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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/1985

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1985 (5/5)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 9

YARHI-MILO

909

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7364	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV: CONVERSATION WITH VELIKHOV IN MOSCOW <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	5/25/1985	B1
7365	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ABORTIVE ATTEMPTO MEET WITH ZAGLADIN <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	5/25/1985	B1
7366	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7364 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	5/25/1985	B1
7367	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7365 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	5/25/1985	B1
7368	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S DINNER WITH ARKADY SHEVCHENKO <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	1	5/25/1985	B1
7369	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PRESIDENT'S DINNER WITH ARKADY SHEVCHENKO <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	5/26/1985	B1
7370	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7368 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	1	5/25/1985	B1
7371	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7369 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	5/26/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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Box Number 9

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909

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7372	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7368 R 1/11/2012 M125/2	1	5/25/1985	B1
7373	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7369 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	5/25/1985	B1
7374	MEMO	USSR: SHEVCHENKO D 5/26/2011 F06-114/2; UPHELD 8/17/2011 M08-125/2#7374	2	ND	B1 B3
7375	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN ON MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV PAR 1/11/2012 M125/2; PAR UPHELD 10/1/2012 F06-114/2	3	5/29/1985	B1
7376	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV; SHULTZ CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	ND	B1
7379	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN MAY 24TH R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	2	5/25/1985	B1

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F06-114/2

Box Number 9

YARHI-MILO

909

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7377	MEMCON	CONTINUATION OF BALDRIGE'S REPORT ON TRIP TO CHINA, INDIA, AND USSR <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	3	5/29/1985	B1
7378	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	1	5/29/1985	B1

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Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Return to
Matlock
by hand

File Chron
May 85

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ M
EYES ONLY

f Adm. Poindexter

Mr. McFarlane

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CS 6/17/02

MEMORANDUM

BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

May 25, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Sakharov: My Conversation with Velikhov in Moscow

You will recall that Ed Fredkin informed me about a month ago that Velikhov, Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, had told him that Gorbachev had indicated a desire to resolve the Sakharov situation "as soon as he had consolidated [power]." You authorized me to query Velikhov about the situation while I was in Moscow if circumstances permitted.

Fredkin was himself in Moscow last week and arranged for Velikhov to invite me to his residence to a small informal social gathering on Sunday, May 19. Besides Fredkin and his wife, two of Velikhov's Soviet friends were present, and a three-hour Russian-style conversation about all and sundry ensued. Just before I had to leave for another commitment, Velikhov took me outside for a private chat.

Since Fredkin had asked me not to repeat the statement regarding Gorbachev's desire to resolve the Sakharov situation (he was not sure Velikhov intended him to pass it on), I raised the subject by asking where the matter stood. Velikhov said that he had been actively involved in trying to resolve the situation, but that two barriers existed: first, the feeling that there is a security problem because of Sakharov's previous work, and second, an apprehension that statements he might make if he were allowed to leave would be damaging to the Soviet Union.

I told Velikhov that their feelings about the security aspects were all wrong; we had absolutely no interest in him from an intelligence point of view. I pointed out that his knowledge of a rapidly moving field is so antiquated as to be of no interest to us, particularly since we already know all we need to about what went on in the period he was active in defense projects. Furthermore, our estimate is that he would probably refuse to discuss his sensitive work on principle, and since we do not really need any information he might have, we would not risk offending him by even asking. Velikhov made no effort to refute these observations.

On the second point, I commented that nobody could predict with certainty what Sakharov would say if he were allowed to leave. But I suggested that the Soviet authorities should understand

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that his views, which are abundantly on the record, get much more attention in the West, given his situation, that they would if he were not in the Soviet Union under adverse circumstances. In the long run, the Soviet authorities would certainly find that their interests are better served by letting him and his wife leave than by perpetuating the current situation, which is a substantial barrier to normal relations in many areas. Once again, Velikhov offered no refutation.

I then pointed out to Velikhov that, if there is uncertainty about the official reaction of the U.S. Government, I could state with full authority that a favorable decision would have a very positive effect on our relations, and that his authorities could be confident that the President would not claim any role in the Soviet decision. In fact, if the Soviet authorities had any particular wishes as to what should be said or not be said by U.S. officials, we would do our best to abide by them, if these wishes were conveyed to us privately.

Velikhov thanked me and said that he would continue to work on the problem, and hoped it could be solved. He made no promises, however, and at no time did he repeat the statement he made to Fredkin about Gorbachev's desire to solve the problem.

As a postscript, I would note that I saw Fredkin again at the Spaso reception for Baldrige on May 21. He told me that some of his Soviet contacts had complained to him about Weinberger's speech on Sakharov Day, alleging that such developments made the task of resolving the problem more difficult.

MEMORANDUM

BY ADT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

NOT FOR SYSTEM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

May 25, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *J*
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*
SUBJECT: Abortive Attempt to Meet with Zagladin

Following your approval of an attempt to see Zagladin while I was in Moscow, I telephoned Curt Kamman (DCM at Embassy Moscow) on secure to request him to let Zagladin's office know, through Stan Menshikov, that I would be in Moscow for a few days and would be pleased to pay a courtesy call on Zagladin if he was available. When I saw Art Hartman in Vienna, he told me that the request had been passed on, but that he felt we should go together, so had indicated to Menshikov that we both would call.

We arrived in Moscow Thursday evening, May 16. Friday morning, Jim Giffen telephoned me at the Embassy just before noon to say that he had just gotten an appointment with Zagladin, and asked if I had anything to convey. Not wishing to make it seem that Giffen is a go-between (and also wary of discussing the matter on the monitored call), I declined. Giffen volunteered that he hoped I would see Zagladin, and I replied that I would be in Moscow until Wednesday morning and would be pleased to see any acquaintances who wished to see me, but I did not ask him to do anything.

Shortly after 2:30, Giffen telephoned again to say that he had to leave within minutes for the airport, but wanted me to know that he had just had a two-hour meeting with Zagladin, during which he urged Zagladin to take advantage of my presence in Moscow to arrange a meeting. He said that Zagladin had replied that he wanted to, but that the Embassy had requested that I come with Hartman, and that this had created problems with the Foreign Ministry. Giffen then said that he thought I would be willing to come alone if that was a problem, and was told that, if that was the case, a meeting was "98% certain."

I reported this conversation to Hartman, who reacted very negatively to the idea, observing that "we shouldn't let them play this game." Since I have always kept him fully informed of all my contacts with Soviets, and briefed him on what was said, I had some difficulty understanding why he thought it would be damaging. However, I did not feel that I should press the point unless and until Zagladin or Menshikov got back to me.

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If there had been a direct proposal for me to come alone, I intended to discuss it again with Hartman and point out that it would be useful to give the Soviets the opportunity -- if they wished -- to convey Gorbachev's desires regarding a meeting with the President without the Gromyko filter, and also to use the meeting to make a representation regarding Balovlenkov, the husband of an American citizen who has been refused permission to leave and whose hunger strike has reached the point that permanent damage to his brain is likely if something isn't done very soon.

However, there was no further message from Zagladin. Menshikov, though -- curiously -- not Zagladin, was invited to the Spaso reception Tuesday evening, and I kept my Wednesday morning free in case he came and we could work something out, but he did not show.

Comment:

We cannot be sure whether a meeting would in fact have been arranged if the request had been made for me to come alone. Certainly, it would have been more likely. Doubtless, it was awkward for Zagladin to tell the Embassy that a meeting would be possible only if I came alone, and since I was not in a position to convey in advance my willingness to do so, it may have been a matter of each side waiting for the other to make the next move. Nevertheless, if Zagladin had obtained a clear green light for the meeting, it would seem that he could have sent Menshikov to Spaso Tuesday evening to try to work something out.

However this may be, I believe that this experience, together with much other evidence which is accumulating, suggests strongly that there is considerable tension between Gorbachev's and Gromyko's staffs -- and probably between the two men. Since this situation has some large implications for our tactics over the coming months, I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss it with you at your earliest convenience.

DECLASSIFIED

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FOG-114/2 # 7366

BY

LDT

NARA, DATE

11/21/07

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Sakharov

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

May 25, 1985

INFORMATION

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DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7367

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MEMORANDUM

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILjfm07
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8~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

May 25, 1985

INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Shevchenko
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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *km*

SUBJECT:

President's Dinner with Arkady Shevchenko

State has supplied the Memorandum at TAB A, which the President may find of interest before his dinner with Shevchenko.

Shevchenko is an engaging conversationalist who is able to speak with considerable authority on the way foreign policy decisions are made and implemented in the Soviet system. He was never a member of the inner policy-making group, however, and as State's memo points out, his views on some points have evolved since his defection.

On one point, Shevchenko's view differs from that widely held by specialists here, and that is his characterization of Gromyko. While most specialists consider Gromyko a potential barrier to the improvement of East-West relations, Shevchenko portrays him as a person preoccupied with managing the U.S.-Soviet relationship, who is careful to cover his flank at home with abundant anti-American rhetoric, but who would not stand in the way of possible improvement if it seems politically feasible in Moscow.

This point of view is worth serious consideration, but it must be borne in mind that, in regard to events since his defection, Shevchenko has not been in a position to obtain inside information and therefore cannot speak with authority about what is happening. His knowledge of many of the people involved, however, can give him insights not available to persons lacking his experience as a senior Soviet diplomat.

Recommendation:

That you forward the Memorandum at TAB A to the President.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Memorandum from State: "USSR: Shevchenko as Source of Information"

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLRR M08-125/2#7368
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Dinner with Arkady Shevchenko,
May 26, 1985

In preparation for your dinner with Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko, you may wish to read the report supplied by the State Department on Shevchenko as a source of information (TAB A).

Shevchenko is an engaging conversationalist who is able to speak with considerable authority on the way foreign policy decisions are made and implemented in the Soviet system. He was never a member of the inner policy-making group, however, and as State's memo points out, his views on some points have evolved since his defection.

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Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from State: "USSR: Shevchenko as Source of Information"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7369

BY MDT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: President's Dinner with Arkady Shevchenko

State has supplied the Memorandum at TAB A, which the President may find of interest before his dinner with Shevchenko.

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Recommendation:

That you forward the Memorandum at TAB A to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Memorandum from State: "USSR: Shevchenko as Source of Information"

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M08-125/2#7370
BY RW NARA DATE 11/12

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Dinner with Arkady Shevchenko,
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Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from State: "USSR: Shevchenko as Source of Information"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOI-114/2#7371
BY NET NARA, DATE 11/21/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

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State has supplied the Memorandum at TAB A, which the President may find of interest before his dinner with Shevchenko.

Shevchenko is an engaging conversationalist who is able to speak with considerable authority on the way foreign policy decisions are made and implemented in the Soviet system. He was never a member of the inner policy-making group, however, and as State's memo points out, his views on some points have evolved since his defection.

On one point, Shevchenko's view differs from that widely held by specialists here, and that is his characterization of Gromyko. While most specialists consider Gromyko a potential barrier to the improvement of East-West relations, Shevchenko portrays him as a person preoccupied with managing the U.S.-Soviet relationship, who is careful to cover his flank at home with abundant anti-American rhetoric, but who would not stand in the way of possible improvement if it seems politically feasible in Moscow.

This point of view is worth serious consideration, but it must be borne in mind that, in regard to events since his defection, Shevchenko has not been in a position to obtain inside information and therefore cannot speak with authority about what is happening. His knowledge of many of the people involved, however, can give him insights not available to persons lacking his experience as a senior Soviet diplomat.

Recommendation:

That you forward the Memorandum at TAB A to the President.

Approve *m*Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Memorandum from State: "USSR: Shevchenko as Source of Information"

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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NLRR M08-125/2 #7372

BY *RW* NARA DATE 11/11/12

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The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Received SS

1035 MAY 25 PM 2:47

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 25, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Your Dinner with Arkady Shevchenko,
May 26, 1985

In preparation for your dinner with Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko, you may wish to read the report supplied by the State Department on Shevchenko as a source of information (TAB A).

Shevchenko is an engaging conversationalist who is able to speak with considerable authority on the way foreign policy decisions are made and implemented in the Soviet system. He was never a member of the inner policy-making group, however, and as State's memo points out, his views on some points have evolved since his defection.

One point you might note is that Shevchenko's characterization of Gromyko differs from that widely held by specialists here. While most specialists consider Gromyko a potential barrier to the improvement of East-West relations, Shevchenko portrays him as a person preoccupied with managing the U.S.-Soviet relationship, who is careful to cover his flank at home with abundant anti-American rhetoric, but who would not stand in the way of possible improvement if it seems politically feasible in Moscow.

This point of view is worth serious consideration, but it must be borne in mind that, in regard to events since his defection, Shevchenko has not been in a position to obtain inside information and therefore cannot speak with authority about what is happening. His knowledge of many of the people involved, however, can give him insights not available to persons lacking his experience as a senior Soviet diplomat.

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from State: "USSR: Shevchenko as
Source of Information"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

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BY

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2-7373

101 NARA, DATE 11/24/07

E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18
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Shultz-Pres Memo
Eyes Only

PRESERVATION COPY
COPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCEARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT:

Shultz Conversation with Dobrynin on Meeting
between the President and Gorbachev

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President reporting a conversation with Dobrynin May 24, when Shultz provided a reply to the suggestion Gromyko made in Vienna regarding the time and locale of a summit meeting. Shultz suggested the week of November 18, and pressed for a meeting here, to be followed by a visit to the USSR by the President.

This puts the ball back into the Soviet court regarding time and place, and it will be appropriate to await an answer before doing anything further. However, I detect a distinct difference in tone between what Gromyko told Shultz in Vienna and what seems to be emanating from Gorbachev more directly. In sum, I believe Gorbachev is in fact interested in coming to the United States, while Gromyko is discouraging it and pushing for a third country. This is speculation on my part, but it is speculation based on a number of clues. Since these clues have a relevance not only to arrangements for a summit meeting, but also for dealing with Gorbachev on substantive issues, I will review some of them.

Evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev Differences

1. The curious way Gromyko introduced the question in Vienna. According to our interpreter, Gromyko said literally the following: "Please tell the President that in my informal personal opinion the General Secretary is thinking along the lines of November, most likely the second half. As for the place, the General Secretary will not be attending the UNGA and thus the meeting could be held in the Soviet Union. This invitation stands, and if the President wishes, we would be prepared to host him in the Soviet Union. If for some reason that did not suit him, the meeting could be held in some mutually acceptable European country."

The question arises: Why, if Gromyko was passing a message, did he say it was his "informal, personal opinion"? Gromyko is careful with his words, and it seems to me the implication is clear that what he was saying is not necessarily identical with Gorbachev's personal view.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/12

Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)
As Amended
E.O. 13526
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-2-

20

2. [REDACTED]

3. Protocollary slights to the Foreign Ministry: Except for Sukhodrev, the interpreter, no Foreign Ministry officials were present for Gorbachev's meeting with Baldrige, and none for his earlier meeting with Andreas. Also, Gorbachev made a point of telling Baldrige that, as regards a summit meeting, Baldrige could say to the press that Gorbachev and the President agree that one would be useful, and that "arrangements will be made between the President and the General Secretary." I was struck by his implication that this is a matter between the two personally, and not necessarily one to be settled through diplomatic channels.

4. Anomalies in Soviet comment on the issue: Somebody authorized Pravda editor Afanasiev to tell foreign correspondents that Gorbachev was thinking of coming to the U.N. in September. That almost had to be Gorbachev or someone close to him, since Pravda is the organ of the Party Central Committee. Gromyko and Dobrynin have denied that this statement was authorized. What this seems to mean is that Gromyko thinks it should not have been authorized.

5. Some evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev political rivalry: Actually, what we have is more gossip and inference than real evidence, but many Soviet intellectuals and some East European officials are convinced that Gromyko opposed Gorbachev's accession to power, and therefore assume that Gorbachev will move against Gromyko when and if he has sufficient power to do so. Even if this is not the case, it would be natural for the General Secretary to try to assume direct control of foreign policy, which would require, at a minimum, some denigration of Gromyko's predominant role.

Conclusions:

1. If the Soviets fail to accept our suggestion regarding a meeting here, we should not rush to think about a site in a third country, but attempt to get a message to Gorbachev directly [REDACTED] in an attempt to arrange the meeting here.

2. We should bear in mind the growing evidence of tension between Gromyko and Gorbachev, and not rely entirely on the Foreign Minister for an accurate portrayal of Gorbachev's positions.

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21

3. Some means of communicating directly with Gorbachev would be in our interest, not only as regards summit questions, but also on substantive issues.

Recommendation:

That you send the memorandum at TAB I to the President, if he has not already seen Secretary Shultz's report.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I -- Memorandum to the President
Tab A -- Shultz-President Memorandum



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

23
SYSTEM II
90652

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gorbachev: Shultz Conversation
with Dobrynin

Secretary Shultz has sent you a memorandum reporting on a conversation he had with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on May 24, at which time Shultz said that you agreed with Gorbachev's proposed time frame for a meeting the second half of November, and suggested the week beginning Monday, November 18. As for place, George pointed out the reasons a meeting in the U.S. would be in order, and indicated that you would be prepared to visit Moscow in a follow-on meeting.

The ball is thus back in the Soviet court regarding time and place, and it will be interesting to see whether Gromyko's comment to Shultz in Vienna that a meeting in Washington is "out of the question" continues to be the Soviet position.

You should be aware that evidence is accumulating which indicates that Gromyko's views and Gorbachev's views may not be identical as regards the locale of a summit meeting. I suspect that Gorbachev is more interested in coming to the United States than Gromyko's comments to Shultz would suggest. Therefore, I believe that we should not rush to think about a site in Europe for the meeting if the Soviet reply to George's proposal continues to resist a meeting in the United States. It might be worthwhile, in that case, to attempt to communicate more directly with Gorbachev on the matter, perhaps using an Agency contact who has provided several reports regarding Gorbachev's interest in coming here.

Attachment:

Tab A Shultz-President Memorandum

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7376
BY hdt NARA, DATE 11/21/07

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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Pearson	1	P	
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John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		staff
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Action: McLock eyes only

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

90562

May 25, 1985

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *gms*

Subject: Conversation with Dobrynin -- May 24th

At a reception last night, I had the opportunity to take Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin aside to discuss the question of a Summit. I told him first that I wanted him to pass on to Gromyko that, should the Foreign Minister come to the UN General Assembly this late September as usual, he would be welcome to come to Washington and meet with you in the Oval Office at that time.

Second, I told Dobrynin that I had passed to you Gorbachev's proposed time frame for a meeting between the two of you, and that you were agreeable, preferring sometime in the week beginning Monday, November 18. I stated that you felt a one-day meeting would probably not be sufficient and that a two-day meeting with three substantive sessions would perhaps be best. Concerning the venue, I reiterated your invitation for Gorbachev to come to Washington, observing that for protocol reasons, Washington would be most appropriate since it was our turn to host such an affair. I added, however, that in any follow-on meeting after such a Washington summit, you would be quite prepared to visit Moscow. I noted to Dobrynin your view that it would be better for the leaders of the world's two most powerful countries to meet in each other's capitals than in some third country.

Dobrynin promised to convey back to Moscow both the invitation for Gromyko to visit Washington in late September and your proposed time frame for a meeting with Gorbachev. On the question of venue, he stated that Gorbachev wanted you to visit Moscow because he thought it would be good for you "to look around" and see the Soviet people and society. I reminded Dobrynin that you would be prepared to visit, but that it was the turn of a Soviet leader to come to the U.S. I noted that in any joint announcement of a Washington meeting, we would be willing to add that the next meeting would be in Moscow.

Dobrynin said that he would report this to Gorbachev, but mused whether our interest in a Washington venue was solely a matter of protocol. I told him it was. We both agreed that if

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/24/02

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- 2 -

such a meeting were to take place, it would best if it could accomplish something tangible. Dobrynin added that from his own experience, once agreement on a Summit was reached, the respective bureaucracies "begin to move" to produce progress.

I concluded by reminding Dobrynin of the need for the Soviets to take special care in the weeks and months to come not to take any unfortunate action, deliberate or otherwise, which might have the effect of derailing this process. (I took this moment to pass to Dobrynin a non-paper noting our strong concerns over the plight of Soviet hunger-striker Balovlenkov). I also stated that, while the other NATO Foreign Ministers might not decide until the Lisbon NAC, it was likely I would be going to the Helsinki commemoration in late July where I meet with Gromyko again. I suggested that the two sides should soon begin work on an agenda for that meeting.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MATLOCK 28
chron
[Signature]

May 30, 1985

UNCLASSIFIED with
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON, *9.2*SUBJECT: Memcon of Secretary Baldrige's Meeting
with the President on May 29

Secretary Baldrige met with the President today to continue his report of his recent trip to China, India and the Soviet Union. A memorandum of conversation covering that meeting is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Jack Matlock concurs.

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

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CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

9/15/05

DECLASSIFIED

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NLS F06-114/247377

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/21/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Continuation of Secretary Baldrige's
Report on His Trip to China, India and the
Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff
Admiral John Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for
International Trade
Ambassador Jack Matlock, NSC Staff
Roger Robinson, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE: May 29, 1985
9:40-10:53 a.m., Oval Office

Secretary Baldrige began the meeting by stating that he wanted to briefly go over some of the remaining highlights of his recent trip. He reiterated that China and India alone represent over 40% of the world's population. The Secretary commented that there are major opportunities for the U.S. to capitalize on the present economic objectives being pursued by China and India but to do so we need to take action in two categories. The first is technology transfer. In this area, he stated, we have finally gotten China straightened out and have just signed an MOU with India. The Secretary stated he was confident we can "whip the problem of technology transfer." The second item needed to capitalize on these developments is the availability of adequate financing for targeted areas. (C)

Secretary Baldrige then called upon Roger Robinson (NSC) for additional comments on this subject. Mr. Robinson stated that he agreed with Secretary Baldrige that there was an implicit recognition by both China and India that their future economic vitality will depend primarily on infusions of Western technology, investment, financing and other types of industrial cooperation. He remarked that the pace of the privatization of industry and decentralization of government control over the two economies would remain a question because of the political and absorption constraints which we discussed in our earlier meeting. Robinson stated that, in his view, our strategy should focus on accelerating the pace of this move by both countries in our general direction by taking the lead role in national priority projects like the three gorges dam project in China and the modernization of India's telecommunications industry as well as in

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

other sectors where the U.S. has a clear competitive advantage. Mr. Robinson concluded by saying that the key element to the success of this approach will be the selective but aggressive use of official low cost financing. He stated his belief that the cost to the U.S. of meeting the competition in the financing area would be more than offset by the strategic and security dividends realized by the United States. (C)

Secretary Baldrige turned to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and observed that he sensed in his meeting with Gorbachev that Soviet insecurity about being treated as equals is a theme which seemed to run through the General Secretary's remarks. He then turned to Lionel Olmer for additional comments in this area. Mr. Olmer told the President that the refusniks in the Soviet Union had an overwhelming admiration and respect for him and that the President is viewed as being the difference between utter despair and hope. He added that the refusniks view the next 12 months as crucial and that they see a clear connection between trade and human rights. Mr. Olmer commented that the refusniks are not talking about the trade which effects our national security. He said that they believe that in the past there have been too few carrots in our trade relations and too many sticks. In other words, that the current pressure on the refusniks could be eased with a commensurate easing up of our trade policy toward the Soviet Union. (C)

The President stated that he still believes that quiet diplomacy is the best approach -- similar to the way in which the U.S. achieved the release of the Pentecostals from the basement of our Embassy in Moscow. He commented that it puts the Soviets in the corner by talking about our human rights objectives publicly. The President indicated that if we do not mention our specific human rights objectives publicly we can help them (refusniks) because of the greater flexibility of our system. (C)

Secretary Baldrige proposed considering a 3-4 month hiatus period on the emigration issue where we would "put away the two by four and see what happens."

The President stated that there was no question about the Soviet inferiority complex which he said is also hurting us in Geneva. He continued that the Soviets rely totally on their military, and it is only the military which makes them a superpower. The President then went through a hypothetical discussion to illustrate his point on human rights along the following lines: we want to increase our trade with the USSR, but we are under pressure from our people to increase emigration; increased emigration would help us be more forthcoming on things the Soviets want; we are not talking about interfering in their internal affairs but rather showing how their internal provisions are merely constraining our ability to be more helpful. (C)

Secretary Baldrige then turned to Jack Matlock (NSC) and asked if he had any further comments on human rights. Ambassador Matlock stated that he believes there may be merit in examining the idea

of conveying to the Soviets unofficially what sort of U.S. reaction could be expected from specific Soviet steps in the human rights area. For example, if emigration increased to, say 10,000, we might give more encouragement to currently licensable exports of equipment for energy exploration and production. With 25,000, we could take further steps, and so on. Chief of Staff Regan stated that we have to be very careful with such an approach. (C)

The President stated that is what we did in the mountain retreat with Dobrynin on human rights. He stated he conveyed to Dobrynin that we could not live for four years with those people in the basement (Pentecostalists) and all of a sudden one day it was resolved. When we lifted the grain embargo (n.b. probably meant renewed the long-term grain agreement), it was portrayed as something we wanted to do anyway. (C)

As the meeting concluded, Secretary Baldrige told the President that he wanted to take a look at some of our technology controls, particularly in cases where three or four countries are providing the same technology that we are controlling. He restated he thought we should look at this issue inside of the Administration. The President responded that he thought so too. (C)

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: SDI and Eureka

I am having breakfast with French Ambassador de Margerie Friday before his return to Paris for consultations. I expect that East-West relations and the prospects for arms control will be high on his agenda. In addition, the potential conflict between our SDI program and the French "Eureka" concept will likely come up.

The French have pressed the amorphous "Eureka" program with some success in Europe, playing on her neighbors' concerns that the U.S. SDI program will condemn the Europeans to a "subcontractor" role, result in a brain and capital drain to the U.S., and leave Europe as a "high-tech" backwater. With the increasing European interest in Eureka reported today there is a danger that the civilian-oriented Eureka program will increasingly be viewed as an alternative or competitor to the SDI. This need not be so. Ty noted that in his discussions in Paris with Morel and Musitelli, among others, that they seemed pleasantly surprised by his assertion that, in fact, the United States strongly supported the effort of the Europeans to accelerate their development of advanced technologies.

In my meeting with de Margerie I would like to take this a step further, speaking for myself, and stress that the U.S. not only supports the European effort embodied in "Eureka", but sees a definite compatibility with our SDI research program. I believe this approach is urgently needed in order to deflect any opportunity for the Soviets and our European critics to use the SDI-Eureka comparison for the purpose of wedge-driving within the Alliance.

If you have no objection, I will raise this point with de Margerie on Friday. Further, I believe the Secretary should use it as a talking point with the Allies at next week's NATO Ministerial in Lisbon. In doing so he could defuse a potentially troublesome issue.

Ty Cobb, Bob Linhard and Steve Steiner concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize my raising this point with de Margerie and that I press Rick Burt to get this point on the Secretary's Lisbon agenda.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD8-125/2 #7378

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 31, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Book to the President Entitled "METRO"

I have reviewed the book and see no reason why it should not be shown to the President and the First Lady. I believe that they will find it most interesting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the book be shown to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Book on the Moscow Underground entitled "METRO"

RECEIVED 30 MAY 85 12

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM OSBORNE, K

DOC DATE 29 MAY 85 23

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: BOOK TO PRES ENTITLED METRO / NOVEL OF THE MOSCOW UNDERGROUND

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE: 04 JUN 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>Staff</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

35
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: Bud McFarlane

FROM: KATHY OSBORNE
Personal Secretary
to the President

DATE: 5-29-85

Preston Long dropped this off
for the President and Mrs. Reagan
Any reason why they shouldn't
see it?