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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (2/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1003

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7494	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ADELMAN MEMO ON LESSONS FROM US-USSR SUMMITS R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	2	7/8/1985	B1
7495	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PAPER ON LESSONS OF U.S.-USSR SUMMITRY R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	ND	B1
7502	MEMO	US-USSR LEADERSHIP MEETINGS: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	7	ND	B1
7496	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, JULY 3, 1985 R 1/11/2012 M125/2	2	7/8/1985	B1
7497	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHULTZ JULY 3 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	ND	B1
7498	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7497 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	ND	B1
7500	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN JULY 3 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	7	7/3/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (2/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1003

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7501	MEMCON	CONVERSATION BETWEEN SHULTZ AND DOBRYNIN RE REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT; HELSINKI MEETING <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	8	7/3/1985	B1
7499	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/10/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

54-c
ID 505105

RECEIVED 29 JUN 85 11

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM ROCKEFELLER, DAVID

DOC DATE 19 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

MP

SUBJECT: THANK YOU LTR TO MCFARLANE FM ROCKEFELLER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 05 JUL 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH
HALL
THOMPSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8505004

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(LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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Mcfarlane	X 7/1	For Signature	7/5	
	C 7/6	Mcfarlane Sgd H		Jmz a H

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 6, 1985

Dear David:

Thank you for your kind and generous letter of June 19.

I want you to know how much I enjoyed talking to Andrei Voznesensky and appreciate your steering him our way.

I am glad the President was able to see him. It would be a different world if the Soviet political leadership shared his deeply humane attitudes.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. David Rockefeller
30 Rockefeller Plaza
Room 5600
New York, New York 10112

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 1, 1985
*Int Pack*ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter from David Rockefeller

David Rockefeller sent you a letter June 19 thanking you for the photographs you sent, for the President's "birthday" letter and for your receiving Andrei Voznesensky and arranging for him to see the President.

I believe a reply is not necessary, but if you would like to send one, a text is at TAB I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter if you wish to reply to Rockefeller's thank you note.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

TAB I Letter to Mr. David Rockefeller

TAB A Thank you Letter to Mr. McFarlane

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10112

Room 5600

247-3700

June 19, 1985

Dear Bud:


I owe you a letter of thanks on several counts. First of all, thank you for sending me some excellent photographs taken at the time of the President's address to the Council of the Americas on May 21. The two photographs which you sent me are extremely good of the President; and, of course, it is flattering to me that I should be seated just behind him.

Thank you also for the surprise birthday letter from the President which you handed me just as I left your office on June 12, the day of my birthday. I cannot imagine how you knew this, but, even taking for granted the excellence of your intelligence system, I very much appreciate your having taken the trouble to ask the President to sign such an extremely friendly and thoughtful letter. It is certainly one which I shall always treasure.

Finally, I should like to thank you for your courtesy in receiving Andre Voznesensky. He is apparently an outstanding poet and is certainly a folklore hero in the Soviet Union. He greatly enjoyed his visit with you and was enormously impressed that you should have organized a meeting for him with the President as well. I am convinced that a gesture of this kind is bound to have beneficial effects in terms of our relations, even though it is difficult to measure those benefits in quantitative terms.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



David Rockefeller

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JKM*

SUBJECT: Adelman Memo on Lessons from U.S.-Soviet Summits

Ken Adelman has sent you the memo at Tab A which discusses "lessons" learned from previous meetings of the U.S. and Soviet leaders and which he suggests might be appropriate for the President's weekend reading.

The paper contains a number of useful observations, though I feel that it is slanted a bit toward the negative. I disagree with a couple of Ken's conclusions, but must admit that they represent arguable positions. Specifically, I believe that some high-level meetings did in fact moderate Soviet behavior temporarily, and had the potential to do so for more extended periods if we had used the "understandings" properly thereafter. Second, regarding Ken's comments on the Vladivostok agreements, the problem here -- in procedural terms -- was that the Soviets sensed that Ford would probably lose the 1976 election and therefore held off negotiating seriously that year in the hope of getting a better deal from Ford's successor. Finally, in concentrating on arms control almost exclusively, Ken misses some of the benefits derived from agreements in other areas which were made possible in the context of the meetings in the early 1970's.

Nevertheless, the paper may well be useful in alerting the President early on to some of the possible pitfalls on the way to Geneva. I leave it to your judgment whether it would be useful in the President's weekend reading at this time.

DF Fortier and *RL* Linhard concur.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/2 #7494

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the President the attached memorandum, if in your judgment the Adelman paper would be useful to him at this time.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A "US-Soviet Leadership Meetings: Lessons from
Experience," by Kenneth Adelman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

1
SYSTEM II
90744

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Paper on Lessons of U.S.-Soviet Summitry

Ken Adelman has sent over the attached paper on lessons derived from past meetings of U.S. and Soviet leaders. Although I would probably draw slightly different conclusions on some of the points, I believe you will find it interesting reading. It points out some of the potential pitfalls we must guard against as we prepare the way for your meeting with Gorbachev in September.

Attachment:

Tab A Paper entitled "US-Soviet Leadership Meetings:
Lessons from Experience"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2# 7495
BY hst NARA DATE 11/21/07

RECEIVED 05 JUL 85 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM ADELMAN, K

DOC DATE 03 JUL 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By JS NARA, Date 6/18/02

KEYWORDS. USSR

SUMMIT

SUBJECT: US - USSR LEADERSHIP MTGS RE LESSONS FM EXPERIENCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 09 JUL 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

FORTIER

LINHARD

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COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

9
SYSTEM II
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OUTSIDE SYSTEM

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

July 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Leadership Meetings: Lessons from Experience

A paper on this topic -- which has been updated from a May 1984 version -- is attached for the President's weekend reading. It is especially timely given the scheduled November 19 - 21 meetings in Geneva.


Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment:
As stated

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 6/15/02

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

US-SOVIET LEADERSHIP MEETINGS: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE

Now that a meeting has been set between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev, speculation will be rife about what such a meeting can and cannot produce. What does history show?

Lessons can be gleaned from the 11 summits held since WWII. Of these, two were four-power meetings (US, USSR, UK and France) held in 1955 and 1960. The other nine were bilateral US-USSR meetings.

Arms control has been a topic at all the meetings. Strategic arms control in particular has been a key topic -- if not the key topic -- for the US in the 1967 Johnson/Kosygin summit and the subsequent six summits: Nixon/Brezhnev in 1972, 1973, 1974; Ford/Brezhnev in 1974, 1975 and Carter/Brezhnev in 1979.

A look at the benefits and risks of summits yields several lessons:

1. Direct and personal communications between the two leaders, "sizing up" each other, can be important but not always helpful (for example, depending on how the US President is "sized up").
2. Summits can spur on the generally slow-moving government machinery to get things done -- nothing energizes like a deadline -- but whether this is helpful depends on what is done.
3. The US image in Western Europe generally improves with summits, especially beforehand.
4. Presidential popularity at home may increase, although that has not always been the case and the duration of that rise can be fleeting.
5. "Working summits" may be a good idea in theory, but it is extremely difficult in reality to avoid generating false hopes and expectations, and to properly manage the drive for "products" to be announced and/or concluded at summits. In the US there is more pressure for concrete results.
6. Presidential-level negotiations at summits are risky business at best and consequently should be avoided, if at all possible.
7. Summits have clearly not helped moderate Soviet behavior around the globe.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Fol6-114/2-#7502

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07

Why Summits Occurred

The impetus for holding summits since WWII has varied. Lobbying by US Allies (the UK and France) was a principal factor leading to the 1955 Geneva summit, the first of its kind since Potsdam in 1945. The Soviets originated the proposal that led to the 1960 Paris summit. The hastily-arranged Johnson/Kosygin summit in 1967, to take advantage of Kosygin's visit for an emergency UN session on the Middle East War, was also initiated by the Soviets. The initiative has sometimes been shared by the US and USSR, as in the case of the 1961 Kennedy/Khrushchev summit and all the subsequent Nixon, Ford and Carter summits.

Who pushes for a summit is important to its results and effects. In 1946 George Kennan offered a relevant lesson on this point:

Do not encourage high-level exchanges of views with the Russians unless the initiative comes at least fifty per cent from their side...Russians can be dealt with satisfactorily only when they themselves want something and feel themselves in a dependent position.

This wisdom was reflected in Kissinger's experience in 1970 when he first indicated to Ambassador Dobrynin US interest in a summit:

...obviously Moscow wanted to be paid for the summit in advance; the more eager we appeared, the higher would be the price.

Preconditions. In some instances, the US set preconditions for holding a summit. Eisenhower, for example, repeated several times in 1959 that he would not participate in a summit without, among other things, some demonstration of Soviet flexibility on the Berlin crisis. The conditions were sufficiently met by the end of the year to invite Khrushchev to a summit in 1960. (That summit fell apart when Khrushchev walked out because of, or at least using as a pretext, the U-2 incident.)

Expectations. Official expectations have also varied. In 1955 the US expected only generalities to come out of the summit, with negotiations on specifics to be left to subsequent foreign ministers' meetings. By the 1970s, the US generally insisted on concrete agreements or achievements completed by the time of or at the summits. This increased pressure on us to produce agreements, especially arms control agreements.

Format. Summits have varied greatly in procedural format. The 1955 four-power meeting involved elaborate preparations and highly formal presentations by the leaders. At the other end was the informal, intimate setting of the Nixon/Brezhnev discussions in the Crimea in July 1974 with only a Soviet interpreter present.

Backdrop. The international setting surrounding summits has also differed greatly. One of the most auspicious settings was in July 1955. That summit occurred after (1) the momentous decisions to rearm and integrate West Germany into NATO (a prior achievement Eisenhower required for there to be a summit), and (2) the sudden Soviet agreement in May, after more than a decade of stalled negotiations, to withdraw its occupation forces from and allow establishment of a neutral, democratic Austria. (This was one of the only two examples where the Soviets subsequently withdrew the Red Army from countries it occupied at the end of WWII, Iran in 1946 being the other case.)

Much less auspicious backdrops have been more frequent throughout the history of summits. These include (1) the U-2 incident shortly before the Paris summit in May 1960 (which broke up bitterly after only one day), (2) the defeat of US-supported forces at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, only a few weeks before the Kennedy/Khrushchev summit in Vienna, and (3) the impending impeachment of Nixon as he traveled to Moscow in July 1974, a month before his resignation.

What And Who Benefits?

Sizing Up Leaders. In what may be the most important contributions they offer, summits provide a unique opportunity for a President to appraise the nature of Soviet leaders and, in turn, provide the Soviets with a chance to take their measure of the President. Seeing Khrushchev's manner and discerning clearly that he was the "real boss" of the ostensibly collective leadership were regarded by Eisenhower and other Western leaders as a positive benefit of the 1955 Geneva conference. This insight can be valuable in making subsequent decisions on US-Soviet relations, particularly if the leaders are adept at sizing up each other.

A major purpose of Kennedy's informal Vienna meeting with Khrushchev in 1961 was evidently to demonstrate to the Soviet leader the new President's competence and determination in foreign affairs, especially in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Kennedy also hoped to reduce the chances of miscalculation by the Soviets regarding Allied resolve to stay in Berlin and the US willingness to defend its vital interests wherever and whenever challenged. Ironically, that summit backfired in this central purpose. Despite or perhaps even because of this personal encounter, Khrushchev underestimated US determination. The Berlin Wall went up within two months and the Cuban missile crisis came the next year. (Kennedy himself indicated he was shaken by the meeting and shocked by Khrushchev's bullying tactics. Within seven weeks he called up ready reserves and accelerated and expanded his defense buildup requests to Congress.)

Reassuring Soviet Leaders About US Intentions. Such reassurance at the summit can be beneficial, if conveyed convincingly. For example, when Eisenhower made his surprise "open skies" proposal in 1955 he pledged that "the United States will never take part in an aggressive war." This personal declaration was reportedly reassuring to Khrushchev and his colleagues.

Improved US Image In Europe. Summits have generally been heralded in Western Europe. They counter the widespread opinion that the US is opposed to dialogue and disinterested in opportunities for relaxing East-West tensions and for advancing arms control. Eisenhower steadfastly opposed a summit but changed his mind in mid-1955, among other reasons, so as not to be portrayed as obstructing the "peace process". Presidents generally seek to be at the forefront of any "peace effort", and summits -- especially decorated by arms control -- have unfortunately come to symbolize such an effort.

Increased Domestic Popularity. Johnson cited his 1967 summit with Kosygin as an example of his willingness, in the midst of the Vietnam War, to go "any place, anywhere, if, in my judgment, it can possibly, conceivably serve the cause of peace". Kosygin downplayed the summit's results but Johnson asserted that "great progress" was made in some areas. In truth, the two leaders largely talked past each other. Nonetheless, Johnson's popularity increased very briefly, for only about two weeks, after the summit. Nixon's popularity, in the same Gallup Poll series, rose substantially after his May 1972 summit in Moscow with Brezhnev, on top of his popularity rise when he travelled to China shortly before.

This popularity gain for a President, however, has not always occurred. Ford's summit with Brezhnev in Vladivostok did not generate any greater popularity in the public opinion polls than he had before. Inflation and growing unemployment were dominant concerns at that time, and neither could be helped by a summit. Carter's popularity was also not increased at all by his summit with Brezhnev in June 1979 during which they signed SALT II.

What Risks?

Generating False Hopes. Summits can and probably unavoidably do generate the illusion of fundamentally improved US-Soviet relations, even when no significant agreement has been reached, or when deadlock in fact characterized the closed sessions.

Concern that such unrealistic expectations and impressions would weaken the defense and foreign policy resolve of the West was an important reason for Eisenhower and Dulles' reluctance to move toward the summit which finally occurred in July 1955. Before that summit, Dulles wisely sought to disabuse public opinion from any expectation that it would in fact relax world tensions.

The Soviet leadership, of course, encouraged just the opposite view. As it turned out, the so-called "spirit of Geneva" atmosphere was brief. Kennedy was also concerned that his summit might generate another "Spirit of Camp David" -- the media event and afterglow of the informal summit with Eisenhower and Khrushchev in September 1959.

The 1972 Nixon/Brezhnev summit, with the signing of SALT I, has been criticized as having had a "tranquilizing effect" on US resolve to maintain the military balance in the years following. For example, the Harris Survey in June 1972 reported that 58 percent of the public agreed with the statement that a "whole new period of more peaceful relations between the United States and Russia was opened up" as a result of that visit. Of course, no "whole new period" of such relations had come about.

Clearly, summits do not moderate Soviet conduct around the world. Within a few months of the June 1973 Nixon/Brezhnev summit, the Soviets conspicuously failed to notify the United States of the October 1973 war they knew was imminent, and then provocatively widened risks of that war. (The Soviets threatened to intervene unilaterally, a move which prompted the US to go on higher strategic alert.) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was launched only a few months after the Carter/Brezhnev summit in Vienna signing SALT II.

Negotiating Arms Control. The concrete achievements actually negotiated at summits have fortunately been remarkably few. The difficulties of engaging personal, Presidential diplomacy at summits to negotiate agreements or even general principles were demonstrated at the 1972 Nixon/Brezhnev summit.

In October 1971, when it was agreed to have a Nixon/Brezhnev summit in May 1972, many of the important issues in SALT I were yet to be resolved. During Kissinger's secret visit to Moscow, shortly before the summit, the Soviets agreed with the US that SLBMs would be included in the Interim Offensive Agreement, but the terms of the inclusion remained to be negotiated.

When Nixon arrived in Moscow, some key issues on the ABM Treaty were still being negotiated in Helsinki (and finally resolved there during the first two days of the summit), and a number of key issues with respect to the Interim Agreement remained: (1) the number of Soviet SLBMs and SLBM submarines that would be included and the counting rules for dismantling older missiles in trade for new SLBMs; (2) the definition of a heavy missile; and (3) what increases in size or volume of existing ICBMs and silos would be permitted. With the summit scheduled to end in three days, the bargaining was long and intense and, at times, somewhat frantic.

15

The resolutions of these key issues at the summit was, of course, subject to later debate as to their meaning and their value to the United States. The Soviets agreed to a mutual statement defining -- in an ambiguous way -- significant increases in ICBM silo dimensions and to freezing new Soviet SLBM starts. The Soviets refused to agree with the US unilateral statement which gave the US definition of a heavy missile. This "loophole" permitted a massive subsequent buildup in the throwweight of the Soviet ICBM force which, to a considerable degree, vitiated the effectiveness of the Interim Agreement.

That intense process in Moscow and other experiences on other issues, demonstrated that detailed negotiations at summits have inherent limitations and high risks:

- o Summits are enormously time-consuming before and during, even without arms control negotiations. Negotiations on important issues like arms control involve either greatly increased demands on the President's time or the risk of inadequate preparation.
- o Summit negotiations are exceedingly high stakes with the President out front. That can mobilize forces for action within the bureaucracy, but also increase pressures to compromise to avoid failure ("not achieving agreement").

Dean Rusk summarizes a lesson here: "The direct confrontation of the chiefs of government of the great powers involves an extra tension because the court of last resort is in session. The costs of error or misunderstanding are multiplied by the seriousness of the issues and the power of those present." John Kennedy concurred when he said that a summit "injected considerations of personal prestige, face-saving and politics into grave international conflicts."

The risk of a confrontational deadlock or unfavorable results on arms control agreements at summits can be avoided in two ways: (1) assure that agreement has already been reached on all major details before a summit is agreed to, or (2) lower expectations for the summit leaders to agree on specifics by having them agree on a broad framework or a few easily understood principles, leaving the detailed negotiations to others to work out after the summit.

The first approach risks not overcoming differences and thus of not having an arms control agreement "concluded" at the summit, or even not having a summit because of the absence of even the prospect of an agreement.

The second approach risks leaving important issues unresolved for the sake of being able to announce an "agreement". This approach was taken at the 1974 Ford/Brezhnev summit. The Vladivostok Accord's broad parameters included a ceiling on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and a subceiling for MIRVed missile launchers. Unfortunately, this proved to be too general and lacked guidance in some critical areas to transform easily into substantive agreement. (For example, although heavy bombers were included as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, they were not defined.) Protracted negotiations were subsequently required to resolve conflicting US and Soviet interpretations of Vladivostok, especially whether it included US air-launched cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber.

At first glance, one might expect that "agreements in principle" represent another possible approach. The problem here was summarized in George C. Marshall's comment to a colleague: "Don't ask me to agree in principle, that just means that we haven't agreed yet."

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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JH-C~~SECRET~~

July 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin, July 3, 1985

Secretary Shultz has submitted the report at Tab A on his meeting with Dobrynin July 3. The Secretary made some preliminary comments regarding planning for the President's meeting with Gorbachev and for his own meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, then reviewed the more important issues in the relationship, except for those on arms reduction being negotiated currently in Geneva.

Dobrynin, who returns to Moscow July 10 for two months of consultation and vacation, was largely in a listening mode. His comments on Sheverdnadze were predictably upbeat, and implicitly critical of Gromyko (he clearly implied that Sheverdnadze would be a more gregarious and pleasant person to deal with).

The only two substantive issues Dobrynin raised were:

1. MBFR: He asked whether it would not be a good idea to move with "symbolic" reductions on U.S. and Soviet forces as the Soviets have proposed, commenting that this would be a good signal; and
2. Nuclear Testing: He urged ratification of the TTBT and PNET, and a resumption of negotiations on a CTB.

Attached is a brief memorandum to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's report. Also, at TAB II, is a copy of Mark Palmer's Memcon, which I received subsequent to the Secretary's memorandum to the President.

RV
Bob Linkard concurs.~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD8-125/2 #7496

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

~~SECRET~~

2

18

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Shutlz-President Memorandum of July 3, 1985

Tab II Memcon of Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's July 3 Meeting with Dobrynin

As you know, Secretary Shultz met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on July 3 to review issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda (except for those being negotiated in Geneva) in preparation for his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki and for your meeting with Gorbachev in November.

Dobrynin, who returns to Moscow July 10 for the rest of the summer, was largely in a listening mode.

The Secretary's report on the meeting is at TAB A.

Attachment:

TAB A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz on July 3, 1985

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/24 7497~~SECRET~~BY hvj NARA, DATE 11/21/07

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90747

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's July 3 Meeting with Dobrynin

As you know, Secretary Shultz met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on July 3 to review issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda (except for those being negotiated in Geneva) in preparation for his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki and for your meeting with Gorbachev in November.

Dobrynin, who returns to Moscow July 10 for the rest of the summer, was largely in a listening mode.

The Secretary's report on the meeting is at TAB A.

Attachment:

TAB A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz on July 3, 1985

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2 #7498

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

21
ID 8590747

RECEIVED 05 JUL 85 10

TO

PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 03 JUL 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By GLS NARA, Date 6/18/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUMMIT

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT. SUMMARY OF SHULTZ MTG W/ DOBRYNIN ON 3 JUL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 09 JUL 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LINHARD

MARTIN

COMMENTS

REF# 8519682

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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July 3, 1985

SYSTEM II
90747

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin July 3

As you and I discussed, I met with Dobrynin this afternoon to begin preparations for your meeting with Gorbachev in November. The session lasted an hour and a half. I was accompanied by Jack Matlock and Mark Palmer. Dobrynin brought his No. 2 Sokolov, who will take over as Chargé when Dobrynin leaves for vacation July 10.

I used the meeting to review areas in which we would like to see some progress, and the kind of substantive steps we believe are generally necessary. In laying out our approach, I followed the attached script virtually verbatim. Jack Matlock had gone over it in advance, and you might wish to glance through it.

Dobrynin had some comments to make at various points. For example, he urged that we not neglect the MBFR talks in Vienna, but agree instead to "symbolic" reductions in Soviet and US forces. He raised nuclear testing issues. Here he did not seem any more willing than previously to pick up on your UNGA proposal for exchanges of experts' visits at test sites, but he did urge resumption of comprehensive test ban talks.

In general, Dobrynin seemed to be saying that we should work to get things ready for you and Gorbachev to approve at your Geneva meeting.

I noted to Dobrynin that at my meeting with their new foreign minister in Helsinki I would have with me our arms control brass, including Bud and Paul Nitze. I asked him whether Shevardnadze would like to set aside some specific time to get into nuclear arms issues in more depth.

We also had some discussion of the preparatory process for Geneva and how to structure it through exchanges in Moscow between Art Hartman and their leaders, contacts here in Washington and upcoming meetings with Shevardnadze. Here I urged them to make an early opportunity for Art to meet with Shevardnadze, and urged Shevardnadze to accept the invitation you extended to Gromyko to come down to Washington to see you during the UNGA sessions.

Attachment: Talking Points for My Meeting

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BY WOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

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Suggested Talking Points

I. Status of the Relationship

-- President and I are pleased with agreement to timing and place for a meeting with Gorbachev.

-- Would also like to wish Chairman Gromyko well in his new duties, and know you will continue to benefit from his experience.

-- Also look forward to meeting Mr. Shevardnadze in Helsinki and to working with him in the months to come as we prepare for Mr. Gorbachev's meeting with the President.

-- I assume your people will be in touch with Art or will keep Sokolov informed, so in your absence we synchronize preparations for Helsinki.

-- Can you confirm we will be meeting July 31 from 2 to 5 p.m. in our Helsinki Embassy?

-- Would like to discuss where we stand, and directions we should go between now and November.

-- Think we have made some progress in clearing the underbrush and getting convergent concepts of what needs to be done.

-- It won't be easy: relationship is going to remain competitive and difficult to manage.

-- Couldn't agree more with statement in your non-paper on need for restraint in bilateral and international relations over next months.

-- Have some ideas on issues where restraint is needed that can be identified now, and will welcome yours.

-- It's going to continue to be a very mixed relationship.

-- But President and I are encouraged that we have given ourselves a date to work against, and appear to be taking same practical approach.

-- Seems to me what we need is sharper focus on more promising issues.

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-- Thus encouraged at message in your non-paper that time between now and November "should be used as productively as possible to resolve specific issues and to reach appropriate agreements where it is possible."

-- Take that to mean we should not be forcing things artificially, but should work as hard as we can on specifics.

-- We should be looking for things that are possible, that are beneficial in their own right, and could be built on later as we go along.

-- I have some suggestions, and will want yours; meetings with Shevardnadze in Helsinki and here will be opportunity to refine and develop agenda of specific issues.

II. Arms Control

-- We are dealing bilaterally with central issues at Geneva, but your non-paper also mentioned various multilateral negotiations, and we should not neglect them either.

-- Don't have any new ideas on Vienna talks, and probably not the most promising negotiation for the time being.

-- Stockholm may be another matter.

-- This is a multilateral negotiation, so nothing happens fast, and at least on our side we cannot impose sharp acceleration or change of direction.

-- We've been disappointed by your side's refusal to get into details of concrete CBMs we have proposed and your insistence on whole range of unrealistic CBMs in your package.

-- But at Stockholm there are at least outlines of a package on basis of President's proposal last June at Dublin.

-- Setting up working groups was progress, and one way to proceed would be to begin drafting a concluding document combining concrete CBM's with political understandings on non-use of force.

-- I understand you have invited our Stockholm Ambassador, Jim Goodby, to Moscow for early September. Helsinki would be a good place to talk further on this.

-- We should also try to move on chemical weapons.

-- I made some suggestions in Vienna, and you have now turned them aside.

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-- That won't make the problem go away, and since the reason you gave was that experts' talks and visits would give a false impression of our relations, you might take another look at it now, with a summit coming up.

-- I'm frank to say we don't have good answers, but we would like you to join us in making suggestions.

-- One arms control area where we have good dialogue bilaterally is nuclear non-proliferation. We should keep building on that.

-- Dick Kennedy gave your man a draft joint statement that could be made later in the summer. I think the response was favorable, and it would be good if we could agree on that soon.

III. Regional Issues

-- We still haven't decided what to think about further exchanges on regional issues after our talks on Afghanistan two weeks ago.

-- I'll want to go over some regional topics with Shevardnadze.

-- (If Dobrynin raises the Middle East) We've had a round in February, and it would be overloading regional exchanges to have two rounds on one topic so early on.

-- With regard to Europe, we still need to deal seriously with the Nicholson case, as an example of a damaging problem that has happened, and with Berlin air corridors, as an example of a problem that could cause damage if it is not dealt with satisfactorily.

-- I said in Vienna that once the Afghanistan talks were over East Asia might be worth looking at, and I'll be active in that area over the next weeks, with my ASEAN trip and the Chinese visit coming up. I know you have an important meeting with the Chinese coming up too.

-- Have to tell you we were somewhat disappointed by Afghanistan talks.

-- Know that your main spokesman was new in his job, and talks took place on eve of another Cordovez round in Geneva, but even so discussion seemed unusually limited.

-- Perhaps we should look at Afghanistan as a place to exercise the kind of restraint you talked about in your non-paper.

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-- Not an easy problem, and no quick solutions.

-- But if we both agree that only possible solution must be political, we ought to look at problem of restraint as a way of laying a basis for moves in that direction.

-- Issue is what we can do to support the Cordovez process.

-- We'd like to look in that direction, but you have been putting heavy pressure on Pakistan, and just on eve of talks you embarked on major offensive in Konar Valley and indulged in particularly threatening incursion into Pakistan May 31.

-- We're not going to give up. We will continue to think about how we can bring about a political solution. But you're not making it any easier.

-- So the negative side what is needed is cessation of these threats and incursions directed at Pakistan.

-- On the positive side, the key thing would clearly be a withdrawal timetable. We are not trying to create an Afghanistan that is hostile to you, and there are things we could do to be helpful in a withdrawal situation.

-- We are also waiting to hear back on our proposal to let International Red Cross do its work with prisoners. That's the kind of step all parties could agree to and that would be of benefit to everyone, and that could encourage people to look at others.

IV. Human Rights/Bilateral Issues

-- Got Gorbachev's message to the President that you will not "negotiate," as you put it, on human rights.

-- The President's message that human rights will not go away as a factor in our relations is equally clear.

-- We know it is a sensitive area, and President's preference, as before, is to deal with it sensitively and quietly.

-- Here again you are not making it any easier.

-- I'd ask you to think about question of what can be done on positive side, in terms of steps forward.

-- Not talking about deals, and especially not about public deals; issues are too sensitive for both countries.

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-- Wiping the slate clean of longstanding cases involving divided spouses would be a really positive step.

-- As we approach the Helsinki meeting which is being held to commemorate the anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, it would be particularly appropriate and helpful to resolve the divided spouse cases. These cases clearly fall under the Helsinki Accords. Can't we get a quiet resolution of them before that meeting?

-- Positive steps in the human rights area can have significant impact in other areas. We know you are interested in a number of these areas.

-- We are following up on Mac Baldrige's visit to Moscow in May, to see what can be done to move forward in the area of non-strategic trade.

-- We will be having fisheries talks soon; we are consulting with Congress about getting rid of our embargo on your fur skins; we will be looking at other possibilities, but it is important to remember that progress here will depend in part on the political atmosphere.

-- None of this will come fast or easy either, but there ought to be a way we can move forward on a broad front, step by step, so that both sides can see and appreciate it.

-- On the bilateral side there are ways to do that concretely in the near future.

-- I hope you will get a delegation to Japan to talk about Pacific air safety next week, and that we can finish up a basic agreement during those talks.

-- I understand your side is anxious not to undertake new commitments in principle, and the paper we have given you uses language on the principal issues that draws on existing ICAO documents to make that possible.

-- It's going to be hard to understand how we failed to reach a basic agreement after three rounds of talk since we and the Japanese have gone so far to meet your requirements.

-- I also understand PanAm has had some talks with Aeroflot and that another Aeroflot delegation is coming this month.

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-- PanAm needs some assurance that they can make money by flying to Moscow, unlike last time, and evidently they don't think they have it yet. So that's worth an effort too.

-- If we can put these two things to bed, we can move promptly into talks on civil aviation and restoring direct air service between the two countries.

-- I've just gotten a report on our exchanges negotiations, and they seem to be narrowing the issues down nicely.

-- We think it is important to recognize the new role of TV by putting language in the agreement on appearances of mutually acceptable representatives on each other's television.

-- But it is absolutely essential to have essentially the same commitments on thematic exhibits we have had in previous agreements.

-- We don't understand why you're trying to cut back on what we had before.

-- We ought to be able to get agreement there when negotiations resume in late summer.

-- As you know we are ready to move ahead on the consulates when you are. Agreeing to initial steps to open consulates would be a good and visible step forward.

V. Wrapup

-- Over next weeks we will start to look at what could usefully emerge from a meeting between the President and Gorbachev.

-- We are in a difficult stage of relations for very good reasons, and it will be deeds and not words that help us move out of it.

-- Think we should probably agree that kind of document produced should depend on how much progress we can make on the issues.

-- Hope you will report back to Moscow and have good consultations there, and look forward to meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze in Helsinki.

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Ambassador Matlock

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

July 3, 1985

Participants: The Secretary
Jack Matlock, NSC
Mark Palmer, EUR

Ambassador Dobrynin
Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy DCM

Subject: Reagan-Gorbachev Summit; Helsinki Meeting

The Secretary opened by saying that in his press conference this afternoon and in this meeting he wanted to convey that the President regards the upcoming summit as a very serious matter. We expect the process of advance discussions and work to make as much progress as possible. We regard the meeting today as the beginning of a process which will unfold through contacts between our governments and embassies in Moscow and here, in his meeting with the new Foreign Minister in Helsinki, and presumably in a meeting in New York as well. The Secretary noted that the President's invitation for the Soviet Foreign Minister to come to Washington stands. We presume that Shevardnadze will be coming to the UNGA. Dobrynin said that he also has this presumption, but he did not know this for a fact.

The Secretary then noted that in his press conference today, he had been asked if he was going to Moscow. He had responded that there is no plan for him to do so. This did not mean that he necessarily would not go. The President thinks that we should do all that is necessary to make the summit a good meeting. The Secretary further noted that we are aware of the many differences between us, that we have two differing systems, but we want to find some accommodation.

Dobrynin asked what kind of preliminary agenda we had in mind? What issues do we expect our leaders to cover? How would we use the month before Helsinki? General Secretary Gorbachev had said that we should use this time before a summit for active work on issues to see what we can accomplish and to exercise mutual restraint. We have a kind of stage-by-stage process, including the meetings between the Secretary and the Minister.

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The Secretary said that before we started on the process and substance of summit preparations, he would like to know what kind of guy the new Soviet Foreign Minister is. Dobrynin said that he is more direct than Gromyko, less reserved. By this he didn't mean that Gromyko was any different when he was with his own people than he was with the Secretary. That was just his character. Shevardnadze has a sense of humor. He is more natural. He does not have much experience in foreign affairs. He has been on some foreign trips, parliamentary and party, and he has held international symposia in Georgia, but he has not been in a negotiating situation government to government. He will have a different style from Gromyko.

The Secretary then said he would like to begin by talking about procedures. We have not heard back whether the Soviets accept the time of 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. in Helsinki. Dobrynin suggested that maybe we had not had an answer because Gromyko foresaw there was going to be a change. The Secretary said we need to nail it down now. We had thought that since the meeting will be in our mission, if the new Foreign Minister wishes, he would be happy to invite him to a light lunch at 1:00 p.m. This would not be for business and there would be just the two of them with interpreters. Dobrynin asked if he was suggesting a tete-a-tete that would precede the meeting from 2:00 to 5:00, and the Secretary said yes, for about an hour.

The Secretary continued that if it seemed after the regular meeting that it would be useful to have more time, he was prepared to do that. If the meeting runs a little longer than three hours, that would be OK because there is some time before the Finnish dinner that evening. But he also noted that some of the most productive times with Gromyko came when there were more than one meeting, and both sides had time to consider between sessions and then get back together. Therefore, he was prepared to stay through lunchtime the next day, if necessary. He was not pushing for this second meeting because he will have been travelling a lot and wanted to get back to Washington as soon as possible.

The Secretary said that we should be discussing here and in Moscow what combination of substantive issues we want for the summit and the beginnings of an agenda. When you get two strong-minded men in a room, they frequently find their own way, but it would be useful to have some sense of how they will spend their time. Dobrynin said that we also will need to see what can be done in advance.

The Secretary said this will be an important meeting; things will be going on in advance and if it is successful it will establish an agenda for us to carry out afterwards. Dobrynin

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interrupted to emphasize that we should aim at things that could be solved before and announced at the summit. The Secretary said he agreed with that. We should use the deadline of the meeting to make as much progress as possible.

The Secretary then said we need to block out the kind of approach that we should take. Perhaps the way that Gromyko and he had proceeded in January in Geneva provides the model. There were morning and afternoon meetings; they kept pretty much to times that had been set; met again the next morning and left open time for a fourth meeting. There were not a lot of social events. This worked out pretty well as we needed the time to work between meetings. Of course, the US did give a little reception. Dobrynin said this would have to be mutual; there would have to be two events this time. He said that we have a lot of time to decide about social events, but it is something Shultz and Shevardnadze could discuss in Helsinki.

Turning to substance, the Secretary said both sides feel arms control is the centerpiece. He gave a quick appraisal of how we see things. With regard to MBFR, we would not lay a big wager on progress. It is not that we should not try, but history shows that this is not a fast moving negotiation. Dobrynin said that he regretted the Secretary's view on MBFR. Couldn't our two bosses get this moving and get some Soviet and American reductions. We could begin with some withdrawals which would be a symbolic gesture -- ten, fifteen, or twenty thousand -- just to show some willingness. This could cut through all the complications. We have five months left, but already the Secretary is saying nothing can be done in this area.

The Secretary said he was not precluding progress here, but trying to construct a mental chart with headings about probabilities and importance. This could help us to focus on what is more likely to yield results if we push. In MBFR, there are some very important verification problems. If the Ambassador was saying this is a priority item for the Soviet Union, we would be glad to know that. Dobrynin said this is not the highest priority, but in a second category.

Continuing, the Secretary said that there are also the issues under discussion in Stockholm. We have created working groups and the structure of a deal has emerged. This is a place to push. We know that Ambassador Goodby has been invited to visit Moscow. In our view, there is more potential here. This is a multilateral negotiation and so we cannot do it just between the two of us, but when we are together, generally the others go along. One way to push this is to say let's start to develop the language of an agreement. This does not mean we are now in agreement, but drafting gives a focus and a way of

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getting a handle on how to phrase things and resolve problems.

The Secretary continued that the third arms control area he wanted to mention was that of chemical weapons. He felt in Vienna that Gromyko had agreed that this is an important area. Chemical weapons have potential for getting out of hand around the world. It is hard to see how we can get agreement overall, but we are prepared to talk about it. We made concrete suggestions in Vienna. The Soviet side has not taken them up, but we urge you to look at them again. They might move the ball slightly. Would you want to set out on a quiet effort to see if we can get somewhere on this? Dobrynin agreed that chemical weapons were rather dangerous. He said the Soviets proposed that our representatives get together on this subject in Geneva. They were disturbed that our representatives had had nothing to say. The Secretary suggested that the Soviets should do a little and we do a little; we can see what we can do.

The Secretary turned to nuclear non-proliferation, noting that we had proposed a statement and that this was apparently agreeable to the Soviet side. We were prepared to have the two leaders do this in their meeting.

Dobrynin asked about nuclear testing. The Secretary said we are prepared to talk about it. We put an interesting proposal to him and we thought at one time that he considered it interesting too. But after we did it, they found it less interesting. We understand sensitivity about changing treaties that we already agreed to, but we could do things separately that would improve our ability to do calibration and verification. Dobrynin commented that apparently we had nothing new on this. What about resumption of CTB talks between the UK, the US, and the USSR? The Secretary responded that they should think some more about our testing proposal. They have a new General Secretary and a new Foreign Minister -- live a little. Dobrynin said that he had gotten the Secretary's message. The Secretary then noted that these are sensible things that could be done. They are not terribly intrusive and would change the environment here.

The Secretary then turned to regional issues. In Helsinki, we would like to have more discussions of these issues with the new Minister. We can talk in our own right and as preparation for the meeting between our two leaders. We have started down the path of experts talks with meetings on the Mideast, southern Africa, and Afghanistan. You have also proposed discussions on East Asia and Central America and the Caribbean. We think that East Asia is the next logical topic and will be ready to talk about this in Helsinki and maybe set it up. We can then consider Central America and the Caribbean. These are healthy

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things to have and we welcome them.

In the Afghanistan talks, the Secretary said we were somewhat disappointed because there was no motion. Of course, there is the UN setup which we support. We had the impression from Rajiv Gandhi that the Soviets are taking another look at Afghanistan and that if we also take another look, there might be some progress. The Indians seem more willing to work on this issue. We might talk about this in Helsinki. We want to support Cordovez. Our perception is that you are putting a lot of pressure on the Pakistanis and also inside Afghanistan with military offensives. Maybe that reflects your desire to deal with this issue on the ground, but if not we want to assure that we have no interest in keeping the war there going. We want a political settlement.

Dobrynin said he wanted to draw the Secretary's attention to two points in Gorbachev's letter to the President. They had hoped the US would show some sign of urging the Pakistanis to be more moderate and to reduce US assistance inside the country. Gorbachev had pointed out that this would not go unnoticed in our relations. Although he considered the US-Soviet talks on Afghanistan to be useful, they did not lead anywhere. The US is increasing support to the rebels. Moscow is for peace in Afghanistan and ultimately for withdrawal. We welcome your and Mr. Armacost's statement that you are not set on "bleeding" us. The Secretary said that that was the word that Gromyko had used and we were pointing to it. Dobrynin said he would pass the message to his Minister. The Secretary said he would like to discuss Afghanistan in Helsinki, but if neither of us had anything new to say, we could of course pass on to other subjects.

On Europe, continued the Secretary, we still have the question of the Nicholson case. Maybe the military discussions are making some progress, but the more unequivocal the Soviet statements are, the better. We also see some improvement in the Berlin air corridors. The distances allotted are better, but they are not enough. Gromyko had said and Gorbachev's message reiterates, that we should try to manage so that the period leading up to the summit would be stable. We agree with that. Dobrynin responded "What about Nicholson?" The President's letter dwells on this at too great a length. The Secretary said that at the moment what is needed is a clearer understanding on how Soviet forces will conduct themselves so that our men will not get shot. Nicholson was in a clearly marked car, in uniform, etc. Dobrynin said that they had delegated this matter to their military authorities. They are on the spot and know best how to handle it. We (presumably the MFA) are leaving it to them. The Secretary said that the question is what emerges

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from those discussions. Dobrynin said that on the Berlin air corridors, the US had received a clearcut answer. This was based on post-War agreements. This had been dealt with at the technical level, but because the US had brought it up at the government-to-government level, we replied in the same way.

Dobrynin continued that he needed to know what the Secretary wanted to discuss in Helsinki with Shevnardnadze at Helsinki. He needed to inform him so the Foreign Minister could be prepared on the details. Should our two leaders spend time on such questions as these? This is unnecessary. The US has the right to raise any subject, but is this just being used as an example of the sort of thing that should not happen before the summit or a subject for the discussions? The Secretary said he was not suggesting that the two leaders spend all their time on issues like the Nicholson case and the Berlin air corridors, but that we must handle such issues well so that they do not blow up on us. They are examples of two things that should be resolved so they do not affect the atmosphere. We should handle these in a manner so they do not come up. Neither has been dealt with to our satisfaction to date.

The Secretary then returned to Afghanistan for a moment, noting that the US had made a proposal to let the ICRC work on the prisoners issue and was awaiting a response.

He then turned to the "Madrid/Helsinki issues" (i.e. human rights). The Ambassador, Gorbachev, and Gromyko always say that you will not negotiate about these issues and that you cannot be asked to violate your own laws. We are not seeking to do that. It is not necessary to go through all the cases; you are familiar with them but it is important for you to point out to your leaders that this is a sensitive area. The Ambassador knows this country well and should tell his leaders that this is a fact. The USSR can take actions unilaterally, consistent with your laws and this would help a great deal. Divided spouses, in particular, is an issue covered in the Helsinki agreements. This is a subject where Soviet unilateral action -- not bargains, not negotiation -- would make a big difference.

Moving to the bilateral area, the Secretary noted Mac Baldrige had had what we considered a good visit to Moscow. Dobrynin interrupted to say that they also considered it to have been a good visit, not for solving problems but for achieving some basic understanding. The Secretary continued that we were prepared to move ahead on non-strategic trade. We will have talks on fishing soon; we are working on the fur skins issue. There are a lot of nuts and bolts to do in this area. If we can make a little bundle of non-strategic trade issues and prepare that for the summit, that would be good. Also, some time before

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the summit, there could be an agriculture visit to the Soviet Union. Secretary Block could go to the Soviet Union in September or October.

The Secretary then noted there is a list of things that the Ambassador was familiar with that we should try to get accomplished. On Pacific Air Safety, we hope the Soviet side will come to the next meeting with a constructive position. If that issue is resolved, we can open up discussions on civil aviation. Both sides have had talks with Pan Am; they feel the need to make money on the Moscow route this time. Dobrynin confirmed that they had had talks with Pan Am and said a Soviet delegation is coming here for additional talks this month. The Secretary commented that there is an obvious pattern to these issues -- a walk, if you will. There is also a relationship to the consulates. If we get into the civil aviation discussions and the Soviets still want a consulate in New York, then we could quickly set up our Kiev and New York consulates. It is up to us to manage the process and to push it ahead.

The Secretary continued that we also have the exchanges agreement negotiations. We think it is important to recognize that television has a role in the modern world. Dobrynin said that they had given Ambassador Hartman time on Soviet television. The Secretary said we think it important to have this in in the exchanges agreement. We also think that exhibits are very important to have as before.

The Secretary said that if we had agreements in all of these areas, we could wrap a ribbon around the four agreements and hand them to our two leaders at the summit. We suggest that we work to push these issues under negotiations and that we keep in close contact here and in Moscow on them.

The Secretary continued that he hoped your new Foreign Minister will meet with Art Hartman soon so we can get to know him better. On the question of an agenda for a summit, we should come forward with our ideas but should avoid getting caught up arguing over the agenda. It is also important to think about how to use our time in Helsinki, whether we should set aside some special time to discuss Geneva issues. Dobrynin said we should concentrate on things in this period that we can get done. The Secretary said he agreed that we should concentrate on important things and try to get them done. The sooner we can hear the Soviet views on the Helsinki schedule and about Washington and New York in the fall the better. The President's time is always tight. Dobrynin asked if the President would go to the UNGA. The Secretary said he would not go up early, but perhaps around October 24 when the special commemoration would be held. The Secretary noted that Gromyko usually came for

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several weeks and that he too would go up as usual to hold his "dentist's office." Assuming that Shevardnadze comes to the UN, it would be good for him to spend some time with the President personally. Dobrynin said that we would probably get news about the Helsinki meeting earlier than we would about New York and Washington.

EUR:BLPascoe/MPalmer
#3348M 7/6/85

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MEMORANDUM

5433

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 9, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request to Speak to the Council on Foreign Relations in Nashville, Tennessee on September 5, 1985

I have been invited to speak to the Council on Foreign Relations in Nashville, Tennessee on September 5, 1985 on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Transportation costs will be covered by the Council.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve

WMP

Disapprove

cc: Administrative Office

37
Matlock
JFM
File

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: July 9, 1985

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1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To Speak to the National Council on Foreign Relations in Nashville, Tennessee September 5, 1985
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington/Nashville/Washington
- DEPARTURE DATE 9/5 RETURN DATE 9/6
TIME TIME
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC OTHER
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
Nashville Committee on Foreign Relations
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO X
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock
13. APPROVALS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 9, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

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Transportation costs will be covered by the Council.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: July 9, 1985 40

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To Speak to the National Council on Foreign Relations in Nashville, Tennessee September 5, 1985
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington/Nashville/Washington
- DEPARTURE DATE 9/5 RETURN DATE 9/6
TIME TIME
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC OTHER
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
Nashville Committee on Foreign Relations
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO X
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock
13. APPROVALS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7499 JH-C 41
5476~~SECRET~~July 10, 1985 MatlockACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRRF06-114/2 #7499

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT:

Preparations for President's Meeting in Geneva:
Arrangements and Logistics

I met this morning with Bill Henkel, Bob Pearson, Mark Palmer and several others who will be handling the arrangements. It is clear that we need a survey trip to Geneva as soon as possible to look over potential sites and facilities, since we need to be clear about what the possibilities are so that we can decide early on what to propose to the Soviets in the way of arrangements. Henkel, therefore, plans to organize a survey trip next week, and he would be accompanied by someone from State and by either Ty Cobb or myself, as well as the various specialists who participate in the surveys.

Our goal would be to have some concrete suggestions to put to the Soviets when Shultz meets Shevardnadze in Helsinki. The following are some of the questions which should be resolved by that time:

1. Does the First Lady wish to make the trip, and if so, should we indicate to the Soviets that she would be interested in planning some joint activities with Mrs. Gorbachev during the meetings? (Comment: I think this would be a good idea if Mrs. G is interested. It would provide good TV footage for playback here and would fit the "getting acquainted" theme.)
2. What social functions should we propose to the Soviets? (Comment: I think we should encourage at least one hosted by each side, with perhaps a third very small lunch or dinner with just the principals, wives, interpreters, and at most a couple of others on each side.)
3. What locale do we prefer for the meetings? (Comment: If the survey turns up an appropriate neutral site, such as a chateau nearby, this would be preferable to shuttling back and forth between our missions. It would provide a more relaxed and informal atmosphere, and might also be preferable from the standpoint of communications.)
4. Liaison with Soviets: We should also ask the Soviets to designate a point of contact for communicating regarding logistic

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Declassify on: OADR


arrangements, and propose that advance teams from both sides do joint surveys on the spot when the general pattern of events has been agreed.

I will be sending a separate memorandum regarding preparations for handling the substantive aspects of preparations for the Geneva meeting.

Bob Pearson concurs.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve a survey trip to Geneva next week by a group led by Bill Henkel, which will include Rosebush, a State representative and an NSC representative.

Approve  Disapprove ____

2. That you indicate any initial reaction you may have to my comments on the four questions listed above.

Approve  Disapprove ____

Jye
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 11, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: State Proposed Testimony on HR-77/Monument for
General Mihailovich Hearing on 12 July

I have reviewed and concur with State proposed testimony on H.R. 77 at TAB A, dealing with establishing a monument for General Draza Mihailovich in recognition of the role he played during World War II.

uDP
Bob Pearson and Chris Lehman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Ronald K. Peterson at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to Ronald K. Peterson

TAB A State Proposed Testimony

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON
Assistant Director for
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: State Proposed Testimony on HR-77/Monument for
General Mihailovich Hearing on 12 July

We have reviewed and concur with the State proposed testimony on
HR-77 (TAB A), dealing with a monument for General Draza
Mihailovich in recognition of the role he played during World
War II.

Attachment:

TAB A Proposed Testimony

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
July 10, 1985

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SPECIAL

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
Department of the Interior - 343-6706 (16)
National Capital Planning Commission
Commission of Fine Arts
✓National Security Council

SUBJECT: State proposed testimony on H.R. 77, dealing with
a monument for General Draza Mihailovich, for a
hearing on Friday, July 12, 1985.

Note: It is our view that this testimony is consistent
with views previously expressed by the Administration on
such legislation. We must presume you have no comments
on this if you do not call us by noon tomorrow.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship
to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular
A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
Noon, Thursday, July 11, 1985.

Questions should be referred to Randy Coleman (395-6194),
the legislative analyst in this office or to Steve Satterfield
(395-4993).

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures
cc:

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TESTIMONY OF R. MARK PALMER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE
TASK FORCE ON LIBRARIES AND MONUMENTS
JULY 12, 1985

MS. OAKAR, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE:

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR TODAY BEFORE THE TASK FORCE ON LIBRARIES AND MONUMENTS TO PROVIDE YOU THE VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON H.R. 77. THIS PROPOSED LEGISLATION WOULD AUTHORIZE THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN AIRMEN RESCUED BY GENERAL DRAZA MIHAILOVICH TO ESTABLISH A MONUMENT ON PUBLIC GROUND IN RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE THE GENERAL PLAYED IN SAVING THE LIVES OF MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED OF THEIR NUMBER IN YUGOSLAVIA DURING WORLD WAR II.

THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS AND SYMPATHIZES WITH THE GRATITUDE TO GENERAL MIHAILOVICH WHICH H.R. 77 SEEKS TO EXPRESS, AND WE DO NOT OPPOSE THE RIGHT OF AMERICAN SERVICEMEN TO ERECT A MONUMENT IN RECOGNITION OF THAT GRATITUDE. THE ADMINISTRATION, HOWEVER, OPPOSES H.R. 77, JUST AS PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE OPPOSED SIMILAR LEGISLATION IN THE PAST. OUR OPPOSITION TO THE BILL HINGES ON THE PHRASE "PUBLIC GROUND," OR AS ELABORATED IN THE LANGUAGE OF H.R. 77, "A SUITABLE SITE ON GROUNDS OWNED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OR ITS ENVIRONS."

LEGISLATION WHICH PROPOSES THE DEDICATION OF FEDERALLY OWNED LAND TO ESTABLISH A MIHAILOVICH MEMORIAL WOULD, IF

PASSED, REQUIRE THIS AND FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF ACTIONS THAT COULD ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS U.S. GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION OF MORE THAN HIS RESCUE OF AMERICAN AIRMEN, WHICH WAS BUT ONE EPISODE IN THE BLOODY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE NAZI OCCUPATION OF YUGOSLAVIA DURING WORLD WAR II. IT WOULD IMPLY OUR OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF ONE INTERPRETATION OF THOSE EVENTS AND THE REJECTION OF OTHERS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF WHAT CONTINUES TO BE A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL AND DIVISIVE DEBATE.

TO UNDERSTAND THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THESE ISSUES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA AND VIRTUALLY ALL PEOPLE OF YUGOSLAV ORIGIN, ONE NEED ONLY CONSIDER THE FACT THAT APPROXIMATELY TWO MILLION YUGOSLAV CITIZENS LOST THEIR LIVES DURING THE WAR, MORE THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF THIS SMALL BALKAN NATION. MORE THAN 400 THOUSAND OF THESE WERE BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES SUFFERED DURING THE GERMAN INVASION OF 1941 AND THE PROTRACTED RESISTANCE THAT FOLLOWED. IN ADDITION TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE NAZIS, YUGOSLAVIA WAS TORN BY A MULTI-SIDED CIVIL WAR IN WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE RESISTANCE LED BY COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST FORCES FOUGHT AGAINST EACH OTHER, AND IN WHICH BOTH RESISTANCE FORCES FOUGHT AGAINST BOTH REGULAR GERMAN FORCES AND NAZI-INSTALLED PUPPET REGIMES.

DURING THE WAR, THE ALLIES EXTENDED RECOGNITION TO BOTH YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE ARMIES, FIRST TO THE CHETNIKS UNDER GENERAL MIHAILOVICH AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE PARTISANS UNDER MARSHAL

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OCCUPATION, AND BOTH CARRIED OUT SUBSTANTIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS FOR AMERICAN AIRMEN WHO WERE SHOT DOWN OVER YUGOSLAVIA.

INDEED, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTISANS RESCUED MORE DOWNED AMERICAN AIRMEN THAN DID MIHAILOVICH'S FORCES. TITO'S PARTISANS, WHO FORMED THE PRESENT YUGOSLAV STATE AT THE END OF THE WAR, RECEIVED ALLIED MILITARY MISSIONS FROM 1943 ON AND OFFICIAL RECOGNITION FROM THE ALLIES IN 1944 AND PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE LIBERATION OF THE COUNTRY IN 1945.

DRAZA MIHAILOVICH'S WARTIME ROLE, AS WELL AS THE RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CHETNIKS AND PARTISANS TO THE YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE, REMAIN DIVISIVE AND EMOTIONAL ISSUES, BOTH IN YUGOSLAVIA AND AMONG AMERICANS WHOSE ORIGINS SPRING FROM THAT COUNTRY. FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NOW TO TAKE A POSITION ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE BY ENACTING H.R. 77 WOULD ONLY INFLAME THE DEBATE AND INEVITABLY DAMAGE RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA. PASSAGE OF H.R. 77 WOULD, IN FACT, BE INTERPRETED BY THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS BY MANY ORDINARY YUGOSLAV CITIZENS AND THOSE OF YUGOSLAV ORIGIN HERE IN THE UNITED STATES, AS EVIDENCE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FAVORED ONE SIDE WHILE DENYING RECOGNITION TO ANOTHER.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER QUESTIONED MIHAILOVICH'S PATRIOTISM OR DEVOTION TO THE ALLIED CAUSE. IT IS A FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE SHARPLY DIVERGENT VIEWS ABOUT HIS ROLE IN WORLD WAR II. THE FINAL WORD ON MIHAILOVICH IS NOT YET IN, AND A REVIEW OF THE MATERIAL ALREADY MADE PUBLIC DOES NOT MAKE THE PROBLEM ANY EASIER TO RESOLVE. DEBATE OVER WHO DID WHAT TO

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WHOM AND WHY, AS WELL AS WHO RECORDED EVENTS AND REPORTED THEM TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND FOR WHAT REASONS, ONLY ADDS TO THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE ROLE OF THE YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE DURING WORLD WAR II. AMONG HISTORIANS, THERE HAS BEEN A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT MIHAILOVICH'S FORCES SPENT MUCH OF THEIR ENERGIES IN ACTIONS AGAINST TITO'S PARTISANS. DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT OF RECENT PRESS ARTICLES WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER STUDY AND DEBATE.

THIS IS A QUAGMIRE WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN WISE ENOUGH TO AVOID THUS FAR AND WHICH WE THINK WE OUGHT TO CONTINUE TO AVOID. H.R. 77 WOULD, UNFORTUNATELY, LEAD US RIGHT INTO THE THICK OF IT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESSENTIAL FACT WE NEED TO REMEMBER IS THAT ALTHOUGH BOTH YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS RESCUED AMERICAN SERVICEMEN DURING THE WAR, H.R. 77 WOULD EXTEND OFFICIAL RECOGNITION TO ONLY ONE OF THEM.

THE CONCERN OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IS FAIRNESS. IN FAIRNESS, MANY MIGHT ARGUE, WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER TO ESTABLISH A MONUMENT HONORING ALL THOSE IN YUGOSLAVIA WHO RESCUED AMERICAN AIRMEN DURING WORLD WAR II? BETTER YET, WOULD IT NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO ERECT A MONUMENT TO ALL THOSE THROUGHOUT EUROPE WHO, DURING WORLD WAR II, LENT A HELPING HAND TO AMERICAN SERVICEMEN BEHIND ENEMY LINES, OFTEN IN THE FACE OF DANGER TO THEIR OWN LIVES? COUNTLESS CITIZENS OF FRANCE, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, POLAND AND OTHER NATIONS MADE MANIFEST THEIR LOVE FOR DEMOCRACY IN COMING TO THEIR AID

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BECAUSE THEY REPRESENTED A NATION WHICH WAS MANKIND'S BEST HOPE FOR FREEDOM'S FUTURE -- THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

AS I HAVE SAID, WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN AIRMEN RESCUED BY DRAZA MIHAILOVICH WHO SEEK TO HONOR HIS MEMORY WITH SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE PASSAGE OF H.R. 77. BUT WE THINK THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAY TO DO SO WOULD BE TO CAMPAIGN FOR PRIVATE FUNDS AND TO FIND A PRIVATE SITE FOR WHATEVER MONUMENT THEY DEEM SUITABLE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT PASSAGE OF H.R. 77, WHICH WOULD SET ASIDE FEDERALLY OWNED LAND FOR THAT PURPOSE, IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WOULD BE HARMFUL TO OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA, AND IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THIS LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE APPROVED.

WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE, GEOPOLITICAL REALITY MAKES YUGOSLAVIA A STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT COUNTRY FOR THE UNITED STATES. IT OCCUPIES A CRITICAL POSITION ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK, IT HAS SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED EFFORTS BY THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTROL IT, AND, AS EVERY PRESIDENT SINCE 1948 HAS DECLARED, WE ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

LESS THAN TWO MONTHS AGO, PRESIDENT REAGAN MET WITH YUGOSLAV PRIME MINISTER MILKA PLANINC IN THE WHITE HOUSE. HE AFFIRMED THAT U.S. RELATIONS WITH HER NATION ARE GOOD AND

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INDICATED THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION HOPED TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEM. THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS IN THAT DIRECTION WOULD ONLY BE HAMPERED IF H.R. 77 IS PASSED. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE INFORMED US, THAT REGARDLESS OF THE INTENT OF THE SPONSORS OF THE BILL, THEY WOULD REGARD PASSAGE AS A DELIBERATE AND UNFRIENDLY ACT. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BELIEVES THAT PASSAGE WOULD DAMAGE OUR GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT.

IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT NOT TAKING SIDES IN WHAT REMAINS A BITTER HISTORICAL DISPUTE IS A PRACTICAL POLICY THAT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. WE BELIEVE THAT FINAL EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF MIHAILOVICH IS A JUDGMENT FOR HISTORIANS AND NOT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WE THEREFORE OPPOSE PASSAGE OF H.R. 77 BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAD MANY OTHERS, BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD, TO ASSUME THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN SIDES AND HAD COME TO A FINAL CONCLUSION ON THIS CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECT. AND THIS, AS I HAVE ARGUED, IS NOT IN THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

THANK YOU.