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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/6/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1985 (3/5)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 9

YARHI-MILO

907

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7350	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN AND SOKOLOV R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	2	5/8/1985	B1
7351	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7350 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	2	5/8/1985	B1
7352	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ITALY'S 12 MAY ELECTION R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	5/9/1985	B1
7358	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE ITALY'S MAY 12 ELECTION: A POSSIBLE COMMUNISM SUCCESS R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	5/8/1985	B1
7353	MEMO	CHEW TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	5/10/1985	B3
7354	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO CHEW RE CAMP DAVID PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	5/10/1985	B3
7355	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV FOR BALDRIGE TO CARRY R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	1	5/10/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7356	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV FOR BALDRIGE <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	1	5/10/1985	B1
7357	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ- GROMYKO MEETING: TALKING POINTS <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	3	5/11/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

System II
Dobrynin
5/8

Mallock

PRESERVATION COPY

FMDC
Dobrynin 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

May 8, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JS*
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dobrynin and Sokolov

At the Soviet reception today both Dobrynin and Sokolov took me aside for lengthy private chats. (We were in a room with other guests, but since we spoke Russian, the American guests who were standing nearby would not have understood what was said.) The following were the more interesting comments made:

Summit Meeting: Dobrynin volunteered that Gromyko would have a proposal regarding time and place when he meets Secretary Shultz in Vienna. He added that Gorbachev hoped to have a meeting before the end of the year. When I asked about the Afanasyev statement regarding the possibility of Gorbachev coming to the UNGA, Dobrynin said that the statement was not only not authorized, but was incorrect. In fact, Gorbachev did not wish to visit the UN in New York, Dobrynin stated. Dobrynin asked whether the President would be interested in visiting the Soviet Union. I replied that I couldn't speak for the President, but I believed that he might well be interested in a reciprocal visit following a meeting here, provided it went well. As for the situation now, I pointed out that there had been two summits in the Soviet Union since there was one here, and the President felt that it was our turn to host. It was for this reason that he had invited Gorbachev to the U.S.

Comment: Dobrynin was careful not to telegraph the particulars of the Soviet proposal, but I would infer from what he said that it is unlikely to involve a meeting on the fringes of some other event, and also that the Soviets may well propose a meeting in some country other than the U.S. I hope my comments will discourage such a proposal, but we will probably have to wait until the May 14 meeting to know. It would obviously be desirable for Secretary Shultz to be prepared to give the Soviet proposal an appropriate response. My recommendation would be that if it is for a visit to the U.S. that it be accepted in principle (subject to fitting it into the President's calendar), but that if it is for a meeting anywhere else, that the Secretary indicate his willingness to discuss it with the President, but point out that protocol seems to require the next meeting to be in the United States.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2-7350
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07

VE-Day Messages: Dobrynin told me when I entered that he had just given Armacost a message from Gorbachev to the President. Subsequently, Sokolov said to me that the President's letter had been "very well received" in Moscow. He then said that the reason Moscow had decided against an exchange of messages was that they were dismayed to note that, in the President's speeches in Europe, not one word was said about the wartime alliance. This, he said, was simply not understood, given the very deep emotions connected with the wartime alliance and VE-Day. Therefore, the President's message was most useful in redressing, at least in part, the feeling that the President was trying to ignore the common effort during the war. (I pointed out to Sokolov that, while the President may not have said much specifically about the wartime alliance, he had also refrained from calling attention to the Nazi-Soviet pact and other historical facts which immediately come to mind when the Soviet media distort the U.S. role and U.S. intentions.)

The President's Letter: Sokolov observed that he had the feeling that both sides really wanted an improvement of relations, but were finding it difficult because of poor communication. Several recent problems, he suggested, might have been handled more smoothly if there had been better communication. I told him that I thought the President had attempted in his long letter to Gorbachev to open some doors to practical steps. Sokolov responded that the letter evoked mixed feelings in Moscow; on the one hand the candor was appreciated, but on the other there is a feeling that the top people should concentrate on the big issues and a page and a half on Nicholson seemed excessive in that context. I responded that the Nicholson tragedy involves important matters of principle and that these are anything but trifles. I also pointed out that the deep emotions which the Soviet mishandling of this issue had stirred here could affect a lot of things, therefore it was essential that the President explain this if we are to find a way to avoid gratuitous damage to the relationship. Sokolov, interestingly, did not challenge my statement about the Soviet mishandling of the issue, but nodded grimly in agreement when I used the word. His only rejoinder was that, as he was sure I understood personally, there was no way the Soviet leadership could be persuaded to apologize and offer compensation.

Confidential Communications: Dobrynin took up this theme at some length during his conversation with me. Like Sokolov, he claimed that many of the problems have been exacerbated by the lack of a genuine dialogue, and then sang his usual refrain about how helpful he could be if we would use him. He then went into a long spiel about how very few people in the Soviet leadership are really authoritative on the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations, and claimed that this circle was limited to Gorbachev, Gromyko and a few others in the "inner core" of the Politburo, plus himself, Korniyenko and Komplektov in the Foreign Ministry. I asked if Marshall Sokolov didn't have a voice, and he said that Sokolov would be consulted only in regard to arms control and military questions and not on broader political ones.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Sensitive/Eyes Only 90493 4
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Matlock

Eyes Only

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED TAGS

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PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

Matlock
SYSTEM II
90493

Chen
5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

May 8, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dobrynin and Sokolov

M
RCM HAS SEEN

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2# 7351
BY 105 NARA DATE 11/21/07

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National Security Council
The White House

54-7

System #

I

Package #

3088

85 MAY 8 P 7: 02

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Back to</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>stuff</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

DAVID
CHEN Has original package for President

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 9, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: NICK KLISSAS / JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Leaders Magazine Article

We have reviewed and concur with Patrick Buchanan's suggested edits for the President's article in Leaders.

RECOMMENDATION

That you notify David Chew that NSC concurs with Buchanan's changes.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Incoming, with background papers

NSC 3088

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/8/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5/9/85 5:00 pm

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ARTICLE IN LEADERS MAGAZINE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	LACY	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☐	McFARLANE	☒	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☐	☐	ROLLINS	☐	☐
CHAVEZ	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
CHEW	☐	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
DANIELS	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FRIEDERSDORF	☐	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKS	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
KINGON	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

Attached are Patrick Buchanan's suggested edits for the Leaders article. Can these be incorporated into your draft? What is the deadline?

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

Received SS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/7/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5:00 pm Wednesday, 5/8/85

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ARTICLE IN LEADERS MAGAZINE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	LACY	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☒	McFARLANE	☐	☒
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	ROLLINS	☐	☐
CHAVEZ	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
CHEW	☐	☒	SPEAKES	☐	☒
DANIELS	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FRIEDERSDORF	☐	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKS	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
KINGON	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please submit any comments or suggestions to my office by close of business tomorrow., 5/8/85. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

See p 2 for changes

11

ARTICLE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN
FOR LEADERS MAGAZINE

July 1985

The theme, "Triad for Peace," appropriately suggests the complexity of the challenges to America's security. The phrase also emphasizes that all varieties of our military forces -- land, sea and air -- are essential to safeguarding the United States and our interests worldwide.

Today, we in America and our Allies and friends face diverse and serious threats to our security. Our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, continues to build a military arsenal far beyond any conceivable defensive needs. To exert its military power around the world, the Soviet Union is also expanding the geographic reach of its forces. We have seen growth in the Soviet airlift capability, the emergence of a strong blue-water Navy, the development of overseas bases, and the opportunistic expansion of Soviet influence worldwide.

To counter these threats, America must maintain a strong military posture. This means in turn that we must complete the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces, including the full planned deployment of MX Peacekeeper missiles. We must, furthermore, continue our strategic defense research program for exploring technologies that may someday provide us with a way to defend the U.S. and our Allies against nuclear missiles. Finally, we and our Allies must continue to strengthen the land, sea and air components of our conventional forces.

The modernization of our military forces remains a major budgetary challenge to the ~~American people~~ ^{the} nations of the Free World. Adequate security is expensive. But inadequate protection can be even more costly. The problem is that, in a complacency nurtured by years of peace, defense weaknesses can only too easily be put out of mind. It falls to leaders with ^{a realistic} vision to ensure that government's first priority -- safeguarding the nation -- is achieved.

True, lasting peace cannot be secured through the strength of arms alone. We, therefore, emphasize constructive diplomacy and are committed to negotiating deep reductions in arms through equitable and verifiable agreements. Underlying all our efforts, however, there must be a realistic assessment of the possible military challenges to our security. Neither weakness nor wishful thinking can keep us secure.

Among free peoples, the open exchange of ideas ultimately is our greatest security. My congratulations to Leaders magazine for its continuing efforts to inform readers on issues affecting the world's peace, prosperity and freedom.

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

85 MAY 8 7:02

Package # 3088

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>Back to</u>
Situation Room			<u>stuff</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

DAVID
CHEN Has original package for President

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 9, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Italy's 12 May Election: a Possible Communist Success

The attached memorandum from State at Tab I alerts you to the possibility that the Italian Communist Party may outpoll the Christian Democrats in local elections May 12. While such a development would be disturbing, it would not necessarily lead to comparable Communist success in a Parliamentary election. Indeed, it seems most unlikely -- as State points out -- that the Communists are close to knocking on the door of national power.

Attachment:

Tab I Platt-McFarlane Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2# 7352
BY 121 NARA, DATE 11/21/07

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15
ID 8503 749

RECEIVED 09 MAY 85 09

TO

McFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 08 MAY 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CXS NARA, Date 6/17/07

KEYWORDS: ITALY

SUBJECT: ITALY 12 MAY ELECTION / A POSSIBLE COMMUNIST SUCCESS

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE: 14 MAY 85 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

SOMMER

MATLOCK

CANNISTRARO

COMMENTS

REF# 8513952

LOG

NSCIFID

(LF)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S 8513952
United States Department of State

3749

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Italy's May 12 Election: a Possible Communist Success

There is a fairly good chance that the Italian Communists (PCI) will outpoll the flagging Christian Democrats (DC) in Italian local elections this Sunday. A second consecutive Communist victory over the DC, following the PCI's surpassing of the DC for the first time ever in last year's Europarlament election, would moderately shake the Italian political system. But the Communists would still have a long way to go before being afforded a role in the national government. They would probably first have to turn in a dramatically strong showing in a new parliamentary election.

The May 12 elections are for regional and local representatives, but they will involve some 90% of the electorate and thereby be a significant referendum on the Craxi government. If the Communists beat the DC again, there will be some noise in Italy over what this might portend. There could be concern in some U.S. quarters that the PCI might be on the verge of coming to national power. We think that a low-key U.S. official public stance would be in order. Italian politicians know the stakes and would not want to hazard Italy's position and prestige in the Alliance by lurching in some way toward the PCI. Left to their devices, they would likely engineer yet another cautious solution such as their inventive politics has produced in the past.

If Craxi's five coalition parties collectively hold close to their current 56% majority, they will probably continue to govern--perhaps after a cabinet reshuffle--even if the DC itself dips below the PCI. In any event, nothing should happen quickly after May 12. Matters would be in a holding pattern pending assessment of the results of a June referendum on wage policy, and the election of a new Italian president (by a parliamentary electoral college) to succeed Pertini in July.

After these events a new parliamentary election would occur only if there were a falling-out between the five coalition parties. The Communists would have to "win" such an election clearly in order to knock on the door of power. With the question posed during the campaign, as it would be, of the elections being a showdown between the Communists and the other parties, the PCI would face an uphill fight.

Nicholas M. Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Feb-11/4/2 #7358

BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/24/67

JH-C
17

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Remarks: Arrival Statement

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed Presidential remarks (Tab A) to be delivered upon arrival at the South Lawn today at 2:00 p.m. A memorandum for your signature to David Chew is attached at Tab I.

MD
Michael Donley concurs.RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to David Chew.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to David Chew

Tab A Incoming proposed Presidential Remarks

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Presidential Remarks: Arrival Statement

We have reviewed and concur in the attached, proposed Presidential arrival statement (Tab A).

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed Presidential arrival statement

UNCLAS EFTO
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 AIR FORCE ONE/27000 0015 DTG: 101325Z MAY 85 PSN: 002866
SIT045 AN009877 TOR: 130/1429Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM VP SIT CHEW /006

OP IMMED
DE WTE1 #0015 1301325
O 101325Z MAY 85
FM AIR FORCE ONE/27000

TO DAVID CHEW'S OFFICE/GFWW

INFO SITROOM

UNCLAS E F T O

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CAS 6/17/02

(ELLIOTT)
MAY 10, 1985
12:00 NOON AF1

ATTN. PHYLLIS FOR WHITE HOUSE STAFFING

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ARRIVAL STATEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FRIDAY, MAY 10, 1985

WELL, VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS,
AND EACH OF YOU HERE, NANCY AND I THANK YOU FROM THE BOTTOM OF OUR
HEARTS FOR COMING OUT TO GIVE US THIS WARM WELCOME.

UNCLAS EFTO

UNCLAS EFTO
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

20

PAGE 02 OF 04 AIR FORCE ONE/27000 0015 DTG: 101325Z MAY 85 PSN: 002866

WE HAVE HAD A FINE TRIP; A FULL AND CHALLENGING TRIP, AND AS I SAID THIS MORNING, A SUCCESSFUL TRIP-- WE ARE RETURNING HOME, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED.

WE RETURN WITH WARM MEMORIES OF EUROPEAN FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICA. THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE KNOW THE UNITED STATES IS A DEPENDABLE LEADER FOR FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND PEACE -- AND, BELIEVE ME, THEY APPRECIATE THAT LEADERSHIP. I KNOW YOU'VE HEARD THAT BECAUSE THERE WERE A FEW DEMONSTRATORS, THINGS MUST HAVE BEEN GOING WRONG. WELL, YOU KNOW SOMETHING, EVERY TIME I NOTICED WHO WAS DEMONSTRATING, I FELT RE-ASSURED. WE WERE SAYING AND DOING THINGS RIGHT.

I DON'T MIND TELLING YOU, THERE'S A VERY SPECIAL PERSON WHO DOES A WONDERFUL JOB ON THESE TRIPS. WHETHER MEETING WITH LEADERS AND PARENTS CONCERNED ABOUT DRUGS IN BONN AND LISBON, OR DOING A PRETTY FAIR FLAMENCO IN MADRID -- I HAPPEN TO THINK THAT NANCY, MY PARTNER, IS ONE OF THE BEST AMBASSADORS AMERICA HAS EVER HAD.

SO, WE FEEL GOOD ABOUT WHAT'S BEEN DONE. AND, AFTER EVERY SUMMIT LEADER AGREED THAT STEADY ECONOMIC GROWTH MEANS EACH GOVERNMENT GETTING SPENDING UNDER CONTROL -- HOW SWEET IT IS TO RETURN WITH

UNCLAS EFTO

UNCLAS EFTO
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 AIR FORCE ONE/27000 0015 DTG: 101325Z MAY 85 PSN: 002866

A 50-49 SENATE VICTORY FOR SPENDING RESTRAINT AND NO TAX MEASURE.

PAGE 2

THANK YOU, GEORGE BUSH, FOR CASTING THE TIE-BREAKING VOTE.

THANK YOU SENATOR PETE WILSON FOR THE GRIT YOU SHOWED TO COME BACK WHEN WE NEEDED YOU MOST. AND THANKS TO BOB DOLE, THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP OF THE SENATE AND THEIR COLLEAGUES FOR PASSING A BUDGET RESOLUTION THAT MOVES CONGRESS TOWARDS REAL SPENDING RESTRAINT AND SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER DEFICITS. THIS WAS A COURAGEOUS AND POLITICALLY DIFFICULT ACTION.

DURING THOSE DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR ECONOMIC ALLIES, CONCERN WAS VOICED THAT PROJECTED BUDGET DEFICITS THREATEN WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH. WELL, THIS SENATE BUDGET RESOLUTION REPRESENTS A SAVINGS OF ALMOST \$300 BILLION OVER 3 YEARS. IT REFLECTS THE SENATE'S WILLINGNESS TO BITE THE BULLET TO HELP SUSTAIN THE ECONOMIC EXPANSION.

IT IS EASY FOR SOME TO ATTACK INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF THE SENATE PACKAGE, BUT I'M CONVINCED THIS WAS THE ONLY SERIOUS DEFICIT REDUCTION PACKAGE THAT COULD PASS THE SENATE.

OUR COMMITMENT TO AMERICA'S SECURITY IS DETERMINED BY THE

UNCLAS EFTO

UNCLAS EFTO
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

22

PAGE 04 OF 04 AIR FORCE ONE/27000 0015 DTG: 101325Z MAY 85 PSN: 002866

THREAT POSED BY OUR AVERSARIES. SO THE SENATE LEADERS HAVE ASSURED ME THEY WILL CONSIDER A SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 86, IF WE CONCLUDE THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY IS JEOPARDIZED.

THE SENATE HAS MADE AN IMPORTANT COMMITMENT TO CUT EXCESSIVE SPENDING. NOW IT'S UP TO THE HOUSE TO DO AS GOOD A JOB REDUCING THE DEFICIT BY CUTTING SPENDING, NOT RAISING TAXES.

I KNOW AMERICANS AGREE WITH US THAT WE MUST RESTRAIN THE GROWTH OF THIS FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT. THE SENATE HAS TAKEN A MAJOR FIRST STEP. WE URGE THE HOUSE TO PASS A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET RESOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE COMMITTED TO REDUCING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND URGE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS TO HELP US IN THAT EFFORT.

AND NOW, IT'S TIME TO SAY GOODBYE AGAIN. BUT THIS TIME I DON'T MIND BECAUSE WE'RE BACK HOME AND WE'LL SEE YOU SOON. THANK YOU AND GOD BLESS YOU ALL.

UNCLAS EFTO

URGENT**WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM**DATE: 5/10/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ASAPSUBJECT: REMARKS: Arrival Statement

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☒	☐	LACY	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☐	McFARLANE	☒	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☒	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	ROLLINS	☒	☐
CHAVEZ	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
CHEW	☐	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
DANIELS	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FRIEDERSDORF	☒	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKS	☐	☒	_____	☐	☐
KINGON	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

If you have any substantial changes or comments, please call them directly to David Chew on Air Force One. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

Matlock

JM-C
SB-C 24

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1985

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your letter of May 1, 1985, in which you invited the President to speak at CSIS's National Leadership Forum.

Although we know that there is no better platform for the President than the one CSIS can provide, the time of this year's conference unfortunately makes it impossible for him to schedule a speech. Because of his trip to Europe and the issues now before Congress, his schedule next week is already packed.

On behalf of the President, I wish CSIS best wishes for success for this year's National Leadership Forum.

Sincerely,

BoL

Robert M. Kimmitt
Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

Dr. Amos A. Jordan
President
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
JMC

May 9, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT:

CSIS Request for Presidential Address

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the self-explanatory letter to Joe Jordan,
President of CSIS.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Jordan
Tab II Incoming, with background materials

26

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your letter of May 1, 1985, in which you invited the President to speak at CSIS's National Leadership Forum.

Although we know that there is no better platform for the President than the one CSIS can provide, the time of this year's conference unfortunately makes it impossible for him to schedule a speech. Because of his trip to Europe and the issues now before Congress, his schedule next week is already packed.

On behalf of the President, I wish CSIS best wishes for success for this year's National Leadership Forum.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Kimmitt
Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

Dr. Amos A. Jordan
President
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

JM-C
21

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 7, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: CSIS Request for Presidential Address re East-West Relations on May 16 or 17

I don't see how we can get a proper speech together in the time left and am not sure we can improve on the Strasbourg speech, which will be delivered only one week before the 15th.

Aside from the technical problems of getting a proper text -- with so many of the players out-of-town -- is it wise to follow the Strasbourg speech so soon? A speech on East-West relations in May would either have to be a repeat or else might be interpreted as -- in some particulars -- inconsistent.

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Staff --</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>using Sys I</u>
			<u># in existence</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

29
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/3/85

Jack Matlock:

CSIS is still
pushing for a major address
on 16 or 17 May. Do you
still think it too early after
the Summit and trip for such
an address?

Bob Kinnitt

1176

30



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

Amos A. Jordan
President
Chief Executive Officer

May 1, 1985

The Honorable
Robert Kimmitt
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
NSC, Ground Floor - West Wing
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Bob:

We were told last Friday that the President would not be able to address our National Leadership Forum at 10:00 AM on the 17th of May, as we had hoped.

We did not present precise alternative time slots in our original invitation. We would be willing to change our entire conference schedule to accommodate an address by the President, for example, either the afternoon of the 16th or 17th of May.

As you may recall from the President's experience at last year's forum, he will be with a very influential and supportive audience, and there will be exceptionally broad media coverage. It would be a great opportunity for him to put a capstone on his European tour with an address on the future of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Sincerely,


Amos A. Jordan

Enclosure: Conference Program

AAJ:at

PS. Bill Taylor tells me of the tragic accidents in your & Holly's families. Our sympathy and support are with you both.

-----CSIS-----

Second Annual National Leadership Forum

THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

May 15-17, 1985

The Center for Strategic & International Studies Georgetown University

THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Conference Cochairs:

Anne L. Armstrong
 Chairman, CSIS Advisory Board
 Representative Thomas S. Foley

Wednesday, May 15

3:00 p.m.	Registration	International Club Wadsworth Room, B-1 1800 K Street, N.W.
4:00 p.m.	Welcome Amos A. Jordan	Wadsworth Room
	Opening Remarks Anne L. Armstrong	
	Keynote Address Jeane J. Kirkpatrick	
5:00 p.m.	Hospitality Lounge	Abshire Room Third Floor
6:00 p.m.	Reception	Wadsworth Room
7:00 p.m.	Dinner	Wadsworth Room
	Dinner Address Zbigniew Brzezinski	

Thursday, May 16

8:30 a.m.	Rolls and Coffee	Wadsworth Room
	Opening Remarks Representative Thomas S. Foley	
	Plenary Address James R. Schlesinger	

10:00 a.m. Morning Panels

Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces

Wadsworth Room

Chair:

Senator Albert Gore, Jr.

Panelists:

Donald Kerr
Eugene V. Rostow
R. James Woolsey

U.S. Trade Policy Toward the East

Abshire Room

Chair:

Senator Jake Garn

Panelists:

Kempton B. Jenkins
Ed A. Hewett
Henry R. Nau

Eastern European Political and Social Issues

Mediterranean Room

Chair:

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Panelists:

Madeleine K. Albright
Charles Gati
Jan Nowak

The Helsinki Process

Hunt Room

Chair:

George S. Vest

Panelists:

Representative Benjamin A. Gilman
Leonard R. Sussman
Warren Zimmerman

12:30 p.m. Luncheon

Wadsworth Room

Luncheon Address
Robert S. Strauss

2:30 p.m. Afternoon Panels

Conventional Forces

Abshire Room

Chair:

Senator John Glenn

Panelists:

William Kaufman

Edward C. Meyer

Harlan Ullman

East Bloc Trade Policy Toward the West

Hunt Room

Chair:

Penelope Hartland-Thunberg

Panelists:

Marshall I. Goldman

Thane Gustafson

John P. Hardt

U.S.-Soviet Competition in the Third World

Wadsworth Room

Chair:

Ray Cline

Panelists:

Ronald Palmer

Donald Zagoria

The Successor Generation--East and West

Mediterranean Room

Chair:

Representative Richard Cheney

Panelists:

Carl Gershman

Walter Laqueur

Robie M. H. (Mark) Palmer

4:30 p.m.

Remarks

Wadsworth Room

Henry A. Kissinger

Friday, May 17

8:45 a.m.	Check-in Commences	Wadsworth Room
9:45 a.m.	Attendees Must be Seated	
10:00 a.m.	Closing Address	Wadsworth Room
	Ronald Reagan (invited)	
11:00 a.m.	Conference Adjourns	

Conference Staff.

Reginald J. Brown
Conference Coordinator

Mary B. Park
Director of Conferences

Patricia Flath
Assistant to the Director
of Conferences

Julia K. Culver
Assistant to the Conference
Coordinator

Maria L. Torres
Assistant to the Conference
Coordinator

Rapporteurs

Paul Ingholt
John Kennedy
Morrie Ruffin
George Sinks

Blake Swensrud
James Townsend
Margaret Trimble
Victor Wolski

This conference was made possible in part by
special contributions from the following:

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3825

SB-*refug*
36

May 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Travel Request to Participate in the Chiefs of Mission Conference to be held in London on June 6-8

I have been invited to participate in the EUR Chiefs of Mission Conference to be held in London on June 6-8. I believe it is important to be present at the conference since it is the principal vehicle for informing our Ambassadors in Europe directly regarding the key issues we face in conducting our diplomacy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: May 10, 1985

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: MATLOCK, JACK F.
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): TO ATTEND CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE IN LONDON, JUNE 6-8
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): WASHINGTON/LONDON/WASHINGTON
- DEPARTURE DATE o/a June 4 RETURN DATE o/a June 9
TIME _____ TIME _____
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION \$778 PER DIEM 590* OTHER 165* TOTAL TRIP COST 1553
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER _____
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES Possibly NO _____
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): Traveler
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ _____
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
5 days per diem @\$118+33= 755
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: [Signature]
13. APPROVALS:

Matlock

JH-C
38

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1985

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Secretary Baldrige's visit to Moscow provides me the opportunity to repeat to you my desire for a more constructive working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. An expansion of peaceful trade can and should be an important part of an improved relationship between our countries.

I place great significance on the discussions between Secretary Baldrige and Minister Patolichev in Moscow. They are holding the first meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in seven years, and their meeting reflects the judgment of both our governments that an expansion of our peaceful trade is now appropriate. It is my hope that their achievements will result not only in increased trade, but also in an increased desire to seek greater cooperation in areas other than trade.

I have asked Secretary Baldrige to have pragmatic discussions with Minister Patolichev, so that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission will result in concrete actions by both sides to expand trade where that is now possible. To leave no doubt that the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, I have also authorized Secretary Baldrige to join with Minister Patolichev in a public statement on the development of trade relations.

While I believe there are some actions we can take now to facilitate trade, I doubt that there can be a fundamental change in our trade relationship

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
Authority NLSF99-051-#341
BY GN, NARA, Date 6/17/02

without parallel improvements in other aspects of our relationship. I have mentioned in my previous letters some of the areas in which improvements would contribute greatly to a climate in which a more complete development of trade and economic cooperation would be possible.

It is my hope that upon his return from Moscow Secretary Baldrige will be able to report to me that there are areas in which both our countries can benefit from commercial cooperation and that there is Soviet interest in parallel improvements in other parts of our relationship. Given such progress, I believe that the development of our trade relationship is a question in which you and I could usefully take a continuing personal interest. I will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

90495

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1985

MR. PRESIDENT:

NSC has requested the
attached be signed by
tomorrow.

After you have had an
opportunity to review
and sign the letter,
could you please have
an usher return it [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to the Sit Room

Thank you.

DC
David L. Chew

FOIA(b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR FOIA-114/2#7353
BY RW NARA DATE 5/26/11

II: 90495

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/10

David Chew,

We would like to get
this to Camp David
and signed tomorrow
morning, since Jack
Mallock leaves on
Sunday. Suggest that
it go up and be delivered
[REDACTED] about 0900.

John

FOIA(b)(3)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON7355
42
SYSTEM II
90495

May 10, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev for Secretary Baldrige
to Carry

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to Gorbachev for Mac Baldrige to present if, after the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, you approve Mac's going to Moscow May 20-21.

Facts

Mac may be in Moscow for a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission and wishes to have a letter from you to Gorbachev in case a meeting with Gorbachev is arranged. Mac departed today for visits to China and India before the Moscow meeting. Ambassador Matlock, of our staff, leaves on Sunday to join Mac and would carry this letter.

Discussion

The letter expresses your interest in an expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, but makes clear that this will depend upon the parallel improvement of the overall relationship. The reference to your previous correspondence makes clear that Soviet human rights behavior is particularly relevant.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

OK RR No

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:
Tab A - Letter to Gorbacheve

cc: Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/2 #7355
BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev for Baldrige

Commerce has requested a letter from the President to Gorbachev for Secretary Baldrige to deliver in case he is granted an appointment.

I have made some changes in the Commerce/State draft to reflect elements of the previous correspondence. In particular, I have made the reference to emigration indirect (though unmistakable), since I believe that direct mention in a letter which will have wider distribution in the Soviet bureaucracy than the confidential correspondence would be counterproductive.

If the letter is signed before my departure from Washington May 12, I can hand carry it to Moscow.

Roger Robinson is out of town.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President, with the recommendation that he sign the letter.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Letter to Gorbachev

Tab II - Commerce/State draft of letter, showing changes

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #7356

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90495

44

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
TO BE CONVEYED IN PERSON BY SECRETARY BALDRIGE IN MOSCOW,
PROBABLY MAY 22.....Revised 5/6/85 and Cleared by State/EUR

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Secretary Baldrige's visit to Moscow provides me the opportunity to repeat to you my desire for a more constructive working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. An expansion of peaceful trade can and should be an important part of an improved relationship between our countries .

I place great significance on the discussions between Secretary Baldrige and Minister Patolichev in Moscow. They are holding the first meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in seven years, and their meeting reflects the judgment of both our governments that an expansion of our peaceful trade is now appropriate. It is my hope that their achievements will result not only in increased trade, but also in an increased desire to seek greater cooperation in areas other than trade.

I have asked Secretary Baldrige to have pragmatic discussions with Minister Patolichev, so that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission will result in concrete actions by both sides to expand trade where that is now possible. To leave no doubt that the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, I have also authorized Secretary Baldrige to join with Minister Patolichev in a public statement on the development of trade relations.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLSF 99-051 #344
BY CAJ, NARA, Date 6/17/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45

-2-

to facilitate trade, doubt
While I believe there are some ~~modest trade~~ actions we can take now, I ~~must stress~~ that there can ~~be~~ be a fundamental change in our trade relationship without parallel improvements in other aspects of our relationship. ~~As one example, resumption of a substantial flow of emigration from the USSR,~~ would contribute greatly to a climate in which a more complete development of trade and economic cooperation would be possible.

Soviet
It is my hope that upon his return from Moscow Secretary Baldrige will be able to report to me that there are areas in which both our countries can benefit from commercial cooperation and that there is ~~interest~~ interest in parallel improvements in other parts of our relationship. Given such progress, I believe that the development of our trade relationship is a question in which you and I could usefully take a continuing personal interest. I will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

I have mentioned in my previous letters some of the areas in which improvements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Under Secretary for International Trade
Washington, D.C. 20230

44

MAY 9 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Lionel H. Olmer *LHO*
SUBJECT: Secretary's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin met briefly with Secretary Baldrige May 8 to discuss the upcoming Joint Commercial Commission (JCC) meeting. Dobrynin said Moscow was working hard preparing for the meeting, and he believed we would see positive results. He asked what the Secretary thought would be accomplished, and was told that we believed we could solve some practical problems in exchange for Soviet actions, but that MFN or any other fundamental changes in trade couldn't come without major improvements in other parts of the relationship. (C)

Dobrynin said he understood, and that he thought the effort to talk positively on trade was good. He believed the meeting would be worthwhile to both sides. At the end of the meeting the Secretary was told that they were working to arrange a meeting for him with Gorbachev, and that they were assuming he would convey a letter from the President at such a meeting. (C)

CLASSIFIED BY FRANKLIN J. VARGO
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

Authority
BY CAS

DECLASSIFIED

NARA, Date

#345 CAS 7/25/00
6/17/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chron jfm 04 47

7357

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 11, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 #7357

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Shultz-Gromyko Meeting: Talking Points

Bob Linhardt has forwarded to you suggested revisions in the Secretary's presentation of arms control issues. We have now reviewed the talking points prepared on subjects other than arms control and have a number of suggestions to make.

Most importantly, I believe the approach to consultations on regional issues should be revised to be consistent with the proposal the President made in his UNGA address for regular consultation on these issues. You will recall that the Soviets have proposed consultations on Afghanistan, the Near East and Persian Gulf, East and Southeast Asia, Central America and Southern Africa. We accepted talks on Afghanistan and Southern Africa and said that Shultz would take up the rest in Vienna. The Soviets have agreed, somewhat to our surprise, since we had assumed that they would not discuss Afghanistan unless we were willing to discuss Central America.

I am attaching a separate paper on this issue, but I would urge that, at Vienna, Secretary Shultz indicate that we accept the Soviet proposal for consultations in all these areas and will be in touch with them through normal diplomatic channels to set times and places. He might also add that consultations on European questions might also be useful (under which rubric we would include Eastern Europe), and that we would like to see them develop into a pattern of regular consultation and not just one-shot meetings.

The attached talking points show our markups. The more significant changes are the following:

-- On the introductory points, I believe it is not wise to make comments about Gorbachev (the line about his being "a very impressive leader"). This sounds patronizing and is unnecessary; furthermore, positive-sounding comments on Gorbachev could be taken as a dig at Gromyko.

-- Summitry: I would omit the comments on summitry on pages three and four of the introductory remarks. The ball is in the Soviet court, and we should let Gromyko bring this issue up if he wants. If Shultz broaches the issue it will convey to them that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

we are motivated primarily by a desire to set a meeting, rather than to deal with the issues. Tactically this is unwise.

-- Afghanistan: The proposed presentation seems weak to us. It treats the standard Soviet position -- that the only problem is outside interference -- as a "contingency" theme rather than as the all-but-certain starting point of the Soviet discussion. Given this (and the total lack of progress in the UN talks), it does no good simply to restate that we are committed to a negotiated settlement. The question for the Soviets is not whether we are committed but whether they can do better militarily than through a negotiated settlement.

Because we have some evidence of Soviet anxiety (and possibly divisions) on this score, it may be a good time to have a somewhat blunter talk, in which Shultz speaks more directly about the trends of the war (i.e., the growing strength of the mujahidin) and about how we see the alternatives (i.e., we have no interest in a Soviet defeat, but we and many other nations also have a strong interest in no Soviet victory. Because this is so, no good will come of this war for the Soviet Union.) At the same time the Secretary could add some conciliatory notes. He can, for example, reaffirm that we have no desire to be involved in Afghanistan's affairs over the long term. We were content for decades -- through many different Afghan regimes and despite preponderant Soviet influence -- to have no such role and we seek none now. A parallel between an Afghan settlement and the Austrian State Treaty should not be constructed, lest it be misunderstood as a U.S. attempt to establish de jure U.S. rights in regard to Afghanistan.

Southern Africa and Central America: There should be more direct references to the specific problem of Cuban troops. As regards Central America, we should not just call for "Cuban restraint," but demand that there be no Cuban military presence in Nicaragua.

Middle East: The Secretary should not repeat the suggestion that better treatment of Soviet Jews would help show that the Soviets can play a constructive role in the region. This issue should be considered entirely outside the context of Middle East issues.

Don Fortier and Steve Sestanovich concur. Burghardt, Laux, Teicher and Steiner have concurred in regard to the subjects in their areas.

Recommendation:

That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that his talking points be amended as indicated in the attached package.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

49

Attachments:

- Tab I - Talking points, with revisions noted
- Tab II - Discussion of regional consultations