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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (4/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1005

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7515	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PREPARING FOR THE GENEVA MEETING <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	2	7/18/1985	B1
7516	DRAFT NSDD	MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7517	MEMO	WHITE HOUSE COORDINATING GROUP FOR GENEVA <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7518	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON GORBACHEV <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	3	7/18/1985	B1
7519	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	4	ND	B1
7521	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE'S AGREEMENT TO MEET IN HELSINKI, NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	7/15/1985	B1
7522	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (4/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1005

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7520	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE STATE MEMO--LETTER TO GORBACHEV <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	7/16/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Preparing for the Geneva Meeting

In order to establish the necessary coherence to our negotiations and public presentation of our policies during the run-up to the President's Geneva meeting, I believe that we need an authoritative statement for the bureaucracy regarding the President's view of the context of the meeting and procedures to be followed in coordinating preparations.

The most effective way to do this would be with an NSDD signed by the President, which would also serve to signal the President's active command of the process despite his operation.

I have tried my hand at drafting such a document, which is at Tab I. At this point it has not been cleared with anyone. If you think such a directive would be useful, I will welcome any comments you may have on the substance and any guidance as to what, if any, coordination you would like me to undertake before putting it into final form.

You will note that it provides very stringent guidance on dealing with the press. Perhaps this is quixotic, but I believe it would be useful for the President to go on record with the bureaucracy regarding the need for discipline in this area. I believe that we can arrange procedures for orderly clearance of requests to background the media, by working with Karna and the White House and State press offices.

Aside from the provisions regarding public statements and backgrounding, the principal action item is the creation of a White House Coordinating Group, which I would chair. I believe this is necessary, since we do not at present have a handle on all that is going on, and the monitoring process will become even more critical as we get closer to November. If establishment of this group formally in an NSDD is likely to create bureaucratic problems, it could be established in more informal fashion, or simply by a memo from you. The question is whether it needs or should have the explicit authority of the President behind it. I have no strong feelings on this score; the main thing is to have a mechanism which works.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2#7515
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

At Tab II, I have added a further explanation of how I would envision the Coordination Group, and what sort of composition I have in mind. I have not suggested a representative from Defense -- and this may cause problems -- because I know of no official there who formally has the "Soviet" portfolio. Operationally, I do not believe a DOD representation is essential, since their concerns are adequately covered by the regular interagency structure. However, DOD representation may be politically desirable, and if you consider it so, I would appreciate your thoughts on an appropriate candidate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve, amend or comment on the draft NSDD at Tab I.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

2. If you approve the idea, that you indicate what sort of clearance you would like me to undertake before putting it into final form:

a. Clear with following: _____

OR

b. Don't bother, I'll take care of any clearances needed: _____

Attachments:

Tab I Draft NSDD

Tab II Suggested Functions and Composition of White House Coordinating Group

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SYSTEM II
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3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DRAFT NSDD

MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA

As we prepare for my meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva November 19-20, it will be important for personnel of all agencies active in the sphere of U.S.-Soviet relations to understand clearly the context of the meeting and United States objectives.

I invited the Soviet leader to a meeting as soon as he assumed his position, because I consider it important for the leaders of the two most powerful nations to know each other and to establish a dialogue which can assist us in managing a relationship which is inevitably adversarial but which must be conducted in a manner which minimizes the possibility of direct military conflict between us.

Accordingly, the primary purpose of the meeting will be to establish personal contact and, if possible, to develop an agenda for negotiations to be undertaken in the future. The meeting will not be a substitute for negotiations in normal channels, nor is its aim the signing of formal agreements. It should rather be viewed as part of an ongoing process of dialogue with the Soviet leadership, which can give direction and momentum to our negotiating efforts.

Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in various areas should continue to be conducted on their merits, and should neither be hastened nor delayed because of my upcoming meeting. While I do not preclude the possibility of signing or announcing possible agreements which may be reached during the intervening period in the normal course of negotiation, this is not the purpose of the meeting, and the planned meeting should under no circumstances be allowed to influence the United States negotiating position.

Since historically public expectations for meetings between American and Soviet leaders have been inflated and have led to a damaging cycle of euphoria and then disillusionment, it will be important to convey to the public a realistic picture of the context in which my meeting will take place. In particular, nothing should be said to encourage the expectation that the meeting will result in a fundamental change in the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, or in major agreements. This must be done, however, without denigrating the importance of the meeting or of kindling suspicions that the United States is not serious in its efforts to resolve problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 # 7516

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

Given the importance of maintaining a clear and consistent treatment of U.S.-Soviet relations in our public statements and public diplomacy, it is imperative for all U.S. Government officials to adhere totally to the press guidance established by my own statements and those approved by the Secretary of State or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. No other official is authorized to originate public statements regarding the Geneva meeting, or to provide comment in background briefings which goes beyond statements made publically by the White House or Department of State. Should public statements or background briefings by other U.S. Government officials on particular aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations seem desirable, they may be undertaken only following the written approval of either the White House, Department of State, or National Security Council press offices.

In this connection, I am compelled to note that our negotiating position continues to be undermined by unauthorized, and often inaccurate or distorted information provided to the public media by anonymous government officials. It will be particularly important in the months ahead to put a stop to this damaging practice, and I would remind every agency head that it is part of his executive responsibility to control access to sensitive information in a manner which insures its integrity from unauthorized disclosure.

Issues under negotiation with the Soviet Union will continue to be staffed in the normal interagency process, culminating in the National Security Council or National Security Planning Group.

To insure that the various strands of U.S.-Soviet relations are properly coordinated for presentation to these cabinet-level bodies, I hereby establish a White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting, with the following mandate:

1. To monitor and insure consistency of substantive preparations for the meeting in Geneva, except for those which come under the aegis of the Senior Arms Control Group.
2. To coordinate policy guidance for public handling of issues related to the meeting in Geneva.
3. To provide liaison with the White House Advance Office and other units responsible for arrangements and logistics in respect to substantive implications of arrangements for the meeting.

The White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting will operate under the Chairmanship of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack F. Matlock, and will include representatives designated by the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence and such other officials as the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary.

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BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

WHITE HOUSE COORDINATING GROUP FOR GENEVA MEETING

Function

To provide a central point for planning, monitoring and coordinating all U.S.-Soviet activities leading up to the meeting in Geneva, with the exception of arms control issues which will continue to be worked in the SACG structure. However, the coordinating committee will take note of activity in the arms control area and will ensure that other activities are conducted with appropriate regard for and synchronization with activities in the arms control area.

Operating Assumptions

The Coordinating Group will work with and not supplant existing interdepartmental groups. Members will be those who head units in the USG with particular responsibility for planning, executing and coordinating issues related to the Geneva meeting.

Proposed Composition of Coordinating Group

Chairman: Matlock

NSC Participation: Martin or Pearson
Small
Steiner
Linhard
Cobb
Chris Lehman or Ron Sable

Other White House: Djeredjian
Henkel or Hooley

State: Burt/Ridgway
Palmer
Simons (who would act as Executive Secretary)

CIA: Gates
Ermarth
Senior Analyst

Others: Most other agencies are probably represented adequately in the various interagency groups which the persons named above can represent or speak for. (DOD, for example, is mainly interested in the arms control issues, which will be worked in the SACG structure, and Linhard can provide the link to that. Similarly, Commerce is well integrated in the IG structure and ICUSA chaired by State.)

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However, if the need becomes clear, we can add other persons or bring in specific officials when subjects under their purview are up for discussion.

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National Security Council
The White House

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81 JUL 18 P 2: 31

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	
William Martin	2		
John Poindexter	3		
Paul Thompson	4		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
William Martin	6	um	
NSC Secretariat	7	BT	return to MATLOCK for further action.
Situation Room	8		Close hold. A

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

This is a very good letter.
[Signature]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 18, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRRF06-114/2 #7518

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Regarding the State Memo with a draft of a letter from the President to Gorbachev and your profs note on the subject, the background is as follows:

The President now has two unanswered letters from Gorbachev, one of June 10 which was in reply to his long letter which touched on items on the entire agenda, and one of June 22 in reply to the President's letter on his interim restraint decision (copies are at Tabs IV and V). Pursuant to your decision, State was also tasked to prepare the invitation to send nuclear testing experts to our test site in the form of a Presidential letter. They felt, and I concur, that it would not be a good idea for the President to send a letter on this subject and ignore the unanswered letters he has received.

As for the non-paper, I don't believe State considered the President's letter as an answer to it. Rick in effect answered it on the spot when he told Sokolov that it was acceptable to us.

COMMENT:

I believe it is appropriate for the President to react to the Gorbachev letters of June 10 and 22 when he makes his nuclear testing proposal. However, I agree with you that the State draft is defective in some basic aspects. First, it does not really answer the two Gorbachev letters. And second, as you point out, by concentrating on the possibility of agreements in advance of the Geneva meeting, it is likely to leave the impression that we are panting for them.

I have redrafted the letter totally, except for the section on nuclear testing which I have left intact. In doing so, I have tried to do several things: (1) Answer some of the more egregious claims made by Gorbachev in his letters, since the Soviets tend to consider failure to answer charges as tacit confirmation of their accuracy; (2) Avoid extensive and detailed polemics, while reserving the President's position on all those matters not mentioned; (3) Include the testing invitation in the context of meeting an expressed Soviet concern, with the

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Declassify on: OADR

suggestion that Gorbachev must show comparable regard for the concerns we have expressed; (4) Eliminate all talk of possible agreements before the Geneva meeting, while leaving the door open - for some if the Soviets wish; (5) Put the Geneva meeting in the context of an agenda-setting exercise.

This redraft is at Tab I. I believe it meets your concerns. I would note, however, that I have not shown it to State, and anticipate a good bit of pain when they see it. (They will cite the last paragraph of Gorbachev's letter of June 10, in which he expressed an interest in using the time before November "to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting". In my opinion, however, we should just let this stand and let the Soviets move toward some agreements if they really want them.)

Before spreading my draft further, I will need your reaction -- and your instructions in this regard. Perhaps it would be best, if you concur that my redraft is preferable, to deal directly with Secretary Shultz on the matter. I believe that it allows the Secretary full scope to discuss the whole range of issues with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, but at the same time positions the President well tactically. In effect, he will be saying, if you guys want some agreements, you know what you have to do. It's no skin off my back if you hang in tough and we don't have any for the meeting in November.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve or amend the draft at Tab I, subject to any coordination you may direct.

Approve *RCM exactly* Disapprove ____

2. That you approve my coordinating the arms control sections with Bob Linhard.

Approve *RCM* Disapprove ____

3. That you either handle the State clearance directly with Shultz, or authorize me to provide the draft to Rick Burt.

A. I'll handle with Shultz ____

OR

B. Supply the draft to Rick and get their reaction

*DOZ as of 7/19
but elevate it
quickly! RCM
this week.*

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-3-

Attachments:

Tab I	Matlock redraft of Presidential Letter
Tab II	Memo and draft from State
Tab III	Your profs note
Tab IV	Gorbachev letter of June 10
Tab V	Gorbachev letter of June 22

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

11 I

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated your kind message following my recent operation, and am pleased to assure you that my recovery is proceeding rapidly. Actually, the necessary cancellation of my public activities planned for this period allows me more time than I otherwise would have had to concentrate my attention on substantive issues, including those which have been part of our dialogue.

I have given the most careful attention to your letters of June 10 and June 22. Obviously, our views are still far apart on the practical aspects of most of the key issues facing us, and I believe that both of us will wish to pursue these matters in greater detail when we meet in November. Since we will be meeting before the end of the year, I will confine my comment at this time to a few observations which I hope may help us prepare for a constructive and productive meeting.

To be frank, my overall impression from your letters is that you have not yet seriously addressed many of the matters of deep concern to me which I have noted in our correspondence. It is encouraging to have general assurances of the Soviet Union's benign intentions in various areas of our relationship, and I can assure you with utter sincerity that the United States in no way threatens the security of the Soviet Union. However, as you wisely note, "in matters affecting the heart of national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of good intentions." If we are to narrow our differences and prepare the way for significant agreements, we must both be prepared to deal, in explicit and concrete terms, with the concerns of the other.

In regard to those issues you have raised with me, I have tried and will continue to try to explain the situation as we see it. If you feel you need more details to understand my view more fully, I will be pleased to supply them. At the same time I hope that you will give further study to those matters I have mentioned to you and will be prepared to deal with them in concrete fashion.

Reading your letter of March 10, I was astounded to note your allegation that the United States is developing "a new strategic weapon" to be deployed in space, as well as your statement that lasers could be used as disarming first-strike weapons and your subsequent charge that the United States is developing space weapons "capable of performing purely offensive missions." Mr. General Secretary, our scientists have informed me repeatedly that no element of our Strategic Defense Initiative is capable of application to weapons of mass destruction or to weapons which would be effective against hardened point targets

on earth such as missile silos. Now I am not debating intentions here (even though our intent is clear to confine our research to the feasibility of defensive weapons), but am referring rather to hard scientific and technical facts as I understand them.

If our scientists really disagree on these points, I would appreciate concrete examples of what specific aspects of a program to investigate the feasibility of defense against missiles which have been launched could be distorted to produce an offensive weapon capable either of mass destruction on earth or of use in a disarming first strike. Alternatively, we could arrange for our specialists to meet for a thorough discussion of this very point. If there is such a possibility, it would certainly be incumbent on both of us to act to preclude its realization in practice.

Since we have agreed to be candid, I must also tell you that the argument that Soviet research programs in the same scientific areas as those in our Strategic Defense Initiative are somehow fundamentally different from ours can hardly be expected to be persuasive to an impartial observer. As I see it, the only difference in our respective approaches to this research results from differences in our political systems. Ours requires us to debate every program in public; yours does not. Yet the research is in the same scientific areas, and I can perceive no basis for a claim that such research is destabilizing only when it is conducted by the American side. Have we not agreed to deal on the basis of equality?

So let us now finally get down to particulars and try to find a solution to the interrelated issues of offensive and defensive weapons. We will not find a mutually acceptable solution by recourse to propaganda or refusal to enter into the concrete bargaining necessary to realize our mutual goal of setting the world on a course toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In respect to your letter of June 22, I can only say that it does not alleviate the concerns over compliance with past agreements which I described to you in my letter of June 10. I hope that the two of us and our representatives will find the way soon to address and resolve these concerns in specific fashion, since resolution of these questions is a key element in making progress on equitable arms reduction.

I am, of course, prepared to address your concerns as well, and have a suggestion which I believe would lay to rest one of the issues which your government has raised with us. This is in the area of nuclear testing.

As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the test site in the United States, and

for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985, exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the Soviet Government says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices they deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure that there are no obstacles posed by the United States which would make acceptance difficult. I believe it will be a useful step if we can eliminate the concerns the Soviet side has expressed on this matter and initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

There are of course many other important issues on our agenda, and I am pleased that our Foreign Ministers will be

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meeting in Helsinki, and subsequently in New York to address them. I also hope to have the opportunity to discuss them personally with Minister Shevardnadze when he is in the United States this fall.

I am looking forward to our meeting in Geneva and believe that we should aim to draw up a joint agenda for steps to be taken to improve the relationship of our countries. If we can also agree upon mutually acceptable approaches to be followed by our negotiators on some of the important issues between us, that would be most helpful. In the meantime, it may be that some headway can be made on several of the issues that divide us, and if so, I would certainly welcome it.

Nevertheless, I feel that the value of our upcoming meeting should not be measured by the presence or absence of agreements to conclude, but rather by the degree to which it can contribute to narrowing our differences in critical areas and charting a course for constructive action in the future.

I will continue to give serious thought to the considerations you have raised in our correspondence, and hope that you will do the same in respect to the concerns I have voiced and the various suggestions I have made. As we prepare for our meeting I hope you will continue to call to my attention those matters which you feel I should address, just as I will be communicating my thoughts to you. This should assist us both in ensuring that our meeting is as constructive and productive as possible.

Sincerely,

14



SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8590774

RECEIVED 16 JUL 85 12

TO

McFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 15 JUL 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/18/02

KEYWORDS. USSR

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

SHEVARDNADZE, EDWARD

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV & FOMIN SHEVARDNADZE AGREEMENT TO MEET W/
SHULTZ IN HELSINKI / NEW YORK & WASHINGTON

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 18 JUL 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
William Martin			
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin	2	<i>Wm</i>	<i>I</i>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<i>MATLOCK</i>	3		<i>A</i>

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)



United States Department of State *9*

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90774

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze's Agreement to Meet in
Helsinki, New York and Washington

We attach at Tab 1 a draft text of the President's next letter to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. The letter reviews briefly the key issues on which the U.S. and USSR should focus in the months leading up to the November summit meeting in Geneva. It discusses the Geneva talks, the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on regional political issues, and our human rights concerns. It also identifies bilateral issues where prospects for early progress are most promising. In this context, the letter conveys the President's invitation for the Soviet Union to send technical experts to the Nevada Test Site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test.

Tab 2 is a Soviet non-paper given to Assistant Secretary Burt July 15 by Soviet Charge Oleg Sokolov. It conveys Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's agreement to meet with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki on July 31 from 2:00 to 5:00 p.m. The non-paper also expresses Shevardnadze's readiness to meet with Secretary Shultz in New York at the UN General Assembly this autumn and Shevardnadze's acceptance of the President's invitation to visit Washington for a meeting at the White House. These Soviet decisions have been reflected in the draft letter to Gorbachev.

Bonickmiley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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NLS *F06 714/2 #7521*
BY *LOT* NARA, DATE *11/21/07*

20

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Draft Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am pleased that we have now agreed to meet in Geneva November 19 and 20. I am looking forward to the opportunity to talk with you privately about the issues affecting our two countries. I am hopeful that we will be able to use that meeting productively for the improvement of relations between our two countries.

My approach to the Geneva meeting will be characterized by the same sense of realism and candor which has characterized our correspondence. I think we should use the time we have before November to look hard at our relationship. We should look carefully at the entire range of issues that we have been discussing and identify those areas where problems can be resolved and those areas where our discussions can clarify differences and identify possible solutions.

Secretary Shultz, in his July 3 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, discussed a number of issues on which we believe progress can be made between now and our meeting in November. Some of these issues are well known to you, but we think they deserve a fresh look. I hope the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki July 31 at the ceremonies commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act will be useful in carrying the exchange of views further. I also look forward to meeting at the White House this autumn with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, following his meeting with Secretary Shultz at the UN General Assembly.

I would like in this letter to review very briefly some of the key issues on which we should focus during the coming months. Clearly the central issues that we must address are the current negotiations in Geneva. We have tried to make every effort to promote progress in those talks -- to build up rather than tear down the current arms control regime. It was on this basis that I made my recent decision to continue our policy of not undercutting the SALT II agreement. I have to say I was disappointed in your reply. I believe, however, that this is an issue which can be discussed further when our Ministers meet at Helsinki and later. As I have written before, we need to correct the non-compliance with existing agreements and find new, radical ways to reduce the levels of nuclear arms, as our Foreign Ministers agreed in January in Geneva.

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At Geneva itself we continue to believe that artificial preconditions should be dropped and concrete bargaining should begin. In January our sides agreed to consider and resolve nuclear and space arms issues in their interrelationship. This does not mean, however, that progress on offensive nuclear arms issues should be held up pending agreement on defense and space arms. I think we should at least agree to allow our diplomats to get on with their work in the individual negotiating groups.

In this connection, I think it appropriate that during the upcoming recess period we each should reflect on discussions that took place during Round II of our negotiations with a view to moving those negotiations forward. I hope that should Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be prepared to meet with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki, he will be prepared to elaborate on your views in this area. The Secretary will be accompanied by our senior arms control advisors and will be prepared to address in a concrete fashion this entire range of questions.

Another arms control issue on which I believe we can move forward in the months ahead is nuclear testing. As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the United States' test site, and for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985 exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the government of the Soviet Union says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

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I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices you deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure there are no obstacles from the U.S. side to its acceptance. I believe it would be a useful step, if in the months ahead we can initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

Let me turn to several non-arms control issues. During the past two months our experts have held talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan. I think the tenor of these meetings has demonstrated the usefulness of this dialogue. On Afghanistan, in particular, I believe the talks underscored the recognition on both sides that the situation in that tragic country is an ongoing problem in our relations. As our experts indicated in their presentation, we continue to be ready to discuss concrete steps that can contribute to the UN Secretary General's efforts to develop a negotiated solution. With regard to further regional experts' talks Secretary Shultz will be prepared in Helsinki to discuss scheduling an exchange on East Asian issues.

As we look to our meeting in November, there is no area in our relationship where the prospects for early progress are more promising than in the bilateral field. With the necessary political will we can take several important steps in the near future. In particular, we should authorize our negotiators at the upcoming third round of talks on Pacific air safety measures in Japan to finalize an agreement. There is no reason why existing differences cannot be resolved at this round. Satisfactory conclusion of a Pacific air safety agreement should open up possibilities for progress in other areas, such as civil aviation, and the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York.

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I also believe that prompt decisions at the political level can resolve the remaining outstanding issues in our negotiations of a new exchanges agreement. We are both agreed that expanded contacts between our two peoples are in the long-term interest of both countries. There is no need for further delay in realizing our mutual goals in this area.

Let me conclude with a few words concerning the comments in your June 10 letter on humanitarian issues. This is a topic with a long history in our relations. We have different approaches, but in the past it has proven possible through quiet efforts to deal with such issues in ways that benefitted both countries. I do not expect the differences in our approaches to be resolved quickly or easily. But perhaps the time has come again to focus on practical ways of dealing with each other's concerns. It seems to me that the period between now and our meeting in November should be a period of opportunity for progress in this field as in other areas of US-Soviet relations.

I would like to ask that you focus on this field with a view to determining how it too could contribute to the forward step in relations I think we both desire. As Secretary Shultz told Ambassador Dobrynin last week, it is not a question of negotiating, or of asking you to violate your laws, or of taking impossible steps on matters of great sensitivity. Rather, it is a question of taking feasible steps that can have a significant impact on the way we deal with each other across the agenda of issues before us.

You are familiar with the kinds of concerns we have identified in the past. I would ask you to give special attention to three of them. First, there is the question of Soviet spouses of American citizens who are repeatedly refused permission to unite their families in the United States. Second, there is the question of long-time applicants for exit permission to go to the United States who have a claim to US citizenship under our law. Third, there is the question of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who have been invited to join relatives abroad and have been refused permission to do so, at great hardship to them and their families, over the years. The first two categories are quite small, the last quite large. It might not be possible in a relatively short time to do more than resolve all the cases in the first two and make some headway in the third. But if that were indeed possible, I can assure you that the effect on our overall relationship would be substantial, and positive.

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Mr. General Secretary, we have an important, historic opportunity to put our relationship on a sound footing, sustainable for the long term. Our agenda is full of proposals which, if realized, can form the substance of a more constructive relationship. As we prepare for our meeting in November, I hope we can agree to move forward across a broad front.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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Edward A. Shevardnadze accepts the suggestion of the Secretary of State that they meet in Helsinki from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. on July 31. In view of the busy schedule of other functions, there will be definitely no possibility to have a second conversation there. For the same reasons, unfortunately, this time a lunch mentioned by the Secretary of State, does not appear possible either.

As to the range of issues, we proceed from the assumption that a general exchange of views will take place on the questions of Soviet-American relations and, perhaps, on certain international problems.

It would seem that there will be an opportunity for a more specific and detailed conversation when the Ministers meet in New York in late September. We are, certainly, in favor of continuing the practice of such meetings of the Ministers in the course of the General Assembly sessions.

Edward A. Shevardnadze expresses his gratitude for the invitation to visit Washington for a conversation with President Reagan and he hopes to take up this invitation.

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NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: State memo--Letter to Gorbachev

The following are my thoughts concerning the State proposal for a letter from the President to Gorbachev. First, I'm not sure where the Reagan-Gorbachev dialogue stands; that is, who wrote last? Was it the President's letter on SALT "no undercut" or Gorbachev's reply to the April 30 RR letter? I tend to think that they crossed in the mail. Whatever] But if it is our turn to reply to Gorbachev then OK, but if it's their's, we should not send a Presidential letter and maybe not even if it is our turn.

As to substance, the Shultz answer to the Shevardnadze non-paper ought to go pack as a non-paper. And it ought to be short and sweet. That is, we ought to say--probably in an oral note to Sokolov this week--roger your last and we'll see you in Helsinki.

As we prepare for Geneva in November we must resist the temptation to force the pace of negotiation on the several fronts. Our stance is that this is a meeting to set an agenda not to conclude agreements.

Finally in any Presidential letter we might send, we ought not be laying out the laundry list of issues in the four areas with the view toward making progress beteen now and November--THAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG--and is the surest sign to them that we are panting to get some kind of agreement (and implicitly, that they can leverage our overanxiousness against us). The worst possible way to negotiate]] Any letter ought simply to say that the President looks to the meeting as an occasion for setting an agenda and priorities and possibly a game plan for moving on the several issues in the years ahead--period. I wouldn't even advert to the possiblity of reaching agreements before then--surely no more than to say "...it may be that some headway may be possible before we meet but I don't think that is essential, especially given your preoccupation with other matters now." Please pass this to Jack and ask that he staff this promptly.

cc: NSGVE --CPUA

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TAB IV

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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
The President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 10, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I noted the intention expressed in your letter of April 30 to share thoughts in our correspondence with complete frankness. This is also my attitude. Only in this manner can we bring to each other the essence of our respective approaches to the problems of world politics and bilateral relations. In this regard I proceed from the assumption that in exchanging views we shall look to the need to move forward on key issues, otherwise one cannot count on a turn for the better in Soviet-American relations. I understand that you agree, too, that such a turn for the better is necessary.

To aim at a lesser goal, say, at simply containing tensions within certain bounds and trying somehow to manage from one crisis to another, is not, in my opinion, a prospect worthy of our two powers.

We noted the fact that you share our view on the need to give an impetus to the process of normalizing our relations. That, in and of itself, is not insignificant. But to be candid: a number of points in your letter perplex and puzzle, and those are the points on which a special stress is made.

What I mean is the generalizations about Soviet policy, contained in your letter, in connection with the deplorable incident with an American serviceman. As to the incident itself, we would like to hope that the explanations which were given by us were correctly understood by the American side.

Now turning to major problems. I also believe that agreement with regard to general principles alone is not sufficient. It is important that such agreement also be reflected in the practical actions of each side. I emphasize precisely each side, since it clearly follows from your letter that you see disparities between the principles and practice in the actions of the Soviet Union.

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That is very far from reality. There is nothing corresponding to the facts in the assertion that the USSR in its policy allegedly does not wish to conduct affairs with the U.S. on the basis of equality and reciprocity. No matter what area of our relations is taken, a really objective assessment indicates that it is precisely the Soviet Union that comes out consistently for equality and reciprocity and does not seek advantages for itself at the expense of the legitimate interests of the USA. And it was precisely when a similar approach was taken by the American side, too, that substantial agreements could be achieved.

It is not an accident that all agreements reached on the subject of arms limitation became possible only because both sides adhered in working them out to the principle of equality and equal security. At no point in time did the Soviet side demand more for itself. But as soon as the USA departed from that principle, the process of arms limitation and reduction was interrupted. Regrettably, this continues to be the case at present, too.

If, nevertheless, the question of equality and reciprocity is to be raised as a matter of principle, then it is the Soviet Union that is surrounded by American military bases, replete with nuclear weapons, rather than the USA by Soviet bases. Try to look at the situation through our eyes, then it will become clear who can have a real, substantiated concern.

Take practically any issue from the sphere of our bilateral relations, whether trade or, for example, air or sea communication. Is it, in fact, the case that the actual state of affairs in those areas is determined by the Soviet Union's being against equality and reciprocity? Quite the contrary: the low level of those relations is a direct consequence of the American side's policy, which is not compatible either with conducting affairs as equals or with reciprocity in the generally recognized meanings of these concepts.

Or take the following aspect of the question of principles and adherence to them. With regard to third countries, we impose neither our ideology nor our social system on anybody. One should not ascribe to us that which does not exist. If the question is to be raised without diplomatic contrivances as to who contributes to international law and order and who acts in a different direction, then it appears that it is precisely the US that turns out to be on the side of groupings working against legitimate governments. And what about direct pressure on governments whose policy does not suit the USA? There are enough examples of both on various continents.

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I addressed these issues frankly and in a rather detailed manner not to embark upon the road of mutual recriminations, but, rather, in the hope that it will help you to understand correctly our approach to principles and their practical implementation, and to appreciate our willingness to build our relations with the USA on the basis of equality and reciprocity with a positive and common understanding of these concepts.

I think a lot about the shape the affairs between our countries can take. And I ever more firmly believe in a point I made in my previous letter: an improvement in the relations between the USSR and USA is possible. There is objective ground for that.

Of course, our countries are different. This fact cannot be changed. There is also another fact, however: when the leaders of both countries, as the experience of the past shows, found in themselves enough wisdom and realism to overcome bias caused by the difference in social systems, in ideologies, we cooperated successfully and did quite a few useful things both for our peoples and for all other peoples. Of course, differences and different views remained, but it was our working together that was the determining factor. And it opened up confident, peaceful vistas.

I noted you also express yourself in favor of each social system's proving its advantages in peaceful competition. Yes, we proceed from the assumption that in this competition the USSR and USA will defend their ideals and moral values as each of our societies understands them. But it will result in nothing good if the ideological struggle should be carried over into the sphere of relations between states. I believe, you understand, what I mean.

The main conclusion that naturally follows from the mutual recognition of the need for peaceful competition is the need to renounce attempts to substitute the dispute of ideas with the dispute of weapons. One can hardly count on serious shifts in the nature of our relations so long as one side tries to gain advantages over the other on the path of the arms race - to talk with the other side "from a position of strength".

Mr. President, for understandable reasons the political leadership of both our countries must judge in a competent manner both existing and prospective weapons systems. This is extremely important in order to avoid miscalculations whose irreversible consequences will manifest themselves, if not today, then at some point in the future.

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In the past a rigid but at the same time quite fragile relationship was jointly defined between strategic nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems. The only correct conclusion was drawn - a treaty of indefinite duration to limit ABM systems was concluded. Only because of that did it become at all possible to tackle as a practical matter the problem of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

Attempts to develop a large-scale ABM system inevitably set in train a radical destabilization of the situation. Just the factor of uncertainty in and of itself will not only block any limitation of nuclear weapons, but will lead to their build-up and improvement. Therefore, when we resolutely raise the question, and state that the militarization of space is impermissible, it is not propaganda and not a consequence of some misunderstanding or fear of "falling behind technologically." It is a result of a thorough analysis, of our deep concern for the future of relations between our countries, and for the future of peace.

There is also another aspect of the program of "strategic defense" which remains as it were in a shadow for the general public. But not for responsible leaders and military experts. They talk in Washington about the development of a large-scale ABM system, but in fact a new strategic offensive weapon is being developed to be deployed in space. And it is a weapon no less dangerous in its capabilities than nuclear weapons. What difference does it make what will be used in a disarming first strike--ballistic missiles or lasers? If there is a difference, it is that with the new systems it will be possible to carry out a first strike practically instantaneously.

Thus, from no matter what point of view you approach it, the mere beginning of efforts to realize this program has a destabilizing character, even regardless of its final results. And it is precisely for this reason that it cannot fail to serve as an impetus to a further upswing of the arms race.

I think you will agree that in matters affecting the heart of national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of good intentions. Any weapons system is evaluated by its military capabilities, and not by public statements regarding its intended purpose.

All facts unambiguously indicate that the USA is embarking on the path of developing attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions. And we shall not ignore that. I must say this frankly. I must confess that what you have said about the USA's approach to the question of a

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moratorium on space and nuclear weapons enhances our concern. The persistent refusal of the American side to stop the arms race cannot but put in question the USA's intentions.

And what is going on at the negotiations in Geneva? The American side is trying to substitute only a part of the agreed mandate of the negotiations for the whole of it. An integral element is being removed from the actually agreed upon formula for the negotiations - the obligation to prevent an arms race in space, to consider and resolve all issues in their interrelationship. The American side has so far done nothing to bring agreement closer. On the subject of preventing an arms race in space the U.S. delegation has not presented a single idea. I emphasize, not a single one. Why should one be surprised after that, why indeed, that there is no movement on nuclear arms reduction?

I wish to mention in passing that the American representatives maintain - this point is also contained in your letter - that it is impossible to verify a ban on scientific research. However, a different thing is involved here: a federal program of research activities directly and specifically oriented towards the development of attack space weapons, a large-scale ABM system with space-based components. The very announcement of such a program is in clear contradiction to the ABM Treaty. (Incidentally, if one is to take the entire text of the "agreed statement" to the ABM Treaty, and not only the part which is quoted in your letter, it is easy to see that it is aimed not at weakening but at strengthening the central provision of the treaty on both sides' renunciation of the development of large-scale ABM systems).

As to the assertions that the USSR is allegedly engaged in its own "large scale research program in the area of strategic defense", here, as Americans put it, apples are being confused with oranges. The Soviet Union is doing nothing that would contravene the ABM Treaty; it is not developing attack space weapons.

Thus, the question of verification is in this case a far-fetched question, if one is clearly to proceed from the premise that nothing can be done - no matter what names one can come up with for it - that is unambiguously prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Mr. President, I would like to hope that you will have another close look at the problem of non-militarization of space, at its interrelationship with solving the problem of nuclear weapons, and from that angle, at the prospects for the

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Geneva negotiations. It is in this objective linkage that there lies a resolution of the problems of the limitation of nuclear arms, a real possibility to get down to their radical reduction and thereby to proceed to the liquidation of nuclear weapons as such. In any case we shall not be able to avoid having precisely this complex of issues as a determining factor both for our relations and for the situation in the world as a whole. This follows from the special responsibility of our two countries.

I am convinced that we must and can rise to this responsibility. In this connection I note with satisfaction your words to the effect that our two countries have a common interest prevailing over other things - to avoid war. I fully agree with that.

Now, with regard to what other steps could be taken, including steps to stimulate progress in Geneva, we are convinced that of very important - and practical - significance would be the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. In this area a lot can be done by our two countries. Specifically, we propose the following practical steps. To put into effect the hitherto unratified Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976. To come to terms on the resumption of trilateral - with the participation of Britain - negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and, acting vigorously, to work towards their speedy and successful conclusion. Finally, we propose that the USSR and USA cooperate in carrying out such a specific and very substantial step on the part of all nuclear powers as a moratorium on any nuclear explosions would be. We are in favor of introducing such a moratorium as soon as possible.

The problem of prohibiting chemical weapons needs to be resolved. But its resolution should be sought realistically. I must say that the positions which the USA has so far had on a number of important aspects of this problem do not meet this criterion. We would like the American side to turn its attention to the proposals we have put forward. We agree that bilateral consultations between our representatives would be useful, for example, within the framework of the Geneva Conference on disarmament. It should be recognized, however, that the efforts which are being made in the USA for chemical rearmament, above all as concerns binary weapons, are not a favorable prerequisite at all for removing chemical weapons completely and forever from the military arsenals of states.

The state of things at the Stockholm Conference leaves one with an ambiguous impression. On the one hand, it would seem

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that there is common understanding regarding the need for an agreement on the basis of an optimal combination of major political obligations and military-technical confidence-building measures. On the other hand, the Western representatives, particularly the American representatives, clearly are not in a hurry to fill this understanding with specific, mutually acceptable - I emphasize, mutually acceptable - content. We favor a substantial understanding, genuinely facilitating enhanced confidence. Such are the instructions of our representatives. They are prepared to listen to constructive considerations which the American delegation may have. To put it briefly, we are for working towards a successful conclusion of the conference.

I would like, Mr. President, to draw your attention to the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Sometimes we hear from the American representatives that our proposals made last February "stimulate interest." But it does not show at all at the negotiations themselves. It would seem that reaching agreement on initial reductions of the Soviet and American forces in that area would be in your and in our interests, in the interests of a military relaxation in Europe. Could you look into it to see whether you might find it possible to advance things in this area?

One of the sources of tension in the relations between the USSR and USA is a difference in the assessment of what is going on in the world. It seems that the American side frequently ignores the in-depth causes of events and does not take fully into account the fact that today a great number of states operate - and most actively, too - in world politics, each with its own face and interests. All this immeasurably complicates the general picture. A correct understanding of this would help avoid serious mistakes and miscalculations.

In the past we had a positive experience of joint action in lowering tensions in some areas and in preventing dangerous outbreaks. But it worked this way when a readiness was shown to take into account the legitimate interests of each other and the positions of all the sides involved in a certain situation.

We positively assess the agreement of the American side to have exchanges of views on some regional problems. We expect it to accept our proposal that a wider range of regional problems be the subject of such exchanges and that those exchanges look to seek specific ways of settling tense situations. In this connection I noted the readiness expressed in your letter to work together with the Soviet Union so that the situation around Afghanistan would move toward a peaceful settlement. I would

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like to have a more clear understanding of how the American side sees this. Such an opportunity is provided by the upcoming consultations of our experts.

However, our opinions in this matter as well will be based upon practical deeds of the USA. From the point of view of achieving a political settlement, and not only from that point of view, we cannot accept what you say in your letter with respect to Pakistan. We perceive the behavior of that country not only as not corresponding to the goal of a political settlement around Afghanistan, but also as dangerous and provocative. We expect that the U.S., being closely linked with Pakistan and also taking into account its own interests, will exert a restraining influence on it. The curtailing of its direct support to antigovernment armed groups intruding into Afghanistan from Pakistan would be a positive signal from the American side. In other words the USA has the opportunities to confirm by its actions its declared readiness to achieve a political settlement around Afghanistan on the basis of a just solution of the questions connected with it and to eliminate tensions in this region as a whole. Such a mode of action would not be left unnoticed by our side and would clearly work toward straightening out Soviet-American relations.

Some kind of movement seems to be discernible in the area of strictly bilateral relations between our countries. You, obviously, have noticed that we support this trend. However, there should be no misunderstanding concerning the fact that we do not intend and will not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet Union. We, as any other sovereign state, have regarded and will regard these questions in accordance with our existing laws and regulations. Let us, Mr. President, proceed from this in order not to aggravate additionally our relations. The development of our ties can be based only on mutual interest, equality and mutual benefit, and respect for each other's rights and legitimate interests.

We consider it positive that in some instances the once diffuse structure of Soviet-American relations is beginning - although not very intensively, to be frank - to be restored and to be filled with content. In particular, we consider useful the talks between our ministers of trade which took place in Moscow recently. We intend to look for mutually acceptable solutions in other areas as well, which constitute the subject of discussion between us, and to expand the range of such areas.

It is encouraging that contacts, including those between parliaments of our two countries, have become more active recently. As I have already said to the representatives of the

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US Congress, we live in a time when people shaping the policy of the USSR and the USA must necessarily meet and have contacts with each other. To speak in broad terms, we stand for vigorously building a bridge to mutual understanding and cooperation and for developing trust.

In conclusion, I would like to confirm my positive attitude to a personal meeting with you. I understand that you feel the same way. Our point of view on this matter was outlined by Andrey A. Gromyko to Mr. Shultz during their stay recently in Vienna. As to the place for holding it, I understand there are reasons which make you prefer the meeting to be held in the USA. But I have reasons no less weighty which, taking into account the present state of Soviet-American relations, make this variant unrealistic.

Important international problems are involved and we should use the time to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting. For our part, we entirely favor that such should be the case. .

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

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Translation from the Russian

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with your letter of June 10, in which you outline the U.S. Government's decision on the SALT II Treaty made public the same day, I deem it necessary to express the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership on this matter.

I shall start by stating that your version of the past and present state of affairs in the key areas of Soviet-American relations, that of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, cannot withstand comparison with the actual facts. Evidently, it was not by chance that you chose 1982 as your point of reference, the year when the American side declared its readiness to comply with the main provisions of the SALT II Treaty, unratified by the United States. Unfortunately, however, it was not this that determined the general course of your administration's policy and its practical actions with regard to strategic armaments.

It is hard to avoid the thought that a choice of a different kind had been made earlier, when it was stated outright that you did not consider yourself bound by the obligations assumed by your predecessors under agreements with the Soviet Union. This was perceived by others, and in the United States too, as repudiation of the arms limitations process and the search for agreements.

This was confirmed in practice: an intensive nuclear arms race was initiated in the United States. Precisely through this race, it would seem, and began to see and continues to see to this day the main means for achieving "prevailing" positions in the world under the guise of assuring U.S. national security.

In this sense, the few steps of the American side that you mentioned that went in a different direction and took account of the realities of today's world, are they not just temporary, "interim?"

It is not for the sake of polemics, but in order to restore the full picture of what has occurred, that I would like to return briefly to what has been done by the United States with regard to the current regime for strategic stability.

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One cannot dispute the fact that the American side created an ambiguous situation whereby the SALT II Treaty, one of the pillars of our relationship in the security sphere, was turned into a semi-functioning document that the U.S., moreover, is now threatening to nullify step by step. How can one then talk about predictability of conduct and assess with sufficient confidence the other side's intentions?

It is difficult to evaluate the damage done to our relationship and to international stability as a whole by your administration's decision to break off a process of negotiations that the USSR and the U.S. assumed a legal obligation to conduct. Such an obligation is contained in the very text of the SALT II Treaty, as well as in the accompanying "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms."

The chain ensuring the viability of the process of curbing the arms race, put together through great effort, was consciously broken.

Today it is especially clear that this caused many promising opportunities to slip by, while some substantial elements of our relationship in this area were squandered.

The United States crossed a dangerous threshold when it preferred to cast aside the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty instead of immediately taking up, as was envisaged, the resolution of these issues which were dealt with in the Protocol. Those issues are of cardinal importance - the limitation and prohibition of entire classes of arms. It is no secret as to what guided the American side in taking this step: it wanted to gain an advantage by deploying long-range cruise missiles. As a result, already today one has to deal with thousands of such missiles. The U.S. sought to sharply tilt in its favor the fine-tuned balance of interests underlying the agreement. Now you see, I believe, that it did not work out this way. We too are deploying cruise missiles, which we had proposed to ban. But even now we are prepared to come to an agreement on such a ban, should the U.S., taking a realistic position, agree to take such an important step.

The deployment in Western Europe of new nuclear systems designed to perform strategic missions was a clear circumvention, that is non-compliance, by the American side with regard to the SALT II Treaty. In this, Mr. President, we see an attempt by the United States, taking advantage of geographic factors, to gain a virtual monopoly on the use weapons in a situation for which our country has no analogue. I know that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes cited. But even in

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that case it is incomprehensible why the U.S. refuses to resolve - this issue in a manner which would establish in the zone of Europe a balance of medium-range missiles, whereby the USSR would not have more missiles and warheads on them than are currently in the possession of England and France. Such a formula would not infringe upon anyone's interests, whereas the distortion caused by the American missiles in Europe is not a balance at all.

In broader terms, all these violations by the United States of the regime for strategic stability have one common denominator: departure from the principle of equality and equal security. This and nothing else is the reason for the lack of progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms over the past 4-5 years.

However, I would like you to have a clear understanding of the fact that, in practice, strategic parity between our countries will be maintained. We cannot envisage nor can we permit a different situation. The question, however, is at what level parity will be maintained -- at a decreasing or an increasing one. We are for the former, for the reduction in the level of strategic confrontation. Your government, by all indications, favors the latter, evidently hoping that at some stage the U.S. will ultimately succeed in getting ahead. This is the essence of the current situation.

Should one be surprised, then, that we are conducting negotiations, yet the process of practical arms limitation remains suspended? It would probably not be too great a misfortune if this process simply remained frozen. But even that is not the case. The "star wars" program -- I must tell you this, Mr. President -- already at this stage is seriously undermining stability. We strongly advise you to halt this sharply destabilizing and dangerous program while things have not gone too far. If the situation in this area is not corrected, we shall have no choice but to take steps required by our security and that of our allies.

We are in favor, as you say, of making the best use of the chance offered by the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Our main objective at those negotiations should be to reestablish the suspended process of limiting the arms race and to prevent its spread into new spheres.

The SALT-II Treaty is an important element of the strategic equilibrium, and one should clearly understand its role as well as the fact that, according to the well-known expression, one cannot have one's pie and eat it too.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

Your approach is determined by the fact that the strategic programs being carried out by the United States are about to collide with the limitations established by the SALT II Treaty, and the choice is being made not in favor of the Treaty, but in favor of these programs. And this cannot be disavowed or concealed, to put it bluntly, by unseemly attempts to accuse the Soviet Union of all mortal sins. It is, moreover, completely inappropriate in relations between our two countries for one to set forth conditions for the another as is done in your letter with regard to the Soviet Union.

I am saying all this frankly and unequivocally, as we have agreed.

One certainly cannot agree that the provisions of the SALT II Treaty remain in force allegedly as the result of restraint on the part of the United States. Entirely the contrary. The general attitude toward the Treaty shown by the American side and its practical actions to undermine it have given us every reason to draw appropriate conclusions and to take practical steps. We did have and continue to have moral, legal and political grounds for that.

We did not, however, give way to emotions; we showed patience, realizing the seriousness of the consequences of the path onto which we were being pushed. We hoped also that sober reasoning, as well as the self-interest of the U.S., would make the American side take a more restrained position. That was what in fact happened to a certain, though not to a full, extent. And we have treated this in businesslike fashion. Without ignoring what has been done by the American side contrary to the SALT II Treaty, we nevertheless at no time have been the initiators of politico-propagandistic campaigns of charges and accusations. We have striven to discuss seriously within the framework of the SCC the well-founded concerns we have had. We also have given exhaustive answers there to questions raised by the American side.

Unfortunately, the behavior of the other side was and continues to be utterly different. All those endless reports on imaginary Soviet violations and their publication did not and cannot serve any useful purpose, if one is guided by the task of preserving and continuing the process of arms limitation. Why mince words, the objective is quite different: to cast aspersions on the policy of the Soviet Union in general, to sow distrust toward it and to create an artificial pretext for an accelerated and uncontrolled arms race. All this became evident to us already long ago.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 5 -

One has to note that your present decision, if it were to be implemented, would be a logical continuation of that course. We would like you, Mr. President, to think all this over once again.

In any event, we shall regard the decision that you announced in the entirety of its mutually-exclusive elements which, along with the usual measures required by the Treaty, include also a claim to some "right" to violate provisions of the Treaty as the American side chooses. Neither side has such a right. I do not consider it necessary to go into specifics here, a lot has been said about it, and your military experts are well aware of the actual, rather than distorted, state of affairs.

One should not count on the fact that we will be able to come to terms with you with respect to destroying the SALT II Treaty through joint efforts. How things will develop further depends on the American side, and we shall draw the appropriate conclusions.

The question of the approach to arms limitation has been, is, and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the overall international situation is concerned. It is precisely here, above all, that the special responsibility borne by our two countries is manifested, as well as how each of them approaches that responsibility.

In more specific terms, it is a question of intentions with regard to one other. No matter what is being done in other spheres of our relationship, in the final analysis, whether or not it is going to be constructive and stable depends above all on whether we are going to find a solution to the central issues of security on the basis of equality and equal security.

I would like to reaffirm that, for our part, we are full of resolve to strive to find such a solution. This determines both our attitude toward those initial limitations which were arrived at earlier through painstaking joint labor, and our approach to the negotiations currently underway in Geneva and elsewhere.

I wish to say this in conclusion: one would certainly like to feel tangibly the same attitude on the part of the United States. At any rate, as I have already had a chance to note, we took seriously the thought reiterated by you in our correspondence with regard to a joint search for ways to improve Soviet-American relations and to strengthen the foundations of peace.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

Schedule Request for Program re Peter the Great TV
Mini-series

Fred Ryan's office has requested our recommendation on the President's participation in a "behind the scenes" program on the making of the mini-series Peter the Great, filmed in the Soviet Union.

Steve Sestanovich concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the self-explanatory memo to Fred Ryan at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Ryan
Tab A Incoming

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Schedule Request for Program re Peter the Great TV
Mini-series

The NSC staff has reviewed the schedule request for the President's participation in a "behind the scenes" program on the making of the mini-series Peter the Great, filmed in the Soviet Union. Committing the President's participation in such a production would be risky, since we presently do not have a fix on the content of the film. If more can be learned about the scope, purpose, and thrust of the film, the NSC will gladly review the schedule proposal.

Attachment

Tab A Incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5597

MEMORANDUM

July 12, 1985

TO: ✓BILL MARTIN - PAT BUCHANAN - LARRY SPEAKES
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Participate in a "Behind the Scenes" program on the making of
the mini-series, Peter the Great, filmed in Russia

DATE: Open

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____ Other _____
Priority _____
Routine _____

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE July 18, 1985 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON



Metrocom Productions, Inc.

2121 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007
PHONE: 202-342-9559

July 2, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC 20045

Dear Mr. President:

In December 1984 and March 1985 we were in Russia filming a "Behind the Scenes" story on the making of Peter the Great, a mini-series for NBC to be aired in 1986.

The production was unique in that it was 10 hours of programming filmed entirely in Russia over a period of nearly a year, with a very large number of Soviet crew and cast working on an American production. All those, both American and Soviet, that we interviewed for our "Behind the Scenes" program were affected by the significance of people of the two countries working together closely, and learning so much about each other.

Maximillian Schell, one of the actors in the mini-series, put it this way, "I find in Russia it's still two sides; the ones who want to keep the Russian soul and tradition for them, and others who would like to open it up for the world. I think that this film might be a step to open it to the west. It's ironic when you think they said no to the Olympic games and practically at the same time, they said yes to this film."

We would like to have you participate in our "Behind the Scenes" program with a few short on-camera comments on the importance of this type of Soviet-American cooperation, which is the theme of our program. We are also asking a Soviet official from their embassy to do the same.

If your participation is not possible, I would appreciate suggestions on other administration officials who might do so.

Thank you very much for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

Jane Raimondi
Jane Raimondi

*File with
talking pts*
49

MSG FROM: NSJFM --CPUA TO: NSSSB --CPUA
To: NSSSB --CPUA

07/18/85 10:14:33

NOTE FROM: Jack Matlock
Subject: Material for press briefing/US/Soviet

Please print this note out for me. Thanks.

*** Forwarding note from NSKS --CPUA 07/18/85 09:58 ***
To: NSJFM --CPUA

NOTE FROM: KARNA SMALL

SUBJECT: Material for press briefing/US/Soviet

In anticipation of a possible major press briefing by Bud tomorrow morning, he has asked that I put together a number of talking points on a number of subjects that could arise. Purpose of briefing is mainly post-Geneva analysis, however, he would also like from you some talking points on:

- (1) US/Soviet relations in general
- (2) Helsinki meeting
- (3) Shevardnaze coming to UN and to DC
- (4) Summit meeting preps and expectations etc.

Could I have something by around 4:00 today? (I have a tentative meeting with Bud at 5:00 to go over plans for tomorrow's briefing).

Many thanks.

File-C
5

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN GENERAL

- Stable. No threats of military confrontation.
- But not good either. Progress on various negotiations has not been as rapid as we would have liked.
- Still, this is not surprising. Important issues are at stake and it would be unreasonable to expect sudden break-through.
- Must recognize that Soviet Union has gone through succession of leadership changes and that current leader must concentrate on organizing his government.
- We continue to be flexible in our approach to problem solving, but also patient.
- We hope that the Soviet leaders will soon be able to give greater attention to finding pragmatic solutions to some of our differences, and this will permit us to make progress.

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HELSINKI MEETING

- Shultz meeting with Shevardnadze will provide us with first opportunity to deal with the new Soviet Foreign Minister.
- Should be useful to review state of U.S.-Soviet relations and to discuss which areas are most promising for our attention.
- Not a negotiating session.
- Will be followed by meetings in New York and Washington -- probably late September, where matters can be discussed in more detail.

SHEVARDNADZE TO U.S.

- Will meet with Shultz in New York and has been invited to meet with President in Washington.
- Our understanding is that Minister Shevardnadze plans to come to the UNGA this fall and probably will accept the President's invitation.
- There are no firm dates yet.
- These meetings will obviously be useful to both sides as we prepare for the President's meeting with Gorbachev.

5

SUMMIT MEETING PREPARATIONS

- At the meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev we want to establish an agenda on what we want to achieve in the next few years.
- We will obviously be discussing with the Soviets in advance how this agenda might shape up, and as you know several high-level meetings are anticipated between now and November.
- Our agenda covers a spectrum from regional issues to arms reduction and confidence-building measures to a host of bilateral and human rights issues.
- We are ready to negotiate arms reduction agreements over the long term and the President has provided our negotiators in Geneva with the necessary flexibility and scope to negotiate an equitable, verifiable, agreement regarding force reductions. The Soviets unfortunately have not chosen to come forth with concrete proposals of their own. We would be pleased if they did so at the next round.
- At the meeting, while there is no exclusive preoccupation with arms control, it is obvious that arms control is an important agenda item and we would hope that the Soviets will come prepared to join in injecting momentum to the arms control process.

7/17/8

Summit Meeting Preparations

ROLE OF SUMMIT. WILL IT BE THE FORUM FOR BREAKING THE ARMS TALKS DEADLOCK?

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~~We also hope that the meeting can provide momentum toward solution of other~~ *in advance*

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-- We will obviously be discussing how this agenda might shape up, and as you know several high-level meetings are anticipated between now and November.

-- Our agenda covers a spectrum from regional issues to arms reduction and confidence-building measures to a host of bilateral and human rights issues.