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**SURVEY OF CAMPUS INCIDENTS AS INTERPRETED BY COLLEGE
PRESIDENTS, FACULTY CHAIRMEN AND STUDENT BODY PRESIDENTS**



**A REPORT SUBMITTED TO
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST**

OCTOBER 1970

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SURVEY OF CAMPUS INCIDENTS AS INTERPRETED BY COLLEGE PRESIDENTS, FACULTY CHAIRMEN AND STUDENT BODY PRESIDENTS

SUMMARY ANALYSES OF RESPONSES FROM APPROXIMATELY
TWO-THIRDS OF THE NATION'S ACCREDITED COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

A REPORT SUBMITTED TO
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST

by

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THE URBAN INSTITUTE
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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper contains the results of a survey conducted for the President's Commission on Campus Unrest by staff members of The Urban Institute. Both the survey and the analysis of it were necessarily performed on a rush basis in accord with the extremely short deadline to report to the Commission--less than three months after receiving the assignment. This summary therefore represents a simple analysis of a large amount of rather complex data. Much more information can be derived from the data than is presented here. The basic data on magnetic tape and a set of printouts are available for interested researchers at The Urban Institute and the National Archives.

The Urban Institute staff has a continuing interest in this matter and is doing further work to perfect the data and its analysis.

Response Rate and Coverage

Three questionnaires were mailed on July 27, 1970, to all 2,789 accredited schools of higher education listed by the National Center for Educational Statistics, U.S. Office of Education. An accompanying letter requested that the identical questionnaire be completed by: 1) the college president or acting president; 2) the chairman of the faculty senate or equivalent faculty group; and 3) the elected president of the student government or equivalent group.

As of the September 10 cut-off date, at least one questionnaire from 1,890 schools (approximately 68 percent) had been received and processed. This sample included responses from 1,568 administrators (approximately 56 percent); 1,077 representatives of faculty organizations (approximately 39 percent); and 643 student representatives (approximately 23 percent).

Considering the colleges geographically, states had a response rate of 50 percent or better, with the exception of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South Dakota.

The response rate reflected that a reasonably representative sample of college administrators was obtained from colleges of different sizes, racial composition, degrees conferred and other characteristics. (See Appendix B) Follow-up phone calls to administrators who had not responded revealed no consistent reasons, such as hostility towards the survey, that would bias the survey results.

The faculty and student responses yielded more biased samples, however. Returns from faculty spokesmen were weighted towards schools with higher acceptance standards and schools that are predominantly white. The student responses came more predominantly from larger schools, coeducational schools, and schools with ROTC. Also, these faculty-student samples underrepresented two-year schools.

Several reasons for poorer responses by faculty and students should be noted. Questionnaires were not sent directly to faculty and student leaders; each college president was asked to forward them to appropriate persons. Fewer students and faculty than administrators would be expected to be on hand during the summer months of the survey period. Finally, a student group whose influence would be difficult to assess urged noncooperation with the survey.

It must be emphasized that the faculty and student samples are from very specialized parts of those populations--the leaders of faculty groups and of student bodies. To consider their responses as representative of college faculties or of students in general would be misleading and contrary to the intent of this survey. Allowing for the biases already noted, these responses reflect only the perspectives of faculty and students in responsible leadership positions. These are very important and influential segments of campus population. Any mention of student or faculty responses in this report refer to these specific leadership groups only.

Organization of the Results

The report is presented in the following sequence. First is the profile of campus unrest incidents over the last three years as revealed by the survey (Chapter III). Next is a summary of information related to what might happen in the school year beginning in the fall of 1970 (Chapter IV). Major causes of campus unrest are then categorized (Chapter V). Finally, major recommendations by respondents are summarized (Chapter VI).

Appendix A includes a copy of the survey questionnaire and shows the questions which were used as sources for the tables and charts in this report. Appendix B discusses the coding categories for the open-ended questions in terms of quality control and reliability. Appendix C presents illustrative replies to open-ended questions.

II. SUMMARY

Profile of Campus Unrest: 1967-70

There has been a steady increase over the last three years in the number of incidents of campus unrest and in the number of schools where incidents have occurred. On the other hand, the percentage of incidents where the National Guard was used, off-campus police were used, and one or more arrests were made substantially decreased during the same period.

During the several months following April 30, 1970, the type of schools where proportionately more incidents occurred were those:

- In the East and Middle Atlantic region.
- Where enrollment was over 10,000.
- With ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps).
- With a liberal arts emphasis.
- With high institutional spending per student.

During the same period after April 30, 1970, the National Guard and off-campus police were used and made arrests in response to incidents of violence most frequently on those colleges with enrollment of over 10,000 and with ROTC.

The most common type of reprimand used against students involved in incidents after April 30, 1970 was to bring them before the institution's judiciary body. The least common reprimand used was to withdraw financial aid.

Fifty percent or more of all three groups surveyed--with the exception of the administrators of Southern schools--indicated that the campus incidents after April 30, 1970 were more serious than previous ones. Forty percent of Southern administrators considered these later incidents to be more serious. A greater proportion of all respondents from colleges in the nation's East believed that these incidents were more serious than the respondents from other regions of the country.

Of those schools reporting incidents of disruption or violence after April 30, 1970, 90 percent reported having contingency plans for such events. However, only 34 percent reported implementing these plans.

Predictions for 1970-71 School Year

The major internal issues that administrators believed might lead to disruption or violence were the demands of black students, and the reaction of students to certain school regulations.

The major external issue mentioned by administrators was the Indo-China War.

Eighty percent of the administrators, 76 percent of the faculty representatives, and 66 percent of the student body representatives believed when they responded in the summer of 1970 that incidents of disruption or violence were not likely to occur on their campuses during the new school year.

However, looking at those schools with enrollment over 10,000, with ROTC, or with low acceptance standards at least 40 percent of the administrators in each case responded that incidents of disruption or violence were probable or highly probably on their campuses beginning this fall.

The events following April 30, 1970 showed a high propensity for disturbances on those campuses with high acceptance standards. Yet administrators of colleges of this sort, in making their predictions for the 1970-71 term, came up with optimistic forecasts. In contrast, administrators of colleges with low acceptance standards and without ROTC--two characteristics which were associated with fewer disturbances--were making particularly pessimistic predictions.

Major Causes Cited

No single cause of campus violence dominated the responses.

The Indo-China War was ranked first by administrators and faculties and ranked second by student leaders. Other matters such as lack of communication and federal unresponsiveness were mentioned almost as frequently as major causes.

Generally, administrators mentioned external (off-campus) causes more often than internal causes. Faculty representatives and student body representatives mentioned internal causes more often than external. These divergent views found to be most polarized at colleges run by religious denominations and on campuses with predominantly female enrollment.

In predominantly male schools, in schools with low entrance requirements and where the appropriations per student is low, all three groups queried mentioned external causes more often than internal ones.

In state-controlled schools and in predominantly black schools, all three groups mentioned internal causes more often than external ones.

Recommendations by Respondents

Improvement of communication was by far the most frequently mentioned general recommendation by all three groups.

Student body representatives placed more emphasis than did the faculty representatives or administrators on giving students a greater voice, restricting federal rhetoric, and avoiding force in dealing with student unrest.

Specific recommendations for different levels of authority that were most frequently mentioned by all three groups were as follows:

The federal government should stop the war, change its policies, and give more recognition to students.

State authorities should give universities more funds, and should leave universities alone.

Local communities should communicate with more universities.

Student organizations should work within the system.

Campus administrations should provide better communication channels.

On those campuses where no incidents had occurred, all three groups agreed that small classes were a major preventive factor.

The three groups also differed on some reasons that certain campuses experienced no disturbances. Good dialogue was given more credit by student body representatives than by either administrators or faculty on those campuses. Clear regulations for dealing with disturbances were cited as more crucial by faculty representatives than by either administrators or students.

III. PROFILE OF CAMPUS UNREST: 1967-70

Some public statements about incidents of campus violence have suggested that the disturbances of recent years have been rarities in the midst of campus conditions that differ little from earlier decades. Others have concluded to the contrary that almost all of the nation's campuses are seething with actual or imminent disorders. Where does the truth lie?

To deal sanely with the problem requires a clearer picture of what actually has been happening. This profile is an attempt to give such a picture in a balanced, meaningful way. Tight time constraints lead to the acquisition of information that was not as complete or as free from distortions as would be possible under ideal conditions. The same constraints have prevented the data gathered from being subjected to as thorough an analysis as would be desired.

The following sections and accompanying charts deal with various aspects of the profile--the numbers, types and seriousness of incidents, the types of actions taken by authorities to deal with the incidents, and college preparedness for disturbances. Incidents are tabulated according to four separate time periods in order to help detect trends or correlations with other specific events that would not have been apparent in simple totals. The time periods are the school years 1967-68 and 1968-69, the school year 1969 to April 30, 1970, and the months May through August, 1970. The final period was segregated in order to distinguish the campus events that followed the President's announcement of U.S. troop entry into Cambodia.

The data for the number and type of incidents and for actions taken by authorities were derived only from responses of the college administrators for several reasons: The administrators comprised the largest and most representative group responding to the questionnaire. College presidents also had more ready access to the information requested than did most faculty or student representatives. It may well be asked whether the faculty and student representatives had different perceptions about these essentially factual matters of what happened on campus. This is one of many interesting questions that reluctantly had to yield to higher priority issues.

Because of the more subjective nature of assessing the seriousness of the incidents before and after May 1, the responses of all three groups queried were compiled separately so their views might be contrasted.

A technical note about transferring pre-coded data from questionnaires to punch cards for constructing tables: it was calculated that an error of approximately 1 percent occurred in this process.

Number of Incidents and Trends

The number of incidents of campus unrest reported by administrators for each of the four time periods are shown in Table 1. The totals are broken down by regions. (See Table 2 for state groupings). Both the numbers and percentages of schools reporting incidents are indicated. The trends are evident by reading data from left to right. Important findings include the following:

There has been a steady increase in the college reporting incidents over the three years. Of the 1,569 colleges, 96 reported incidents in 1967-68 while 508 reported incidents in May-August of 1970. The percent of campuses involved rose from 6.1 to 32.4 percent in the corresponding periods of the 1969-70 school year.

The smallest regional increases during this latest recorded period were in the South and West; even there, percentages of incidents doubled compared with the earlier part of the 1969-70 school year.

The greatest fourth-period increases were in the East.

During all four periods, the East experienced substantially more incidents than other regions, both in numbers of campuses and in percentages of all campuses involved.

The regions with the lowest percentages of schools with incidents during the three years were the Midwest and the South.

Types of Action Taken in Response to Incidents

Much controversy has surrounded the calling in of the National Guard and off-campus police and the making of arrests in connection with campus disturbances. Arguments focus on whether these actions should be used more or less frequently. The survey, without attempting to evaluate these tactics, attempted to provide a factual base about the extent of their use.

Table 1

Campus Incidents for Each of Four Periods from 1967, Showing Number and Percent of Schools Involved for Total Sample and by Region, as Reported by College Administrators

	Number of Administrators Reporting	1967-68	1968-69	1969 to April 30, 1970	May 1, Through August, 1970
Total ^a	1569				
Number of Incidents		136	272	388	508
Number of Schools with Incidents		96	171	220	508
Percent of Schools with Incidents		6.1	10.8	14.0	32.4
West ^b	315				
Number of Incidents		34	72	91	90
Number of Schools with Incidents		19	34	47	90
Percent of Schools with Incidents		6.0	10.8	14.9	28.6
South	259				
Number of Incidents		18	25	34	54
Number of Schools with Incidents		15	20	26	54
Percent of Schools with Incidents		5.8	7.8	10.0	20.8
East	490				
Number of Incidents		41	88	140	233
Number of Schools with Incidents		34	64	93	233
Percent of Schools with Incidents		6.9	13.1	19.0	47.6
Midwest	502				
Number of Incidents		42	85	119	130
Number of Schools with Incidents		27	52	52	130
Percent of Schools with Incidents		5.4	10.3	10.3	25.9

^aThrough an error in the state code, a small number of incidents were "lost" in the regional breakdowns so they do not in all cases add to the total; but the total figures are correct.

^bStates in each region are listed in Table 2.

Table 2

States Included in Each of Four Regions

East	Midwest	West	South
Connecticut	Illinois	Alaska	Alabama
Delaware	Indiana	Arizona	Arkansas
Maine	Iowa	California	Florida
Maryland	Kansas	Colorado	Georgia
Massachusetts	Kentucky	Hawaii	Louisiana
New Hampshire	Michigan	Idaho	Mississippi
New Jersey	Minnesota	Montana	North Carolina
New York	Missouri	Nevada	South Carolina
Pennsylvania	Nebraska	New Mexico	Tennessee
Rhode Island	Ohio	North Dakota	Virginia
Vermont	Wisconsin	Oklahoma	
District of Columbia		Oregon	
West Virginia		South Dakota	
		Texas	
		Utah	
		Washington	
		Wyoming	

The percent of incidents in which they figured is shown in Chart 1. The same type of information by regions is given in Table 3. Among the findings of this phase of the survey are the following:

There has been a substantial overall decrease during the last three years in the percentage of incidents where the National Guard and off-campus police were used and in which arrests were made.

Very different pictures from this general trend appear, however, when looking at specific types of action by regions. In the Midwest, the National Guard was called in on a larger percentage of campus incidents during the May-August period of 1970 than during any of the previous three periods. Over the four periods, the use of the National Guard rose in the West.

Use of off-campus police dropped steadily in the West from 20.6 percent of the incidents to 6.7 percent. In the South, however, the use of police held fairly steady at 22.2 percent, 16 percent, and 17.6 percent and then rose to its highest point--24.1 percent--in the final period. After its very high use of police in 1967-68, the Midwest held to a steady and still high percent of police use in the next three periods measured. Even the East, which shows a dramatic drop from 22 to 4.3 percent, experienced a rising reliance on police in 1969-70, which would show up even more clearly in the final part of that school year were not counted separately.

Relationship Between Types of Action to Deal with the Incidents and Seriousness of Incidents

The use of different responses to incidents is more meaningful to the extent the actions taken can be keyed to the seriousness of the events. This is attempted in Chart 2, for the May-August 1970 period, using data provided by the college administration.

The seriousness of the incidents is indicated by grouping them in three categories as follows:

- 1) Least serious: School routines and regulations had to be changed; teach-ins and mass rallies were held; but incidents were not considered infringements of campus rules.

Chart 1. Types of Total Incidents Involving Use of National Guard, Off-Campus Police, and Arrests Over Three Years as Reported by Administrators




Chart 2. Types of Action Taken Against Incidents, by Seriousness of Incident, as Reported by Administrators, May Through August, 1970




Table 3

Percent of Incidents Involving Use of National Guard, Off-Campus Police, and Arrests over Three Years, By Regions, as Reported by College Administrators
(Percent of Actions per Total Number of Incidents)

	1967-68	1968-69	1969 to April 30, 1970	May 1, Through August 1970
National Guard Used				
West	0.0	1.4	2.2	2.2
South	11.1	8.0	2.9	1.9
East	4.9	0.0	0.7	0.0
Midwest	2.4	2.4	2.5	3.1
Off-Campus Police Used				
West	20.6	16.7	13.2	6.7
South	22.2	16.0	17.6	24.1
East	22.0	8.0	11.4	4.3
Midwest	31.0	18.8	18.5	18.5
One or More Arrests Made				
West	23.5	13.9	15.4	4.4
South	11.1	12.0	14.7	5.6
East	12.2	8.0	10.0	3.4
Midwest	26.2	20.0	24.4	8.5

- 2) Moderately serious: Infringements of campus rules but no damages or injuries.
- 3) Most serious: Violence with either injuries to people or damage to property, or both.

The data indicate that:

Approximately 60 percent (304) of the incidents were of the least serious type; 32 percent (165) were moderately serious; and 8 percent (36) were of the most serious or violent type.

For least serious incidents, off-campus police were called 2.6 percent of the time, but the National Guard was not used and only 0.6 arrests were made.

For the most serious incidents, the National Guard was used 16.7 percent, off-campus police were used 38.9 percent of the time, and arrests were made 38.9 percent of the time.

Off-campus police and student marshalls were used about equally within each category of incidents.

Mediation was reported as the most frequently used response to the least serious and moderately serious events. Again, for the most serious incidents, mediation shared the highest rank (along with the use of student marshalls) among the types of responses.

Relationship Between Types of Action Against Students and Seriousness of Incidents


The previous aspect of the profile looks at actions to halt the incidents. Now the focus turns to specific types of reprimands to students involved. Again, these data are for the period May-August 1970 and are keyed to the seriousness of the incidents, as characterized by the college administrators.

The data, as shown in Chart 3, indicate the following:

Bringing students before a college's judiciary body was the action most frequently taken, regardless of the seriousness of the incidents.

Withdrawal of financial aid was the action used most seldom against students in the least serious and most serious incidents. In response to moderately serious incidents, withdrawal of aid and expulsions shared the least-used rank.

Chart 3. Types of Action Taken Against Students by Seriousness of Incident, as Reported by Administrators, May Through August, 1970



Expelling students was used frequently only in response to incidents of violence (13.9 percent of those incidents).

Suspensions were used appreciably in response to the 11.5 percent of the moderately serious incidents and to 33.5 percent of the most serious incidents.

Seriousness of Incidents and College Characteristics

College campuses differ from each other in many ways (Table 4). The survey attempted to relate the numbers and seriousness of incidents to these characteristics, to see what insights this might yield. Table 5 shows this information for six ways of differentiating colleges where the relationship appeared to be the greatest. Obviously, these do not imply cause and effect.

Size:

There is a definite relationship between school size and incidents.

Incidents at schools with enrollments over 10,000 were more often of the moderately and most serious types. Incidents at schools with under 10,000 enrollment were more often of the least serious type.

Sex:

All three types of schools experienced about the same percentage of incidents.

However, incidents at coeducational institutions were more often disruptive or violent than those at schools with predominantly male or female enrollment.

ROTC:

Schools with ROTC reported proportionately more incidents than schools without ROTC.

Incidents on campuses with ROTC also were more frequently of the disruptive or violent type.

Academic Emphasis:

Liberal arts schools proportionately had far more incidents than schools with other academic emphases. They also had the highest percentage of serious incidents.

Table 4

College Characteristics Selected for Use in the Analysis,
Including Sources of Data

Characteristic	Source
1. Size of Institution	National Center for Educational Statistics, U. S. Office of Education
2. Control of School ^a	National Center for Educational Statistics, U. S. Office of Education ^b
3. Highest Degree Conferred	National Center for Educational Statistics, U. S. Office of Education
4. Sex Distribution	National Center for Educational Statistics, U. S. Office of Education
5. Academic Emphasis	American Council on Education ^c
6. Selectivity Standards (Acceptance Standards)	American Council on Education
7. Racial Composition	American Council on Education
8. State and Region	American Council on Education ^d
9. Presence of ROTC	Lovejoy's Education Center ^e
10. Percent Resident of Total Enrollment	American Council on Education
11. Percent of Enrollment Awarded Scholarships	American Council on Education
12. Percent of Enrollment Given: a. jobs b. loans c. financial aid	American Council on Education
13. Urban/Suburban/Rural Environment	Lovejoy's Education Center
14. Institutional Expenditures per Student	American Council on Education
15. Research Funds per Student	American Council on Education

^aState, municipal, private, parochial.

^bHigher Education Tape: Survey Contact File.

^cAmerican Council on Education, ACE Research Report (Vol. 4, No. 6).

^dGeographical Location Codes, General Services Administration, Office of Finance, Government Printing Office, October 1966.

^eLovejoy's College Guide, Simon and Schuster, New York, New York, 1970.

Table 5
Relationship Between College Characteristics and the Number and Seriousness of Incidents, May through August, 1970, as Reported by Administrators

College Characteristics	Number of Schools ^a	Total Incidents		Seriousness of Incidents					
				Least Serious		Medium Seriousness		Most Serious	
		No.	Percent of Schools Reporting	No.	Percent of Total Incid.	No.	Percent of Total Incid.	No.	Percent of Total Incid.
Size									
Under 1,000	738	160	22	130	81	29	18	1	.2
1,001 - 10,000	571	279	49	163	58	102	37	14	5
10,001 - over	98	59	60	10	17	32	54	17	29
Sex ^b									
Male	95	29	31	22	76	7	24	0	0
Female	145	51	35	41	80	10	20	0	0
Coeducational	1302	416	32	239	57	145	35	32	8
ROTC									
Yes	195	92	47	32	25	41	45	19	20
No	1366	409	30	271	66	123	30	15	4
Academic Emphasis									
Professional and Teachers	146	34	23	28	82	6	18	0	0
Liberal Arts	810	343	42	202	59	112	33	29	8
Occupational & Technical	463	105	23	62	59	40	38	3	3
Two-year	125	16	13	11	69	5	31	0	0
Institutional Spending Per Student									
\$1250 - less	353	74	21	50	68	22	30	2	2
\$1251 - 2000	353	115	33	69	60	41	36	5	4
\$2001 - over	523	229	44	128	56	77	34	24	10
Acceptance Standards									
High	99	56	57	36	64	19	34	1	2
Average	502	226	45	128	57	76	33	22	10
Low	289	65	22	34	52	24	37	7	11

^aTotals within the six categories differ because classification data are not available for all schools.

^bMale and Female schools are predominantly so, despite very small numbers of other sex.

The occupational and teaching category of colleges had the highest proportion of moderately serious disruptions.

Two-year institutions had proportionately fewest incidents.

Acceptance Standards:

Schools with high acceptance standards had proportionately more incidents than schools with lower acceptance standards. However, schools with average and low acceptance standards had substantially higher percentages of the most serious violent incidents.

Spending Per Student:

Schools with higher spending per student experienced proportionately more incidents and more of the most serious incidents than did the other schools.

Reactions to Incidents of Violence at Schools of Different Sizes and at Those With and Without ROTC

The reaction to incidents of violence was not the same on campuses of different characteristics. Table 6 shows these differences for two characteristics--size and the existence (or lack) of ROTC units--during the period beginning in May 1970. This part of the profile indicates the following:

Size:

National Guard and off-campus police were called in and arrests were made more often in response to incidents of violence on campuses with student enrollment over 10,000 than on those where enrollment was under 10,000.

ROTC:

National Guard and off-campus police were called in and arrests were made more often in response to incidents of violence on campuses that have ROTC than on those without ROTC.

Estimates of Seriousness of Incidents Beginning May 1, 1970

The percentages of administrators, representatives of faculty organizations, and elected student body representatives who believed that the incidents on their campuses became more serious after April 30, 1970, are shown in Table 7. Also shown are the percentages of these three

Table 6
Reaction to Incidents of Most Serious Kinds--Involving Violence--on Campuses of Different Sizes and on Those With and Without ROTC, May through August, 1970, as Reported by Administrators

School Characteristics	Number of Schools Reporting	Violent Incidents Reported		National Guard Called	Off-Campus Police Called	One or More Arrests Made
		(Number)	(Percent)			
Size						
Below 1,000	860	1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
1,000 to 10,000	863	14	1.6	0.0	7.1	0.0
Over 10,000	127	17	13.4	29.4	64.7	76.5
ROTC Status						
ROTC	231	19	8.2	26.3	52.6	57.9
No ROTC	1626	15	0.9	6.7	20.0	20.0

Table 7
Percent of Administrators, Faculty and Students Reporting Greater Seriousness of Incidents Beginning May 1, 1970

Views of Three Groups Surveyed			
	Administrators	Faculty Organization Representatives	Student Body Representatives
	(1569 Responses)	(1077 Responses)	(643 Responses)
More Serious than Earlier Incidents			
	57.8	58.3	63.2
Student Participation			
Greater	68.2	67.4	76.6
Same	19.7	20.7	12.4
Smaller	12.1	11.9	11.0
Faculty Participation with Students			
Greater	63.9	59.8	73.7
Same	27.3	30.8	17.9
Smaller	8.7	9.5	8.4
Faculty Helping Mediate			
Greater	65.0	63.2	63.2
Same	30.9	29.8	25.6
Smaller	4.0	7.1	11.2

groups that indicated they believed there had been an increase in (a) student participation, (b) faculty participation with students, and (c) faculty help as mediators. Table 8 shows the estimates of seriousness by each of these three groups broken down by regions of the country. The data in these two tables indicate that:

A greater proportion of student body representatives than faculty organization representatives or administrators believed the incidents become more serious after April 30, 1970.

A greater proportion of student body representatives than administrators or faculty organization representatives believed there was more student participation and more faculty participation with students than in previous incidents.

Fifty percent or more of all three groups in all regions of the country except the South believed that the incidents after April 30, 1970, were more serious than previous incidents. Only 39.5 percent of Southern school administrators believed these incidents were more serious.

Higher percentages of respondents from the East in all three groups believed the incidents became more serious than did the respondents from other regions.

Preparedness for Incidents

Before the May-through-August period of 1970, a number of campuses had developed contingency plans for dealing with further disturbances, and some of those plans were then put into use. Table 9 gives the data on the existence and use of such plans on those campuses that reported incidents of the two most serious types--those with campus disruption and those with violence to persons or property. This part of the profile indicates that:

Contingency plans in anticipation of moderately serious or very serious incidents were developed in 89.3 percent of the colleges that reported actual disruptions or violence beginning May 1970.

Only 33.9 percent of the contingency plans were reported as having been implemented.

Table 8
Percent of Administrators, Faculty and Students Reporting Greater Seriousness of Incidents Beginning May 1, 1970, by Region

	Percentage of Respondents who Believed Seriousness of Incidents Increased Compared with Earlier Period ^a		
	Administrators	Faculty	Students
West	53.3	58.1	61.1
South	39.5	44.8	45.8
East	61.1	60.8	68.8
Midwest	58.5	58.4	62.8

^aSee Table 7 for numbers of respondents in each category.

Table 9

Existence and Use of Contingency Plans on Campuses that Experienced Disruptions or Violence from May through August, 1970

	Contingency Plans Prepared (percent)	Contingency Plans Used (percent)
Schools (201 reporting moderately serious or very serious incidents)	89.3	33.9

IV. PREDICTIONS FOR THE TERM BEGINNING IN FALL 1970

The survey inquired into expectations of what might happen on campuses during the school year beginning in the fall of 1970. Administrators, faculty representatives, and heads of student body organizations were asked in the summer months to give their predictions about the likelihood of incidents of a moderately, serious, or very serious nature in the 1970 school term. An effort also was made to tabulate the major on-campus and off-campus events facing colleges which, according to the administrators, were deemed most likely to touch off disturbances.

Major Issues for the 1970-71 School Year

The internal and external issues most often mentioned by administrators as likely to contribute toward incidents of campus unrest are presented in Table 10. The administrators' responses are categorized by the type of previous incidents that had occurred at their schools. The results indicate that:

The two major internal issues that emerged were demands by black students and student discontent over certain school regulations.

These two internal issues were given about the same weight on campuses with no previous incidents and with previous violent incidents. On campuses with previous nonviolent incidents, however, almost twice as many administrators expressed concern about black demands as about regulations.

The Indo-China War far exceeded any other external issue mentioned.

At schools with no previous incidents, the influence of outside agitators loomed as a strong second cause of concern.

Table 10

Internal and External Issues Cited by Administrators as Likely to Contribute to Campus Incidents in 1970-71 School Term, with Importance Expressed as Percentage of Times Issues Were Mentioned

	All Schools ^a	Prior Experience with Campus Unrest		
		Previous Incidents of Violence	Previous Incidents But No Violence	No Previous Incidents
Internal Issues				
Number of Responses	515	197	138	180
Black Demands	18.4	16.2	26.8	14.4
School Regulations	16.3	19.3	14.5	14.4
No Communication	5.4	7.6	2.9	5.0
Lack of Student Involvement	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.0
Campus Housing	4.5	5.6	3.6	3.9
External Issues				
Number of Responses	622	142	300	180
Indo-China war	31.7	33.1	35.0	25.0
Outside Agitators	10.0	7.0	7.7	16.1
Racial Discrimination	9.5	11.3	8.3	10.0
Federal Domestic Policies and Actions	9.0	8.5	10.0	7.8
Political Interference	6.9	8.5	6.7	6.1
Mass Media	4.5	3.5	2.5	8.9

^a Many respondents did not answer the questions about issues.

Predictions About the Likelihood of Further Incidents

The administrators, faculty and students who responded to the survey often were not in close agreement about the amount or seriousness of the incidents that might be occurring during the next school year, beginning in the fall of 1970.

The percent of administrators, representatives of faculty organizations and student body leaders who forecast moderately or very serious incidents--with either disruptions or violence--are shown in Table 11. The "highly probable" and "probable" responses stand out more sharply in terms of the actual percentage of these moderately or very serious incidents on the same campuses during the May-through-August period of 1970: the percentage with such incidents was 12.8 percent. The percentage, of course, is much greater--32.4 percent of the reporting schools--when the least serious incidents are counted as well.

College administrators themselves had a wide range of views about what the future held. These differences show up in Table 12 which separates the administrators' responses according to various college characteristics. The responses about expectations may be checked in this table against the record of actual incidents in the period after April 30, 1970, at colleges with these same characteristics.

Among the data that may be observed from Tables 11 and 12 are the following:

Large percentages of those queried believed campus incidents of the moderately serious and most serious types--disruptive and violent--would not occur. Describing such incidents as unlikely were almost 70 percent of the administrators, 76 percent of the faculty representatives and 66 percent of the student leaders.

The predictions about 1970-71 disruptions and serious incidents by the administrators more nearly coincide with the actual May-August 1970 record of such incidents than do the predictions by faculty or students. Student respondents particularly anticipated a major escalation of serious incidents.

Table 11

Expectations of Disruptive or Violent Campus Incidents for the 1970-71 School Year by Administrators, Faculty and Students, Expressed as Percentages of Those Responding

	Administrators (1569 Responses)	Representatives of Faculty Organization (1077 Responses)	Elected Student Body Representatives (643 Responses)
Highly Probable	3.1	3.2	6.9
Probable	18.2	21.1	27.4
Unlikely	78.7	75.7	65.7
Percent of campuses with incidents (of the same sort for which predictions were requested--of the moderately serious or most serious types) that actually occurred in the period after April 30, 1970:		12.8	

Table 12

Expectations of Disruptive or Violent Campus Incidents for the 1970-71 School Year by Administrators for Colleges of Various Characteristics, Compared with Recent Pattern of Actual Incidents

College Characteristics	Number of Schools Responding	Percent with Serious Incidents May-Aug 1970	Predictions (Percent)		
			Highly Probable	Probable	Unlikely
Size					
1,000 - less	738	4.1	1.1	7.5	91.4
1,001 - 10,000	571	20.3	3.8	24.3	72.0
10,001 - over	98	51.0	12.7	46.8	40.5
ROTC					
Yes	195	30.8	4.9	35.9	59.2
No	1366	10.1	2.9	15.9	81.3
Racial Composition					
Predominantly Black	29	17.2	8.7	17.4	73.9
Predominantly White	1194	13.8	3.7	22.2	74.2
Academic Emphasis					
Prof. and Tech.	146	4.1	1.9	7.6	90.5
Liberal Arts	810	17.4	4.0	23.2	72.8
Occup. and Tech.	463	9.3	2.0	14.0	84.0
Two Year	125	4.0	2.3	8.0	89.7
Acceptance Standards					
High	99	20.2	4.0	11.9	84.1
Average	502	19.5	2.9	24.8	72.3
Low	289	10.7	6.5	35.1	58.4
Appropriations					
\$1250 - less	353	7.1	4.0	13.7	82.4
\$1251 - 2000	353	9.2	3.5	16.7	79.8
\$2001 - over	523	19.3	3.2	25.3	71.5

Eighty percent or more of the administrators of the following types of schools believed incidents of disruption or violence were unlikely:

- Enrollment of less than 1,000 students.
- No ROTC.
- All academic emphases except liberal arts.
- High acceptance standards.
- Per student appropriations under \$1,250.

Forty percent or more of the administrators of the following types of schools believed that incidents of disruption or violence on their campuses were probable or highly probable:

- Enrollment of 10,000 or more students.
- ROTC on campus.
- Low acceptance standards.

Using the pattern of incidents that occurred in the period after April 30, 1970 as a model of what might be anticipated in the succeeding school year, the predictions by administrators of the following types of schools may be characterized as quite pessimistic:

- Under 1,000 enrollment.
- Predominantly white.
- Professional and technical.
- Two-year colleges.
- Low acceptance standards.
- Appropriations less than \$2,000 per student.

On the same basis, optimistic predictions were made by administrators of colleges with:

- High acceptance standards.

V. MAJOR CAUSES OF INCIDENTS

The prediction section discussed issues believed likely to cause future campus unrest. This section, dealing with opinions about the major causes of campus unrest to date naturally focuses on many of the same issues. The earlier section and Table 10 tabulated only college administrators' opinion. Here the opinions of administrators, faculty organization representatives, and student body representatives are contrasted. For each group queried, the major causes of incidents are listed in Table 13 by the percentage of times mentioned and their rank of frequency.

This aspect of the survey indicates the following:

The Indo-China War was mentioned as a major cause of campus unrest most often by administrators and faculty representatives, and second most often by student body representatives.

No one cause dominated the responses, however. Many factors are believed to be crucial according to all three groups.

A comparison of the rank ordering of the responses by administrators, faculty, and students, show that:

Faculty and students do not place as much emphasis on the roles of subversive groups and outside agitators as do administrators.

Student respondents do not believe that permissiveness and lack of maturity are as important as do administrators and faculty.

Student respondents consider the draft and repressive tactics as more important causes than do administrators and faculty.

Table 13

Major Causes of Campus Unrest Most Often Mentioned by Administrators, Faculty Organization Representatives and Student Body Representatives; Percent^a and Rank Order

Causes	Administrators		Faculty		Students	
	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank
Indo-China War	12.7	1	13.1	1	12.9	2
Lack of Communication	9.4	2	11.4	2	13.3	1
Federal Unresponsiveness	7.8	3	9.2	3	12.8	3
Permissiveness	6.4	4	4.9	6	2.1	12
Subversive Groups	6.3	5	4.4	8	3.7	8
Alienation	5.7	6	7.1	4	9.3	4
Lack of Clear School Policy	4.4	7	4.3	9	2.9	10
Irrelevancy of School Work	4.2	8	4.7	7	3.1	9
Lack of Student Maturity	4.0	9	3.4	11	1.8	13
Hypocrisy	3.9	10	5.7	5	7.7	5
Mass Media	3.8	11	2.6	14	2.5	11
Large Size of Schools	3.7	12	2.8	13	1.5	16
Affluence of Students	3.3	13	3.4	11	1.7	14
Tradition of Activism	3.0	14	2.2	15	1.7	14
Draft	2.9	15	4.3	9	4.3	7
Repressive Tactics	1.8	16	2.5	15	6.9	6
Loss of Religion	1.7	17	0.8	18	1.1	17
Unfairness of Courts	1.5	18	0.6	19	0.4	18
Lower Standards of Acceptance	1.4	19	1.2	17	0.4	18
Other	11.3		10.7		9.5	

^aPercentages are of total causes cited--2,523 by administrators, 1,601 by faculty, 1,305 by students.

Proportion of Internal to External Causes Mentioned

Table 14 shows the frequency with which internal causes of incidents were mentioned as compared to external causes by administrators, faculty organization representatives, and student body representatives. The total percentages are followed by responses associated with particular school characteristics that reveal deviations from the general trend. The results indicate that:

Administrators mentioned more external than internal causes.

Faculty and students mentioned slightly more internal than external causes.

Extremes of these two trends occurred at parochial schools, where internal causes were mentioned 39.4 percent by administrators as contrasted with 59.4 percent by students, and at predominantly female schools, where internal causes were mentioned only 35.6 percent by administrators as contrasted with 57.1 percent by students.

All three groups mentioned more external than internal causes at private schools, predominantly male schools, schools with low entrance requirements, and schools where the appropriation per student was low.

All three groups mentioned more internal than external causes at state-controlled schools and predominantly black schools. This trend was particularly strong at black schools: Administrators mentioned internal causes 57.1 percent, students, 70 percent.

Students in schools with low acceptance standards mentioned internal causes much less--38.1 percent--than students in schools with high acceptance standards--60.2 percent. Similarly, in schools with low appropriations, students mentioned internal causes 46.6 percent while students in schools with high appropriations mentioned internal causes 57.8 percent.

Table 14

Frequency of Mention of Internal Causes Compared with External Causes by Administrators, Faculty Organization Representatives and Student Body Representatives; Total and by Particular School Characteristics

	Percentages of Attribution to Internal Causes		
	Administrators	Faculty	Students
Total	45.3	51.7	52.2
School Control			
Parochial	39.4	52.3	59.4
Private	41.1	46.3	46.3
State	50.7	53.6	53.4
Municipal	45.7	55.1	49.4
Sex Distribution			
Male	47.4	48.1	40.5
Female	35.6	57.4	57.1
Coed	45.9	51.6	52.4
Race			
Predominantly White	45.7	51.9	52.3
Predominantly Black	57.1	61.5	70.0
Academic Emphasis			
Professional and Teachers	50.1	46.7	48.9
Liberal Arts	46.1	52.1	53.0
Occupational and Technical	42.4	50.3	52.4
Two Year	41.8	62.1	37.5
Acceptance Standards			
High	48.5	52.0	60.2
Average	46.1	52.7	53.3
Low	37.4	48.9	38.1
Appropriation			
\$1250 and Less	47.5	47.6	46.6
\$1251 to \$2000	46.7	53.3	57.6
\$2001 and Over	44.8	53.5	57.8

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

To deal with campus unrest, administrators, faculty and students responded with a variety of general recommendations. Table 15 lists and ranks those mentioned most frequently. The following are among the survey results:

Improving communications--among government representatives, university administrators, politicians, parents, students, board of trustees, faculty, and so forth--was by far the most frequently mentioned recommendation by all three groups of respondents.

Administrators and faculty representatives expressed high agreement in the rank ordering of their recommendations.

Student body representatives placed different emphasis than the administrators or faculty on some recommendations. For example, students gave more weight to giving greater voice in campus governance, moderating federal rhetoric about students, not overreacting to protests, and avoiding force in dealing with incidents. Students placed less emphasis than the others on reforming higher education, strengthening the legal system, and having the Commission inform the nation about campus unrest in understandable terms.

Specific Recommendations for Different Levels of Authority

The administrators, faculty organization representatives, and student body representatives also indicated their preferences for actions that should be taken by different levels of authority. The percent and rank order of recommendations are shown in Table 16. Most frequently mentioned actions for each level of authority were:

Federal Government

Stop the war
Change domestic policies
Give more recognition to student concerns

Table 15

Most Frequently Mentioned General Recommendations by Administrators, Faculty Organization Representatives and Student Body Representatives; Percent^a and Rank Order

Recommendation	Administrators		Faculty		Students	
	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank
Improve Communications	17.0	1	17.4	1	16.1	1
End the War	8.9	2	9.9	2	11.4	3
Solve Domestic Problems	8.9	2	9.6	3	9.8	4
Reform Higher Education	7.4	4	7.2	6	3.9	7
Respond Rapidly to Student Dissent	7.1	5	7.4	5	9.4	5
Greater Student Voice	6.1	6	8.3	4	11.5	2
Strengthen Punishment of Students	5.5	7	3.7	7	3.0	9
Strengthen Legal System	4.5	8	3.0	9	1.8	15
Commission Inform Nation in Clear Terms	3.3	9	2.9	10	2.4	14
Restrict Federal Rhetoric	3.0	10	3.6	8	5.3	6
Assure Valid Reporting by Media	2.7	11	2.1	14	2.7	11
Change Military Requirements	2.3	12	2.7	11	2.6	12
Do not Overreact to Student Protest	2.2	13	2.7	11	3.3	8
Involve College in Communities	2.0	14	2.7	11	2.5	13
Reduce Size of Schools	1.7	15	1.5	16	0.8	18
Assure Education for All	1.7	15	0.9	18	1.1	16
More Religion	1.5	17	0.8	19	0.8	18
Avoid Force in Dealing with Incidents	1.1	18	1.9	15	2.9	10

^aPercentages are of total recommendations cited--1,878 by administrators, 1,368 by faculty, 1,277 by students.

Table 16

Most Frequently Mentioned Recommendations for Different Levels of Authority by Administrators, Faculty Organization Representatives and Student Body Representatives; Percent and Rank Order

Recommendations	Administrators		Faculty		Students	
	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank
Federal Government						
Stop the War	17.2	1	18.2	2	13.4	3
Change Domestic Policies	16.9	2	20.3	1	18.8	1
Recognize Students' Concerns	10.2	3	10.2	3	15.0	2
Provide More Scholarships	7.9	4	4.6	6	4.1	6
Modify Statements Concerning Dissenters	7.3	5	8.3	4	10.5	4
Do not Dictate University Policies	6.0	6	6.3	5	8.6	5
Stronger Student Reprimands	2.8	7	2.9	7	1.6	7
Support Commission	1.3	8	2.0	8	0.6	8
State Authorities						
Give Universities More Funds	14.0	1	11.2	2	10.1	2
Do not Interfere with University Activities	10.0	2	14.7	1	16.3	1
Better National Guard Training	7.0	3	8.3	3	6.8	4
More Effort on Urban Problems	6.7	4	4.6	6	3.7	6
Stop Anti-Education Attitude	5.8	5	6.6	4	4.5	5
Remove Politics from Campus	3.8	6	6.1	5	7.2	3
Local Community						
More Communication	39.0	1	41.1	1	44.7	1
Adequate Police Protection	10.3	2	8.6	3	3.6	4
Stop Youth Discrimination	7.0	3	8.8	2	10.0	2
Leave Campus Control to the University	5.9	4	6.6	4	8.3	3
Upgrade Police	3.8	5	4.6	5	3.1	5
Provide Youth Centers	3.1	6	2.0	6	2.3	6
Student Body						
Work Within System	35.5	1	31.0	1	33.5	1
Better Leadership	10.6	2	12.5	2	9.4	3
Attend to Non-Political Issues	9.0	3	8.3	5	10.1	2
Get Involved in Community	8.8	4	9.3	3	8.9	4
Set Up Campus Council	7.4	5	9.0	4	4.7	5
Evaluate Faculty	1.2	6	0.8	7	0.5	7
Confine Interest to Academics	0.9	7	1.3	6	0.8	6
Campus Administration						
Provide Better Communication	45.7	1	40.8	1	39.7	1
Involve Students More in Governance	17.1	2	18.9	2	23.5	2
Improve Governance	15.9	3	18.1	3	9.5	3
Do not Overreact to Disturbance	1.8	4	2.8	4	4.9	4
Remove Hard-core Agitators	1.7	5	2.2	5	2.1	5
Smaller Student Body	0.2	6	0.5	6	0.2	6

State Authorities

Give more funds to universities
Do not interfere with university activities

Local Community

More communication

Student Body

Work within the system

Campus Administration

Provide better communication channels.

There was substantial agreement between the three groups surveyed on these specific recommendations. Students, however, placed more emphasis than did administrators or faculty on removing State politics from campuses, while administrators and faculty placed more emphasis than did students on provision of adequate police protection by local communities.

Appropriate Actions for Different Types of Incidents

Important as a set of recommendations for and by administrators were the views of college presidents about appropriate responses to particular types of incidents. Table 17 shows the frequency with which administrators reported that primarily punitive action (such as arresting, expelling or suspending students) or discussions only, with no punitive measures, should be the response to specified circumstances. The remaining percentage of administrators (not shown) advocated some type of gradual response starting with discussions, progressing to punitive measures if necessary. Opinions are shown according to whether administrators responding are on campuses that have had violent incidents, nonviolent incidents, or no previous incidents. The tabulation indicates:

A higher percentage of administrators from schools with no history of incidents believe that punitive measures are most appropriate for all types of incidents than do administrators from schools with previous incidents. This divergence is particularly noticeable for less serious types of incidents.

Administrators from schools with previous incidents, but where no violence occurred, believe that punitive measures are less appropriate than do administrators in the two other groups.

Table 17

Preferences of Administrators for Punitive or Discussion-Only Methods^a for Dealing with Disturbances of Varying Seriousness, at Colleges with Differing Histories of Incidents, Indicated by Percent of Respondents

	Previous Incidents of Violence		Previous Incidents with No Violence		No Previous Incidents	
	Punitive Measures	Discussion Only	Punitive Measures	Discussion Only	Punitive Measures	Discussion Only
Injuries or Destruction of Property	71.7	0.6	70.0	1.6	75.4	2.9
Disruption of Classes	53.1	1.7	46.8	8.8	56.8	6.3
Occupation of Buildings	49.7	2.2	44.4	8.0	58.5	7.2
Heckling of Speakers	33.9	9.6	29.2	18.9	44.0	12.1
Blocking of classes or strikes	56.3	1.7	47.9	6.3	60.4	6.0
Mass rallies and teach-ins	10.7	46.0	10.8	54.5	23.2	37.0

^aAdministrators urging some intermediate measures, combining punitive and nonpunitive approaches, are not tabulated here. Thus, pairs of the two extreme positions shown do not total 100 percent.

Reasons for No Incidents

Explanations that colleges have given for not having had incidents are often looked upon as implied recommendations for dealing effectively with campus unrest. The administrators, faculty organization representatives, and student body representatives at campuses that had experienced no incidents offered their reasons for this. These are shown in Table 18 as percentages of responses and are ranked. The data indicate:

All three groups attached high importance to small classes as a major factor.

Students gave greater weight to good dialogue than did administrators or faculty as a reason for incident-free campuses.

More faculty representatives than administrators or students believed that clear regulations for dealing with incidents played a crucial role.

Table 18
Major Reasons for Avoidance of Campus Incidents

Reasons	Administrators		Faculty		Students	
	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank
Religious School	15.9	1	10.8	3	10.2	4
Small Classes	14.8	2	18.1	1	17.6	1
Professional	9.9	3	7.4	5	11.4	3
Good Dialogue	9.2	4	7.8	4	11.9	2
Clear Regulations for Dealing with Disturbances	6.4	5	11.3	2	4.0	7
All Girl School	4.3	6	3.9	7	5.1	5
Older Students	2.8	7	2.5	8	3.4	8
No Outsiders	2.1	8	4.4	6	4.5	6
Student Senate	1.9	9	2.5	8	2.8	9

APPENDIX A. Questionnaire Used in Survey

SURVEY OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
for the
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
on
CAMPUS UNREST

1. Name of Educational Institution:

Mailing Address:

2. Your Name and Position:

IF YOUR INSTITUTION EXPERIENCED ONE OR MORE INCIDENTS WHICH RESULTED IN DISRUPTION OF THE NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTITUTION FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 67-68 ACADEMIC YEAR THROUGH APRIL 30, 1970, PLEASE COMPLETE QUESTIONS 3 AND 4. IF NO INCIDENTS OCCURRED, BEGIN WITH QUESTION 5, ON PAGE 2.

3. Please indicate the number of such incidents during each academic year:

1967-68 _____ 1968-69 _____ 1969-April 30, 1970 _____

4. For each academic year such incidents occurred please check if any of the following actions occurred:

	1967-68	1968-69	1969 to April 30, 1970
National Guard called in	☐	☐	☐
Off-campus police called in	☐	☐	☐
Temporary restraining order or injunction obtained	☐	☐	☐
One or more protestors arrested	☐	☐	☐

QUESTIONS 5-13 DEAL WITH EVENTS ON YOUR CAMPUS ON OR AFTER MAY 1, 1970

5. Please check any of the following activities which occurred on your campus on and after May 1, 1970:

- a. Routines or regulations affecting class attendance were changed. ☐
- b. Routines or regulations affecting examinations were changed. ☐
- c. Routines or regulations concerning degree requirements were changed. ☐
- d. Teach-ins, rallies, or discussion groups took the place of normal academic activities. ☐
- e. Disruption of normal campus functioning occurred, involving the infringement of campus rules but not involving serious damage to or destruction of property or personal injury. ☐
- f. Activities of a disruptive nature by students that took place off campus. ☐
- g. Incidents of violence occurred, involving serious damage to or destruction of property, personal injury or death. ☐
- h. Law enforcement officials or National Guard troops came onto the campus. ☐
- i. Other (please describe briefly). ☐

PLEASE CHECK APPROPRIATE ANSWER FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS

6. How would you characterize the seriousness of these events in comparison with any incidents on your campus prior to May 1970?

- More serious than other prior incidents ☐
- No more serious than other prior incidents ☐
- No prior incidents for comparison ☐

7. How would you describe the number of students who participated in these activities?

- Greater than in any other previous protests ☐
- About the same as in other previous protests ☐
- Smaller than in previous protests ☐
- No previous protests for comparison ☐

8. How would you describe the number of faculty who helped plan the events, participated in the events, or generally supported the events?

- Greater than in any other previous protests ☐
- About the same as in other previous protests ☐
- Smaller than in previous protests ☐
- No previous protests for comparison ☐

9. How would you describe the number of faculty who helped mediate the events, or actively tried to ameliorate the situation?

- Greater than in any other previous protests ☐
- About the same as in other previous protests ☐
- Smaller than in previous protests ☐
- No previous protests for comparison ☐

IF THE ANSWERS TO QUESTION 5 WERE e THROUGH i, THEN ANSWER QUESTIONS
10 THROUGH 13. IF NOT GO TO QUESTION 14

10. Please indicate the number of students penalized by your institution for an infringement of campus rules or criminal laws.

- | | Number of
Students |
|---|-----------------------|
| a. Brought case before institution's judiciary body | _____ |
| b. Students suspended | _____ |
| c. Students expelled | _____ |
| d. Financial aid withdrawn | _____ |
| e. Reprimands | _____ |
| f. Other (describe briefly) | _____ |

11. Please check any of the following responses which occurred as a result of the protests on your campus:

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| a. National Guard called in | ☐ |
| b. Off-campus police called in | ☐ |
| c. Temporary restraining order or injunction obtained | ☐ |
| d. One or more protesters arrested | ☐ |
| e. Mediations | ☐ |
| f. Use of student marshals to prevent violence | ☐ |
| g. Other (please describe briefly) | ☐ |

12. a. Did your institution have any contingency plans in the event of campus disorders?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know ☐

b. If so, were these plans implemented?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know ☐

IF "YES," PLEASE DESCRIBE THESE PLANS

13. If there were any incidents of violence on your campus during this period,

a. What actions were the most effective in dealing with these incidents?

b. What actions were least effective?

14. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem that your university will face this fall that may lead to campus unrest?

15. What is your prediction as to the likelihood of disruption or violence on your campus this fall?

Highly Probable ☐

Probable ☐

Unlikely ☐

16. What policies, plans or actions do you believe each of the following should take to reduce the likelihood of disruption or violence on your campus in the future? (Please include actions that might be taken which will effectively deal with student protests before they reach crisis proportions.)

a. The Federal Government _____

b. State authorities _____

c. Local community _____

d. Student body (including student government) _____

e. Campus administration _____

f. Other (specify) _____

17. How should your institution respond to the following incidents?

a. Destruction of school property _____

b. Disruption of class _____

c. Occupation of building _____

d. Heckling guest speaker _____

e. Preventing students from entering classrooms _____

f. Mass rallies, teach-ins, class boycotts, etc. _____

18. Are there any other suggestions or comments you believe would be helpful to the Commission?

19. Describe what in your view are the principal causes of campus unrest. What recommendations should this Commission make with respect to these causes or otherwise to fulfill its mandate?

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES.

Relationship Between Questions in the Questionnaire
and Tables in This Report

<u>TABLES</u>	<u>CHARTS</u>	<u>DERIVED FROM QUESTIONS</u>
1		3, 5
2		_____ a/
3	1	3, 4, 5, 11
4		_____
	2	5, 11
	3	5, 10
5		5
6		5, 11
7		
8		6, 7, 8, 9
9		12
10		14
11		15
12		5, 15
13		18, 19
14		14
15		18, 19
16		16
17		17
18		18, 19

a/ Blanks indicate table not derived from questionnaire.

APPENDIX B. Description of Coding Categories

Questions 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19 asked for discussion (open-end or non pre-coded) responses; assessment of mood and intensity of the reply to Questions 18 and 19 and the data in Table 18, giving reasons for no incidents, were also judgmental. As questionnaires were received, a large number were read separately by two persons and topic categories were recorded and tallied. They were then combined and test-coded on another set of questionnaires by the two coders separately. They were again refined, and although this process ideally should have continued further, time pressures necessitated acceptance of the second revision.

Problems result from defining categories during an insufficient time period. Since first mail deliveries brought many more replies from administrators than from students and faculty, the categories established for coding were necessarily geared to the content and style of administrators' answers. Coders found it difficult to place the other groups' responses in these classifications. The "Other" categories resulted in larger percentages than ordinarily would have been the case because later responses did not fit categories already allocated.

Reliability is the extent to which the measurement procedure produces the same results each time it is applied. Reliability in quantifying qualitative data has little methodology to fall back upon. Within the very serious time constraints placed upon this study, properly developed tests of reliability were not possible.

Attempts were made at quality control and some relatively crude checks on reliability. For the variables or institution characteristics coding, and for the pre-coded or closed-end questionnaire coding, a sample test showed a percent error in consistency. A similar procedural test of the open-end questionnaire coding sheets found a 10 percent error.

The crucial reliability problem was with the open-end coding of responses for Questions 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19.(combined) and the "mood of response" evaluation. Efforts were made for quality control and consistency by using a single supervisor for detailed instructions with examples, and by assuring interchange among coders on interpretation problems. A sample of 110 questionnaires was coded separately by two persons and the extent of error was measured for each question; manual computation indicated that average reliability ran between 70 and 75 percent.

APPENDIX C. Sample Responses to Open-End Queries

The authors gave the Commission a random sample of the responses to open-end questions to supplement the statistical tabulations. However, extracts are presented here to add another dimension--the mood or flavor of the individual answers--to the broader analyses of replies.

Question 14: In your opinion, what is the most serious problem that your university will face this fall that may lead to campus unrest?

"If the War continues without an end in sight." (Student)

"Dissatisfaction with War in Southeast Asia; widespread belief that urgent problems at home are being neglected in order to prosecute a dubious military action abroad." (Faculty)

"The continuing accreditation of ROTC by one of the six undergraduate schools (engineering) and moves in the University Council to remove ROTC." (Student)

"As a result of last May's unrest, the Board of Trustees is revising the Code of Student Conduct. A very repressive document will create serious problems. The new document will be presented August 13. It could, or could not, be a major issue with unfortunate repercussions, depending on the way the committee in charge of it handles it." (Student)

"Student social life and illegal drug use." (Administration)

"Unnecessary killing of any kind regardless of circumstances or geographic origin." (Faculty)

"The 'adventure' of American Imperialism in South East Asia, the draft, the reaction from the 'right' to concerned protest, the lack of communication and communication 'block' between campuses and government, and the governance of America's institutions of higher learning. If demonstrations are rapidly renewed (as we expect they may be), the administration will probably act more quickly by taking specific actions, something they haven't done in the past. This 'new thing' could result in a serious confrontation caused by a combination of raised expectations and a new dedication to 'deal with' campus unrest quickly." (Student)

Question 16: What policies, plans or actions do you believe each of the following should take to reduce the likelihood of disruption or violence on your campus in the future? (Please include actions that might be taken which will effectively deal with student protests before they reach crisis proportions.)

a. The Federal Government

"Listen to the students and begin to make meaningful, substantive, changes where criticism. Get out of Vietnam. Begin real progress in alleviating the problems of minorities." (Administration)

"Enforce existing Federal laws promptly, fairly and firmly, rather than enacting new ones." (Faculty)

"Do all possible to prevent escalation of war activity. Take positive action on social ills (population increase, pollution, housing, etc.) What respect can we have in the eyes of other countries abroad when we are unable to care for our domestic ills? We need to get things in order here before we tell the rest of the world what is good for them." (Faculty)

"Perhaps the only thing the Federal Government can do that would be beneficial to the university would be to redirect its orientation and investment of energies from that of serving as a world policeman to a greater commitment at all levels to the problems that are symptomatic of our bifurcated society; these include hunger, poverty and social inequality." (Administration)

"Stay out." (Faculty)

"Moderation and understanding expressed in Presidential statements." (Administration)

b. State Authorities

"Nothing: The ineptness of state legislatures has all but destroyed faith in state governments." (Student)

"Muzzle anti-student speakers. Make no threats - explain policies very carefully." (Faculty)

"Display through legislation a continued desire to support higher education and not punish the majority for the acts of a few." (Faculty)

"Let campuses police themselves unless they ask for authorities to assist." (Administration)

Question 16

c. Local Community

"Plan with the Administration (university) what support can be given if and when requested. Be tolerant and supportive of the university." (Faculty)

"Should not take advantage of students in food and clothing prices, rents, and should not treat students as rabble rousers." (Student)

"No repressive action directed specifically to campus unrest and enforce existing laws as applies to all citizens." (Faculty)

"They need a better understanding of the college. They need to overcome a strong prejudice." (Student)

"The local community should understand the role of the educational institution and should try to communicate with members of the campus regarding goals, programs, needs, etc." (Administration)

"Self education as to what student protest is really all about. Develop more sensitive police agencies." (Administration)

"Do not over-react to student concern." (Administration)

"If the disruptions involve local community property, etc., then a peaceful discussion between the local fathers and village administration would be a first step." (Faculty)

"Closer ties with the university. There should not be a separation of the university and local communities." (Student)

"Support law enforcement authorities and work closely with college administration so that appropriate separation can be effected between student actions which are college responsibilities and those that are not." (Faculty)

"Improvement in intergroup relations. Need for housing, job training, and combating drug problems." (Administration)

"Maintain cooperation by local authorities with university officials and students; intensify efforts of mass media to improve understanding." (Administration)

Question 16

d. Student Body (including Student Government)

"Must remember changes take time, should work for constructive projects to better mankind." (Student)

"Should become more responsible to the entire student body." (Faculty)

"Sincere and honest opportunity for involvement--not just window dressing." (Administration)

"Proceed through normal channels in trying to solve their differences." (Faculty)

"Self-appointed crisis leaders should be publicly challenged to identify their constituency. A rumor center would help. In advance, student protestors should be appointed." (Faculty)

"Participate in the governance of the institution, learn to understand the roles, weights and responsibilities of the various publics in the college population." (Administration)

"Be more objective on all issues. Have enough courage to support unpopular causes." (Administration)

"Increased attempts to understand the faculty members who wish to avoid politicizing the educational institution." (Administration)

"Must be able to provide effectiveness in dealing with the problems which students have rather than playing merely the role of a sounding board." (Student)

"Students should take an active role in serving on the campus committees which have provision for campus representation." (Faculty)

"Get the students to trust the student government and believe what is said." (Student)

"Stimulate massive participation of students in the election of student governing bodies in order to provide for a more representative body." (Administration)

Question 16

e. Campus Administration

"Cooperation with local and state officials and with student body in creating an atmosphere in which we can demonstrate that the system we have now will work and that change is possible where change is needed." (Administration)

"Greater interest in directing curriculum toward relevant issues and lasting values; i.e., social awareness, life style development in work-leisure balance, interpersonal relations, political activity and sense of proportion." (Student)

"Listen more; discuss with many students, not just leaders, about the problems." (Administration)

"Be more aware of the students' needs and be willing to change outdated policies and practices." (Administration)

"Continually keep all persons in the institution informed of objectives and results of disruptions." (Faculty)

"Try to be more human and less of a business machine. Students are people besides being numbers." (Student)

"Assume the proper responsibility of leaders." (Administration)

"Dismiss for disorderly or unprofessional conduct." (Administration)

"New communication channels between students, faculty and administration must be found through colloquia, governance and social action." (Faculty)

"More discussions to ventilate student and administrative problems. Students should learn that they have no monopoly on worry or concern." (Faculty)

"Maintain the lines of communication. Pre-planning for any possible contingencies, a crisis intervention team." (Administration)

"Continue to be aware of student concerns and responsive to their wishes without pandering." (Faculty)

Questions 18 and 19--combined for coding purposes. These quotes are purposely selected, but only on the basis of conciseness of reply.

Are there any other suggestions or comments you believe would be helpful to the Commission?

What recommendations should this Commission make with respect to these causes or otherwise to fulfill its mandate?

"The Commission should recommend the immediate termination of the Vietnam War, changes in the American political system so as to make it more flexible and responsive to a changing society, stronger steps to end segregation, and an immediate change in the present administration's views and statements about the intellectual and academic communities." (Faculty)

Suggested Recommendations:

1. At the university level there is the need for broad measures to involve students in university decision making. Token representation on various committees and boards or "advisory committees" are of little or no value and most students realize this.
2. The plan advanced in other parts of the country to allow students to take two weeks to work in political campaigns is an excellent proposal. It is unfortunate that this option is not available to more citizens.
3. Colleges should institute programs of social and political involvement for students. For example, a student could work for an entire semester on a poverty project, in a political campaign or for some government agency and write a series of papers and get credit for a semester of independent study. I would suggest a program with maximum flexibility in which the student would be responsible for finding his own job with the college granting approval of the project.
4. It is most important to stop the use of the Vice President and other high officials to intimidate those opposed to the President. The constant appeal to the worst in people--their hates, fears and frustrations--is one thing coming from a Wallace or a Maddox, but it is another when it comes from the Vice President.
5. The Selective Service system must be abolished or altered drastically. It is a form of slavery from which few profit and many suffer. One can legitimately fear a serious threat to his individuality and creativity as a result of military service.

6. The political system must be reformed significantly. The convention system must be changed or abolished. The control of the system by a few, the powerful in state and local politics, must end. Those who work through the system must be phased out of the system.

"The Commission could recommend a speedy withdrawal from Vietnam conflict, the avoidance of future adventures like the Cambodian invasion, a more sympathetic hearing for the young, the black, the poor, and others denied fulfillment of the American dream; positive support for educational reform, more widespread educational opportunities, and the amelioration of social injustices and deprivations in the United States." (Administration)

"There are no simple solutions available to solve the crisis we find ourselves in today on college campuses, but I would offer these recommendations:

1. A new look at the priority system of higher education.
2. An improvement in the channels of communication between students and faculty, students and the administration of a college, students and government leaders, students and the communities in which they reside. We simply have to recognize that students are not always wrong and misdirected.
3. The hierarchical nature of colleges and universities is in for an overhaul. Students want answers and they are entitled to them.
4. Students are perplexed about racial discrimination, the poor and the hungry, materialism, the relevance of their education, wars, and their inability to express themselves at the polls. Lowering the voting age would certainly help relieve some of the frustrations.
5. Colleges and universities should allow more flexibility in dealing with academic, political, and sociological matters. This would require an adjustment in thinking regarding the role of higher education. Is the college a place where a student can learn about all segments of his society, or does the college exist only to provide narrow preparation for some type of occupational skill?
6. Top government officials should carefully consider statements made that tend to scathe students as a group. Some students need reprimand, but not at the expense of the vast majority. The same applies to faculty members as well." (Faculty)

The following statement is included as one of the many essay responses received. It was selected not for the views expressed, but to illustrate the range and complexity of subjects found in the open-end responses. This reply was received from a student.

Campus unrest stems from two aspects of American society. One is that students believe that the Federal Government and local governments are hypocritical and at times even lie to the public (Mr. Nixon's many contradictory statements about the Vietnam War are an example). The other is their increasing acceptance of violence as a way of life.

The present generation of students is very different from any previous one in that it is the first to seriously dispute the traditional contentions that America is the "best" country or the "fairest" country. Thanks to the relatively new concept of television news, these students are more aware of the world around them than any students have ever been. As they watched the harsh realities of violence, be it in Selma or in Vietnam, every night at home, they realized that there is a great deal of American society to be reckoned with beyond the simple messages of patriotism contained in grade school and high school text books. In addition to learning not to trust their own leaders and teachers, the students have learned not to trust even the various media as they report the news (stories about the murder of Fred Hampton by the Chicago Police Department, and about rock music festivals and good examples).

Students are concerned with the enormous questions of our commitments in Southeast Asia and the Nation's racial inequities. They are concerned with the "social problems" of drug abuse, homosexuality, and prison conditions in which the victims are treated as animals and criminals.

Students question why Mr. Nixon was recently willing to veto bills to provide funds for education and housing so as to help curb inflation, but was unwilling to take the one billion dollars in question from war funds. They question the reasons for his recent statement that he would not send Federal officials into the South to help enforce the 1954 Supreme Court decision on school desegregation, unless requested to do so by southern governors. They question why the congressmen who took so long to agree on postal reforms had no qualms about doubling the President's salary and substantially increasing their own.

What students are faced with, in short, are day-to-day refutations of the lessons of their history books. When they realize that these refutations are enacted by the country's leaders, by the corporations that form the base of our economic system, and by those who report the news, they wonder whether they can believe in the American Way any longer.

* * *

It is a law of science that "every action causes a reaction." That is what is happening on the Nation's campuses today. The "protest movement" did start out quietly with marches and sit-ins, but since these had relatively little effect on the Federal and local governments, it was inevitable that protest would become more and more violent. As the War in Vietnam continued, and even expanded, as as civil rights legislation remained unenforced, protestors became increasingly frustrated in the governments' inability to recognize their own shortcomings.

In 1967, for instance, the country was horrified and perplexed by the summer's many urban riots. The Kerner Commission's Report blamed the riots on the Nation's institutional racism and cited such things as the lack of educational opportunities and the lack of decent housing available to blacks as examples. Yet, three years later, the President, on national television vetoed funds for education and housing in the interests of curbing inflation, while he continues to fight a war that is in large part responsible for the inflation. Such frustration as is caused by this and a vast number of similar incidents is responsible for "campus unrest."

The Kerner Report also said that the actual incidents that triggered the various riots were in large part irrelevant for the real issue in question was racism. Similarly, I feel, individual local issues in campus demonstrations are secondary in importance to the incredible feeling of helplessness that students experience as a result of, say, the above incident. Many black students are victims of the racism discussed in the Kerner Report. All students are pawns in the hands of the military. Many would like to take a year off from their studies, or do not want to go to school at all, but must go to school to avoid the inequities of the draft and the War.

Writing letters to congressmen or carrying signs in a march will not make the President end the War, nor will they make him transfer one billion dollars in defense appropriations to HEW or HUD. Something has to be done to let the President know that he does not have a vote of confidence from students. Because non-violent protest in American in recent years has not been as successful as one would hope, and because students hold no legal power in terms of the vote (and, come next January, in terms of determining who has the "established" support and financial resources to run), they have no "quiet" way of being heard.

They must make a mark, and the violence that grows out of the frustrations of being held down is, it seems, the only way they can make a mark. It is also significant that violence presents itself as a feasible form of protest not only because it seems to be the best way of drawing attention to one's cause, but also because violence is nothing new in the students' conception of American life.

TV Westerns have long been an accepted form of violence that in themselves refute traditional principles of democracy. Bull Conner and his police dogs were violent. The murders of Medgar Evers, James Cheney, Michael Goodwin, and James Schwerner, for which not one person has been convicted to this day, were violent. The War in Vietnam is violent. The actions of policemen and soldiers at the March on the Pentagon (1967) and at the Democratic Convention of 1968 were violent. The assassinations of the Kennedy brothers, Dr. King, Malcolm X, and, most recently, Fred Hampton were violent deeds. Even the American Revolution was steeped in violence as colonists found themselves unable to protest against George III and his "taxation without representation" in a "quiet" way!

In short, as they look around, students see violent actions everywhere. This violence appears to be a very natural part of our national tradition as it continues, unabated. In addition to watching others flout the law constantly, students further question the very foundations of "the law" as they realize that those who refuse to consider, and sometimes try to suppress peaceful protest, are the very people who write on condone the draft laws and laws against marijuana smoking.

Students know in their consciences that the draft laws are wrong, and their own experiences with marijuana strongly contradict the statements made by opponents of its legalization. Finally, after watching others' disregard for the law and after realizing that the laws affecting them the most are wrong, students see official scorn for "the law" as it was represented by police action at the Democratic Convention, the murder of Fred Hampton, the "Conspiracy 8" trial, and the deaths of six students in May at Kent State and Jackson State. How, after this, can students-or anyone for that matter-be expected to truly respect the law, those who have written it, and those who administer and enforce it?

Better or more stringent law enforcement will not end campus unrest. Only better and more honest government by our leaders can do that, along with greater responsibility on the part of corporate leaders and the news media. Student faith in the Nixon Administration is so low that it is not expected that your Commission's findings will be genuinely endorsed and taken to heart by the President unless they generally shift blame to "students." If the President was indeed sincere in calling for a report on the various facets and causes of campus unrest, then he will be willing to take a large share of the blame for such violence upon himself, his Vice-President, and the others who hold positions of power in the Nation.