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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/1985

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (6/6)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 9

YARHI-MILO

904

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7324	MEMO	KIMMITT TO PLATT/AFFOURTIT RE RESPONSE TO THE NICHOLSON SHOOTING <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	4/26/1985	B1
7325	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB TO MCFARLANE RE RESPONSE TO NICHOLSON SHOOTING <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	1	4/25/1985	B1
7333	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE SHOOTING OF MAJOR NICHOLSON: NEXT STEPS <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	4	4/24/1985	B1
7326	MEMO	MATLOCK/LINHARD TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ-GROMYKO VIENNA MEETING: TALKING POINTS <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	3	4/27/1985	B1
7327	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7326 <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	3	4/27/1985	B1
7328	MEMO	NSC STAFF ANALYSIS <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	3	ND	B1
7334	MEMO	SHULTZ MAY 14 MEETING WITH GROMYKO <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	4	4/26/1985	B1
7335	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7334 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	4	4/26/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/1985

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (6/6)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 9

YARHI-MILO

904

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7336	PAPER	AIDE MEMOIRE BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR ON BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	5	ND	B1
7329	MEMO	MATLOCK/LINHARD TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ-GROMYKO VIENNA MEETING: TALKING POINTS R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	3	4/27/1985	B1
7330	MEMO	KIMMITT TO PLATT RE IMPOSITION ON TRAVEL CONTROLS ON UN SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	4/29/1985	B1
7331	MEMO	DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE IMPOSITION ON TRAVEL CONTROLS ON UN SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL	2	4/22/1986	B1
7332	MEMO	USSR PRESENCE IN THE UN SECRETARIAT D 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	2	3/1/1985	B1 B3
7337	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE IMPOSITION ON TRAVEL CONTROLS ON U.N. SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL FROM CERTAIN HOSTILE COUNTRIES R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	4/8/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

~~Marked:~~
3343

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 26, 1985

Chiron

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL R. J. AFFOURTIT
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Response to the Nicholson Shooting (S)

Reference State's memorandum of April 24, please implement the following four measures immediately, in response to Soviet retrenchment on our agreements concerning the non-use of force against military liaison personnel:

1. General Otis should initiate immediate contact with his Soviet counterpart to discuss ways to prevent incidents of violence against our MLM. He should also press for written confirmation from the Soviet side of their instructions that force or weapons will not be used against members of the USMLM.
2. Resume continual overt surveillance of the Soviet MLMs in the Federal Republic of Germany, and coordinate with the French and British.
3. State must continue, through diplomatic channels, to emphasize the unacceptability of the Soviet April 22 statement, demand clarification of the Soviet position, insist on Soviet adherence to the agreement reached by Generals Otis and Zaytsev, and continue to press our demands for an apology and compensation.
4. One Soviet military attache stationed in Washington should be declared persona non grata. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~
Declassify:OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-7324

BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

261035L
C

WASHFAX RECEIPT
THE WHITE HOUSE
C

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 956 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 1

FROM ROBERT KIMMITT 456-2224 Gf1/WW
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Response to the Nicholson Shooting
NSC LOG # 3343

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Eyes ONLY Nicholas Platt</u>		
<u>D</u>	<u>Eyes ONLY Col. R.J. Affairtit</u>		

REMARKS _____

URGENT!

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK/TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: Response to Nicholson Shooting

State called in Soviet charge Sokolov yesterday to express our dissatisfaction with the apparent Soviet reversal of their commitment on the non-use of violence against our MLM personnel. He warned that the Soviet reversal, and their public statement of their new position, could lead to a rapid deterioration of our relationship.

-- State reemphasized that our understanding of the Otis-Zaitsev meeting is that General Zaitsev agreed that force would not be used in the apprehension of the MLMs. The new Soviet position was tantamount to a "shoot to kill" order if "intruders" were detected.

We now have interagency agreement on four measures that need to be taken immediately in response to the recent Soviet reversal (Tab A). In essence, NSC approval was requested for:

- General Otis to press for written confirmation of Soviet implementation of the non-use of force.
- Resumption of continued overt surveillance of Soviet MLMs in the FRG, in coordination with the French and the Brits.
- Pressures, through diplomatic channels, for clarification of the Soviet position, and demanding an apology and compensation.
- Declaring one Soviet military attache persona non grata.

RECOMMENDATION

authorize Bob Kimmitt to
That you sign the memorandum from you to State at Tab I, approving implementation of the four steps listed above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Shultz
Tab A - State Paper

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/2 #7325

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR



~~SECRET~~

April 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: SHOOTING OF MAJOR NICHOLSON: NEXT STEPS

In light of the unacceptable Soviet statement of April 22 concerning the shooting of Major Nicholson, the Departments of State and Defense recommend that the US take the following actions and request NSC approval to carry them out.

1. CINCUSAREUR General Otis, directly or through the USMLM, should initiate immediate contact with his Soviet counterpart to pursue his mandate for further discussions to prevent incidents of violence against our MLM. General Otis should press for written confirmation from the Soviet side of their instructions that force or weapons will not be used against members of the USMLM.
2. The US should for the time being resume continual overt surveillance of Soviet MLMs in the Federal Republic of Germany and coordinate with the French and British military in the FRG to have them take similar steps against the Soviet MLMs accredited to their zones.
3. The Department of State should continue contacts with the Soviet Embassy at a high level to emphasize the unacceptability of the Soviet April 22 statement, demand clarification of the Soviet position, insist on Soviet adherence to the agreement reached by Generals Otis and Zaytsev, and continue to press our demands for an apology and compensation, including a diplomatic note on compensation.
4. One Soviet military attache in Washington -- identified by the USG as being a prominent intelligence collector -- should be declared persona non grata as a signal of US seriousness about the need for acceptable Soviet responses on the issues raised by the Nicholson tragedy.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7333

BY 105 NARA, DATE 11/21/07

5

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

In addition, for the information of the NSC, we are attaching a further illustrative list of measures which could be a starting point for consideration if the Soviet response remains unsatisfactory. These measures do not have inter-agency endorsement. Indeed, some are strongly opposed by some agencies; further, some may be more disadvantageous to the US than the Soviet Union. They are not submitted for decision at this time.

BMCKmley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Illustrative List

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIVE MEASURES

(These do not have interagency endorsement. Indeed, some are strongly opposed by some agencies; further, some may be more disadvantageous to the US than the Soviet Union. They are not submitted for decision at this time.)

Actions against Soviet military in Germany

1. Declare Persona Non Grata the Chief of the Soviet MLM plus additional officer.
2. Require the Soviet MLM-Frankfurt to transit FRG and GDR through one crossing point; encourage Allies to adopt similar restrictions.
3. Deny/limit support to Soviet MLMs such as PX privileges, ration cards, and recreational equipment, or demand dependents leave West Germany.
4. Publicize broadly the next detention of an SMLM tour.
5. Restrict Soviet MLM-Frankfurt to Mission headquarters pending receipt of favorable instruction to troops from the Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.
6. Take restrictive actions against Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin.

Other possible actions outside Germany

1. Institute proposed travel controls on Soviet UN Secretariat personnel, tying the imposition to the Nicholson case.
2. Conduct a public diplomacy campaign highlighting examples of Soviet abhorrent behavior and their inability to admit error, failure, or loss of control, or to apologize in any meaningful way. The campaign would be initiated by a DOD press briefing on facts of the Nicholson murder.
3. Conduct an interagency search for areas of leverage that could be used against the Soviets, e.g., restricting visas to Soviets, trade, etc.
4. Raise the issue in MBFR/CDE talks, in the context of requiring specificity in any confidence building measures or arrangements for exchanges of observers, rather than being prepared to rely on Soviet willingness to implement general measures to the same extent we would.
5. Express displeasure in social functions where Soviets are present and in various negotiating fora.
6. Ensure no US participation in World War II ceremonies at which Soviets attend.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1

Other measures which would have major consequences for
US-Soviet relations

1. Presidential letter to Gorbachev pressing three US demands.
2. Postpone or cancel upcoming high-level US-Soviet meetings.
3. Reduce the number of Soviet military attaches in the US.
4. Reduce other staff members of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

~~SECRET~~

matlock

3351

JMC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8

April 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *WRP for*
SUBJECT: Telegram to the President from Martha Swiderski
Regarding the Plight of Yuri Shukhevych

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed draft response prepared by the State Department to Ms. Martha Swiderski of the Ukrainian Club in Amsterdam, New York concerning the plight of Yuri Shukhevych.

Attachment:

TAB A Proposed Response with Incoming Telegram

CD 165

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

8510854

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 / 1 /

Name of Correspondent: Martha Swidersky

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Plight of Ukrainian Political Prisoner
Yuriy Shukhevych

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION			
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>PLK02E</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>85104105</u>			<u> 1 / 1 / </u>
<u>✓ 99 DOS</u>	<u>Referral Note:</u>	<u>D 85104105 10</u>			<u> 1 / 1 / </u>
	<u>Referral Note:</u>				<u> 1 / 1 / </u>
	<u>Referral Note:</u>				<u> 1 / 1 / </u>
	<u>Referral Note:</u>				<u> 1 / 1 / </u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

309280 14

8510854

1-0237331087 03/28/85

ICS IP [REDACTED] WSH

03611 [REDACTED] 0648P EST

PMS WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

4-040790S087 03/28/85

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

5181533611 POM TDMT AMSTERDAM NY 18 03-28 0620P EST
PMS PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC 20500

MR PRESIDENT,

PLEASE INTERVENE ON YURIY SHUKHEVYCH BEHALF UKRANIAN POLITICAL
PRISONER 35 YEARS BLIND AND EXTREMELY POOR HEALTH
MARTHA SWIDERSKY

UKRANIAN CLUB 3 TELER ST
AMSTERDAM NY 12010

1847 EST

1906 EST

15 MAR 28 P 7: 22

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Telegram to the President from Martha Swiderski
Regarding the Plight of Yuri Shukhevych

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft response at TAB A, prepared by the State Department for the President's signature to Ms. Martha Swiderski of the Ukrainian Club in Amsterdam, New York concerning the plight of Yuri Shukhevych. A memorandum is attached at TAB I for your signature to Sally Kelley.

SS
Steve Steiner concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at TAB I.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

Attachment:

TAB I Memorandum for Sally Kelley

TAB A Draft Letter to Ms. Martha Swiderski and Incoming Telegram

S/S # 8510854

DATE APR 24 1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: The President FROM: Ms. Martha Swidersky
DATE: March 28, 1985 SUBJECT: Yuri Shukhevych

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: April 10 NSC # 309280

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- XXX A draft reply is attached
- A draft reply will be forwarded
- A translation is attached
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
- Other

REMARKS:

for Tom Collins
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

10

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Ms. Swidersky:

I am replying to your message to President Reagan regarding Yuri Shukhevych.

We follow closely the situation of Mr. Shukhevych, who has spent most of his adult life imprisoned in the Soviet Union. His most recent period of imprisonment, from 1972 until the present, stems primarily from his human rights activities. In March 1972, Mr. Shukhevych was arrested and charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." This is a well-known catch-all charge which the Soviets employ when they cannot detain human rights activists for more specific "criminal" offenses. In September 1972, Mr. Shukhevych was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, to be followed by five years' internal exile. While in prison, he joined the Helsinki Monitoring Group established in Kiev to check Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Shukhevych's prison term was scheduled to end in March 1982. He reportedly has been transferred to his place of exile. Mr. Shukhevych is said to suffer from several severe medical ailments, and we are concerned that he is not receiving adequate medical care. Reports indicate that

Ms. Martha Swidersky,
Ukrainian Club,
3 Teler Street,
Amsterdam, New York.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Shukhevych may now be totally blind as a result of unsuccessful eye surgery performed in a Leningrad hospital, and he is serving his exile in a facility for invalids.

We remain committed to drawing world attention to the plight of persons in the Soviet Union who suffer for their defense of individual human rights. At the Madrid Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), we conducted a thorough and candid discussion of Soviet treatment of human rights activists in Ukraine. We have voiced our special concern for Mr. Shukhevych and other individuals deprived of their liberty for expressing their cultural rights or asserting their national heritage. Vice President Bush called specific attention to the plight of Yuriy Shukhevych at the 30th convention of the Ukrainian National Association in Rochester, New York.

Let me assure you we will continue to do all we can to help Mr. Shukhevych and other Ukrainians imprisoned for practicing their culture or expressing their beliefs.

Sincerely,

12
8510854

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E
R E F E R R A L

APRIL 10, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 309280

MEDIA: TELEGRAM, DATED MARCH 28, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MS. MARTHA SWIDERSKY
UKRANIAN CLUB 3 TELER STREET
AMSTERDAM NY 12010

SUBJECT: PLIGHT OF UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PRISONER
YURIY SHUKHEVYCH

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II *Matlock*
90454

Chen 16


MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

April 27, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK *Matlock* / BOB *Linhard*

NLRR E06-114/2 #7326

BY kml NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Shultz-Gromyko Vienna Meeting: Talking Points

Attached at Tab A & B is are two alternative draft sets of talkers concerning the Geneva negotiations proposed by State for Secretary Shultz's use in his meeting with Gromyko on May 14. In terms of the substance of the U.S. position, the approach in both drafts is identical. The difference between the two drafts is how the substance is presented.

-- The draft at Tab A simply presents the U.S. ideas and suggests that these ideas could form the basis of a later agreement between the President and the General Secretary.

-- The draft at Tab B would capture the substance in the form of a specific draft aide memoire that would be provided for Soviet consideration.

NSC Staff Views. So far as the desirability of presenting a new and comprehensive U.S. proposal at the Vienna meeting, we would have the following observations:

1. We do not feel that an initiative like that suggested in the attached papers need, or should be made in the context of the Vienna Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Jack Matlock feels that it is desirable to make our proposal more concrete during the second round of negotiations, preferably at the beginning. Bob Linhard is less certain.

2. Both agree that this should be done only after consultations with key allies, at the highest level, and on the closest-hold basis. (This aspect is particularly important for relations with Thatcher, Mulroney, Kohl and Mitterand. Some of the others, such as Craxi, Martens and Lubbers, should be given a general briefing in advance.)

3. It is clear that we do not have time to vet the details of the proposal suggested in the attached papers and to conduct the indispensable consultations before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Vienna. Therefore, we should not aspire to do so at that time.

4. When a proposal is made to the Soviets, we should be prepared to keep it confidential for several weeks at least, to demonstrate our seriousness. Jack Matlock feels that we will need before too long, however, something to point to publicly as an effort on our part to move the negotiations ahead. (Thus, Jack sees the desirability of doing something early in the second round.)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

17

5. Actually, it would be well to shift some of the focus of the Vienna meeting away from arms control. Circumstances required the Geneva meeting to deal almost wholly with arms control issues, and we should spend most of the Vienna meeting getting back to our broad agenda: regional and bilateral issues, and human rights.

agree

6. As for the subject of the NST negotiations, we believe that the line taken in the President's letter provides a basis for discussing broad approaches for dealing with the issues in an integrated fashion. The discussion in the SACG on Friday also suggested a number of good ideas that, hopefully, Jack Chain will pull together and vet. Drawing on this, Secretary Shultz can lay the foundation for a more concrete U.S. proposal either early in the next round [as Jack Matlock suggests] or later when appropriate.

Analysis of the Substance of the Proposals. We do have significant problems with the substance of the proposals suggested. These problems are outlined in the detailed analysis of the substance of the proposals made in both attachments is provided at Tab I.

Follow-up to SACG. Based upon yesterday's SACG, we will have Jack Chain's paper on this product by next Friday. We will transmit both the paper and our analysis of it to you in Europe. This should serve as the main stream activity for the development of Secretary Shultz's talking points in this one area of what will be, hopefully, a discussion on a much larger range of issues.

Paul Nitze called Bob Linhard following the SACG to ask if he thought that further work on the aide memoire was needed. Paul volunteered that he was inclined to concentrate on working the talking points along the lines of the SACG discussion. Linhard encouraged him to do so, noting that you had the benefit of the attached paper.

Recommendations

That you advise Secretary Shultz that you do not believe we can put together a new concrete proposal and conduct the necessary prior consultations in time for his meeting in Vienna, and that you have substantive problems with the one offered, but that you agree that we should consider a more concrete proposal which would be useful during the second round at Geneva.

Approve RCM Disapprove _____

That you encourage Secretary Shultz to follow a balanced agenda at the Vienna meeting, giving major attention to regional and bilateral issues and more closely following the tack taken in the President's letter in regard to Geneva.

Approve RCM Disapprove _____

That we take the necessary action to make the paper that you tasked Jack Chain to develop at Friday's SACG the basis for staffing the Secretary's talking points in this area.

Approve

PCM

Disapprove _____

Have not yet seen this paper. Is it finished?

Attachments:

- Tab I Substantive Analysis (S/S)
- Tab A Talkers Without Aide Memoire (S/S)
- Tab B Talkers With Aide Memoir (S/S)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90454

*Chiron*¹⁹

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

7327

ACTION

April 27, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 #7327

FROM: JACK MATLOCK / BOB LINHARD

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Shultz-Gromyko Vienna Meeting: Talking Points

Attached at Tab A & B is are two alternative draft sets of talkers concerning the Geneva negotiations proposed by State for Secretary Shultz's use in his meeting with Gromyko on May 14. In terms of the substance of the U.S. position, the approach in both drafts is identical. The difference between the two drafts is how the substance is presented.

-- The draft at Tab A simply presents the U.S. ideas and suggests that these ideas could form the basis of a later agreement between the President and the General Secretary.

-- The draft at Tab B would capture the substance in the form of a specific draft aide memoire that would be provided for Soviet consideration.

NSC Staff Views. So far as the desirability of presenting a new and comprehensive U.S. proposal at the Vienna meeting, we would have the following observations:

1. We do not feel that an initiative like that suggested in the attached papers need, or should be made in the context of the Vienna Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Jack Matlock feels that it is desirable to make our proposal more concrete during the second round of negotiations, preferably at the beginning. Bob Linhard is less certain.

2. Both agree that this should be done only after consultations with key allies, at the highest level, and on the closest-hold basis. (This aspect is particularly important for relations with Thatcher, Mulroney, Kohl and Mitterand. Some of the others, such as Craxi, Martens and Lubbers, should be given a general briefing in advance.)

3. It is clear that we do not have time to vet the details of the proposal suggested in the attached papers and to conduct the indispensable consultations before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Vienna. Therefore, we should not aspire to do so at that time.

4. When a proposal is made to the Soviets, we should be prepared to keep it confidential for several weeks at least, to demonstrate our seriousness. Jack Matlock feels that we will need before too long, however, something to point to publicly as an effort on our part to move the negotiations ahead. (Thus, Jack sees the desirability of doing something early in the second round.)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

5. Actually, it would be well to shift some of the focus of the Vienna meeting away from arms control. Circumstances required the Geneva meeting to deal almost wholly with arms control issues, and we should spend most of the Vienna meeting getting back to our broad agenda: regional and bilateral issues, and human rights.

6. As for the subject of the NST negotiations, we believe that the line taken in the President's letter provides a basis for discussing broad approaches for dealing with the issues in an integrated fashion. The discussion in the SACG on Friday also suggested a number of good ideas that, hopefully, Jack Chain will pull together and vet. Drawing on this, Secretary Shultz can lay the foundation for a more concrete U.S. proposal either early in the next round [as Jack Matlock suggests] or later when appropriate.

Analysis of the Substance of the Proposals. We do have significant problems with the substance of the proposals suggested. These problems are outlined in the detailed analysis of the substance of the proposals made in both attachments is provided at Tab I.

Follow-up to SACG. Based upon yesterday's SACG, we will have Jack Chain's paper on this product by next Friday. We will transmit both the paper and our analysis of it to you in Europe. This should serve as the main stream activity for the development of Secretary Shultz's talking points in this one area of what will be, hopefully, a discussion on a much larger range of issues.

Paul Nitze called Bob Linhard following the SACG to ask if he thought that further work on the aide memoire was needed. Paul volunteered that he was inclined to concentrate on working the talking points along the lines of the SACG discussion. Linhard encouraged him to do so, noting that you had the benefit of the attached paper.

Recommendations

That you advise Secretary Shultz that you do not believe we can put together a new concrete proposal and conduct the necessary prior consultations in time for his meeting in Vienna, and that you have substantive problems with the one offered, but that you agree that we should consider a more concrete proposal which would be useful during the second round at Geneva.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you encourage Secretary Shultz to follow a balanced agenda at the Vienna meeting, giving major attention to regional and bilateral issues and more closely following the tack taken in the President's letter in regard to Geneva.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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That we take the necessary action to make the paper that you tasked Jack Chain to develop at Friday's SACG the basis for staffing the Secretary's talking points in this area.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Substantive Analysis (S/S)
- Tab A Talkers Without Aide Memoire (S/S)
- Tab B Talkers With Aide Memoir (S/S)

TAB I

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #7328

NSC STAFF ANALYSIS

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

START. With regard to the substance of the proposals, in the START area, the drafts proposit to have the Secretary deploy the contingency authority granted to Senator Tower by NSDD 165, but not used during round I. In fact, they go well beyond this contingency guidance.

NSDD 165 states that "the START negotiator is also authorized the following contingent authority. As a function of the degree of Soviet interest in making early progress as reflected by specific Soviet proposals, or as a result of significant exploratory conversation, you are authorized to state that:

- The U.S. is willing to consider Soviet proposals which involve associated limitations on ballistic missile warheads and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), so long as the resulting outcome would result in significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads, improved overall stability, and equality in the aggregate. Any specific aggregate numbers proposed by the Soviet Union should be referred to Washington. However, in accordance with the criteria stated, any levels proposed that would not result in a reduction in the number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads should be rejected at the time proposed.

- In the context of an agreement in which U.S. concerns about the destructive capacity and potential of ballistic missiles were met, the U.S. is willing to consider Soviet proposals which could involve associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers with the total of both in the range previously proposed by the Soviet Union (i.e., around 1800)." [FYI: The above underlining was not in NSDD 165.]

The proposed draft talking points go beyond this formulation in a number of ways.

With respect to associated limits on ballistic RVs and ALCMs, the draft talkers propose that those limits result "in a total combined number of ALCMs plus ICBM and SLBM RVs to level of no more than 8000." This not only provides a specific number not previously authorized, but it also significantly reduces our flexibility in defining what we mean by "associated limits" since the number results (de facto) in an aggregation of RVs and ALCMs under a common ceiling. Both of these moves are significant steps that we avoided in the drafting of NSDD 165.

Turning to the associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers, the draft talkers state that the U.S. "would be prepared to agree to associated limits on the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers." The change in critical verbs from "consider" [NSDD 165] to "agree to" [proposed talker] is worthy of note. Also, NSDD 165 did not authorize Ambassador Tower to state that there would be a "total number" [i.e., an aggregate limit]. While hinting at this, NSDD 165 did not discuss an aggregated total number. Rather, it authorized Ambassador Tower to suggest that, within the associated limits [method of limit unspecified], "the total of both (could be) in the range previously proposed by the Soviet Union (i.e., around 1800)."

Finally, NSDD 44 did authorize that a limit on new RVs of about 200 kilograms. The Soviets never did bite at this, and we deemphasized it within our presentations over the last rounds of START. However, such a proposal remains within the U.S. position.

Taken all together, the presentation in the START area moves us fairly far towards the acceptance of aggregate limits of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and an associated aggregate limit of 8000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. This is a rather big step to make at this time -- especially since Ambassador Tower has not seen fit to exercise his contingency guidance which represents a prudent intermediate step. If something like this were to be done in Vienna at all, we would recommend that the maximum step we take go no further than Ambassador Tower's contingency guidance.

INF. Turning to INF, NSDD 165 states that "the U.S. INF negotiating group should make clear that the U.S. believes that an agreement is possible on the basis of the September 1983 U.S. proposals which signalled flexibility and a willingness to consider a variety of ways to reach the goal of equal global limits on LRINF. ... While doing so, the INF negotiating group is authorized to explore Soviet interest in equal global entitlements at levels other than those previously proposed." NSDD 165 did not authorize the delegation to table specific numbers other than zero-zero.

In previous INF negotiations, NSDD 86 outlined our INF "interim proposal." It authorized the U.S. delegation to "notify the Soviet Delegation that the U.S. is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on longer-range land based INF missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land based missile force to an equal level on a global basis." NSDD 104 subsequently reaffirmed that language for use in the context of the previous set of INF negotiations.

The proposed talking points would have Secretary Shultz propose that "each side agree to limit its global LRINF warheads to levels of no more than 600" and "if the Soviet side agreed to such a reduction, the U.S. could agree to limit its LRINF warheads in Europe to a level of no more than 300, provided (the Soviets) did not deploy more than 300 warheads within range of Europe."

The language of the proposed aide memoire is a bit more specific. It states that "the Parties shall agree to limit the total number of warheads on deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer-range to a level of no more than 600" and "the United States of America shall agree to limit its warheads on deployed Pershing II and BGM-109G missiles in Europe to a level of no more than 300, provided that the Soviet Union deploys no more than 300 SS-20 warheads within range of Europe."

The most obvious point to be made is that proposing specific numbers (600/300) is a significant step. But beyond this, other points are worthy of consideration:

-- The language proposed in the talkers is substantively different than the language in the aide memoire. The talkers discuss a 600/300 limit on all LRINF warheads. The talkers discuss limits on warheads in general while

the aide memoire specifies 600/300 limits on deployed missiles (which could be a problem for us as we struggle with the problem of whether SS-20s in transit are technically deployed). The aide memoire also specifies that the limits would apply only to SS-20 warheads. These discontinuities reflect an imprecision that would need to be resolved if this proposal were to go any further.

-- The focus on warhead numbers also is a matter of concern. While this focus is correct in light of the details of our interim proposal and the guidance in NSDD 86 and 104, specifying we seek direct warhead limits (vice missile or launcher limits) does cut into our flexibility considerably. The goal is to get to equal U.S./Soviet LRINF warhead limits, but the optimum mechanism may lie in other limits. For example, if the Soviets come back to the equal percentage reductions scheme, the option we would prefer uses a launcher limit to our advantage and gets at warhead levels indirectly. Also, as we struggle with the British and French issue, a specific limit on launchers or missiles would be to our advantage -- since British and French plans to MIRV their forces will compound our problem if the unit of account is warheads.

In short, we are not sure that we need to make this step now. We do have the opportunity to maintain some flexibility as to how we pursue our interim option proposal. We should protect that flexibility. If it should be decided to do something like this, the imprecision must be eliminated before the proposal is tabled and all aspects of the warhead limit staffed to ensure that we don't inadvertently shoot ourselves in the foot.

Date of Agreement. The talkers and the aide memoire also call for us to establish a target date for full agreement, no later than the end of 1986. The rationale behind this step is unclear and the consequences of taking this step need further study.

TAB A

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4/26/85

The Secretary's May 14 Meeting with Gromyko

Geneva Talks

Talking Points

-- Disappointed by Soviet approach in first round of nuclear and space arms talks. Also disturbed by Soviet public allegations regarding US approach to those talks, which do nothing to foster atmosphere for serious negotiations.

-- Reject charge that US is backing away from our January agreement, i.e. that we do not accept interrelationship between strategic forces, INF, and defense and space arms.

-- US has long held that there is conceptual link between these issues. Indeed, stable offense-defense relationship lies at heart of our approach to Geneva talks.

-- But cannot accept your negotiators' unilateral interpretation of January agreement. We are being told that, unless we first accept ban on so-called "space-strike" arms, progress on reductions in offensive nuclear forces will be impossible. This distorts our agreement into an unacceptable precondition. Making progress in all areas contingent on our acceptance of your space proposal is not serious negotiating, and is in neither side's interest.

-- Indeed, by isolating the space area, it is Soviet side that is making it impossible to proceed in earnest on the range of issues as envisaged in the January 8 statement.

-- Also must reject your charge that US is backing away from objective of preventing an arms race in space.

-- We have made clear that SDI is a research program only, and that, should new defenses prove feasible, we seek an agreed transition to a more defense-reliant balance, in which introduction of new defenses, along with further reductions in offensive arms, would be jointly managed. This would be the opposite of an arms race.

-- Soviet negotiators suggested that they would have numbers and specifics to introduce in the second round. Hope this is so and that Soviet negotiators will be prepared to engage in serious give-and-take.

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-- US negotiating group in defense and space forum is fully prepared to discuss rationale and implications of SDI, and present our thoughts about how possible new defensive technologies might produce more stable and secure balance from perspective of both sides.

-- Our negotiators in START and INF fora have broad authority to negotiate solutions that meet interests of both sides. We are prepared to agree to radical cuts in such systems. You will note that, while we have presented desired ends, we have left considerable flexibility as to how to achieve those ends. Your negotiators should join ours in jointly developing mutually acceptable agreements.

-- START trade-offs concept, in particular, offers means to achieve deep cuts while reconciling asymmetries between US and Soviet strategic force structures.

-- Elements of our INF position, for example, our readiness within context of agreed global ceiling to discuss a commitment regarding US deployments in Europe and reducing P-IIIs, should also be of interest to you.

-- Prepared to move forward in all three areas in Geneva. Could envisage mutually acceptable solutions as follows.

-- With regard to strategic nuclear forces, propose reducing ICBM and SLBM RVs to level of no more than 5000. Believe this is appropriate first step, but are willing to consider your alternatives.

-- While reductions in RVs are most critical for enhancing stability, also prepared to consider associated limitations on ALCMs on heavy bombers, resulting in reduction in total combined number of ALCMs plus ICBM and SLBM RVs [to level of no more than 8000.]

-- We should also negotiate constraints resulting in substantial reductions in destructive capability of strategic ballistic missiles.

-- In context of Soviet ^{CONSIDER} agreement to such constraints, would be prepared to [agree to] associated limitations on total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

[-- Would also be useful to constrain weight of RVs on new types of strategic ballistic missiles.]

* THIS EXCEEDS EVEN TOWER'S CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE BY INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC NUMBER 8000. NSDD 165 GAVE TOWER CONTINGENCY AUTHORITY TO PROPOSE THE ABBREVIATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE RVs AND ALCMs BUT DID NOT AUTHORIZE A SPECIFIC NUMBER.

* WHILE WE HAD NSDD 44 APPROVE A LIMIT ON NEW RVs TO ABOUT 2000 KG FOR WE NEVER HAD THE SOV'S BITE ON THIS.

* THIS GOES BEYOND OUR CURRENT POSITION BUT IS IN LINE WITH NSDD 165'S CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE -- WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT IT SHOULD READ THE US WOULD BE "PREPARED TO CONSIDER" VICE "WANT TO CONSIDER"

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* THIS WOULD LOCK US INTO A WARHEAD
LIMIT - VICE A MISSILE LIMIT - OUR GOAL
IS GET EQUAL WARHEAD LIMITS BUT WE
MAY WANT TO ACHIEVE IT BY LIMITING MISSILES
SO AS TO AVOID A REAL PROBLEM AS UK AND
FRANCE
MAY.

-- Taken together, above constraints would embody trade-offs concept, addressing our concern over your ballistic missile force and your concern over our bomber/ALCM force. At same time, agreement along these lines would not require identical force structures; above framework takes account of and accommodates asymmetries in sides' forces.

-- With regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces, propose that each side agree to limit its global LRINF warheads to level of no more than 600.

-- If Soviet side agreed to such a reduction, US could agree to limit its LRINF warheads in Europe to level of no more than 300, provided you did not deploy more than 300 warheads within range of Europe.

-- Within this context, we would further be prepared to accept specific limit on P-II deployment in Europe.

-- Also prepared to agree to equitable limits on LRINF aircraft, which would respond to your long-standing concerns about so-called "forward-based systems."

-- Such an outcome would be balanced and consistent with security interests of both sides. It would put INF problem behind us.

-- With regard to defense and space arms, believe we should commit to resolve outstanding compliance issues associated with ABM Treaty and reaffirm commitment to comply fully with all provisions of existing treaties limiting ABM systems and arms in outer space.

-- Also propose that we agree to work out means to reverse erosion of ABM Treaty, including ways to maintain clear and unambiguous distinctions between non-ABM radars and ABM and early-warning ABM radars, and between non-ABM and ABM interceptor missiles and launchers.

-- Finally, we are prepared to agree, should either side's research establish that new defensive systems to counter strategic ballistic missiles could enhance security and stability, to pursue discussions as to how such systems could be developed, tested and deployed, concurrent with further agreed reductions in offensive nuclear forces, in controlled manner.

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-- Intent would be to enhance security of both sides and strengthen stability of strategic relationship. Such development, testing and deployment would be carried out in accordance with procedures jointly agreed and authorized pursuant to Articles XIII and XIV and Agreed Statement D of ABM Treaty.

-- These points, in our view, provide basis for forward movement in all three areas and take full account of interrelationships among the issues. Many details would, of course, have to be negotiated and agreed, but these ideas provide framework in which our negotiators could work.

-- With such a framework, believe it would be useful to set a target date for full agreement, no later than end of 1986.

-- Please give these thoughts careful consideration. If you are prepared to work on basis of these ideas, perhaps it would be useful to think about joint document to be agreed by President and General Secretary.

WJM

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TAB B

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WITH AIDE MEMOIRE

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4/26/85

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The Secretary's May 14 Meeting with Gromyko

Geneva Talks

Talking Points

-- Disappointed by Soviet approach in first round of nuclear and space arms talks. Also disturbed by Soviet public allegations regarding US approach to those talks, which do nothing to foster atmosphere for serious negotiations.

-- Reject charge that US is backing away from our January agreement, i.e. that we do not accept interrelationship between strategic forces, INF, and defense and space arms.

-- US has long held that there is conceptual link between these issues. Indeed, stable offense-defense relationship lies at heart of our approach to Geneva talks.

-- But cannot accept your negotiators' unilateral interpretation of January agreement. We are being told that, unless we first accept ban on so-called "space-strike" arms, progress on reductions in offensive nuclear forces will be impossible. This distorts our agreement into an unacceptable precondition. Making progress in all areas contingent on our acceptance of your space proposal is not serious negotiating, and is in neither side's interest.

-- Indeed, by isolating the space area, it is Soviet side that is making it impossible to proceed in earnest on the range of issues as envisaged in the January 8 statement.

-- Also must reject your charge that US is backing away from objective of preventing an arms race in space.

-- We have made clear that SDI is a research program only, and that, should new defenses prove feasible, we seek an agreed transition to a more defense-reliant balance, in which introduction of new defenses, along with further reductions in offensive arms, would be jointly managed. This would be the opposite of an arms race.

-- Soviet negotiators suggested that they would have numbers and specifics to introduce in the second round. Hope this is so and that Soviet negotiators will be prepared to engage in serious give-and-take.

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-- US negotiating group in defense and space forum is fully prepared to discuss rationale and implications of SDI, and present our thoughts about how possible new defensive technologies might produce more stable and secure balance from perspective of both sides.

-- Our negotiators in START and INF fora have broad authority to negotiate solutions that meet interests of both sides. We are prepared to agree to radical cuts in such systems. You will note that, while we have presented desired ends, we have left considerable flexibility as to how to achieve those ends. Your negotiators should join ours in jointly developing mutually acceptable agreements.

-- START trade-offs concept, in particular, offers means to achieve deep cuts while reconciling asymmetries between US and Soviet strategic force structures.

-- Elements of our INF position, for example, our readiness within context of agreed global ceiling to discuss a commitment regarding US deployments in Europe and reducing P-IIs, should also be of interest to you.

(Draft Aide Memoire)

-- Given different interpretations of our January agreement it might be useful were we to develop more definitive guidance for our negotiators.

-- Would like you to consider this draft paper, which sets down more definite guidelines for each of the three negotiations fora. Do not expect you to agree to it today, but suggest you review it; we could address it later at future meeting and through our Ambassadors. Moreover, we would hope this would be a useful basis for productive exchange during second round in Geneva.

-- Let me walk you through paper's main elements.

-- As to strategic nuclear arms, first point codifies proposed limit of 5000 ballistic missile RVs. Believe to appropriate first step, but are willing to consider alternative Soviet-proposed levels.

-- While reduction in RVs are most critical for end stability, second point provides for associated limit plus ballistic missile RVs. Propose level of no more

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-- Third point commits sides to negotiate deep cuts in destructive capability of ballistic missiles. You are aware of our concern over SS-18/SS-19 force. It has to be reduced markedly, but we are flexible as to how that end is accomplished.

-- In context of above, fourth point provides for associated limit on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, as you have in the past suggested.

-- Fifth point is intended to constrain destructive capability of new ballistic missile systems by limiting RV weight.

-- Taken together, these constraints would embody trade-offs concept, addressing our concern over your ballistic missile force and your concern over our heavy bomber/ALCM force. Agreement along these lines would not require identical force structures; above framework takes account of and accommodates asymmetries in sides' forces.

-- As to intermediate-range nuclear forces, we are prepared to introduce specifics.

-- In particular, in context of global limit of 600 LRINF missile RVs, propose to limit our deployments to no more than 300 in Europe, provided you reduce your SS-20 warheads within range of Europe to similar level.

-- Would also be prepared, under such an arrangement, to reduce and agree to specific level on P-II.

-- Would add that we are also prepared to agree to equitable limits on LRINF aircraft, which would respond to your long-standing concerns about so-called "forward-based systems."

-- Such an outcome would be balanced and consistent with security interests of both sides. It would put INF problem behind us.

-- Under defense and space arms, first point would commit us to resolve outstanding compliance issues and reaffirm our intent to comply fully with those accords covering ABM systems and outer space.

-- Second point commits sides to develop distinctions that would clearly separate non-ABM and ABM systems. This would ease concerns over possible circumvention of the Treaty.

-- Taken together, these two points would do much to restore ABM Treaty regime to what we thought we had agreed in 1972.

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-- Third point looks toward future. It would formalize our readiness to discuss implications of possible new defensive systems and how, should such systems prove feasible, we would jointly manage their development, testing and deployment pursuant to relevant provisions of ABM Treaty.

-- These points, in our view, provide basis for forward movement in all three areas and take full account of interrelationships among the issues. Many details would, of course, have to be negotiated and agreed, but these ideas provide framework in which our negotiators could work.

-- With such a framework, believe it would be useful to set a target date for full agreement, no later than end of 1986.

-- Please give draft careful consideration. We might again address this document at meeting later this year. If we can come to agreement, it could be appropriate document for meeting between President and General Secretary.

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DRAFT

Aide Memoire between the
United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Basic Principles for the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties

Reaffirming that the complex of questions concerning
nuclear and space arms shall be considered and resolved in
their interrelationship;

Reaffirming their objective of working out effective
agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and
terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear
and at strengthening strategic stability; and

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Reaffirming their ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere;

Agree to the following guidelines to govern the on-going negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

With regard to strategic nuclear forces:

-- The Parties shall agree to reduce the total number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level of no more than 5000.

-- The Parties shall agree to associated limitations on air-launched cruise missiles on deployed heavy bombers, resulting in a reduction in the total combined number of cruise missiles and warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level of no more than 8000.

-- The Parties shall negotiate constraints resulting in substantial reductions in the destructive capability of strategic ballistic missiles.

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-- In the context of such constraints, the Parties shall agree to associated limitations on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

-- The Parties shall negotiate limitations regarding the weight of intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile re-entry vehicles, such that re-entry vehicles tested and deployed on new types of such missiles shall weigh no more than [] kilograms.

With regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces:

-- The Parties shall agree to limit the total number of warheads on deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer-range to a level of no more than 600.

-- The United States of America shall agree to limit its warheads on deployed Pershing II and BGM-109G missiles in Europe to a level of no more than 300, provided that the Soviet Union deploys no more than 300 SS-20 warheads within range of Europe.

-- The United States of America shall agree further to limit its deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe to a level of no more than [].

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With regard to defense and space arms:

-- The Parties shall resolve outstanding compliance issues associated with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and shall reaffirm their commitment to comply fully with all provisions of existing treaties limiting anti-ballistic missile systems and arms in outer space.

-- The Parties shall work out means to assure the strict implementation of the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, including provisions to maintain clear and unambiguous distinctions between non-ABM radars and ABM and early warning ABM radars, and between non-ABM and ABM interceptor missiles and launchers.

-- The Parties shall agree to pursue discussions as to how, should either Party's research lead to a conclusion that new defensive systems (including systems based on "other physical principles") to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory could enhance security and stability, such systems could be developed, tested and deployed, concurrent with further agreed reductions in offensive nuclear forces, in a controlled manner to enhance the security of both sides and strengthen the stability of the strategic relationship. Such development, testing and deployment would

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be carried out in accordance with procedures jointly agreed and authorized pursuant to Articles XIII and XIV and Agreed Statement D of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the Parties shall negotiate other constraints as appropriate.

The Parties shall agree to cooperative measures in the course of these negotiations which, in combination with, and in addition to, national technical means, shall permit effective verification of compliance, and that prohibit interference with or impeding of verification of compliance.

The Parties shall agree to continue further negotiations with the ultimate objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The Parties agree to devote themselves to negotiation and conclusion of an agreement along these lines by no later than December 31, 1986.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 27, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR ~~FOUO~~-114/2 # 7329

FROM: JACK MATLOCK AND BOB LINHARD

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Shultz-Gromyko Vienna Meeting: Talking Points

The talking points submitted by State center on a comprehensive proposal for the Geneva negotiations, formulated in a draft Aide Memoire to be presented to Gromyko.

So far as the desirability of presenting a new and comprehensive U.S. proposal at the Vienna meeting, we would have the following observations:

1. It is desirable to make our proposal more concrete at the second round of negotiations, preferably at the beginning.
2. This should be done only after consultation with key allies, at the highest level and on the closest hold basis. (This aspect is particularly important for relations with Thatcher, Mulroney, Kohl and Mitterand, and some of the others, such as Craxi, Martens and Lubbers should be given a general briefing in advance.)
3. When the proposal is made to the Soviets, we should be prepared to keep it confidential for several weeks at least, to demonstrate our seriousness. We will need before too long, however, something to point to publicly as an effort on our part to move the negotiations ahead. (Thus the desirability of doing something early in the second round.)
4. It is clear that we do not have time to vet the details of the proposal and to conduct the indispensable consultations before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Vienna. Therefore, we should not aspire to do so at that time.
5. Actually, it would be well to shift some of the focus of the Vienna meeting away from arms control. Circumstances required the Geneva meeting to deal almost wholly with arms control issues, and we should spend most of the Vienna meeting getting back to our broad agenda: regional and bilateral issues, and human rights.
6. As for the subject of the NST negotiations, we believe the line taken in the President's letter provides a basis for discussing broad approaches for dealing with the issues in

integrated fashion. Shultz should push for that, and thus lay the groundwork for a concrete U.S. proposal in the second round.

So far as the proposal itself is concerned, Bob has the following comments:

Recommendations:

1. That you advise Shultz that you do not believe we can put together a new concrete proposal and conduct the necessary prior consultations in time for his meeting in Vienna, and that you have substantive problems with the one offered, but that you agree that a ^{more concrete} new proposal would be useful ^{divine} when the second round resumes at Geneva.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

2. That you encourage Shultz to follow a balanced agenda at the Geneva meeting, giving major attention to regional and bilateral issues and following the tack taken in the President's letter in regard to Geneva.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

~~3. That you authorize us to work with Paul Nitze and others as appropriate with the view of developing a more detailed proposal for the second round.~~

~~Approve ___ Disapprove ___~~

~~most attention~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 29, 1985

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~~Chow~~

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MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Imposition of Travel Controls on UN Secretariat
Personnel from Certain Hostile Countries (S)

Robert C. McFarlane concurs with the proposed action to require
UN Secretariat personnel of certain hostile countries to
arrange travel through the Office of Foreign Missions. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET April 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Imposition of Travel Controls on UN Secretariat
Personnel from Certain Hostile Countries

The hostile intelligence threat at the United Nations remains a serious concern. Over the past few years, through the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM), we have taken steps to assist in controlling this threat. Certain hostile country missions to the United Nations (i.e., USSR, Afghanistan, Cuba, Iran, Kampuchea, Libya, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and also the PLO) are now required to arrange all travel in the United States through OFM. Heretofore, UN Secretariat employees, regardless of their nationality, have not been required to use OFM because ostensibly they are international civil servants. It is a well-known and widespread practice for the Soviet Union to use its own nationals in the UN Secretariat to conduct espionage. The FBI has noted that the lack of travel controls for UN Secretariat personnel from certain hostile countries creates a gap in our efforts to deal with this problem, and limits U.S. counterintelligence capabilities.

One of the SIG(I) proposals currently before the NSC would require UN Secretariat employees from those countries whose national missions to the UN are required to use OFM travel services to arrange all travel within the United States through OFM. Implementation of this proposal would close a significant loophole in our efforts to control travel in the United States by hostile country personnel.

Although possibly vulnerable to legal challenge, we believe national security considerations are overriding and argue for implementation. Moreover, public and world-wide perception of Soviet abuse of the UN Secretariat staff has increased as a result of Arkady Shevchenko's recent book, thereby creating a favorable atmosphere for this measure. We desire to move forward on the implementation of this proposal and request your concurrence.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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