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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (3/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1004

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7503	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PAPERS ON USSR FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	1	7/12/1985	B1
7504	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PAPER ON USSR <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	ND	B1
7505	PAPER	THE SOVIET UNION: A COMMUNIST POWER OR A RUSSIAN IMPERIAL POWER? WRITTEN BY MATLOCK <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	7	ND	B1
7506	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE USSR CHANNEL <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	4	7/15/1985	B1
7507	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7506 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	4	7/15/1985	B1
7508	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE BREAKFAST ITEM: EMBASSY MOSCOW SECURITY AND REPLACEMENT OF USSR NATIONALS <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/16/1985	B1
7514	MEMO	A PLAN FOR SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AT EMBASSY MOSCOW <i>D 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7509	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	3	7/18/1985	B1
7510	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	4	ND	B1
7511	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE'S AGREEMENT TO MEET IN HELSINKI, NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	7/15/1985	B1
7512	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	5	ND	B1
7513	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS MCFARLANE RE STATE MEMO-LETTER TO GORBACHEV R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	7/16/1985	B1

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5531

7503

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FEI JM-C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 12, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Papers on Soviet Union for the President

Attached at Tab A is the first in the series of papers I am preparing for the President on basic aspects of the Soviet Union. It deals with the fundamental question of whether the Soviet Union is an ideological power or a traditional Russian great power, and concludes that it is both.

Subsequent papers will be submitted at a rate of one or two a week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Paper on Soviet Union for the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-12512#7503

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Paper on the Soviet Union

As background information while you prepare for your meeting with Gorbachev, I have asked my staff to prepare a series of papers dealing with basic aspects of the Soviet system and typical Soviet attitudes.

Attached at Tab A is the first of these papers, which discusses the fundamental question of whether the Soviet Union is an ideological power or simply an expansionist power in the traditional Russian mold. I think you will find it interesting reading.

Attachment:

TAB A Paper on the Soviet Union

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2# 7504
BY 101 NARA, DATE 11/21/87

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOI 714/2# 7505
BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

3

THE SOVIET UNION:
A COMMUNIST POWER OR A RUSSIAN IMPERIAL POWER?

When outsiders observe and assess Soviet actions and policies, many tend to interpret these in one of two ways, depending on their own psychological and ideological bent. One group operates on the assumption that the Soviet Union represents a new type of revolutionary power, motivated and driven by its ideology, which provides all the clues needed to determine Soviet motivations. The other group believes that the ideology is no more than window dressing and that at the core the Soviet Union is simply a continuation of the Russian Empire, committed primarily to pursuing Russian national interests. Both groups can advance powerful arguments to support their approach.

Those who see ideology as the ultimate motivation point to the obvious facts that the Soviet regime bases its entire legitimacy on its ideology and therefore cannot abandon the ideology without destroying itself. Furthermore, all actions are explained in terms of ideology, and the ideology is used to subvert other nations and provide a rationale for Soviet penetration of other countries, and if the opportunity exists, for Soviet control of them. The "Brezhnev doctrine," which holds that the Soviet Union has not only the right but the duty to prevent the overthrow of "socialism" in another country, is seen as the ultimate expression of an ideological imperative.

Proponents of the "Russian imperial" approach would concede that the Soviet regime is clothed in ideological trappings, and that the ideology is used as an instrument of foreign policy and propaganda. But they would point out that very few Soviet officials really believe it, and that the ideology is simply used, in totally cynical fashion, to advance Russian national interests. Since Lenin's pronouncements go all over the lot, citations can be found to justify any policy decision. Therefore, Soviet political leaders can decide what they want to do, without any regard to ideology, and their propaganda technicians will always find an "ideologically correct" justification.

Those who denigrate the role of ideology as a motivating force, would also point out that many key characteristics of the Soviet system simply cannot be explained by communist ideology. Take hypersecrecy, for example. This is a pronounced Russian trait, going back to the Middle Ages, and has no basis in Marxism. And -- this group would add -- how can you reconcile Marxism with a policy which outlaws the workers' movement in Poland? Doesn't the Soviet attitude toward Solidarity have more in common with nineteenth century Tsarist

repression of Polish "rebels" (who also had the support of virtually all Poles)?

The truth is that both sides of this argument have cited factors which are critical for understanding the Soviet Union, but neither offers a full explanation. Their debate is like a argument over whether brass is copper or zinc. It is both, and the Soviet Union is both an ideological power and a modern-day embodiment of Russian imperial urges. What is important is not to debate which element is predominant, but to understand how the amalgam works.

The Ideological Element

The Soviets call their ideology Marxism-Leninism, but it should be called simply Leninism. Marx, after all, predicted that the working class would revolt against the ruling bourgeoisie, establish a dictatorship of the working class (not of an individual or a small group), and after eliminating other classes, live in a state of brotherly love and cooperation, without needing a government or repressive instruments. In fact, the state itself would "wither away" and no longer be necessary. This vision, though fundamentally flawed in itself, has nothing in common with the Bolshevik Revolution and the regime it established, a regime which controls the working class rather than being controlled by it, and which built the most awesome instruments of repression in human history, along with an enormous, bureaucratic state.

It was Lenin's adaptations -- some would say distortions -- of Marxist philosophy which created the ideological basis of the Soviet state. Lenin, seeing that the "working class" in Russia was small and unorganized, postulated that a small number of intellectuals and professional revolutionaries were the "vanguard" of the working class and could act in its name. Therefore, he created an elite party which arrogated to itself the right to determine the "true" interests of the workers, and to rule the country on their behalf. And what is more, he established a structure of authority and discipline in the elite party itself so that it could be controlled from the top. This was the structure which Stalin inherited (and Mao Tse-tung borrowed for China) which provided the instrument for the most repressive regimes mankind has known.

Leninism, therefore, is simply a mechanism for seizing, consolidating and perpetuating power. The fact that it is clothed in high-sounding phrases about social betterment does not alter its essence. Nevertheless, the pretense that the goal of this power is to improve the lot of the "masses" is

better suited to propaganda than Nazi "master race" theories, which are guaranteed to turn off anyone not a member of the "master race."

The Role of Ideology

Most persons who have dealt extensively with Soviet officials, even those officially charged with propaganda, are struck by how few really believe the ideology. In private, most are frank to say that the social theories are not consistent with reality and that Soviet-style "socialism" does not work very well in terms of meeting human needs. In Soviet schools, obligatory classes in ideology are considered dull make-work, good only for cynical jokes and material for opportunists who must master the "catechism" to make a career with little work. None seem to see their ideology as offering a practical guide to policy decisions. One senses none of the revolutionary elan today which observers described in the 1920's and 1930's.

But the loss of revolutionary elan is not the whole story. The fact is that those who run the Soviet system cannot give up the ideology, whether they believe it or not. They cannot because it provides the sole source of their own legitimacy as rulers. Their power does not stem from constitutional processes; it can only be justified on ideological grounds, both to their own people and to the world at large. When so much at home seems to be either unsuccessful or inconsistent with the proclaimed ideology, it becomes important to the rulers to claim victories of the ideology abroad. Such claims have a legitimizing impact and contribute an important element to Soviet objectives which were absent from the motivations of monarchs and would be absent from those of a real constitutional republic.

Leninist ideology has, moreover, struck deeper roots than the pattern of cynical manipulation which we often observe would suggest. The fact is that so much Soviet discourse has been forced into the mold of Leninist reasoning that it affects the thinking even of those who would privately profess disbelief in its fundamental tenets. Entirely aside from its use as a propaganda tool, it provides a framework for looking at the world and analyzing developments.

Thus, Soviet citizens are inclined to interpret events in democratic countries in terms of the "class struggle," and -- paradoxically -- to assume that official statements put out by other countries are as duplicitous as those put out by their own. They tend to see other countries as ruled by elites which oppress the "masses" and deny them social services such

as free education and medical care. And while the Soviet rulers do not find clear-cut answers to policy dilemmas in the ideology, the ideology acts to define options and to channel decisions in particular directions.

The ideology is also a dandy tool for an expansionist foreign policy. Its rhetorical element promising power to the masses and economic betterment for the poor has an appeal to naive reformers and provides a cloak of benign intent to cover Soviet attempts to extend their influence and establish control over others. Its Leninist core provides a rationale to would-be dictators to gain and retain power, and a pro-paganda "justification" for accepting "fraternal assistance" in the form of Soviet arms and Cuban troops.

The Russian Tradition

Leninist ideology explains a lot, but it does not explain it all. The Soviet system also exemplifies a number of characteristics which are deeply rooted in the non-communist Russian past.

One of the most striking and pervasive of these involves the relationship of the state and its citizens. Russia has no tradition of individual rights or of the rule of law binding on both rulers and the ruled. All inhabitants were considered servants of the state (or of the Tsar), and virtually the sovereign's property. A ruler might be liberal or repressive, but "rights" were not inherent but rather privileges dispensed from above. And he who giveth can also take away. This is still a deep-seated Russian attitude which underlies much of the regime's behavior on human rights issues and explains why the population as a whole is relatively indifferent to them. This tradition produces an unspoken and perhaps subconscious attitude which holds that foreigners who press for the right of emigration are, in effect, out to rob the Russian regime of its property, and those who want to leave are guilty of disloyalty which smacks of treason.

Another deep-seated Russian tradition is that of hyper-secrecy, especially as regards foreigners. Western visitors to Muscovy as far back as the fifteenth century wrote about this trait, which even then was carried to absurd extremes, not only by the authorities, but by ordinary people as well. Often the secrecy stemmed from a desire to cover up weaknesses or potential embarrassments and was connected with a feeling of technological and cultural inferiority in comparison with Western Europe. Even today tourists are often harassed by ordinary citizens if they photograph buildings in disrepair or

primitive-looking open-air markets. The popular assumption seems to be that any foreigner is a potential threat, actively trying to uncover weaknesses which can be exploited in some fashion. The Communist regime exploits and fans this attitude in its "vigilance" campaigns, and the traditional attitude bolsters official resistance to intrusive verification measures of arms control agreements. As Gromyko once remarked when pressed to agree to additional confidence-building measures, "What you want is a license to spy on us."

The Russian attitude toward Western Europe has always been ambivalent. On the one hand, the material prosperity, civic spirit and (for intellectuals at least) political freedoms have been envied. But, feeling that Russia was backward in all these respects, Russians indulged in psychological compensation by telling themselves that they were spiritually superior. Historically, this took various forms, sometimes with claims that their values were more spiritual and not so materialistic as the West, and sometimes with claims that they were more devoted to the good of the whole community rather than that of the most vigorous individuals who, in the West, were held to exploit others. Communist ideology exploits this deepseated ambivalence in numerous ways, by claiming that sacrifices are required today to build a better society for tomorrow, by picturing Western societies as marked by ruthless exploitation and callousness toward the unfortunate, and by stimulating the implicit xenophobic strain in these attitudes.

Traditionally the Russians have always been suspicious of their immediate neighbors and have striven to dominate them. Muscovy grew steadily from a tiny city state in the fourteenth century to a giant empire by adding, piece by piece, the territory of its neighbors. Usually territorial expansion was "justified" by claiming that the neighbor threatened them, or might be used by another powerful state to threaten them. Sometimes the threat was real, but often it did not exist at all. But whether or not the threat really existed, the Russian people as a whole seemed persuaded by their leaders' claims.

Expansion of the Russian Empire was also justified by many on grounds of ideology and religion. For centuries, it was commonplace to speak of Moscow as the "Third Rome," in the sense that it was the successor of Rome and Constantinople as the seat of true Christianity. According to this concept, Russia had both the right and duty to spread her rule over Orthodox Christians to protect them from the Turks (and Western Protestants and Catholics.) The great writer

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Dostoevsky, for example, a fierce enemy of Marxism and all forms of socialism, supported aggressive wars against the Turks to protect Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.

At first it might seem that this has little to do with atheistic communism. But in fact it does, because the "Brezhnev doctrine" is really only a secular version of the traditional Russian messianic vision. What the Communists have done in this case, as in the others, is to fuse a distorted Marxian concept with a traditional Russian one. If Orthodox Tsarist Russia had the duty to "protect" Orthodox believers by establishing its rule over them, then the communist Soviet Union has a comparable duty as regards other "socialist" states.

The Amalgam

One of the achievements of the communist regime in Russia has been to convince the Russian people in general that the Soviet system is "theirs" -- that is, authentically Russian. This is important, since even those who complain about its failures rarely consider it an alien imposition. And for many, outside criticism of the system -- even for failures they know are real -- is resented as damaging to their national pride.

Russia's communist leaders have been able to do this precisely because they grafted elements of Leninist ideology on to the tree trunk of Russian nationalist tradition, so that they are able to tap and mobilize attitudes which have deep roots in the national psyche.

The result, however, resembles not so much a plant with grafts as a chemical amalgam, with ideology and Russian traditions intermixed in an intimate and complex fashion. In this intermixture, those traditions useful to centralized, totalitarian rule have been accentuated and those traditions which do not fit it have been resisted.

The Russian Empire was well known for its secret police, forced labor camps and censorship. The Bolsheviks adopted these institutions and made them much more efficient, pervasive and oppressive.

Religion is an good example of a tradition which was not adopted, but opposed. The Russian peasantry, in particular, has traditionally been deeply religious. The Orthodox Church, however, for several centuries operated under tight state controls. The communists did two things. They waged an unremitting campaign against the practice of religion, by propagating

atheism and at the same time trying to build up the cult of Lenin and the Party as a replacement for religious belief. At the same time they utilized the Russian tradition of state control of the Orthodox Church to bring the Church under their ultimate control, which makes it possible to monitor and limit what the Church does, and when the opportunity occurs -- as with contacts with foreign religious groups and "peace" organizations -- to use it as an instrument of official policy.

Ideas of Western-style constitutional government and the rule of law penetrated the Russian intellectual class in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Russia seemed to be evolving belatedly in that direction when World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution cut this evolution short. The Revolution, however, swept away most of the educated class which espoused these ideas. Many were killed, many others were driven into emigration, and those who survived and stayed in the country were driven to the fringes of society and were further decimated in the purges of the 1930's. In their place there arose a new "upper class" which came primarily from the peasantry, a group steeped in traditional, non-Western attitudes and little touched by the influx of Western ideas.

The regime has never succeeded in extirpating either religion or Western ideals of constitutional government. By all accounts, the practice of religion is growing, particularly among the young, and the dissident movement and figures like Andrei Sakharov make clear that, while they may be down, those who strive to establish a government of limited powers subject to the rule of law are not entirely out. Up to now, however, the communist regime has demonstrated the capability of keeping the practice of religion within tolerable bounds and of preventing ideas of constitutional government from spreading to the population as a whole.

For us, the fundamental fact to bear in mind in managing our relations with the Soviet Union and dealing with its leaders is that the system and its motivations cannot be explained exclusively in either ideological or traditional Russian geopolitical terms. We are dealing with a superpower which combines, in ways unique to it, ideological and traditional attitudes, institutions and motivations. Subsequent essays will probe in more detail how this "amalgam" works out in practice.

Prepared by
Jack f. Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

July 15, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Soviet Probes for Private Channel

Two developments last week -- the first almost certainly and the second potentially -- indicate that Gorbachev or members of his office are attempting to establish a personal channel to prepare for the Geneva meeting.

The first of these involves Bill McSweeney of Occidental Petroleum and the second Larry Horowitz of Teddy Kennedy's staff. I will describe each in turn:

McSweeney:

Mark Palmer has reported to me a call by Bill McSweeney last Thursday. He asked me to pass this information on to you with the proviso that he would like to have the opportunity to report it directly to Secretary Shultz when he returns and therefore would appreciate your not mentioning it to the Secretary until Palmer has had a chance to put him in the loop. In the meantime Palmer is not informing anyone else at State regarding the matter.

McSweeney told Palmer the following: During his last trip to Moscow (early July), Occidental's Soviet employee in Moscow, one Mike Bruk (aka Brook) insisted on taking him from a performance at the Bolshoi for "an important message." (Bruk is a well-known KGB official who has been working for the Hammer organization for some time -- obviously to keep an eye on their operations and to act as an official go-between. He is bright, capable and speaks perfect, unaccented English. The Occidental people know of his affiliation, but Hammer took him on and keeps him on because he considers it useful to have the contacts Bruk provides.)

Bruk's message purported to be from Alexandrov-Agentov, Gorbachev's principal foreign affairs adviser in his immediate office. (Alexandrov held the same job with Brezhnev, Andropov

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Declassify on: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/12

and Chernenko. Many of us marvel at his staying power, but he does seem to be in solidly with Gorbachev. He, not a Foreign Ministry official, attended Gorbachev's meetings with Baldrige and with Adreas. Bruk and Alexandrov are known to be close personal friends, often -- for example -- spending their vacations together.)

The message was that Gorbachev very much wanted a private channel to the President in order to make appropriate preparations for their meeting. McSweeney was told, however, that under no circumstances should Armand Hammer be involved in any effort to set one up. Bruk said the Soviets consider him unreliable because he is "garrulous" and indiscreet. McSweeney agreed not to inform Hammer, and Bruk then asked whom McSweeney would recommend as a point of contact in the Administration. McSweeney said that the person he knew best was Mark Palmer and that he had found Mark both reliable and discreet. Bruk then agreed that the message should be passed to Mark.

As an example of the sort of thing Gorbachev wanted to discuss, Bruk cited his desire to arrange for regular, annual meetings, which could be announced at the Geneva meeting. Otherwise he mentioned no substance but laid out a "communications plan" with code names for the various people who might be mentioned in messages. The code names included ones for the President, Shultz, yourself, Charlie Wick (!?) and Palmer. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev, Alexandrov and Gromyko were covered. According to this system, Palmer -- if so authorized -- could pass messages to McSweeney, who would then communicate with Bruk by the Occidental telex, using the code names provided.

That was the extent of the message itself, but McSweeney mentioned to Palmer two other matters which tend to substantiate the hypothesis that this is a real probe. First, McSweeney said that when he was in Moscow in mid-June (an earlier trip than the one when he was given the "message") Bruk had asked him one evening to tell Art Hartman that Romanov would soon be removed and that Gromyko would be "kicked upstairs." McSweeney said he was unable to do so since he had to leave Moscow early the next morning and did not want to do it by telephone. He therefore told Bruk he would have to find another channel. This occurred nearly two weeks before the Romanov/Gromyko change was made, and suggests two things: (1) That Gorbachev (or, at a minimum, Alexandrov) wanted to get word to us in advance, probably anticipating that we would consider it welcome news; and (2) It was an attempt to validate Bruk as a channel to the top.

The second matter has a bearing on McSweeney's relationships with Bruk and Alexandrov. McSweeney told Palmer that he, Bruk and Alexandrov had been involved (to the distaste of all three, he

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claimed) as middlemen in getting expensive gifts from Hammer to Brezhnev, and possibly Brezhnev's successors. When Brezhnev or members of his family wanted an expensive bauble, the word came by this channel and Hammer always was obliging. McSweeney did not say specifically whether Andropov and Chernenko also made use of this arrangement, but did say that on his most recent visit Alexandrov had asked for the "Heritage Edition" of the Encyclopedia Britannica for Gorbachev and the regular edition for himself -- both of which have already been dispatched through the McSweeney-Bruk channel. (I find this both fascinating and curious. I can understand why Alexandrov, who speaks good English, might like a copy of the Encyclopedia Britannica, but Gorbachev? Is his English better than we have assumed? Does he just want it because the leather-bound volumes look good on the shelf? Or is Alexandrov indulging in a little free lancing? And whatever the answers to these questions may be, the incident seems to indicate that these fellows are not so devoted to their "anti-corruption" campaign that they let it interfere with their own ability to solicit some largess from a soft touch.)

Horowitz:

Larry called me Friday to say that he had been invited to make a sudden visit to Moscow and that he would be seeing, at a minimum, Alexandrov and Zagladin. He said he just wanted us to know and that he would come over and brief John Poindexter and me when he gets back next week.

Given the fact that we responded to a message Zagladin sent through Horowitz last year -- and that the whole matter was handled discreetly on all sides -- the purpose of calling Horowitz over at this time could be to activate another probe for a channel.

Comment:

1. Regarding McSweeney: There are many unsavory aspects of this connection, and it is obviously unsuitable for passing any substantive messages. It does seem to be a genuine effort on the Soviet side, however, and we might consider sending just one message back to the effect that if there is interest in private communications they should have an appropriate member of their party in Helsinki contact Palmer or me to discuss.

2. Regarding Horowitz, there is nothing to do until we find out what he comes back with. However, the invitation to him, coming on top of the various probes made to Agency sources, indicates to me that Gorbachev is indeed trying to make a connection and that we should find some way to accommodate him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss the general question once again with Secretary Shultz and decide what our stance should be if we are approached in Helsinki, and also whether we should find some way through the various channels which seem to be available to let the Soviets know in advance that we will respond cooperatively if the wish to make a concrete suggestion. (Please protect Palmer regarding McSweeney's approach to him until Mark has a chance to brief the Secretary directly.)

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOT FOR SYSTEM 14

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~



AMB. JACK MATLOCK

~~Admiral John P. ...~~

Eyes Only

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

July 15, 1985

ACTION

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

and Chernenko. Many of us marvel at his staying power, but he does seem to be in solidly with Gorbachev. He, not a Foreign Ministry official, attended Gorbachev's meetings with Baldrige and with Adreas. Bruk and Alexandrov are known to be close personal friends, often -- for example -- spending their vacations together.)

The message was that Gorbachev very much wanted a private channel to the President in order to make appropriate preparations for their meeting. McSweeney was told, however, that under no circumstances should Armand Hammer be involved in any effort to set one up. Bruk said the Soviets consider him unreliable because he is "garrulous" and indiscreet. McSweeney agreed not to inform Hammer, and Bruk then asked whom McSweeney would recommend as a point of contact in the Administration. McSweeney said that the person he knew best was Mark Palmer and that he had found Mark both reliable and discreet. Bruk then agreed that the message should be passed to Mark.

As an example of the sort of thing Gorbachev wanted to discuss, Bruk cited his desire to arrange for regular, annual meetings, which could be announced at the Geneva meeting. Otherwise he mentioned no substance but laid out a "communications plan" with code names for the various people who might be mentioned in messages. The code names included ones for the President, Shultz, yourself, Charlie Wick (!?) and Palmer. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev, Alexandrov and Gromyko were covered. According to this system, Palmer -- if so authorized -- could pass messages to McSweeney, who would then communicate with Bruk by the Occidental telex, using the code names provided.

That was the extent of the message itself, but McSweeney mentioned to Palmer two other matters which tend to substantiate the hypothesis that this is a real probe. First, McSweeney said that when he was in Moscow in mid-June (an earlier trip than the one when he was given the "message") Bruk had asked him one evening to tell Art Hartman that Romanov would soon be removed and that Gromyko would be "kicked upstairs." McSweeney said he was unable to do so since he had to leave Moscow early the next morning and did not want to do it by telephone. He therefore told Bruk he would have to find another channel. This occurred nearly two weeks before the Romanov/Gromyko change was made, and suggests two things: (1) That Gorbachev (or, at a minimum, Alexandrov) wanted to get word to us in advance, probably anticipating that we would consider it welcome news; and (2) It was an attempt to validate Bruk as a channel to the top.

The second matter has a bearing on McSweeney's relationships with Bruk and Alexandrov. McSweeney told Palmer that he, Bruk and Alexandrov had been involved (to the distaste of all three, he

claimed) as middlemen in getting expensive gifts from Hammer to Brezhnev, and possibly Brezhnev's successors. When Brezhnev or members of his family wanted an expensive bauble, the word came by this channel and Hammer always was obliging. McSweeney did not say specifically whether Andropov and Chernenko also made use of this arrangement, but did say that on his most recent visit Alexandrov had asked for the "Heritage Edition" of the Encyclopedia Britannica for Gorbachev and the regular edition for himself -- both of which have already been dispatched through the McSweeney-Bruk channel. (I find this both fascinating and curious. I can understand why Alexandrov, who speaks good English, might like a copy of the Encyclopedia Britannica, but Gorbachev? Is his English better than we have assumed? Does he just want it because the leather-bound volumes look good on the shelf? Or is Alexandrov indulging in a little free lancing? And whatever the answers to these questions may be, the incident seems to indicate that these fellows are not so devoted to their "anti-corruption" campaign that they let it interfere with their own ability to solicit some largess from a soft touch.)

Horowitz:

Larry called me Friday to say that he had been invited to make a sudden visit to Moscow and that he would be seeing, at a minimum, Alexandrov and Zagladin. He said he just wanted us to know and that he would come over and brief John Poindexter and me when he gets back next week.

Given the fact that we responded to a message Zagladin sent through Horowitz last year -- and that the whole matter was handled discreetly on all sides -- the purpose of calling Horowitz over at this time could be to activate another probe for a channel.

Comment:

1. Regarding McSweeney: There are many unsavory aspects of this connection, and it is obviously unsuitable for passing any substantive messages. It does seem to be a genuine effort on the Soviet side, however, and we might consider sending just one message back to the effect that if there is interest in private communications they should have an appropriate member of their party in Helsinki contact Palmer or me to discuss.

2. Regarding Horowitz, there is nothing to do until we find out what he comes back with. However, the invitation to him, coming on top of the various probes made to Agency sources, indicates to me that Gorbachev is indeed trying to make a connection and that we should find some way to accommodate him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss the general question once again with Secretary Shultz and decide what our stance should be if we are approached in Helsinki, and also whether we should find some way through the various channels which seem to be available to let the Soviets know in advance that we will respond cooperatively if they wish to make a concrete suggestion. (Please protect Palmer regarding McSweeney's approach to him until Mark has a chance to brief the Secretary directly.)

Approve

RCM

Disapprove

—

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Matlock
5553
JH-C
19

July 16, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Speech

We have reviewed and concur in Ambassador Rowny's draft speech at TAB A (as amended) to the Comstock Club in Sacramento, California on July 19, 1985.

William F. Martin

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

cc: Fred Shaheen, S/ART
Department of State

Attachments:

TAB A Draft Speech

20

A



21

COMSTOCK CLUB
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
JULY 19, 1985

EDWARD L. ROWNY

GORBACHEV'S NEXT 100 DAYS

Mikhail Gorbachev faces a golden opportunity over the next 100 days. Gorbachev himself has recently said the Soviet Union is now at a turning point. He used the first 100 days of his position as General Secretary to begin solidifying his power base. He could use the time between now and his meeting with President Reagan in Geneva on November 19-21 to profoundly affect the stability of US-Soviet relations and hence the cause of world peace.

But, even now it appears that his power base is sufficiently consolidated that he could, if he chooses to do so, take a more serious approach to the Soviet position on arms control.

We can be certain that he will continue to solidify his power base, a process which could take -- even at the swift speed with which he is moving -- until the 27th Party Congress in February to complete.

While Gorbachev may want to become serious about arms control, bringing about changes in the Soviet Union's past and current positions may not be as easy as many Westerners think. Even when a leader has a consolidated power base, changes are not easily or quickly accomplished under the Soviet system. At the

present time, the Politburo contains a still significant minority of Brezhnevites who have a vested interest in continuing past Soviet policies. Even the younger members Gorbachev has brought into the Politburo are creatures of the Soviet system and know that the Soviet Union needs to demonstrate a continuity in foreign policy and arms control. Major policy changes, whether they be related to external or internal matters, must be made slowly under the Soviet system of government. Even if changes are recognized to be in the best interests of the Soviet Union, for example, reshaping their industry and economy, they can take years to bring about.

Showing continuity fits the mold of the Soviet way of doing things, a mold which they inherited from Russian leaders of earlier times. Those who brought Gorbachev into power may have recognized that internal reform and change were absolute necessities if the Soviet Union is to come into the modern age. They may also have realized that such changes can be best brought about in a climate of relative international calm and relaxation of tension. A period of relaxed tensions would not only permit the Soviets to turn their major energies inward but could also allow them to gain economic and technological assistance to help bring these internal changes to fruition.

The West in general and the United States in particular are not only willing -- but anxious -- for a relaxation of tensions. Gorbachev is in a unique position to bring this about. As General Secretary he is in a position to effect changes, both

short- and long-term, in Soviet foreign policy to make this relaxation of tensions a reality. Only in this environment can the arms control process flourish. However, Gorbachev will have to decide to make changes in their basic thrust, their outlook and goals throughout the world in order to cement these arms control agreements to make them a long lasting foundation for mutual security.

It would be shortsighted, however, for us to believe that arms control agreements could, in the longer run, serve our interests -- or for that matter even survive -- unless our overall relationship with the Soviet Union improved. In fact, it would be detrimental to our longer run objectives if arms control agreements were to lull us into a false sense of security that such fundamental changes were not necessary.

If there can be movement toward arms control agreements that serve our own security interest, we should, of course, move. Indeed, the United States has designed its arms control positions so that not only the security interests of the United States are served but also those of the Soviet Union.

In the United States, arms control is perceived as the most important element of our policy with respect to the Soviet Union, and is closely scrutinized by the public. In contrast, Soviet arms control policy is not an area that must be justified to its citizens or subject to public pressure. The Soviet leadership could, if it chooses to, allow movement to occur toward an arms control agreement.

Though arms control is indeed central to the relationship, there exists a whole host of issues that constitute our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the first place, there are many important regional issues such as Soviet direct intervention into Afghanistan, and Soviet support of governments in Africa, Kampuchea, and Central America. Second, there are important differences between us over human rights, an area in which we have great interest as a champion of human freedom everywhere. And finally, there are issues of investment, trade and technology transfer. However, as alluded to earlier, this last area is of particular importance to the Soviets in this age of rapid technological advancements. They recognize that there is an alternative to pursuing the less assured route of stealing or buying technological secrets from the West. They can bring about technology transfers simply by cooperating and improving their overall relationships with us.

General Secretary Gorbachev currently has an opportunity to take steps to improve US-Soviet bilateral relations. President Reagan has provided this opportunity -- and further incentive -- by saying he will "go the extra mile," and will show patience and restraint toward the disappointing Soviet arms control policies. This was reflected in his June 10th decision to continue not to undercut the SALT agreements. In doing so, President Reagan has sent Gorbachev a message. The message is that the Soviets must stop cheating on existing agreements, ~~and~~ ^{actively pursue arms reduction agreements} must ~~begin to show seriousness~~ at the negotiating table in Geneva,

actively promote ^{OR} progress

Note: President's words

and must reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military build up.

In essence, this message to Gorbachev says: "Here is an opportunity, you can come back into compliance with existing agreements and join us in reducing strategic offensive arms and reducing the risk of nuclear war."

At the same time, President Reagan instructed Secretary Weinberger to study the impact of Soviet conduct on our deterrent and to recommend, by November 15th, those steps needed to ~~accelerate and~~ augment our strategic modernization program in response to ~~Soviet non-compliance and intransigence~~ ^{and as a hedge against the military consequences of those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct}. What we are saying in effect is: "Like you, we will continue to ensure our national security. But we would prefer to do so at lower levels of offensive arms." This would make for a more stable world.

Note President's words
↓

Gorbachev can bring about these changes -- within the bounds of the Soviets' claim that they are still maintaining continuity in their approach to arms control. He holds the key to resuming a dialogue which, if allowed to develop, could result in sensible, workable and verifiable agreements, whereby both we and the Soviets can further our mutual security interests at lower levels of strategic offensive arms on both sides.

However, we must guard against an overconfidence that such changes, even though they are sensible, will necessarily come about. We should, above all, not delude ourselves into thinking that unilateral concessions on our part will induce the Soviets to change. The Soviets have a long history of trying to influence Western publics with solutions which sound good to the uninitiated,

or to those who do not look beyond the simple psychic appeals of such proposals.

Examples of this are the recent Soviet calls for reductions of 20 or 25 percent in strategic offensive arms. By such proposals, the Soviets hope to create the illusion of reductions without actually expecting reductions. In recent news reports we hear that the Soviet proposals have been changed to also call for reductions in warheads. Until very recently the Soviets focused on launchers. This SALT II standard -- one of the major reasons why the SALT II treaty was fatally flawed -- attempted to perpetuate the myth that it is somehow launchers which matter. It is the missiles in those launchers -- and even more specifically the warheads on these missiles -- which can kill. For this reason the proposals introduced by the United States from the first days in 1982 at the START talks specified that we reduce warheads. Our proposals have consistently called for real reductions of both ballistic missiles and their warheads. We have proposed that we and the Soviets significantly reduce the level of missiles -- that we reduce the number of warheads by onethird, to a level of 5000 on each side. The proposals call for more serious cuts than ever proposed before by either the US or the Soviet Union.

By way of contrast, whether the Soviet proposal to reduce launchers is by 25 percent or by 20 percent, depending on the baseline, the Soviets have said they want to end up at approximately 1800 launchers. The "Catch 22" until now in their proposal

is that the Soviets insist that they be permitted 10 warheads on all their remaining missiles. Thus the Soviets could reduce their launchers by 20 or 25 percent and still be permitted upwards of 18,000 warheads on their remaining missiles. This is more than twice the 7900 warheads the Soviets now possess.

*July 16
N.H. Statement
D. off*
~~But now we hear that the Soviets in Geneva are telling U.S. Congressmen that a large reduction -- 25 percent or greater -- is~~

Late in the round, the Soviets surfaced some concepts which could involve possible reductions in existing offensive nuclear arsenals. However, the method of aggregation proposed in these concepts seems one sidely to favor preservation of the Soviet Union's primary area of advantage, its near monopoly in prompt, hard target kill capability. Efforts by the U.S. delegation to elicit some precision about these concepts with regard to numbers, ceilings, rates of possible reduction and the like, also went essentially unanswered. In this regard, we are disappointed that the Soviet Union has been unable to deal in concrete terms and with hard numbers, even framed as overall negotiating goals.

~~President has given his team, then the difference can be narrowed.~~

The Soviets will, by virtue of their highly competitive nature and past success with their propaganda campaigns, be tempted to continue to tie their offers to demands that the US give up research on defensive systems. Our research is taking place on defensive systems which we include under the term Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI). Moreover, the Soviets also have previously agreed that limiting research is unverifiable. ~~and~~ Hence ^{it} cannot be subject to ^{an effective} agreement. ~~admitted that research is unverifiable.~~

while ~~the~~ ^{have been trying} Soviets ~~can be counted upon to try~~ to limit such defensive research in the West, ~~at~~ the same time, comparable

research in the Soviet Union ^{LS} ~~would~~ proceed^{ing} at full speed. What is little understood in the West is that the Soviets have been conducting research on defensive systems for over 15 years. In fact, the Soviets have spent fully 50 percent of their defense budget on defensive systems. They have the only ABM system -- 100 missiles -- fully deployed. In addition, they have a huge air defense establishment amounting to about 10,000 surface-to-air missiles and about 4000 interceptor aircraft, in contrast to a handful of surface-to-air missiles and about 250 interceptor aircraft in the US. The Soviets, while attempting to thwart our anti-satellite program, have the only deployed anti-satellite system in existence today.

In the end, we can expect Gorbachev to do what he believes to be in the best interests of the Soviet Union. While the Soviets do not have a public constituency which calls for arms control agreements or a legislative branch which controls funds for defense programs, we nevertheless expect the Soviets will find it in their own self-interest to reduce the number and destructive power of their nuclear weapons. The more sophisticated elements of the Soviet leadership, and in particular their military leaders, realize that the Soviets' security interests, even as they define it, can be served at lower levels of strategic offensive weapons. All the more reason, therefore, for pointing out that now is the time for the Soviets to exhibit some genuine movement in Geneva.

There will be increasing speculation, of course, about the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev

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in Geneva this November. I will not add to that speculation.

I think it would be a mistake to expect the meeting to ~~produce~~ produce a major arms control agreement. However, we should not have high expectations about the outcome of this meeting, especially in the field of arms control. In the first place, the Soviets have not, to date, contributed to a realistic possibility. But the meeting can give progress in the negotiations in Geneva. Therefore, unless the Soviets do an abrupt about-face in the near future, there will be no results to discuss at this meeting. It will provide the opportunity for our two leaders to discuss the key substantive issues before us and to agree on an agenda for subsequent negotiation. If Mr. Gorbachev approaches the issues as seriously and constructively as the President will, then we can expect the hope that the meeting will be an important step in moving us toward agreements which enhance both countries' security by reducing the high levels of offensive nuclear weapons. in pursuing arms control negotiations.

As I said earlier, we have provided the Soviets with an opportunity. President Reagan is going the extra mile by displaying restraint in connection with our "no undercut" policy. The Soviets are also well aware that our patience cannot be expected to last forever. In this connection, the Soviets know of President Reagan's direction to Secretary Weinberger to present him recommendations by November 15th as to those programs needed to accelerate and augment our strategic modernization program.

It must be abundantly clear that the ball is in the Soviet

court. President Reagan has, in a truly statesmanlike way, announced on June 10th that the United States will continue for the time being to be patient, show restraint, and not to undercut existing SALT agreements. President Reagan has given General Secretary Gorbachev time to bring the Soviets back into compliance with the SALT agreements and the ABM Treaty, and to begin bargaining seriously in Geneva.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 15, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. ~~MARLOCK~~ *ASE*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Rowny Draft Speech for Comstock Club 19 July

I have reviewed and concur in Ambassador Rowny's draft presentation at TAB A (as amended) to the Comstock Club in Sacramento, California on July 19, 1985.

KS Karna Small, *SK* Sven Kraemer and *7.9* Don Fortier concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Nicholas Platt at Tab I.

Approve *um*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Memo to Nicholas Platt

Tab A Draft Speech



July 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Mr. William Martin✓
OSD - Col. David Brown
ACDA - Mr. William Staples

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Speech

Ambassador Rowny and Secretary of Defense Weinberger will be addressing the Comstock Club in Sacramento, California on July 19. Please find attached Ambassador Rowny's presentation for the event.

Please submit comments to S/ART - Fred Shaheen (632-4153) by COB Monday, July 15.

B. McKinley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR F06-114/2 # 7508

July 16, 1985

ACTION BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: Embassy Moscow Security and
Replacement of Soviet Nationals

RCM HAS SEEN

I understand that Defense placed this item on the agenda for your breakfast meeting tomorrow.

I am not sure whether there is an issue here or not. I have been informed that State has plans well advanced to begin the replacement of the majority of Soviet nationals with Americans when our move into the new Embassy building makes this possible. I have been working closely with State management on this issue, since I have long been convinced that such a move is desirable -- actually more on grounds of efficiency than of security, since I believe that some have exaggerated the security threat local employees in segregated locations can pose.

Presumably Whitehead or Armacost will be prepared to outline what State has in mind. My understanding is that several steps will be taken, including:

- (1) No Soviet nationals allowed in the main Embassy building;
- (2) Replacement of most Soviet white-collar workers with Russian-speaking Americans;
- (3) Replacement of many of the support staff either with military personnel (e.g. Seabees) or with contract personnel.

You should be aware that State's Office of Security is most dubious about the last of these plans. In their opinion -- which is based on considerable experience -- Americans who do not know the language and do not have a professional interest in the Soviet Union are more likely to cause security problems than the others. The tendency to get involved in blackmarketing or sexual liaisons is substantial. State SY would frankly prefer to segregate Soviet nationals, who are known risks and can therefore be dealt with on that basis, to bringing large numbers of American support workers to Moscow. This point of view should not be totally dismissed, but my understanding is that Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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Shultz has given instructions to develop plans to replace as many Soviet employees as possible.

I have attached at Tab I Art Hartman's summary of the steps he has recommended to meet both the physical and personnel security issues at the Embassy. On the whole I consider it sound, but I believe there is somewhat greater potential for replacing Soviet employees than Hartman's report suggests.

RECOMMENDATION

If the question arises, I would suggest that you stay largely in a listening mode, but you may wish to make the following points:

1. We encourage movement to replace as many Soviet nationals as seems practical, and urge that concrete plans to do so be completed as soon as possible.
2. We recognize that we will not insure Embassy security merely by replacing Soviets with Americans, but that the process must be handled in a way which does not create greater potential security problems by dumping large numbers of ill-prepared and motivated Americans in the very difficult environment Moscow represents.

Attachment:

Tab I - "A Plan for Security Enhancement at Embassy Moscow"
(Hartman proposal)

HOUSE
STON

JUL-C
JFMOS
8th to Gorbachev
90774

EYES ONLY

Matlock

EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ALL ENCLOSED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/10/02

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	
William Martin	2		
John Poindexter	3		
Paul Thompson	4		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
William Martin	6	um	
NSC Secretariat	7	BT	return to MATLOCK for further action.
Situation Room	8		Close hold.
<i>Matlock</i>			<i>A</i>
I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action			

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

This is a very good letter.
JP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

July 18, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 #7509

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *km*BY KNL NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Regarding the State Memo with a draft of a letter from the President to Gorbachev and your profs note on the subject, the background is as follows:

The President now has two unanswered letters from Gorbachev, one of June 10 which was in reply to his long letter which touched on items on the entire agenda, and one of June 22 in reply to the President's letter on his interim restraint decision (copies are at Tabs IV and V). Pursuant to your decision, State was also tasked to prepare the invitation to send nuclear testing experts to our test site in the form of a Presidential letter. They felt, and I concur, that it would not be a good idea for the President to send a letter on this subject and ignore the unanswered letters he has received.

As for the non-paper, I don't believe State considered the President's letter as an answer to it. Rick in effect answered it on the spot when he told Sokolov that it was acceptable to us.

COMMENT:

I believe it is appropriate for the President to react to the Gorbachev letters of June 10 and 22 when he makes his nuclear testing proposal. However, I agree with you that the State draft is defective in some basic aspects. First, it does not really answer the two Gorbachev letters. And second, as you point out, by concentrating on the possibility of agreements in advance of the Geneva meeting, it is likely to leave the impression that we are panting for them.

I have redrafted the letter totally, except for the section on nuclear testing which I have left intact. In doing so, I have tried to do several things: (1) Answer some of the more egregious claims made by Gorbachev in his letters, since the Soviets tend to consider failure to answer charges as tacit confirmation of their accuracy; (2) Avoid extensive and detailed polemics, while reserving the President's position on all those matters not mentioned; (3) Include the testing invitation in the context of meeting an expressed Soviet concern, with the

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

suggestion that Gorbachev must show comparable regard for the concerns we have expressed; (4) Eliminate all talk of possible agreements before the Geneva meeting, while leaving the door open - for some if the Soviets wish; (5) Put the Geneva meeting in the context of an agenda-setting exercise.

This redraft is at Tab I. I believe it meets your concerns. I would note, however, that I have not shown it to State, and anticipate a good bit of pain when they see it. (They will cite the last paragraph of Gorbachev's letter of June 10, in which he expressed an interest in using the time before November "to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting". In my opinion, however, we should just let this stand and let the Soviets move toward some agreements if they really want them.)

Before spreading my draft further, I will need your reaction -- and your instructions in this regard. Perhaps it would be best, if you concur that my redraft is preferable, to deal directly with Secretary Shultz on the matter. I believe that it allows the Secretary full scope to discuss the whole range of issues with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, but at the same time positions the President well tactically. In effect, he will be saying, if you guys want some agreements, you know what you have to do. It's no skin off my back if you hang in tough and we don't have any for the meeting in November.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve or amend the draft at Tab I, subject to any coordination you may direct.

Approve *PCM exactly* Disapprove ____

2. That you approve my coordinating the arms control sections with Bob Linhard.

Approve *PCM* Disapprove ____

3. That you either handle the State clearance directly with Shultz, or authorize me to provide the draft to Rick Burt.

A. I'll handle with Shultz ____

OR

B. Supply the draft to Rick and get their reaction

*DOZ as of 7/19
but elevate it
quickly! P.
this week. PCM*

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-3-

Attachments:

Tab I	Matlock redraft of Presidential Letter
Tab II	Memo and draft from State
Tab III	Your profs note
Tab IV	Gorbachev letter of June 10
Tab V	Gorbachev letter of June 22

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated your kind message following my recent operation, and am pleased to assure you that my recovery is proceeding rapidly. Actually, the necessary cancellation of my public activities planned for this period allows me more time than I otherwise would have had to concentrate my attention on substantive issues, including those which have been part of our dialogue.

I have given the most careful attention to your letters of June 10 and June 22. Obviously, our views are still far apart on the practical aspects of most of the key issues facing us, and I believe that both of us will wish to pursue these matters in greater detail when we meet in November. Since we will be meeting before the end of the year, I will confine my comment at this time to a few observations which I hope may help us prepare for a constructive and productive meeting.

To be frank, my overall impression from your letters is that you have not yet seriously addressed many of the matters of deep concern to me which I have noted in our correspondence. It is encouraging to have general assurances of the Soviet Union's benign intentions in various areas of our relationship, and I can assure you with utter sincerity that the United States in no way threatens the security of the Soviet Union. However, as you wisely note, "in matters affecting the heart of national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of good intentions." If we are to narrow our differences and prepare the way for significant agreements, we must both be prepared to deal, in explicit and concrete terms, with the concerns of the other.

In regard to those issues you have raised with me, I have tried and will continue to try to explain the situation as we see it. If you feel you need more details to understand my view more fully, I will be pleased to supply them. At the same time I hope that you will give further study to those matters I have mentioned to you and will be prepared to deal with them in concrete fashion.

Reading your letter of March 10, I was astounded to note your allegation that the United States is developing "a new strategic weapon" to be deployed in space, as well as your statement that lasers could be used as disarming first-strike weapons and your subsequent charge that the United States is developing space weapons "capable of performing purely offensive missions." Mr. General Secretary, our scientists have informed me repeatedly that no element of our Strategic Defense Initiative is capable of application to weapons of mass destruction or to weapons which would be effective against hardened point targets

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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NLS F06-114/2 #7510

BY hjt NARA, DATE 11/21/07

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on earth such as missile silos. Now I am not debating intentions here (even though our intent is clear to confine our research to the feasibility of defensive weapons), but am referring rather to hard scientific and technical facts as I understand them.

If our scientists really disagree on these points, I would appreciate concrete examples of what specific aspects of a program to investigate the feasibility of defense against missiles which have been launched could be distorted to produce an offensive weapon capable either of mass destruction on earth or of use in a disarming first strike. Alternatively, we could arrange for our specialists to meet for a thorough discussion of this very point. If there is such a possibility, it would certainly be incumbent on both of us to act to preclude its realization in practice.

Since we have agreed to be candid, I must also tell you that the argument that Soviet research programs in the same scientific areas as those in our Strategic Defense Initiative are somehow fundamentally different from ours can hardly be expected to be persuasive to an impartial observer. As I see it, the only difference in our respective approaches to this research results from differences in our political systems. Ours requires us to debate every program in public; yours does not. Yet the research is in the same scientific areas, and I can perceive no basis for a claim that such research is destabilizing only when it is conducted by the American side. Have we not agreed to deal on the basis of equality?

So let us now finally get down to particulars and try to find a solution to the interrelated issues of offensive and defensive weapons. We will not find a mutually acceptable solution by recourse to propaganda or refusal to enter into the concrete bargaining necessary to realize our mutual goal of setting the world on a course toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In respect to your letter of June 22, I can only say that it does not alleviate the concerns over compliance with past agreements which I described to you in my letter of June 10. I hope that the two of us and our representatives will find the way soon to address and resolve these concerns in specific fashion, since resolution of these questions is a key element in making progress on equitable arms reduction.

I am, of course, prepared to address your concerns as well, and have a suggestion which I believe would lay to rest one of the issues which your government has raised with us. This is in the area of nuclear testing.

As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the test site in the United States, and

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for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985, exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the Soviet Government says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices they deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure that there are no obstacles posed by the United States which would make acceptance difficult. I believe it will be a useful step if we can eliminate the concerns the Soviet side has expressed on this matter and initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

There are of course many other important issues on our agenda, and I am pleased that our Foreign Ministers will be

meeting in Helsinki, and subsequently in New York to address them. I also hope to have the opportunity to discuss them personally with Minister Shevardnadze when he is in the United States this fall.

I am looking forward to our meeting in Geneva and believe that we should aim to draw up a joint agenda for steps to be taken to improve the relationship of our countries. If we can also agree upon mutually acceptable approaches to be followed by our negotiators on some of the important issues between us, that would be most helpful. In the meantime, it may be that some headway can be made on several of the issues that divide us, and if so, I would certainly welcome it.

Nevertheless, I feel that the value of our upcoming meeting should not be measured by the presence or absence of agreements to conclude, but rather by the degree to which it can contribute to narrowing our differences in critical areas and charting a course for constructive action in the future.

I will continue to give serious thought to the considerations you have raised in our correspondence, and hope that you will do the same in respect to the concerns I have voiced and the various suggestions I have made. As we prepare for our meeting I hope you will continue to call to my attention those matters which you feel I should address, just as I will be communicating my thoughts to you. This should assist us both in ensuring that our meeting is as constructive and productive as possible.

Sincerely,

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TO

McFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOC DATE 15 JUL 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 24, 1997

By CVS NARA, Date 6/15/01

KEYWORDS. USSR

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

SHEVARDNADZE, EDWARD

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV & FOMIN SHEVARDNADZE AGREEMENT TO MEET W/
SHULTZ IN HELSINKI / NEW YORK & WASHINGTON

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 18 JUL 85 STATUS S FILES SII

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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Pearson

William Martin

John Poindexter

Paul Thompson

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

William Martin

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

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SEQUENCE TO

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DISPOSITION

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I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze's Agreement to Meet in
Helsinki, New York and Washington

We attach at Tab 1 a draft text of the President's next letter to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. The letter reviews briefly the key issues on which the U.S. and USSR should focus in the months leading up to the November summit meeting in Geneva. It discusses the Geneva talks, the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on regional political issues, and our human rights concerns. It also identifies bilateral issues where prospects for early progress are most promising. In this context, the letter conveys the President's invitation for the Soviet Union to send technical experts to the Nevada Test Site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test.

Tab 2 is a Soviet non-paper given to Assistant Secretary Burt July 15 by Soviet Charge Oleg Sokolov. It conveys Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's agreement to meet with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki on July 31 from 2:00 to 5:00 p.m. The non-paper also expresses Shevardnadze's readiness to meet with Secretary Shultz in New York at the UN General Assembly this autumn and Shevardnadze's acceptance of the President's invitation to visit Washington for a meeting at the White House. These Soviet decisions have been reflected in the draft letter to Gorbachev.

Bornet Miley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

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Draft Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am pleased that we have now agreed to meet in Geneva November 19 and 20. I am looking forward to the opportunity to talk with you privately about the issues affecting our two countries. I am hopeful that we will be able to use that meeting productively for the improvement of relations between our two countries.

My approach to the Geneva meeting will be characterized by the same sense of realism and candor which has characterized our correspondence. I think we should use the time we have before November to look hard at our relationship. We should look carefully at the entire range of issues that we have been discussing and identify those areas where problems can be resolved and those areas where our discussions can clarify differences and identify possible solutions.

Secretary Shultz, in his July 3 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, discussed a number of issues on which we believe progress can be made between now and our meeting in November. Some of these issues are well known to you, but we think they deserve a fresh look. I hope the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki July 31 at the ceremonies commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act will be useful in carrying the exchange of views further. I also look forward to meeting at the White House this autumn with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, following his meeting with Secretary Shultz at the UN General Assembly.

I would like in this letter to review very briefly some of the key issues on which we should focus during the coming months. Clearly the central issues that we must address are the current negotiations in Geneva. We have tried to make every effort to promote progress in those talks -- to build up rather than tear down the current arms control regime. It was on this basis that I made my recent decision to continue our policy of not undercutting the SALT II agreement. I have to say I was disappointed in your reply. I believe, however, that this is an issue which can be discussed further when our Ministers meet at Helsinki and later. As I have written before, we need to correct the non-compliance with existing agreements and find new, radical ways to reduce the levels of nuclear arms, as our Foreign Ministers agreed in January in Geneva.

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At Geneva itself we continue to believe that artificial preconditions should be dropped and concrete bargaining should begin. In January our sides agreed to consider and resolve nuclear and space arms issues in their interrelationship. This does not mean, however, that progress on offensive nuclear arms issues should be held up pending agreement on defense and space arms. I think we should at least agree to allow our diplomats to get on with their work in the individual negotiating groups.

In this connection, I think it appropriate that during the upcoming recess period we each should reflect on discussions that took place during Round II of our negotiations with a view to moving those negotiations forward. I hope that should Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be prepared to meet with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki, he will be prepared to elaborate on your views in this area. The Secretary will be accompanied by our senior arms control advisors and will be prepared to address in a concrete fashion this entire range of questions.

Another arms control issue on which I believe we can move forward in the months ahead is nuclear testing. As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the United States' test site, and for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985 exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the government of the Soviet Union says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

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- 3 -

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices you deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure there are no obstacles from the U.S. side to its acceptance. I believe it would be a useful step, if in the months ahead we can initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

Let me turn to several non-arms control issues. During the past two months our experts have held talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan. I think the tenor of these meetings has demonstrated the usefulness of this dialogue. On Afghanistan, in particular, I believe the talks underscored the recognition on both sides that the situation in that tragic country is an ongoing problem in our relations. As our experts indicated in their presentation, we continue to be ready to discuss concrete steps that can contribute to the UN Secretary General's efforts to develop a negotiated solution. With regard to further regional experts' talks Secretary Shultz will be prepared in Helsinki to discuss scheduling an exchange on East Asian issues.

As we look to our meeting in November, there is no area in our relationship where the prospects for early progress are more promising than in the bilateral field. With the necessary political will we can take several important steps in the near future. In particular, we should authorize our negotiators at the upcoming third round of talks on Pacific air safety measures in Japan to finalize an agreement. There is no reason why existing differences cannot be resolved at this round. Satisfactory conclusion of a Pacific air safety agreement should open up possibilities for progress in other areas, such as civil aviation, and the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York.

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I also believe that prompt decisions at the political level can resolve the remaining outstanding issues in our negotiations of a new exchanges agreement. We are both agreed that expanded contacts between our two peoples are in the long-term interest of both countries. There is no need for further delay in realizing our mutual goals in this area.

Let me conclude with a few words concerning the comments in your June 10 letter on humanitarian issues. This is a topic with a long history in our relations. We have different approaches, but in the past it has proven possible through quiet efforts to deal with such issues in ways that benefitted both countries. I do not expect the differences in our approaches to be resolved quickly or easily. But perhaps the time has come again to focus on practical ways of dealing with each other's concerns. It seems to me that the period between now and our meeting in November should be a period of opportunity for progress in this field as in other areas of US-Soviet relations.

I would like to ask that you focus on this field with a view to determining how it too could contribute to the forward step in relations I think we both desire. As Secretary Shultz told Ambassador Dobrynin last week, it is not a question of negotiating, or of asking you to violate your laws, or of taking impossible steps on matters of great sensitivity. Rather, it is a question of taking feasible steps that can have a significant impact on the way we deal with each other across the agenda of issues before us.

You are familiar with the kinds of concerns we have identified in the past. I would ask you to give special attention to three of them. First, there is the question of Soviet spouses of American citizens who are repeatedly refused permission to unite their families in the United States. Second, there is the question of long-time applicants for exit permission to go to the United States who have a claim to US citizenship under our law. Third, there is the question of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who have been invited to join relatives abroad and have been refused permission to do so, at great hardship to them and their families, over the years. The first two categories are quite small, the last quite large. It might not be possible in a relatively short time to do more than resolve all the cases in the first two and make some headway in the third. But if that were indeed possible, I can assure you that the effect on our overall relationship would be substantial, and positive.

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Mr. General Secretary, we have an important, historic opportunity to put our relationship on a sound footing, sustainable for the long term. Our agenda is full of proposals which, if realized, can form the substance of a more constructive relationship. As we prepare for our meeting in November, I hope we can agree to move forward across a broad front.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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Edward A. Shevardnadze accepts the suggestion of the Secretary of State that they meet in Helsinki from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. on July 31. In view of the busy schedule of other functions, there will be definitely no possibility to have a second conversation there. For the same reasons, unfortunately, this time a lunch mentioned by the Secretary of State, does not appear possible either.

As to the range of issues, we proceed from the assumption that a general exchange of views will take place on the questions of Soviet-American relations and, perhaps, on certain international problems.

It would seem that there will be an opportunity for a more specific and detailed conversation when the Ministers meet in New York in late September. We are, certainly, in favor of continuing the practice of such meetings of the Ministers in the course of the General Assembly sessions.

Edward A. Shevardnadze expresses his gratitude for the invitation to visit Washington for a conversation with President Reagan and he hopes to take up this invitation.

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From: NSRCM --CPUA
To: NSJMP --CPUA

Date and time 07/16/85 17:35:24

TAB III

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NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: State memo--Letter to Gorbachev

The following are my thoughts concerning the State proposal for a letter from the President to Gorbachev. First, I'm not sure where the Reagan-Gorbachev dialogue stands; that is, who wrote last? Was it the President's letter on SALT "no undercut" or Gorbachev's reply to the April 30 RR letter? I tend to think that they crossed in the mail. Whatever] But if it is our turn to reply to Gorbachev then OK, but if it's their's, we should not send a Presidential letter and maybe not even if it is our turn.

As to substance, the Shultz answer to the Shevardnadze non-paper ought to go pack as a non-paper. And it ought to be short and sweet. That is, we ought to say--probably in an oral note to Sokolov this week--roger your last and we'll see you in Helsinki.

As we prepare for Geneva in November we must resist the temptation to force the pace of negotiation on the several fronts. Our stance is that this is a meeting to set an agenda not to conclude agreements.

Finally in any Presidential letter we might send, we ought not be laying out the laundry list of issues in the four areas with the view toward making progress beteen now and November--THAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG--and is the surest sign to them that we are panting to get some kind of agreement (and implicitly, that they can leverage our overanxiousness against us). The worst possible way to negotiate]] Any letter ought simply to say that the President looks to the meeting as an occasion for setting an agenda and priorities and possibly a game plan for moving on the several issues in the years ahead--period. I wouldn't even advert to the possiblity of reaching agreements before then--surely no more than to say "...it may be that some headway may be possible before we meet but I don't think that is essential, especially given your preoccupation with other matters now." Please pass this to Jack and ask that he staff this promptly.

cc: NSGVE --CPUA

NSJFM --CPUA

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/24/07

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TAB IV
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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
The President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 10, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I noted the intention expressed in your letter of April 30 to share thoughts in our correspondence with complete frankness. This is also my attitude. Only in this manner can we bring to each other the essence of our respective approaches to the problems of world politics and bilateral relations. In this regard I proceed from the assumption that in exchanging views we shall look to the need to move forward on key issues, otherwise one cannot count on a turn for the better in Soviet-American relations. I understand that you agree, too, that such a turn for the better is necessary.

To aim at a lesser goal, say, at simply containing tensions within certain bounds and trying somehow to manage from one crisis to another, is not, in my opinion, a prospect worthy of our two powers.

We noted the fact that you share our view on the need to give an impetus to the process of normalizing our relations. That, in and of itself, is not insignificant. But to be candid: a number of points in your letter perplex and puzzle, and those are the points on which a special stress is made.

What I mean is the generalizations about Soviet policy, contained in your letter, in connection with the deplorable incident with an American serviceman. As to the incident itself, we would like to hope that the explanations which were given by us were correctly understood by the American side.

Now turning to major problems. I also believe that agreement with regard to general principles alone is not sufficient. It is important that such agreement also be reflected in the practical actions of each side. I emphasize precisely each side, since it clearly follows from your letter that you see disparities between the principles and practice in the actions of the Soviet Union.

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BY CIS, NARA, Date 6/18/02
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That is very far from reality. There is nothing corresponding to the facts in the assertion that the USSR in its policy allegedly does not wish to conduct affairs with the U.S. on the basis of equality and reciprocity. No matter what area of our relations is taken, a really objective assessment indicates that it is precisely the Soviet Union that comes out consistently for equality and reciprocity and does not seek advantages for itself at the expense of the legitimate interests of the USA. And it was precisely when a similar approach was taken by the American side, too, that substantial agreements could be achieved.

It is not an accident that all agreements reached on the subject of arms limitation became possible only because both sides adhered in working them out to the principle of equality and equal security. At no point in time did the Soviet side demand more for itself. But as soon as the USA departed from that principle, the process of arms limitation and reduction was interrupted. Regrettably, this continues to be the case at present, too.

If, nevertheless, the question of equality and reciprocity is to be raised as a matter of principle, then it is the Soviet Union that is surrounded by American military bases, replete with nuclear weapons, rather than the USA by Soviet bases. Try to look at the situation through our eyes, then it will become clear who can have a real, substantiated concern.

Take practically any issue from the sphere of our bilateral relations, whether trade or, for example, air or sea communication. Is it, in fact, the case that the actual state of affairs in those areas is determined by the Soviet Union's being against equality and reciprocity? Quite the contrary: the low level of those relations is a direct consequence of the American side's policy, which is not compatible either with conducting affairs as equals or with reciprocity in the generally recognized meanings of these concepts.

Or take the following aspect of the question of principles and adherence to them. With regard to third countries, we impose neither our ideology nor our social system on anybody. One should not ascribe to us that which does not exist. If the question is to be raised without diplomatic contrivances as to who contributes to international law and order and who acts in a different direction, then it appears that it is precisely the US that turns out to be on the side of groupings working against legitimate governments. And what about direct pressure on governments whose policy does not suit the USA? There are enough examples of both on various continents.

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I addressed these issues frankly and in a rather detailed manner not to embark upon the road of mutual recriminations, but, rather, in the hope that it will help you to understand correctly our approach to principles and their practical implementation, and to appreciate our willingness to build our relations with the USA on the basis of equality and reciprocity with a positive and common understanding of these concepts.

I think a lot about the shape the affairs between our countries can take. And I ever more firmly believe in a point I made in my previous letter: an improvement in the relations between the USSR and USA is possible. There is objective ground for that.

Of course, our countries are different. This fact cannot be changed. There is also another fact, however: when the leaders of both countries, as the experience of the past shows, found in themselves enough wisdom and realism to overcome bias caused by the difference in social systems, in ideologies, we cooperated successfully and did quite a few useful things both for our peoples and for all other peoples. Of course, differences and different views remained, but it was our working together that was the determining factor. And it opened up confident, peaceful vistas.

I noted you also express yourself in favor of each social system's proving its advantages in peaceful competition. Yes, we proceed from the assumption that in this competition the USSR and USA will defend their ideals and moral values as each of our societies understands them. But it will result in nothing good if the ideological struggle should be carried over into the sphere of relations between states. I believe, you understand, what I mean.

The main conclusion that naturally follows from the mutual recognition of the need for peaceful competition is the need to renounce attempts to substitute the dispute of ideas with the dispute of weapons. One can hardly count on serious shifts in the nature of our relations so long as one side tries to gain advantages over the other on the path of the arms race - to talk with the other side "from a position of strength".

Mr. President, for understandable reasons the political leadership of both our countries must judge in a competent manner both existing and prospective weapons systems. This is extremely important in order to avoid miscalculations whose irreversible consequences will manifest themselves, if not today, then at some point in the future.

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In the past a rigid but at the same time quite fragile relationship was jointly defined between strategic nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems. The only correct conclusion was drawn - a treaty of indefinite duration to limit ABM systems was concluded. Only because of that did it become at all possible to tackle as a practical matter the problem of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

Attempts to develop a large-scale ABM system inevitably set in train a radical destabilization of the situation. Just the factor of uncertainty in and of itself will not only block any limitation of nuclear weapons, but will lead to their build-up and improvement. Therefore, when we resolutely raise the question, and state that the militarization of space is impermissible, it is not propaganda and not a consequence of some misunderstanding or fear of "falling behind technologically." It is a result of a thorough analysis, of our deep concern for the future of relations between our countries, and for the future of peace.

There is also another aspect of the program of "strategic defense" which remains as it were in a shadow for the general public. But not for responsible leaders and military experts. They talk in Washington about the development of a large-scale ABM system, but in fact a new strategic offensive weapon is being developed to be deployed in space. And it is a weapon no less dangerous in its capabilities than nuclear weapons. What difference does it make what will be used in a disarming first strike--ballistic missiles or lasers? If there is a difference, it is that with the new systems it will be possible to carry out a first strike practically instantaneously.

Thus, from no matter what point of view you approach it, the mere beginning of efforts to realize this program has a destabilizing character, even regardless of its final results. And it is precisely for this reason that it cannot fail to serve as an impetus to a further upswing of the arms race.

I think you will agree that in matters affecting the heart of national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of good intentions. Any weapons system is evaluated by its military capabilities, and not by public statements regarding its intended purpose.

All facts unambiguously indicate that the USA is embarking on the path of developing attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions. And we shall not ignore that. I must say this frankly. I must confess that what you have said about the USA's approach to the question of a

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moratorium on space and nuclear weapons enhances our concern. The persistent refusal of the American side to stop the arms race cannot but put in question the USA's intentions.

And what is going on at the negotiations in Geneva? The American side is trying to substitute only a part of the agreed mandate of the negotiations for the whole of it. An integral element is being removed from the actually agreed upon formula for the negotiations - the obligation to prevent an arms race in space, to consider and resolve all issues in their interrelationship. The American side has so far done nothing to bring agreement closer. On the subject of preventing an arms race in space the U.S. delegation has not presented a single idea. I emphasize, not a single one. Why should one be surprised after that, why indeed, that there is no movement on nuclear arms reduction?

I wish to mention in passing that the American representatives maintain - this point is also contained in your letter - that it is impossible to verify a ban on scientific research. However, a different thing is involved here: a federal program of research activities directly and specifically oriented towards the development of attack space weapons, a large-scale ABM system with space-based components. The very announcement of such a program is in clear contradiction to the ABM Treaty. (Incidentally, if one is to take the entire text of the "agreed statement" to the ABM Treaty, and not only the part which is quoted in your letter, it is easy to see that it is aimed not at weakening but at strengthening the central provision of the treaty on both sides' renunciation of the development of large-scale ABM systems).

As to the assertions that the USSR is allegedly engaged in its own "large scale research program in the area of strategic defense", here, as Americans put it, apples are being confused with oranges. The Soviet Union is doing nothing that would contravene the ABM Treaty; it is not developing attack space weapons.

Thus, the question of verification is in this case a far-fetched question, if one is clearly to proceed from the premise that nothing can be done - no matter what names one can come up with for it - that is unambiguously prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Mr. President, I would like to hope that you will have another close look at the problem of non-militarization of space, at its interrelationship with solving the problem of nuclear weapons, and from that angle, at the prospects for the

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Geneva negotiations. It is in this objective linkage that there lies a resolution of the problems of the limitation of nuclear arms, a real possibility to get down to their radical reduction and thereby to proceed to the liquidation of nuclear weapons as such. In any case we shall not be able to avoid having precisely this complex of issues as a determining factor both for our relations and for the situation in the world as a whole. This follows from the special responsibility of our two countries.

I am convinced that we must and can rise to this responsibility. In this connection I note with satisfaction your words to the effect that our two countries have a common interest prevailing over other things - to avoid war. I fully agree with that.

Now, with regard to what other steps could be taken, including steps to stimulate progress in Geneva, we are convinced that of very important - and practical - significance would be the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. In this area a lot can be done by our two countries. Specifically, we propose the following practical steps. To put into effect the hitherto unratified Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976. To come to terms on the resumption of trilateral - with the participation of Britain - negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and, acting vigorously, to work towards their speedy and successful conclusion. Finally, we propose that the USSR and USA cooperate in carrying out such a specific and very substantial step on the part of all nuclear powers as a moratorium on any nuclear explosions would be. We are in favor of introducing such a moratorium as soon as possible.

The problem of prohibiting chemical weapons needs to be resolved. But its resolution should be sought realistically. I must say that the positions which the USA has so far had on a number of important aspects of this problem do not meet this criterion. We would like the American side to turn its attention to the proposals we have put forward. We agree that bilateral consultations between our representatives would be useful, for example, within the framework of the Geneva Conference on disarmament. It should be recognized, however, that the efforts which are being made in the USA for chemical rearmament, above all as concerns binary weapons, are not a favorable prerequisite at all for removing chemical weapons completely and forever from the military arsenals of states.

The state of things at the Stockholm Conference leaves one with an ambiguous impression. On the one hand, it would seem

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that there is common understanding regarding the need for an agreement on the basis of an optimal combination of major political obligations and military-technical confidence-building measures. On the other hand, the Western representatives, particularly the American representatives, clearly are not in a hurry to fill this understanding with specific, mutually acceptable - I emphasize, mutually acceptable - content. We favor a substantial understanding, genuinely facilitating enhanced confidence. Such are the instructions of our representatives. They are prepared to listen to constructive considerations which the American delegation may have. To put it briefly, we are for working towards a successful conclusion of the conference.

I would like, Mr. President, to draw your attention to the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Sometimes we hear from the American representatives that our proposals made last February "stimulate interest." But it does not show at all at the negotiations themselves. It would seem that reaching agreement on initial reductions of the Soviet and American forces in that area would be in your and in our interests, in the interests of a military relaxation in Europe. Could you look into it to see whether you might find it possible to advance things in this area?

One of the sources of tension in the relations between the USSR and USA is a difference in the assessment of what is going on in the world. It seems that the American side frequently ignores the in-depth causes of events and does not take fully into account the fact that today a great number of states operate - and most actively, too - in world politics, each with its own face and interests. All this immeasurably complicates the general picture. A correct understanding of this would help avoid serious mistakes and miscalculations.

In the past we had a positive experience of joint action in lowering tensions in some areas and in preventing dangerous outbreaks. But it worked this way when a readiness was shown to take into account the legitimate interests of each other and the positions of all the sides involved in a certain situation.

We positively assess the agreement of the American side to have exchanges of views on some regional problems. We expect it to accept our proposal that a wider range of regional problems be the subject of such exchanges and that those exchanges look to seek specific ways of settling tense situations. In this connection I noted the readiness expressed in your letter to work together with the Soviet Union so that the situation around Afghanistan would move toward a peaceful settlement. I would

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like to have a more clear understanding of how the American side sees this. Such an opportunity is provided by the upcoming consultations of our experts.

However, our opinions in this matter as well will be based upon practical deeds of the USA. From the point of view of achieving a political settlement, and not only from that point of view, we cannot accept what you say in your letter with respect to Pakistan. We perceive the behavior of that country not only as not corresponding to the goal of a political settlement around Afghanistan, but also as dangerous and provocative. We expect that the U.S., being closely linked with Pakistan and also taking into account its own interests, will exert a restraining influence on it. The curtailing of its direct support to antigovernment armed groups intruding into Afghanistan from Pakistan would be a positive signal from the American side. In other words the USA has the opportunities to confirm by its actions its declared readiness to achieve a political settlement around Afghanistan on the basis of a just solution of the questions connected with it and to eliminate tensions in this region as a whole. Such a mode of action would not be left unnoticed by our side and would clearly work toward straightening out Soviet-American relations.

Some kind of movement seems to be discernible in the area of strictly bilateral relations between our countries. You, obviously, have noticed that we support this trend. However, there should be no misunderstanding concerning the fact that we do not intend and will not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet Union. We, as any other sovereign state, have regarded and will regard these questions in accordance with our existing laws and regulations. Let us, Mr. President, proceed from this in order not to aggravate additionally our relations. The development of our ties can be based only on mutual interest, equality and mutual benefit, and respect for each other's rights and legitimate interests.

We consider it positive that in some instances the once diffuse structure of Soviet-American relations is beginning - although not very intensively, to be frank - to be restored and to be filled with content. In particular, we consider useful the talks between our ministers of trade which took place in Moscow recently. We intend to look for mutually acceptable solutions in other areas as well, which constitute the subject of discussion between us, and to expand the range of such areas.

It is encouraging that contacts, including those between parliaments of our two countries, have become more active recently. As I have already said to the representatives of the

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US Congress, we live in a time when people shaping the policy of the USSR and the USA must necessarily meet and have contacts with each other. To speak in broad terms, we stand for vigorously building a bridge to mutual understanding and cooperation and for developing trust.

In conclusion, I would like to confirm my positive attitude to a personal meeting with you. I understand that you feel the same way. Our point of view on this matter was outlined by Andrey A. Gromyko to Mr. Shultz during their stay recently in Vienna. As to the place for holding it, I understand there are reasons which make you prefer the meeting to be held in the USA. But I have reasons no less weighty which, taking into account the present state of Soviet-American relations, make this variant unrealistic.

Important international problems are involved and we should use the time to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting. For our part, we entirely favor that such should be the case. .

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

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Translation from the Russian

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with your letter of June 10, in which you outline the U.S. Government's decision on the SALT II Treaty made public the same day, I deem it necessary to express the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership on this matter.

I shall start by stating that your version of the past and present state of affairs in the key areas of Soviet-American relations, that of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, cannot withstand comparison with the actual facts. Evidently, it was not by chance that you chose 1982 as your point of reference, the year when the American side declared its readiness to comply with the main provisions of the SALT II Treaty, unratified by the United States. Unfortunately, however, it was not this that determined the general course of your administration's policy and its practical actions with regard to strategic armaments.

It is hard to avoid the thought that a choice of a different kind had been made earlier, when it was stated outright that you did not consider yourself bound by the obligations assumed by your predecessors under agreements with the Soviet Union. This was perceived by others, and in the United States too, as repudiation of the arms limitations process and the search for agreements.

This was confirmed in practice: an intensive nuclear arms race was initiated in the United States. Precisely through this race, it would seem, and began to see and continues to see to this day the main means for achieving "prevailing" positions in the world under the guise of assuring U.S. national security.

In this sense, the few steps of the American side that you mentioned that went in a different direction and took account of the realities of today's world, are they not just temporary, "interim?"

It is not for the sake of polemics, but in order to restore the full picture of what has occurred, that I would like to return briefly to what has been done by the United States with regard to the current regime for strategic stability.

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One cannot dispute the fact that the American side created an ambiguous situation whereby the SALT II Treaty, one of the pillars of our relationship in the security sphere, was turned into a semi-functioning document that the U.S., moreover, is now threatening to nullify step by step. How can one then talk about predictability of conduct and assess with sufficient confidence the other side's intentions?

It is difficult to evaluate the damage done to our relationship and to international stability as a whole by your administration's decision to break off a process of negotiations that the USSR and the U.S. assumed a legal obligation to conduct. Such an obligation is contained in the very text of the SALT II Treaty, as well as in the accompanying "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms."

The chain ensuring the viability of the process of curbing the arms race, put together through great effort, was consciously broken.

Today it is especially clear that this caused many promising opportunities to slip by, while some substantial elements of our relationship in this area were squandered.

The United States crossed a dangerous threshold when it preferred to cast aside the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty instead of immediately taking up, as was envisaged, the resolution of these issues which were dealt with in the Protocol. Those issues are of cardinal importance - the limitation and prohibition of entire classes of arms. It is no secret as to what guided the American side in taking this step: it wanted to gain an advantage by deploying long-range cruise missiles. As a result, already today one has to deal with thousands of such missiles. The U.S. sought to sharply tilt in its favor the fine-tuned balance of interests underlying the agreement. Now you see, I believe, that it did not work out this way. We too are deploying cruise missiles, which we had proposed to ban. But even now we are prepared to come to an agreement on such a ban, should the U.S., taking a realistic position, agree to take such an important step.

The deployment in Western Europe of new nuclear systems designed to perform strategic missions was a clear circumvention, that is non-compliance, by the American side with regard to the SALT II Treaty. In this, Mr. President, we see an attempt by the United States, taking advantage of geographic factors, to gain a virtual monopoly on the use weapons in a situation for which our country has no analogue. I know that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes cited. But even in

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that case it is incomprehensible why the U.S. refuses to resolve this issue in a manner which would establish in the zone of Europe a balance of medium-range missiles, whereby the USSR would not have more missiles and warheads on them than are currently in the possession of England and France. Such a formula would not infringe upon anyone's interests, whereas the distortion caused by the American missiles in Europe is not a balance at all.

In broader terms, all these violations by the United States of the regime for strategic stability have one common denominator: departure from the principle of equality and equal security. This and nothing else is the reason for the lack of progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms over the past 4-5 years.

However, I would like you to have a clear understanding of the fact that, in practice, strategic parity between our countries will be maintained. We cannot envisage nor can we permit a different situation. The question, however, is at what level parity will be maintained -- at a decreasing or an increasing one. We are for the former, for the reduction in the level of strategic confrontation. Your government, by all indications, favors the latter, evidently hoping that at some stage the U.S. will ultimately succeed in getting ahead. This is the essence of the current situation.

Should one be surprised, then, that we are conducting negotiations, yet the process of practical arms limitation remains suspended? It would probably not be too great a misfortune if this process simply remained frozen. But even that is not the case. The "star wars" program -- I must tell you this, Mr. President -- already at this stage is seriously undermining stability. We strongly advise you to halt this sharply destabilizing and dangerous program while things have not gone too far. If the situation in this area is not corrected, we shall have no choice but to take steps required by our security and that of our allies.

We are in favor, as you say, of making the best use of the chance offered by the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Our main objective at those negotiations should be to reestablish the suspended process of limiting the arms race and to prevent its spread into new spheres.

The SALT-II Treaty is an important element of the strategic equilibrium, and one should clearly understand its role as well as the fact that, according to the well-known expression, one cannot have one's pie and eat it too.

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Your approach is determined by the fact that the strategic programs being carried out by the United States are about to collide with the limitations established by the SALT II Treaty, and the choice is being made not in favor of the Treaty, but in favor of these programs. And this cannot be disavowed or concealed, to put it bluntly, by unseemly attempts to accuse the Soviet Union of all mortal sins. It is, moreover, completely inappropriate in relations between our two countries for one to set forth conditions for the another as is done in your letter with regard to the Soviet Union.

I am saying all this frankly and unequivocally, as we have agreed.

One certainly cannot agree that the provisions of the SALT II Treaty remain in force allegedly as the result of restraint on the part of the United States. Entirely the contrary. The general attitude toward the Treaty shown by the American side and its practical actions to undermine it have given us every reason to draw appropriate conclusions and to take practical steps. We did have and continue to have moral, legal and political grounds for that.

We did not, however, give way to emotions; we showed patience, realizing the seriousness of the consequences of the path onto which we were being pushed. We hoped also that sober reasoning, as well as the self-interest of the U.S., would make the American side take a more restrained position. That was what in fact happened to a certain, though not to a full, extent. And we have treated this in businesslike fashion. Without ignoring what has been done by the American side contrary to the SALT II Treaty, we nevertheless at no time have been the initiators of politico-propagandistic campaigns of charges and accusations. We have striven to discuss seriously within the framework of the SCC the well-founded concerns we have had. We also have given exhaustive answers there to questions raised by the American side.

Unfortunately, the behavior of the other side was and continues to be utterly different. All those endless reports on imaginary Soviet violations and their publication did not and cannot serve any useful purpose, if one is guided by the task of preserving and continuing the process of arms limitation. Why mince words, the objective is quite different: to cast aspersions on the policy of the Soviet Union in general, to sow distrust toward it and to create an artificial pretext for an accelerated and uncontrolled arms race. All this became evident to us already long ago.

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One has to note that your present decision, if it were to be implemented, would be a logical continuation of that course. We would like you, Mr. President, to think all this over once again.

In any event, we shall regard the decision that you announced in the entirety of its mutually-exclusive elements which, along with the usual measures required by the Treaty, include also a claim to some "right" to violate provisions of the Treaty as the American side chooses. Neither side has such a right. I do not consider it necessary to go into specifics here, a lot has been said about it, and your military experts are well aware of the actual, rather than distorted, state of affairs.

One should not count on the fact that we will be able to come to terms with you with respect to destroying the SALT II Treaty through joint efforts. How things will develop further depends on the American side, and we shall draw the appropriate conclusions.

The question of the approach to arms limitation has been, is, and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the overall international situation is concerned. It is precisely here, above all, that the special responsibility borne by our two countries is manifested, as well as how each of them approaches that responsibility.

In more specific terms, it is a question of intentions with regard to one other. No matter what is being done in other spheres of our relationship, in the final analysis, whether or not it is going to be constructive and stable depends above all on whether we are going to find a solution to the central issues of security on the basis of equality and equal security.

I would like to reaffirm that, for our part, we are full of resolve to strive to find such a solution. This determines both our attitude toward those initial limitations which were arrived at earlier through painstaking joint labor, and our approach to the negotiations currently underway in Geneva and elsewhere.

I wish to say this in conclusion: one would certainly like to feel tangibly the same attitude on the part of the United States. At any rate, as I have already had a chance to note, we took seriously the thought reiterated by you in our correspondence with regard to a joint search for ways to improve Soviet-American relations and to strengthen the foundations of peace.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

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