

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
4	letter	Lodge to HAK	1/10/72	B
10	note	Saunders to HAK	n.d.	B
11	memo	SANITIZED <small>PER EAC REVIEW 5/5/2008</small> CIA to HAK	3/30/71	B
18	memo	Eliot to HAK	9/27/69	B
25 A	report	Biography DECLASSIFIED <small>PER EAC REVIEW 4/5/2008</small>	March '69	B
28	telegram	Amemb Helsinki to SecState	7/7/73	B
63	telegram	SecState to Amemb Helsinki	2/2/72	B
65	report	Intelligence Information Cable	7/21/70	B
66	report	Intelligence Information Cable	3/5/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE **NSC** BOX NUMBER **673**

FOLDER TITLE **(2)**

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information. | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |

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65	report	Intelligence Information Cable	7/21/70	B
66	report	Intelligence Information Cable	3/5/70	B

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- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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DECLASSIFIED

Memos & Misc.

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

July 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Additional Comments on Resignation
of Finnish Government

Although the actual reason for the sudden resignation of the minority Finnish Government July 19 may have been its reluctance to take sole responsibility for signing the free trade agreement with the EEC, as stated by Prime Minister Paasio, the possibility that the Soviet Union may have played some role in the move cannot be discounted. In the past the Soviets have on occasion moved to block planned courses of action by the Government of Finland; the most recent case was in December 1969, when the Finns abandoned plans to form a Nordic Economic Community (NORDEC) at the last moment, due to Soviet objections. In this connection, the visit to Helsinki of Soviet Ambassador to Paris Valerian Zorin on July 17-18 could be connected to the surprise resignation. The Soviets have been persistently cool to any Finnish tie to the Common Market, although Finnish Government officials have moved ahead with the negotiations on the assumption that Moscow would go along with a free trade agreement which had no political strings. If, indeed, Soviet reserve towards a Finnish tie to the EEC is involved in the Government's resignation, the matter will undoubtedly be a major topic of discussion when President Kekkonen visits Prime Minister Kosygin in the Soviet Union next month.



Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	5700	D'feldt
7 22	7 24 09		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 KISSINGER ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 'S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Add Comments on Resignation of Finnish Government*

REFERENCE: S/S *7212349* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____	()
EUROPE/CANADA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			RECOMMENDATIONS	()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>7/28</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING				<i>NAR</i>	
CONGRESSIONAL				<i>rl 7/24</i>	

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>7/26</i>	<i>RFL</i>	<i>NSCS</i>		<i>no action required</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO *250m*

INIT _____

DATE *JUL 28 1972*

ORIG) NSC

TO) PAF _____

WHC _____

SUBF _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Action concluded. All people notified.

Col. J. Merritt

NSC/S

Close out

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has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETACTION
July 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Phil Odeen *PO*

SUBJECT: Finns Propose Date for CSCE

The Finns have proposed November 22 as the date to start CSCE preparatory talks (see Tab A). State wants to go to our allies saying we could agree to this date.

Agreeing at this time to a specific date for CSCE would seriously undermine the concept of parallel MBFR Explorations and CSCE preparations, and the arrangements worked out in Moscow (which the Soviets appear to be edging away from).

We are only in the initial stages of getting an allied consensus on the procedural aspects of MBFR Explorations (place, participants, etc.). More time is needed to bring preparations for MBFR Explorations abreast of CSCE.

We have already agreed to a tentative date for CSCE preparatory talks around the 20th of November. I do not believe we should go beyond this until our efforts to get Warsaw Pact agreement to convening MBFR explorations are more advanced, or we will give up any leverage we might have. We may get some help from the FRG on this. They are growing increasingly concerned that CSCE preparatory talks not begin before the FRG elections in early December, and they are talking privately about early next year for CSCE preparations.


State has prepared a cable which could instruct US NATO to tell the allies that we could accept November 22. They are holding it for clearance by Secretary Rogers who returns to Washington Monday. They also plan to get White House clearance.

SECRET

I believe we should tell State to take a different approach. We should tell the Allies and the Finns that we are not in a position to settle on a firm date for CSCE preparations. We should be frank with out Allies and explain that we do not want to set a date until we are further along in making arrangements for MBFR explorations so the two can go forward in parallel. This will have the added benefit of encouraging the Allies and our own bureaucracy to move more expeditiously in getting MBFR underway.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve instructing State along the above lines. Bill Hyland agrees.

Approve 
Disapprove
See me



CSCE

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 628

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01126 192048Z

65
ACTION EUR-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 T-03
OMB-01 IO-12 OIC-04 ACDA-19 RSR-01 /129 W
----- 105735

P R 191450Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4729
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION NATO

*file MDPK
memo*

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 1126

SUBJECT: FINNISH GOVERNMENT PROPOSES CSCE PREPARATORY
TALKS BE OPENED NOVEMBER 22, 1972
REF: HELSINKI 1066

1. SUMMARY. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS ASKED FOR US VIEWS ON
FINNISH PROPOSAL TO INVITE AMBASSADORS OF PARTICIPATING
COUNTRIES TO CSCE PREPARATORY MEETING BEGINNING
NOVEMBER 22, 1972. FINNS HAVE CONTACTED SOVIETS
AND BRITISH EMBASSIES AND PLAN ALSO TO DISCUSS
SUGGESTED DATE WITH FRENCH.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HELSIN 01126 192048Z

2. FOREIGN OFFICE, (CHIEF OF POLITICAL DIVISION MATTI TUOVINEN) CALLED EMBASSY TO SOLICIT US VIEWS ON FINNISH PROPOSAL TO INVITE AMBASSADORS OF PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES TO CSCE PREPARATORY MEETING IN HELSINKI BEGINNING NOVEMBER 22, 1972. HE SAID FOREIGN OFFICE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED DATE WITH SOVIET AND BRITISH EMBASSIES AND IT WOULD BE IN TOUCH ALSO WITH FRENCH EMBASSY. FINNS WOULD DISCUSS PROPOSED DATE WITH OTHER PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, AS NECESSARY, DEPENDING ON RESPONSE FROM MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES INCLUDING US, BUT SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD NOT BE ACTIVELY PURSUED.

3. ACTION REQUESTED. DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE ON ACCEPTABILITY OF DATE. PETERSON

Handwritten notes:
M...
for HALL

CONFIDENTIAL

C208

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG BR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	5615	
7 22	7 24 12		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 ODEEN _____ 'S _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Coordination & Finnish timing on proposed date for CSCE*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK _____ (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ (_____)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
<i>Bill Hyland</i>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
7/24	ODEEN	HAK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Decision (7/28)	
7/25		CARR DAVIS	5	no Tty stale (xsp)	Sam ODEEN
7/24				Steve notified by Hyland in BFR working 6 ramp by Merritt nothing further	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO *[Signature]* INIT _____

DATE _____

ORIG) _____

TO) _____

WHC _____

SUBF _____

JUL 28 1972

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5660

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Robert Gerald Livingston *rgl*

SUBJECT: Fall of Finnish Government

The State Department has sent you a short memorandum (Tab A) on the resignation of the Finnish government. The memorandum calls attention to the fact that it fell July 19 on the issue of Finland's industrial free trade agreement with the European Community (EC). The Paasio government, which is a minority Social Democratic administration, declared that it could not take sole responsibility for signing the agreement. Signature had been scheduled for July 22 but now will be postponed until a new government is formed -- which is likely to take some time.

Besides the information in State's memorandum, the following points bear on the situation:

-- Regardless of what government now emerges, Kekkonen will remain the key maker of Finland's main foreign policies -- EC affiliation, diplomatic recognition of the two Germanies (which the Finns have recently offered), and the hosting of the European Security Conference (CSCE).

-- The EC agreement carries so much potential for adverse domestic and Soviet reaction that, faced with the July 22 deadline, the minority government recoiled.

-- A key question is how Moscow will react to the agreement. So far the Soviets have exercised no known pressure on Finland's trade negotiations with the Community but in 1970, Finnish politicians recall, they made a last-minute volte-face on NORDEC (Nordic Economic Union). Kekkonen may have been so unsure about Moscow's final attitude that the government preferred to clarify it before proceeding to signature of the EC agreement.

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A

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 20, 1972

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Finnish Government Resigns

In a surprise move, the minority Social Democratic Government of Finland submitted its resignation to President Kekkonen July 19. The Government's action came only three days before Finland was expected to sign an industrial free trade agreement with the European Economic Community. In submitting the resignation, outgoing Prime Minister Rafael Paasio declared that the Social Democratic Party could not take sole responsibility for signing the agreement with the Common Market. Another factor in the Government's resignation has been its opposition to the expanded pension scheme voted by Parliament for which no adequate funding is available. After accepting the resignation, President Kekkonen asked the Paasio Government, which had been in office only five months, to continue in a caretaker status until a new Government is named. Negotiations will start next week for the formation of a cabinet based on a Parliament majority. As a result of the Government's resignation, the planned signing of the agreement with the EEC will be postponed until a new Government is formed.

for Henry Schuler
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7207762

3714

April 28, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for: NSC Secretariat
The White House

Subject: Private Visit to Alaska by Finnish President
Kekkonen

For your information, President Urho Kekkonen of Finland plans to make a private visit to Alaska from June 22 to June 29. His primary purpose is to go fishing. He will be flown to and from Alaska on an aircraft belonging to the Lummus Company of White Plains, New York, a subsidiary of Combustion Engineering. Lummus has close ties to Finland because it has designed two petroleum refining facilities for Neste Oy, the Finnish government-owned petroleum refining company. The visit has not yet been announced in Finland, and we want to keep it confidential until the Finnish Government makes it public.

Secretariat Staff

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	3714	Sonnefeldt
4 25 7	29 10		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT Δ _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER x _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C Δ _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 'S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Info memo on Private visit of Finnish Pres Urho Kekkonen to us in June

REFERENCE: S/S 7207762 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		FOR	MEMO FOR HAK	(_____)
STAFF SECRETARY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR PRES.	(_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	(_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	(_____)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____	(_____)
EUROPE/CANADA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			RECOMMENDATIONS	(_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	(_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	(_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	(_____)
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <u>5/3</u>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
		DC			
<u>5/2</u>	<u>HS</u>	<u>NScls</u>		<u>No further action - was included in briefing item</u>	

DISPOSITION

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SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO [Signature]

INIT _____

DATE _____

ORIG) NSC _____

TO) PAF _____

WHC _____

SUBF _____

MAY 04 1972

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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ZNR UUUUU
O 082004Z FEB 72 ZFF-1
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMB HELSINKI
BT
UNCLAS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE WH20127

FEBRUARY 8, 1972

FOR: RISTON HYVARINEN, FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I HEARD WITH GREAT CONCERN OF YOUR ILLNESS, BUT AM ENCOURAGED BY REPORT THAT YOUR CONDITION IS IMPROVING. YOU HAVE MY SINCERE WISHES FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY.

WARM REGARDS.

BT
0353

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'72 FEB 8 PM 4:05

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NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*Ed Roberts -
Your files pls.
meh*

February 8, 1972

TO: AM. EMBASSY - HELSINKI
FOR: RISTO HYVARINEN, FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

I heard with great concern of your illness, but am encouraged by report that your condition is improving. You have my sincere wishes for a speedy recovery.

Warm regards.

2/8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Coleman Hicks

Please call
to HAK's
attention
bs.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 121

PAGE 01 HELSIN 00147 031243Z

FILE COPY

45
ACTION EUR-20

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 INR-06 NSC-10 CIAE-00 IO-12 RSR-01 RSC-01

1065 W

023215

R 031035Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4225
INFO USUN NEW YORK 126

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HELSINKI 0147

SUBJECT: HYVARINEN ILLNESS

FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY'S CHIEF OF POLITICAL SECTION RISTO HYVARINEN WAS ADMITTED TO MEILAHTI HOSPITAL, HELSINKI, EARLIER THIS WEEK AFTER SUFFERING HEART ATTACK WHILE PLAYING TENNIS. THE ILLNESS HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICIZED. ACCORDING TO HIS DEPUTY, HYVARINEN NOT IN CRITICAL CONDITION, BUT HAS EXPERIENCED SOME DIFFICULTIES OF MOVEMENT. AT THIS JUNCTURE THE MINISTRY HOPES HE WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO WORK AFTER A CONVALESCENCE OF SEVERAL WEEKS.
PETERSON

- ANDERSON _____
- HOLDRIDGE _____
- HORMATS _____
- JESSUP _____
- KENNEDY _____
- LEHMAN _____
- NACHMANOFF _____
- NEGROPONTE _____
- ODEEN _____
- RONDON _____
- SAUNDERS _____
- ~~SONNENFELDT~~ _____
- WALSH _____
- WELANDER _____
- WRIGHT _____

T

MEMORANDUM

34511 2 MW

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

File

INFORMATION

November 9, 1971

NOT 345

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Dr. Kissinger and Risto Hyvarinen, Wednesday, November 3

Hyvarinen began by saying that he could not understand our China policy. The trend in the UN had been an inevitable one but not because of Dr. Kissinger's most recent trip to Peking. US arm twisting had created bad reactions but even without it, the vote would have been the same although perhaps made up of a different set of countries.

Hyvarinen then conveyed regards from Max Jakobsen. Dr. Kissinger said he would like to see him when he is in Washington. Hyvarinen said that Secretary Rogers felt Jakobsen should not come here before the vote on the Secretary General. Dr. Kissinger agreed. Hyvarinen went on to say that Jakobsen's chances were pretty good. The Soviets have no serious candidate of their own but have not yet made up their minds. The French cannot very well use their veto. The Finns have the impression that Peking is not against Jakobsen and might support him. The Arabs were not using their old arguments against Jakobsen any more. Hyvarinen thought that the role of the Secretary General was an important one, especially now that the Chinese were coming into the United Nations. Dr. Kissinger agreed and added that we were supporting Jakobsen and would use our best influence to get him elected.

Hyvarinen then asked whether anything had come up in Peking on Sino-Soviet relations. Dr. Kissinger said he would not comment on his talks in Peking but this particular subject had not been a major one. Hyvarinen said the Soviets see the Chinese as their major enemy and are worried about their coming to the UN but the Chinese would probably be quite moderate. Dr. Kissinger agreed that they probably would not do much in the first year. Hyvarinen commented that the Chinese arrival would diminish Soviet influence in the third world and further split the "anti-imperialist front."

Dr. Kissinger asked whether Hyvarinen thought that some UN delegations had behaved badly after the Chinese vote. Hyvarinen thought some had, for example, the Cubans. (Hyvarinen added that the Cubans supported Jakobsen and this may be an indication of the Chinese attitude.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Dr. Kissinger asked why the Soviets were so eager to have a European Security Conference. Hyvarinen thought the reason was psychological. The Soviets liked congresses and ceremonial occasions. They want the status quo ratified. Perhaps they also want the conference as an end in itself, to mark a triumph of a long-standing policy. To Dr. Kissinger's inquiry as to the more concrete Soviet objective in a conference, Hyvarinen responded he thought the Soviets were looking for a declaration on relations between states.

Dr. Kissinger asked Hyvarinen why he thought the Soviets wanted to meet with President Nixon. Hyvarinen said it must be related to SALT and the European Security Conference.

Dr. Kissinger asked about the Finnish assessment of Brezhnev. Hyvarinen said the Finns had had little to do with him. They had found Kosygin a most intellectual person. Brezhnev appeared to have had heart trouble but Hyvarinen could not really give an assessment. Podgorny always seemed to be on a single track party line. Kosygin told Kekkonen two years ago that he wanted to retire. At present the top leaders seem to have a division of labor for travel. Dr. Kissinger said that Brezhnev seemed to get the more important trips.

In conclusion, Dr. Kissinger noted that there did not seem to be many real issues at the UN. He asked Hyvarinen whether he thought the China vote was a good thing, whether it was better to have had it this year than next. Hyvarinen said it would make the organization more realistic. After agreeing with Hyvarinen that U Thant was not very intellectual, Dr. Kissinger reiterated that we supported Jakobsen. Hyvarinen expressed his appreciation.



Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Original - Dr. Kissinger

CONFIDENTIAL

Friedland ?

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION @
November 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Risto Hyvarinen, Wednesday,
November 3, at 5:30

You will presumably wish to touch on the Kekkonen visit to Moscow, the Jakobson candidacy, the Finnish Government collapse, the Finnish-German initiative, and CES.

* * * * *

Kekkonen's Moscow Visit. His 15th unofficial visit to the USSR since taking office in 1956 was on October 17-18 en route from Iran to Helsinki. Kekkonen met with Podgorny and Gromyko, and discussed Jakobson and CES. The Finns were heartened by the fact that the Russians made no negative comment about Jakobson. The Finns believe that the Soviets would not make up their minds finally until after a full discussion at the politiburo meeting after Brezhnev returns from France. Kekkonen, at least at that time, was fairly sanguine about eventual Soviet support for Jakobson. On CES, Kekkonen had the feeling that the Soviets wanted it badly, but have come to the conclusion that some delay is now likely.

New Finnish Government. On October 30 Kekkonen appointed a non-political Cabinet of experts to replace the Karjalainen Government which resigned the day before after failing to resolve a dispute between labor and agrarian interests over agricultural income policy. The new Cabinet is politically balanced, and half of the 15 Ministers were members of the "experts" Cabinet which sat in 1970 before the Karjalainen government was formed. The change in government eases former Foreign Minister Leskinen out of office with minimal embarrassment (beyond the inconvenience of being on an official visit to Czechoslovakia and Hungary when deprived of office).

CONFIDENTIAL

New elections will be around January 2. Indeed, the reason for the hectic activity last week was because any further delay would have constitutionally postponed the elections by a month -- and then placed them in the middle of the politically-charged collective bargaining period and negotiation regarding the entire economic stabilization program. There is a general supposition that the elections will not appreciably change the political coloration of the Parliament. The elections may serve to clear the air before the stabilization negotiations, and might also clarify Finland's position vis a vis the Common Market, which will be a major campaign issue.

The Common Market. Finnish industry gave its support to the former Government's position of negotiating an industrial free-trade arrangement with the EC. Since the Social Democrats have also climbed on board, the Soviets presumably will have greater difficulty in opposing the Finnish EEC talks. Hyvarinen may have some information on the EC issue, since the potential effects of EC enlargement was the main subject at the one day Nordic Prime Ministers meeting on October 28. (The Danish surcharge problem was also discussed; the Communist press in Finland has been urging the Government to take similar trade blocking measures.)

The Germanies. The GDR rather promptly informed the Finns that they were ready to start negotiations on the Finnish initiative. So far the Finns are sticking to their position that no "definitive" reply has been received from the FRG, and so no date can be set for the talks. The general speculation has been that the Finns took this initiative as a gesture to the Soviets in part designed to head off pressure from Moscow on the Common Market issue.

Visit by President. As I mentioned in an earlier memorandum, Hyvarinen asked me last month "on a personal basis" whether the President could not stop in Helsinki on his way back from Moscow. I said that details as to his itinerary etc. had not yet been worked out. Until more is known about possible stops in Allied countries, I assume the question of a Helsinki stop -- in itself desirable -- should be held in abeyance.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	OG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	3-306	
11 2	11 2 20		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 S _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 TS _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Talkers for HAK mtg with Risto Hyvonen on*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO			
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK	(_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	(_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	(_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	(_____)
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LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	(_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	(_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	(_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	(_____)
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE:	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
11/2	Sam	HAK	X	Talkers (11/3)	
11/4				Noted by HAK	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

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DATE _____

NOV 08 1971

ORIG) NSC

TO) PAF

WHC _____

SUBF _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30 pm Wed 3 Nov

~~THRU HALL~~

34143

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

ACTION

October 29, 1971

Finland

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Hyvarinen

He called from New York today after having been in Finland for ten days. He will be in Washington Tuesday about noon and has an appointment with Hillenbrand. He wants of course again to try to see you and says he can stay through Wednesday night or even Thursday morning, November 4.

At Tab A (Log #33685) is the message he asked me to give you when I saw him two weeks ago. As it turned out, Kekkonen only saw Porgorny.

RECOMMENDATION

That you indicate whether you want to see Hyvarinen.

Yes HK Day _____ Time _____

No _____

Hicks notify _____

Sonnenfeldt notify _____

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT INFORMATION
October 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Message From Hyvarinen

At lunch with the Finnish Ambassador today, Hyvarinen asked me to tell you the following:

-- He is going home for about a week; when he returns week after next he will be able to report on Kekkonen's talks with Brezhnev et al in Moscow next week enroute to Tehran.

-- The Chinese have indicated that Jakobsen would be acceptable to them as the next UN Secretary General;

-- Saying he spoke without instructions, Hyvarinen wondered whether the President could stop in Helsinki on the way back from Moscow for a brief talk, perhaps luncheon, with Kekkonen. I said no detailed plans had yet been made but I certainly would pass the idea on.

HS:hc

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
10	29	10	29	14	24143

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 SUBJECT: *Boonenfeldt*
Renewed request from Riisto Nymanen of Finland for appt with HAK
 S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____
 REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____
 APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK *Request* TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO FOR HAK	()
STAFF SECRETARY			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO FOR PRES.	()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO TO _____	()
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE:	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
10/29		HAK	X	Decision (10/30)	
11/2				HAK Approved Recor	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____
 SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
 JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO *Logon*
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 NOV 04 1971
 ORIG) NSC _____
 TO) PAF
 WHC _____
 SUBF _____



7117654

34352

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

*Finnland*CONFIDENTIAL

November 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Resignation of Finnish Government

The attached memorandum was prepared for the Secretary and is forwarded for the information of the National Security Council.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memorandum on Resignation
of Finnish GovernmentCONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Resignation of the Finnish Government

The Cabinet of Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen resigned on October 29 after a bitter dispute between the two major coalition partners, the Social Democrats and the Center Party, over agricultural price supports. An interim cabinet headed by Helsinki Mayor Teuvo Aura took office October 29. The new cabinet, acting with the President, dissolved parliament and called for new elections on January 2-3, 1972. Prime Minister Aura declared that his government would not change the course of Finland's foreign policy.

The Social Democrats apparently felt they could not allow themselves to appear negligent in protecting the interest of the blue collar worker by accepting the demands of the agriculturally oriented Center Party for increased farm subsidies. This is particularly important at this time because the Social Democrats are engaged in a fight with the Communists for control of the largest industrial trade union, the Metalworkers Union.

The resignation of the Karjalainen government, the appointment of the Aura government, and the call for new elections do not have any implications for U.S. interests in Finland at this time.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	34352	800/50/2500

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT U LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER ROGERS, W LOU NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____

TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Resignation of the Finnish Government*

REFERENCE: S/S *7117654* / *7117536* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY	FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				MEMO FOR HAK _____ (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (_____)
FAR EAST					REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ (_____)
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NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA					MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
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LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)
UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO STATE _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY <i>2</i> _____ (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
LR PLANNING					DUE DATE: <i>11/10</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>11/4</i>	<i>Dowdy</i>	<i>Ad ✓</i> <i>sect</i>	<i>FYE</i>	<i>no action necessary</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO *[Signature]*

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DATE _____

NOV 08 1971

ORIG) NSC

TO) PAF

WHC _____

SUBF _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Finnland

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT INFORMATION

October 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Message From Hyvarinen

At lunch with the Finnish Ambassador today, Hyvarinen asked me to tell you the following:

-- He is going home for about a week; when he returns week after next he will be able to report on Kekkonen's talks with Brezhnev et al in Moscow next week enroute to Tehran.

-- The Chinese have indicated that Jakobsen would be acceptable to them as the next UN Secretary General;

-- Saying he spoke without instructions, Hyvarinen wondered whether the President could stop in Helsinki on the way back from Moscow for a brief talk, perhaps luncheon, with Kekkonen. I said no detailed plans had yet been made but I certainly would pass the idea on.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	53685	100/50/000
10 14	10 14 18		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Sonnenfeldt*
Linnich Amb Conveys Msg to Sonnenfeldt re his return to Moscow, UN Sec General + Ples trips to PRC

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ()
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EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
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INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

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10/14	Sonn	HAK	9x	Info	
11-03				Noted by HAK	

DISPOSITION

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JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO *ADH*

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DATE **NOV 05 1971**

ORIG) NSC

TO) PAF

WHC _____

SUBF _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HAK:

The attached telegram refers to a Fatah terrorist who, by his account, was assigned the task of assassinating King Hussein in London. He decided not to and says that Fatah is now out to kill him.

The State judgment not to consider him eligible was made on general grounds that he is an undesirable alien--i.e. an itinerant terrorist. He is not in danger from any government--either his own in Lebanon or the Finnish where he is now. He does not seem the kind of upstanding individual in danger from a repressive government that usually is the asylum case.

Hal Saunders

State Dept. review completed

HAK

JK

You asked about
this



Department of State
DISPATCHED
RSC

TELEGRAM

JAN 7 9 58 AM '71

Handwritten notes:
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SECRET 207

PAGE 01 STATE 002330

82
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APPROVED BY: NEA-ATHERTON
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NEA/ARN-T.W.SEELYE
S/S-O:BRIMS

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET STATE 002330

25X1

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ABDUL RAHIM HASSANEIN HUSAYNI

REF:

1. DEPT TENDS TO DISCOUNT BULK OF HUSAYNI'S STORY ALTHOUGH APPEARS THAT PORTIONS OF IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN FABRICATED. FOR INSTANCE, HIS CLAIM THAT HE WOULD FACE PRISON SENTENCE IN LEBANON FOR AL-FATAH ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONFORM TO REALITIES OF SITUATION IN LEBANON.

2. ON BASIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE SUBJECT APPEARS TO BE IN NO DANGER IN FINLAND OR LEBANON AND, THEREFORE, HIS ELIGIBILITY FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM STRONGLY IN DOUBT. FURTHERMORE, WE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO PERMIT ENTRY INTO THIS COUNTRY OF HIRED ASSASIN.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 002032

3. DEPT RECOMMENDS THAT HELSINKI POLITELY DISABUSE HUSAYNI OF ANY NOTION THAT HE MAY BE ABLE TO ENTER UNITED STATES AS A DEFECTOR.

4. DEPT SUGGESTS THAT HELSINKI AT ITS DISCRETION, MAY WISH TO INFORM APPROPRIATE FINNISH AUTHORITIES IN CONFIDENCE CONCERNING HUSAYNI, INQUIRY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 11 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S 7104005

March 19, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Finnish Government Resigns over
Communist Intransigence

The eight-month old coalition government headed by Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen has resigned over the opposition of the Communist-front Finnish Peoples Democratic League to an essential government measure. Its members in parliament voted against the price control program supported by the other four coalition parties. The Finnish Communists first joined non-Communist parties in a coalition in 1966 after an 18 year absence from government.

In December 1970 the Finnish Peoples Democratic League almost wrecked the five party coalition over a minor issue, a gasoline price increase, but backed down at the last moment. Until the onset of this latest political crisis, the Soviet Union and the majority of the Finnish Communist leaders evidently agreed that the advantages of political respectability and power outweighed the disadvantage of association with government measures which were not in line with Marxist doctrine. However, participation in government exacerbated the rift between the hard-line Stalinists and the so-called liberals within the Finnish Communist Party. Recently the Communists have, to an increasing extent, played the double game of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


2.

attacking the government for actions which are economically necessary though unpopular with the left, while remaining in the Cabinet. Although the price control program was adopted by the Parliament, Prime Minister Karjalainen called the Communists' hand by resigning.

Our Embassy reports it is generally believed that President Kekkonen will ask Prime Minister Karjalainen to attempt to form a four party coalition without Communist participation. Such a government would have a slim majority in Parliament.

The resignation of the Finnish Government has no worrisome implications for US-Finnish relations, which remained healthy during the period of Communist participation in the governing coalition. Whatever the character of the government that is next formed, President Kekkonen will remain in absolute control of Finnish foreign policy. If the Communists do not make their peace with him and are excluded, Kekkonen may face certain difficulties with Moscow but should be able to master them as he has in the past.

Should the next government not include the Communists, then our relations with Finland will be on even more secure ground. Also, the "European showcase" of Communist participation in the exercise of government power will be shattered.


William P. Rogers

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 27 1971

NSC # 26911

↓
Secretariat
Sonnenfeldt

MR _____

The attached has been referred to you for action *on March 19TH*.

At this time:

- Do you recommend "No Action Required"? _____
 - Is this item "OBE"? YES _____
 - Do you intend to reply? _____
- Can you specify an approximate date? _____

Please return this sheet to the NSC Secretariat as soon as possible.

Thank you.

MICROFILM	DATA
DO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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ORIG)	NSC
TO)	PAF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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MAY 03 1971

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
3	19	3	19	19	06911

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Registration of Personal Goods due to Communist Intimidation*

REFERENCE: S/S *7104005* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY	FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK _____ (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ (_____)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE/CANADA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>3/23</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: <i>(Including Special Instructions)</i>
NSC PLANNING				
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INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>3/20</i>	<i>HB</i>	<i>WIT</i>			
<i>4/28</i>	<i>Hyland</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>		<i>OBE</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

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
SUBF _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIALINFORMATION

November 18, 1970



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt ~~SS~~

SUBJECT: Meeting with Finnish Roving Ambassador Ralph Enckell
on European Security

As you may know, Ambassador Enckell has been touring Europe for about a year talking soundings on a European Security Conference. Ambassador Munkki hosted a small luncheon for him on Wednesday, and since I could not make it I saw Enckell briefly before lunch. Bill Hyland attended the luncheon. He explained the latest Finnish idea, which is to hold a "gathering" of Ambassadors in Helsinki to talk about a conference. The theory is that this might serve as a catalyst, and only in this way could one really know if there was any prospect for a more formal meeting that might have a chance of success. He reports growing enthusiasm, except for British coolness, and, he implied, American skepticism. He stressed that his effort was not at Soviet behest, and in fact, reported that the Finns during Kekkonen's visit to Moscow had to warn the Soviets off of embracing the Finnish idea lest Soviets endorsement turn it into a Warsaw Pact proposal. He said the Finns would soon send formal notes with their proposal to all interested states.

I asked whether he had talked all this over with State. (He said he had.) I said that I assumed that once a Finnish note was officially received by our Government it would be given full consideration and a response would then be forthcoming. I asked whether the note would be sent out before the December NATO meeting; he said it would but stressed that it would be made clear that no NATO response would be expected soon. (Comment: As a practical matter I assume that a new Finnish initiative will in fact stimulate further pressures in NATO to be forthcoming on a conference, even though the Rome Communique last spring already went some way toward endorsing preparations through multilateral contacts.)

In response to Enckell's question as to whether our attitude had changed I said we still did not oppose a conference as a matter of principle but were concerned that it deals with real issues and showed promise of success.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Enckell asked about the relationship of the Berlin talks to preparations for a conference. I said there had been some assertions that we had raised a new "pre-condition" by making a Berlin settlement a pre-requisite to a conference. Enckell said it was wrong to think of pre-conditions. All aspects of East-West relations in Europe were interrelated. I said this made sense; it was hard to envisage real security in Europe if Berlin remained a source of constant tension or crises. At the same time, the Berlin talks pointed up the fact that the real issues that might currently be ripe for negotiation and settlement were hardly suited for Conference-style diplomacy. Enckell reiterated that the Finnish idea was to test the water by having Ambassadors informally talk about whether and how to hold a conference at some unspecified time. He concluded that the chief Finnish criterion in all their activities in this field was "acceptability"; i. e. there could be a conference only if all concerned wanted it. (Comment: Enckell, whom I have known for some years, is in fact a quite hard-headed man who has few illusions about the Soviets or the prospects for fundamental changes in East-West relations. He is doing a job for his government and is trying to do it in such a way as to minimize the propagandistic effects of Soviet-Warsaw Pact tactics. Even so, as noted above, his activities will to some extent contribute to pressures for a conference which already exist in the West. Cf. for example, the long way the Italians just went with Gromyko in endorsing a conference and the FRG's similar posture. Even Pompidou, while in Moscow, found it expedient to agree to communique language favoring a conference.)

In reporting this talk, I note that Senator Percy has sent you a special message reporting on this same subject in his talks with Finnish Prime Minister Karjalainen. Percy promised to bring the Finnish proposal to the President's attention when he returned. (Cable at Tab A).

Enckell

CONFIDENTIAL

A

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HELSIN 01425 171627Z

CONFIDENTIAL HELSINKI 1425

CODEL PERCY

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. KISSINGER

PASS SENATOR'S OFFICE FOR HNPLJ

4LSF

ICD JZWEHEN ()

SUBJ: SENATOR PERCY DISCUSSION OF CES WITH PRIME
MINISTER KARJALAINEN

1. DURING CALL BY SENATOR PERCY ON PRIME MINISTER KARJALAINEN TO DISCUSS VIETNAM (SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE), PRIMIN RAISED QUESTION OF CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY (CES). NOTING THAT NUMBER OF CRITICS ABROAD HAD SUGGESTED THAT FINLAND WAS ACTING AS STALKING HORSE FOR MOSCOW IN PROPOSING CES IN HELSINKI, KARJALAINEN SAID FINLAND WAS ACTING STRICTLY IN HIS OWN INTERESTS IN MAKING PROPOSAL.
2. SENATOR PERCY POINTED OUT THAT USG WELL AWARE FINLAND'S SINCERITY--AND THAT OF PRIMIN HIMSELF--IN PROPOSING CES FURTHER, SENATOR SAID U.S. DID NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSE CES BUT THAT US AND ITS NATO ALLIES BELIEVED THAT PROGRESS SHOULD BE MADE ON CONCRETE ISSUES, SUCH AS BERLIN, SALT, ETC -- BEFORE POWERS COULD TAKE STEPS TOWARDS REALIZATION OF CES. IF BY THEIR ACTIONS, SOVIETS SHOWED THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CES IN BUSINESSLIKE MANNER, THEN GROUNDWORK WOULD BE LAID FOR EVENTUAL CONFERENCE. SENATOR NOTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ATTENDED NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, AT WHICH POSITIVE RESOLUTION ON CES HAD BEEN VOTED. BUT US AND NATO ALLIES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ATTEND CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE SIMPLY PROPAGANDA FORUM FOR MOSCOW.
3. PRIMIN THEN REFERRED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR "GATHERING" OF AMBASSADORS IN HELSINKI WHICH COULD SERVE AS A KIND OF PRELIMINARY CES. HE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD SERVE AS EXCELLENT TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS; WEST COULD AT THIS GATHERING DETERMINE WHETHER SOVIETS REALLY READY FOR SERIOUS CES NEGOTIATIONS. BY ATTENDANCE AT SUCH A MEETING, HE CONCLUDED, WESTERN NATIONS WOULD LOSE NOTHING
4. SENATOR PERCY DECLINED TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HELSIN 01425 171627Z

PROPOSAL, BUT PROMISED TO TRANSMIT PRIMIN'S VIEWS TO
PRESIDENT NIXON WHEN SENATOR RETURNS TO U.S.

GP3.

PETERSON

NOTE BY OC/T: HELSINKI 1425 () AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

→ Gary
Finland

SECRET

May 6, 1970

JK

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Bill Codus from this office informed me upon his return from the trip with the Apollo 12 Astronauts that, in spite of the fact that President Kekkonen had returned from Moscow especially to be on hand to greet the Astronauts, our Ambassador to Finland was off on vacation. This was the cause of a certain amount of embarrassment.

Emil
Emil Mosbacher, Jr.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

October 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Your Meeting Friday, October 24 at 1 p.m. with Risto Hyvarinen

You have agreed to meet with Risto Hyvarinen, Director of Political Affairs in the Finnish Foreign Ministry. He was a student of yours while a Fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs during 1963-64. A confidant of President Kekkonen, he was hand-picked for his extremely influential position in the Foreign Ministry, and has traveled with Kekkonen on most of his foreign trips. Hyvarinen is an honest and careful talker, and has been most cooperative with our Embassy.

Hyvarinen may raise the following points:

- the desire of President Kekkonen to visit the US, preferably in the second quarter of 1970; (NOTE: Ambassador Val Peterson recently strongly urged such a visit; State, however, has not included it on the visit list for the first half of 1970.)
- continued interest in the "Finnish initiative" for a European Security Conference;
- Helsinki as a site for the SALT talks (the Finns have indicated they would be delighted to be hosts, but they do not want to be in competition with Geneva and Vienna).

There are no bilateral Finnish-US problems. You may wish to ask his assessment of the Kekkonen visit in September to Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (heavily criticized by the Finnish left) and the visit to Helsinki last week of Soviet President Podgorny. You should give him a succinct rundown on Vietnam because this will get back to the Soviets.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

you - schedule

ACTION
October 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *[initials]*

SUBJECT: Appointment with You for Risto Hyvarinen, Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Finland (Tab A)

A former student of yours, Risto Hyvarinen, now Director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of Finland, has asked to call on you when he is here from October 23 to 25. Alternatively, the Finnish Ambassador, Mr. Munkki, suggests a private luncheon for the two of you at his residence.

State and Ambassador Val Peterson in Helsinki strongly support the request. Apart from any personal interest you may have, I think it would be useful for you to see a prominent Finn for a change. If you like, I can take him off your hands after 15 minutes or so.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to see Risto Hyvarinen for 15 minutes.

Approve

October 23

October 24

October 25

*Tentatively - 5pm
(for 15 minutes)*

Disapprove

*Sally - enter
then return
to*

*Clid w/andrea Long, S/S
0930 10/17 RBS*

A

3394



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 10, 1969

15487

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment with you for Risto Hyvarinen,
Director of Political Affairs, Foreign
Ministry of Finland.

The Finnish Ambassador, Olavi Munkki, has spoken to us concerning the wish of Risto Hyvarinen, Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Finland, to pay a call on you. Mr. Hyvarinen was a student of yours while a Fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs during the school year 1963-64. The request for an appointment is supported by Ambassador Val Peterson.

Mr. Hyvarinen is a man of most substantial influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. He is a confidant of President Kekkonen, and has traveled with the President on most of his recent trips abroad. He has been cooperative and forthcoming with our Embassy in Helsinki on all occasions.

Hyvarinen will be in Washington from October 23 to 25. Ambassador Munkki has suggested that, while you might prefer that Mr. Hyvarinen call on you at your office, as an alternative he would be happy to offer a private lunch for the two of you at his Residence.

Recommendation

I very much hope that it will be possible for you to see Mr. Hyvarinen. His meeting with you would be decidedly in the interest of our relations with Finland.

for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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fully [unclear]

Department of State

Staff to make recommendation

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 663

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01042 081420Z

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ACTION EUR 08

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RSR 01, /055 W

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R 081250Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1914

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 1042

1. DURING COURSE OF LUNCHEON CONVERSATION TODAY, RISTO HYVARINEN, DIRECTOR OF FONMIN OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, ASKED ME TO ARRANGE MEETING FOR HIM WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER, WHO WAS HYVARINEN'S PROFESSOR WHEN HE WAS FELLOW AT HARVARD CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1963-64. HYVARINEN SAID HE WOULD BE IN NEW YORK OCT. 20-25 TO ATTEND UNGA, AND WOULD COME TO WASHINGTON IF HE COULD MEET FOR APPROXIMATELY HALF-HOUR WITH DR. KISSINGER AT LATTER'S CONVENIENCE.

2. ASIDE FROM HOLDING DOWN KEY FONMINISTRY POST OF POLITICAL OFFICE DIRECTOR, HYVARINEN IS CONFIDANT OF PRESIDENT KEKKONEN AND HAS TRAVELED WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN ON MOST OF KEKKONEN'S RECENT TRIPS ABROAD. HE HAS IMPORTANCE IN GOF CONSIDERABLY BEYOND HIS OFFICIAL POST, AND KEKKONEN IS KNOWN TO HAVE HIGH RESPECT FOR HIS JUDGEMENT.

3. IN VIEW OF HYVARINEN'S POSITION HERE, AND FACT HE ALWAYS COOPERATIVE IN DEALING WITH ME AND MY STAFF ON BILATERAL MATTERS, I RECOMMEND THAT DR. KISSINGER AGREE TO RECEIVE HYVARINEN FOR BRIEF MEETING, PROVIDED DR. KISSINGER'S SCHEDULE PERMITS. I CONSIDER MEETING WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO U.S.-FINNISH RELATIONS, AND WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED BY HYVARINEN.

GP-3
PETERSON

CONFIDENTIAL

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

May 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS (w/TA)*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Ambassador Peterson

The President will receive Val Peterson, Ambassador-designate to Finland, Friday at 3:45. Attached (Tab A) is a brief background and talking point memorandum for the President, drawing on State's memo (Tab B). Peterson is an old acquaintance of the President's.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign and forward the attached memorandum (Tab A).

A

B

929



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7698

May 15, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meeting with Ambassador-designate to Finland, Val Peterson, Friday, May 16, 1969 at 3:45 P.M.

Ambassador Peterson has been in Washington since May 5 for a series of briefings attendant on his assignment as Ambassador to Finland. He plans to return to Hastings, Nebraska on May 17 to conclude his personal affairs, and then to embark for Europe on June 24. The Ambassador, who served as President Eisenhower's Administrative Assistant, as Federal Civil Defense Administrator and as Ambassador to Denmark, is well acquainted with the President. A biographic sketch of Ambassador Peterson is enclosed.

Relations between Finland and the United States remain exceptionally good. There are no important bilateral issues pending between the two countries. The Finnish political situation is stable. President Kekkonen last year began his third six year term. The present five party coalition government, which took office in March 1968, is given a good chance of remaining in office until early 1970.

Finnish foreign policy is one of neutrality, non-involvement in conflicts between the Great Powers and friendly relations with all nations and particularly the Soviet Union. Finland, the only European democracy to share an extensive frontier with the USSR, considers it necessary to its survival to avoid any move that the USSR could legitimately regard as a threat to its security. While Finland has a 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet

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Group 3

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not automatically declassified.


CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Union, it is of limited applicability as the Finns are obliged to fight only in the event of an attack, by West Germany or its allies, on Finland or on the USSR through Finland.

Finland, despite its policy of non-involvement in major East-West issues, plays an active and responsible role on the international scene. During 1969, Finland is occupying a seat on the UN Security Council.

The most significant of Finland's recent foreign policy undertakings has been its initiative on a European Security Conference. On the sixth of this month, the Finnish Government approached the Governments of the United States and Canada as well as all European Governments, including both Germanies, with an offer of Helsinki as the site of a European Security Conference. The Finnish proposal calls for preliminary consultations among the Governments concerned and, if it is ascertained that conditions are ripe, a subsequent preparatory meeting prior to the conference itself. The Finns have told us privately that they expect that the entire process would require a considerable period of time. In response to the Finnish proposal, we have made reference to the April NATO decision that the Allies, while remaining in close consultation, would explore with the USSR and other Eastern European countries the concrete issues which best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and early resolution. We have told the Finnish Government that we believe it best to approach first the specific problems, such as Berlin access, that do not require a general conference. We believe that the NATO Allies should, of course, examine this proposal (as is being done in NATO), but continue with the real task of sorting out the issues. In this way we hope to maintain progress and to avoid the generation of euphoric hopes that, by promising quick and enduring solutions to complex problems, would prove detrimental to the achievement of real solutions.


John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch

CONFIDENTIAL

VAL PETERSON

Position for which considered: Ambassador to Finland

Present Position: Chairman of the Board, Investors Growth Industries, Incorporated

Office Address: First Security Building, Suite 201,
601 West Second Street, Hastings, Nebraska

Born: July 18, 1903, Oakland, Nebraska

Legal Residence: Nebraska

Marital Status: Married June 6, 1929

Family: Wife: Elizabeth Pleak

Home Address: 1124 Oswego Street, Hastings, Nebraska

Education: A.B. 1927, Wayne State Teachers College;
A.M. 1931, University of Nebraska; 1931-33,
graduate student, University of Nebraska

Language Ability: Not stated

Experience:

Non-Government
1925-30

Teacher public school, athletic coach,
Nebraska

1930-33

Instructor, University of Nebraska

1933-39

Superintendent, Elgin, Nebraska

1936-46

Publisher Elgin Review, Elgin, Nebraska

1939-40

Campaign Manager for U.S. Senator from
Nebraska, August 1939-November 1940

Government
1941-42

Secretary to Governor Dwight Griswold
of Nebraska

Military
1942-46

United States Army, served to Lieutenant
Colonel; China, Burma, India Theatre

Government
1947-53
1947-53

Governor of Nebraska

Member, Missouri Basin Inter-Agency
Committee

1948-53

Chairman, Missouri River States Commission

1953

Administrative Assistant to the President

1953-55

Member, Commission Intergovernmental
Relations

1953-57

Federal Civil Defense Administrator

1957-60

Ambassador to Denmark

Non-Government
1961-64

Vice-President, Administrator, J. M. McDonald Foundation, Inc.

1961-66

Vice Chairman of the Board, J. M. McDonald Company, Hastings, Nebraska

1961-69

Director and Chairman of the Board, Life Investors of Nebraska, Incorporated and Director, Investors Life Insurance Company of Nebraska

January/1969
to present

Chairman of the Board, Investors Growth Industries, Incorporated

Memberships and Clubs:

Director: Public Relations, Mary Lanning Memorial Hospital (Hastings, Nebraska); Member, National Council of Boy Scouts; Regent, University of Nebraska (1963-65); President, University of Nebraska (1965); Executive Council, Nebraska Association of 4-H Development; President, Wayne State Foundation; Nebraska Delegate at Large, Republican National Convention (1960 and 1964); Member: American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Air Force Association. Clubs: Lochland Country Club, Omaha Club, International Club; National Press Club.

Decorations and Awards:

Bronze Star; Grand Cross of Dannebrog (Denmark). Honorary degrees: LL.D.: Midland College, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Stetson University, Texas Lutheran, Muhlenberg College.

March 1969

<u>To</u> Kissinger	<u>From</u> K. Cole	<u>Classif.</u> U	<u>Doc. Date</u> 5/14	<u>Recd.</u> 5/14	<u>Log No.</u> 850
<u>Subject</u> Memo re President's Meeting with AMKXX Ambassador Delegate Val Peterson, Friday, May 16, 3:45 P.M.		<u>Comments</u> <i>also #929</i>			
<u>Index Terms</u>					

<u>Action</u> Sonnenfeldt	<u>Info.</u>	<u>Action Required</u> Briefing Memo for HAK	<u>DUE 5/15</u>	<u>Micro.</u>	<u>Date Out</u>
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<u>To.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Date</u>
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LOG CARD

MEMORANDUM

Date: May 14, 1969

Time: 9:30 A.M.

850

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR: H. Kissinger

cc (for information):

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

-Designate

SUBJECT (see attached): President's Meeting with Ambassador Delegate Val Peterson, Friday, May 16, 3:45 P.M.

ACTION AND REMARKS:

For Necessary Action

Draft Reply

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Remarks

For Your Comments

For Your Information

For Your Recommendations

Other:

DUE: Date: May 15, 1969

Time: 2:00 P.M.

Please attach this copy to material submitted.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.


K. H. COLE, JR.
For the President

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 9, 1969

FOR THE PRESS

NO. 111

VAL PETERSON SWORN IN AS UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO FINLAND

Val Peterson, of Nebraska, was sworn in today as United States Ambassador to the Republic of Finland. Mr. Peterson had been Chairman of the Board, Investors Growth Industries, Incorporated, since January 1969. In Helsinki, he will succeed Ambassador Tyler Thompson, who had served there since August 1964.

Born on July 18, 1903, at Oakland, Nebraska, Mr. Peterson was educated at Wayne State Teachers College (A.B., 1927); the University of Nebraska (A.M., 1931); and was a graduate student at the University in 1931-33. During 1942-46, he served in the U.S. Army in the China, Burma, India Theatre, rising to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

Mr. Peterson taught in the Nebraska public school system from 1925 to 1930, and at the University of Nebraska from 1930 to 1933. In 1933, he became Superintendent of the Elgin, Nebraska school system. He was appointed Assistant to Governor Dwight Griswold in 1941. In 1947, he was elected Governor of Nebraska, serving until 1953. At the same time, he was Chairman of the Missouri River States Commission and a member of the Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee. In 1953, Mr. Peterson was named Administrative Assistant to President Eisenhower, and a member of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in addition to his position as Federal Civil Defense Administrator. During 1957-60, he served as United States Ambassador to Denmark.

Upon leaving Government service, Mr. Peterson became Vice-President, Administrator, J.M. McDonald Foundation, Inc. (1961-64); Vice Chairman of the Board, J.M. McDonald Company, Hastings, Nebraska (1961-66); and during 1961-69, Director and Chairman of the Board, Life Investors of Nebraska, Incorporated, and Director, Investors Life Insurance Company of Nebraska.

Ambassador Peterson is married to the former Elizabeth Howells Pleak.

* * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3-28

NOTE - Mr. Malinen advised
unable to see before March 29
but would call after April 20
to set something up

Joan McCarthy

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. JOAN McCARTHY

FROM: Don Lesh *DL*

SUBJECT: Finnish Counselor's Request to See Dr. Kissinger

Remember our great and good friend, Mr. Malinen, of the Finnish Embassy, who wants to pay his respects to Dr. Kissinger? The Scandinavian Desk at State telephoned today to tell me that Malinen still wants to come in, and has asked them to check once more on the possibilities.

Any chance of finding him ten minutes in the near future? I gather you had called once before when Malinen was setting off on holiday, and he couldn't make it.

Strike a blow for US-Finnish friendship. Maybe he'll invite you to a sauna.

*Recently named
Amb to UAR*

*HAK saw
at 3⁵⁰ pm, 6/16, 69*

RECEIVED
KISSINGER'S OFFICE

1969 MAY 2 PM 4 53

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

April 15, 1969

To : The Acting Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*
Subject: USSR/Finland: President Kekkonen and Premier Kosygin
to Meet May 19 for Unofficial Talks

The just-released announcement that Finnish President Kekkonen and Soviet Premier Kosygin will meet in Leningrad on May 19 raises questions about the connection between that meeting and Finland's recent energetic diplomatic activity in favor of a European security conference. Although the recent Finnish offer to host a European security conference will doubtless be among the subjects discussed, we do not believe that the meeting was arranged **specifically for this purpose**. Kekkonen and Kosygin, each for his own reasons, have found frequent personal contact with each other to be valuable, they have a number of bilateral matters to discuss, and the timing of the forthcoming meeting may well have been dictated largely by Kosygin's busy schedule. Kekkonen and Kosygin last met in Finland in October, and Kekkonen had planned to make a visit to the Soviet Union this past winter.

Kekkonen Sensitive on European Security Conference Issue. Kekkonen has shown himself to be sensitive to the possibility that the Finnish initiative would be interpreted as having been undertaken in collusion with the USSR or at Soviet behest. Consequently, the Finns have gone out of their way to emphasize that their proposal is entirely a unilateral one.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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- 2 -

There are also indications that Soviet leaders are willing to respect these Finnish sensitivities. A planned visit to Finland by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko scheduled for later this month (but never made public) has reportedly been postponed until later in the year or next year. Moscow has apparently agreed with Kekkonen's reported contention that such a visit at this time would be harmful to Finnish efforts on behalf of a security conference. On the basis of these developments we believe that the security conference itself and the Finnish initiative in this regard are not the major reason for the upcoming meeting. Subsequently, in any public reports that he may make about the conversations, Kekkonen can be expected to play down the security conference as a subject of discussion.

No Major Outstanding Bilateral Issues. The two leaders have not conferred since the heads of the Scandinavian governments met in Stockholm and Helsinki in early 1969 to plan for a Nordic Economic Community (NORDEC), and they are likely to exchange views on this subject. The Soviets have yet to formulate their own position on this issue; therefore, Kosygin may seek Kekkonen's views before Moscow takes a stand. For his part, Kekkonen will want to reassert the Finns' contention that Finland's membership in NORDEC would not impair the development of Finnish-Soviet trade, nor would it result in Finland's being drawn politically closer to NATO members Norway and Denmark, as some Soviet leaders are reported to believe.

- 3 -

Trade issues, focussing on the USSR's desire to increase its share of the Finnish market, have from time to time provided minor irritants in the otherwise trouble-free Finnish-Soviet relationship. Within this context, the two leaders will no doubt discuss such matters as the USSR's longstanding offer to build Finland's first nuclear power plant; its desire to provide electric locomotives for Finland's railways; and its proposal to build a natural gas pipeline into Finland. There are strong indications that the Finns have decided to give the power plant and locomotive contracts to the USSR. The pipeline proposal is still in a state of conjecture. We think it is highly unlikely that any substantive decisions will be taken on these issues at the Leningrad meeting.

Meetings Valuable to Both Sides. In addition to the reportedly close and cordial relationship that has developed between them, both Kekkonen and Kosygin have longstanding and valid reasons for wanting to maintain contact through frequent, informal consultations. Kekkonen ascribes a high priority to the Finnish need to keep its fences with the USSR mended, and believes personal contacts are important in this context. Of perhaps subsidiary, but nonetheless real, value to Kekkonen is the domestic political advantage that he derives from periodically refurbishing his image as the Finnish leader best able to represent Finland's interests in dealing with Soviet leaders.

For Kosygin, the value of a close relationship with Kekkonen is probably twofold: Kekkonen is a Western leader whom the Soviets

- 4 -

feel they know well enough to trust and to seek out for a frank insight into events in the Western world. On the other hand, Kosygin also probably finds Kekkonen useful as a channel for informally transmitting to non-Communist countries Moscow's views on delicate international issues. In addition, informal meetings, such as the one planned for Leningrad, serve to enhance the image of Finnish-Soviet relations as an ideal example of the desirable relationship between a great Communist power and its small non-Communist neighbor. Moscow probably considers the promotion of that image even more desirable now in view of its own European security initiatives.

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6/17

SECRETARIAT

I don't have a file on this one.... guess
I returned it earlier as an OBE or something,
huh??

dene

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *H*

April

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment by Finnish Embassy Counselor

Mr. Pekka Malinen -- a former student of yours at Harvard in 1956 and now Counselor of the Finnish Embassy here in Washington -- has twice called the Finnish Desk at State to express his wish to make a courtesy call on you at your convenience. He would merely like to renew your acquaintance and pay his respects.

Mr. Malinen understands that you have been extremely busy. However, if you feel that you would like to see him, he will be available at any time between now and March 29, when he will leave on vacation. He also would be available after his return on April 20. A biographical sketch of Mr. Malinen has been prepared by the State Department to refresh your memory (Tab A).

Since Mr. Malinen's interest in seeing you is strictly personal, the decision is entirely up to you. However, while you certainly cannot begin to receive all your former students, you may wish to make a slight concession for Mr. Malinen in view of his status in the Finnish Embassy.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you see Mr. Malinen very briefly after April 20.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

See him before March 29 briefly

2:30 3/26

HAK saw 6/16/69 Jm

H

ACTION
March 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment by Finnish Embassy Counselor

Mr. Pekka Malinen -- a former student of yours at Harvard in 1956 and now Counselor of the Finnish Embassy here in Washington -- has twice called the Finnish Desk at State to express his wish to make a courtesy call on you at your convenience. He would merely like to renew your acquaintance and pay his respects.

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Since Mr. Malinen's interest in seeing you is strictly personal, the decision is entirely up to you. However, while you certainly cannot begin to receive all your former students, you may wish to make a slight concession for Mr. Malinen in view of his status in the Finnish Embassy.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you see Mr. Malinen very briefly after April 20.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DR Lesh:mm

A

CONFIDENTIAL

FINLAND

NAME: Pekka Kullervo MALINEN (Pronounced MA'-lee-nen)

PRESENT POSITION: Counselor, Finnish Embassy, Washington

BORN: June 11, 1921, in Viipuri, Finland (now Vyborg, USSR)

FAMILY: Married Hilikka Helena Tiaien, two daughters (born 1946 and 1951) and one son (born 1962)

EDUCATION: M.A., (political science) 1948; Graduate School, Harvard University, 1956

LANGUAGES: English (good)

- CAREER: 1939-44 - Military service, decorated
- 1945 - Economic Research Institute
- 1948-49 - Secretary, Chamber of Commerce, Employers Organization
- 1949-50 - Principal, Adult Education Institute
- 1951-52 - Editor, Kaleva magazine
- 1952-60 - Secretary, Liberal Party
- 1957 - Minister of Defense (for six months)
- 1960 - Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki
- 1960-61 - Finnish Consul, Gdynia, Poland
- 1961-65 - Finnish Commercial Counselor, Beirut, Lebanon (also Charge d'Affaires for Cyprus)
- 1965-67 - Chief of Bureau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki (promoted to rank of Counselor, 1966)
- 1967 - Counselor of Finnish Embassy, Washington (July 1)

March 1969

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
 PER PAC REVIEW 9/5/2008
 By JLS NARA, Date 4/2/2012

CONFIDENTIAL

Pekka Malinen is a large, pleasant man, naturally somewhat reserved. His apparent stolidity and strong sense of propriety are probably useful, however, in his present position as deputy to a dominant Ambassador noted for his mercurial temper. Malinen is an intelligent man, competent, and agreeable to do business with.

From the time he joined the Foreign Minister in 1960 until his assignment to Washington in 1967, Mr. Malinen dealt largely with economic and commercial matters. His earlier experience, however, included eight years (1952-60) as Secretary of the Liberal Party. It was during that period that he held his most imposing appointments, those of Minister of Defense and Associate Minister of Finance in the Suskelainen Cabinet which held office from May to November 1957. Malinen appears to regard his appointment to such high office at 35 years of age as an amusing accident, reflecting less on his ability than on the transitory nature of Finnish Cabinets in the mid 1950's.

Malinen's Liberal Party service suggests a conservative political outlook, but he is restrained in discussing Finnish domestic politics. He appears to enjoy living in the United States, and is generally pro-American.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 7, 1969

3026
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment by Finnish
Embassy Counselor

Pekka Malinen, the Counselor of the Finnish Embassy in Washington, wishes to make a courtesy call on you. Mr. Malinen says that he has no substantive matters to raise but that, as a former student of yours at Harvard (1956), he would like merely to renew the acquaintance and pay his respects.

This is the second time that Mr. Malinen has asked about such a call. In late January the Finnish country officer, after discussing the matter with a member of your staff, suggested to Mr. Malinen that it might be advisable to postpone his request until you had had time to assemble your staff and organize your office. Mr. Malinen said that he thoroughly understood the difficulty of scheduling such a call and has waited until now to renew his request.

Mr. Malinen has said that, if you are able to receive him, he would be available any time between now and March 29, when he leaves on vacation. He would also be available on any day after his return to Washington on April 20.

A biographic sketch of Mr. Malinen is enclosed.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 187

PAGE 01 HELSIN 00313 131610Z

45
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

017184

P R 131520Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7174
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION GNEVA

74 FEB 13 PM 2:55

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 0313

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, FI, UR, ME, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KEKKONEN'S VIEWS ON CSCE, MIDDLE
EAST AND ENERGY CRISIS.

REFERENCES: HELSINKI 0241, STATE 025365, 026197, 027048.

1. DURING FORTY-MINUTE VISIT WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN TODAY, HE GAVE ME FOLLOWING VIEWS ON SUBJECTS I RAISED IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM DEPARTMENT IN REFTELS.

2. US-FINNISH RELATIONS: KEKKONEN SAID HE APPRECIATED VERY MUCH MY REFERENCE TO THE USG'S CONTINUED UNDERSTANDING OF FINNISH NEUTRALITY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO HIM.

3. CSCE: KEKKONEN SAID IT WAS USEFUL TO RECEIVE THE US POSITION ON CSCE AT THIS TIME. AS HOST FOR PHASE III HE WAS FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA CLOSELY. HE SAID FINLAND HAD ADOPTED A ROLE AS MODERATOR BUT WOULD ALSO MAKE INITIATIVES ON ITS OWN. HE HOPES THAT BY JUNE PHASE II WILL REACH A POINT THAT DEFINITE PLANS CAN BE MADE TO MOVE ON TO PHASE III. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BASKET III WAS DIFFICULT AT THIS TIME.

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4. MIDDLE EAST: KEKKONEN SAID HE HAD THE GREATEST RESPECT FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER, PARTICULARLY THE RESULTS HE HAD ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE KNEW FROM HIS SOVIET FRIENDS THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS KEEPING THE SOVIETS INFORMED AND THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO WERE TAKING HELPFUL STEPS BEHIND THE SCENES, BUT NOT IN THE OPEN.

5. ENERGY: KEKKONEN SAID FINLAND WAS IN A BETTER POSITION THAN OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES IN VIEW OF ITS BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. (FINLAND RECEIVES ROUGHLY SEVENTY PERCENT OF ITS CRUDE FROM THE SOVIET UNION PLUS NATURAL GAS.) THE CURRENT PRICE IS HIGH BUT HE THINKS IT WILL COME DOWN, ALTHOUGH IT WILL NEVER RETURN TO THE PRICE LEVEL PRIOR TO LAST FALL. THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO PROVED SUCCESSFUL AND THEREFORE THE USE OF OIL AS A POLITICAL WEAPON WILL MOST LIKELY CONTINUE.

6. COMMENT: PRESIDENT KEKKONEN AT SEVENTY-TWO APPEARED IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL CONDITION. HE WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED IN EXPRESSING HIS VIEWS. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT USUALLY DISCOURAGES VISITS BY LOCAL AMBASSADORS UNLESS A STATE VISIT IS IMMINENT, HIS CORDIALITY THIS AFTERNOON REFLECTS HIS APPARENT INTEREST IN KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US ON SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
KREHBIEL

2215 MR 01 037 AT

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CONFIDENTIAL 036

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01902 080835Z

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11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 /027 W
----- 025421

R 080756Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6506
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

973 JUL 9 AM 8:19
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 1902

EXDIS

SECTO 52

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: B-26 AIRPLANES IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

1. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JULY 7 FOLLOWING BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY (SEPTEL), STOESSEL TOOK UP WITH HIM QUESTION OF B-26 AIRPLANES IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA.

2. STOESSEL RECALLED NUMEROUS CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND REPRESENTATIONS IN LISBON ON THIS SUBJECT, WHICH WAS ONE WITH A POTENTIAL FOR ATTRACTING CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST AND WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED BY PERSONS WHO DID NOT WISH TO SEE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND US. WE STRONGLY HOPED THAT B-26S COULD BE RETURNED TO PORTUGAL.

3. PATRICIO WAS WELL BRIEFED ON THIS QUESTION AND WENT OVER MANNER IN WHICH PLANES HAD FIRST BEEN ACQUIRED NUMBER OF YEARS AGO IN GOOD FAITH BY PORTUGUESE THROUGH US PRIVATE FIRM. HE INDICATED TWO PLANES WERE NOT SERVICEABLE AND OTHER TWO WERE MARGINAL. HE DOUBTED, IN FACT, IF THEY COULD BE FLOWN BACK TO EUROPE. IN ANY CASE, PATRICIO STATED SOMEWHAT EMOTIONALLY, OUR MOST RECENT APPROACHES ABOUT PLANES HAD COINCIDED WITH MISSILE

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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SECRET 769

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01897 072046Z

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60
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 ADP-00 FILE-01 /027 W
***** 023939

R 071843Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6501
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T HELSINKI 1897

EXDIS

SECTO 47

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH TURKISH
FOREIGN MINISTER BAYULKEN, JULY 7.

BEGIN SUMMARY: BAYULKEN SUGGESTED NOVEMBER WOULD BE
BEST TIME FOR POSSIBLE VISIT TO TURKEY BY PRESIDENT
NIXON. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT DURABILITY OF US
MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE, AND SECRETARY REASSURED
HIM THAT ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN
PRESENT US FORCE LEVELS IN ABSENCE OF AN MBFR AGREE-
MENT. END SUMMARY.

1. PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. BAYULKEN SAID THAT BEST DATE
FOR POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT TO TURKEY WOULD
BE DURING NOVEMBER, FOLLOWING TURKISH ELECTIONS AND
PRIOR TO DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL.

2. US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. BAYULKEN SAID
THAT COMBINATION OF US PROPOSAL FOR NEW ATLANTIC
CHARTER, FORTHCOMING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND CSCE
PROCESS CAUSED MANY IN TURKEY TO QUESTION
DURABILITY OF US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

73 JUL 8 AM 10:12
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 HELSIN 01897 072046Z

TURKISH GOVERNMENT OF COURSE, REGARDED STRONG US MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE AS ESSENTIAL TO TURKISH SECURITY.

3. SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT OUR SUGGESTION ON DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT WE INTEND TO CHANGE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF ALLIANCE. MAJOR US INITIATIVES, IT SEEMS, OFTEN AROUSE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS IN THE MINDS OF OUR FRIENDS. WITH RESPECT TO DECLARATION -- AS IN OTHER SUCH CASES -- OUR INTENTIONS ARE EXACTLY AS WE HAVE STATED THEM. WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO SET OUT CLEARLY COMMON US-EUROPEAN INTERESTS TO PROVIDE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE CAN ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS BEFORE US. THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS INITIATIVE WHICH SHOULD WORRY TURKEY. SECRETARY ADDED THAT US IS DETERMINED TO RESIST CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES, WHICH MIGHT BECOME ACUTE IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER, TO FORCE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF US FORCES IN EUROPE. THERE IS THUS NO CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION'S BASIC COMMITMENT TO ALLIANCE.

4. BAYULKEN ASKED WHETHER SOMETHING COULD NOT BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL THAT WOULD HELP ADMINISTRATION WITH ITS CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM AND ALSO REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY AND OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES. HE SUGGESTED ALLIED COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN NATO FORCES AT SPECIFIED LEVEL FOR, SAY, FIVE YEARS. HE LATER REFERRED TO THIS AS SOMETHING THAT COULD BE USEFUL IMMEDIATELY AFTER INITIAL MBFR REDUCTIONS, APPARENTLY UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT SOVIETS WILL BE WILLING TO STRIKE A QUICK DEAL FOR SMALL CUTS ON BOTH SIDES. BAYULKEN EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND A UNILATERAL US COMMITMENT BUT AN ALLIANCE-WIDE UNDERTAKING.

5. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT, EVEN SO, IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO JOIN IN UNDERTAKING OF THIS KIND SINCE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH COULD NOT COMMIT THE CONGRESS, IN ADVANCE, TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS

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NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT IT. HOWEVER, IN NOTING
BAYULKEN'S SUGGESTION HE SAID TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD
KEEP IN TOUCH.
ROGERS

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ROUTINE
ESA013HLA025
DE RUESHLQ #1892 1881750
R 071650Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6496

INFO USINT ALGIERS 0024
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0106
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0123
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0009
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0043
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0022
USUN NEWYORK 0197
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT

UNCLAS HELSINKI 1892

SECTD 42
DEPT PLEASE PASS ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE MINISTERIAL: FINAL COMMUNIQUE TEXT

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE ADOPTED FOR CSCE FIRST
STAGE MINISTERIAL JULY 7. QUOTE:
COMMUNIQUE

ON THE FIRST STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

1. THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE TOOK PLACE IN HELSINKI FROM 3 TO 7 JULY 1973. IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED EARLIER, THIS STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE
WAS HELD AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.

2. THE FOLLOWING STATES ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE: AUSTRIA,
BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK,
FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, GREECE, HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,
LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY,

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY,LL

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POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND
TURKEY, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED KINGDOM,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, YUGOSLAVIA.

3. AT THE INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE DR. URHO KEKKONEN,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND MADE A SPEECH OF WELCOME.
DR. KURT WALDHEIM, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE.

4. THE MINISTERS ADOPTED THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HELSINKI
CONSULTATIONS WHICH COMPRISE THE AGENDA AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
WORKING BODIES OF THE CONFERENCE TOGETHER WITH THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND THE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF
THE CONFERENCE. THE TEXT OF THESE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS IS
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

5. THE MINISTERS STATED THE VIEWS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS ON
ESSENTIAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE,
AND ON THE FURTHER WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SEVERAL STATES SUBMITTED PROPOSALS ON
VARIOUS QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE AGENDA. OTHERS ANNOUNCED THE
INTENTION TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE.

7. THE MINISTERS EXAMINED THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CONFERENCE WOULD
ACQUAINT ITSELF WITH POINTS OF VIEW EXPRESSED BY NON-PARTICIPATING
STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF VARIOUS AGENDA ITEMS. THIS MATTER WAS IN
PARTICULAR CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE REQUEST OF MALTA AND
SPAIN IN FAVOUR OF ALGERIA AND TUNISIA. THIS MATTER WAS ALSO
CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO OTHER NON-PARTICIPATING STATES
BORDERING THE MEDITERRANEAN. NO CONSENSUS WAS REACHED FOR
THE TIME BEING.

8. THE MINISTERS DECIDED THAT THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE
WILL MEET IN GENEVA ON 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE
STUDY OF THE QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA AND IN ORDER TO PREPARE DRAFTS
OF DECLARATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, RESOLUTIONS OR ANY OTHER FINAL
DOCUMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED DURING THE FIRST
STAGE AS WELL AS THOSE TO BE SUBMITTED.

9. THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ASSEMBLE FOR ITS FIRST MEETING IN
GENEVA ON 29 AUGUST 1973 IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE SECOND STAGE.

10. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS
TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE FURTHER WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

11. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE EXPRESSED THEIR PROFOUND

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GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND FOR ITS HOSPITALITY AND
FOR THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION MADE BY FINLAND TO THE PREPARATION
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE AND TO THE
CONDUCT OF THE FIRST STAGE.

UNQUOTE. ROGERS
BT

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PAGE 03

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DTG:071650Z JUL 73

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'73 JUL 5 AM 8:30

CONFIDENTIAL 641

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01809 041504Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 FILE-01 ADP-00 NSCE-00 /027 W
----- 125374

O R 041430Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6427
INFO AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 1809

SECTO 6

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S POSSIBLE VISIT TO PRAGUE; US-CZECH
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT

REF: PRAGUE 1495

1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RUZEK SOUGHT OUT STOESEL
JULY 3 DURING CSCE TO DISCUSS SECRETARY'S POSSIBLE VISIT
TO PRAGUE. HE EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE SECRETARY COULD
COME AND MENTIONED OUTLINE OF SCHEDULE FOR VISIT
CONSISTENT WITH REFTEL. IN SEPARATE TALK WITH SECRETARY,
CHNOUPEK ALSO STATED HOPE SECRETARY COULD STOP IN PRAGUE.

2. RUZEK SAID CONSULAR TREATY WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNING
AS OF JULY 7. IF SECRETARY COULD NOT COME FOR SIGNING
THEN RUZEK PROBABLY WOULD BE SENT TO WASHINGTON
FOR SIGNING. HOWEVER, CZECHS WOULD MUCH PREFER HAVING
SECRETARY VISIT PRAGUE.

3. IN ADDITION SIGNING CONSULAR TREATY, RUZEK SAID
HE HOPED SECRETARY ALSO WOULD BE WILLING TO INITIATE
DISCUSSIONS ON CLAIMS. HE DESCRIBED THIS AS LONG-STANDING
PROBLEM WHICH IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET BEHIND US AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

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PAGE 02 HELSIN 01809 041504Z

4. WE HAVE TOLD CZECHS THAT, WHILE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO VISIT PRAGUE, HIS PLANS ARE STILL UNCERTAIN AND ARE DEPENDENT TO SOME EXTENT ON SCHEDULE OF CSCE. WE HOPE TO INFORM CZECHS ONE WAY OR OTHER BY END OF WEEK. IF SECRETARY IS ABLE TO COME, STOESEL SAID HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO TALKS WITH CZECH OFFICIALS AND TO SIGNING CONSULAR CONVENTION. WHILE HE WOULD BE PREPARED INDICATE OUR DESIRE REACH MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF CLAIMS PROBLEM, SECRETARY WOULD NOT PLAN TO ENTER INTO ANY DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THIS MATTER.

5. AS OF INTEREST TO DEPARTMENT AND PRAGUE, RUZEK OUTLINED CZECH VIEWS ON POSSIBLE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT. BASED ON US CLAIMS OF APPROXIMATELY \$72 MILLION, CZECHS WOULD EXPECT TO PAY APPROXIMATELY 40 PER CENT, OR ABOUT \$28 MILLION. SUBTRACTING CZECH CLAIMS OF \$16 MILLION FOR STEEL MILL PLUS \$1 MILLION FOR "OTHER ITEMS", THIS WOULD LEAVE \$11 MILLION FOR CZECHS TO PAY. WHILE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR, RUZEK SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT CZECHS WOULD WORK OUT THIS AMOUNT THROUGH PURCHASES OF INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY IN US WHICH WOULD BE OVER AND ABOVE PURCHASES NORMALLY PLANNED.

6. RUZEK MENTIONED INCREASE IN VALUE OF GOLD AND SAID CZECHS WOULD NOT PLACE VALUE ON THIS EQUAL TO CURRENT MARKET RATES BUT WOULD REGARD GOLD AS HAVING DOUBLED IN VALUE FOR PURPOSES OF SETTLEMENT. RUZEK ADDED THAT "OF COURSE" SOME FORM OF COMMITMENT FOR MFN FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PROBABLY ALONG LINES OF US-HUNGARIAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, WOULD BE ESSENTIAL PART OF SETTLEMENT.

7. RUZEK FELT THAT MUCH OF GROUND WORK FOR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HE HOPED THAT SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PRAGUE COULD RESULT IN AGREEMENT TO SET UP MIXED US-CZECH COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE NEW SETTLEMENT AND THAT THIS COMMISSION SHOULD WORK AGAINST DEADLINE OF, SAY, THREE MONTHS. ROGERS

JUN 2 1953 8:30

TELEGRAM

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 771

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01598 130505Z

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13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 121445Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6302
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T HELSINKI 1598

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE: DATE FOR MBFR

COPENHAGEN FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY, MCQUIRE, AND VEST

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: HELSINKI 1589

1. IN RESPONSE TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR ELLIOTT'S INQUIRY CONCERNING MY CALL ON MENDELEVITCH YESTERDAY (REFTEL), DCM LIMITED REPLY TO SOLE POINT THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN RESOLVING THE ONLY OUTSTANDING QUESTION AT VIENNA MBFR PREPARATORY TALKS, I.E. THE OPENING DATE, AND BROUGHT OUR INTEREST TO MENDELEVITCH'S ATTENTION SINCE HE WAS RETURNING TO MOSCOW TODAY.

2. ELLIOTT THOUGHT THIS WAS GOOD MOVE AND HOPED IT WOULD BRING THE DESIRED RESULTS. HE ADDED THAT HE KNEW THAT THE CANADIAN RESERVATION ON DATE FOR CSCE MINISTERIAL WAS NOT WASTED ON MENDELEVITCH AND HOPED THIS TOO WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SOVIETS COMING UP WITH MBFR DATE.
KREHBIEL

073685
73 JUN 13 PM 12:04
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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'73 JUN 11 PM 7:59
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

SECRET 506

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01589 111553Z

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ACTION SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

058152

O 111530Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6296
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T HELSINKI 1589

EXDIS

TOSEC TEHRAN ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE: DATE FOR MBFR

COPENHAGEN HOLD FOR MCGUIRE
TEHRAN FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY
VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A. STATE 112110; B. 112060

1. IN COMPLIANCE WITH REQUEST IN REFTEL B, I CALLED ON MENDELEVITCH THIS AFTERNOON AND SET FORTH POINTS AS INDICATED. MENDELEVITCH EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR MY BRINGING THESE POINTS TO HIS ATTENTION AND SAID HE WOULD PASS THEM TO MOSCOW. HE ADDED THAT SINCE THE SUBJECT MATTER WAS PRIMARILY ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA, HE WOULD ACCEPT THE POINTS ON AN INFORMATION BASIS AND WITHOUT COMMENT.

2. MENDELEVITCH SAID THAT HE HAD ENJOYED WORKING WITH GEORGE VEST AND THOUGHT THAT THE COOPERATION THAT EXISTED BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN DELEGATIONS, EVEN

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

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P R 091031Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6083
INFO USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T HELSINKI 1220

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM: POLICY ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS

REF: A) STATE 83486 B) STATE 85682

1. AFTER PREPARING GROUND IN SERIES OF WEEKEND
BILATERALS, VEST INFORMED NATO CAUCUS MORNING OF
MAY 8 OF EXCHANGE WITH MENDELEVICH AND PROPOSED
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OUTLINED IN REF (A). CAUCUS
DISCUSSIONS PRODUCED: A) AGREEMENT THAT THIS PROBLEM
SHOULD BE HANDLED IN HELSINKI, NOT RPT NOT IN NATO;
B) CLEAR INDICATION THAT NO RPT NO ALLIED DELEGATION
WOULD WISH TO DELAY CONVENING OF CONFERENCE BECAUSE OF
DIFFERENCES WITH SOVIETS OVER MILITARY MOVEMENTS
ISSUE; C) STRONG MAJORITY PREFERENCE NEVERTHELESS TO
HOLD TO CURRENT NATO POSITION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE,
BASED ON EXPECTATION OF MANY NATO DELS THAT THERE
IS SOME GIVE IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

2. SITUATION AT MAY 8 NATO CAUCUS WAS MUDDIED
BY FACT THAT SOME OTHER ALLIES HAD REPORTS FROM
SKOWRONSKI (POLAND), A SENIOR SOVIET STAFF MEMBER,
AND AMBASSADOR BOCK (GDR), WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN
WARSAW PACT SPOKESMAN ON THIS SUBJECT, THAT AFTER
HARD FIGHT SOVIETS WOULD GIVE IN AND ACCEPT "MAJOR
MILITARY MOVEMENTS." PORTUGAL REPORTED THAT FRENCH

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(WHO WERE NOT REPRESENTED AT CAUCUS) HAD REPORT TO THE SAME EFFECT. THUS, LED BY UK, FRG, ITALY AND NORWAY, MAJORITY OF ALLIES HELD FIRMLY TO VIEW THAT, AT NEXT MINI-GROUP DISCUSSION, LATER THIS WEEK, THEY SHOULD STICK TO CURRENT NATO POSITION, WHICH HAD THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF OTHERS LIKE YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA -- THIS DESPITE FACT THAT VEST-MENDELEVICH CONVERSATIONS WERE CLEAR AND THAT MENDELEVICH RE-ITERATED TO VEST AFTERNOON MAY 8 THAT HE HAS NO RPT NO LEE-WAY EVEN TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE TROOP MOVEMENTS.

3. AFTER NEXT MINI-GROUP DISCUSSION WE WILL PRESS AGAIN FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMULA CONSONANT WITH REF (A) AND WILL WORK WITH MENDELEVICH IN THAT PROCESS. WHITE

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 031528Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6051

S E C R E T HELSINKI 1157

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM: POLICY ON MILITARY "MOVEMENTS"

REF: STATE 083486

1. VEST SAW MENDELEVICH ON MAY 3 AND DREW FULLY ON PARAGRAPH 3 OF REFTTEL TO PRESENT CASE FOR "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS."

2. MENDELEVICH WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ARGUMENT IN PARAGRAPH 3F ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST WHICH HE SAID WAS A NEW PROPOSAL FOR HIM. HE WAS REASSURED AT THE DEGREE OF NATIONAL CONTROL AND THE EXTENT OF MUTUAL EXAMPLE WHICH WAS EMBODIED IN SUCH AN IDEA. HOWEVER, IN SPITE OF VEST'S STRESS ON THE COOPERATION WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY FLOW FROM THE EXCHANGE OF

SUCH LISTS, MENDELEVICH WAS WORRIED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET LIST WOULD VERY LIKELY BE MUCH SHORTER THAN THAT OF THE US AND THUS THAT THE USSR WOULD BE PRESSURED BY THE SITUATION.

3. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD HAD FOR A TIME, HOPES FOR SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, DURING THE EASTER BREAK, THE MOSCOW AUTHORITIES HAD EXAMINED THE SUBJECT IN DETAIL, INCLUDING HIS PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT, AND HE NOW HAD INSTRUCTIONS THAT--AS HE HAD VOLUNTEERED IN US-SOVIET

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BILATERAL CONVERSATION OF MAY 2--REQUIRED HIM "CATEGORICALLY" TO REJECT THE ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR TROOP MOVEMENTS.

4. FURTHER HE HAD NO RPT NO AUTHORITY TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS FOR ANY COMPROMISE FOMULAE. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION, HE SAID, THAT THE FRG DID NOT ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THIS PROPOSAL AND HE HOPED THE US WOULD NOT EITHER. HE THOUGHT THAT A SIMPLE REFERENCE TO "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS" WOULD IN PRACTICE MAKE LITTLE REAL DIFFERENCEDURING THE CONFERENCE. IN PHASE II WE WOULD PROBABLY END UP WITH MUCH THE SAME RESULTS.

5. THUS MENDELEVICH, AS ANTICIPATED, WAS RESOLUTELY NEGATIVE AND HAD NO ALTERNATIVE FORMULA. MIN-GROUP WILL DISCUSS CBM PARAGRAPH NEXT WEEK.

6. RECOMMEND THAT VEST BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM ALLIED DELS HERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF SOVIET ATTITUDE. WE EXPECT NUMBER OF ALLIES WILL INSIST THAT DECISION ON "MOVEMENTS" BE DECIDED IN NATO RATHER THAN BY MPT NEGOTIATORS. IF SO, WE SHOULD ARRANGE TOPURSUUE QUESTION IN NATO, OBTAIN APPROVAL THERE FOR ALLIED REPS HERE TO LOOK FOR COMPROMISE OR TO DROP MOVEMENTS, IN LINE WITH THINKING OF PARA 2, REFTTEL.

7. DEPT REQUEST REPEAT TO USNATO.
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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

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R 131113Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5754

S E C R E T HELSINKI 0649

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR
SUBJECT: CSCE: SOVIET DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT

73 MAR 13 AM 8:20

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. MENDELEVICH IN CONVERSATIONS WITH VEST HAS SEVERAL TIMES MADE PASSING REFERENCES TO SOVIET DRAFT OF "FINAL CSCE DOCUMENT," LEAVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE ASSUMED VEST HAD SEEN TEXT OF DRAFT. US DELOFF THEREFORE ASKED SOVIET DELOFF SHIKALOV, WHO ACCORDING TO MENDELEVICH IS WORKING ON DRAFT, AT WHAT STAGE SOVIETS ENVISAGE SUCH A DOCUMENT BEING ADOPTED. SHIKALOV RESPONDED THAT THEY ENVISAGE IT AS A DOCUMENT FOR ADOPTION AT THE THIRD, SUMMIT PHASE, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE CONSIDERED BY THE MINISTERS IN PRELIMINARY WAY. SHIKALOV THEN ASKED WHAT THE US DELOFF THOUGHT OF THE SOVIET DRAFT. USDELOFF REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN IT.

2. INTERESTINGLY, ROMANIAN DELOFF AT BEGINNING OF THIS ROUND ALSO ASKED US DEL WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE SOVIET DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT AND EXPRESSED DISBELIEF WHEN TOLD THAT WE HAD NOT SEEN IT.

3. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON SOVIET DRAFT.
PETERSON

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O 021423Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4585

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 0842

EXDIS

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

REF STATE 96887

1. WITHOUT EXCEPTION, ALL FINNS I HAVE TALKED TO SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE POSITIVE RESULTS ATTAINED AND THEY APPLAUD HIS INITIATIVE. TRUE, SOME WITH LONG MEMORIES OF THEIR BIG NEIGHBOR EXPRESSED THE HOPE WE BE ALERT AND STRONG.

2. MEDIA COVERAGE, PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION, OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO USSR HAS BEEN HEAVY, REASONABLY ACCURATE, GROWING IN INTEREST, INTENSITY AND VOLUME AND OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE UP TO AND INCLUDING THIS DATE. MY OBSERVATION IS THAT THIS ACCURATELY REFLECTS VAST MAJORITY PUBLIC OPINION.

3. OVERALL, VISIT BEST PLUS IN MANY YEARS FOR US IN FINLAND. FOREIGN NEWS EDITOR MAIN FINNISH PAPER (HELSINGIN SANOMAT) TOLD PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER "THIS TRIP REALLY HELPED US HERE. ALL OF US FINNS FEEL GOOD ABOUT THIS."

4. THERE HAS BEEN SOME ANCILLARY STATIC FROM HOPELESS DISSIDENTS, VIETNAM DIEHARDS, MAOISTS, YOUTH BELLIGERENTS AND THE LIKE.

5. SOME FINNS WHO HAD FEARED THAT CHINESE-US

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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RAPPROCHMENT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE USSR AND
THUS FINLAND ARE RELIEVED BY THE SUCCESS OF THE MOSCOW
MEETINGS.

6. THE FINNS LIKE BOLD AND DARING ACTIONS BASED ON
CAREFUL PREPARATION AND PRESIDENT NIXON'S STOCK
WAS NEVER HIGHER IN FINLAND.
PETERSON

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ACTION SS-25

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R 021330Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4224

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 0143

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

SUBJECT: TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT OF VALUE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: STATE 14505

1. THE EMBASSY (INCLUDING THE DATT) CANNOT ASCERTAIN WHY IT WAS AN ACTION ADDRESSEE OF THE MESSAGE UNDER REFERENCE. THERE IS NO MAP IN FINLAND. THE ONLY ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA IS TRAINING, I.E. THE ATTENDANCE OF ONE TO THREE FINNISH OFFICERS PER YEAR AT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES OR SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOLS OF THE THREE US SERVICES. THE FINNS PAY INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL WHILE THE US SERVICE CONCERNED PAYS PERTINENT STUDY-CONNECTED EXPENSES. THUS, EVEN IF THE PROVISION OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR FY 1972 WERE TO APPLY TO FINLAND, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE TRAINING ASSISTANCE NOW RENDERED, OR LIKELY TO BE RENDERED IN THE FUTURE WOULD, AS SERVICE-FUNDED, BE COVERED BY THE EXCLUSION IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF THE REFTEL.

2. PLEASE CLARIFY.
PETERSONO

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PRS-01 SS-20 NIC-01 MC-02 O-03 OPR-02 SY-03 OC-08
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O R 171745Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3511
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 271

SUBJ: FALL OF FINNISH GOVERNMENT IMMINENT

REF: HELSINKI 265

1. FINNISH GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AHTI KARJALAINEN IS EXPECTED TO RESIGN WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS, FOLLOWING COMMUNIST REJECTION OF THE GOVT.'S PRICE CONTROL BILL. IN A DRAMATIC SESSION OF PARLIAMENT, THE COMMUNIST-FRONT SKDL PARTY THIS EVENING VOTED UNANIMOUSLY AGAINST THE MEASURE, WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY THE OTHER FOUR CABINET PARTIES. SINCE PRIME MINISTER KARJALAINEN HAD DECLARED BEFORE THE VOTING THAT THE GOVT. WOULD FALL IF THE COMMUNISTS VOTED AGAINST THE BILL, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL CALL ON PRESIDENT KEKKONEN TO SUBMIT HIS GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION PERHAPS AS EARLY AS THIS EVENING. IN ALL PROBABILITY THE PRESIDENT WILL ACCEPT THE RESIGNATION BUT ASK KARJALAINEN TO REMAIN ON UNTIL A NEW GOVT. IS FORMED.

2. AS LATE AS LAST NIGHT, IT HAD BEEN WIDELY BELIEVED IN LOCAL POLITICAL CIRCLES THAT PRESIDENT KEKKONEN, WHO RETURNED FROM

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SWEDEN LAST NIGHT, WOULD TAKE MATTERS INTO HAND AND BRING ABOUT A COMPROMISE IN THE IMPASSE. INDEED, KEKKONEN DID MEET THIS MORNING WITH MAJOR POLITICAL FIGURES, INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST LEADERS. HOWEVER, NEITHER SIDE WAS WILLING TO BACK DOWN FROM ITS PREVIOUSLY DECLARED POSITION AND THUS THE CRISIS PROGRESSED TO ITS INEVITABLE DENOUEMENT THIS EVENING.

3. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT KEKKONEN WILL ASK PRIMIN KARJALAINEN TO FORM A NEW GOVT., BASED ON THE PRESENT CABINET COALITION MINUS THE COMMUNISTS. SUCH A COALITION, MADE UP OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRAT, CENTER, SWEDISH AND LIBERAL PARTIES, WOULD HAVE 206 PARLIAMENTARY SEATS, SINCE TWO SWEDISH PARTY MEMBERS RECENTLY DECLARED THAT THEY WERE JOINING THE OPPOSITION.

4. HOWEVER, THE KEY TO FORMING SUCH A CENTER-LEFT GOVT. WILL BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, WHO HOLD 52 SEATS IN THE 200 MEMBER PARLIAMENT. THERE IS GREAT RELUCTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO CONTINUE IN GOVT. IF THE COMMUNISTS ARE IN THE OPPOSITION, SINCE THE COMMUNISTS COULD ATTACK THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF ECONOMICALLY NECESSARY BUT POLITICALLY DIFFICULT MEASURES. THE SOCDEM PARTY COUNCIL IS SCHEDULED TO MEET ON MARCH 24 AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT A DECISION ON FUTURE GOVT. PARTICIPATION WILL BE MADE AT THAT TIME.

5. IF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS DO NOT ACCEPT A ROLE IN A NEW POLITICAL GOVT., THE MOST LIKELY ALTERNATIVE IS THE FORMATION OF A CARETAKER "GOVERNMENT OF EXPERTS" WHICH WOULD GOVERN UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS ARE HELD, POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS NEXT FALL. HOWEVER, SINCE NONE OF THE PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, WANT SUCH EARLY ELECTIONS, THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE PARTY TO PARTICIPATE IN A POLITICAL GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD HOLD POWER AT LEAST THROUGH THE CURRENT YEAR.

6. A SEPARATE EMBASSY MESSAGE WILL COMMENT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT. GP-3.
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P R 101604Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3497
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T HELSINKI 247

LIMDIS

SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN

POLICY

1. I CALLED ON FINNISH PRESIDENT URHO KEKKONEN THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS HIS RECENT TWO-DAY TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION WHERE HE HAD SPENT TWO FULL DAYS HUNTING WITH PODGORNYY, BREZHNEV, AND KOSYGIN. I FOUND THE PRESIDENT RELAXED, AND THE DISCUSSION, WHICH LASTED 45 MINUTES WAS CONDUCTED IN A FRANK AND AMICABLE MANNER. THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT WAS A FINNISH INTERPRETER.

2. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I WAS CALLING ON HIM TO DISCUSS IN A GENERAL WAY HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. I SAID I DID NOT INTEND TO QUESTION HIM ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, BUT RATHER WISHED TO KNOW HIS GENERAL IMPRESSION OF CURRENT SOVIET THINKING ON MAJOR EAST-WEST ISSUES. I POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD HAD A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO GAUGE THE ATTITUDE OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP, HAVING BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT FOR TWO DAYS WITH THE SOVIET "TROIKA."

3. OBSERVING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN THE WORLD TODAY HINGE ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS, I ASKED THE PRESIDENT, IN VIEW OF HIS 15 YEARS AS CHIEF OF STATE AND HIS INTIMATE

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ASSOCIATION DURING THESE YEARS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS, WHETHER HE MIGHT HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR EASING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS. I SAID I RECOGNIZED THAT HE WOULD NOT PRESUME TO GIVE UNSOLICITED ADVICE TO THE LEADERS OF EITHER SUPER POWER, BUT IN VIEW OF THE TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE OF THIS QUESTION TO ALL NATIONS IN THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE NEUTRALS, HIS THOUGHTS WOULD BE HELPFUL. I CONCLUDED WITH THE SPECIFIC QUESTION: "WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF YOU WERE IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S POSITION TODAY, FACED WITH THE GREAT BURDEN OF SEEKING PEACE?"

4. KEKKONEN REPLIED THAT HIS ADVICE WOULD BE FOR PRESIDENT NIXON TO SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT PODGORNÝ OFFERING TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION TO MEET WITH HIM AND THE OTHER SOVIET LEADERS TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. SUCH A PROPOSED MEETING, HE ADDED, SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER THE FORTHCOMING SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS. CONTINUING, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS SEEM TO "LACK TRUST" IN PRESIDENT NIXON; WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY, HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW. HOWEVER, HE SAID IN HIS VIEW, TRUST IS SOMETHING THAT COULD BE BUILT. KEKKONEN SAID THAT FROM HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THEM, HE HAD FOUND THE SOVIET LEADERS TO BE "REASONABLE MEN" AND A "SUMMIT MEETING" WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WORSEN THE SITUATION AND MIGHT VERY WELL IMPROVE IT. THE SOVIET LEADERS, HE ADDED, KNOW THE NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND OF ACCOMODATION WITH THE U.S. AND SEEM FULLY AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES IF THERE IS NOT.

5. KOSYGIN AND BREZHNEV

I ASKED THE PRESIDENT HIS EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT SOVIET LEADERS. HE REPLIED THAT HE FOUND KOSYGIN IN A MUCH BETTER "PHYSICAL CONDITION AND MENTAL OUTLOOK" THAN ON HIS LAST VISIT TO THE USSR (JULY 2970). KOSYGIN SEEMED MUCH MORE VIVACIOUS THAN ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION. KEKKONEN SAID HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT KOSYGIN HAS A MUCH BETTER COMPREHENSION OF WORLD PROBLEMS THAN THE OTHER SOVIET LEADERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE ADMITTED THAT BREZHNEV CLEARLY SEEMS TO BE THE DOMINANT FIGURE AMONG THE SOVIET LEADERS. HE SAID IT "IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHY," BUT HE HAS SOME CHARACTERISTICS THAT DIFFERENTIATES HIM FROM THE OTHER TWO MEN. PERHAPS, THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED, HIS STRENGTH IS DUE TO HIS SECURE PARTY BASE. KEKKONEN DID NOT DISCUSS PODGORNÝ.

6. VIETNAM

WHAT, I ASKED, ARE THE PROBLEMS MOST PREOCCUPYING THE SOVIET

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LEADERS WITH REGARD TO THE WEST. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THE TWO CHIEF CONCERNS ARE VIETNAM AND THE MID-EAST. ON VIETNAM, THE SOVIETS CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD "EXPANDED" THE WAR IN INDOCHINA BY THE ENTRANCE INTO LAOS; I CHALLENGED THIS, NOTING THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD YEARS AGO "EXPANDED" THE WAR TO LAOS.

7. THE MID-EAST

CONCERNING THE MID-EAST, KEKKONEN SAID THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THAT THE US AND USSR HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN SEEING THAT PROBLEM SETTLED PEACEFULLY. HE SAID THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN LEST SOME "HOTHEAD" EGYPTIAN ARMY OFFICERS GET OUT SADAT'S CONTROL AND IGNITE A CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

8. SOVIET JEWS

THE PRESIDENT SAID THE SOVIET LEADERS SHOWED CONSIDERABLE SENSIVITIVITY OVER THE CRITICISM DIRECTED AT THEM FOR SOVIET HANDLING OF JEWS IN THE USSR. HE SAID THEY WENT TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO EXPLAIN THAT THERE NO POGROMS" AGAINST JEWS IN THE USSR, AND SEEMED QUITE UPSET AT AGITIATION IN THE U.S. AGAINST THEIR HANDLING OF THE JEWS.

9. EXPANSIONISM

I POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF OUR CONCERNS WAS THE GROWING SOVIET EXPANSIONISM THROUGHTOUT THE WORLD, AS REFLECTED BY MOVING OF THE SOVIET FLEET INTO EVERY MAJOR SEA. KEKKONEN LAUGHED AT THIS COMMENT, AND SAID THAT HE HAD ONCE DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH GENERAL DEGAULLE, WHEN THE LATTER WAS STILL PRESIDENT. DEGAULLE, HE CONTINUED, HAD OBSERVED THAT HE WAS NOT WORRIED BY SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN; "GREAT POWERS," DEGAULLE COMMENTED, "BY THEIR NATURE MUST MAKE THEIR PRESENCE FELT EVERYWHERE." KEKKONEN ADDED THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS HAD BECOME MORE EXPANSIONIST IN RECENT YEARS, THE U.S. TOO HAD DEMONSTRATED "EXPANSIONIST" TENEDENCIES IN THE PAST.

10. SALT AND CES

REGARDING SALT, THE PRESIDENT DID NOT ENLARGE ON HIS PUBLIC COMMENTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE TALKS. CONCERNING CES, I COMPLIMENTED HIM ON THE LOW-KEY, CAUTIOUS APPROACH RECENTLY ASSUMED BY THE GOF ON THIS QUESTION, AND HE OBERVED THAT THERE WAS ONLY LIMITED DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IN MOSCOW.

11. FINNISH SOVIET TRADE

THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION OF FINNISH SOVIET TRADE IN MOSCOW, BUT THE BASIC PROBLEM,

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KEKKONEN OBSERVED, IS THE LIMITED NUMBER OF ITEMS THE FINNS CAN FIND TO BUY FROM THE USSR. THIS PROBLEM, HE ADDED, HAS BEEN FACING THE GOF FOR SOME 20 YEARS, AND WILL PROBABLY BE AROUND LONG AFTER HE (KEKKONEN) LEAVES OFFICE. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR BILATERAL PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE DISCUSSED DURING HIS VISIT.

12. BERLIN

ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT DID NOT REFER TO THE GERMAN QUESTION, HE SAID THE SOVIETS DID MENTION BERLIN, NOTING THAT THEY HAD MADE A PROPOSAL TO THE WESTERN POWERS ON BERLIN BUT HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A RESPONSE.

13. COMMENT: INSASMUCH AS KEKKOEN IS PROBABLY ON CLOSER TERMS WITH THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAN ANY OTHER NON-CMMUNIST LEADER, HIS COMMENTS ARE WORTHY OF CAREFUL STUDY. HE IS A SHREWD JUDGE OF CHARACTER, AND PROBABLY KNOWS THE SOVET LEADERS AS WELL AS ANY OUTSIDER CAN. PARTICULAR INTERESTING IS HIS SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT NIXON VISIT THE SOVIET UNION; IT OBVIOUSLY REFLECTS THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL BELIEF IN "SUMMIT" DIPLOMACY AS A WAY OF DEALING WITH SOVIET LEADERS.

GP 4

PETERSON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 224

PAGE 01 HELSIN 00012 071531Z

51
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

075266

O 071450Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3345

SECRET HELSINKI 012

EXDIS:

DEPT PASS INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, COPENHAGEN, LONDON, STOCKHOLM

SUBJECT: ABDUL RAHIM HASSANEIN HUSAYNI

REF: STATE 002330 (NOT SENT STOCKHOLM)

EMBASSY AGREES WITH DEPARTMENT'S REASONING AND HAS INFORMED HUSAYNI THAT HE CANNOT QUALIFY FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM. HUSAYNI ACCEPTED NEWS AND STATED HE WILL ASK SWEDES FOR ASYLUM. HE PLANS TO TRAVEL TO STOCKHOLM TONIGHT AND IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE THERE AT 0730 JANUARY 8 ON M.V. BOTNIA. PETERSON

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

22/3
71 JAN 7 PM 8:00
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 188730/1

LIMDIS

FOR KISSINGER

FOL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ADDIS ABABA LAGOS LONDON
USDEL FRANCE USDEL SALT III NOV 17TH

QUOTE
HELSINKI 1426

LIMDIS

CODEL PERCY

SUBJ: SENATOR PERCY'S CALL ON PRIMIN KARJALAINEN: VIETNAM

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. KISSINGER

PASS SENATOR'S OFFICE FOR MESSRS FARRELIAND COHEN

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. ON NOVEMBER 16, SENATOR PERCY CALLED ON FINNISH PRIME MINISTER AHTI KARJALAINEN TO ASK FINNISH GOVERNMENT TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE HANOI TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON BASIS PRESIDENT NIXON'S FIVE POINT PROGRAM TO OBTAIN PEACE IN VIETNAM. PRIMIN PROMISED TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN AND CABINET TO DETERMINE WHAT HELPFUL STEPS FINNS COULD TAK. HE SAID HE WOULD ADVISE EMBASSY OF GOVERNMENT'S DECISION WITHIN A FEW DAYS. END SUMMARY

2. SENATOR PERCY, IN CALL ON PRIMIN KARJALAINEN NOVEMBER 16, POINTED OUT THAT SITUATION IN UNITED STATES REGARDING VIETNAM HAD CHANGED RADICALLY SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON HAD MADE HIS DTAMATIC FIVE-POINT PROGRAM FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM OCTOBER 7. WHILE IN PAST AMERICAN PEOPLE--AND U.S. SENATE--HAD BEEN DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER VIETNAM, NOW COUNTRY IS UNITED BEHIND PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE FOR PEACE. THE SENATE ITSELF HAD CONFIRMED THIS BY PASSING RESOLUTION EXPRESSING UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. SENATOR HAD TRAVELED IN 12 STATES DURING LAST CAMPAIGN, SPEAKING BEFORE UNIVERSITIES, YOUTH GROUPS, SENIOR CITIZENS, ETC., AND NOT ONCE HAD ANYONE EXPRESSED CRITICISM OF CURRENT U.S. VIETNAM POLICY. IT IS CLEAR U.S. PUBLIC IS CONVIENCED THAT PRESIDENT'S APPROACH TO ENDING KILLING IN VIETNAM IS THE RIGHT ONE. THIS IS BITTERLY DISAPPOINTING TO HANOI, WHICH HAS BEEN COUNTING ON DIVISION WITHIN AMERICA TO MAKE U.S. ACCEDE TO ITS DEMANDS.

3. UNFORTUNATELY, SENATOR CONTINUED, AT PARIS PEACE TALKS NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG ARE NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY AND INSTEAD USE TALKS AS FORUM FOR PROPAGANDA DIATRIBES. THEY HAVE DEMANDED, AS CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, TIMETABLE FOR U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND OUSTER OF PRESENT SAIGON GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP. U.S. BELIEVES THAT DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS--QUITE POSSIBLY WITHIN YEAR--IS SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION, BUT CANNOT BE PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATION. U.S. IS DEFINITELY COMMITTED TO ENDING VIETNAM. U.S. IS ONLY ACTION TO THE UNITED STATES

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WILL BE THROUGH NEGOTIATION WITH OTHER SIDE, WHICH COULD SPEED WITHDRAWAL, OR THROUGH UNILATERAL ACTION FOLLOWING VEITNAMIZATION, WHICH WOULD OF COURSE TAKE LONGER. CONCERNING HANOI'S DEMANDS FOR OUSTER OF PRESIDENT THIEU, VICE PRESIDENT KY, AND PRIMIN KHIEM, NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE TRYING TO GET U.S. TO DO WHAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DO AFTER NINE YEARS OF FIGHTING, I.E., OVERTHROW THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. U.S. WILL NEVER AGREE TO THIS. THE SOONER THE OTHER SIDE RECOGNIZES THIS FACT, THE BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED, SINCE TIME IS NOT WORKING IN HANOI'S FAVOR.

4. IT IS ESSENTIAL, SENATOR PERCY CONTINUED, THAT HANOI GIVE UP ITS HOPES THAT A DIVISION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES WILL BRING ABOUT PEACE ON ITS OWN TERMS, AND GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, A COUNTRY SUCH AS FINLAND, WITH IT INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION FOR NEUTRALITY, AND WHICH PLAYS A ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS FAR GREATER THAN ITS SIZE WOULD INDICATE, COULD HELP THE CAUSE OF PEACE BY ENCOURAGING HANOI, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE BAISSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S 5-POINT PROGRAM. SENATOR ADDED THAT KARJALAINEN HIMSELF, AS ARCHITECT OF FINNISH INITIATIVE FOR CES IN HELSINKI, HAD ESTABLISHED REPUTATION AS STATESMAN WORKING FOR PEACE AND RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. FURTHERMORE, FINLAND, BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH STATES REPRESENTING DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS--HERE SENATOR REFERRED TO SOVIETS AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES--MIGHT WELL BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE. SENATOR ALSO TOOK OCCASION TO REMIND PRIMIN OF FONMIN LESKINEN'S PROMISE IN WASHINGTON TO CONSIDER "VERY SERIOUSLY" U.S. REQUEST TO APPROACH HANOI REGARDING U.S. POW'S. FINALLY, SENATOR NOTED THAT SUCCESSFUL ENLARGED CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM COULD HAVE FAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS FOR EVENTUAL CES.

5. FOLLOWING SENATOR'S PRESENTATION, PRIMIN SAT IN REFLECTIVE SILENCE FOR SOME MOMENTS. HE THEN ASKED IF SENATOR HAD YET SEEN PRESIDENT AND, UPON BEING INFORMED THAT SENATOR WOULD NEXT CALL ON PRESIDENT, SAID THAT ONCE SENATOR HAD SEEN PRESIDENT KEKKONEN HE (KARJALAINEN) WOULD CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT AS WELL AS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF CABINET TO DETERMINE WHAT STEPS FINLAND MIGHT TAKE TO HELP IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN VIETNAM. KARJALAINEN SAID THAT WHILE FINLAND DOES NOT HAVE RELATIONS WITH HANOI, IT NEVERTHELESS DOES HAVE CONTACT WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, WHO OCCASIONALLY VISITS FINLAND. THE PRIMIN ADDED THAT IN PAST HE HAD TALKED WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR AND THAT FURTHER SUCH CONTACTS WERE POSSIBLE. ALSO, FINNISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD CONTACT WITH THE AMBASSADOR (HE DISMISSED CONTACTS BETWEEN FINNISH AND NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADORS IN PEKING AS NOT BEING VERY SIGNIFICANT). HOWEVER, BEFORE COMMENTING FURTHER, HE WOULD WISH TO CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT AND CABINET AND PROMISED TO INFORM EMBASSY HELSINKI "WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS" OF DECISION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT REGARDING SENATOR'S REQUEST.

6. ON CONCLUSION OF CONVERSATION, PRIMIN ASKED SENATOR PERCY TO REMEMBER HIM TO SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS, WHOM THE SENATOR SAID HE HAD GOTTEN TO KNOW WELL IN WASHINGTON. SENATOR PERCY PROMISED TO DO SO AND, AFTER THANKING PRIMIN WARMLY, DEPARTED FOR APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT.

7. EMBASSY COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT PRIMIN KARJALAINEN WAS IMMENSELY PLEASED BY COMMENDATORY REFERENCES TO HIS

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1970 NOV 18 20 49

FOR KISSINGER

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE, INFO ADDIS ABABA, AND BY POUCH TO ANKARA, ATHENS, BELGRADE, BERN, BERLIN, BONN, BRUSSELS, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LISBON, LONDON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, MOSCOW, OSLO, OTTAWA, PRAGUE, PARIS, REYKJAVIK, SOFIA, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, VALLETTA, VIENNA, WARSAW, NATO, USNMR SHAPE, USLO SAACLANT, AND SALT III ON 17 NOV FROM HELSINKI. QUOTE:

HELSINKI 1425

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CODEL PERCY

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. KISSINGER

PASS SENATOR'S OFFICE FOR MESSRS FARRELL AND COHEN

SUBJ: SENATOR PERCY DISCUSSION OF CES WITH PRIME MINISTER KARJALAINEN

1. DURING CALL BY SENATOR PERCY ON PRIME MINISTER KARJALAINEN TO DISCUSS VIETNAM (SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE), PRIMIN RAISED QUESTION OF CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY (CES). NOTING THAT NUMBER OF CRITICS ABROAD HAD SUGGESTED THAT FINLAND WAS ACTING AS STALKING HORSE FOR MOSCOW IN PROPOSING CES IN HELSINKI, KARJALAINEN SAID FINLAND WAS ACTING STRICTLY IN ITS OWN INTERESTS IN MAKING PROPOSAL.
2. SENATOR PERCY POINTED OUT THAT USG WELL AWARE FINLAND'S SINCERITY--AND THAT OF PRIMIN HIMSELF--IN PROPOSING CES. FURTHER, SENATOR SAID U.S. DID NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSE CES BUT THAT US AND ITS NATO ALLIES BELIEVED THAT PROGRESS SHOULD BE MADE ON CONCRETE ISSUES, SUCH AS BERLIN, SALT, ETC.-- BEFORE POWERS COULD TAKE STEPS TOWARDS REALIZATION OF CES. IF BY THEIR ACTIONS, SOVIETS SHOWED THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CES IN BUSINESSLIKE MANNER, THEN GROUNDWORK WOULD BE LAID FOR EVENTUAL CONFERENCE. SENATOR NOTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ATTENDED NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, AT WHICH POSITIVE RESOLUTION ON CES HAD BEEN VOTED. BUT US AND NATO ALLIES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ATTEND CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE SIMPLY PROPAGANDA FORUM FOR MOSCOW.
3. PRIMIN THEN REFERRED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR "GATHERING" OF AMBASSADORS IN HELSINKI WHICH COULD SERVE AS A KIND OF PRELIMINARY CES. HE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD SERVE AS EXCELLENT TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS; WEST COULD AT THIS GATHERING DETERMINE WHETHER SOVIETS REALLY READY FOR SERIOUS CES NEGOTIATIONS. BY ATTENDANCE AT SUCH A MEETING, HE CONCLUDED, WESTERN NATIONS WOULD LOSE NOTHING.
4. SENATOR PERCY DECLINED TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE OF PROPOSAL, BUT PROMISED TO TRANSMIT PRIMIN'S VIEWS TO PRESIDENT NIXON WHEN SENATOR RETURNS TO U.S.

GP3.

PETERSON

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UNQUOTE ROGERS

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 188730/2

LIMDIS

COUNTRY'S IMPORTANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AS WELL AS THE FAVORABLE REFERENCES TO HIS OWN STATURE AS A STATESMAN OF PEACE. FURTHER, KARJALAINEN APPEARED TO BE DEEPLY INTRIGUED BY THE PROSPECT OF PLAYING A POSITIVE ROLE IN SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS FAVORABLE IMPACT ON FINLAND'S NEUTRAL IMAGE AND ON HIS OWN POLITICAL AMBITIONS. INDICATIVE OF THIS IS THE PRIMIN'S COMMITTING HIMSELF TO INFORM THE EMBASSY WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON THE SENATOR'S REQUEST. A KEY FACTOR IN ANY DECISION TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE WILL BE THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT KEKKONEN, WHO HOLDS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCTING THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (SENATOR PERCY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN IS THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.)
GP-3 PETERSON UNQUOTE ROGERS

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 518

PAGE 01 HELSIN 01067 071909Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O 071700Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3019
INFO US ARMY PROC CENTER FRANKFURT

SECRET HELSINKI 1067

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: STATE 146284

I. EMBASSY HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED REFTEL AND HAS FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A. ALTHOUGH ARMY PROCUREMENT AGENCY, FRANKFURT, HAS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED CONTRACT WITH LAPUA FOR AMMUNITION, THIS WAS FOR TEST AND TRAINING PURPOSES IN UNITED STATES. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE HERE, IT APPEARS NO RPT NO END-USE CERTIFICATE WAS REQUIRED ON THIS CONTRACT.

B. IF END-USE CERTIFICATE WERE REQUIRED ON PROPOSED CONTRACT FOR USE OF AMMUNITION IN CAMBODIA, IT HIGHLY LIKELY THAT FINNISH GOVERNMENT WOULD REFUSE TO GRANT APPROVAL.

C. EVEN IF END-USE CERTIFICATE NOT RPT NOT REQUIRED FOR PROPOSED CONTRACT, THERE IS REAL DANGER THAT INFORMATION ON CONTRACT WOULD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. IN THIS EVENT, IT WOULD PLACE FINNISH GOVERNMENT IN HIGHLY EMBARRASSING POSITION AND ALMOST CERTAINLY BE INJURIOUS TO FINNISH-U.S. RELATIONS. FURTHERMORE, SOVIETS WOULD REACT STRONGLY TO NEWS OF SUCH CONTRACT, WITH CONSEQUENT UNFAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS FOR FINNISH-SOVIET RELATIONS. FINALLY, PUBLICATION OF CONTRACT WOULD STRIKE BLOW TO CREDIBILITY OF FINNISH NEUTRALITY WHICH FINNS HAVE SO PAINSTAKINGLY STRIVEN TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN.

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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2. ON BASIS OF ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS STRONGLY AGAINST ANY EFFORT TO PROCURE AMMUNITION IN FINLAND FOR USE IN CAMBODIA.

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Finland



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2220

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SECRET HELSINKI 1500

EXDIS

SUBJ: APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT ON VIETNAM PEACE TALKS

REF: STATE 181401; HELSINKI 1133

1. FONMINISTRY DIRGEN VANAMO CALLED ME TO FONMINISTRY TODAY TO GIVE ORAL REPLY TO OUR APPROACH OF OCTOBER 29 WHEN WE REQUESTED GOF, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ITS ALLIES, TO EXPRESS ITS SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND TO SEEK TO PERSUADE HANOI TO MAKE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN VIETNAM.

2. IN PREFACE TO HIS FORMAL REPLY, DIRGEN SAID GOF HAD STUDIED CAREFULLY AND EXTENSIVELY U.S. APPROACH AND THAT BECAUSE OF ITS REGARD FOR VERY FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES HAD DECIDED TO REPLY.

3. VANAMO BEGAN REPLY WITH GENERAL STATEMENT THAT GOF BELIEVED VIETNAM QUESTION TO BE POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. GOF, HE CONTINUED, HAS SUPPORTED PROPOSALS OUTLINED BY UN SEC GEN U THANT FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF QUESTION.

4. HE SAID FINLAND WELCOMED BEGINNING OF PARIS TALKS AND HOPED THEY WOULD BRING ABOUT SETTLEMENT OF COMPLICATED VIETNAM QUESTION. HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT THAT IN LINE WITH ITS POLICY OF NEUTRALITY, GOF HAS NOT TAKEN ANY STAND ON PROPOSALS ADVANCED AT PARIS TALKS AND NOTED THAT GOF DOES NOT RECOGNIZE EITHER PART OF VIETNAM.

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TELEGRAM

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5. VANAMO CONCLUDED WITH STATEMENT THAT GOF WOULD FOLLOW VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS AND "IN ACCORDANCE WITH HER POLICY OF NEUTRALITY WILL CONSIDER WHAT SHE, FOR HER PART, COULD USEFULLY DO IN THIS QUESTION."

6. FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF HIS FORMAL REPLY, WE DISCUSSED VIETNAM ISSUE FOR SOME MINUTES. I POINTED OUT THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT EXPLORING EVERY POSSIBLE AVENUE IN EFFORT TO REACH JUST PEACE IN VIETNAM. I ASKED IF GOF HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO SEARCH FOR PEACE. VANAMO REPLIED THAT GOF "SMALL COUNTRY" WHICH COULD HARDLY DARE TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS TO GREAT POWER LIKE U.S. I COUNTERED THAT FINLAND'S SMALLNESS HAD NOT APPEARED TO BE FACTOR WHEN FONMIN KARJALAINEN HAD PROPOSED IN OCTOBER 1968 SPEECH IN UNGA FOR HALT TO BOMBING OF N. VIETNAM. VANAMO LAUGHED RATHER SHEEPISHLY AT THIS POINT, BUT REPLIED SOMEWHAT LAMELY THAT KARJALAINEN HAD SIMPLY BEEN EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR U THANT PROPOSALS.

7. ALTHOUGH ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT MEETING WAS AMICABLE, I MADE CLEAR TO DIRGEN U.S. CONVICTION THAT NATIONS OF WORLD SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE HANOI TO MOVE TOWARDS SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, SO THAT A JUST PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THAT WAR-TORN COUNTRY.

8. I INFORMED DIRGEN I WOULD COMMUNICATE GOF REPLY TO MY GOVERNMENT. GP. I.
PETERSON

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PAGE 01 HELSIN 01133 291452Z

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ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, /046 W

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R 291425Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1965

S E C R E T HELSINKI 1133

EXDIS

SUBJ: APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT ON VIETNAM PEACE TALKS

REF: STATE 181401

1. I CALLED ON FONMIN KARJALAINEN OCTOBER 29 TO DISCUSS VIETNAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL. I CITED FONMIN'S SPEECH OF OCTOBER 7, 1968, TO UNGA, IN WHICH KARJALAINEN HAD CALLED FOR HALT TO BOMBING OF N. VIETNAM AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY "SO AS TO PREPARE GROUND FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD ENABLE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE." I POINTED OUT THAT U.S. HAD STOPPED ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND THEN LISTED OTHER STEPS U.S. HAD TAKEN TO REDUCE LEVEL OF CONFLICT, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF 60,000 MEN BY DECEMBER 15. UNFORTUNATELY, OTHER SIDE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO OUR MOVES. I CONCLUDED WITH REQUEST THAT GOF APPROACH HANOI, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ITS ALLIES, TO EXPRESS ITS SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND TO SEEK TO PERSUADE HANOI TO MAKE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN VIETNAM.

2. KARJALAINEN THANKED ME FOR VISIT AND SAID GOF WILLING TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN ITS POWER TO CONTRIBUTE TO CAUSE OF PEACE. HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT THAT FINLAND SMALL COUNTRY WITH LIMITED INFLUENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. I COUNTERED THAT ALTHOUGH FINLAND SMALL, ITS MORAL FORCE CONSIDERABLE, AND THAT GOF COULD MAKE CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE BY URGING HANOI TO ADOPT MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUR PROPOSALS. I THEN LEFT AIDE MEMOIRE DESCRIBING IN DETAIL STEPS TAKEN

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BY U.S. TO GET SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS STARTED.

3. FONMIN AGREED TO TAKE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION, AND REITERATED DESIRE OF GOF TO ASSIST CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE.
GP-1.
PETERSON


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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 085682

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM: EUSTREATOR: DAH

5-4-73 EXT. 21626

APPROVED BY EUR: GSSPRINGSTEEN

S/S-0: JMEALUM

EUR/RPM: RJMCGUIRE

ACDA/IR: DLINEBAUGH

DOD/ISA: GENERAL LOBDELL

PM/DCA: VBAKER

JS-J-5: COL. LAFFERTY (INFO)

NSC: DCLIFT

WHITE HOUSE
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TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

Z.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: PFDR, PARM
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM: POLICY ON MILIYARY MOVEMENTS

REF: HELSINKI 1157 (EXDIS); STATE 83486

1. YOU SHOULD INFORM ALLIED DELS CONCERNING YOUR EXCHANGE WITH MENDELEVICH REPORTED HELSINKI 1157, AND PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE APPROACH AS OUTLINED STATE 83486.

2. WE NOTE YOUR VIEW (PARA 6, HELSINKI'S 1157) THAT SOME ALLIES WILL PREFER THAT DECISIONS ON "MOVEMENTS" BE TAKEN IN NATO. WE BELIEVE OUR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE KEEPS OPEN "MOVEMENTS" ISSUE AND PRESERVES ESSENTIAL SUBSTANCE OF ALLIED POSITION WHILE PROVIDING ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE TO MEET TACTICAL SITUATION IN HELSINKI. WE

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STRONGLY PREFER THEREFORE TO KEEP FOCUS OF DISCUSSION ON SUCH TACTICAL MATTERS IN HELSINKI, RESERVING ONLY MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE POLICY SHIFTS FOR NAC DISCUSSION. ACCORDINGLY, YOU SHOULD SUGGEST TO ALLIED DELS THAT THEY SEEK INSTRUCTION TO ALLOW CONSULTATIONS TO GO FORWARD AT HELSINKI ON THIS ISSUE SO THAT YOU MAY MAKE PROMPT PRESENTATION TO MENDELEVICH ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACH.

3. BEGIN FYI: WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SEIZING NAC AND SPC WITH THIS ISSUE COULD LEAD TO DELAY IN REACHING COMPROMISE ESSENTIAL TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON BASKET I MANDATE NEEDED

TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM TOWARD CONVENING CSCE IN LATE JUNE. END FYI. RUSH


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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (OMISSION PARA 2)

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO, UR
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM'S: POLICY ON MILITARY "MOVEMENTS"

HELSINKI FOR VEST

1. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, YOU SHOULD MEET WITH MENDELEVICH TO DISCUSS INCLUSION OF TERM "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" IN CBM'S, MAKING POINTS CONTAINED IN PARA 3 BELOW. (BEGIN FYI) BASED ON INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED, SOVIETS WILL NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT "MOVEMENTS." HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU MAKE A STRONG CASE TO MENDELEVICH ON THIS ISSUE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PROPOSING TO ALLIES THAT THEY PUT FORWARD A COMPROMISE FORMULATION

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DESIGNED TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENT. END FYI.)

2. YOU SHOULD REPORT FULLY TO DEPARTMENT MENDELEVICH'S REACTIONS, AND ANY SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR POSSIBLE COMPROMISE, TOGETHER WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS. THEREAFTER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT YOUR VIEWS, WE WOULD ENVISAGE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE SCENARIO. IF, AS WE ANTICIPATE, SOVIET REACTION IS ENTIRELY NEGATIVE, UPON RECEIPT OF AUTHORIZATION FROM DEPARTMENT, YOU WOULD BRIEF ALLIED DELS ON YOUR MEETING WITH MENDELEVICH, STRESSING THAT YOU HAD MADE VIGOROUS ATTEMPT TO BRING SOVIETS TO AGREE TO INCLUSION OF "MOVEMENTS," AND THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT AGREE. YOU WOULD FURTHER EXPRESS OUR VIEW THAT WESTERN INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS SUBSTANCE AND NOT TOWARDS POINTLESS DEBATE OVER DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY, AND THAT UNDUE STRESS SHOULD NOT BE PLACED ON "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" ISSUE. ACCORDINGLY, ALLIES SHOULD SEEK TO FIND SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE FOR THE BASKET I MANDATE, WHICH WOULD PROTECT ALLIED INTERESTS, AND STILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO PACT COUNTRIES. FOR EXAMPLE, ALLIES MIGHT EMPLOY IN MANDATE PHRASE, "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE CHANGES IN THE LOCATION OF FORCES, INCLUDING MAJOR MANEUVERS." IF ATTEMPTS TO FIND COMPROMISE LANGUAGE PROVE UNACCEPTABLE, ALLIES WOULD STILL HAVE OPTION OF ACCEPTING SOVIET PREFERENCE IN MPT AND THEN IN THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF CSCE SEEKING TO DEFINE MANEUVERS IN A FASHION COVERING MOVEMENTS OF REAL CONSEQUENCE. IN PROPOSING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH, YOU WOULD POINT OUT US WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH ALLIES TO PROTECT SUBSTANTIVE ALLIED INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION, BUT POINT OUT THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A PROTRACTED TERMINOLOGICAL DISPUTE OVER MOVEMENTS, OR SEE PROGRESS IN TALKS SLOWED OVER THIS ISSUE. YOU ALSO COULD PROPOSE TO ALLIES THAT YOU DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE MANDATE LANGUAGE FOR BASKET I (ABOVE) WITH MENDELEVICH, DRAWING ON POINTS IN PARA 4, BELOW.

3. IN INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH MENDELEVICH, YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) IN ALLIED VIEW, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE

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PARTICIPATING STATES THAT THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF OTHER STATES ARE NOT THREATENING. AS SUCH, CBM'S WOULD SERVE TO SUPPORT ANY DECLARATION ON NON-USE OR THREAT OF USE OF FORCE.

(B) TO RESTRICT THE CBM'S ONLY TO MANEUVERS COULD LEAD TO AMBIGUITIES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WOULD SERVE TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE CONFIDENCE. RETENTION OF "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS," THE MORE ENCOMPASSING TERM, WOULD IN ALLIED VIEW ELIMINATE THIS PROBLEM.

(C) ON THE OTHER HAND, ALLIES WOULD NOT FAVOR SO STRICT A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENT" THAT REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD BE ADMINISTRATIVELY BURDENSOME AND CONFLICT WITH NORMAL, NON-THREATENING ACTIVITIES OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES' FORCES.

(D) INSTEAD, IN ALLIED VIEW, "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" SHOULD ENCOMPASS THOSE LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENTS OF FORCES FOR WHICH CONSIDERABLE ADVANCED PLANNING IS REQUIRED IN ANY CASE, AND WHICH CANNOT BE CONCEALED. TO REQUIRE PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH MAJOR MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT IMPOSE EXCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS, AND WOULD SERVE TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE. MOREOVER, AS ALLIES ENVISAGE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, THE INITIATIVE OF ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD LIE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS.

(E) THE ALLIES HAVE NOT REACHED FIRM CONCLUSIONS ON THE TYPES OF MOVEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENT." WHILE THE SIZE OF THE MOVEMENT IN ANY CASE WOULD HAVE TO BE QUITE LARGE, LOCATION AND OTHER FACTORS WOULD ALSO PLAY A ROLE. IN ANY CASE, THE ALLIES DO NOT ENVISAGE PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT TO INHIBIT REGULAR ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCES OF ANY GOVERNMENT.

(F) WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THESE PROBLEMS CAN BE RESOLVED TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE,

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WHEN THESE MATTERS CAN BE DEALT WITH IN GREATER DETAIL. THE ALLIES FOR THEIR PART WOULD BE WILLING THEN TO PROVIDE ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES TO INDICATE THE KINDS OF ACTIVITIES OF WHICH PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

4. FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS RELATED TO ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION IN PARA 2:

(A) ALLIES ARE DISAPPOINTED IN SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE TERM "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" IN MANDATE FORMULATION ON CBM'S.

(B) IN WESTERN TERMINOLOGY, MANEUVERS ALONE DO NOT COVER ALL OF THE LARGE SCALE CHANGES IN FORCE DISPOSITIONS, FOR WHICH PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD SERVE TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.

(C) NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES ARE NOT INTERESTED IN A PROLONGED DEBATE OVER DEFINITIONS, AND ARE PREPARED TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON "MOVEMENTS" IF MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE CAN BE DEVELOPED.

(D) FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, THE MANDATE MIGHT BE CHANGED TO READ ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE CHANGES IN THE LOCATION OF FORCES, INCLUDING MAJOR MANEUVERS." WE BELIEVE THIS LANGUAGE DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO THIS SUGGESTION, AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONSIDER ANY ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE WHICH THE SOVIETS MIGHT WISH TO SUGGEST. WE MAKE THIS

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APPROVED BY EUR:WJSTOESSEL
EUR:GSSPRINGSTEEN
EUR/RPM:RJMCGUIRE
OSD/ISA:GEN LOBDELL
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
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APPROVED BY: PM/MAS - CHRISTIAN CHAPMAN
EUR/RPM - MR. REHFELD
S/S-O: C. MAGEE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 021732

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT OF VALUE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REFERENCE: HELSINKI 143

WE RECOGNIZE THAT ONLY MILITARY ASSISTANCE ACTUALLY
IN FINLAND IS SMALL TRAINING PROGRAM. HOWEVER, THAT
PROGRAM IS MAP FUNDED, NOT SERVICE FUNDED. IT WILL
THEREFORE BE SUBJECT TO TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT
UNDER SECTION 514 (PARA 9 OF STATE 14505). AGREEMENT
WITH GOF TO DEPOSIT TEN PERCENT OF VALUE OF TRAINING
PROGRAM WILL THEREFORE BE NECESSARY. ROGERS

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EUR/RPM-MR. REHFELD
S/S-MR. MILLER

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EXDIS

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT TO ACCRA ADDIS AMMAN ANKARA ASUNCION
ATHENS BAMAKO BEIRUT BOGOTA BRASILIA BUENOS AIRES CARACAS
COLOMBO DAKAR DJAKARTA GUATEMALA JIDDA KABUL KATHMANDU KUALA
LUMPUR KINSHASA LAGOS LA PAZ LIMA LISBON MANAGUA MANILA MEXICO
MONROVIA MONTEVIDEO PANAMA QUITO SAN SALVADOR SANTIAGO
SANTO DOMINGO SEOUL TAIPEI TEGUCIGALPA TEHRAN ISLAMABAD MADRID
NEW DELHI PHNOM PENH RABAT RANGOON TUNIS CINCPAC CINCEUR CINCSO
DTD 26 JAN

QUOTE 014505

CINCPAC, CINCEUR, CINCSO ALSO FOR POLADS.

SUBJ: 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT OF VALUE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR FY 1972
HAS BEEN REPORTED OUT OF CONFERENCE AND HAS PASSED SENATE
(STATE 230375). IT HAS NOW ALSO PASSED THE HOUSE AND IS
EXPECTED SHORTLY TO BE SIGNED INTO LAW. THIS MESSAGE INTERPRETS
AND SPELLS OUT SOME OF THE NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
ONE PARTICULAR PROVISION OF THIS BILL. SUBJECT TO COMPLETION
OF CIRCULAR 175 PROCEDURE, YOU WILL RECEIVE TELEGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS

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TO CARRY OUT IMPLEMENTING STEPS DESCRIBED BELOW.

2. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR FY 1972
CONTAINS FOLLOWING NEW PROVISION:

"SECTION 514. SPECIAL FOREIGN COUNTRY ACCOUNTS.

(A) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION, NO
DEFENSE ARTICLE MAY BE GIVEN, AND NO GRANT OF MILITARY
ASSISTANCE MAY BE MADE, UNDER THIS ACT TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY
UNLESS THE COUNTRY AGREES -

(1) TO DEPOSIT IN A SPECIAL ACCOUNT ESTABLISHED BY
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE FOLLOWING AMOUNTS OF CURRENCY
OF THAT COUNTRY:

(A) IN THE CASE OF ANY EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE
TO BE GIVEN TO THAT COUNTRY, AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 10 PER CENTUM
OF THE FAIR VALUE OF THE ARTICLE, AS DETERMINED BY THE SECRETARY
OF STATE, AT THE TIME THE AGREEMENT TO GIVE THE ARTICLE TO THE
COUNTRY IS MADE; AND

(B) IN THE CASE OF A GRANT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO BE MADE TO THAT COUNTRY, AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 10 PER CENTUM
OF EACH SUCH GRANT; AND

(2) TO ALLOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO USE
SUCH AMOUNTS FROM THAT SPECIAL ACCOUNT AS MAY BE DETERMINED,
FROM TIME TO TIME, BY THE PRESIDENT TO BE NECESSARY TO PAY
ALL OFFICIAL COSTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PAYABLE
IN THE CURRENCY OF THAT COUNTRY, INCLUDING ALL COSTS RELATING
TO THE FINANCING OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL
EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THE COUNTRY PARTICIPATES UNDER
THE PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED BY THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1961.

(B) THE PRESIDENT MAY WAIVE ANY AMOUNT OF CURRENCY OF A
FOREIGN COUNTRY REQUIRED TO BE DEPOSITED UNDER SUBSECTION
(A)(1) OF THIS SECTION IF HE DETERMINES THAT THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO PAY ALL OF ITS OFFICIAL COSTS
PAYABLE IN THE CURRENCY OF THAT COUNTRY ENUMERATED UNDER
SUBSECTION (A)(2) OF THIS SECTION WITHOUT THE DEPOSIT

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OF SUCH AMOUNT AND WITHOUT HAVING TO EXPEND UNITED STATES DOLLARS TO PURCHASE CURRENCY OF THAT COUNTRY TO PAY SUCH COSTS.

(C) THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL NOT APPLY IN ANY CASE IN WHICH AN EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE IS GIVEN, OR A GRANT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS MADE --

(1) TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY UNDER AN AGREEMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY WHICH ALLOWS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO OPERATE A MILITARY OR OTHER SIMILAR BASE IN THAT COUNTRY IN EXCHANGE FOR THAT ARTICLE OR GRANT; AND

(2) TO SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, OR LAOS.

(D) IN NO EVENT SHALL ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY BE REQUIRED, UNDER THIS SECTION, TO MAKE DEPOSITS IN A SPECIAL ACCOUNT AGGREGATING MORE THAN DOLS 20,000,000 IN ANY ONE YEAR".

3. EXCLUSIONS

AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED, SECTION 514 WOULD HAVE BEEN APPLICABLE TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE "UNDER THIS OR ANY OTHER LAW". AN AMENDMENT LIMITED IT TO ASSISTANCE "UNDER THIS ACT", I.E., FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (FAA). ACCORDINGLY, DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO SERVICE-FUNDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THUS, SUCH ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, THAILAND (FY 1972 AND PRIOR YEAR UNDELIVERED BALANCES) AND KOREA (FOR ITS FORCES IN VIETNAM) IS EXCLUDED FROM OPERATION OF THIS SECTION.

4. BILL ALSO PROVIDES THAT PRESIDENT MAY WAIVE 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT FOR ANY RECIPIENT COUNTRY IN WHICH ALL USG OFFICIAL EXPENSES CAN BE PAID WITHOUT SUCH DEPOSIT AND WITHOUT HAVING TO SPEND DOLLARS TO PURCHASE THAT COUNTRY'S CURRENCY (SUBSECTION (B)). AT PRESENT TIME, ONLY MAP RECIPIENT COUNTRIES (INCLUDING PRIOR YEAR PIPELINES) WHICH ARE ALSO "EXCESS CURRENCY" COUNTRIES ARE TUNISIA, MOROCCO, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND BURMA. THE LIST OF EXCESS CURRENCY COUNTRIES CHANGES FROM TIME TO TIME AND, WHEN SUCH CHANGES ARE MADE, ADDRESSEES WILL BE NOTIFIED.

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5. SUBSECTION (C)(1) OF BILL ALSO EXCLUDES FROM 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT PROVIDE, PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT, MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES TO THE U.S. IN EXCHANGE FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE. BOTH LANGUAGE OF BILL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY LEAD TO CONCLUSION THAT THIS EXCLUSION APPLIES ONLY WHERE THERE IS AN EXPLICIT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WITH HOST COUNTRY THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE IS QUID PRO QUO FOR BASE RIGHTS. SPAIN CLEARLY FITS THIS DESCRIPTION. EMBASSY ADDRESSEES MAY WISH TO REVIEW EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY PROPERLY FIT UNDER THIS EXCLUSION. DEPT WOULD NOT FAVOR REVISION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE EXPLICITLY IN EXCHANGE FOR BASE RIGHTS. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH AGREEMENTS WOULD INCREASE "POLITICAL HOSTAGE" CHARACTER OF OUR BASES AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INCREASE LONG-TERM COST OF MAINTAINING SUCH BASES.

6. FINALLY, SECTION IS MADE EXPRESSLY INAPPLICABLE TO SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS (SUBSECTION (C)(2)).

7. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS.

SUBSECTION (A)(1) REQUIRES RECIPIENT COUNTRY TO AGREE TO MAKE 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT, AND SUBSECTION (A)(2) REQUIRES ITS AGREEMENT FOR USE OF THE DEPOSITED FUNDS TO PAY ALL USG OFFICIAL EXPENSES PAYABLE IN RECIPIENT COUNTRY'S CURRENCY, INCLUDING COSTS OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY BEFORE ANY ASSISTANCE CAN BE DELIVERED AFTER BILL BECOMES LAW. 10 PERCENT PROVISION WILL ONLY BE EFFECTIVE FOR MATERIAL DELIVERED AFTER ENACTMENT OF BILL. SINCE THERE IS ASSISTANCE IN PIPELINE FOR HOST COUNTRIES OF MOST ACTION ADDRESSEES, AN AGREEMENT WILL BE NEEDED IMMEDIATELY AFTER BILL BECOMES LAW. THIS COULD, WE BELIEVE BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES ALONG FOLLOWING LINES, WHICH COULD EITHER STAND ALONE AS SEPARATE AGREEMENT OR BE PUT IN FORM OF AN AMENDMENT TO AN EXISTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT:

"THE EMBASSY OF THE USA PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF----- AND HAS THE HONOR TO REFER TO RECENT DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1971,

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PAGE 05 STATE 014505

WHICH INCLUDES A PROVISION REQUIRING PAYMENT TO THE USG IN (LOCAL CURRENCY) OF TEN PERCENT OF THE VALUE OF GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES PROVIDED BY THE U.S. TO THE GOVERNMENT OF

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT PROVISION, IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF WILL DEPOSIT IN AN ACCOUNT TO BE SPECIFIED BY THE USG, AT A RATE OF EXCHANGE WHICH IS NOT LESS FAVORABLE TO THE USG THAN THE BEST LEGAL RATE AT WHICH U.S. DOLLARS ARE SOLD BY AUTHORIZED DEALERS IN THE COUNTRY OF FOR (LOCAL CURRENCY) ON THE DATE DEPOSITS ARE MADE, THE FOLLOWING AMOUNTS IN (LOCAL CURRENCY):

(A) IN THE CASE OF ANY EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE GIVEN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF, AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO TEN PERCENT OF THE FAIR VALUE OF THAT ARTICLE, AS DETERMINED BY THE USG, AND (B) IN THE CASE OF A GRANT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF, AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO TEN PERCENT OF EACH SUCH GRANT. THE GOVERNMENT OF WILL BE NOTIFIED QUARTERLY OF DELIVERIES OF EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES AND GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THE VALUES THEREOF. DEPOSITS TO THE ACCOUNT OF THE USG WILL BE DUE UPON NOTIFICATION OF SUCH DELIVERIES. NO MORE THAN DOLS 20 MILLION IN (LOCAL CURRENCY) WILL BE REQUIRED TO BE DEPOSITED FOR DELIVERIES IN ANY ONE U.S. FISCAL YEAR.

"IT IS FURTHER PROPOSED THAT THE AMOUNTS TO BE DEPOSITED MAY BE USED TO PAY ALL OFFICIAL COSTS OF THE USG PAYABLE IN (LOCAL CURRENCY), INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ALL COSTS RELATING TO THE FINANCING OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES UNDER PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES MUTUAL EDUCATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1961.

"IT IS FINALLY PROPOSED THAT THE MINISTRY'S REPLY STATING THAT THE FOREGOING IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SHALL, TOGETHER WITH THIS NOTE, CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT EFFECTIVE FROM AND AFTER (DATE OF ENACTMENT OF THE FAA OF 1971)".

8. WE WILL, EXCEPT FOR UNUSUAL CASES OF WHICH YOU

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PAGE 06 STATE 014505

WILL BE NOTIFIED, CONTINUE TO FOLLOW PRESENT PRACTICE OF VALUING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES AT ONE-THIRD OF ACQUISITION COST. GRANT ASSISTANCE OF NON-EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES UNDER FAA WILL OF COURSE BE VALUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 644(M) OF THE FAA.

9. "MILITARY ASSISTANCE" IS INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE ALL ASSISTANCE UNDER PART II OF THE FAA (EXCLUDING CHAPTER 4, THAT IS, SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE) E.G., TANGIBLE ITEMS, CONSUMABLES, PCH AND T AND TRAINING.

10. EMBASSIES SHOULD NOTE THAT EXPENDITURE OF THE LOCAL CURRENCIES DEPOSITED UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATIONS. THEY WILL HAVE TO BE PURCHASED FROM TREASURY WITH APPROPRIATED DOLLARS, LIKE ANY OTHER FOREIGN CURRENCY ACQUISITION. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON MAINTENANCE AND USE OF THESE LOCAL CURRENCY ACCOUNTS WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

11. LIMITATION

THE BILL EXPLICITLY PROVIDES THAT DEPOSITS WILL NOT BE REQUIRED FROM ANY COUNTRY IN EXCESS OF DOLS 20 MILLION IN ANY ONE YEAR (SUBSECTION (D)). IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 514(B), NO DEPOSITS WILL BE REQUIRED FROM ANY COUNTRY CLASSIFIED AS AN EXCESS CURRENCY COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, USG WILL ON BASIS OF ITS NEED FOR CURRENCY OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO PAY ITS OFFICIAL COSTS, WAIVE OR REDUCE DEPOSIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH COUNTRIES TO SOME AMOUNT LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF VALUE OF MAP AND EXCESS. DEFERMENT OF INITIAL BILLING, COVERING DELIVERIES AFTER DATE OF BILL'S ANACTMENT, TO ACCOMMODATE BUDGETARY REVISION PROBLEMS OF HOST GOVERNMENTS WILL BE CONSIDERED ON A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BASIS.

12. NO ACTION WILL NEED TO BE TAKEN WITH REGARD TO HOST GOVERNMENT PAYMENT OF ALL OR PART OF MAAG COSTS (OR THE PROVISION OF HOUSING, OFFICES OR FACILITIES TO THE MAAG) SINCE SUCH PAYMENTS SIMPLY REDUCE THE TOTAL USG OFFICIAL EXPENDITURES IN THAT COUNTRY AND THUS THE TOTAL AMOUNTS NEEDED UNDER THE 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT.

13. ACTION

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IN ABSENCE OF COMPELLING REASON NOT TO DO SO, ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD INITIATE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED IN ORDER TO LAY GROUNDWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT. PLEASE ADVISE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF ANY RECIPIENTS AFTER FULL DISCUSSION, INDICATE AN UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT 10 PERCENT PAYMENT REQUIREMENT SO THAT ORDERS TO CUT OFF PIPELINE ASSISTANCE MAY BE ISSUED ON TIMELY BASIS BY DOD. NO AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONCLUDED UNTIL RECEIPT OF TELEGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL BE SENT AS SOON AS BILL BECOMES LAW.

14. FOR LISBON: SEPTTEL FOLLOWS.

15. FOR SEOUL: SEPTTEL FOLLOWS. ROGER
UNQUOTE
ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 NSC-10 SS-20 PM-05 EUR-20 L-04 CIAE-00 INR-08

NSAE-00 RSC-01 IO-13 USIE-00 PRS-01 P-03 DODE-00 /105 R

66608

DRAFTED BY ACDA/PA:RSMITH:MEW

10/23/70

APPROVED BY ACDA/D:GSMITH

WHITE HOUSE:HOUDEK

PM:JSHAW

ACDA/DD:PJFARLEY

S/S:RTCURRAN

Ed

017682

R 261801Z OCT 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 175821

SALT
ATTENTION MURPHY, USIS

FOLLOWING IS ADVANCE TEXT OF ARRIVAL STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR GERARD SMITH, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO
THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, HELSINKI, OCTOBER 30,
1970.

QTE IT IS A PLEASURE TO RETURN TO HELSINKI FOR THE THIRD
PHASE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. MY
DELEGATION REMEMBERS THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED US BY
THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT, THE OFFICIALS OF HELSINKI, AND THE
FINNISH PEOPLE IN GENERAL WHEN WE OPENED THESE IMPORTANT
TALKS HERE LAST YEAR.

QTE WE FEEL THAT THE TWO PREVIOUS PHASES OF THE TALKS WERE
USEFUL IN OUR SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT ON ONE OF THE GRAVEST
PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD TODAY: HOW TO CONTROL AND RE-
STRAIN THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION. I AM HOPEFUL THAT

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 175821

THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE WILL BE MARKED BY FURTHER PROGRESS.
UNQTE.

FOREGOING IS FOR RELEASE UPON AMBASSADOR SMITH'S ARRIVAL.
ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 146284

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ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

2/3

66605
DRAFTED BY: EAPR; BOWEN; EUR/AIS; RMBEAUDRY
APPROVED BY: EUR; MR DAVIES
PM: MR PICKERING
EA: MR WILSON
ASD/ EA AND PR: ADM FLANIGAN
EUR/SCAN: MR BODDE
S/S: MR BREWSTER

048764

O 051722Z SEP 70 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO US ARMY PROC CENTER FRANKFURT

SECRET STATE 146284

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. DOD URGENTLY REQUIRES QUANTITIES OF AK-47 AMMUNITION FOR TRANSFER TO CAMBODIAN FORCES UNDER MAP. US ARMY PROCUREMENT CENTER, FRANKFURT, GERMANY, IS PLANNING TO PROCURE 2,000,000 ROUNDS OF AK-47 AMMUNITION FROM LAPUA IN FINLAND. HALF ARE TO BE DELIVERED IN NOVEMBER AND HALF ARE TO BE DELIVERED IN DECEMBER. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT PRIOR SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITHOUT A REQUIREMENT FOR END-USE CERTIFICATE BY THE FINNS.

2. US ARMY HAS PROCURED THIS TYPE OF AMMUNITION FROM LAPUA IN THE PAST FOR TEST PURPOSES. UNLESS EMBASSY PERCEIVES OBJECTION TO ABOVE PROPOSAL, PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION WILL BE ISSUED. EMBASSY COMMENTS REQUIRED SOONEST.
JOHNSON



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 111059

51
ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 CPR-02 SS-20 PM-05 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 USIA-12
PRS-01 /080 R

66606
DRAFTED BY: EUR/SCAN: JGSAMPAS
APPROVED BY: EUR: MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS
EUR/SCAN: MR INGRAM
S/CPR: MR SMOAK
WHITE HOUSE: MR SONNENFELDT
S/S: MR LEVITSKY

066009

R 111621Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 111059

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY CONGRATULATORY
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KEKKONEN

PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KEKKONEN:

QUOTE THE PEOPLE OF THE US JOIN WITH ME IN EXPRESSING TO
YOUR EXCELLENCY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE ON
OUR INDEPENDENCE DAY.

QUOTE MRS. NIXON JOINS ME IN LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR
VISIT TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH. WE ARE SORRY THAT
MRS. KEKKONEN WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCOMPANY YOU. RICHARD
NIXON END QUOTE.

FYI PRESIDENT KEKKONEN HAS SENT INDEPENDENCE DAY MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT NIXON WHICH READS: QUOTE ON THE OCCASION OF THE
INDEPENDENCE DAY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I WISH TO
EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MY MOST CORDIAL CONGRATULATIONS
TOGETHER WITH MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL WELFARE
AND FOR THE PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

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PAGE 02 STATE 111059

OF AMERICA. URHO KEKKONEN PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND END QUOTE.

DEPARTMENT DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO ITS RECEIPT BY GOF. END FYI. JOHNSON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 080750Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6505
BT
SECRET HELSINKI 1901

CONTROL: 1 7 8 9 Q
RECD: 8 JULY 73 -
4 12 AM

NODIS

SECTO 51

DEPT PASS AMEMBASSY BONN FOR INFO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (WALTER SCHEEL)

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON FOR SCHEEL)

REF: STATE 132724 (TOSEC 78)

SECRETARY AGREES TO HOST LUNCHEON FOR SCHEEL ON
JULY 12 IF SCHEDULE PERMITS.

ROGERS

BT

73 JUL 8 AM 10:12
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NOTE: NOT PASSED BONN BY OC/T.

SECRET

NOV-1983



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

1057Q
05 JUL 73Z 1900

O 051805Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6452
BT
SECRET HELSINKI 1839 CORRECTED COPY

Kennedy
McFarlane
Sent to HAK

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SECTO 21
DEPARTMENT REPEAT BONN FOR AMBASSADOR
FOR ELIOT FROM STOESSEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ROGERS, WILLIAM P.)
SUBJECT: SCHEEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. SCHEEL HAS INFORMED SECRETARY HE HAS RECEIVED COMMUNICATION FROM BRANDT STATING THAT HE SHOULD PROCEED TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH DR. KISSINGER ON US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS.
2. SCHEEL PROPOSES, IF AGREEABLE TO KISSINGER, THAT HE ARRIVE WASHINGTON JULY 11 IN EVENING FOR TALKS ON JULY 12. SCHEEL WOULD DEPART FOR BONN MORNING OF JULY 13.
3. SCHEEL OBVIOUSLY WILL LEAVE TO KISSINGER MANNER IN WHICH TALKS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED. HIS OWN PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR HEAD-TO-HEAD MEETING, FOLLOWED BY SESSION WITH ONE OR TWO ADVISORS ON EACH SIDE. SCHEEL WILL ALSO WISH TO SEE SECRETARY AND WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE BRIEF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IF POSSIBLE.
4. IF ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON SUBJECT MATTER OF TALKS WITH KISSINGER COULD BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO SCHEEL'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON, SCHEEL STATEY HE WOULD BE VERY PLEASSED TO HAVE IT.
5. SCHEEL WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY VAN WELL AND BRUNNER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE, AND HALLIER FROM HIS OWN OFFICE.

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6. SCHEEL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS ON SUGGESTED SCHEDULE AND OTHER POINTS WHICH WE COULD PASS TO HIM HERE PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM HELSINKI, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR SATURDAY AFTERNOON, HELSINKI TIME, JULY 7.

ROGERS

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED BONN BY OC/T.

SECRET



Department of State
TOP SECRET

W 78
TELEGRAM

8

R 111500Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2641
BT
TOP SECRET HELSINKI 506

Control: 70 25070
Recd : 13 May 70
10: 29 a.m.

SENATE HOUSE
STATION ROOM

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON FROM AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 069963

1. THE ACTION BY ARMY REGARDING PROCUREMENT OF AK-47 AMMUNITION HAS BEEN HANDLED BY ARMY PROCUREMENT CENTER, FRANKFURT, GERMANY, THROUGH THE ARMY ATTACHE OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE OF THIS EMBASSY. INITIAL ACTIONS BEGAN IN FEBRUARY 1970 THROUGH CONTACTS BY THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY THROUGH DAO TO DETERMINE THE CAPABILITY OF TWO FACTORIES TO PRODUCE THIS AMMO, TO INCLUDE AN ORAL BID FOR PRODUCTION.
2. DURING THE PERIOD APRIL 21-25, 1970, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY VISITED FINLAND. HIS VISIT WAS COORDINATED WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM AND ALSO THE FOREIGN SECTION OF THE FINNISH DEFENSE FORCES (FDF). PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT WAS TO INSPECT THE QUALITY CONTROL STANDARDS OF THE LAPUA AMMUNITION FACTORY (GOVERNMENT OWNED) AND SAKO OY (A PRIVATELY OWNED RIFLE AND AMMO MANUFACTURING COMPANY). DURING THIS VISIT HE BROUGHT WITH HIM THE FORMAL REQUESTS FOR BIDS FOR THE TWO COMPANIES AND USED THE VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY TECHNICAL QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE PAPERS. INCLUDED ALSO WAS A REQUEST FOR BID FROM VALMET OY FOR AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLE MAGAZINES WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO THAT COMPANY SEPARATELY BY THE DAO. DURING THIS VISIT THE REPRESENTATIVE EMPHASIZED TO ARMA THE URGENCY OF THE PROCUREMENT. THE REQUEST FOR BIDS HAD A SUBMISSION DATE TO THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY OF MAY 4, 1970. THE REQUEST FOR BID CONTAINED 1.2 MILLION ROUNDS OF AK-47 AMMUNITION AND 5,000 ASSAULT RIFLE MAGAZINES.
3. ON MAY 6, 1970 CONTRACTS WERE AWARDED TO LAPUA AND SAKO VIA TELEX BY THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY, FORMAL PAPER WORK TO FOLLOW. LAPUA WAS AWARDED A CONTRACT FOR 1.2 MILLION ROUNDS OF AK-47 AMMO (CARTRIDGE 7.62 MM XM39, M43). SAKO WAS AWARDED A CONTRACT FOR 100,000 ROUNDS OF SAME AMMO AND ALSO 5,000 ASSAULT RIFLE MAGAZINES. THE REQUESTS FOR BIDS ALSO CONTAIN OPTIONS FOR PROCUREMENT OF ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION. THE

TOP SECRET

-2- Helsinki 506 dated 11 May 70

Control: 2507Q

PROCUREMENT AGENCY INFORMED ARMA PRIVATELY THAT SUCH ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS MAY GO BY INCREMENTS TO AS HIGH AS TEN MILLION ROUNDS. THE VALMET COMPANY DID NOT SUBMIT A BID FOR THE MAGAZINES, ALTHOUGH IT IS THE PRIME MANUFACTURER OF THIS EQUIPMENT.

4. FOR INFORMATION THERE HAS BEEN A VERY CORDIAL AND BUSINESSLIKE WORKING RELATIONSHIP DURING THE VISIT BY THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY REP AND THE FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH OFFICIALS OF BOTH COMPANIES BY ARMA, ALL OF WHICH INDICATED THAT THEY DESIRED THE CONTRACT. LAPUA IS THE PRIME MANUFACTURER OF THE SAME TYPE OF AMMUNITION FOR THE FDF. THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY REP WAS INFORMED THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON A TEN MILLION ROUND ORDER FOR THE FDF AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH SAKO IS PRIMARILY A MANUFACTURER OF SPORTING RIFLES AND AMMUNITION (MANY BEING EXPORTED TO THE U.S.), IT ALSO HAS THE CAPABILITY OF MANUFACTURING MILITARY AMMUNITION. THIS SAME AMMUNITION AND MAGAZINE USED IN THE FINNISH ASSAULT RIFLE IS COMPATIBLE WITH ALL EAST BLOC AND CHICOM MANUFACTURED ASSAULT RIFLES.

5. THE FOREGOING REPRESENTS THE RELEVANT FACTS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER TO DATE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE COUNTRY TEAM HERE IN HELSINKI WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS ACTION AS WE HAVE IN THE RECENT WEEKS. MY SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH INFORMS ME OF THE HIGH LEVEL SUPPORT OF THIS PROJECT AND THE DESIRES THAT THIS MATTER REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

PETERSON

BT

Note: Message delayed in transmission.



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TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 071842Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6499
BT
SECRET HELSINKI 1895

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07 JUL 73 Z19 40 Kennedy
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TO HAIL

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SECTO 45

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE MINISTERIAL MEETING

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 JUL 8 AM 10:12

1. THE CSCE MINISTERIAL MEETING HELD AT HELSINKI JULY 2-7, IN WHICH WE WERE JOINED BY COLLEAGUES FROM 33 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA, MARKED A FURTHER AND REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL STEP IN THIS ENTERPRISE LAUNCHED LAST NOVEMBER. WE COMMITTED OUR GOVERNMENTS TO RECOMMENDATIONS DEVELOPED IN SIX MONTHS OF PREPARATORY TALKS, AND AGREED TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES TO DEVELOP TEXTS COVERING PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND OTHER SPHERES, AND FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLES, IDEAS, AND INFORMATION.
2. IN SESSIONS FREE OF CONTENTION AND SERIOUS IN TONE, THE SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES LAID HEAVIEST STRESS, AS EXPECTED, ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. I WAS JOINED VIGOROUSLY BY THE FRG AND OTHER ALLIES IN EMPHASIZING RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE, AND MAKING CLEAR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL CHANGE IN FRONTIERS, IF BASED ON POPULAR WILL.
3. AT THE SAME TIME, ALL WESTERN AND NONALIGNED STATES ENDORSED ENHANCED HUMAN CONTACTS, THE FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION, AND CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES. RETURNING TO POSITIONS THEY HAD EARLIER TAKEN IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, THE SOVIETS AND OTHER PACT STATES EMPHASIZED THAT CONTACTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN CONFORMITY WITH NATIONAL REGULATIONS, REFLECTING THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN EXISTING BARRIERS LARGELY INTACT.

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-2- HELSINKI 1895, JUL 7, NODIS

4. THE UNITED FRONT OF OUR ALLIES ON BOTH OF THE FOREGOING ISSUES WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO ACHIEVE WITHOUT REAL CHALLENGE THEIR PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE OF AFFIRMING THROUGH CSCE THE IMMUTABILITY OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES IN EUROPE; THEY WILL BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO MODIFY THEIR PRESENT RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES IN THE AREAS OF HUMAN CONTACTS AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND IDEAS.

5. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK, TOO, BY THE REALISTIC ATTITUDE OF OUR ALLIES, ESPECIALLY AS REFLECTED IN THE COMMENTS OF DOUGLAS-HOME, SCHEEL, AND JOBERT. WHILE ALL SHARE HOPE FOR SOME PROGRESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT NONE BELIEVES CSCE WILL BE A PANACEA. NOR ARE OUR ALLIES FEEDING EUPHORIC PUBLIC EXPECTATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THEIR CAUTIOUS COMMENTS SUGGEST THEY ARE TRYING TO CONVEY TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THEIR COUNTRIES THAT CSCE IS ONLY A LIMITED STEP AND THAT NATO'S DEFENSES MUST BE MAINTAINED.

6. THE REACTIONS TO THE US POSITION WERE FAVORABLE. THE RESTATEMENT OF YOUR POSITION CONCERNING THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE WAS ESPECIALLY WELCOMED BY OUR ALLIES.

7. THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BEGIN AT COMMITTEE LEVEL IN SEPTEMBER. THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR CONCLUDING THE CONFERENCE AT A MEETING AT HIGHEST LEVEL TOWARD THE END OF THIS YEAR, BUT THESE POINTS WERE NOT REALLY DEBATED. THERE CONTINUES TO BE SUBSTANTIAL RESERVE ABOUT THE LEVEL AND THE WORK REMAINING MAKES A CONSIDERABLY LATER DATE A MORE REALISTIC PROSPECT FOR THE FINAL PHASE.

ROGERS

SECRET

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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O 051805Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6452
BT
S E C R E T HELSINKI 1839

1057Q
05 JUL 73Z 1900

Sent to S.C.
Kennedy
McFarlane
Sonnenfeldt

NODIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

FOR ELIOT FROM STOESSEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ROGERS, WILLIAM P.)
SUBJECT: SCHEEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. SCHEEL HAS INFORMED SECRETARY HE HAS RECEIVED COMMUNICATION FROM BRANDT STATING THAT HE SHOULD PROCEED TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH DR. KISSINGER ON US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS.
2. SCHEEL PROPOSES, IF AGREEABLE TO KISSINGER, THAT HE ARRIVE WASHINGTON JULY 11 IN EVENING FOR TALKS ON JULY 12. SCHEEL WOULD DEPART FOR BONN MORNING OF JULY 13.
3. SCHEEL OBVIOUSLY WILL LEAVE TO KISSINGER MANNER IN WHICH TALKS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED. HIS OWN PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR HEAD-TO-HEAD MEETING, FOLLOWED BY SESSION WITH ONE OR TWO ADVISORS ON EACH SIDE. SCHEEL WILL ALSO WISH TO SEE SECRETARY AND WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE BRIEF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IF POSSIBLE.
4. IF ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON SUBJECT MATTER OF TALKS WITH KISSINGER COULD BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO SCHEEL'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON, SCHEEL STATEY HE WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO HAVE IT.
5. SCHEEL WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY VAN WELL AND BRUNNER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE, AND HALLIER FROM HIS OWN OFFICE.

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-2- HELSINKI 1839, Jul 5, 1973 NODIS

6. SCHEEL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS ON SUGGESTED SCHEDULE AND OTHER POINTS WHICH WE COULD PASS TO HIM HERE PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM HELSINKI, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR SATURDAY AFTERNOON, HELSINKI TIME, JULY 7.

ROGERS

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED BONN BY OC/T.

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73 JUL 6 PM 10:57

SECRET

COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES

Department of State
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WH
TELEGRAM

O 062134Z JUL 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5391
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 8154
BT
S E C R E T STATE 132724

CONTROL: 1 5 2 5Q

NODIS
TOSEC 78

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (WALTER SCHEEL)
SUBJECT: SCHEEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON
REF: HELSINKI 1839

1. DR. KISSINGER WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL ON JULY 12, AND WILL ENDEAVOR ALSO TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.
2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING SUBJECT MATTER OF TALKS AND ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING PARTICIPANTS, NOT NOW AVAILABLE, BUT WE HOPE IT CAN BE PROVIDED TO SCHEEL IN BONN PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE JULY 11.
3. WOULD THE SECRETARY WISH TO DO ANYTHING MORE THAN MEET WITH SCHEEL? FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD HE WISH TO HAVE A LUNCHEON FOR HIM ON JULY 12, PROVIDED THAT SCHEDULE COORDINATION WILL PERMIT THIS? RUSH

EUR:WSTABLER:EMT
7/6/73:21010
S/S - MR. MILLER

EUR/CE - MR. SKOUG
S - MR. LISSY

WHITE HOUSE - GEN. SCOWCROFT {SUBS}

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Department of State

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SONNENFELD
TELEGRAM

R 072125Z FEB 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESHL/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 2992
INFO RUQSNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 2451
BT
SECRET STATE 021361

CONTROL: 0 0 1 7 1 7Q
RECD: 07 FEB '72, 438PM

NODIS

NAIROBI FOR AMBASSADOR BUSH

SUBJECT: JAKOBSON AFFAIR

REF: HELSINKI 147
STATE 18868

1. FINNISH CHARGE PUSA CALLED ON FESSENDEN EVENING OF FEBRUARY 4. PUSA SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A CABLE FROM HELSINKI IN RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE REPORTING CONVERSATION WITH FESSENDEN ABOUT JAKOBSON AFFAIR.
2. IN THE CABLE FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMED PUSA THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF MATTER WERE CLOSED AND "LEFT TO DIE."
3. IN VIEW OF FINNISH GOVERNMENT'S OBVIOUS EMBARRASSMENT AND DESIRE TO BURY ISSUE, DEPARTMENT FEELS MATTER IS CLOSED. HYVARINEN'S HEART ATTACK, AS REPORTED IN HELSINKI'S 147, REINFORCES THIS DECISION. EMBASSY SHOULD THEREFORE NOT DISCUSS AFFAIR. GP-4 ROGERS

BT
1361

DRAFTED BY: EUR/SCAN: WBodde, Jr.
APPROVED BY: EUR - Mr. Fessenden
EUR/SCAN - Mr. Fleisher
C- Mr. Pedersen

IO- Mr. Depalma
S/S - Mr. Miller

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 5 7 9 9Q
RECD: 21 JUL '71, 8:01PM

JUL 22 AM 9:37
STATE DEPT ROOM

R 212243Z JUL 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESHL/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 2545
RUESPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3366
RUESFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 4249
RUESSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 2597
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7409
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 8099
RUESXBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN 3708
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2352
RUESMDQ/AMEMBASSY MADRID 7059
RUESFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON 3459
RUESGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 5208
RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 0540
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 8967
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1766
BT
SECRET STATE 132194

NODIS

1. AT THEIR REQUEST, CHIEFS OF FOLLOWING EUROPEAN MISSIONS CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY GREEN FOR BRIEFING ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S JULY 15 ANNOUNCEMENT: AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, DENMARK, FINLAND, IRELAND, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND. DURING TWENTY MINUTE SESSION GREEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

2. HE APPRECIATED GROUP'S DESIRE FOR INFORMATION BUT SPEAKING FRANKLY THERE WAS NOT MUCH HE COULD SAY BEYOND THE PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT. HE CITED PRESIDENT NIXON'S 1971 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT STATEMENT, "IN THIS DECADE, THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE NO MORE IMPORTANT CHALLENGE THAN THAT OF DRAWING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE REST OF ASIA." CONSISTENT WITH THAT VIEW, PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF UNILATERAL STEPS DESIGNED TO OPEN UP COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRC, TO RENEW THE DIALOGUE, TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PEKING AND TO FACILITATE PRC MOVEMENT INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MAINSTREAM. INTERNAL CHANGES WITHIN PRC SINCE END OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION OFFERED HOPE THAT NOW MIGHT BE A PROPITIOUS TIME FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE.

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-2- STATE 132194, JUL 21, 1971 (NODIS)

3. HE REGRETTED OUR INABILITY TO HOLD ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS ON THIS LATEST MOVE BUT IT HAD TO BE HANDLED WITH THE GREATEST SECRECY: NO COUNTRY WAS INFORMED IN ADVANCE AND VERY FEW WERE PRIVY TO THIS INFORMATION IN USG. HE HOPED THAT THOSE PRESENT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE THE NECESSITY FOR HOLDING DOWN SPECULATION WHICH COULD IMPAIR OR JEOPARDIZE THE SUCCESS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT, NO DATE FOR WHICH HAD YET BEEN SET.

4. THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WAS NOT RPT NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY ON THE CONTRARY AS WE MOVED TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS WITH PEKING THERE WAS NO REASON FOR OTHERS TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE AT THEIR EXPENSE. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY OUR FRIENDS, INCLUDING THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND OUR COMMITMENTS TO THEM.

5. ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT GO INTO SUBSTANCE OF THE CHOU-KISSINGER TALKS, HE COULD SAY THAT THERE WERE NO AGREEMENTS BEYOND THAT SET FORTH IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE TALKS WERE EXPLORATORY IN NATURE, DIRECTED AT PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL TRIP INCLUDING THE DRAFTING OF THE COMMUNIQUE.

6. WORLD REACTION HAD BEEN ALMOST UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE AND GREEN THANKED THOSE PRESENT WHOSE GOVERNMENTS HAD SUPPORTED OUR MOVE.

7. IN THE ENSURING QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD, GREEN SAID: (A) USG IS CLOSE TO A DECISION ON THE CHIREP ISSUE BUT MUST CONSULT FURTHER, ESPECIALLY WITH TAIPEI; (B) WE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF FUTURE CONTACTS WITH PEKING; AND (C) THE TERM "NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS" IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS CAREFULLY

CHOSEN BECAUSE IT IS NOT SPECIFIC WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. ROGERS
BT

DRAFTED BY: EA/ACA:WABrown
IO-UNP-JAArmitage
EUR/RPM-Mr.Floyd

APPROVED BY: EA-MGreen
S/S-Mr.Miller
EUR-Mr.Fessenden

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LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

1. Sent by:

TO: WH 971
(Msg. No.)

3. Transmitted by: Stenberg

4. Received by: WASB CB

Date & Time: 20

Date & Time: 12/12/32

5. Description:

Depart. Tel. to HELSINKI

6. Class & Controls:

SECRET/LIMDIS

7. No. of Pgs. 1

8. Precedence

IMMEDIATE

9. Validated by: JPWalsh

10. Deliver to:

Henry Kissinger

For: Clearance

XXXXXX

The White House

Information

Per Request

FAIR concerns called S/S O R

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