

EXECUTIVE

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FOB-2-1

January 18, 1969

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Dear Peter:

I want you to know how much I appreciated your January 30 letter. As you mentioned, I have been greatly interested in the work of the American Institute for Free Labor Development and have been grateful for the opportunity to observe at first hand the efforts of the local institutes of the AIFLD in Latin America. As a result, I have gained an appreciation of the important part the organization is playing in strengthening democratic labor unions in the hemisphere and in developing improved labor-management relationships at all levels.

It is clear that the role you and George Meany^x have played in developing this cooperative effort between labor, management and the U.S. Government has been crucial to AIFLD's success. I believe that we can continue to make progress with the same spirit of cooperation in pursuit of common goals for the AIFLD, and I am looking forward to working with you in the years to come.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

RN

Mr. J. Peter Grace^x
President
W. B. Grace & Company
7 Hanover Square
New York, New York 10005

cc: Mr. John Hummon
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

(Cleared with BOB, Robert W. Mashek)

RN:Melencamp:emu

FEB 19 1969

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OK

W.H. Central File
EXECUTIVE
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March 11, 1969

MEMO FOR

Mr. Findley Burns
Department of State - ARA
Room 3906 - New State

Please forward the attached memo from
Mr. Harry Dent, with materials on Mr.
Manuel Ciberga, to Governor Rockefeller, *Nelson*

Thank you.

131
Arnold Nachmanoff

Attachment

3/6/69 memo to HAKissinger from
Harry Dent w/att.

cc: *AAK file*
W.H. Central File

RECEIVED
MAR 11 1969
CENTRAL FILES

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of *3/17/69*

Nachmanoff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1969

NOTE FOR DICK MOOSE

Dick -

I recommend that we forward Harry Dent's note and the material on Manuel R. Giberga to Governor Rockefeller without a recommendation from Dr. Kissinger.

If you agree, I will be glad to forward the materials to Governor Rockefeller through Findley Burns, the State Department coordinator.

Am
ANachmanoff

Agree
R. Heave

Attachment

Harry Dent's 3/6/69 memo to Dr. Kissinger w/atts.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Nachmanoff —
Son Recommendation

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1969

TO: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HARRY DENT *hs*

Attached is some information on Manuel R. Giberga, a former leading Cuban economist and now a citizen of the United States. Also attached is a paper he has prepared on the Alliance for Progress.

I have known Mr. Giberga for several years and have great confidence in his ability, integrity, and his vast contacts with and knowledge of all leading figures in Latin America. This gentleman feels he would be most helpful to Governor Rockefeller on his trip for the President. I concur. He asks no job, no salary---only to serve.

He has just returned from a trip throughout Latin America. He is on a first name basis with a great number of the most influential people in this entire area.

Manuel R. Giberga

International Consultant

Huntington Farm, Clarksville, Maryland 21029 / Telephones: (301) 924-3510 531-5666 / Cable: Giberga, Washington, D. C.

REVAMPING OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

AN URGENT NEED

INTRODUCTION

This article is my attempt to make known some of the urgent major economic issues which confront the Latin American countries today, which, if not corrected in time, can place the U. S. Government in the most critical period in its history of Latin-American friendly relations.

The Nixon Administration has realized that the economic issues that have gone unresolved for the last 8 years - no longer permit any delay, therefore a Re-evaluation of the Plans of the Alliance for Progress has been indicated.

As futile as may seem now to debate the mistakes of the past, I see no other way in which to help correct the pressing economic issues at stake, unless by pointing out the Historical process of the Alliance for Progress - and its Political concepts, which in my opinion are the responsible elements of the present Latin dilemma.

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS CONCEPTS

A. Predominance of the Political Strategies:

The Alliance for Progress was created as a Political Strategical Plan with little emphasis on the economic necessities of Latin-America.

A precise and thorough analysis of its concepts will corroborate the above mentioned assertion.

Many economists in Latin America today are in concurrence with the assumption that the Alliance for Progress was conceived as the 2nd stage for the Plan of the Bay of Pigs invasion, in Cuba.

This assumption has arisen, in my opinion, because of the fact that the Alliance for Progress Plans were disclosed for the first time by President Kennedy in March of 1961 and the Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April of the same year.

But it was not until August of 1961 that President Kennedy officially announced a "NEW ERA OF PROGRESS" -- "the total liberation of all the social and economic maladies for the Latin countries which would align with the U.S. in the Kennedy Plan."

For the Latin people, the Kennedy announcement represented a new era of economic prosperity - a Marshall Plan, the pumping of billions of dollars into their crumbling economies; something that Castro could not offer in his exportation of the Cuban-marxist revolution to Latin-America.

Therefore, the die was cast. All the countries of the Inter-American system with the exception of Cuba were aligned under the Kennedy Plan.

But the organizers of the Alliance for Progress were not satisfied. In order to compete with Castro's popularity in the Hemisphere, money was not enough. It was necessary to dress the Alliance with a Revolutionary philosophy, with an ideology that would fit the complex social problems of the Latin-Americans.

This philosophy of the Alliance for Progress is well described by Senator Fullbright in his book "Old Myth and New Realities", quote:

"The policy of the United States in its relation with Latin America is proclaimed by the premise that the social revolution can take place without violence. This is the principle of the Alliance for Progress."
unquote.

This revelation was quite a shock for the Latin countries that were expecting the fulfillment of President Kennedy's promises of total economic liberation. They were expecting an Economic Plan, not a Political Plan.

In the Conference of Punta del Este in August 1961 - The Alliance for Progress committed 1 billion dollars for 1962, but no specific plan was announced, nor when and how those funds would be assigned.

But the question still stands today.

Was 1 billion dollars enough to bring total social and economic liberation to the Latin countries?

II. LATIN AMERICAN REACTION

Some economists in Latin America were aware from the beginning that the offered assistance of 1 billion dollars a year, was an unrealistic sum. (when talking about total economic liberation).

Were the Kennedy Administration advisors aware of the fact, that to produce an increase of 2.5% in the per capita national income of Latin America, required an investment from 9 to 10 billion a year (taking into consideration that the demographic growths reaches 3%), not including the balance of previous debt and the financing of foreign trade imbalances?

And, can those advisors describe the economic impact of a 2.5% increase in the per capita national income in some of those countries, where the per capita income per person are not over \$200.00 a year?

This analysis brought many disillusionments - but they had no way to turn. The failure of the Bay of Pigs, the confiscation of billions of dollars of American and Foreign properties in Cuba had produced more damage to the South American economy than all the benefits to be received by the Alliance for Progress.

III. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND LATIN AMERICA

Before Castro's takeover in Cuba in 1959, the private foreign American investments in Latin America had a steady flow from 800 to 900 million dollars a year, reaching a record high of 1.2 billion in 1957.

After the confiscation of the American properties by Castro, the direct private American investments to Latin America were reduced to \$300 million, and kept descending until the 2nd semester of 1961 after the Bay of Pigs, reaching an all-time record low of \$140 million.

At the end of 1962, as per statement of Mr. Edward Martin of the U.S. State Department, the American investors' capital withdrawal from Latin America was surpassing the investments by far.

This withdrawal of private capital investments in Latin America was respondent to the distrust of the American investors who realized that their Administration was not effecting a leadership role, and had descended in their capacity to cope with the social-political and economic problems in the Hemisphere.

It is important to point out that during the period of post-World War II, the private American investors obtained benefits over \$10 billion dollars of their capital investments.

IV. SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE

Even though the Alliance for Progress represented a commercial transaction between the U.S. and the Latin American countries, Washington kept insisting on calling it an Aid program, and the available funds were offered to those countries, with the condition of strict compliance with the social-revolutionary reforms adopted within the framework of the Alliance for Progress ideology.

This imposition not only brought new disillusionments, but through the adoption of the imposed social and economic revolutionary reforms, created in some of those countries desolate effects into their economy, plus many political shakeups.

From those imposed reforms, the two major responsible for their devastating effects in the economy, and creating social instability are:

- A. Agrarian Reform
- B. Deficits of the Balance of Payments and Budget Stabilization.

V. AGRARIAN REFORM

In view of the Alliance for Progress advocacy of Agrarian Reform in Latin America, it is worthwhile to review its record both in the Hemisphere and in Asia. The process of Agrarian reform, defined changes in the structure of land ownership with the objective of promoting economic growth, but has had a dismal record in the American Hemisphere.

The well known debacle of Bolivian agriculture, following the radical agrarian reform of the fifties, has been amply documented in the economics literature. The Puerto Rican agrarian reform of the nineteen fifties had to be abandoned after wholesale decreases in productivity and agricultural production. The record of the Mexican experience is also dismal from the economic point of view. The rapidly growing modern sector of Mexican agriculture which is the envy of the rest of South America is basically in private hands, with private agricultural enterprises outstripping all ejidos and communal farms in productivity and growth.

What is sometimes ignored in discussions of agrarian development policy is that agrarian reform objectives are basically political objectives, not economic. The success attributed to the Mexican agrarian reform is essentially political, the breakdown of the landowning class. The same can be said of the Japanese agrarian reform conducted by the American Occupation Authorities through which they achieved the dual objectives of eliminating the aggressive and militaristic land-owning class and giving a stake in the new post-occupation society to landless peasants which now vote conservatively. The Formosa agrarian reform objectives were initially basically political - the disappearance of the native Formosa land-owning class ill disposed towards the arrival mainlanders.

The recent agriculture development experience has pointed out significantly the role played by technology - new improved seeds, irrigation, fertilizers, etc., in spurring the growth of agricultural productivity.

In view of this fact and that the Latin American countries (with few exceptions such as Haiti, El Salvador and the Caribbean islands) are densely populated with huge areas not under cultivation, it then seems incredible that the Alliance policymakers insisted on a political imposition which basically did not respond neither to the area's dismal experience with agrarian reform nor to the demographic situation of Latin America.

If the efforts spent on Agrarian reform had instead been spent on colonization and opening up of new areas of cultivation, who knows whether the continent would have solved its agriculture problem.

VI. DEFICITS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BUDGET STABILIZATION

A huge sum of the funds made available by the Alliance for Progress were conditioned to the objective of covering the deficits of the balance of payments of the Latin countries and to stabilize their budgets, which in their majority were in a deplorable state due to the great problem of past disadjusted balance of payments which required readjustment due to the violence of price changes in their exports.

In order to complement this imposition of the Alliance for Progress, some of the Latin countries were forced to follow the rigid stabilization policy of the International Monetary Fund which consequently produced a 30-40% in unemployment, causing ill discontent in the masses of the people of those countries.

Were the organizers of the Alliance for Progress not aware of the economic

fact "that the Stabilization of Prices are made at the cost of high unemployment and social instability"?

It is a known fact that over 2 billion dollars of private Latin American capital was exported to the U.S. and Switzerland banks because of the frightening effects of the various imposed social reforms of the Alliance for Progress.

VII. DECLINING TERMS OF TRADE FOR LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS

The Latin American countries have insisted in the last 25 years that if the U.S. will correct and give a solution to the declining terms of trade of their products in the U.S. markets, they will be able to carry a self-supporting economy, with no need for U.S. credits or loans.

Many leaders of Latin American countries have been continuously stating that unless the U.S. can reach a mutual understanding about the prices paid for their trade exports in the American market, the Alliance for Progress or any other kind of aid program could not help to bring them out of the under-developed stages.

Hermes Lima, former Prime Minister of Brazil stated: quote

"In less than 8 years - we have lost over 2 billion dollars due to the declining prices of our export products into the U.S. markets. This sum can never be compensated thru the loans or credits established by the Alliance for Progress." unquote

In the same manner, other Latin leaders such as Jorge Palacios, former Minister of Finance of Colombia, Orlich, former President of Costa Rica, Carlos Urrutia Dean of the Faculty of Economic Science of Lima, Kubitscheck, former President of Brazil, have denounced the ill effects of these declining Terms of Trade in the Latin American Economy.

During the meeting of the Latin American Foreign Ministers in Washington in 1962, U. S. promised to study and come up with a solution to this problem with the Latin countries, but so far nothing has been done to correct this economic maladjustment.

VIII. SOLUTIONS.

If the Alliance for Progress is going to be re-oriented, it is perhaps worth while to start by changing its name to "OPERACION PANAMERICANA," like the old OPA of Juscelino Kubitscheck. Kubitscheck's OPA was the genuine Latin American concept of the role to be played by the U.S. in the support of Latin American development.

As part of this re-orientation several development concepts and strategies seem promising enough to warrant consideration for their inclusion as the basis for a revamped economic policy toward Latin-America; they include:

- A. Colonization program as the main component of an agricultural development policy, substituting for the old and misguided emphasis on agrarian reform. The infrastructure for supporting the colonization program would include a vigorous credit, transport development and irrigation components among others. Therefore the U.S. would be providing the impetus for a land policy not inimical to its interests.
- B. Elimination of the strict stabilization programs of the International Monetary Fund in favor of a more moderate stabilization program by stages such as the Brazilian stabilization program under Roberto Campos (which was much under attack by the IMF and U.S. officials). This policy would moderate the serious unemployment and social problems which arise from the vigorous short term stabilization policies of the IMF. This stabilization policy alternative is not unlike the time-phased attack on inflation in the U.S. by the Nixon Administration.
- C. The foreign trade component of the new A.I.D. program should reflect the "TRADE NOT AID" slogans of the Latin Americans, two indispensable components of such programs could be: 1) the stabilization of export prices of raw materials, some proposals of which have been under review and study by the IMF for a long time; and 2) a system of import preferences for Latin American products in the U.S. markets, not unlike the one enjoyed by African nations under the European Common Market arrangements.
- D. Self-Help and Matching Funds

One of the cornerstones of any new or revamped economic policy towards Latin America is the development of new concepts for the promotion and encouragement of self-help efforts of AID recipient countries. Otherwise funds will be diverted to countries where, because of lack of self-help, there will be little to show for their expenditure.

An effective instrument for the encouragement of self-help which has worked very well in U.S. in areas such as Education, Health and Highways is the use of Federal Matching Funds. A revamped AID program based on self-help and matching funds might work in the following fashion: after the specification of certain minimum standards which the recipient countries must adhere to, in areas such as Infrastructure, Agriculture, Industrial Development, Housing, etc., the U.S. Government would offer to match the allocation of Latin American public credit to these sectors according to certain matching formulas to be determined after consideration of the expected levels of AID funding.

Safeguards would have to be worked out so that in periods of inflation the US AID would not add to the inflationary spiral. However, the concept and encouragement of self-help through some form of matching funds is such an attractive new concept to guide the allocation of AID funds that efforts should be spent in appraising its feasibility.

E. Development of New Interamerican Institutions for the Mobilization of Private Capital

New attitudes towards private flow of investments:

The experience of the last 8 years in Latin American economic conditions suggests that, under present arrangements and institutions, the earlier development periods characterized by the flow of private American investments to Latin America has come to an end. Among the various factors contributing to the above situation are the lack of guarantees and the crisis of confidence regarding Latin American and U.S. Governmental attitudes toward the flow of private capital to these nations.

The organization and continued development of International and Interamerican institutions for the mobilization of public credit and funds, such as the World Bank, The Interamerican Development Bank, etc., contrast with the lack of existing institutions to mobilize the flow of private capital to Latin America.

The very high interest rate (around 15%) prevailing in private Latin American capital markets, and the preponderance of mortgage and foreign trade financing operations in their banking systems suggests the need for some form of interamerican arrangements for the mobilization of private North American capital in either the form of direct investments or the provision of loan capital for development purposes in Latin America.

It is interesting to note how the Alliance for Progress concentrated almost entirely on the mobilization of public Governmental funds with complete abandonment of the private flow of capital to Latin America. For these reasons the development of a private interamerican institution under interamerican private banking and governmental auspices should be seriously considered in any re-evaluation of Alliance for Progress mechanisms and American economic policy towards Latin America.

In speculating how such private interamerican components of the Alliance for Progress should be organized: it should be located in the U.S. and capitalized by the banking associations of each member country including the U.S. Its staff recruited from both the U.S. and overseas, would have the function of promoting, underwriting, and floating private debt and equity issues in U.S. capital markets for private development projects which either because of insufficient size, lack of information and experience in U.S. banking concerns or other imperfections in capital markets are undercapitalized. Another important role of such institution would be the acting as liaison and broker for U.S. investment prospects in Latin America lobbying for a decrease in the restrictions demanded by U.S. banking concerns in financing American investments in the area.

The promotion of such private Interamerican institution under a revamped Alliance for Progress program would signal a change in U.S. Governmental and Latin American attitudes, and greatly increase the confidence on the future and role of foreign investments throughout the area.

Pertinent Remarks

I have considered it worthwhile to point out certain conceptual methodological differences between the analysis of our U. S. economists and the Latin America Econo-counterparts within the constant evolution of economics- but restraining to make of it an academic issue.

The American economist have developed an intensified dynamic and market oriented economic mentality based on the context of an advanced industrial economy with highly developed financial institutions, efficient markets and a sophisticated business class. In this field the American economist has no equal in the world, but has little to say directly with respect to the problems of under-developed countries which are framed in an entirely different context.

Of course, the exception is represented by many American economists well versed and experienced in the problem solving mentality of policy makers in developing countries.

Outside of the exceptions the disparity of concepts (to mention some) arise from certain differences as follows:

a. "The concern of unemployment to the American economists is accompanied by the under-utilization of capacity already in existence."

b. "The concern of unemployment of the economists of the under-developed countries arises because capacity and effective demand never have been great enough."

Another conceptual difference arises in the context of the distribution of income and wealth, a problem which although critical in developing countries is hardly ever taken into consideration by U. S. economists.

To revamp the alliance for progress we have to analyze the economy of each Latin nation respectively, not as a whole, in order to understand the motives and manner in which each reacts in the various kinds of social-economic and political systems in which they operate.

Some of the solutions offered in this paper represents a new concept in economic ingenuity applicable to the under-developed countries of Latin America, but are attractive enough to have their feasibility appraised.

K-243

Manuel R . Giberga
Huntington Farm,
Clarksville, Maryland 21024

Background Summary;

Cuba

1945 - 1946: Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Cuba, representing him on the Cuban Economic Planning Board

1946 - 1949: Special Economic Assistant to the Constitutional President of Cuba, Dr. Carlos Prío Socarras.

In U.S.A. from 1960 to 1969:

President of the Reserve Sugar Co -Sugar Mill in Reserce, La.

Vice-President of the Godchaux Sugar Refining Co , 3rd largest in the country.

President of the Godchaux Sugar Trading Co representing said firm -with a seat in The New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange in New York .

Since 1967

Private business - acting as Economic Consultant for various private Latin-American Companies , and Economic Researchs also for private american citizens , such as Mr.William G Reynolds , Vice-Pres of Reynolds Metals in Richmond, Va.

citizen

Mr.Giberga - has been a U.S. since 1962 .

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, DR. CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former constitutional President of the Republic of Cuba - duly elected as such, in the Presidential Elections of 1948 - HEREBY CERTIFIES:

THAT: MANUEL R. GIBERGA was duly appointed to Head the Department of Sugar Production and Fiscalization Controls - Division of 2% Tax, of the Cuban Treasury Department; and personally selected by me to act as one of my SPECIAL CONSULTANTS in Sugar Economic matters to the Presidency - during my term in Office as Constitutional President of the Republic of Cuba.

THAT: Also, prior to my election, and during my term in Office as PRIME MINISTER, and as the Presiding Chairman of the JUNTA NACIONAL DE ECONOMIA, (NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING BOARD), I selected MANUEL R. GIBERGA to act as my SPECIAL CONSULTANT in the Field of Sugar Economics and Marketing.

THAT: MR. GIBERGA'S background and knowledge in Sugar Economics was not only of a great value to me personally, but, represented an exceptional contribution to the Government over which I had the honor to preside.

For his invaluable assistance, loyalty and dedication - he has won my personal esteem - warm friendship and gratitude.


Carlos Prio Socarras
DR. CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS

Miami, Florida
May 20, 1966

Sworn and subscribed before me
this 26th day of May, 1966.-

Hoyt
Notary Public At Large

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUG. 17, 1969
OFFICE 1010 E. BUCH FRED W. HARRIS



May 12, 1969

EXECUTIVE

ME 3/10*

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703-2-1

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I want you to know the great importance that I attribute to your work. The Partners of the Alliance exemplify the best of the Hemisphere's joint efforts. Any working Alliance for Progress which has set challenging goals such as ours must be a partnership of people as well as nations. You have recognized this, and you are meaningfully advancing our common objectives.

Productive international cooperation must be between partners -- partners who listen to each other, who share a cause, and pursue it with equal vigor. Your continuing success in furthering such cooperation is rewarding for all of us.

The creative potential of our societies can be fully realized only if individual citizens exercise initiative and are willing to reinforce the work of their governments. It is imperative that we realize this full potential if we are to deal effectively with our immense problems and achieve the kind of progress we seek.

As civic-minded individuals and groups, the Partners of the Alliance are in the vanguard of voluntarism in the Americas. You are using your talents and your time constructively for our benefit, and for that of all our Sister Republics.

I send you my warmest best wishes for sustained achievement.

Richard Nixon

Sent to: Hon. Charles Meyer^x
Assistant Secretary of State
for Latin American Affairs

(Mr. Meyer is hand-carrying message to 4th Inter-American Conference^x of the Partners of the Alliance.)

c c *Sen Bennett*

BN:AMachmanoff/HHasek:ck

cc: Rose Mary Woods/Mary Alice Passman/Lamar Alexander/Arnold
Nachmanoff/Eliska Hasek/Central Files

DUE: ASAP - Requested by Sen. Bennett.

Approved by James Keogh.

*Original
dispt by
Ken Colles
on 8/12
3 PM.*

RECEIVED
MAY 12 1969
CENTRAL FILES

(2)

EXECUTIVE

PR 5-1

CO 21

LG/GOIAS

FO 3-2-1

June 6, 1969

Dear Senator Hansen:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 5 to Ken BeLieu requesting an autographed picture of President Nixon for the People of the State of Goias, Brazil.

It is a pleasure to comply with your request, and I am herewith enclosing the photograph.

With cordial regard.

Sincerely,

Dale Grubb
Special Assistant to
the President

Honorable Clifford P. Hansen
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Enclosure

DG:jo

JUNE 27, 1969

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith are proposals for changing the name of the
Alliance for Progress, in response to your request.

John D. Ehrlichman

Attachment

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of 5/2/70
LW

APR 16 1970
CENTRAL FILES

1-1

✓
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: Jim Keogh JK

We have been brooding about that new name for the Alliance for Progress and have not come up with one that excites everybody. The possibility that I like best is:

The Inter-American Community

This is plain, but it's straightforward and descriptive.

Another variation of this would be:

The Fellow-American Community

That gets across the idea but it might be attacked as being a bit slick.

We have run through quite a few other possibilities. I've attached three memos that list some of these.

Attachments

1 - 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM TO JIM KEOGH

FROM: Pat Buchanan

How about these?

AMERICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (After the EEC, or Common Market)

THE NEW WORLD UNION

THE PAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

ECONOMIC UNION OF AMERICAN STATES

WESTERN WORLD ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

NEW WORLD ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

WEST ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

WEST ATLANTIC ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN DIGNITY

UNITED STATES OF THE WESTERN WORLD

WEST ATLANTIC UNION

ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN DIGNITY

UNION OF THE AMERICAS

UNION FOR PROGRESS

UNITED IN PROGRESS

WEST ATLANTIC FEDERATION FOR PROGRESS

ECONOMIC UNION OF AMERICAN STATES

ECONOMIC ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN STATES

SOCIAL ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN STATES

SOCIAL UNION OF AMERICAN STATES

WEST ATLANTIC ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

WEST ATLANTIC LEAGUE

WEST ATLANTIC COUNCIL

WEST ATLANTIC CONGRESS FOR PROGRESS

WEST ATLANTIC ECONOMIC CONGRESS

(I'm not happy with them, either.)

Buchanan

1-4

MEMORANDUM

To: Jim

From: Bill

Date: June 24, 1969

Re: Alliance for Progress

I recommend that if there is not a substantial change in the program, there should be no change in the name.

If there is to be a change:

1. Progress for Latin America
2. United Americas
3. Latin American Development
4. Americas United for Progress
5. Prosperity: Americas
6. Action for Americas
7. Hemispheric Inter Cultural Union

1 - 5

To : J. Keogh

From: B. Safire

Re : Name for Alliance for Progress

6/17/69

How about the "Fellow American System"?

Policy, Plan, Program are out, since they produce the initials so dear to Major Hoople. But system gives a connotation of a businesslike approach, and there is the play on "American system." Also, it is livelier than "approach" or "course."

Fellow american alliance

1-6

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

JUNE 17, 1969

TO: JIM KEOGH

FROM: JOHN EHRLICHMAN

The President would like your people to attempt to develop a new name for the "Alliance for Progress" for immediate substitution.

EXECUTIVE

C01-9

TA

FO3-2-1

③

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1969

FOR: Mr. Viron Vaky, NSC

To: FROM: N. Melencamp

Mr. Harnischfeger^{Walter} is among the President's old friends. He is a very prominent businessman and has many years of experience in firms dealing in international trade. None of this may be new to you. The attached xerox is a copy which he send to the President of his letter to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.

→ After you have had a chance to look it over please return it to the White House Central Files.

Many thanks

RECEIVED
AUG 21 1969
CENTRAL FILES