announce at the Geneva meeting, that's OK with us. OK, but not enough." I think it is clear that they have misinterpreted Secretary Shultz's "inventory approach" as meaning that we are setting these issues up as candidates for announcement at the Geneva meeting. It is important for Shultz to clear up this misunderstanding at Helsinki, and also important for us not to jump to the conclusion that we have a "commitment" that the Soviets will come to terms with our positions. It is entirely possible that they have interpreted what was said as a signal from us that we will come to terms with theirs.

On the first two points, let me digress with some experiences from the past which shed light on Soviet negotiating behavior. Before each of Nixon's summits, Kissinger met with Dobrynin -- and from time to time with Gromyko and Brezhnev -- to settle in principle what would be achieved. In addition to the key issues, a list of "target agreements" was compiled and left to the bureaucracies to negotiate, but with a clear push from the top. As Director of SOV in State, it fell my lot to coordinate all the negotiations in the non-arms control areas. We always had a White House directive listing the areas in which to seek agreement, and the admonition to "negotiate them on their merits." But whenever we held in tough on some important points, telephone calls always came from the NSC to "be reasonable." Usually these were the result of direct appeals from Dobrynin to Kissinger -- in a couple of cases Dobrynin actually told me he would "call Henry and see that you are overruled." (Actually, we never were formally overruled since neither Kissinger nor members of his staff wanted to take responsibility in writing for overruling us, and I and my superiors insisted on instructions in writing if we were to deviate from our judgment regarding the merits of the issues.)

My point is simply that the Soviets, given their experience in the past when they, unlike we, had essentially the same staffs working the issues as are active today, probably expect Shultz or somebody in authority to engage them in advance regarding the contours of the "results" of the meeting in November. When we catalog issues and say that we think some can be solved by

November, they are likely to interpret this as a signal that that is what we want from the meeting, and also that we will make most of the negotiating concessions to get it if they agree in principle that it can be done. Also, if we don't find some way to discuss, in fairly precise terms, how some of the critical impasses might be broken, they will doubtless interpret this as an attempt by us to evade addressing the key issues.

3. MBFR: The Horowitz "message" implies greater interest in MBFR than I would have anticipated. Given the complexities of this issue with the Allies, I do not think we should encourage them to think it is a promising area. Nevertheless, I think it probable that they feel genuinely that the West has not yet adequately adjusted its position to take account of their moves on verification in '83. The emphasis on symbolic reductions is related to the "imagery" problem, even though that does not explain it totally.

4. Nuclear testing is different. The Soviet interest in ratification of the TTBT and PNET keeps cropping up. The President's offer in his letter (if it gets out) might stimulate some movement here. Also I believe it would be well if Shultz reviewed our position on the issue in Helsinki, to make sure the new Soviet team really understands it. (I am growing more and more dubious that Gorbachev is getting the straight skinny from the MFA bureaucracy on what our position really is.)

5. Regional Issues: I was struck, as I am sure you were, by the statements on Afghanistan. I don't know whether anything is really here or not, but there may be. I suspect that Gorbachev would really like to get this one off his plate if he can, and realizes that if he lets it drag on for another year, it will be his war and thus more difficult to resolve without damage to his own prestige.

I would suggest two steps for the Helsinki meeting:

a. A proposal to schedule the remaining "regional consultations" which have been proposed. (Shultz told Dobrynin July 3 that we are now prepared to proceed with the others.)

b. Some pointed questioning on Afghanistan, with perhaps a suggestion that since the meeting of experts was largely sterile, we might want a higher-level meeting soon. If the Soviets are really serious about striking a deal they will seize on this, or else give a signal in another way. (As for "higher level," I have in mind perhaps Mike Armacost one-on-one with one of the First Deputy Foreign Ministers for a day.)

6. Human Rights: The flat and completely negative statement on this issue is ominous. I think our approach should be to state (in Helsinki): "You know what needs to be done in this area. It does not require contravening your laws or changing your system. It only requires the political will to do what you have agreed to

do in the Helsinki Final Act. All I have to say is that many issues of mutual benefit, particularly in the trade area, are not going to be resolved until these matters are resolved."

My guess, by the way, is that if the Soviets are inclined to allow some movement in this area, they will try to arrange things so that someone other than the President implicitly gets the credit for it: Mitterand, for example, or perhaps some of our Congressional figures or private groups -- or even the Israelis, if Gorbachev has decided to try to strike a bargain for the renewal of diplomatic relations.

7. Gorbachev's Paris Visit: The comments given Horowitz smack of rather outrageous blackmail. Some of it is doubtless bluff (I cannot imagine that Mitterand, even in his most irresponsible mood, would give them anything useful on INF). However, broadly speaking, there is considerable potential for Gorbachev here. If he makes some attractive-looking trade offers, praises Eureka, and throws a human rights bone or two, he can doubtless have a visit which can be touted as an unalloyed success -- and potentially give us some collateral problems. But he will do this anyway, and there is not much we can do about it other than keep in close touch with Mitterand along the way and try not to give him any gratuitous cause to make problems.

8. Nuclear/Space Issues: Velikhov's comments about the contours of a possible agreement were much more precise and coherent than Bukin's. The latter's mention of an "Incidents in Space" agreement is intriguing, particularly since in the past Soviet specialists have tended to belittle the idea as relatively meaningless. The fact that both Bukin and Velikhov used a 50% reduction factor (in both cases applied to warheads) is interesting in light of the rumors from other sources, and is most curious in light of the behavior of the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. Could the thinking in Moscow be moving faster than the instructions to the delegation?

In any event, I think it would be appropriate for Shultz to ask some questions in Helsinki designed to draw Shevardnadze out on the various issues involved here.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Re the Helsinki meeting:

1. Shultz should make a crystal-clear presentation of our view of the Geneva meeting when he meets Shevardnadze in Helsinki.
2. He should focus primarily on eliciting Soviet ideas as to how the deadlock on some of the key issues might be broken, without making very many suggestions himself.

3. He should also try to elicit a sense of Soviet priorities, so that we can mull them over before the September meetings.

4. He should avoid the usual "inventory" approach lest this be misunderstood as representing either the focus or the sum total of our aspirations for the Geneva meeting.

b. Re communications in general:

1. All possible factors of deliberate Soviet misrepresentation and calculated special pleading notwithstanding, it seems clear that important elements of our policies and our approach are simply not getting through to Soviet decision makers.

2. If we had an arrangement whereby a well-informed U.S. official could review these matters with a Soviet counterpart, it could be extremely useful to both sides. In the first place, we could be more confident that we are understanding precisely what they are saying. In the second, it would provide an opportunity to call attention to misrepresentations of our position and faulty interpretations of our reaction (such as conclusions that particular speeches -- perhaps reported inaccurately -- are intended as signals). And finally, it would provide a vehicle for a franker discussion of what is in the ball park than is possible in formal sessions, given the Soviet propensity for concentrating, in their public and their formal diplomacy, on issues which are often not in fact the center of their concern.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you indicate your reaction to the various thoughts above.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

2. That you authorize me to work with State next week to try to cast Secretary Shultz's Helsinki talking points in the framework I have suggested above.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

3. That, before my departure next weekend, we discuss the whole situation in case there is an opportunity for some private discussion with Soviet officials in Helsinki.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Matlock
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY

~~MR. McFarlane~~

→ AMB. MATLOCK

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OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

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NOT FOR SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

July 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JRM*

SUBJECT: Reflections on Horowitz Message

My overall reaction to this, as well as the plethora of other indirect "messages" we have been getting of late is that this is one helluva way for great powers to communicate (or mis-communicate).

Many of the particulars of this "message" must be treated with great caution for several reasons:

a. One of the Soviet motivations was doubtless to sow seeds of dissension (or water the growths already present) in our own political system.

b. Even if we discount this factor, we must recognize that Horowitz (who I believe is acting in good faith) is not a specialist on the various issues involved and also is not a stenographer. He may well have missed critical details and in some cases misunderstood the point being made. (For example, there are some inner contradictions in the points made, which may not have been in the original presentation. In particular I do not grasp (and Horowitz could not explain) the contradiction they say they found in the positions Kampelman was said to have taken in Geneva.

c. There is clear and obvious misrepresentation in some of the details given Horowitz (e.g., that the Soviets discussed warhead reductions down to 50% at Geneva).

The Message

Having noted these caveats, however, I believe that in this and other messages we have received, the Soviets are trying to convey to us the impression -- either for constructive purposes or for disinformation -- the following basic points:

1. Gorbachev needs to come out of the November meeting with a breakthrough on at least some of the key issues as they define them.

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/1/12

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2. He is willing to take a hard look at existing Soviet positions, whether they be on Afghanistan, SDI, or the extent of offensive nuclear weapon reduction, but must have something significant in return if he alters the Soviet position.

3. If he doesn't get this in at least one of the areas they deem critical, he will do all he can to make the meeting seem a failure. (And he knows we know about the SS-20 base construction, therefore can be counted on to grasp the plausibility of the threat to increase the number substantially after November.)

Gorbachev's Real Position

My hunch is that this basic message is authentic, and not disinformation, although its utility in pressing for unilateral concessions is obvious. I believe it fits with the facts as we know them of Gorbachev's internal position, and also with the typical way Soviet Russians look at issues. The most salient perceptions which give rise to my hunch are the following:

-- It is clear that Gorbachev's fundamental aim is "to get the country moving again." He faces an enormous task in this, since it will require replacement of the great majority of personnel in key positions.

-- As he proceeds down the road of internal reform of management and leadership style (not of the system itself, which he has no intention of changing), he needs fewer pressures on the international scene, and in particular an excuse to refuse to throw a steadily increasing proportion of investment resources into the military sector. (The question is not whether to cut back -- they won't do that -- but only how much more will be required.)

-- Imagery is vitally important to him, as a Russian, as a communist, and as the leader of a superpower. He cannot be seen making concessions from a position of weakness.

-- Therefore, with all his relative pragmatism (and I believe he has proved to be pragmatic by Soviet standards), he is quite capable of following an irrational course in military terms, just to make a political point. For this reason, I do not believe the SS-20 threat is a bluff. (Whether we need to worry much about it is another question.)

The Specific Issues

With these assumptions in the background, I have the following thoughts on the specific issues raised by Bukin and Velikhov:

1. The reference to the need for an "agreement on the framework of future relations" is a very typical Soviet attitude of trying to find a conceptual framework within which actions can be taken

without carrying overtones of compromise with principles. (In formulating them, of course, the Soviets try to derive maximum advantage, but that is a separate matter.)

This compulsion to agree on a theoretical framework first, then proceed to details, is not fundamentally inconsistent with the President's desire to set an agenda, priorities and map out a game plan for the future. In practice, if the Soviets are willing to proceed in good faith, the two could amount to the same thing. We need to explore this concept further to find out what, precisely, the Soviets have in mind.

2. The comments on CDE and on the four bilateral issues probably do not mean that the Soviets are prepared to agree to our terms. I believe that what they are saying is, "If you want these agreements to announce at the Geneva meeting, that's OK with us. OK, but not enough." I think it is clear that they have misinterpreted Secretary Shultz's "inventory approach" as meaning that we are setting these issues up as candidates for announcement at the Geneva meeting. It is important for Shultz to clear up this misunderstanding at Helsinki, and also important for us not to jump to the conclusion that we have a "commitment" that the Soviets will come to terms with our positions. It is entirely possible that they have interpreted what was said as a signal from us that we will come to terms with theirs.

On the first two points, let me digress with some experiences from the past which shed light on Soviet negotiating behavior. Before each of Nixon's summits, Kissinger met with Dobrynin -- and from time to time with Gromyko and Brezhnev -- to settle in principle what would be achieved. In addition to the key issues, a list of "target agreements" was compiled and left to the bureaucracies to negotiate, but with a clear push from the top. As Director of SOV in State, it fell my lot to coordinate all the negotiations in the non-arms control areas. We always had a White House directive listing the areas in which to seek agreement, and the admonition to "negotiate them on their merits." But whenever we held in tough on some important points, telephone calls always came from the NSC to "be reasonable." Usually these were the result of direct appeals from Dobrynin to Kissinger -- in a couple of cases Dobrynin actually told me he would "call Henry and see that you are overruled." (Actually, we never were formally overruled since neither Kissinger nor members of his staff wanted to take responsibility in writing for overruling us, and I and my superiors insisted on instructions in writing if we were to deviate from our judgment regarding the merits of the issues.)

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My guess, by the way, is that if the Soviets are inclined to allow some movement in this area, they will try to arrange things so that someone other than the President implicitly gets the credit for it: Mitterand, for example, or perhaps some of our Congressional figures or private groups -- or even the Israelis, if Gorbachev has decided to try to strike a bargain for the renewal of diplomatic relations.

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27

3. He should also try to elicit a sense of Soviet priorities, so that we can mull them over before the September meetings.

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1. All possible factors of deliberate Soviet misrepresentation and calculated special pleading notwithstanding, it seems clear that important elements of our policies and our approach are simply not getting through to Soviet decision makers.

2. If we had an arrangement whereby a well-informed U.S. official could review these matters with a Soviet counterpart, it could be extremely useful to both sides. In the first place, we could be more confident that we are understanding precisely what they are saying. In the second, it would provide an opportunity to call attention to misrepresentations of our position and faulty interpretations of our reaction (such as conclusions that particular speeches -- perhaps reported inaccurately -- are intended as signals). And finally, it would provide a vehicle for a franker discussion of what is in the ball park than is possible in formal sessions, given the Soviet propensity for concentrating, in their public and their formal diplomacy, on issues which are often not in fact the center of their concern.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you indicate your reaction to the various thoughts above.

Approve *ACM* Disapprove

2. That you authorize me to work with State next week to try to cast Secretary Shultz's Helsinki talking points in the framework I have suggested above.

Approve *ACM* Disapprove

3. That, before my departure next weekend, we discuss the whole situation in case there is an opportunity for some private discussion with Soviet officials in Helsinki.

Approve *ACM* Disapprove

*Good analysis, Jack.
I wish we could either
put you in Moscow or
set you up in a private
channel.*

JM-c
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia

Senator Robert Byrd is requesting an appointment to see you sometime this week. The Senator will be heading a Senate delegation which will visit the Soviet Union, as well as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in late August. He specifically would like to discuss with you some way in which he might represent the President during his trip. Senator Byrd also plans to see Secretary Shultz.

This appears to be a very impressive delegation: Senators Thurmond, Nunn, Stevens, and Warner will be going as well.

Ron Sable  concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to see Senator Byrd sometime this week, if possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Incoming memo from Pam Turner

CC Nick Klissas

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 17, 1985

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

THROUGH: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORE *mf.*
M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *Bo*

FROM: PAM TURNER *pt*

Subject: Meeting with Senator Robert C. Byrd
(D-West Virginia)

Senator Byrd has requested an opportunity to meet with you next week. Senator Byrd will be heading a Senate delegation which plans to visit the Soviet Union in late August, and would like to discuss with you some way in which he might represent the President (a message, etc.) during his trip.

The trip leaves August 23rd, and returns September 4th. They will visit Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, where they have scheduled a meeting with Mr. Gorbachev on September 2nd or 3rd. Other members of the delegation include Senators Thurmond, Nunn, Stevens, Warner, DeConcini, Boren and Mitchell.

Senator Byrd also plans to meet with Secretary Shultz.

Guidance please.

79

JUL 30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: References to President's Meeting with Gorbachev
in November 19-20, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature advising NSC staff members to refer to the President's meeting with Gorbachev as a "meeting" and not as a "summit."

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to NSC staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2# 7528
BY LST, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: References to President's Meeting with Gorbachev
in November

Staff members should note that the President's meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, which is scheduled for November 19-20 in Geneva, should always be referred to as a "meeting" and not as a "summit."

Since the President's objectives for this meeting are different from those of past "summits," where the focus was on signing formal agreements, it is important to maintain a clear distinction between the two types of meetings.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/24 7529
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Papers on Soviet Union for the President

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of papers I am preparing for the President. It deals with common traits of Soviet Russian psychology.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Paper on Soviet Union for the President

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CJS* NARA, Date *6/18/02*

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Paper on the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of studies we are doing on the Soviet Union. It deals with Soviet Russian psychology, and I believe you will find it of interest.

Attachment:

Tab A Paper on the Soviet Union

Prepared by:
Jack F. MatlockCONFIDENTIALDECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CRS NARA, Date 6/18/02

SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY:
SOME COMMON TRAITS

Yes, they lie and cheat. And they can stonewall a negotiation when it seems in their interest to strike a deal. They have a sense of pride and "face" that makes the proverbial oriental variety pale in comparison. Yet, in private, with people he trusts, the Russian can be candid to a fault -- grovelling in his nation's inadequacies -- and so scrupulously honest that it can be irritating, as when he makes a big deal over having forgotten to return a borrowed pencil.

Do these contradictions stem from ideology and politics? To a degree, certainly. The lying, cheating and stonewalling, even the exaggerated sense of pride, often serve an obvious political or ideological purpose. But that is not the whole story, for these traits have deep roots in Russian culture and society.

Now when we talk about the "psychology" of a nation or ethnic group, we need to bear in mind that we are not talking about the psychology of every individual in that group. By no means every Russian, or every Soviet official, fits a stereotype. They exhibit as much individual variety as any other people. Yet there are certain psychological characteristics which are more common, and more characteristic, in one society than in another. What we are concerned with here are some which differ from those most common to Americans and explain in part frequently observed behavioral differences.

The "Truth": Reality or a Convenient Fiction?

Lying is endemic in every society. But societies differ in how the phenomenon is regarded. All societies I know of excuse it under certain circumstances. Who would reproach a wife who comforted her husband after he had delivered a dull after-dinner speech by telling him, "It was a very thoughtful talk, dear, and I'm sure those idiots who dozed off just had too much to drink before dinner"? We would call it a white lie; not the truth, but meant well.

The Russians have many more categories of the "excusable" lie than we typically do. There is, for example, the lie which is not so much meant to deceive as to salvage the pride of the liar. Most Russians would feel that it is a social faux pas to confront another person with an embarrassing fact, and that it is understandable if the other person denies the fact and concocts an alternate, fictional explanation, since he is only trying to save face, not to deceive. They even have a separate word for this sort of lie, to distinguish it from one made with deliberate intent to deceive.

In 1978, President Ford made a direct appeal to Brezhnev to turn off the microwave signals being directed at the American Embassy in Moscow. We then supplied the Soviets with the technical data we had that proved conclusively the existence of the microwave

radiation and even pinpointed the sources. Subsequently, Gromyko had the gall to state to our Ambassador in a face-to-face meeting that he could assure us, officially and on behalf of the Soviet Government, that no microwaves were being directed at our Embassy.

Gromyko, of course, knew that we knew he was lying, and that there was no way this "assurance" was going to diminish our confidence in the hard facts we had gathered with our own instruments. So why did he do it? I suspect that his reasoning went something like this: "They know very well that we will not admit to this. They are just trying to put us on the spot, and gain an advantage. We'll show them we are not so weak that they can push us around." (In fact, somewhat later the microwave signals were turned off, but without any admission that they ever existed.)

In addition to condoning lying to save face, Russians expect it from governments and official authorities. Lying for reasons of state is not so much excused as simply accepted as a fact of life. They know their own authorities lie to them, and assume that every other government does the same. This is why Russians have never understood why Watergate brought an end to Nixon's presidency. To them, the charges against President Nixon seemed so trivial -- a very mild form of what they assume all government officials do as a matter of course -- that they simply could not accept that these charges could have been the real reason for his resignation. (Given to conspiracy theories, most Russians seem convinced that Nixon was removed by an anti-Soviet cabal because he tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union.)

These typically Russian attitudes toward telling the truth are mingled with a much more purposeful and cynical view of the "truth" which the communist regime introduced. As a calculated instrument for establishing and maintaining control of the population, the communist authorities introduced an elaborate and pervasive system not merely to control information, but to shape the perception of reality by distorting and misrepresenting facts which tended to undermine the political line of the moment. Communist Party professionals were trained on the proposition that the truth is what the Party says it is at a given moment, and many of those who adapted to this requirement seem over time to lose the ability to distinguish between the Party line and reality. Psychologically, the Party line becomes reality for them. Professor Leszek Kolakowski, a former Polish Communist who broke with the regime some 20 years ago and now lives in England, has described this phenomenon as follows:

[The truth of Stalinist totalitarianism] consisted not simply in that virtually everything in the Soviet Union was either falsified or suppressed -- statistics, historical events, current events, names, maps, books (occasionally even Lenin's texts) -- but that the inhabitants of the country were trained to know what was politically "correct." In the functionaries' minds, the borderline between what is

"correct" and what is "true," as we normally understand this, seems really to have become blurred; by repeating the same absurdities time and again they themselves began to believe or half-believe them. The massive corruption of the language eventually produced people who are incapable of perceiving their own mendacity.

To a great extent this form of perception seems to survive, in spite of the fact that the omnipresence of ideology has been somewhat restricted recently. When Soviet leaders maintain that they have "liberated" Afghanistan, or that there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union, it is quite possible that they mean what they say. To such an extent have they confounded linguistic ability that they are incapable of using any other word for a Soviet invasion than "liberation," and have no sense at all of the grotesque distance between language and reality. It takes a lot of courage, after all, to be entirely cynical; those who lie to themselves appear among us much more frequently than perfect cynics."

Whether it is a case of lying to themselves or of conditioned cynicism, the ability of many Russians (and not only communist officials) to change their version of the truth when so instructed by authority can be breathtaking to an outsider. When the "line" is changed abruptly, many seem to wipe the previous position from their consciousness and blithely assume it never existed. One encounters such habits even in the trivia of everyday life.

Once, while visiting Moscow some years ago, I had dinner in a restaurant with several other Russian speakers. The waitress apparently did not spot us as foreigners, and when we ordered extra bottles of mineral water (it was a sultry summer day) she simply said abruptly, "We're out." This was a little hard to believe, because while most foods are scarce, mineral water rarely is in Soviet restaurants. So we protested and pressed her for an explanation, and she repeated her denial several times and finally terminated the conversation with a curt, "We're out of it, and that's that."

As the waitress walked away from our table, she was intercepted by the maitre d' (who knew we were foreigners), and a few words were exchanged. A couple of minutes later, she appeared with two chilled bottles, which she placed on our table, offering no explanation. I observed naively, "Thanks, I thought you were out."

Her reply was instant and accusatory, "Of course we have mineral water. Why do you think we live worse than you?" It was as if her statement less than five minutes earlier had never been made, and my gentle reference to it was taken as an affront to her national pride. What right did I, a foreigner, have to think that such a simple commodity would be unavailable! And if I had

chosen to remind her of her previous statement, she doubtless would simply have denied ever having said it.

Ends and Means

Some of the attitudes described above are connected with another difference in the typical Russian and the typical American ethical system. By and large, Americans believe that good ends do not justify bad means. Most Russians feel that proper ends justify whatever means necessary.

An emigre Russian professor recently conducted a survey comparing Russian and American attitudes on this subject, placing it in a completely non-political context. He asked the same question to a sample group of persons born in the U.S. and to a group of recent emigres from the Soviet Union. The question was, "If you have a good friend who is having trouble passing a course at school, it is right for you to give him answers during an exam?" The great majority of Americans said it was not right; the Russians, by a comparable majority, said it was.

It is easy to see how this attitude can be exploited by the political authorities. If they can present the objective of a given action as a laudable one, their people are likely to accept whatever means are claimed necessary to achieve it.

The Soviet handling of the KAL shoot-down illustrates many of these factors. A deeply embarrassing incident, first denied, then -- when denial was no longer possible -- a concocted story meant to be exculpatory, particularly in the eyes of the Russian people. The authorities could rely on the Russian propensity to justify means to a "necessary" end if they could be convinced that KAL 007 was a "spy plane" which threatened their security. And the larger tragedy of it all is that most Russians probably believed the concoction, because to disbelieve it would mean that they, as a nation, are aggressive brutes with no respect for human life -- an image the direct opposite of the one the Russians have of themselves and the one the regime, with all its instruments of disinformation, cultivates.

Compromise and Principle

Americans tend to see the willingness to compromise as a value in and of itself. Russians, on the other hand, tend to view it as a fault and a sign of moral weakness. The morally "correct" behavior is to stand firm on your principles and either prevail or go down fighting.

This does not mean that Russians do not understand bargaining. Anyone who has haggled with the peasants in an open-air market or dealt with their grain purchasers can testify to their innate ability to negotiate a price. But if a principle is involved, that is another matter.

Of course, none of us likes to think that we ever compromise on our principles. The real difference between Russians and Americans is that the former impute a "principle" to a much broader category of issues than we would. The communist line is always described as a "principled" line. Counting British and French nuclear systems in any INF agreement is a matter of "principle." For a long time, paying more than 6% on borrowed funds was also one, with the result that the Soviets would knowingly pay a higher price than market on a contract so that the supplier could provide a lower nominal interest rate. In real terms, the lower rate was an illusion, and they knew it, but the "principle" itself was important enough to them to insist upon it.

The underlying Soviet attitude toward compromise explains in part some of their foreign policy blunders. They probably genuinely expected the rest of the world to see their withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations in 1983 as a noble defense of principle, even if it was a principle the outsiders did not agree with. They must have realized very quickly that it was an error but once they had taken the step, they had to readjust their "principles" before they could correct it. Thus the maneuvering in advance of the Geneva meeting last January, and the insistence at that time that the renewed negotiations be characterized as entirely new.

In actual practice, the Soviet attitude toward compromise is related more to its public presentation than to the act itself. Like the peasant woman in the market who wants to move her onions before she takes the train back to her village, Soviet leaders can be quite realistic in judging when it is in their interest to strike a deal and when they may be better off without one. If they are interested in a deal, however, they will wish to position themselves so that they can present it to their own people as a triumph of some principle. This partially explains their habit of seeking general agreements in principle before negotiating details. The agreement in principle, as it were, legitimizes the detailed bargaining which must follow and the result can be portrayed as a successful embodiment of the principle, rather than a craven compromise.

If, however, the Soviet leaders are unable to adjust their "principled" position to accommodate a deal, they may refuse to conclude the deal at all, even if it is in their interest. Immediately after the Trade Act of 1974 was passed with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments, the Soviets very privately showed a willingness to reach a deal. They offered an emigration figure of at least 50,000 a year, but on condition that there would be no public acknowledgement that there was a deal. Everything fell apart when there were leaked stories in Washington about this; the Soviets drew back, refused further negotiation and have never since been persuaded to resume bargaining on the issue.

Pride, Face and Status

The Russians have only themselves to blame for the widespread criticism their actions evoke, and the fear and derision they inspire in outsiders. It is doubtless too much to expect them to understand this -- though some of their intellectuals do. Some criticism they can take -- but only in private. They usually do not mind the fear, because it is testimony to their importance and, furthermore, has important political uses. It is really the derision that sends them up the wall. And their skins are so thin on this subject, that they often see insult where none is intended.

Gorbachev's opening monologue to Baldrige in May provided several examples of this. "We recognize that you are a great country and have great achievements," he claimed, "but you ignore what we have achieved. You won't treat us as equals." Subsequently, he complained that even when they pay good hard cash for our grain, which we are anxious to sell, we make statements that they cannot feed their own people, while we never make such statements about Western Europe, which imports more food per capita than the Soviet Union.

Distorted and self-serving as Gorbachev's statements were, they probably represented genuine feelings. Underlying them is a deep inferiority complex bred of many factors: an awareness of their technological backwardness and lower living standards; a basic (though probably subconscious) sense of their political illegitimacy; a recognition that their system has failed to fulfill its promises to provide a better life for their people; and a feeling that they have been systematically denied their rightful recognition and "place in the sun."

Never mind that they have usually stimulated by their own actions and behavior the treatment which they resent. The fact is probably that their skins are thin precisely because they know in their hearts that the criticism, and much of the derision, is well founded. A Russian-speaking American diplomat who served in Moscow in the 1930's tells the following story. Despite the Stalinist atmosphere of the time, he managed to acquire a number of Russian friends, and at their meetings they would speak freely of many of their country's problems. Once, however, the diplomat was called on in a gathering which included foreigners to discuss the current situation, and he alluded gently to some of these problems. Afterwards, some of his Soviet acquaintances came up and told him with indignation, "We thought you were our friend!" He protested that he was, indeed, a friend and pointed out that he had said nothing which was not true. "Of course it's true." the Soviets replied. "But if you were our friend, you wouldn't tell the truth about us."

It is hard to imagine a Chinese or a Frenchman making a statement like that. But then, they have a rock-steady foundation of national and cultural self-confidence to rely on. The Russian psyche, in contrast, teeters on the sand of self-doubt.

The Other Side of the Coin

Having said so much about contrasts in Russian and American attitudes, a word may be in order about some similarities. We are not poles apart in everything.

In private, and away from a politically-charged environment, a Russian is typically gracious and remarkably open -- if he likes you and considers you sincere. Five or ten minutes after a chance meeting -- say in a train compartment or on a park bench -- he is likely to tell you the story of his life and elicit yours, and respond with spontaneity and candor. In this respect Russians are much less reserved than most West Europeans, and are quick to notice that Americans have the same trait.

Nor do they allow the xenophobic strain in much of their thinking -- and much of the propaganda -- to affect personal ties with individuals. West Germans often are amazed by the warmth and hospitality shown them by Russians when they visit the Soviet Union, given Russian memories of World War II. Many Germans have told me that they are treated better in Leningrad than in Paris by the man on the street.

For all their sensitivity to criticism in public, Russians expect it in private, so long as it does not seem gratuitous or damaging to their sense of national dignity. In fact, the foreigner who tries to curry favor by praising everything Soviet earns only their contempt; such praise is considered insincere, and often patronizing and condescending to boot. (Of course, they like praise of those things they are genuinely proud of, such as their heroism in World War II, Shostakovich's music or Voznesensky's poetry, but not of the things they know very well do not merit praise.)

Their deepest contempt, however, is reserved for those foreigners who try to ingratiate themselves by running down their own country. This the Russians simply do not understand -- in their eyes the foreigner should stand up for his country just as a Russian would for his own -- and if he does not do so, he is considered morally defective. This attitude, of course, does not prevent them from using such persons for propaganda purposes, but Russians, official or otherwise, really have no respect for them.

This attitude applies in particular to members of communist parties in Western Europe and the U.S. In 1976 we sponsored a major exhibition on American life in Moscow to mark the Bicentennial of American Independence. It was an election year, and one section of the exhibit had a real voting machine and the Soviet visitors were encouraged to go in and cast a mock ballot. The slate used was taken from New York and the American Communist Party was on the ballot.

Almost nobody voted the CP slate (if memory serves, there were perhaps three of four votes for the communists out of thousands cast). Almost all Soviet visitors voted for either Ford or Carter. Our American guides conducted a bit of exit polling at the exhibit, asking visitors how they had voted. Once in a while they would ask why the visitor had not voted for the communists. Sometimes that question only elicited a discreet shrug, but several Soviet visitors were brutally frank, making statements like, "If I were an American, do you think I'd vote for those clowns?" or "Do you think I want America to have a mess like we have here?" So much for Marxist "proletarian solidarity"!

Unfortunately, these appealing Russian traits of personal openness and candor are all too often submerged under the repressive lid of the police state. But when the regime tries to suppress these traits, it is moving against, rather than with, the Russian cultural tradition. Whenever the lid is slightly raised, the traditional behavior spurts forth, all the more vehemently for having been constrained.

* * * * *

The contradictory pull of the various urges, hang-ups and ideological imperatives at work in Soviet Russian minds and emotions tends to make Soviet behavior not only unpredictable to the outsider, but unpredictable for Russians themselves.

Michael Vozlensky, a former member of the Soviet elite who defected in the early 1970's and has written a classic work on the Soviet ruling class, commented recently that those who think the Soviet leaders operate in accord with a careful plan of action have it all wrong. "Everything is decided ad hoc," he maintained. "They don't know themselves what they are going to do next. But they will always claim that they had it in mind all along."

He may be right.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

MEMORANDUM

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JM-C
42

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Papers on Soviet Union for the President

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of papers I am preparing for the President. It deals with common traits of Soviet Russian psychology.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Paper on Soviet Union for the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *CJS* NARA, Date *6/14/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Paper on the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of studies we are doing on the Soviet Union. It deals with Soviet Russian psychology, and I believe you will find it of interest.

Attachment:

Tab A Paper on the Soviet Union

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CSJ NARA, Date 6/12/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7531

~~BY~~ ~~NOT~~ NARA DATE 11/21/07

SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY:
SOME COMMON TRAITS

Yes, they lie and cheat. And they can stonewall a negotiation when it seems in their interest to strike a deal. They have a sense of pride and "face" that makes the proverbial oriental variety pale in comparison. Yet, in private, with people he trusts, the Russian can be candid to a fault -- grovelling in his nation's inadequacies -- and so scrupulously honest that it can be irritating, as when he makes a big deal over having forgotten to return a borrowed pencil.

Do these contradictions stem from ideology and politics? To a degree, certainly. The lying, cheating and stonewalling, even the exaggerated sense of pride, often serve an obvious political or ideological purpose. But that is not the whole story, for these traits have deep roots in Russian culture and society.

Now when we talk about the "psychology" of a nation or ethnic group, we need to bear in mind that we are not talking about the psychology of every individual in that group. By no means every Russian, or every Soviet official, fits a stereotype. They exhibit as much individual variety as any other people. Yet there are certain psychological characteristics which are more common, and more characteristic, in one society than in another. What we are concerned with here are some which differ from those most common to Americans and explain in part frequently observed behavioral differences.

The "Truth": Reality or a Convenient Fiction?

Lying is endemic in every society. But societies differ in how the phenomenon is regarded. All societies I know of excuse it under certain circumstances. Who would reproach a wife who comforted her husband after he had delivered a dull after-dinner speech by telling him, "It was a very thoughtful talk, dear, and I'm sure those idiots who dozed off just had too much to drink before dinner?" We would call it a white lie; not the truth, but meant well.

The Russians have many more categories of the "excusable" lie than we typically do. There is, for example, the lie which is not so much meant to deceive as to salvage the pride of the liar. Most Russians would feel that it is a social faux pas to confront another person with an embarrassing fact, and that it is understandable if the other person denies the fact and concocts an alternate, fictional explanation, since he is only trying to save face, not to deceive. They even have a separate word for this sort of lie, to distinguish it from one made with deliberate intent to deceive.

In 1978, President Ford made a direct appeal to Brezhnev to turn off the microwave signals being directed at the American Embassy in Moscow. We then supplied the Soviets with the technical data we had that proved conclusively the existence of the microwave

radiation and even pinpointed the sources. Subsequently, Gromyko had the gall to state to our Ambassador in a face-to-face meeting that he could assure us, officially and on behalf of the Soviet Government, that no microwaves were being directed at our Embassy.

Gromyko, of course, knew that we knew he was lying, and that there was no way this "assurance" was going to diminish our confidence in the hard facts we had gathered with our own instruments. So why did he do it? I suspect that his reasoning went something like this: "They know very well that we will not admit to this. They are just trying to put us on the spot, and gain an advantage. We'll show them we are not so weak that they can push us around." (In fact, somewhat later the microwave signals were turned off, but without any admission that they ever existed.)

In addition to condoning lying to save face, Russians expect it from governments and official authorities. Lying for reasons of state is not so much excused as simply accepted as a fact of life. They know their own authorities lie to them, and assume that every other government does the same. This is why Russians have never understood why Watergate brought an end to Nixon's presidency. To them, the charges against President Nixon seemed so trivial -- a very mild form of what they assume all government officials do as a matter of course -- that they simply could not accept that these charges could have been the real reason for his resignation. (Given to conspiracy theories, most Russians seem convinced that Nixon was removed by an anti-Soviet cabal because he tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union.)

These typically Russian attitudes toward telling the truth are mingled with a much more purposeful and cynical view of the "truth" which the communist regime introduced. As a calculated instrument for establishing and maintaining control of the population, the communist authorities introduced an elaborate and pervasive system not merely to control information, but to shape the perception of reality by distorting and misrepresenting facts which tended to undermine the political line of the moment. Communist Party professionals were trained on the proposition that the truth is what the Party says it is at a given moment, and many of those who adapted to this requirement seem over time to lose the ability to distinguish between the Party line and reality. Psychologically, the Party line becomes reality for them. Professor Leszek Kolakowski, a former Polish Communist who broke with the regime some 20 years ago and now lives in England, has described this phenomenon as follows:

[The truth of Stalinist totalitarianism] consisted not simply in that virtually everything in the Soviet Union was either falsified or suppressed -- statistics, historical events, current events, names, maps, books (occasionally even Lenin's texts) -- but that the inhabitants of the country were trained to know what was politically "correct." In the functionaries' minds, the borderline between what is

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"correct" and what is "true," as we normally understand this, seems really to have become blurred; by repeating the same absurdities time and again they themselves began to believe or half-believe them. The massive corruption of the language eventually produced people who are incapable of perceiving their own mendacity.

To a great extent this form of perception seems to survive, in spite of the fact that the omnipresence of ideology has been somewhat restricted recently. When Soviet leaders maintain that they have "liberated" Afghanistan, or that there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union, it is quite possible that they mean what they say. To such an extent have they confounded linguistic ability that they are incapable of using any other word for a Soviet invasion than "liberation," and have no sense at all of the grotesque distance between language and reality. It takes a lot of courage, after all, to be entirely cynical; those who lie to themselves appear among us much more frequently than perfect cynics."

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As the waitress walked away from our table, she was intercepted by the maitre d' (who knew we were foreigners), and a few words were exchanged. A couple of minutes later, she appeared with two chilled bottles, which she placed on our table, offering no explanation. I observed naively, "Thanks, I thought you were out."

Her reply was instant and accusatory, "Of course we have mineral water. Why do you think we live worse than you?" It was as if her statement less than five minutes earlier had never been made, and my gentle reference to it was taken as an affront to her national pride. What right did I, a foreigner, have to think that such a simple commodity would be unavailable! And if I had

chosen to remind her of her previous statement, she doubtless would simply have denied ever having said it.

Ends and Means

Some of the attitudes described above are connected with another difference in the typical Russian and the typical American ethical system. By and large, Americans believe that good ends do not justify bad means. Most Russians feel that proper ends justify whatever means necessary.

An emigre Russian professor recently conducted a survey comparing Russian and American attitudes on this subject, placing it in a completely non-political context. He asked the same question to a sample group of persons born in the U.S. and to a group of recent emigres from the Soviet Union. The question was, "If you have a good friend who is having trouble passing a course at school, it is right for you to give him answers during an exam?" The great majority of Americans said it was not right; the Russians, by a comparable majority, said it was.

It is easy to see how this attitude can be exploited by the political authorities. If they can present the objective of a given action as a laudable one, their people are likely to accept whatever means are claimed necessary to achieve it.

The Soviet handling of the KAL shoot-down illustrates many of these factors. A deeply embarrassing incident, first denied, then -- when denial was no longer possible -- a concocted story meant to be exculpatory, particularly in the eyes of the Russian people. The authorities could rely on the Russian propensity to justify means to a "necessary" end if they could be convinced that KAL 007 was a "spy plane" which threatened their security. And the larger tragedy of it all is that most Russians probably believed the concoction, because to disbelieve it would mean that they, as a nation, are aggressive brutes with no respect for human life -- an image the direct opposite of the one the Russians have of themselves and the one the regime, with all its instruments of disinformation, cultivates.

Compromise and Principle

Americans tend to see the willingness to compromise as a value in and of itself. Russians, on the other hand, tend to view it as a fault and a sign of moral weakness. The morally "correct" behavior is to stand firm on your principles and either prevail or go down fighting.

This does not mean that Russians do not understand bargaining. Anyone who has haggled with the peasants in an open-air market or dealt with their grain purchasers can testify to their innate ability to negotiate a price. But if a principle is involved, that is another matter.

Of course, none of us likes to think that we ever compromise on our principles. The real difference between Russians and Americans is that the former impute a "principle" to a much broader category of issues than we would. The communist line is always described as a "principled" line. Counting British and French nuclear systems in any INF agreement is a matter of "principle." For a long time, paying more than 6% on borrowed funds was also one, with the result that the Soviets would knowingly pay a higher price than market on a contract so that the supplier could provide a lower nominal interest rate. In real terms, the lower rate was an illusion, and they knew it, but the "principle" itself was important enough to them to insist upon it.

The underlying Soviet attitude toward compromise explains in part some of their foreign policy blunders. They probably genuinely expected the rest of the world to see their withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations in 1983 as a noble defense of principle, even if it was a principle the outsiders did not agree with. They must have realized very quickly that it was an error but once they had taken the step, they had to readjust their "principles" before they could correct it. Thus the maneuvering in advance of the Geneva meeting last January, and the insistence at that time that the renewed negotiations be characterized as entirely new.

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Pride, Face and Status

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Nor do they allow the xenophobic strain in much of their thinking -- and much of the propaganda -- to affect personal ties with individuals. West Germans often are amazed by the warmth and hospitality shown them by Russians when they visit the Soviet Union, given Russian memories of World War II. Many Germans have told me that they are treated better in Leningrad than in Paris by the man on the street.

For all their sensitivity to criticism in public, Russians expect it in private, so long as it does not seem gratuitous or damaging to their sense of national dignity. In fact, the foreigner who tries to curry favor by praising everything Soviet earns only their contempt; such praise is considered insincere, and often patronizing and condescending to boot. (Of course, they like praise of those things they are genuinely proud of, such as their heroism in World War II, Shostakovich's music or Voznesensky's poetry, but not of the things they know very well do not merit praise.)

Their deepest contempt, however, is reserved for those foreigners who try to ingratiate themselves by running down their own country. This the Russians simply do not understand -- in their eyes the foreigner should stand up for his country just as a Russian would for his own -- and if he does not do so, he is considered morally defective. This attitude, of course, does not prevent them from using such persons for propaganda purposes, but Russians, official or otherwise, really have no respect for them.

This attitude applies in particular to members of communist parties in Western Europe and the U.S. In 1976 we sponsored a major exhibition on American life in Moscow to mark the Bicentennial of American Independence. It was an election year, and one section of the exhibit had a real voting machine and the Soviet visitors were encouraged to go in and cast a mock ballot. The slate used was taken from New York and the American Communist Party was on the ballot.

Almost nobody voted the CP slate (if memory serves, there were perhaps three of four votes for the communists out of thousands cast). Almost all Soviet visitors voted for either Ford or Carter. Our American guides conducted a bit of exit polling at the exhibit, asking visitors how they had voted. Once in a while they would ask why the visitor had not voted for the communists. Sometimes that question only elicited a discreet shrug, but several Soviet visitors were brutally frank, making statements like, "If I were an American, do you think I'd vote for those clowns?" or "Do you think I want America to have a mess like we have here?" So much for Marxist "proletarian solidarity"!

Unfortunately, these appealing Russian traits of personal openness and candor are all too often submerged under the repressive lid of the police state. But when the regime tries to suppress these traits, it is moving against, rather than with, the Russian cultural tradition. Whenever the lid is slightly raised, the traditional behavior spurts forth, all the more vehemently for having been constrained.

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The contradictory pull of the various urges, hang-ups and ideological imperatives at work in Soviet Russian minds and emotions tends to make Soviet behavior not only unpredictable to the outsider, but unpredictable for Russians themselves.

Michael Vozlensky, a former member of the Soviet elite who defected in the early 1970's and has written a classic work on the Soviet ruling class, commented recently that those who think the Soviet leaders operate in accord with a careful plan of action have it all wrong. "Everything is decided ad hoc," he maintained. "They don't know themselves what they are going to do next. But they will always claim that they had it in mind all along."

He may be right.

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