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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/4/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1985 (3/4)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 8

YARHI-MILO

808

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6977	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A US-USSR EXCHANGES AGREEMENT R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	11	3/6/1985	B1
6964	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6961 R 3/27/2012 M266/1	1	3/7/1985	B1
6983	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6977 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	11	3/6/1985	B1
6966	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE	2	3/8/1985	B1
6968	MEMO	CHERNENKO PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	3/1/1985	B1 B3
6971	CABLE	081035Z MARCH 85 D 1/11/2008 NLRRF06-114/2 PAR M09-266 10/14/10	1	3/8/1985	B1 B3
6973	TALKING POINTS	SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH NEW GENERAL SECRETARY R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	3	3/11/1985	B1
6976	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6973 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	3	3/11/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/4/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1985 (3/4)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 8

YARHI-MILO

808

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6961	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS: SECOND ROUND INSTRUCTIONS <i>R 3/27/2012 M266/1</i>	1	3/7/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

JM-C 1

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8501128

RECEIVED 12 FEB 85 13

TO MCFARLANE FROM MOLANDER, ROGER C

DOC DATE 07 FEB 85

KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

MP

SUBJECT: MOLANDER FWDS MANUSCRIPT GENERATED FM ROOSEVELT CENTER SEMINARS ON
LESSONS LEARNED IN NEGOTIATING W/ SOVIET UNION

ACTION: PREPARE REPLY FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 19 FEB 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

KRAEMER

HALL

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

McFarlane 3/8 For Signature 3/8
3/7 MCF sig'd Jm, SK

Jay Ruff

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 7, 1985

Dear Roger:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the manuscript report of the study sponsored by the Roosevelt Center and Leon Sloss Associates to examine the lessons learned from negotiating with the Soviets.

I found the study of great interest, and believe the summary chapter is particularly useful in encapsulating the principal findings of the participants and pointing out where there are divergencies of view.

I appreciate your thinking of me.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Roger C. Molander
President
Roosevelt Center for American
Policy Studies
316 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20003

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

February 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *SM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Manuscript on Negotiating with the Soviets

Roger Molander has sent you a manuscript of a study sponsored by the Roosevelt Center and Leon Sloss Associates which deals with "lessons learned" during past negotiations with the Soviets.

Though I have not had time to read all the studies attached, the summary article and some of the "chapters" contain excellent material. The study as a whole seems a balanced presentation of the points of view of the various participants, some of whom of course are more astute or experienced than others.

If you have time, you would probably find the summary chapter of interest.

Sven ^{SK}Kraemer concurs in proposed response, but has not read/evaluated study.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to Molander.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Letter to Roger C. Molander
- Tab A Manuscript

ack pls

RCM HAS SEEN

1128

FEB 9 1985

Jack Matlock
What do you know of this?
Some good people are involved

ROOSEVELT CENTER FOR AMERICAN POLICY STUDIES

February 7, 1985

Hon. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

As you may be aware, in the spring and summer of 1984, the Roosevelt Center and Leon Sloss Associates conducted a series of seminars on "lessons learned" in negotiating with the Soviet Union. Participants included many past and present U.S. arms control negotiators (Max Kampelman, Ed Rowny, Paul Warnke, etc.), as well as other arms control experts, businessmen, and scholars.

The series generated a rich collection of papers, which we are in the process of publishing for wider circulation. As we approach the renewal of talks with the Soviets, I thought that you might find these "lessons learned" by some of your colleagues and predecessors useful. I believe they are as interesting in their emphasis on the importance of ensuring the soundness of internal organization--bureaucratic and political--in order to secure broad support for our negotiating strategy and tactics as they are in their conclusions about our actual dealings with the Soviet side in negotiations.

This manuscript is for your personal use and not for reproduction or distribution. We would appreciate receiving your comments on the manuscript once you have had an opportunity to read or review it. Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Roger Molander
Roger C. Molander
President

P.S. Good luck with all those problems which we didn't solve the first time around at the NSC!

Life 05

5

90253

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 7, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement: Second Round
Instructions

State has submitted a detailed memorandum outlining recommended negotiating instructions for the second round of negotiations on a U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement in Cultural, Educational, Scientific, Technical and Other Fields (TAB A).

The State memorandum lists twelve areas in which there is still disagreement. Most of these, in my judgment, can be resolved to our satisfaction when and if the Soviets decide that they want to conclude the agreement. We are already close to agreement on the "safety" issue, since the Soviets appear willing to accept language which does not imply that we will return defectors.

Two issues are likely to remain particularly difficult, however: (1) The provision for a guaranteed number to television appearances; and (2) The provision for cultural information centers in both countries. The former is very important to us, and we should consider a reasonable form of guaranteed access to Soviet television a sine qua non for an agreement. The provision for cultural centers, however, is almost certainly not acceptable to the Soviets -- which we have known all along, but are keeping in our draft as potential trading material in the end game. If the other issues can be resolved, we would hope to reach a compromise which would involve acceptable assurances regarding access to television in return for dropping the proposal for cultural centers. Accordingly, State recommends continuing to push for cultural centers during the second round.

I believe that the suggested negotiating approach is sound and therefore recommend that it be approved.

Recommendation:

That you approve transmittal of the Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum

Tab A US-USSR Exchanges Agreement

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M266 #6964

BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12

6
I

8

A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: US-USSR Exchanges Agreement: Second Round
Instructions ~~(S)~~

The Instructions for the Second Round of Negotiations on a
U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement, transmitted by your memorandum
to Mr. McFarlane of March 6, 1985, have been reviewed and
approved. ~~(S)~~

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A US-USSR Exchanges Agreement

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/14/02

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

9
ID 8590253

RECEIVED 06 MAR 85 16

TO MCFARLANE FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 06 MAR 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CW NARA, Date 6/14/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR 2ND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON US - USSR EXCHANGES
AGREEMENT IN CULTURAL / EDUCATIONAL / SCIENTIFIC / TECHNICAL & OTHER
FIELDS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 09 MAR 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# 8506964

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(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



March 6, 1985

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Instructions for the Second Round of Negotiations
on a US-USSR Exchanges Agreement in Cultural,
Educational, Scientific, Technical and Other Fields

We have discussed with United States Information Agency
Director Charles Z. Wick the positions reached in the Exchanges
Agreement negotiations as of their recess on December 27, 1984.

The talks have been thorough in both directions. Both
sides have suggested various ad referendum changes. We have
reviewed these and recommend that the current US text be
approved as the basis for further negotiation.

It is clear that we have moved well toward our goals in
some areas, in which complete or basic agreement has been
reached. In other cases of importance to each side, though we
have become fully acquainted with each other's views, we are
far from reaching agreement. In some cases compromise will be
easy; in others trade-offs should be explored. On certain
issues, we recommend absolutely no compromise. As certain
Soviet positions seem to be similarly tightly held, the
end-game trade-offs will require an understanding by each of
the other's basic goals and requirements and limitations.

With this in mind, we have made the following
recommendations on the negotiating strategy to follow when the
talks resume in March.

1. The Preamble: (a) We should agree, without comment, to
maintain in the new 6-year General Agreement reference to the
1972 "Statement of Basic Principles," but only to "relevant
portions" of them. Reference to the Helsinki Final Act should
be similarly qualified.

(b) We should oppose without compromise the new Soviet
text pledging the Agreement to "improve the international
situation, in the interests of preserving and strengthening
peace."

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#6977
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

11

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(c) We should argue that the reference to tourism be deleted, as it is sufficiently noted in the body of the Agreement and is in no sense basic to its purposes.

(d) We should, in this connection, reaffirm our opposition to the addition of a mini-Preamble at the top of the 3-year Program of Exchanges. The Soviet text's reference to the Helsinki Final Act is out of place here.

(e) see Tab [A] for the present and suggested Preambular texts.

2. "Safety" or "security" as a translation of the Russian "bezopasnost": The Soviets have indicated that they will accept "safety" in the English text. They would retain "bezopasnost" in the Russian. We recommend new language reflecting this change, in the three sections at which the issue arises:

- (a) Article I, para 2 of the General Agreement
- (b) Article III, para 3 of the Program
- (c) Article VII, para 1, sentence 2 of the Program
- (d) See Tab [B] for the suggested new texts.

3. Cultural/Information Centers in both countries. We should not yet withdraw our text, though it was clear from the very start that there is no chance at all that the Soviets will accept it. We may, however, be able to trade its withdrawal at a later date for an acceptable text on television appearances. (FYI: The British and French have insisted in recent negotiations on the reciprocal establishment of information centers. As the Soviets would not agree, British and French bilateral exchanges with the USSR are organized according to "protocols" which are not considered formal Agreements and are thus diminished in scope.)

4. Reciprocal Appearances on TV by representatives of the other country: We have been stonewalled. The Soviets have declared as unacceptable any text which specifies any number of appearances. Since our original instructions stated that "assuring access to Soviet television by our representatives, including the President" was one of the highest priorities of the Exchanges Agreement, we should continue to insist on Soviet acceptance on our language on this issue. (Article VII of the General Agreement; Article VI of the Program)

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-3-

5. Expanded distribution of "America Illustrated" and "Soviet Life": We recommend easing off in the end-game trade-off on our suggested increases of 20,000 in the print runs of these magazines, and returning to the text as contained in earlier Agreements. This should be traded for a return to a full schedule of travelling exhibits (Article VIII of the General Agreement; Article IV of the Program).

6. Travelling exhibits: We should retain our original draft language in the General Agreement regarding "at least four circulating exhibitions during the six-year period of this Agreement, with each exhibition showing in six different cities." This establishes the principle of our desired pace of at least two exhibits in six cities each in a three-year Program. Since it would be well into the first year of a 1985-87 Program when an Agreement is actually signed, we have included the following sentence in Para 1 of Article IX: "There will normally be two exhibits for a full three-year Program." We have also suggested a change in the language in Article V of the Program, which now reads: "up to two circulating exhibitions during the three-year period of this Program. Each Party will accord the other the opportunity to show its exhibit or exhibits in a total of up to 12 cities." (Article IX of the General Agreement; Article V of the Program)

7. Aeroflot landing rights: We should continue to insist that the Exchange Agreement talks are not an acceptable forum, nor the proper forum, for discussion of the issue.

8. Academic Exchanges: We have reached basic agreement on all but one matter, i.e., assurance that there will be adequate housing for the spouses and minor children of IREX and CIES (Fulbright) exchangees. IREX considers satisfactory language in this section basic to their ability to carry on with their programs. Admitting that there may be added costs to the Soviets if they accept a satisfactory version of our text, and in view of the fact that there is pressure to increase IREX stipends for Soviet exchangees, we recommend offering the latter as bait against a favorable decision on our text on housing. This is IREX's position. A solution of the Fulbright housing text should follow once the IREX exchanges text is agreed. (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

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-4-

9. Balance between disciplines in the academic exchanges: Data covering the past ten years of exchanges administered by IREX (long-term and short term scholars and the ACLS-USSR Academy of Sciences exchanges) show that more than 50% of the Soviet exchangees have been in the social sciences and the humanities. We have suggested revised language committing the two sides to maintaining the practices which have led to this balance. We believe the Soviets will accept our suggested revised text, and we recommend absolutely no compromise on that text. (The Soviets have been adamant over the years in refusing to sign any agreement which specifies the percentage of exchangees' fields of discipline, such as our original draft text of not more than half of IREX exchanges from either side to be in the natural and physical sciences. In a recent negotiation, the French insisted on such specificity, in result of which the IREX-counterpart Franco-Soviet scholars' exchanges were terminated.) (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

10. Balance between disciplines among Fulbright scholars: Again, we recommend absolutely no compromise with our text, which seeks to maintain balances advantageous to our side. (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

11. Official persons as members of delegations: We recommend no compromise with our language on this point. The Soviets confidently expect full reports from their participants in exchange programs organized under an Agreement. We can expect to receive such information only from delegations, and even then only if the US sponsoring organization agrees that an official interpreter/Embassy officer be included in it. The Soviets maintain that we should negotiate the inclusion of such a person with the Soviets on each occasion, a position which we have resolutely opposed. (Article VII of the Program)

12. Host-country escort officers on travelling exhibits to be paid for by receiving side: The Soviets do not address this matter at all in their text, but will when we have an agreed text on the basic concept of exhibits. We predict that they will insist that we pay for the Soviet accompanying escorts with our exhibits, or for some of them. We recognize that we could no better get along without them than our Embassy could survive without UPRK (the Soviet organization that is charged with supplying services to the diplomatic missions). However, thus far the host country has always paid for as many escorts

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~~-5-~~

as were considered necessary. We should not compromise on this point. (Article V of the Annex)

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

~~SECRET~~

15
~~SECRET~~

Tab A

Original U.S. Text:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries;

Referring to the provisions and objectives set forth in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

~~SECRET~~

16

~~SECRET~~

~~-2-~~

Original Soviet Draft:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Government of the United States of America,

Consistent with the Basic Principles of Relations Between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States
of America, signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to strengthen mutual understanding between the
peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States and to assist
the improvement of relations between the two countries in
general,

Aspiring to improve the international situation, in the
interests of preserving and strengthening peace,

Believing that the further development of mutually
beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will assist in
reaching these goals,

Referring to the principles, provisions and objectives of
the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, signed at Helsinki, August 1, 1975,

Taking into account the positive experience accumulated
within the framework of previous agreements and programs in
exchanges in the cultural, educational, scientific, and
technical fields, in tourism, and in other fields, have agreed
on the following:

~~SECRET~~

17
~~SECRET~~

-3-

Suggested New U.S. Text:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries;

Referring to the relevant provisions and objectives set forth in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Consistent with the relevant provisions of the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

~~SECRET~~

18

~~SECRET~~

Tab B

Para 2 of Article I of the General Agreement

Present U.S. Text:

2. This General Agreement and implementation of the contacts, exchanges and cooperation under it shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, the Parties will make every effort to promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of these contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

Soviet Text:

2. These contacts, exchanges and cooperation will be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations existing in each country. Within this framework, the Parties will take all necessary measures in implementing this Agreement to create appropriate conditions to carry out such cooperation and to ensure safety for the stay and normal work of all persons involved in Soviet-American exchanges.

Suggested new U.S. Text:

2. This General Agreement and implementation of the contacts, exchanges, and cooperation under it shall be subject to the constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, the parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable circumstances for such cooperation, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in U.S.-Soviet exchanges.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~
~~-2-~~

Para 3 of Article III of the Program

Present U.S Text:

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2, above, the Parties will do all within their legal powers to ensure maximum favorable conditions for those performances and tours.

Soviet Text: None on this issue

Suggested new U.S. Text:

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Parties will, to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations, act to insure maximum favorable circumstances for these performances and tours, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in them.

~~SECRET~~

20

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~~-3-~~

Sentence 2 of Para 1 of Article VII of the Program

Present U.S. Text:

Within this framework, both Parties will promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of these exchanges and visits in accordance with the provisions and objectives of the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, signed on _____.

Soviet Text:

Within this framework, while implementing this Program, the Parties will take all necessary measures to create proper conditions for fulfillment of these exchanges and visits and to insure security during the stay and normal work of all persons participating in Soviet-American exchanges.

Suggested new U.S. Text:

Within this framework, both parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable circumstances for such cooperation, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in U.S.-Soviet exchanges in accordance with the provisions and objectives of this Program and of the General Agreement signed on _____.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

6961
SYSTEM II
90253

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 7, 1985

~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement: Second Round
Instructions

SIGNED

JM-C
JFMOS

State has submitted a detailed memorandum outlining recommended negotiating instructions for the second round of negotiations on a U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement in Cultural, Educational, Scientific, Technical and Other Fields (TAB A).

The State memorandum lists twelve areas in which there is still disagreement. Most of these, in my judgment, can be resolved to our satisfaction when and if the Soviets decide that they want to conclude the agreement. We are already close to agreement on the "safety" issue, since the Soviets appear willing to accept language which does not imply that we will return defectors.

Two issues are likely to remain particularly difficult, however: (1) The provision for a guaranteed number of television appearances; and (2) The provision for cultural information centers in both countries. The former is very important to us, and we should consider a reasonable form of guaranteed access to Soviet television a sine qua non for an agreement. The provision for cultural centers, however, is almost certainly not acceptable to the Soviets -- which we have known all along, but are keeping in our draft as potential trading material in the end game. If the other issues can be resolved, we would hope to reach a compromise which would involve acceptable assurances regarding access to television in return for dropping the proposal for cultural centers. Accordingly, State recommends continuing to push for cultural centers during the second round.

I believe that the suggested negotiating approach is sound and therefore recommend that it be approved.

Walter Raymond and Donald Fortier concur.

Recommendation:

That you approve transmittal of the Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve RCMDisapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum

Tab A US-USSR Exchanges Agreement

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M266 #6961

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1985

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: US-USSR Exchanges Agreement: Second Round
Instructions (S)

The Instructions for the Second Round of Negotiations on a
U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement, transmitted by your memorandum
to Mr. McFarlane of March 6, 1985, have been reviewed and
approved. (S)

Robert Pearson

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A US-USSR Exchanges Agreement

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 21, 1997

By

CRS

NARA, Date

6/17/02



March 6, 1985

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Instructions for the Second Round of Negotiations
on a US-USSR Exchanges Agreement in Cultural,
Educational, Scientific, Technical and Other Fields

We have discussed with United States Information Agency
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have become fully acquainted with each other's views, we are
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easy; in others trade-offs should be explored. On certain
issues, we recommend absolutely no compromise. As certain
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1972 "Statement of Basic Principles," but only to "relevant
portions" of them. Reference to the Helsinki Final Act should
be similarly qualified.

(b) We should oppose without compromise the new Soviet
text pledging the Agreement to "improve the international
situation, in the interests of preserving and strengthening
peace."

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FD6-114/2#6983
BY 18J NARA, DATE 11/21/07

24

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-2-

(c) We should argue that the reference to tourism be deleted, as it is sufficiently noted in the body of the Agreement and is in no sense basic to its purposes.

(d) We should, in this connection, reaffirm our opposition to the addition of a mini-Preamble at the top of the 3-year Program of Exchanges. The Soviet text's reference to the Helsinki Final Act is out of place here.

(e) see Tab [A] for the present and suggested Preambular texts.

2. "Safety" or "security" as a translation of the Russian "bezopasnost": The Soviets have indicated that they will accept "safety" in the English text. They would retain "bezopasnost" in the Russian. We recommend new language reflecting this change, in the three sections at which the issue arises:

- (a) Article I, para 2 of the General Agreement
- (b) Article III, para 3 of the Program
- (c) Article VII, para 1, sentence 2 of the Program
- (d) See Tab [B] for the suggested new texts.

3. Cultural/Information Centers in both countries. We should not yet withdraw our text, though it was clear from the very start that there is no chance at all that the Soviets will accept it. We may, however, be able to trade its withdrawal at a later date for an acceptable text on television appearances. (FYI: The British and French have insisted in recent negotiations on the reciprocal establishment of information centers. As the Soviets would not agree, British and French bilateral exchanges with the USSR are organized according to "protocols" which are not considered formal Agreements and are thus diminished in scope.)

4. Reciprocal Appearances on TV by representatives of the other country: We have been stonewalled. The Soviets have declared as unacceptable any text which specifies any number of appearances. Since our original instructions stated that "assuring access to Soviet television by our representatives, including the President" was one of the highest priorities of the Exchanges Agreement, we should continue to insist on Soviet acceptance on our language on this issue. (Article VII of the General Agreement; Article VI of the Program)

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5. Expanded distribution of "America Illustrated" and "Soviet Life": We recommend easing off in the end-game trade-off on our suggested increases of 20,000 in the print runs of these magazines, and returning to the text as contained in earlier Agreements. This should be traded for a return to a full schedule of travelling exhibits (Article VIII of the General Agreement; Article IV of the Program).

6. Travelling exhibits: We should retain our original draft language in the General Agreement regarding "at least four circulating exhibitions during the six-year period of this Agreement, with each exhibition showing in six different cities." This establishes the principle of our desired pace of at least two exhibits in six cities each in a three-year Program. Since it would be well into the first year of a 1985-87 Program when an Agreement is actually signed, we have included the following sentence in Para 1 of Article IX: "There will normally be two exhibits for a full three-year Program." We have also suggested a change in the language in Article V of the Program, which now reads: "up to two circulating exhibitions during the three-year period of this Program. Each Party will accord the other the opportunity to show its exhibit or exhibits in a total of up to 12 cities." (Article IX of the General Agreement; Article V of the Program)

7. Aeroflot landing rights: We should continue to insist that the Exchange Agreement talks are not an acceptable forum, nor the proper forum, for discussion of the issue.

8. Academic Exchanges: We have reached basic agreement on all but one matter, i.e., assurance that there will be adequate housing for the spouses and minor children of IREX and CIES (Fulbright) exchangees. IREX considers satisfactory language in this section basic to their ability to carry on with their programs. Admitting that there may be added costs to the Soviets if they accept a satisfactory version of our text, and in view of the fact that there is pressure to increase IREX stipends for Soviet exchangees, we recommend offering the latter as bait against a favorable decision on our text on housing. This is IREX's position. A solution of the Fulbright housing text should follow once the IREX exchanges text is agreed. (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

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9. Balance between disciplines in the academic exchanges: Data covering the past ten years of exchanges administered by IREX (long-term and short term scholars and the ACLS-USSR Academy of Sciences exchanges) show that more than 50% of the Soviet exchangees have been in the social sciences and the humanities. We have suggested revised language committing the two sides to maintaining the practices which have led to this balance. We believe the Soviets will accept our suggested revised text, and we recommend absolutely no compromise on that text. (The Soviets have been adamant over the years in refusing to sign any agreement which specifies the percentage of exchangees' fields of discipline, such as our original draft text of not more than half of IREX exchanges from either side to be in the natural and physical sciences. In a recent negotiation, the French insisted on such specificity, in result of which the IREX-counterpart Franco-Soviet scholars' exchanges were terminated.) (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

10. Balance between disciplines among Fulbright scholars: Again, we recommend absolutely no compromise with our text, which seeks to maintain balances advantageous to our side. (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

11. Official persons as members of delegations: We recommend no compromise with our language on this point. The Soviets confidently expect full reports from their participants in exchange programs organized under an Agreement. We can expect to receive such information only from delegations, and even then only if the US sponsoring organization agrees that an official interpreter/Embassy officer be included in it. The Soviets maintain that we should negotiate the inclusion of such a person with the Soviets on each occasion, a position which we have resolutely opposed. (Article VII of the Program)

12. Host-country escort officers on travelling exhibits to be paid for by receiving side: The Soviets do not address this matter at all in their text, but will when we have an agreed text on the basic concept of exhibits. We predict that they will insist that we pay for the Soviet accompanying escorts with our exhibits, or for some of them. We recognize that we could no better get along without them than our Embassy could survive without UPDK (the Soviet organization that is charged with supplying services to the diplomatic missions). However, thus far the host country has always paid for as many escorts

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as were considered necessary. We should not compromise on this point. (Article V of the Annex)

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

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Tab A

Original U.S. Text:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries;

Referring to the provisions and objectives set forth in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

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Original Soviet Draft:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Consistent with the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to strengthen mutual understanding between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States and to assist the improvement of relations between the two countries in general,

Aspiring to improve the international situation, in the interests of preserving and strengthening peace,

Believing that the further development of mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will assist in reaching these goals,

Referring to the principles, provisions and objectives of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki, August 1, 1975,

Taking into account the positive experience accumulated within the framework of previous agreements and programs in exchanges in the cultural, educational, scientific, and technical fields, in tourism, and in other fields, have agreed on the following:

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Suggested New U.S. Text:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries;

Referring to the relevant provisions and objectives set forth in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Consistent with the relevant provisions of the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

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~~SECRET~~

Tab B

Para 2 of Article I of the General Agreement

Present U.S. Text:

2. This General Agreement and implementation of the contacts, exchanges and cooperation under it shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, the Parties will make every effort to promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of these contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

Soviet Text:

2. These contacts, exchanges and cooperation will be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations existing in each country. Within this framework, the Parties will take all necessary measures in implementing this Agreement to create appropriate conditions to carry out such cooperation and to ensure safety for the stay and normal work of all persons involved in Soviet-American exchanges.

Suggested new U.S. Text:

2. This General Agreement and implementation of the contacts, exchanges, and cooperation under it shall be subject to the constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, the parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable circumstances for such cooperation, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in U.S.-Soviet exchanges.

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Para 3 of Article III of the Program

Present U.S. Text:

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2, above, the Parties will do all within their legal powers to ensure maximum favorable conditions for those performances and tours.

Soviet Text: None on this issue

Suggested new U.S. Text:

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Parties will, to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations, act to insure maximum favorable circumstances for these performances and tours, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in them.

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Sentence 2 of Para 1 of Article VII of the Program

Present U.S. Text:

Within this framework, both Parties will promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of these exchanges and visits in accordance with the provisions and objectives of the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, signed on _____.

Soviet Text:

Within this framework, while implementing this Program, the Parties will take all necessary measures to create proper conditions for fulfillment of these exchanges and visits and to insure security during the stay and normal work of all persons participating in Soviet-American exchanges.

Suggested new U.S. Text:

Within this framework, both parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable circumstances for such cooperation, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in U.S.-Soviet exchanges in accordance with the provisions and objectives of this Program and of the General Agreement signed on _____.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] 36CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

1 - 8 March 1985

SPOT COMMENTARY: USSR--Reports That Chernenko Has Died

Around 0700 Washington time, [redacted]

[redacted] had been told by "an official source" Chernenko had died. We have no further details from that source.
[redacted][redacted]
Soviet Politburo members minus Chernenko and Romanov, appeared at a meeting yesterday in the Bolshoy Theater in honor of the holiday. It is not unusual for ceremonies to be held on a day other than the actual holiday. [redacted]

[redacted] Moscow media are following scheduled programming, with features devoted to the holiday. [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets in the Shcherbitskiy delegation here in Washington have displayed no unusual activity thus far. [redacted]

Comment: In the last two cases, the Soviets announced the death of the Soviet leader in about 24 hours. It is possible Chernenko might be dead and the Politburo is withholding the news. If Chernenko really is dead, we believe the Politburo will not withhold the news much longer. With each hour that passes without information, the story becomes more unlikely to be true.
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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NLRR E00-11412#6968

BY RW NARA DATE 5/26/11

~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c), 3.5(f)

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NLRR M266 #6971
BY KML NARA DATE 10/14/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JM-CHRON

Secret Service

Letter & Talking
Points

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CTD 6/14/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you assume your new responsibilities, I would like to take this opportunity to underscore my hope that we can in the months and years ahead develop a more stable and constructive relationship between our two countries. Our differences are many, and we will need to proceed in a way that takes both differences and common interests into account in seeking to resolve problems and build a new measure of trust and confidence. But history places on us a very heavy responsibility for maintaining and strengthening peace, and I am convinced we have before us new opportunities to do so. Therefore I have requested the Vice President to deliver this letter to you.

I believe our differences can and must be resolved through discussion and negotiation. The international situation demands that we redouble our efforts to find political solutions to the problems we face. I valued my correspondence with Chairman Chernenko, and believe my meetings with First Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitsky here in Washington were useful in clarifying views and issues and making it possible to move forward to deal with them in a practical and realistic fashion.

In recent months we have demonstrated that it is possible to resolve problems to mutual benefit. We have had useful exchanges on certain regional issues, and I am sure you

are aware that American interest in progress on humanitarian issues remains as strong as ever. In our bilateral relations, we have signed a number of new agreements, and we have promising negotiations underway in several important fields. Most significantly, the negotiations we have agreed to begin in Geneva provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

It is important for us to build on these achievements. You can be assured of my personal commitment to work with you and the rest of the Soviet leadership in serious negotiations. In that spirit, I would like to invite you to visit me in Washington at your earliest convenient opportunity. I recognize that an early answer may not be possible, but I want you to know that I look forward to a meeting that could yield results of benefit to both our countries and to the international community as a whole.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,
General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow, U.S.S.R.



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United States Department of State

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March 11, 1985

RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev and Talking Points
for the Vice President's Use in Moscow

Attached is a draft letter from the President to be hand
delivered by Vice President Bush to incoming General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev, and suggested talking points for the Vice
President's use in that meeting.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By Q/S NARA, Date 6/14/02

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DECL:OADR

Draft Personal Letter from the President
To the New General Secretary

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you assume your new responsibilities, I would like to take this opportunity to underscore my hope that we can in the months and years ahead develop a more stable and constructive relationship between our two countries. Our differences are many, and we will need to proceed in a way that takes both differences and common interests into account in seeking to resolve problems and build a new measure of trust and confidence. But history places on us a very heavy responsibility for maintaining and strengthening peace, and I am convinced we have before us new opportunities to do so. Therefore I have requested the Vice President to deliver this letter to you.

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In recent months we have demonstrated that it is possible to resolve problems to mutual benefit. We have had useful exchanges on certain regional issues, and I am sure you are aware that American interest in progress on humanitarian issues remains as strong as ever. In our bilateral relations, we have signed a number of new agreements, and we have promising negotiations underway in several important fields. Most significantly, the negotiations we have agreed to begin in Geneva provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

It is important for us to build on these achievements. You can be assured of my personal commitment to work with you and the rest of the Soviet leadership in serious negotiations. In that spirit, I would like to invite you to visit me in Washington at your earliest convenient opportunity. I recognize that an early answer may not be possible, but I wanted you to know that I look forward to a meeting that could yield results of benefit to both our countries and to the international community as a whole.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Authority NLSF99-DS1 318 8 MF 10/16/00
BY 45, NARA, Date 6/14/02
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March 11, 1985

YOUR MEETING WITH THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

-- Please accept my condolences and sympathy on behalf of the American Government and people for your loss.

-- I would appreciate it if you would pass on my sympathy to Mr. Chernenko's family at this difficult time.

-- I bring with me a message to your leadership from our Government and people.

-- It is a message of peace.

-- We know this is a time of difficulty; we would like it to be a time of opportunity.

-- Both countries know that our systems and interests and purposes are different in vital respects, and that these differences will not go away.

-- Each side will defend and promote its interests. Our relationship is bound to be essentially competitive.

-- But it is in the interest of both countries to compete and to resolve problems in peaceful ways, and to build a more stable and constructive relationship.

-- We know that some of the things we do and say sound threatening or hostile to you.

-- The same is true for us. Many of the things you have been doing and saying for many years sound hostile or threatening to our interests, our values, even our existence.

-- I can tell you that neither the American Government nor the American people has hostile intentions toward you.

-- We recognize that you have suffered a great deal, and struggled a great deal, throughout your history.

-- We recognize the tremendous effort and suffering and contribution to the common victory in the war that ended forty years ago this year, when we were Allies.

-- That common victory was both a triumph and a tragedy.

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Authority
BY

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GAN, NARA, Date 6/17/02

-- It was a triumph because it opened up opportunities to build a new, more stable, more peaceful world, based on self-determination and common efforts to resolve problems constructively.

-- It was a tragedy because those opportunities were not used. Instead, we have had division, more armaments, more suspicion, and more needless human suffering.

-- Of course we have also had real achievements. We have kept the peace. We have made economic progress. We have been able to solve some problems together.

-- My country believes it should be in both our interests to build realistically on those achievements and create and seize new opportunities for a more stable peace and more cooperative relations.

-- We are ready to embark on that path with you.

-- It is the path of negotiations, of steady effort toward significant objectives through give-and-take that recognizes the interests and concerns of the other side.

-- On a number of issues we have shown that we can make such progress. We have signed a number of new agreements; we are revitalizing cooperation under old agreements; we have a number of promising negotiations underway.

-- We think it is time to be more energetic, to tackle larger issues, to set higher goals.

-- That is the way we are approaching the negotiations that began yesterday in Geneva.

-- We have reached agreement at the highest level that we should strive to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

-- In the postwar period our two countries have never set themselves such a worthy and grandiose objective.

-- If we can radically reduce offensive nuclear weapons and make it possible to shift toward stable deterrence based on non-nuclear defense, we will have set the world on a new, more peaceful course.

-- We should approach the other issues between us with the same energy and vision.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

-- We should seek to rid the world of the threat or use of force in international relations.

-- We should try to build new trust and confidence in our dealings with each other by solving problems on the basis of mutual benefit and by increasing contacts and dialogue.

-- These are goals worthy of the new generation that will come after us, of men and women and children who did not experience the war and its aftermath.

-- They are goals worthy of the generation that did.

-- They are goals that can unite us in a common endeavor across our different values and interests. The world will thank us.

-- That is the message of peace I bring. The United States is ready for that effort now.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 11, 1985

YOUR MEETING WITH THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY

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-- Both countries know that our systems and interests and purposes are different in vital respects, and that these differences will not go away.

-- Each side will defend and promote its interests. Our relationship is bound to be essentially competitive.

-- But it is in the interest of both countries to compete and to resolve problems in peaceful ways, and to build a more stable and constructive relationship.

-- But you must understand that we are concerned with developments on your side. Many of the things you have been doing and saying for many years sound hostile or threatening to our interests, our values, and even our existence.

-- I know you say you feel threatened by us, but it is difficult for us to understand why you should. Those actions you interpret as hostile are all a reaction to what we see as threats from you.

-- I can tell you that neither the American Government nor the American people has hostile intentions toward you.

-- We recognize that you have suffered a great deal, and struggled a great deal, throughout your history.

-- We recognize the tremendous effort and suffering and contribution to the common victory in the war that ended 40 years ago this year, when we were Allies.

-- That common victory was both a triumph and a tragedy.

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#6973

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

-- It was a triumph because it opened up opportunities to build a new, more stable, more peaceful world, based on self-determination and common efforts to resolve problems constructively.

-- It was a tragedy because those opportunities were not used. Instead, we have had division, more armaments, more suspicion, and more needless human suffering.

-- Of course we have also had real achievements. We have kept the peace. We have made economic progress. We have been able to solve some problems together.

-- My country believes it should be in both our interests to build realistically on those achievements and create and seize new opportunities for a more stable peace and more cooperative relations.

-- We are ready to embark on that path with you.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

-- We should seek to rid the world of the threat or use of force in international relations.

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*File: Chron -
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March 11, 1985

YOUR MEETING WITH THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY

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DECL:OADR

NARA, DATE

11/21/07

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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-- It was a triumph because it opened up opportunities to build a new, more stable, more peaceful world, based on self-determination and common efforts to resolve problems constructively.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE