

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 19, 1977

TO: The Recipients of NSDM #144
SUBJECT: Declassification of NSDM #144

National Security Decision Memorandum #144 of December 22, 1971 titled "United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group" was declassified on May 18, 1977. Please mark your document accordingly.

Met
Michael Hornblow
Acting Staff Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 22, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 144

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Interior
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Secretary of Transportation
 The Director, National Science Foundation
 The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality

SUBJECT: United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group

The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as forwarded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.

The President has decided that the United States will support the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace.

In furtherance of this policy, the President has:

- Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific projects (with budgetary implications as appropriate), for increasing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource development and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the understanding of the Arctic environment; and for developing a framework for international cooperation with particular attention given the Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be forwarded for the President's consideration not later than March 1, 1972.)

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Auth. EC 11052
D. G. 18 May 1977
By: Michael H. HANCOCK
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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
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- Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established, chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Department of State is responsible for providing the administrative support, including staff, necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group to carry out its responsibilities.)

The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to Alaska. In discharging these responsibilities, the Arctic Policy Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. Any substantive policy issues requiring the President's decision will be referred to the NSC Senior Review Group for consideration.

- Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations to be made to the Arctic Policy Group.

There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action programs requested above.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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March 10, 1972

Memorandum for: NSC Secretariat
The White House

Subject: CSCE Working Group Meeting on Security
Monday, March 13, 1972 at 10:00 a.m.,
Room 7519 NS

There is attached, for Mr. Hyland and Mr. Powers of your staff, a copy of a paper "CSCE: Relationship with MBFR" which will be discussed at the meeting.

Michaela Plas
Secretariat Staff

Attachment:

As stated.

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Mr Powers 3/9/72

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CSCE: Relationship with MBFR

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CSCE Security Issues:
The Relationship with MBFR

I. Introduction

The current US position, stated in NSDM 142, is to move slowly and carefully on both MBFR and CSCE, to develop NATO consensus on positions on both which maintain undiminished security, and to keep the two fully separate.

We have urged upon the Allies the need for separation on the basis that East-West MBFR discussions should not be delayed, and that linking MBFR to CSCE would attach to MBFR the Allied CSCE precondition of a Berlin agreement. The Allies thus far have been prepared to accept separation, mainly because they recognize MBFR has played a major role in dealing with Congressional sentiment favoring unilateral US force reductions. However, as the prospect increases that CSCE may precede MBFR negotiations, the argument for CSCE separation from MBFR has less validity in the eyes of our Allies.

At this time, general Allied sentiment favors the inclusion of questions related to security on a CSCE agenda, and a majority, but not including the US, UK and France, would prefer to deal with MBFR and related issues under the CSCE security rubric. Thus, the US confronts the following issues addressed in this paper:

- the procedural relationship between CSCE and MBFR negotiations;

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-- the related question of dealing with the desire of some Allies for CSCE discussion at least of stabilizing measures, and perhaps of other MBFR elements, such as MBFR principles and proposals for force limitations or reductions.

II. The Security Question in CSCE

The Pact proposed in 1969 that CSCE adopt a declaration on renunciation of the use of force. Subsequently, NATO, to rebut the Brezhnev doctrine, proposed that CSCE address principles governing relations between states. However, partly in response to US desire that CSCE also address concrete issues of security, and partly from the concern of some over the results if CSCE were to avoid addressing issues of military security, NATO Ministers agreed in December 1971 to continue the study of "questions of security, including ... certain military aspects of security", looking toward discussion of these issues at a Conference on European Security (CSCE). Their decision reflected the view of a strong majority of Ministers that, in addition to discussion, under the security heading, of principles governing relations between states, CSCE should address concrete issues related to the military confrontation in Europe.

Allied Views. Subsequent Allied efforts to identify appropriate issues of security for discussion at CSCE have resulted in

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-- a general Allied desire to address general strategic issues related to the European military balance;

-- a majority, but not including the UK and France, favoring, at minimum, CSCE discussion and possible agreement on stabilizing measures, such as advance notification of military movements and maneuvers, heretofore associated with MBFR as "collateral constraints" complementing an agreement on force reductions. This represents a departure from the position taken by the Allies in the December 1969 declaration. NATO Ministers at that time directed further studies of measures which could accompany or follow agreement on MBFR. As examples of these ancillary measures, Ministers cited advance notification of military movements and maneuvers, exchange of observers at military maneuvers, and possibly establishment of observation posts. Two of these -- advance notification and observation posts -- have subsequently been considered in NATO studies as collateral measures associated with MBFR. Observation posts also could be one of the MBFR verification and inspection modalities, which NATO has agreed will depend on the size and nature of the reduction agreement. Only exchange of observers has not yet been considered in the MBFR context.

-- some also viewing favorably CSCE discussion of principles governing MBFR, along the lines of the Allied statements on guidelines for MBFR in recent Ministerial communiqués;

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-- all but the US favoring general discussion of MBFR at CSCE, though there is broad Allied recognition that actual negotiation of force reductions should take place in a more restricted forum.

In Allied and US studies to date, no other issues of security have been identified as suitable for possible discussion at CSCE.

Pact Views. The Warsaw Pact clearly prefers to address MBFR and related issues in a body to be established by CSCE. While acknowledging that reference may be made to disarmament at CSCE, but apparently seeking to avoid dealing with security issues at CSCE, the Soviets have indicated that complicated matters of military security should be dealt with in a limited forum, preferably established by CSCE, and comprising states directly involved, as well as some neutral and non-aligned states.

* * * *

In sum, at this point, CSCE is the center of Allied and Soviet attention. Barring FRG parliamentary failure to ratify the Moscow treaty, multilateral preparations for CSCE could begin in Helsinki by autumn. Movement toward MBFR explorations and negotiations, on the other hand, has been stalled by Soviet refusal to receive Brosio, and apparent preference for dealing with MBFR only after convening a CSCE. Meanwhile, many Allies are seeking to inject MBFR elements into the CSCE context.

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III. Procedural Relationship of CSCE and MBFR

The linkage, or lack of it, between CSCE and MBFR discussions and negotiations on substantive issues depends importantly on the procedural relationship between the fora to be established to address these questions. The considerations addressed below would obtain whether there were a long or short preparatory phase, or whether there were one or two Ministerial CSCE meetings. Broadly, there are four alternatives:

1. maintain total separation of CSCE and MBFR, as in current US policy.
2. maintain procedural separation between CSCE and MBFR, with concurrent emphasis on movement toward MBFR, conditioning progress in preparations for CSCE on progress toward MBFR.
3. Advocate in Allied CSCE preparations and in initial multilateral East-West talks the establishment by a Ministerial CSCE of machinery for subsequent MBFR negotiations.
4. Link MBFR to CSCE via a special subgroup to deal with MBFR in tandem with CSCE.

1. Maintain total separation of CSCE and MBFR, as in current US policy. The Allies would seek to limit CSCE consideration of security issues at most to a general discussion of MBFR, possibly followed by a CSCE declaration supporting MBFR negotiations among the states directly concerned. CSCE would not consider stabilizing measures, MBFR principles, or reductions. Progress toward CSCE would not be conditioned on parallel progress toward MBFR.

Advantages

-- would underline the long-standing US position that MBFR is so complex and sensitive that only the states directly

involved should participate in negotiations.

-- would likely be acceptable to the Soviets, who prefer that CSCE address non-security issues.

-- would avoid risk of scuttling MBFR in the event CSCE did not take place.

-- would give the US and the Allies maximum freedom to pursue MBFR studies, explorations and negotiations at a pace corresponding to military and political needs.

-- would avoid separating elements of MBFR, and permit them to be pursued comprehensively in a single forum.

-- would avoid offering the Soviets a possible tactical opportunity to allege that, since stabilization measures were being addressed at CSCE, they were inappropriate for discussion in association with force reduction negotiations.

Disadvantages

-- could result in no progress toward MBFR, at least until after convening of CSCE.

-- since no change in the current US approach to MBFR would be involved, Congressional proponents of unilateral US forces reductions could claim lack of US and Allied interest in MBFR.

-- there would be only the most general CSCE discussion of security issues, and desires for progress in dealing at CSCE with real issues of security would not be met.

-- could precipitate sharp criticism and possibly isolation from our Allies, since a fairly broad consensus has existed for several months that MBFR elements constitute the only real security issues CSCE could address.

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-- would make the US appear opposed to possible movement toward resolution of East-West security issues.

-- would forego opportunities for US leadership in shaping Allied goals at CSCE which might otherwise result in declaratory undertakings, peripheral to central security concerns, while giving the appearance of enhancing detente to the detriment of Allied defense efforts.

-- would forego an opportunity to bring CSCE participants face-to-face with the strategic realities of European security.

2. Maintain present procedural separation between MBFR and CSCE, with concurrent emphasis on movement toward MBFR explorations and negotiations, conditioning progress in preparations for CSCE on progress toward MBFR. Under this approach, the US would continue to argue against dealing with MBFR in the CSCE context. This approach also would build upon Soviet interest in an early CSCE to obtain agreement to steps toward MBFR talks, conditioning Allied movement in CSCE multi-lateral preparatory talks to Soviet movement toward MBFR. Depending on the Soviet response and Allied cohesion, this approach also could result in MBFR explorations and negotiations beginning at about the same time as CSCE.

Advantages

- would keep substantive MBFR elements separate from CSCE.
- if the Soviets refused to move forward on MBFR, for

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example by not receiving Western MBFR exploratory mission, the Allies would have a logical basis for arguing that Pact failure to deal with a real security issue ruled out further preparations for a CSCE.

Disadvantages

-- by making movement toward MBFR negotiations a precondition of CSCE, contrary to the present Allied position on CSCE, it would encounter strong resistance from the majority of Allies favoring an early CSCE.

-- could be exploited publicly by the Soviets as a belated new obstacle, analogous to the Berlin precondition, to CSCE.

-- to be fully effective, this approach would require that CSCE preparations and MBFR explorations advance in tandem, which could prove complicated, particularly in view of the complexity of MBFR.

-- could preclude CSCE discussion of real security issues.

-- even if the USSR were to agree to early MBFR negotiations, the Allies might not be adequately prepared.

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3. Advocate in Allied CSCE preparations and in initial multilateral East-West talks the establishment by a Ministerial CSCE of machinery for subsequent MBFR negotiations.

Advantages

- Would be acceptable to most Allies and to the Pact.
- Would provide a vehicle for preliminary discussion of security issues, without necessarily circumscribing actual MBFR negotiations to follow in a more restricted forum.

Disadvantages

- Would suggest to many that MBFR deliberately were being deferred and played down.
- By postponing MBFR discussions until after CSCE, might not meet Allied desires for discussion and negotiation in CSCE of elements of MBFR.

4. Link MBFR to CSCE via a special sub-group to deal with MBFR in tandem with preparation for a CSCE, possibly followed by establishment by the Ministerial CSCE of a continuing MBFR group. This approach offers a way to move ahead on MBFR by linking MBFR and CSCE procedurally, but in a way designed to limit the problems of mixing the two. In the initial CSCE multilateral preparatory stage, the Allies could press for the creation of an MBFR sub-group along with other CSCE working groups. Thereafter, in subsequent multilateral preparatory talks the MBFR sub-group would be formally established. It would be confined to states directly concerned, and

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would report to Ministers of those states, who would undertake to report to CSCE the results of the sub-group's work. Thus, while the full CSCE could hold general discussions on MBFR, substantive explorations or negotiations on principles, constraints, or reductions would be conducted by the sub-group, while the CSCE would only note its findings.

The MBFR sub-group could:

-- Continue exploration of substantive issues, along the lines envisaged for the Brosio mission; or

-- If agreed by the Allies, negotiate agreements on MBFR principles and/or stabilization measures, along the lines envisaged in the first two steps of the FRG proposal for a phased approach; or

-- After appropriate explorations, undertake to move directly to negotiation of an MBFR agreement, including actual reductions, as well as principles and constraints.

The following illustrative sequence suggests a possible way of advancing this approach with our Allies and with the Soviets and their allies:

-- US and NATO studies would continue on security issues to be addressed at CSCE.

-- Until the May 30-31 Ministerial meeting, bilateral probes would continue by the US and Allies of the USSR views towards MBFR and CSCE.

-- The US could discuss bilaterally with Soviet representatives in Moscow a comprehensive and coordinated procedural approach to CSCE and MBFR negotiations.

-- If the Soviets agree, preparatory talks on MBFR or its elements -- as outlined above -- would be held among national representatives concurrent with CSCE preparatory talks.

There follow the advantages and disadvantages of this approach:

Advantages

-- Could use CSCE preparatory stages as a springboard to MBFR preparations, by providing in the near term an organization linked to CSCE and specifically charged with exploring MBFR and establishing the framework for negotiations.

-- Would be consistent with Pact indications that it would be prepared to envisage MBFR talks parallel to CSCE preparations.

-- Would represent a step forward on MBFR highly visible to Allied publics and parliaments.

-- Would provide a measure of control over the pace of MBFR explorations.

-- Would leave open the possibility of linking progress in the

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IV. Dealing with Elements of MBFR in CSCE

Depending upon the procedural approach selected from those in Part III, above, there follow possible alternative approaches to dealing with elements of MBFR at CSCE, on the assumptions that a) general discussion, at least, of MBFR is unavoidable; b) negotiations on actual force reductions are too complex and sensitive to be handled in CSCE, which will comprise some thirty states, and should be dealt with in a smaller body; and c) some Allies will maintain pressures to deal with elements of MBFR in CSCE:

(1) Attempting to reach at least broad agreement on stabilizing measures in the CSCE context.

(2) A variant of (1), whereby discussion of stabilizing measures of European-wide application would be discussed initially in a CSCE, negotiated in an MBFR forum established by CSCE, but open to accession by all European states.

(3) Negotiation of MBFR principles in the CSCE context.

All have the following disadvantages:

-- MBFR, if introduced into CSCE, with so many participants, might slip from the control of the states most directly involved;

-- The separation of MBFR elements into different fora working on different schedules would render difficult, if not impossible, a comprehensive sequential approach; and

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-- Could be seen by Allied publics and parliaments as postponing actual negotiation of reductions.

On the other hand, all have the following general advantages:

-- Allied movement to negotiations on actual reductions could proceed at a more deliberate pace;

-- NATO and other countries not directly involved would participate to some degree in discussions related to MBFR;

-- French involvement in discussion of European security issues, regional arms control measures and force reductions might be encouraged; and

-- Stabilizing measures, if agreed, might be advantageously extended to a broader geographic area than the eventual zone of actual force reductions.

The following discussion outlines pros and cons of each of the approaches outlined above.

(1) Attempting to Reach at Least Broad Agreement in CSCE on Stabilizing Measures. As envisaged by a majority of Allies, and now under NATO study, though the US, the UK and France have reserved their positions, agreement could be sought at CSCE on stabilizing measures, which previously had been considered as collateral constraints in the MBFR context. A balance would be needed between stabilizing measures that might be discussed at CSCE and those that are better suited for MBFR. At the same time, however, very demanding -- even patently unnegotiable -- measures might be explored in CSCE for propaganda purposes; for example, measures designed to challenge the Brezhnev Doctrine.

General advantages and disadvantages follow; some illustrative stabilizing measures are provided at Annex A:

Advantages

-- could lead to a better understanding of the utility of such measures in arms control arrangements by focusing general attention on specific measures to enhance stability;

-- could provide a test of Soviet interest in specific arms control measures, and their willingness to deal at CSCE with initial steps to enhance stability;

-- could permit application of some stabilizing measures to a broader area than the eventual reduction zone, encompassing, say, the flanks and Romania;

-- would give Allies and others not directly involved in eventual MBFR negotiations a role in dealing with issues associated with MBFR;

-- more stringent stabilizing measures than are likely to be agreed at CSCE would not necessarily be precluded from later negotiation in a more restricted MBFR forum; and

-- by addressing concrete issues of security, would offset Pact proposals for CSCE agreement on a purely hortatory declaration on renunciation of the use of force.

Disadvantages

-- the Pact could react acrimoniously to Allied efforts to introduce into CSCE elements of MBFR that could inhibit Soviet flexibility.

-- could prejudice later discussion of collateral constraints in MBFR negotiations and, specifically, tactically complicate efforts to tie specific constraints to proposed reductions in an MBFR negotiating package.

-- measures agreed in the CSCE context might reflect little net advance, yet be touted by the Pact as a significant achievement in the security sphere, and viewed by Allied public opinion as steps toward detente warranting reduced defense efforts.

-- if this occurred, it might be easier for the Soviets to avoid substantive MBFR explorations and negotiations, thus allowing MBFR, a major Allied initiative, to be postponed and slip into the background.

(2) As a variant of (1) above, initial discussions of stabilizing measures would be conducted in CSCE preparatory talks, and the issues thereafter would be remanded to the MBFR subgroup (see Part III.4, above) for the purpose of drawing up a separate agreement on stabilizing measures, which would be open to accession by other states as well as the MBFR participants.

Advantages

-- most of the advantages given for (1) above would apply;
-- additionally, it would have the advantage of linking discussion of stabilizing measure more closely to discussion of troop reductions. Europe-wide association could be encouraged by opening the agreement to accession by all states participating in the CSCE;

-- would set in train talks on MBFR in parallel with CSCE.

Disadvantages

-- would be akin to those under (1) above, but less compelling.

(3). Negotiation in CSCE of MBFR Principles, but not Reductions. Strongly supported by the FRG, and favored by others as well, including Belgium and Denmark, negotiation at CSCE of principles related to MBFR could involve seeking agreement on a declaration containing guidelines for MBFR along the lines proposed by the Allies in Ministerial communique of June 1968, December 1969, May 1970, and June 1971, and

reflected in the mandate of the Allied MBFR explorer (CM(71)49), agreed in October 1971. The FRG foresees the possibility of accession to a declaration by all at CSCE, or only by interested states or those participating in MBFR negotiations.

MBFR principles proposed by the FRG for CSCE discussion are at Annex B. There follow general advantages and disadvantages of including MBFR principles on a CSCE agenda:

Advantages

-- the advantages largely parallel those of dealing with stabilizing measures in CSCE. Additionally, however, by attracting broad support, efforts to agree on principle could provide additional pressure on the USSR and its allies to move toward MBFR negotiations, particularly if agreement were sought on the principle that early MBFR negotiations should be held, perhaps referring to a specific date.

Disadvantages

-- above all, might lead the Pact to accept anodyne principles, which they later could tout as a significant achievement in the security sphere.

-- if the foregoing occurred, it might be easier for the Soviets to avoid substantive MBFR explorations or negotiations, thus allowing MBFR, a major Allied initiative, to slip into the background.

-- the thrust of MBFR principles would likely be vitiated by separation from the more concrete context of force

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reductions, rendering more difficult subsequent discussion looking toward agreement on more stringent principles in MBFR negotiations.

-- involvement of states not directly concerned could pose problems.

V. A Force Limitation Agreement

To include a force limitation agreement in CSCE discussion, looking toward agreement, in line with tentative FRG thinking, would give the CSCE a focus toward a central security issue, and render discussion of force limitations the core agenda item.

However, the overriding disadvantage would be the likely pressures on the West, as much as on the East, to reach an agreement that, by setting a ceiling on forces, deprive the US and the Allies of flexibility and might prejudice force improvements. Moreover, it would engage some thirty states in sensitive issues best dealt with by states directly involved. Accordingly, it would appear clearly inappropriate for CSCE consideration.

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SECRETStabilizing Measures

Stabilizing measures would involve agreements to notify the other side in advance of significant military movements and to limit or refrain altogether from certain movements. They would not serve to prevent or slow down a Warsaw Pact buildup, if the Soviets chose to violate an agreement. Nor would they speed the flow in intelligence on Pact activities. They could, however, enhance early warning of a buildup by helping to remove ambiguity from Soviet military activity and making unannounced or otherwise illicit activities immediately suspect. Treating the agreement as an interpretive yardstick, NATO could reach judgments sooner about Pact intentions, and thus gain more time to decide on its reaction to Pact moves. Such additional time could help compensate NATO for the relative enhancement in the Soviet reinforcement advantage in Central Europe which reductions would bring about.

^{illustrative}
The/stabilizing measures below pertain to movement into and out of Europe, movement within Europe, and reserve call-ups. It would be preferable to negotiate/as a package. Most have been studied by the US in the MBFR context; a paper on MBFR constraints in response to a Verification Panel Working Group request is in production, and NATO's MBFR Working Group has initiated a study to which the US will be expected to contribute.

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Illustrative Measures

-- exchange of calendar year schedules of all force movements into and out of Europe, with a 90-day notification of any changes.

-- limitation on the size and duration of stay of forces introduced into Europe.^{1/} A limitation of 30 days and 20,000 men would seem reasonable. This would permit Reforger exercises, and allow the Pact to conduct its multilateral Front level exercises.

-- advance notification and exchanges of observers at exercises and maneuvers.

-- limitation on the size and duration of maneuvers. Illustrative figures are 30,000 men and 30 days.

-- advance notice of reserve call-ups. Call-ups of more than 1,000 (the figure is illustrative only) could be made subject to advance notification.

A constraints agreement would require some implementing machinery. An East-West commission could serve as a vehicle for exchange of notifications required by an agreement, for complaints and explanations of apparent violations, and for discussion of potentially destabilizing moves by either side not specially provided for in the agreement itself. A further discussion of permanent machinery that might be established by CSCE is at Annex C.

^{1/} While the duration provision may be of largely symbolic value until reductions or a force limitation agreement are negotiated, this provision would have a political value in both Eastern and Western Europe and would make the constraints, if negotiated reductions, also valid for a post-reduction setting.



ANNEX B

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 612

PAGE 01 NATO 00875 241832Z

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ACTION EUR-20

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 NSC-10 ACDA-19 E-11 TRSE-00 SA-03

CIAE-00 PM-06 INR-06 L-03 NEA-09 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 SAL-02 RSR-01 7123 W

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P R 241748Z FEB 72

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5251

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 1574

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 875

SUBJ: MBR: FRG DRAFT OF JOINT DECLARATION

REF: USNATO 797

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 25 AM 7 23

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. FRG DEL HAS CIRCULATED BY LETTER OF 23 FEBRUARY REVISED DRAFT OF JOINT DECLARATION ON OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FUTURE MBR NEGOTIATIONS. LETTER STATES DRAFT HAS BEEN FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT COULD BE USED IN CONTEXT OF CSCS, AND THAT DOCUMENT C-41(7-1049) (FINAL) AND RESULTS OF DISCUSSION IN SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. TEXT FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

- A -

THE SIGNATORIES,

CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN SECURING PEACE, EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE POLICY OF DETENTE ON WHICH THEY HAVE EMBARKED, INTENDING TO LOOK FOR POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION IN THE INTEREST OF GREATER SECURITY, HOPING THEREBY TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN EUROPE AND

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 02875 241832Z

THROUGHOUT THE WORLD,
WELCOME THE DECISION OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO ENTER INTO
NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE
AND AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER STABILIZING
MEASURES.

-B-

THE SIGNATORIES

- AGREE THAT IT SHOULD BE THE AIM OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS
- (A) TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE THROUGH STABILIZING AGREEMENTS,
 - (B) TO SET IN MOTION A PROCESS TOWARDS AN AGREED, REDUCED LEVEL OF FORCES IN EUROPE,
 - (C) TO PLAN THIS PROCESS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE REDUCED LEVEL OF FORCES IS REACHED BY PHASES FORMING PART OF AN INTEGRAL PROGRAM,
 - (D) TO ENSURE THAT STABILITY IS MAINTAINED AT EACH STAGE AND TO THIS END CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT TRANSITION TO A SUBSEQUENT STAGE DOES NOT TAKE PLACE UNLESS THE MEASURES PERTAINING TO THE PRECEDING STAGE HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AND UNLESS THE COLLATERAL MEASURES HAVE PROVED EFFECTIVE.

-C-

THE SIGNATORIES

- AGREE THAT THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:
- (A) ALL REDUCTION MEASURES SHOULD BE SO BALANCED THAT THEY DO NOT OPERATE AT ANY STAGE TO THE MILITARY DISADVANTAGE OF ANY ONE STATE OR GROUP OF STATES AND THAT UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IS ENSURED EQUALLY FOR ALL PARTIES,
 - (B) AGREEMENTS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR THE DIFFERENCES ARISING FROM GEOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS,
 - (C) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY BY ALL STATES WHOSE FORCES ARE AFFECTED BY AGREEMENTS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS,
 - (D) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PHASED IN THEIR SCOPE AND TIMING,
 - (E) AN INTEGRAL PROGRAM ON FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES,
 - (F) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PRECEDED OR ACCOMPANIED

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 NATO 00875 241832Z

- BY OTHER STABILIZING MEASURES
OR:
COLLATERAL MEASURES SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE RISK OF
MISCALCULATION AND SURPRISE ATTACKS IS REDUCED,
(G) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RESULT IN
AN INCREASED THREAT TO OTHER REGIONS REPRESENTED BY
SIGNATORIES OF THIS DECLARATION,
(H) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH ANY
MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY VERIFIED AT
EACH STAGE, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SUCH VERIFICATIONS
DEPENDING ON THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AGREED MBFR
MEASURES.

-D-

THE SIGNATORIES

EXPRESS THEIR FIRM CONVICTION THAT AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING
THESE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES WOULD STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND
PEACE IN EUROPE AND STATE THEIR INTEREST IN AN EARLY START OF
NEGOTIATIONS ON MEASURES REDUCING THE DANGERS OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION. END TEXT
GP-4 VEST

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CONFIDENTIALPOSSIBLE POST-CSCE
PERMANENT MACHINERYI. RECOMMENDED US POSITION

We remain ready to study this issue further when the Allies wish to do so. Consideration will have to be given internally to what kind of prior congressional consultation would be required or appropriate, should the US decide to participate in post-conference permanent machinery.

II. DISCUSSION

We tabled in NATO in September 1971 a study giving illustrative US views on permanent machinery, which has not yet been discussed by the Allies. The following paragraphs are based essentially upon that study.

Introduction

The Warsaw Pact countries proposed, at their June 1970 Budapest meeting, the establishment, by a CSCE, of a permanent "organ" for questions of security and cooperation in Europe. In part, this may have been in response to the NATO proposal, in paragraph 15 of the May 1970 Rome Ministerial Communique, that a permanent body might be established prior to such a conference. However, apart from mention of the possibility of discussion of MBFR in the "organ," the Warsaw Pact countries have never explained their views clearly, although it has been raised in the course of various bilateral contacts with the NATO countries and was briefly mentioned in the January, 1972 Prague Communique.

For the foreseeable future, the security of the Allies will rest upon the NATO deterrent, and the existence of a permanent procedural device for East-West discussion could not restore the security which would be lost if the Allied deterrent posture

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should weaken. Indeed, in such circumstances, the existence of a body of this kind might have the opposite effect of making it easier for the Soviets to manipulate developments to their advantage. Thus, while a permanent body could not, in any meaningful sense, assume responsibility for the maintenance of European security, it might nevertheless provide a useful forum in which to address East-West problems, although the mere fact of its existence would not, of course, ensure that serious discussion or negotiations would actually take place.

Objectives

A. Allied Objectives

The utility of a permanent East-West organization should be decided in light of the following general Allied objectives:

- to further serious negotiations and discussions of concrete problems of European security and cooperation;
- to inhibit, to the extent possible, Moscow's use of force or threatening behavior to impose its will upon the Eastern European states;
- to give the smaller Warsaw Pact members additional latitude to develop their relations with the West without Soviet interference;
- to avoid providing the Soviets with additional opportunities to divide the Allies or to impede the growth of Western European unity.

If Allied Governments eventually agree to the establishment of a permanent organization after a CSCE, they would undoubtedly wish to make clear

to parliamentary and public opinion in their respective countries the rather modest results that could realistically be expected from it, at least in the near and medium term, in order to avoid unwarranted optimism and a consequent decline in support for the Alliance and for the necessary Allied defensive efforts.

B. Warsaw Pact Objectives

The Soviets undoubtedly see a permanent, post-CSCE body as a small step toward their long-held and ultimate goal of a European security system politically and militarily advantageous to them, which would supersede the "two military blocs" and involve the withdrawal of North American forces from the continent. It is interesting to recall that the Soviets first proposed the creation of a permanent body for European political consultations as early as the 1955 Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference.

To further this ultimate goal, the Soviets would almost certainly hope to use a permanent body as a platform from which to exert influence over Western European policies and developments, particularly to hinder further political and military cooperation. The Soviet Union would also seek to promote the view in Western public opinion that political problems could best be worked out in Europe among European countries themselves, without the participation of the United States and Canada.

Some of the smaller Warsaw Pact members, however, likely believe that the existence of some kind of on-going East-West machinery would give them additional freedom of maneuver and make it somewhat more embarrassing for the Soviets to use coercive methods in Eastern Europe.

The Nature Of A Permanent BodyA. General Considerations

Experience shows that multilateral groupings empowered to take decisions binding on member states function best when the members share a considerable measure of common purpose--something which could not be said of the some thirty states likely to attend a CSCE. Thus this suggests that the permanent body should be given a more modest role.

Conceivably one might also envision that the body could serve as a forum for largely public discussion and be empowered to vote resolutions--a kind of East-West general assembly. In an uncertain political climate, its debates, however, might sharpen opposing positions rather than create a climate conducive to negotiations. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact states would agree to join a body in which they would constitute a small minority (seven) of the likely total membership of some 30 states.

The Soviets will very probably attempt publicly to portray any permanent body as the first step in the creation of a new European security system which would progressively render obsolete existing alliances. They would also emphasize the "European" nature of the new body, conveying thereby the implication that they are members by right, while Canada and the US are present on sufferance.

Thus it would be desirable, in selecting the official title of any post-CSCE organization and drafting its terms of reference, to avoid terminology that might be consonant with these Soviet propaganda themes. Hence, permanent secretariat or permanent commission for East-West relations might, for example, be an appropriate designation. By the same token, the permanent body should not be constituted as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

B. Possible Alternative Structures

1. A Permanent East-West Secretariat

The Allies might wish initially to propose the establishment of a small secretariat in a neutral capital limited to purely administrative functions. It could serve as a link between the first and any subsequent conferences and could also organize ad hoc meetings of all or some of the participant states to discuss specific problems.

Modest machinery of this kind would be capable of expansion into a more ambitious organization if this should at some later period seem useful to all concerned.

2. A Permanent East-West Commission

The Allies might also wish to consider the possibility of a permanent organization structured somewhat along the lines of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and designed to promote businesslike and largely private discussions leading to the negotiation of concrete problems.

a. The Business of a Permanent Commission

Like the CCD, a post-CSCE organization might adopt a broadly defined and essentially permanent agenda, which illustratively could include the following headings:

- problems of security;
- problems of cooperation;
- problems of regional disarmament.

(1) Problems of security. If CSCE adopts a declaration or agreement on principles that should govern relations between states, the text could provide that any state which had reason to believe that another state had violated those principles, or was preparing to violate them, could raise the problem for discussion in the permanent body with a view to its resolution there.

In addition, a permanent commission, even though without enforcement powers, might nevertheless provide a framework for quiet diplomacy that could be helpful in resolving disputes endangering the security of Europe. While such problems could well come before the UN in some manner, concurrent discussions, out of the public limelight and in a body where most of the participants would have a substantial interest in a peaceful settlement, might usefully supplement the UN discussions.

(2) Problems of cooperation. A CSCE and its preliminaries will probably canvass a number of problems relating to expanded economic and technical exchanges, environmental matters, and the NATO proposal for freer movement of people, ideas and information. But few specific agreements may emerge.

If the discussions indicate a promise of future progress in these fields, negotiations could continue in the permanent body. Care should be taken to avoid organizational arrangements that would conflict and overlap with ECE and GATT.

Although the Soviets will resist it, the agenda of any post-CSCE body should nevertheless be arranged to permit further discussion of freer movement. This might be accomplished by subsuming the freer movement issue under the broader rubric of "cooperation." If further discussion of economic and technological exchanges, after a CSCE, were reserved exclusively to the ECE, it would then become very difficult if not impossible to get Warsaw Pact agreement to inclusion of freer movement, as a separate item, on the agenda of a permanent commission.

(3) Problems of regional disarmament. Were it agreed by the US and subsequently among the Allies, a permanent organization could, for example, provide a framework, after an initial MBFR agreement, for multilateral soundings on further regional disarmament negotiations. Subject to the terms of an

MBFR agreement, the organization could also be given the authority to discuss complaints of non-compliance. Finally, it could receive and disseminate reports produced by the multilateral system of verification and collateral constraints that might accompany such an agreement.

b. Methods of Work

These could also be similar to those of the CCD. It might be agreed that, in their formal statements, delegations could address themselves to any or all of the agenda items and make specific proposals if they desired. Work sessions would be closed to the press but perhaps open to the public on a restricted basis. While delegations would often brief the press on positions they had adopted, thus giving the proceedings a semi-public character, they nevertheless would not take place in the full glare of publicity. It could be hoped, then, that statements of delegations would be businesslike in character and not designed primarily for propaganda effect.

During the course of formal discussions and informal exchange, a consensus might develop on specific problems, permitting the tabling of draft agreements by one or several delegations which would reflect the general views of an even broader number and could thus serve as a realistic basis for negotiations. These could be conducted in plenary sessions or be assigned initially to restricted committees or working groups.

It might be useful to designate, as secretary general of the commission, a highly respected and experienced statesman from a neutral or non-aligned member state, in the expectation that he would chair plenary and other meetings and, particularly in informal discussion, actively encourage the convergence of viewpoints necessary to the initiation of negotiations. Although the chairmanship might be shared jointly by an Eastern

and Western state, or rotated between East and West, this could create difficulties with the non-aligned participants.

Illustratively, there might be two plenary sessions annually of about two months each, with meetings perhaps twice weekly during the sessions. There could be provision for calling special meetings between plenaries on short notice whenever, for example, three member governments so request the secretary general. States would usually be represented at ambassadorial level.

c. Administrative Questions

The Allies could propose Berlin as a desirable site for the organization. Other possible sites would be Vienna, Helsinki, Geneva, or another Swiss city.

Given the probable importance of the secretary general's role, he should be assisted by a personal staff of appropriate number and rank selected by him. The secretary general might also be assisted by two or three assistant secretaries general. The remainder of the secretariat should be apportioned roughly equally between nationals of NATO, the Warsaw Pact and neutral states. Moreover, just as in the case of the CCD negotiations, the UN might agree to render assistance and provide services. If the organization were located at Geneva, it could then draw upon the resources of the UN secretariat there. National delegations could also draw upon the expertise available in missions dealing with problems before the ECE, GATT and other bodies.

Conclusions

It is difficult now to judge whether a permanent organization could usefully supplement existing bilateral and multilateral channels for East-West negotiation. However, the prospects in this regard

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should become clearer during the multilateral exploratory and preparatory conversations prior to a CSCE and during the course of the conference itself.

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Backgrounder for the Mar 13 CSCE working Group mtg on MBFR

SUBJECT: _____

REFERENCE: S/S 7204569 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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| LATIN AMERICA | | | |
| UNITED NATIONS | | | |
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| NSC PLANNING | | | |
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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

SECRET

NSC-U/DM 72A

January 7, 1972

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Under Secretary, Department of Commerce
 The Under Secretary, Department of Interior
 The Under Secretary, Department of Health,
 Education and Welfare
 The Under Secretary, Department of
 Transportation
 The Director, Office of Science and Technology
 The Director, National Science Foundation
 The Assistant Director, Office of Management
 and Budget
 The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
 The Administrator, Environmental Protection
 Agency

SUBJECT: United States Arctic Policy and Arctic
 Policy Group

A study of United States Arctic policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation undertaken by the Under Secretaries Committee was completed and forwarded to the President on August 9, 1971. The President has completed his review of our recommendations, conclusions and report. National Security Decision Memorandum 144, copy attached, reflects his decisions.

The President has directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group (APG) be established, chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National Science Foundation,


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and the Council on Environmental Quality. I should like these departments and agencies, at this time, to designate to the APG their representatives at the Assistant Secretary level. The APG should coordinate its actions with the Under Secretaries Committee and refer to the Under Secretaries Committee unresolved issues. I have asked Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, to act as the State Department representative on, and chairman of the APG.

The President has also directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and forward detailed action programs for the Arctic. Details are set forth in NSDM 144. The APG should initiate the necessary action in furtherance of this and other directives and policy contained in NSDM 144.


John N. Irwin II

Attachment:

NSDM 144

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

December 22, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 144

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Interior
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Secretary of Transportation
 The Director, National Science Foundation
 The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality

SUBJECT: United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group

The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as forwarded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.

The President has decided that the United States will support the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace.

In furtherance of this policy, the President has:

- Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific projects (with budgetary implications as appropriate), for increasing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource development and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the understanding of the Arctic environment; and for developing a framework for international cooperation with particular attention given the Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be forwarded for the President's consideration not later than March 1, 1972.)


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- Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established, chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Department of State is responsible for providing the administrative support, including staff, necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group to carry out its responsibilities.)

The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to Alaska. In discharging these responsibilities, the Arctic Policy Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. Any substantive policy issues requiring the President's decision will be referred to the NSC Senior Review Group for consideration.

- Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations to be made to the Arctic Policy Group.

There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action programs requested above.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

December 22, 1971

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Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor

TYPE OF DOCUMENT: NSDM 144

DISPATCHED
N. S. C.

SUBJECT: United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
Oct 22 7 13 PM '71

DATE: December 22, 1971

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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| Defense - Sec. Laird | 2 | B. Wade, Jr. | 1325 | 23 Dec 71 |
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| HEW - Sec. Richardson | 1 | | | |
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| Gen. Haig | 1 | | | |
| Mr. Odeen | 1 | | | |
| Col. Kennedy | 1 | | | |
| Mr. Walsh | 1 | | | |
| JSC - Adm. Welander | 1 | | | |
| Justice - Attorney General | 1 | | | |
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

December 22, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 144

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Interior
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Secretary of Transportation
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Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor

NSOM 144

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REF/ACTION 31425

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CONFIDENTIAL

November 24, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG

FROM: MICHAEL GUHIN *MG*

THRU: JOHN WALSH *JW*

SUBJECT: US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group

John Haig

John Haig

On September 25, I forwarded for decision a package on the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's report on US Arctic policy and the establishment of an Arctic Policy Group (Action #31425).

At a recent meeting of the Economic Commission for Europe gas committee, the USSR chief delegate (Osipov) informed the US delegate that the Soviets would be interested in holding joint US-Canadian-USSR discussions and possibly organizing study tours on Arctic gas technology problems (Tab A). There have been some other indications over the past few months regarding Soviet interests in cooperation in specific Arctic projects.

As you know, the Canadians and Soviets have also been exploring cooperative bilateral Arctic projects. I think we can expect both countries to be raising Arctic issues with the US.

A decision on the Arctic policy package will facilitate consideration of possible Arctic issues which might be raised during the President's visits to Canada and the Soviet Union next year. If it is decided to pursue any of these issues, the bureaucracy will need time to prepare specific proposals. (As you know, Dr. Kissinger has just asked Russell Train to begin work on a bilateral environmental package that has Arctic policy implications.)

As I noted in the Arctic package memorandum, there is agreement between ourselves and the Domestic Council that there should be no public statement on this matter before an announcement of and any court action regarding a decision to proceed with the Alaskan oil pipeline. Nonetheless, in my view, we should not hold up all action and refrain from proceeding with the tasks defined in the package.

Gen Haig

RECOMMENDATION:

Therefore, I recommend priority attention be given to the request for decision submitted with my memorandum of September 25.

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AL - I signed the memo. Is it really best

CONFIDENTIAL

*To give it to the USC we should
we run it through the SKG one time*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION IO-13

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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 5096

SUBJECT: ECE: GAS COMMITTEE: SOVIETS PROPOSE ARCTIC GAS
TECHNOLOGY CONTACTS

MOSCOW PASS TO SIMPSON OF COMMERCE

1. AT RECENT ECE GAS COMMITTEE MEETING, USSR CHIEF DEL
OSIPOV (MIN. GAS IND) INFORMED US DEL GAGNE THAT SOVIETS
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HOLDING JOINT US-CANADIAN-USSR
DISCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLY ORGANIZING STUDY TOURS ON ARCTIC
GAS TECHNOLOGY PROBLEMS, EITHER UNDER AUSPICES OF ECE GAS
COMMITTEE OR ON TRILATERAL BASIS. MAJOR TOPICS OF INTEREST TO
USSR ARE TO LEARN ABOUT US RESERACH IN THIS FIELD, AND IN
PARTICULAR, ABOUT SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGIES IN ARCTIC LONG-
DISTANCE PIPE LINING WHICH HAPPENS TO BE AREA OF SOME INTEREST
TO US DEL GAGNE, NORTHERN NATURAL GAS, OMAHA, NEBRASKA.

2. US DEL AWARE OF RECENT BILATERAL SOVIET-CANADIAN CONTACTS
AND EXCHANGES ON GAS TECHNOLOGY. US DEL GAGNE HIMSELF
VISITED USSR ARCTIC FIELDS IN 1969.

3. SINCE SOVIET REQUEST LIKELY TO BE REPEATED AT SUITABLE FUTURE
OCCASION, MISSION WOULD APPREICATE GUIDANCE. GP-3. BASSIN

- ANDERSON _____
- ~~BEHR~~ _____
- BERGSTEN _____
- CHAPIN _____
- HOLDRIDGE _____
- KENNEDY _____
- LENMAN _____
- NAGIMANOFF _____
- ROBINSON _____
- RONDON _____
- SAUNDERS _____
- SMITH _____
- SMYSER _____
- ~~SPENGLER~~ _____
- WRIGHT _____

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION/31425

SECRET

September 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

MICHAEL A. GUHIN

SUBJECT:

US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group

The Problem. The US has never defined any general policy guidance specifically relating to the Arctic and no interagency mechanism exists to focus the overall national effort. We are operating mostly on an ad hoc basis, internationally and internally, at a time when:

- Technology is opening the Arctic to increased resource exploitation and transportation possibilities, and there is a more serious danger to the Arctic environment, which inter alia influences the world's weather patterns.
- Canada and the USSR are recognizing a mutuality of special interests in the Arctic (result of PM Trudeau's visit to the USSR in May), and Canada has acted on its growing concern with jurisdictional prerogatives by setting up a pollution control zone extending into Arctic waters.
- A continued trend of unilateral extensions of jurisdiction would cause more serious problems relating to our manifold military (strategic mobility), economic, environmental and oceans policy interests in access to the Arctic.

Issues. There are two fundamental issues: How to define our general Arctic policy and proceed from here and how to harness the bureaucracy to implement this policy effectively?

Last year the President directed the Under Secretaries Committee (USC) to review these questions (Tab E). Though plagued in the beginning by some interagency disagreement (e. g. , Interior's problem with State on how adequately to exclude internal Alaskan matters), the study has taken over a year primarily because of State's apathy and the concomitant lack of priority and resources given the project.

The USC has forwarded its report and recommendations (Chairman Irwin's Memorandum, Tab B/Arctic Study, Tab D). I have prepared an analytical summary (Tab C).

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The USC recommends (1) adoption of proposed statement of Arctic policy and objectives; (2) formation of an interagency Arctic Policy Group chaired by State; (3) development of possible frameworks for international Arctic cooperation; (4) development of a coordinated scientific research program; and (5) a feasibility study of a comprehensive Arctic transportation system. Mr. Irwin notes that all USC members plus CEQ, Interior, HEW, Commerce, Transportation, and NSF concur in the report and recommendations.

The memorandum for the President at Tab 1 (1) outlines the problem and issues, the USC's recommendations and the proposed NSDM at Tab A; and (2) recommends that he approve the NSDM.

The NSDM at Tab A:

- Sets forth general Arctic policy guidelines consistent with those recommended by the USC, but eliminates the proposed objective of Alaska's economic development (since this is essentially a domestic matter) and states policy in a less platitudinous and repetitive manner than the bureaucracy's proposal.
 - Directs the USC to submit an action program, for the President's consideration by November 30, including plans for attaining our objectives in (1) increasing mutually beneficial international cooperation, (2) enhancing the U. S. capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic, and (3) developing a framework of international cooperation in the Arctic, with particular attention given the Northlands Compact approach.
- [The USC recommends further study of two options: a Northlands Compact aimed toward a loose framework for increasing cooperation in specific areas of common concern, and a specialized Arctic Regime aimed toward a more comprehensive, legally binding treaty for the Arctic. While a regime may be a worthy long-range goal, it is probably not attainable today (because of the Canadian and Soviet positions on preserving jurisdictional prerogatives) and present bureaucratic energies should not be absorbed in it to the possible detriment of getting a pragmatic proposal.]
- Directs the establishment of an Interagency Arctic Policy Group, chaired by State and including other interested agencies, reporting to the USC.
 - Approves the recommendations regarding development of a coordinated scientific research program and a feasibility study of an Arctic transportation system.

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Since State's resources are today grossly inadequate, the NSDM also reinforces the point made in Mr. Irwin's report that State will provide adequate administrative resources and staff for the Arctic Policy Group.

Mr. Ehrlichman, Dr. David, Mr. Dam (OMB), Hal Sonnenfeldt, and Dick Kennedy concur. Mr. Ehrlichman and OMB concur on the understanding that there will be no public statement before Secretary Morton announces the decision to proceed with the Alaskan oil pipeline (probably in mid-December) and, in the event the government is taken to court, before the case is decided.

Once the pipeline decision is absorbed by the nation and we have an action program combined with the decisions in the NSDM at Tab A, a Presidential policy statement on the Arctic could put these matters in broad perspective were this desired.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you forward the memorandum for the President (Tab 1) recommending he approve the NSDM at Tab A on US Arctic policy and Arctic Policy Group; and
2. That, if he approves, you sign the NSDM at Tab A.

Attachments

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CONFIDENTIAL

December 21, 1971

*Done
Kennedy
per note
on attached
folder
mth*

MEMO FOR GENERAL HAIG

SUBJECT: US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group

AL:

I agree with your thought that we ought to keep this exercise in the Under Secretaries Committee to the extent possible. However, there may be some substantive policy issues arise which should be considered by the SRG during the course of the exercise (or at least in that framework for the President's decision). There is no need to put the issue through the SRG unless such issues do arise.

Accordingly, I have very slightly revised the NSDM to make this point (see page 2 of revised NSDM at paper clip). In view of the time lapse, we have also changed the due date.

If you agree, please just return the whole file to me and I will have the revision of the NSDM machine signed and issued (HAK had already signed the original version).

RTKennedy

WASHINGTON

Dear Kennedy
Give me on please
prompt your view
on Holt's quarters
I personally believe
we should keep as
is given press of
such more urgent

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION/31425

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*
SUBJECT: US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group

Problem. The US has no policy guidance specifically relating to the Arctic and no coordinating mechanism to focus the national effort at a time when:

- Technology is opening the Arctic to more resource exploitation (e. g. , oil), and there are more serious dangers to the Arctic environment.
- Canada and the USSR are recognizing a mutuality of special Arctic interests, and Canada has set up a pollution control zone extending into Arctic waters.
- Continued unilateral extensions of jurisdiction would cause more serious problems relating to our military, economic, environmental and oceans policy interests in access to the Arctic.

Two Issues. How to define our general Arctic policy and how to harness the bureaucracy to implement this policy. At your direction, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (USC) reviewed these questions, and has forwarded recommendations with the concurrence of the eleven interested agencies (Tab B/ Analytical Summary, Tab C).

Policy. The USC recommends you approve a general policy statement including (1) support for orderly and sound Arctic development, (2) protection of our national security interests (e. g. , freedom of the seas), and (3) development of a framework for international cooperation in the Arctic. The USC also recommends you approve: (1) related policy objectives including environmental protection, increased international cooperation, improved operational capability, and Alaska's economic development; (2) the development of a coordinated scientific research program; and (3) a feasibility study of an Arctic transportation system.

With increasing Arctic interests, I believe we need to establish explicit, though necessarily general, policy guidelines. Except for the reference to Alaskan development (which is basically a domestic matter), I agree with the above recommendations. They cover our economic, environmental, military, and political interests and recognize our interest in furthering international cooperation to achieve our objectives. Follow-on action programs will add substance to these generalities.

Of particular significance, the USC recommends that we now study two optional frameworks for international cooperation: (1) a Northlands Compact option

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aimed toward a loose framework for increasing cooperation in specific areas of common concern; and (2) a Specialized Arctic Regime option aimed toward a legally binding treaty similar to that in the Antarctic. (I think that further study should give particular attention to the first option for now since it appears the more practicable. While we have an interest in increasing cooperation, we can expect the USSR and Canada generally to favor the status quo: the USSR because of its more advanced Arctic programs, strategic and resource interests and security sensitivities; and Canada because of its sensitivities to jurisdictional and resource exploitation questions.)

Harnessing the Bureaucracy. The USC recommends that you approve the formation of an independent Interagency Arctic Policy Group— chaired by State and including interested agencies— to oversee policy implementation and coordinate our Arctic activities, except purely domestic programs.

I agree that such an interagency committee is required to implement policy and coordinate activities effectively. Initially, however, this group should be tied into the NSC system during consideration of foreign policy and security questions.

The NSDM at Tab A (1) sets forth US Arctic policy guidelines consistent with the USC's recommendations; (2) directs that action programs for increasing cooperation, for enhancing our capability to operate in the Arctic, and for developing a framework of international cooperation be submitted for your consideration; (3) establishes an Arctic Policy Group, and (4) approves the development of a coordinated scientific research program and a feasibility study of an Arctic transportation system.

John Ehrlichman, Ed David and Kenneth Dam concur in the decision memorandum. We agree that there should be no public statement on this before the announcement of and any court action regarding a decision to proceed with the Alaskan oil pipeline. Once the pipeline decision is absorbed by the nation and we have action programs plus these decisions, you could, if you wished, review US Arctic programs and policy in a Presidential statement.

RECOMMENDATION:


That you approve the decision memorandum at Tab A setting forth US Arctic policy, requesting action programs, and establishing an Arctic Policy Group.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

Attachments



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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National Security Decision Memorandum

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Interior
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Secretary of Transportation
 The Director, National Science Foundation
 The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality

SUBJECT: United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group

The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as forwarded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.

The President has decided that the United States will support the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace.

In furtherance of this policy, the President has:

- Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific projects (with budgetary implications as appropriate), for increasing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource development and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the understanding of the Arctic environment; and for developing a framework for international cooperation with particular attention given the Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be forwarded for the President's consideration not later than November 30, 1971.) *March 1, 1972.*

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- Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established, chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Department of State is responsible for providing the administrative support, including staff necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group to carry out its responsibilities.)

The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to Alaska. ~~Any substantive policy matters requiring Presidential decision will be reviewed by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and forwarded for the President's consideration.~~ The Arctic Policy Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, ~~all foreign policy and national security matters.~~ *

In discussing other responsibilities, etc.

- Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations to be made to the Arctic Policy Group.

There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action programs requested above.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

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August 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Arctic Policy and
Organizational Arrangements for
Implementation

The review which you have directed of U.S. Arctic policy by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee has been completed. This report is attached.

The report finds that there is not now nor has there ever been a coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic. Additionally, no single agency or interagency mechanism or body has been charged with the task of focusing a national effort, particularly where the international and national security implications of domestic policy and programs must be considered. The report recommends that the Arctic Policy of the U.S. be:

to insure that Arctic development is orderly and consistent with U.S. policy on conservation and protection of the environment; to maintain a posture sufficient to protect our national security interests and preserve the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace; to develop and implement programs and activities within a framework of international cooperation wherever appropriate and feasible.

To that end the report defines and recommends U.S. policy objectives in the Arctic and recommends four additional actions:

- (1) The development of a mechanism for international cooperation in the Arctic.

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- (2) The formation of an interagency Arctic Policy Group to review, develop and coordinate Arctic Policy.
- (3) The development of a coordinated program of scientific research focusing especially on "baseline research" and including projects suitable for international cooperation.
- (4) The investigation of the feasibility of developing a comprehensive transportation system to meet the requirements of the Arctic.


The recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee are detailed in the first section of the attached report entitled "Conclusions and Recommendations on the Review of U.S. Arctic Policy".

Background discussion relating to the recommendations on U.S. Arctic Policy is attached to this memorandum.

Recommendation

That the conclusions and recommendations of the report on United States Arctic Policy be adopted.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____


John N. Irwin II
Chairman

Attachments:

Background Discussion
Report of USC Ad Hoc Study
Group on U.S. Arctic Policy

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BACKGROUND DISCUSSION

The Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group of the Under Secretaries Committee which prepared the report notes that while the strategic importance of the Arctic has been recognized since World War II, subsequent events have enormously increased its economic potential. Simultaneously, concern for the preservation of the environment has grown.

The Study Group has concluded that the lack of a coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic, or single policy coordinating mechanism probably will not be detrimental to U.S. interests in the short run. In some areas adequate formal or informal interagency coordination already exists; for example, in scientific research and defense. However, the value of a coordinated policy defining national interests and goals within the international context of the entire Arctic region becomes evident as our Arctic interests and activities expand into areas where responsibilities are less clearly defined and operational interdependence is a necessity, e.g., regional environmental protection, economic development and transportation.

Two of the recommendations are key to the implementation of a coordinated U.S. Arctic Policy:

- (1) The development of mechanism for international cooperation in the Arctic.
- (2) The formation of an Arctic Policy Group to review, develop and coordinate Arctic Policy.

International Cooperation

The Arctic region for the purpose of the review is defined as the land and water areas surrounding the North Pole, including the Arctic Ocean and adjacent water, and extending on land to the southern limit of continuous permafrost. This region includes parts of Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United States and the USSR. Although by this definition Finland, Iceland, and Sweden are not

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technically Arctic, their interests in the region are significant and they are considered a part of the "Arctic community". Other nations, e.g., United Kingdom, France, and Japan have longstanding Arctic interests in one or more specific areas; for example, scientific research, exploration, trade and maritime affairs.

Several of the areas of general concern and interest relating to the Arctic can be usefully approached through international cooperation; e.g., scientific research, environmental studies and pollution control. One thread which particularly links the Arctic interests of the U.S. and other Arctic nations is the need to preserve the ecological and environmental balance of the Arctic region, and to insure that Arctic development is rational. Pollution control is one problem which can best be approached through multinational cooperation. Another is the conduct of basic Arctic research needed to allow more accurate prediction of the effects of man-made and natural changes within the region. Other important areas in which there is a commonality of interest among Arctic nations include resource exploration, transportation, and cold weather construction techniques.

At present international cooperation in the Arctic is effected largely on an ad hoc basis. As technology opens the region to further resource exploitation and new transportation possibilities, interest in the region for commercial, scientific and possibly military uses will increase, creating strains on the ability of a purely ad hoc approach to function effectively. The review states the necessity for developing a framework for international cooperation in the Arctic and recommends that the development of this framework be undertaken.

The Arctic Policy Group

The Arctic Policy Group (APG) would provide leadership in implementing the policy and a coordinative mechanism for U.S. Arctic planning. This group would be primarily concerned with international and national security aspects

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of Arctic affairs. It would also be concerned with otherwise "domestic" activities having significant international or national security components or effects. This body would not delimit or replace existing agencies or committees with Arctic responsibilities, nor would it exercise responsibility in purely domestic Arctic related matters.

The APG would be an independent body somewhat analogous to the existing Antarctic Policy Group (State, Defense, National Science Foundation). It would include State (Chairman), Defense, Interior, Commerce, Transportation and the National Science Foundation (NSF) and representatives of such other agencies as might be invited by the Chairman to participate on an ad hoc basis. The respective members of the APG will be designated at the Assistant Secretary level by the appropriate agency Secretaries and the Director, NSF. The APG would coordinate its actions with the Under Secretaries Committee in matters falling within the cognizance of that body and would refer to the Under Secretaries Committee unresolved issues.

The APG will give immediate attention to the development of the recommended framework for international cooperation and the budgetary implications of U.S. Arctic Policy. This body will also be responsible for further reviewing, developing and coordinating U.S. Arctic Policy and for reviewing plans for U.S. activities and promulgating guidelines for coordinated action in the Arctic within the scope of U.S. Arctic Policy as stated in this report. The Department of State will be responsible for providing the administrative support including staff necessary to enable the APG to carry out its responsibilities.

Discussion of Agency Views

For the purposes of this review the Under Secretaries Committee has included, in addition to its regular membership, representatives of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Departments of Interior, Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare, Transportation, the Office of Science and Technology, and the National Science Foundation. All agencies of the Under Secretaries Committee, as so constituted, concur in the review and its conclusions and recommendations.

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Conclusions and Recommendations
on the
Review of US Arctic Policy
and
Organizational Arrangements for Implementation

Report
NSC Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group

July 1971

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Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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CONCLUSIONS

The Committee, having reviewed the history and status of U.S. Arctic Policy has concluded that there has never been, nor does there now exist a coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic. Additionally, no single agency or interagency mechanism or body has been charged with the task of focusing a national effort, particularly where the international and national security implications of domestic policy and programs must be considered.

To continue as at present would probably not be detrimental to U.S. interests in the short run. In some areas, for example, e.g., scientific research and defense, the U.S. currently has significant programs and interests which fall under defined agency responsibilities. In these areas, adequate formal or informal interagency coordination already exists. However, the value of a coordinated policy defining national interests and goals within the international context of the entire Arctic region becomes evident as our Arctic interests and activities expand into areas where responsibilities are less clearly defined and operational interdependence is a necessity, e.g., regional environmental protection, economic development and transportation.

STATEMENT OF POLICY

U.S. Arctic interests including developmental and environmental concerns, research, and national security interests cannot any longer be pursued separately without real coordination. They must now be addressed within the framework of a single coherent national policy. To this end, the Ad Hoc Committee on U.S. Arctic Policy has developed the following statement of U.S. Arctic policy:

It is declared to be the policy of the United States to insure that Arctic development is orderly and consistent with U.S. policy on conservation and protection of the environment; to maintain a posture sufficient to protect our national security interests and preserve the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace; to develop and implement programs and activities, within a framework of international cooperation wherever appropriate and feasible.

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STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

If this statement of U.S. Arctic policy is to be effectively implemented our activities relating to the region must be organized and coordinated so as to contribute to the realization with a minimum adverse effect on the environment of the following objectives:

1. Mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries in exploration, scientific research, resource development and exchange of scientific and technical data.
2. An improved capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic based on a fuller understanding of the marine, terrestrial atmospheric components of the Arctic environment.
3. The economic development of Alaska including its continental shelf.
4. Adequate freedom of action to conduct those military and intelligence operations essential to the security of the U.S. and the capability to carry out aerospace, surface and undersurface military operations in the Arctic.
5. The settlement of jurisdictional questions and disputes among nations through peaceful international means.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The President directed that a review of United States policy for the Arctic be made in view of the critical need for an overall policy framework to preserve the environment of the North, to provide guidelines for decision-making on several issues of international concern, and to focus United States activities, longer-range interests and objectives in the Arctic. In light of these needs the Committee makes the following recommendations regarding U.S. Arctic policy and its implementation.

RECOMMENDATION 1

That the statement of U.S. Policy and related objectives set out above be adopted by the United States Government.

RECOMMENDATION 2

That we seek the establishment of a general framework for international cooperation in the Arctic. This framework would provide a mechanism for international cooperation in scientific and other activities.

RECOMMENDATION 3

That there be established an Arctic Policy Group for the purposes of: (1) further reviewing, developing and coordinating U.S. Arctic Policy; (2) reviewing plans for U.S. activities and promulgating guidelines for coordinated action in the Arctic within the scope of this policy statement, and (3) developing the recommended framework for international cooperation. The Arctic Policy Group should give priority attention to the development of the budgetary implications of U.S. Arctic policy.

The Arctic Policy Group should consist of the Departments of State (Chairman), Defense, Interior, Commerce, Transportation and the National Science Foundation, and representatives of such other agencies as may be invited by the Chairman to participate on an ad hoc basis. The respective members of the Arctic Policy Group will be designated at the Assistant Secretary level by the appropriate agency Secretary and the Director, National Science Foundation.

RECOMMENDATION 4

That urgent attention be given by the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee to developing a coordinated plan of scientific research in and on the Arctic, including projects for international cooperation. Priority should be given to that research necessary to predict potential changes in the global environment as related to changes in the physical characteristics of the Arctic.

RECOMMENDATION 5

That the Departments of Transportation, Defense and Commerce in cooperation with other interested agencies give early attention to the investigation of the feasibility of developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting logistic and support requirements in the Arctic, and make appropriate recommendations to the Arctic Policy Group.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF US ARCTIC POLICY REVIEW

The Arctic. The review defines the term "Arctic region" broadly as the land and water surrounding the North Pole, including the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas, extending on land to the southern limit of continuous permafrost. The region comprises about 8.3 million square miles (50% larger than the US), with the Arctic Ocean— much of which is perennially covered by a floating ice cap— accounting for over 5 million square miles.

This broad region includes both national and non-national territories. Canada, Denmark, Norway, the US and the USSR (which has the most active and largest Arctic region program) have permanently inhabited Arctic national territories. Finland, Iceland and Sweden also have significant Arctic interests and are considered "Arctic community" countries. Other nations (e. g., the UK, France and Japan) have long-standing Arctic interests in scientific research, exploration, trade and maritime affairs.

For foreign policy purposes, Arctic policy relates to the non-national area of the North Pole, the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas. The US position is that the extent and nature of sovereignty or jurisdiction exercised by coastal states over water beyond certain limits should be determined by international agreement. However, some other Arctic countries do not necessarily agree with the application of the US position in the Arctic region.

The Problem. The US has never defined any general policy guidance specifically relating to the Arctic, though several existing US policies are directly applicable to the Arctic (e. g., law of the sea policy). Also, though we have special interagency committees on economic, resource and oil development in Alaska and scientific research in the Arctic (including Alaska), we have no interagency mechanism to focus the overall national effort, particularly from a foreign policy and national security standpoint.

The US is operating mostly on an ad hoc basis , internationally and internally, at a time when:

- Technology is opening the Arctic region to increased resource exploitation, particularly oil and mineral development, and new transportation possibilities (e. g., the 1968 discovery of oil in Alaska and the 1969 and 1970 Arctic voyages of the tanker MANHATTAN.)

- With the interest in resource and transportation development there is a more serious danger of degrading the fragile Arctic environment, which is not self-renewing like more temperate climates and which heavily influences the world's weather patterns.
- The economic potential and environmental problems of the Arctic have heightened the USSR's and Canada's concern with preserving jurisdictional prerogatives. Canada and the USSR are recognizing a mutuality of special interest in the Arctic and "special responsibilities and corresponding rights" with respect to ensuring the safety of navigation and preserving the Arctic environment (Joint Communique on PM Trudeau Visit to USSR, May 18, 1971).
- Canada has set up a pollution control zone extending 100 miles from its coast in areas north of 60° latitude, defining it in terms of extending jurisdiction rather than territorial sovereignty. (The US protested this unilateral action.)
- There are potentially more serious problems regarding US military, economic, environmental and oceans policy interests in access to the Arctic. (Since 1926 the USSR's organic law has included the "sector theory", under which a country claims as its territory that pie-shaped wedge extending along its borders to the North Pole. This "theory" finds some support in the fact that the Arctic Ocean's ice cap is comparable to land in some respects and, therefore, subject to territorial claims. The US does not recognize the validity of this "theory" though Seward's Treaty by which we acquired Alaska defines the territory as extending along delineating longitudinal lines to the Frozen Ocean.)
- Areas of common concern (e. g., scientific research, environmental studies and pollution control) are becoming more important and can best be approached on a multinational basis.

U. S. Interests in the Arctic. Historically, US interests in the Arctic have been focused on Alaska. Our interests in the broader Arctic region have been, until recently, limited primarily to continental defense, exploration and scientific research.

Since the discovery of oil resources in Alaska, our interests have grown to include the feasibility of extracting and transporting oil and mineral resources to markets and the concurrent need for environmental protection. Broadly speaking, US interests in the Arctic are:

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- National security and military interest in freedom of access, freedom of the seas and the superjacent airspace.
- Economic and commercial interest in resource development and transportation (which subsumes a better capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic).
- Environmental interest in minimizing any adverse effects on the environment, particularly since degradation of the environment could have serious, widespread consequences (which subsumes a better understanding of the Arctic environment and its global effects).
- Political interests in having jurisdictional questions and disputes settled through international agreement.

Policy Guidelines and Options

There is no question that general US policy guidelines should recognize the above mentioned US Arctic interests which are, for the most part, not unique to that region.

But there remains the question of how one proceeds to protect and further those interests in an era of increasing activity and interests and growing concerns with jurisdictional and sovereignty prerogatives. The report concludes that advancing international cooperation generally and, more specifically, developing a framework for cooperation in the Arctic is in the US interest and should be pursued not merely because many areas of common concern can best be approached on a multinational basis, but because cooperation may be the only alternative to increasing restrictive national claims (jurisdictional and perhaps even sovereignty) which would run counter to US military, economic, environmental and oceans policy interests.

The "sector theory" approach, whereby the US could claim jurisdiction or sovereignty over the pie-shaped territory from the borders of Alaska to the North Pole, is not considered a realistic policy option precisely because it would appear contrary to US interests. A US "sector theory" policy would likely lead to a division of the Arctic "pie" with the US having less than 15%, the USSR over 50% and Canada over 30%. More importantly, by accepting national claims through our action, there would be no guarantee of freedom to act in the Arctic Ocean or adjacent seas either in the interests of national security, military intelligence, commercial development or for environmental monitoring and protection activity.

The Existing System. There are already some established beginnings in cooperation. A large number of informal exchanges occur among scientists, universities and private institutions, often including their Soviet counterparts. Cooperation among the western Arctic nations, particularly in North America, is more highly developed (e. g., the US and Canada built and maintain the DEW line and operate weather stations; Japanese, British and Canadians have worked together on ice flow stations; and the NSF sponsors Arctic research projects with Canada, Denmark and other countries).

However, the existing system deals with international relations and cooperation in the Arctic on an ad hoc basis. As technology opens the Arctic, national interests and activities for gaining access to the area for commercial, scientific and even military uses will increase. The interaction of these growing interests and activities cannot be dealt with effectively on a piecemeal national approach to the Arctic. The report concludes that new means are required to meet the potential problems.

Optional Frameworks for International Cooperation. The report analyzes three options for developing a framework for international cooperation in the Arctic. Though there appears ample room for increasing exchange in many fields, there are also substantial problems in any US approach to increasing international cooperation and particularly to promoting a framework for such:

- Nations with Arctic territory (particularly the USSR and Canada) will be increasingly concerned with preserving jurisdiction prerogatives, while other states will be seeking to preserve maximum access to the area (e. g., the US or Japan).
- We can expect the USSR and Canada generally to favor the status quo: the USSR because of its advanced Arctic programs (making it difficult for the Soviets to believe they stand to receive equal gain in a more cooperative framework), strategic and resource interests and security sensitivities; Canada because of its sensitivities to jurisdictional questions and matters of resource exploitation and environmental problems.

Option 1. The Northlands Compact for International Cooperation

This proposal would establish a loose framework for enhancing cooperation among Arctic and other interested states. The agreement would provide an umbrella under which participating states could, as they wished, share

experience and data affecting (1) regional development (transportation, construction, communications, et cetera), (2) environmental protection, (3) conservation of resources and (4) basic scientific research in fields of mutual interest.

Cooperation would be facilitated by (1) exchanging information, data, and experts, (2) holding conferences, (3) coordinating research by interested parties, (4) facilitating expeditions through logistic support and rescue missions, (5) designating national points of contact, and (6) consulting on significant projects and meeting regularly.

The main advantage of this option is its potential for acceptance by nations interested in the Arctic. The loose and flexible arrangement could be adjusted to the needs and desires of participating states, and could sidestep the jurisdiction issues which may retard international cooperative efforts. The US could also gain in Arctic science and technology from cooperation with other countries.

The disadvantage of this option would be its inability to bind states to common action. It would probably not have much immediate and substantial impact on the larger problems created by increasing international interest and activity in the Arctic (e.g., economic development versus environmental protection, unilateral claims versus international agreement, extension of jurisdiction or sovereignty versus freedom of the seas).

Option 2. The Specialized Arctic Regime

This proposal would be a more comprehensive and binding arrangement than the Northlands Compact. The regime would establish an agreed code of conduct for states in various Arctic activities and an agreed mechanism for continued consultation among the parties. It could be limited to discreet fields of mutual interest or encompass a broad range of concerns. It would approximate, though with significant differences, an Antarctic Treaty for the Arctic.

The regime could encompass matters which lend themselves to joint objectives and joint or self regulation, stipulating certain agreed "freedoms" and "obligations", such as (1) environmental protection with the obligation for national regulation under agreed guidelines, (2) promotion of scientific research with the obligation to exchange plans and data; (3) facilitation of international cooperation; (4) preservation and conservation of living and non-living resources; (5) protection of indigenous peoples; (6) mutual operation aids, assistance and services. The regime might specifically exclude subjects more suitable for national action such as defense and jurisdictional

considerations. It might also circumvent sovereignty claims by applying different codes of conduct to land and water areas.

The main advantages of this option are that it (1) would establish international agreed codes of conduct and consultative machinery; (2) could supplement the earlier and related U. S. initiatives of the seabed regime for mineral resources; (3) could provide an unobtrusive mechanism through which the interested nations of the international community could deal with Arctic issues; and (4) if successful, could fashion Arctic cooperation before mounting national interests in Arctic resources harden and jurisdictional claims proliferate.

The disadvantages of this option, as reflected in our current discussions with Canada and the USSR about an Arctic regime for pollution and navigation, revolve around national jurisdictional and defense considerations. To negotiate a regime today would be more difficult than to establish a compact, and the consequences of its failure could reduce chances for cooperation in specific areas. Also, a special regime for the Arctic runs the risk of derogating from existing Law of the Sea Conventions and setting a precedent for other nations to apply special circumstances and considerations to other areas of the world ocean.

A third option, a condominium type regime, is also discussed in the USC report. It would be an extension and further formalization of the Specialized Arctic Regime. It would provide for some form of governing Council with stipulated membership and authority over specific aspects of Arctic activity. This approach would have even less chance of acceptance than an Arctic regime, and is probably not needed at this time to accomplish U. S. objectives. Moreover, it is not clear that such a formal regulatory arrangement would be in the US interests.

The report recommends further study and development of the Northlands Compact option and the specialized Arctic Regime option.

Harnessing the Bureaucracy Options

There does not now exist any agency or interagency mechanism to focus the overall national effort and give guidance to agencies responsible for implementing Arctic programs. There are Federal interagency mechanisms to plan and coordinate activities in resource, economic and oil development in Alaska and scientific research in the Arctic (including Alaska), but these are relatively limited in scope and basically domestically oriented.

With active US interest growing to encompass the Arctic as a region, and with the increasing interrelations between domestic, international and

national security aspects of Arctic plans, programs and activities, some interagency mechanism should be established to focus on the overall national effort, to coordinate agency activities and to evaluate and relate international aspects of domestic programs with regional policy aims. This mechanism should also be the focal point for the pursuit of international cooperation and aims in the Arctic. Such a mechanism would not infringe upon purely domestic Arctic-related matters in Alaska and already established mechanisms for dealing with them.

The report reviewed the following options for harnessing the bureaucracy:

- Option 1. Designation of an Executive non-operating agency without Arctic programs (e.g., OST, NSC or State) as the central policy coordinating agency.
- Option 2. Designation of an independent, Presidentially-appointed board or coordinating committee of individuals.

Both options 1 and 2 have the advantage of giving coordinating responsibility to an agency without vested interests in particular programs, missions and operations and thereby avoid agency parochialism while expressing executive interest at a high level. However, both options have the disadvantages of lacking authority to define programs or develop budgetary support.

- Option 3. Designation of an appropriate executive operating agency (e.g., Interior, DOD, Transportation or Commerce) as the lead agency.

This option has the advantage of placing central coordinating authority with an agency which has responsibility for program development and budgetary allocations and an existing support staff familiar with Arctic programs; but it has the disadvantages of lacking authority over the areas of other agency responsibility and of tending toward agency parochialism.

- Option 4. An NSC Under Secretaries Committee including agencies with Arctic interests.
- Option 5. An independent, interagency committee or "Arctic Policy Group" consisting of agencies with the most significant Arctic interests.

Both options 4 and 5 have the advantage of allowing for collective leadership in developing programs and guidance, giving consideration to all interests, operating and non-operating. Information on programs and budgets could be effectively assembled because of the level of agency representation. The

designation of an independent interagency committee (Option 5) would have the additional advantages of (1) not involving the USC in such areas as coordinated scientific research programs and studies of transportation systems, and (2) facilitating coordination of related activities with the existing Antarctic Policy Group (chaired by State). There appear to be no real disadvantages to these two options other than bureaucratic concerns that nothing can be accomplished by either group without Presidential authorization.

The report recommends the establishment of an independent interagency Arctic Policy Group (Option 5), but charged with reporting to and coordinating with the Under Secretaries Committee all matters pertaining to national security, matters significantly affecting our international posture or policy questions, and matters which the Arctic Policy Group is unable to resolve.

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REVIEW OF US ARCTIC POLICY
AND
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Report
NSC Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group

July 1971

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Group 1

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I. Introduction

The President directed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to undertake a review of the U.S. policy on the Arctic. Dr. Henry Kissinger in a memorandum to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee of April 15, 1970 stated that this review should consider the political implications of U.S. policy and explore all opportunities for international cooperation on Arctic matters. It should also include consideration of the necessary Interagency coordinating mechanisms and budgetary implications. This report prepared by an NSC Under Secretaries Committee Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group is in response to that request.

In the interests of coherence and brevity, a considerable amount of background material necessary to an understanding of U.S. interests and involvement in the Arctic as well as the interests and involvement of other countries has been incorporated in a single background paper as an appendix to this paper.

U.S. Arctic Policy Study

II. The Arctic - Definition & Description

The term "Arctic" has two meanings in the context of this paper. First, the term refers to a specific geographical region whose limits may be variously defined. The term broadly refers to the circumpolar cold region around the North Pole. However, for specific purposes, the Arctic may be defined by:

- High latitude or the area within the Arctic Circle ($66^{\circ} 33' N$).
- Polar basin or the area of the Arctic Ocean, often including the drainage basin of rivers flowing into it.
- Continuous permafrost or the high latitude areas where the ground is perennially frozen.
- Tree line or the poleward limit of tree growth.
- Temperature or areas where the average temperature of the warmest month is below $50^{\circ}F$ and the coldest month is below $32^{\circ} F$.

All of these definitions include land and sea, national and "non-national" territories. The region generally comprises about 8.3 million square miles, a region about 50% larger than the United States, of which the Arctic Ocean is over 5 million square miles. It is unique among the seas of the world in that much of it is perennially covered by a floating ice cap.

For the purposes of this review, the term "Arctic region" will be defined as the land and water areas surrounding the North Pole including the Arctic Ocean and adjacent water and extending on land to the southern limit of continuous permafrost. What we mean by the Arctic for the purpose of national policy, however, must take into consideration geopolitical realities in the region.

The second meaning of the term "Arctic" refers to the community of nations having territory which is "arctic" by some conventional definition and to the interests of those nations focusing on their Arctic territory and the region generally. The second meaning can be extended to encompass nations having no Arctic territory, but having substantial present or potential interests in the region.

In geopolitical terms, the Arctic region includes the territory of five nations -- Canada, Denmark, Norway, U.S. and USSR. Finland, Iceland and Sweden are not characterized by permafrost nor do they directly abut the Arctic Ocean. However, because of their northern geographic location and concern for Arctic exploration and development, they are considered a part of the general "Arctic community". The Arctic is clearly a region delineated by common environmental characteristics wherein the constituent regional countries share interests: for example, the possibilities for resource development, preservation of the environment and scientific research.

Additionally, the United Kingdom and France have long traditions of Arctic interest, expressed mostly in exploration and research. Japan is showing increasing interest in the region. It can be expected that maritime nations in general will take greater note of the region should the Northwest Passage and/or the Northern Sea Route adjacent to the USSR open to regular commercial traffic.

A national policy for the Arctic must be workable in the context of the political realities relating to the

region. Some nations, particularly the USSR and Canada, consider their sovereignty and jurisdiction to extend into areas of the seas generally considered to be "non-national". Because of the permanent nature of the Arctic Ocean's ice cap, the view is held by some that it is comparable to land in some respects, and, therefore, it has been suggested that the "frozen Arctic Ocean" might be subject to territorial claims. The view is embodied in the "Sector Theory" under which a country claims as its own territory ice found in a wedge extending along the limiting lines of longitude of land territory to the North Pole.

The USSR has included the "Sector Theory" as part of its organic law since 1926. Though individual members of various Canadian governments have also referred to this theory as a means for delineating Canadian territory, it has never been adopted as policy by any Canadian government. The recent Canadian legislation (establishing inter alia pollution control zones extending 100 miles seaward of the Canadian coast in all areas north of 60° latitude) speaks of extension of jurisdiction rather than territorial sovereignty and does not mention the "Sector Theory".

The U.S. position is that the extent and nature of sovereignty or jurisdiction exercised by coastal states over waters beyond three miles should be determined by international agreement. The U.S. has never recognized the validity of the "Sector Theory" or claims under it although Seward's Treaty, through which we acquired Alaska, defines the territory as extending along delineating lines of longitude to the Frozen Ocean.

Another important factor in considering a U.S. Arctic policy is the fact that the Arctic, unlike the Antarctic, is permanently inhabited. Most Arctic nations, therefore, have a natural interest in Arctic development.

Thus, in the political context, the Arctic region is not uniform and may be characterized in three ways:

- The national territory of Arctic states other than the U.S.;
- The U.S. Arctic (for example, Alaska); and
- The non-national area of the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas.

The policy interests of the U.S. may differ significantly in many ways regarding each of these three categories. For example, with regard to the Arctic territories of other states, a U.S. policy can of course have no direct "extra territorial effect". However, this does not preclude reaching agreements with other Arctic states on matters of mutual interest which will require the initiation or modification of domestic actions (for example, trade or wildlife preservation).

In the case of the U.S. Arctic (Alaska), the development, coordination and implementation of policy on domestic matters is the responsibility of those agencies and authorities of the Federal Government with programs, activities and interests within the state and of the state authorities themselves. This study does not contemplate the establishment of a new national policy for Alaska or the establishment of new bureaucratic entities for coordinating or overseeing domestic Alaskan development or programs as such.

While the impact of a general U.S. Arctic policy on domestic planning for Alaska would not be direct, the development of such a policy would afford an opportunity to identify and integrate useful elements of domestic activities into the development of a multinational approach to the solution of Arctic problems. Moreover, otherwise "domestic" plans or programs in Alaska may have significant implications with regard to the national security and our relations with other countries (for example, the ecological implications of transporting oil from northern Alaska by sea routes). Where domestic programs have such implications, they may be best considered within the framework of the broader U.S. international and national security policy goals. Any U.S. policy would require a mechanism for evaluating the international implications of significant domestic plans and coordinating, where appropriate, such plans with related international activities.

It is in approaching questions related to the non-national area of the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas that the formulation of a coordinated U.S. Arctic Policy would prove most useful and assist U.S. agencies in planning and implementing Arctic programs.

III. U.S. Interests in the Arctic

Historically, the U.S. interest in the Arctic has been focused on Alaska, its past exploitation (for example, the "gold rush"), and future development. Our interests in the broader Arctic region have in the past been limited primarily to continental defense, exploration

and scientific research. Since the discovery of the oil resources in Alaska, in 1968, our interests have grown to include the feasibility of extracting and transporting oil and mineral resources to markets and the concurrent need for environmental protection. The voyages of the MANHATTAN have brought the commercial utilization of the Northwest Passage into the realm of possibility for the first time.

U.S. interests can thus be considered in three broad categories: (1) national security and military interests; (2) the development of Arctic resources which subsumes a capability to operate and transport in the Arctic; and (3) the ensuring of the maximum environmental protection consistent with the growth of human activity.

These interests are in fact interrelated to a degree which makes any final ordering of priorities arbitrary. While the need for military preparedness in the Arctic has not diminished, there has been a rise in importance and the immediacy of the national interest in resource and transportation development and environmental protection. Both the development of the oil and mineral resources in the Arctic and Alaska and the need for environmental protection have increased importance today because of the potential importance of these interests to the total welfare of the people of the U.S. and the world. Also, because none of these interests can be realized without developing an adequate data base and the application of technology, the need for increased scientific and technological research is obvious. Such research is inherent to the realization of the interests and is considered as a necessary element in each case.

a) National Security Interests - The assurance of the freedom to act as necessary to ensure the national security has been, at least since World War II, our primary interest in the Arctic. With the advances in technology, the nature of the primary initial military threat to the North American Continent has shifted from direct invasion to aerospace incursions, primarily missile attacks, and underwater operations. Our own technology has been applied to counter these threats. There is, of course, a continuing strategic importance of the Arctic region in that it is the shortest distance between the Eurasian and North American continents, and because of its position directly between the U.S. and the USSR.

The impediments to the freedom of military actions are at the moment almost as much political and environmental as technological. Such issues as the ensuring of freedom of the seas and superadjacent aerospace are of significance in the Arctic to both commercial traffic and national defense. The direct military interest is then to a greater degree than in the past related to the interests of other segments of our national interest. The establishment of the principles of freedom of the seas in the context of opening new sea routes will also benefit the military defense interest.

b) Resource and Transportation Development - The discovery of large oil reserves in the Prudhoe Bay region of Alaska has particularly emphasized the resources potential of the Arctic. The transportation of oil and minerals, particularly to the east coast of the U.S. by sea has significant economic implications, as it could be marketed in the U.S. at a price less than that of Venezuelan or Mid-East oil, and possibly less than the present cost of oil now derived from domestic sources. With the development of efficient and safe transportation systems the more rapid development of the extractable resources of the Arctic is likely.

c) Protection of the Arctic Environment - The interest in development and transportation of oil and mineral resources is itself largely the source of the need to focus greater emphasis on environmental protection. The preservation of the Arctic environment may be considered extremely important because of its influence on the world's weather and environmental patterns. Several considerations come into play in defining this interest:

(1) The Arctic environment is itself fragile - It does not have the self-renewing ability of more temperate environments. For example, the degrading effects of an oil spill in the Arctic may persist for an indefinite period. In any event, the seriousness of the fragility of the Arctic environment is compounded by the difficulty of working in the frigid temperature.

(2) Relatively small chances in the environmental characteristics of the Arctic may have serious implications for lower latitudes - For example, it is possible that with regular

surface shipping made possible through the use of huge icebreakers the ice may be prevented from refreezing thereby allowing interchange of eastern and western waters which might significantly affect the ecological balance and the heat exchange equation of the region. This would alter aquatic life distribution and temperature elsewhere.

(3) Arctic conditions heavily influence the world's weather - Should there be major changes in the amount of ice cover in the Arctic, the forces creating basic weather patterns elsewhere in the world conceivably will be altered. Also, the appearance of pollutants in the Arctic could create a chain of circumstances which could culminate in serious alterations of the Earth's climate. Although we can develop conceptual pictures of what gross changes in the Arctic environment can do, we do not yet have the knowledge to accurately predict the effects of incremental degradation or to determine levels of "acceptability" in ecological and environmental change as balanced against the degradation accompanying development. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the environmental effects of all developmental acts.

IV. U.S. Activities in the Arctic

Increased interest in the Arctic's potential for economic development coupled with its importance to the defense of the continent and the necessity for preserving the regional environment means that U.S. involvement in activities such as shipping and research on the high seas and other areas beyond national jurisdiction will grow in size and importance. Some indications of the growth of U.S. Arctic interest is given by a comparison of the approximate gross figures for U.S. Federal Agency expenditures for FY 70 and FY 71. In FY 70, the total Federal expenditures in and on the Arctic (including Alaska programs) was approximately \$91 million; for FY 71, the estimate is \$152 million. About \$40 million of the increase is accounted for by the cost of a new icebreaker for the Department of Transportation. However, significant projected increases in funding for Arctic programs are

planned by several agencies, notably NSF which is increasing its budget requests by a factor of two over FY-70 levels in each of FY 71 and 72, to a level of \$5,500,000 in FY 72. The Departments of Commerce and Defense have also increased their FY 71 budget requests for Arctic activities over FY 70 levels. Over twenty Federal agencies are involved in Arctic programs in science, resource development, health and welfare and research development. Research and science activities encompass a broad range of atmospheric, earth and marine sciences.

Moreover, the growing interest of government and private sectors in our own Arctic (Alaska) will increasingly have international and national security implications.

V. Interests and Activities of Other Countries

A number of other countries have active interests in the Arctic. The USSR, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden either possess Arctic territory or have "northern" interests with resulting strategic, political, economic, social and environmental interests. Each of them has special policies and programs for Arctic development, a few more advanced than our own.

The USSR is developing and using the Arctic region more than any other nation. The Arctic constitutes one-third of Soviet territory and harbors two million people. The area is being woven systematically in the country's fabric. Extensive military facilities and missile units are there along with the world's largest fleet of ice breakers to keep open the Northern Sea Route for ocean vessels and the world's most extensive Arctic scientific research program.

While less active than the USSR, other countries conduct Arctic activities. Canada, with the major western icebreaker fleet (U.S. and Finnish fleets are smaller) has begun a major commercial exploration and environmental protection effort.

The new interest in Arctic resources and the possibility of environmental damage have awakened interest in territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction control in the Arctic, issues which have not been seriously disputed in the Arctic in the past. The potential of Alaskan and Canadian oil resources and the possibility for commercial shipping in the Northwest Passage precipitated Canadian proposals for new and stringent legislation for control in

the Canadian north and its high seas areas.

In June of 1970, Canada enacted legislation establishing pollution zones for controlling shipping routes and standards in Arctic waters extending 100 miles seaward from the coast in all areas north of 60° N latitude. (We protested Canada's unilateral action in the absence of international agreement in areas recognized by international law as the high seas, and we proposed early convening of an international conference to seek international agreement on pollution and navigation standards for the Arctic beyond national limits).

The Nordic countries are beginning to consider the need for coordinated, continuous Arctic programs and planning. Norway (Spitsbergen and Jan Mayen) and Denmark (Greenland) have limited but growing economic interests in the Arctic, and they conduct important maritime and scientific programs there. Finland, Sweden and Iceland share interest in the area's exploration, development and exploitation. The Sea Ice Conference scheduled in Iceland this season has stimulated considerable interest.

VI. Policy Options

There has never been, nor does there now exist, a coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic. Each of the twenty Federal agencies and activities with Arctic programs is, of course, responsive to Federal policy or policies in planning and carrying out its mission. However, there is no general overall policy guidance, specifically relating to the Arctic, to which all Federal agencies with Arctic interests can relate. Additionally, no single agency or interagency mechanism or body exists which is able to focus a national effort, particularly where the international and national security implications of domestic policy and programs must be considered.

In considering a coordinated U.S. Arctic policy, two factors must be kept in mind:

There are a number of existing U.S. policies affecting the issues which apply to or have implications for the Arctic (for example, seabeds and continental shelf, fisheries, law of the sea and sovereignty). These issues all have manifestations in the Arctic. A U.S. Arctic policy would not supersede or subsume existing developed policies which affect the Arctic. Rather, a U.S. Arctic policy is conceived of as a statement of goals and

recommendations which will delimit the continuing U.S. interest in the Arctic as a region and provide a framework for the orderly establishment of Arctic program priorities as well as facilitating the rationalization of U.S. Arctic objectives with our international commitments.

- Because of the non-uniform nature in the geopolitical context of the Arctic region, any framework developed for accommodating policy implementation must be flexible enough to allow the development and implementation of programs relating to U.S. bilateral relations with Arctic and non-Arctic countries as well as those relating to a more general international context.

The possibilities of developing a suitable "compact" or treaty framework for international cooperation in various areas of concern should be evaluated with this in mind. At the present time, we are taking this approach with respect to the prevention of sea pollution and establishing navigation standards in the Arctic. Broader areas, including environmental protection generally, basic and applied research, commercial development and transportation, might also be amenable to this approach.

The four basic policy options considered below each concern advancing international cooperation in the Arctic. While it might be contended that the U.S. could itself adopt a type of "Sector Theory" policy, thereby claiming jurisdiction or sovereignty over the pie-shaped territory from the borders of Alaska to the North Pole, this approach would lead to a division of the Arctic "pie" with the U.S. having less than 15%, the USSR over 50%, and Canada over 30%. More importantly, by accepting national claims through our action, there would be no guarantee or freedom to act either in the interests of national security or in commercial development. Moreover, protection of the environment and control of pollution can best be approached on a coordinated international and multinational basis. Thus, because the "Sector Theory" approach would be contrary to U.S. political, economic, environmental and military interests, it is not considered a realistic policy option.

It can also be argued that the U.S. could continue to handle issues individually on an ad hoc basis with no coordinated, definitive U.S. Arctic policy relating all elements of national interest and relatively little continuing coordination of Federal agency programs except

in scientific research and defense. The U.S. currently has significant programs and interests which fall under defined agency responsibilities. In these areas, adequate formal or informal interagency coordination already exists. Thus, this approach would probably not be detrimental to U.S. interests in the short run.

However, as our Arctic interests and activities expand into areas where responsibilities are less clearly defined an operational interdependence is a necessity (for example, regional environmental protection, economic development and transportation), the value of a coordinated policy defining national interests and goals within the international context of the entire Arctic region becomes evident. Moreover, technology is opening the Arctic region to resource exploitation and new transportation possibilities, and interests of states in gaining access to the area for commercial, scientific and even military uses is growing. and the danger of environmental degradation is more serious. Many resource, environmental, and security issues cannot be resolved through unilateral action.

Thus, the increasing international activity in the Arctic points to handling Arctic issues, by broadening and strengthening international collaborative machinery and programs. One thread particularly links the Arctic interests of the U.S. with those of other Arctic nations and, in fact, with the broader interests of all nations. This is the need to preserve the ecological and environmental balance of the Arctic region. The protection of the Arctic environment from pollution is of international concern since environmental degradation here has implications for all nations, including "territorial Arctic states" and commercial "users" of the region.

Control of pollution is a problem which can best be approached through coordinated international and multinational action. The conduct of the basic research needed to raise our understanding of the Arctic environment to allow more accurate prediction of the effects of man-made and natural changes within the region and elsewhere in the world can best be performed through the collaborative efforts of interested nations. Problems of pollution control and environmental protection in the Arctic which lend themselves to a multinational approach include: air pollution, water pollution (including ocean dumping), preservation of ecology (for example, safeguarding habitats of unique or endangered species, and navigation assistance. Other

important areas, which would benefit from international cooperation though not to a single approach for all nations, include disposal of solid waste and community planning.

Besides environmental protection and pollution control, there are broad areas of common interest among the nations in such fields as resource exploration and exploitation, transportation, construction, communications, science, conservation, and weather observation. Each of these areas requires new scientific and engineering knowledge and capability.

There is already some established beginnings in cooperation. A large number of informal exchanges occur among scientists, universities and private institutions, often including their Soviet counterparts. Arctic nations exchange world weather information under the World Meteorological Organization. In October of 1969, the President announced our intention to increase Arctic environmental research and support oceanic research generally in the International Decade of Ocean Exploration. On November 7, 1969, the Vice President confirmed designation of the National Science Foundation as lead agency for the International Decade of Ocean Exploration and for the extension of Arctic research with the advice of the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee.

Cooperation among the western Arctic nations, particularly in North America, is more highly developed. The U.S. and Canada built and maintain the DEW line and operate weather stations. Japanese, British and Canadians have worked together on ice flow stations. The National Science Foundation under its Arctic Research Program sponsors and encourages International Arctic research in projects with Canada, Denmark and other countries.

But, while there is ample room for exchange in these fields, there are also problems which must be recognized in any U.S. approach to increasing international cooperation. As national activities and interests in resources grow in the North, nations with Arctic territory (particularly, the USSR and Canada) will be concerned increasingly with preserving jurisdictional prerogatives, while other states will be seeking to gain maximum access to the area (for example, the U.S. or Japan). These divergent interests may hamper attempts at cooperation and may lead to extensions of jurisdictional claims (for example, the recent Canadian

legislation extending its jurisdiction into what we consider "non-national" territories). Soviet security sensitivities in the Arctic further strengthen their restrictive policies and militate against cooperative arrangements in research and data exchange.

Also, nations with substantial existing capabilities for scientific research in and access to the Arctic, particularly the Soviet Union and to a much less extent Canada, will wish to cooperate largely in areas where they believe they stand to receive equal gain. This factor, plus the vast extent of Soviet territory rimming the Arctic Basin and their correspondingly large "sector claim", are likely to limit Soviet interest in collaborative efforts.

The success of efforts to promote international collaboration in the Arctic now will rest upon shaping a cooperative arrangement with programs and machinery which will build upon the existing foundation of common national interests in the Arctic and at the same time allay the sensitivities and issues of difference.

Four alternative frameworks to foster expanded international cooperation in the Arctic have been proposed within the United States Government: (1) a continuation of the existing system, (2) the so-called Northlands Compact, (3) a Specialized Arctic Regime, and (4) a Condominium Type Regime.

Option 1. The Existing System

The existing system deals with international relations in the Arctic on an ad hoc basis. The strong pressures being exerted on the arrangements are discussed above. As technology opens the Arctic, as it has the seabed, to resource exploitation and new transportation possibilities, national interests and activities for gaining access to the area for commercial, scientific and even military uses will increase. The interaction of these interests and activities place overbearing strains on the current piecemeal national approach to the Arctic, hampering our ability to deal with international Arctic issues. New means are required.

Option 2. The Northlands Compact for International Cooperation

This proposal would establish a loose framework for enhancing cooperation among Arctic and other interested states, particularly those with Arctic territories and economic and scientific research interests. The agreement would provide an umbrella under which participating states could, as they wished, share experience and data affecting (1) regional development (transportation, construction, communications and the like), (2) environmental protection, (3) conservation of resources and (4) basic scientific research in fields of mutual interest.

The cooperation would be facilitated by exchanging information and data, exchanging visits of experts, holding conferences, joint planning and coordination of research by interested parties and facilitating expeditions through logistic support and rescue missions. Nations would support the compact by permitting and encouraging international cooperative projects by their nationals, designating national points of contact for cooperation and coordination, seeking to reduce impediments to research, consulting on specific, significant projects and meeting on a regular basis to review experience and decide upon ways to further the goals of the compact.

The possible advantages of a compact approach lie in its potential for acceptance by nations interested in the Arctic. Loose and flexible, the arrangement could be adjusted to the needs and desires of participating states, and it could sidestep the jurisdiction issues which may retard international cooperative endeavors. In a general way, it could shape the basic structure, direction and atmosphere of Arctic cooperation.

Among its disadvantages would be its inability to bind states to common action. Its success would hinge upon the interests of the States, which are likely to change, and the resulting effort could be one-sided. It would probably not have much immediate and substantial impact on the larger problems created by increasing international interest and activity in the Arctic.

Option 3. The Specialized Arctic Regime

The specialized Arctic regime approach would be a more comprehensive and binding arrangement than the compact proposal, though in a sense it would be an extension of the compact arrangement. While it might comprise the same interested states, the regime would establish an agreed code of conduct for states in various Arctic activities and an agreed mechanism for continued consultation among the parties. It could be limited to discreet fields of mutual interest or encompass a broad range of concerns, and be comprised of a single or a series of agreements with narrow or broad guidelines. It would approximate although with significant differences, an Antarctic Treaty for the Arctic.*

Like the Antarctic Treaty, which revolves around international interest in scientific research, it is likely that a successful regime would focus upon a common theme, such as scientific research and environmental maintenance and protection, and a limited number of specific fields of cooperation where there is a known community of interest. The regime could encompass matters which lend themselves to joint objectives and joint or self regulation, stipulating certain agreed "freedoms" and "obligations", such as (1) environmental protection with the obligation for national regulation under agreed guidelines, (2) promotion of scientific research with the obligation to exchange plans and data; (3) facilitation of international cooperation; (4) preservation and conservation of living and non-living resources; (5) protection of indigenous peoples; (6) mutual operation aids, assistance and services. The regime might specifically exclude subjects more suitable for national action such as defense and jurisdictional considerations. It might incorporate a limitation of future claims to sovereignty. It

* While the Arctic and Antarctic have similarities, the differences are significant, notably: unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic is an area of known economic potential, recognized claims of territorial sovereignty and first order environmental and security interest near major world population centers. In the Antarctic, neither the U.S. nor the USSR hold or recognize any national territorial claims, favoring maximum access to the area.

might circumvent sovereignty claims by applying different codes of conduct to land and water areas.

The possible advantages of the specialized regime approach are that it would establish international agreed codes of conduct and consultative machinery which could shape the international community's approach to the Arctic for years to come. The specialized regime would supplement the earlier and related U.S. initiatives of the seabed regime for mineral resources, which are designed to foster order and cooperation in other parts of the ocean. It could provide an inexpensive, unobtrusive mechanism through which the interested nations of the international community could deal with Arctic issues and the U.S. could seek to further appropriate priorities. A flexible arrangement, it would permit the determination of the subject areas of the regime by international negotiation. A binding instrument, it could fashion Arctic cooperation before mounting national interests in Arctic resources harden and jurisdictional claims proliferate.

Disadvantages of the specialized regime approach, as we have recently observed in our current discussions with Canada and the USSR about an Arctic regime for pollution and navigation, will revolve around national jurisdictional and defense considerations. As technology enables all nations to increase Arctic activities, these concerns are likely to heighten. Thus to negotiate a regime today would be more difficult than to establish a compact, and the consequences of its failure would be greater, in that failure in establishing a specialized regime could reduce chances for formal cooperative mechanisms in specific areas, which might have been subsumed therein. Also, depending upon the substance of the regime, a special regime for the Arctic runs the risk of derogating from existing Law of the Sea Conventions and setting a precedent for other nations to apply special circumstances and considerations to other areas of the world ocean.

Option 4. The Condominium Type Regime

This type of regime would be an extension and further formalization of the Specialized Arctic Regime. It would go beyond consultative machinery and provide for some form

of governing Council with stipulated membership and authority to govern specific aspects of Arctic activity. These aspects might well include those cited in the discussion of the Specialized Arctic Regime. The regime's operation might resemble in some respects that proposed in the U.S. draft for a United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area.

The advantages of the condominium regime are that it would extend and solidify the objectives and machinery of the specialized regime and bind nations to a cooperative mechanism.

The disadvantages are that the structure probably is not needed at this time to accomplish U.S. objectives, and, in view of Canadian and Soviet and perhaps other sensitivities about jurisdictional aspects of the Arctic, may not be acceptable to some major Arctic powers. Moreover, evidence is not clear that the vital interests of other Arctic nations will reinforce our own. Under these uncertainties a formal regulatory arrangement may not now be in the U.S. interest.

While consultations will be needed to determine the attitudes of other countries toward an international Arctic framework, it is likely that options 2 and 3 would be accepted by most nations. The smaller Arctic and other involved countries would probably be attracted to options 3 and 2 in that order because they would foster broad international cooperation while maintaining the parity of the smaller Arctic nations. The USSR and Canada would probably only depart reluctantly from the status quo, the former because of its concern for strategic and resource interests, limiting access to the area and its dislike for new international arrangements, and the latter because of its sensitivity over jurisdictional and resource exploitation considerations. But options 2 and 3 in that order might be attractive to Canada, because they offer a means to regularize international activities in the Arctic while providing valuable cooperation and information exchange. The Soviets are not likely to consider initially that the concrete benefits of international cooperation will override their other Arctic interests. Their reaction today to an international Arctic framework proposal is expected to be negative. Nevertheless, we believe the overall benefits of the proposal warrant our exploring their attitudes and seeking their support for it.

Recommended Option: The Committee believes that Option 2, the Northlands Compact for International Cooperation and Option 3, the Specialized Arctic Regime both provide general contexts within which U.S. needs and objectives in the Arctic region might reasonably be attained. However, the selection of one of these, or the melding of desirable elements from each, as a recommended framework for international cooperation in the Arctic will require a detailed consideration of many factors which it has not been possible to treat thoroughly within this Review. These factors include the acceptability and probable reaction of other countries with Arctic territory and interests; the specific areas in which international cooperation is most useful; the identification of the resources within the U.S. to support international cooperation in these areas; and the interrelation between the framework for general international cooperation in the Arctic and such efforts as our desire to formulate within the "Law of the Sea" context international agreement on maritime environmental and navigation standards and regulations in the Arctic.

In view of the need to give more attention to the development of a framework for international cooperation in the Arctic, the Committee recommends the adoption in principle of the establishment of a framework for international cooperation in the Arctic and that the Arctic Policy Group as the mechanism for effecting overall Federal coordination and policy guidance given immediate attention to the development of a single recommended framework for international cooperation in the Arctic.

VII. Interagency Coordinating Mechanism

As indicated earlier, there does not now exist any agency, or interagency mechanism able to give guidance consonant with overall national policy interests and objectives to agencies having the responsibility for implementing Arctic programs. Federal interagency mechanisms which plan and coordinate activities in several relatively limited and essentially domestically oriented areas do, however, exist. Of particular interest are three interagency bodies focusing on the Arctic: The Federal Field Committee for Development and Planning in Alaska; the "Task Force on Alaskan Oil Development"; and the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee.

The Federal Field Committee was established to serve as the principal instrumentality for developing coordinate plans for Federal programs which contribute to economic and resource development in Alaska and for recommending appropriate action by the Federal Government to carry out such plans. The Committee has produced a series of studies, long-range plans, program developments and policy recommendations concerning the actions the government should take to improve Alaskan economic and resource development. The Chairman of the Field Committee is appointed by the President. The members of the Field Committee are senior Federal officials in Alaska representing the Departments of Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, Small Business Administration and the Federal Power Commission.

The Federal Task Force on Alaskan Oil Development was established in May 1969 by the President under the Department of the Interior. Membership includes, DOD, DOT, Commerce, HEW, HUD, OST, CEQ, NSF and OMB. This Task Force conducted a number of biological and geological investigations during the summer of 1969, which resulted in the development of environmental stipulations to condition the permit of the Trans Alaska Pipeline.

The focus of the Task Force has recently broadened to include: (1) the initiation of studies on the effectiveness of land use regulations and procedures for Federal lands in the Arctic; (2) an evaluation of the management of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; and (3) the establishment of a Master Land Use Plan to determine the best use and protection of all Federal lands north of the Procupine-Yukon-Kuskowim line in Alaska.

The Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee (IARCC) was established in 1967. It is chaired by the National Science Foundation. Membership on this Committee includes the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, State, Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare, Interior, and Transportation, the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Office of Management and Budget and the National Academy of Sciences are observers. The IARCC is limited in its coordinative abilities because its expertise is confined to general scientific and logistic matters.

This Committee collects and collates agency research budgets, coordinates scientific research programs and coordinates Arctic research with Antarctic research. Classified military research and research in the economic sciences are beyond the IARCC's scope of interest. The

IARCC has been actively concerned with international as well as domestic scientific research activities relating to the Arctic.

These three interagency groups have been and continue to be active and effective in their areas of interest. However, with the exception of the IARCC, these bodies have not been directly concerned with planning and coordination for international programs or for the international and national security components and implications of largely domestic programs.

The principle limitations of each of these committees and similar bodies are lack of breadth and/or lack of agency representation at a "policy" level. Both the Federal Field Committee and the Federal Task Force on Alaskan Oil Development focus on matters relating in essence to Alaskan development. The IARCC, which is increasingly involved in international activities, does not have direct interests beyond research.

With active interests of the U.S. growing to encompass the Arctic as a region, and with the increasing interrelation between domestic, international and national security aspects of Arctic plans, programs and activities, some mechanism focusing on regional policy development, and serving to evaluate and relate international aspects of domestic programs with regional policy aims is desirable. It should be concerned with investigating the possibilities for international cooperation in the Arctic and the available alternatives in our approach to Arctic regional problems and opportunities generally.

The "policy coordinating mechanism" should also specifically address itself to gathering budgetary and other data necessary to the formulation of a coherent integrated regional Arctic policy. This mechanism should be the primary policy level entity for the expression of U.S. international and national security interests in the Arctic. In this capacity it should advise other constituted bodies whose responsibilities might from time to time require a consideration of Arctic interests. It will not, however, replace presently constituted and "chartered" bodies with Arctic responsibilities. Also, the "mechanism for policy guidance" is not intended to infringe upon defined agency responsibilities or adequate formal or informal interagency coordination where these exist with regard to domestic Arctic policy and programs; specifically, all matters of concern to the Interagency Task Force on Law

of the Sea arising in an Arctic context shall continue to be the responsibility of that body.

The "mechanics for policy guidance" might take any of several forms. Options available to effect overall Federal coordination and policy guidance include:

- Option 1. Designating an Executive non-operating agency which does not operate Arctic programs like the Office of Science and Technology, the National Security Council, or the Department of State as a central policy coordinating agency.
- Option 2. An independent, Presidentially named board or coordinating body consisting of designated individuals.
- Option 3. Designation of an appropriate Executive operating agency; e.g., Interior, DOD, Transportation or Commerce as a "lead agency".
- Option 4. An NSC Under Secretaries Committee including agencies with Arctic interests.
- Option 5. An independent, interagency committee or "Arctic Policy group" consisting of agencies with the most significant Arctic interests.

Option 1.

The designation of a non-operating Executive agency has the advantage of having no vested interests in its own programs or conflicts in mission with operating agencies.

The primary disadvantages are a lack of authority to define programs or develop budgetary support.

Option 2.

The designation of an independent Presidentially named board or coordinating body has the advantage of avoiding agency parochialism, and an ability to exercise judgments out of the context of an agency mission and expressing Executive interest at the highest level.

Its disadvantages are essentially the same as apply to Option 1, that is lack of authority to define programs or develop budgetary support.

In addition, such a body could only advise and not direct Federal agencies or programs.

Option 3.

The designation of an operating Executive agency has the advantage of placing central coordinating authority with an agency which has responsibility and authority for program development and budgetary allocations and an existing support staff familiar with Arctic programs.

The principal disadvantages are a lack of authority in developing and guiding programs which are the normal responsibility of other agencies and the possibility of parochialism.

Option 4.

The designation of an Under Secretaries Committee has the advantage of allowing for collective leadership in developing programs and policy guidance giving consideration to all interests, operating and non-operating. Also because of the level of agency representation, information on programs and budgets could be effectively assembled.

The principle disadvantage is that in the absence of a specific authority, from the President or Congress, the Committee cannot specifically control or plan the programs of its constituent agencies. This problem may be accentuated because of the fact that within agencies Arctic expertise frequently is directly associated with operating programs which might overly color the positions of agencies as represented within the Committee. Additionally, the focus of the Under Secretaries Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy affairs might impede the development of broader Arctic programs in that forum.

Option 5.

The designation of an independent interagency committee or Arctic Policy Group has the advantages of option 4 and also such a group could more easily develop whatever new guidelines that may be necessary to carry out the actions arising from this study and its recommendations; since it would not be limited to the terms of reference and specific interests of the Under Secretaries Committee. For example actions relating

to the implementation of the recommendations calling for the development of a comprehensive transportation system and a coordinated program of scientific research would fall largely outside of the specific general boundary of interests of the Under Secretaries Committee. The involvement of the Under Secretaries Committee in such activities would be an anomaly. The establishment of such a group also could assist in the coordination of related activities in the Arctic and Antarctic, e.g., certain aspects of scientific research, by creating a body analogous to the Antarctic Policy Group.

Its principal disadvantages include those listed for option 4 and in addition, its independent status could leave its relation to established interagency bodies unclear, particularly its relation to the Under Secretaries Committee, and the NSC system with regard to National Security and international affairs.

Recommended Option:

The Committee believes that Option 5, the establishment of an independent, interagency committee designated the Arctic Policy group best meets U.S. needs and interests at this time. The Arctic Policy Group should consist of the Departments of State (Chairman), Defense, Interior, Commerce, Transportation and the National Science Foundation. The group should consult with other agencies as appropriate in carrying out its responsibilities, and should utilize fully the facilities and advice of existing interagency groups in carrying out its responsibilities. The Arctic Policy Group should also insure that its decisions relating to matters affecting the National Security or significantly affecting our international posture are coordinated with the Under Secretaries Committee. The Policy Group should also refer to the Under Secretaries Committee questions in these areas which it is unable to resolve. The Arctic Policy Group will not oversee or coordinate primarily domestic or Alaskan development or programs as such.

A principal recommendation of the Committee is the creation of a framework providing for the establishment of international agreement in several specific areas of Arctic activity and interests. Agreements under this framework might in many instances include monitoring and regulating mechanisms. To give guidance and

continuity to the development and implementation of such agreements and to coordinate USA activities under its aegis, a defined mechanism is needed. Placing the responsibility for giving guidance to US activities in the Arctic with an "Arctic Policy Group" is reasonable since its membership includes those agencies primarily responsible for their developments. The independent status of the Arctic Policy Group will allow broad flexibility in developing and coordinating policy actions. By defining a relational link with the Under Secretaries Committee, adequate coordination of National Security and foreign policy interests can be insured.

VIII. Budgetary Implications

It has not been possible to develop the budgetary implications of a U.S. policy on the Arctic, particularly those inherent in achieving the U.S. Interests and Objectives we have listed. Since there has heretofore been no coordinated policy on the Arctic, many agencies have had no incentive or requirement to specifically identify Arctic budgetary data or programs and program components. In many agencies such data can be acquired only by separately identifying and extracting Arctic components of functional or broader geographic programs.

Additionally, the lack of a consistently applied definition of the Arctic makes the extraction of program data difficult. An accurate breakdown of Arctic program costs is available only in the area of scientific research at the present time. This breakdown is annexed in the Appendix Table II. The President's FY 71 budget request emphasizes the expansion of Arctic research; the message transmitting the annual report, Marine Science Affairs, to the Congress in particular takes note of this need. The approximate total figures for gross Federal expenditures including research as well as all other expenditures (NSF) in and on the Arctic are: FY 70 - \$91,024,936.; FY 71 - \$151,682,730.

IX. Conclusions

The Committee, having reviewed the history and status of U.S. Arctic Policy has concluded that there has never been, nor does there now exist a coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic. Additionally, no single agency or interagency mechanism or body has been charged with the task of focusing a national effort, particularly where the international and national security implications of domestic policy and programs must be considered.

To continue as at present would probably not be detrimental to U.S. interests in the short run. In some areas, for example, e.g., scientific research and defense, the U.S. currently has significant programs and interests which fall under defined agency responsibilities. In these areas, adequate formal or informal interagency coordination already exists. However, the value of a coordinated policy defining national interests and goals within the international context of the entire Arctic region becomes evident as our Arctic interests and activities expand into areas where responsibilities are less clearly defined and operational interdependence is a necessity, e.g., regional environmental protection, economic development and transportation.

STATEMENT OF POLICY

The Arctic region a polar ice-covered ocean bounded by adjacent seas and territories of several nations -- including the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union -- presents the United States with multifold, often-disparate opportunities and challenges.

The time has come when U.S. Arctic interests -- which range from economic development consistent with U.S. policy regarding preservation of environmental quality and cooperative, international research to issues of strategic importance to the Nation's security -- may no longer be pursued separately but must, instead, be addressed within the framework of a single, coherent national policy. To this end, the Ad Hoc Committee on U.S. Arctic Policy has developed the following statement of U.S. Arctic Policy.

It is declared to be the policy of the United States to insure that Arctic development is orderly and consistent with U.S. policy on conservation and protection of the environment; to maintain a posture sufficient to protect our national security interests and preserve the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace; to develop and implement programs and activities within a framework of international cooperation wherever appropriate and feasible.

In order to effectively implement U.S. policy in the Arctic, our activities relating to the region must be organized and coordinated to contribute to the following objectives:

U.S. Objectives

U.S. objectives in the Arctic may be defined as the achievement, with a minimum adverse effect on the environment, of:

1. Mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries in exploration, scientific research, resource development and exchange of scientific and technical data.

The U.S. should promote international cooperation in exploration, research, safety, health and welfare and other activities which will be beneficial to all participating countries. We should establish criteria for identifying information suitable for exchange. The development of a general framework within which multinational cooperation can take place is specifically recommended. Such a framework might focus over a broad spectrum of activities including, but not limited to scientific and technical research and regional economic development assistance. It would not be pre-emptive, nor prohibit the establishment of specialized agreements in particular areas, e.g., an agreement between nations on anti-pollution and environmental standards for Arctic waters and on standards and regulations for navigation assistance.

2. An improved capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic based on a fuller understanding of the marine, terrestrial and atmospheric components of the Arctic environment.

The U.S. should facilitate and improve the education and training of technical and professional personnel for Arctic work and develop a comprehensive understanding of the technical, economic and social problems presented by the Arctic environment. We should encourage, support and conduct broad fundamental research programs to develop a fuller understanding of the Arctic environment and ecology.

3. The economic development of Alaska including its continental shelf

The U.S. should, through governmental and private sector resources, encourage the conduct of the research and engineering necessary for the development of Alaska, giving attention to both environmental quality and economic goals.

4. Adequate freedom of action to conduct those military and intelligence operations essential to the security of the U.S. and the capability to carry out aerospace, surface and under-surface military operations in the Arctic.


This would encompass, but not be limited to:

- a. Operational freedom and exercises, as deemed appropriate and with due regard for economic, social and political objectives as well as the preservation of the ecology and environment in the Arctic region on U.S. territory and in areas of the region beyond the limit of national jurisdiction recognized by the U.S.;

- b. Facilities, equipment and logistic support systems required to implement the air defense of the North American Continent and the maintenance of an assured retaliatory capability;
 - c. Protection of U.S. military facilities against surveillance, espionage, and compromise;
 - d. Scientific and engineering research in support of those military and intelligence activities essential to the security of the U.S.
5. The settlement of jurisdictional questions and disputes among nations through peaceful international means.

The U.S. should continue to encourage the resolution of international problems by agreement among nations reached through existing international mechanisms and means, or through the development, if necessary, of new approaches to the solution of such problems by agreement among nations.


THE ARCTIC REGION



BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY

Polar Azimuthal Equidistant Projection

- Southern boundary of continuous permafrost
- Routes of Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route



78635 7-70

North Polar Region



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REVIEW OF U.S. ARCTIC POLICY
AND
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

BACKGROUND PAPER

Purpose

Increasing awareness in the United States and other countries bordering the Arctic of the great economic potential and strategic importance of the region makes reappraisal of U.S. policy for the Arctic necessary at this time. The Arctic region, especially the land area, has been reconnoitered sufficiently to identify its importance, but further development without causing irreparable disruption of its fragile ecological fabric depends on a concerted and strong U.S. policy decision to devote sufficient priority attention and resources to U.S. Arctic programs.

Definition of Arctic Region

The term "Arctic" has different real meanings in different contexts. Generally it is used to refer to the broad cold region which surrounds the North Pole. For the purposes of specific studies and problems, however, it has been defined by several more definitive criteria, the most common being as follows:

- a. High latitude -- usually that area within the Arctic Circle (66° 33' N)
- b. Polar Basin -- the area of the Arctic Ocean, sometimes also including the drainage basins of rivers flowing into it.
- c. Continuous permafrost -- the high latitude areas where the ground is perennially frozen.
- d. Temperature -- areas where the average temperature of the warmest month is below 50° F and the coldest month is below 32° F.
- e. Tree line -- the poleward limit of tree growth.

For the purposes of this paper the term is most often used in its general sense. Where a specific boundary is

required the Arctic Region is defined as: the land and water areas surrounding the North Pole including the Arctic Ocean and adjacent waters, extending on the land to the southern limit of continuous permafrost.

Description of Arctic Region

The Arctic region, some 8.3 million square miles, centers on the Arctic Ocean and includes almost 3 million square miles of continuous permafrost land. The Arctic Ocean itself covers 5.4 million square miles, and area 50% larger than the U.S., and connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A perennial, floating icepack extends outward from the North Pole to distances of 500 to 1200 miles. The mean monthly temperatures for this region, ranging from minus 40° F. to plus 50° F., make it a most hostile environment for human activity.

The Arctic Environment

The Arctic regions exercise a major influence on weather and climate of the Northern Hemisphere and indeed of the whole planet. Small changes in the ice cover and snow cover significantly affect the atmospheric heat balance. Perturbations in the heat balance can alter weather and climate over large regions, can influence the extent of glaciation and produce changes in mean sea level. These influences make it imperative that prior to the initiation of large-scale operations sufficient research and evaluation be carried out to determine the effect on global conditions. For example, the diversion of rivers currently flowing into the Arctic could bring about profound changes. At present relatively fresh waters lie near the surface. Fresh water freezes more rapidly than saline water to form sea ice, the extent of which plays an important role in determining the thermal balance within the atmosphere.

The Arctic is now one of the world's least polluted areas. By proper planning in the development of this area, we can prevent many of the environmental problems which now plague most of the populated sectors of the world. The following features of pollution control should be considered:

a. Control of Air Pollution.

Again because of the sensitivity of world-wide climate, perturbations in conditions existing at the Arctic could have not only local and regional but also world-wide effects.

b. Disposal of Solid Wastes.

This presents a special problem due to the difficulties in the Arctic of excavating sanitary landfills. Special care should be taken in handling of solid waste.

c. Water Pollution Including Ocean Dumping.

Particular care must be taken in monitoring the activities of the offshore oil industries and the related sea transports. Research is urgently needed on the property of oil in the Arctic Ocean environment. The specific gravity of the oil is intermediate between that of the water and ice and this fact could complicate to a very large extent any cleanup operations.

d. Proper Land Use Planning.

The Arctic regions present a unique opportunity to plan ahead so as to make optimum uses of the varied resources.

e. Planning of Communities, Defense and Industry Cantonments.

Past history reveals that in frontier areas these usually have grown in a helter-skelter manner. In the Arctic these should be planned and take into account the following factors:

1. functional purpose and utility
2. recreational activities
3. disposal of sewage and solid waste and the provision of other sanitary measures
4. esthetic values, both natural and man-made
5. prevention of air and noise pollution
6. provision of adequate transportation/communications facilities without endangering environmental values

f. Extraction of Minerals and Other Natural Resources

In many wilderness areas these activities have proceeded without regard to the esthetic or wilderness of the lands affected. Adequate controls must be instituted so that development of one sort does not destroy resources of another sort.

g. Arctic Ecology Should be Preserved.

Research and evaluation is urgently needed to define further this ecology. Areas of natural habitat of unique species must be identified and safeguarded. Particular attention should be devoted to those animals, fish and birds that could on a short time scale become endangered species.

The prevention of many of these environmental problems is particularly critical in the Arctic because of its unique characteristics. These include the effect of the icepack and other physical features on the world's weather, and the nature of permafrost, as it relates to the ability to excavate, construct and drain. In the Arctic, land use planning and community development must be accomplished in a context of environmental preservation. Without careful planning the Arctic ecological balance cannot be preserved.

Importance of Arctic

The Arctic is the "last frontier" in the northern hemisphere in terms of the world's limited natural resources and space for an expanding world population. In spite of the extremely adverse conditions, modern technology--clothing, shelter, transportation systems, and operational techniques--makes possible year-round human occupancy and work in this region.

The Arctic is strategically important because it affords the shortest distance between the continents of Eurasia and North America. The Arctic encompasses the most direct attack routes from the USSR to the U.S. The region also contains the avenues of attack and operation required to maintain the effectiveness of the U.S. retaliatory capability and, thereby, the integrity of deterrence against attack on the U.S. The Arctic Region, as defined herein, consists largely of areas that the U.S. considers to be

international, subject to the high seas regime affording freedom of transition, over and under the high seas, including areas of superincumbent ice mass. Although the dimensions of the strategic threat to the U.S. may change somewhat as that threat becomes more omnidirectional, the Arctic Region will continue to be of primary strategic concern because of its position contiguous to and directly between the U.S. and the USSR. The military significance of the Region may increase as the technologies of operations (military and civilian) are more fully developed and as the economic potential of the Arctic littorals is realized.

The U.S. Arctic Region is important to the economy of our Nation because of its unexploited natural resources and favorable trade-route location. Oil and gas, in Alaska partially relieve our concern over supply of these energy reserves from foreign sources in times of emergency. Hardly of less importance is the existence of an alternate supply of petroleum which could ease the essentially total dependence of our major allies on Mideast and Africal oil. The supply of strategic and precious metals in the Arctic are not immediately important, but will be in the long term as the world's population expands and other sources are depleted. Natural resources of the Arctic can be useful to restore a healthy balance of foreign trade and possibly enhance our gold reserves. Arctic Alaska is geographically well-suited to trade with Asia and Europe via the northern and northwestern sea routes should commercial transiting of these routes become feasible. Its sparse, underprivileged population needs economic help. The development of Arctic resources can assist in relieving the immediate social and economic problems of the indigenous Alaskan population by providing an opportunity for jobs and community development.

Science in the Arctic is important to the Nation because the keys to an understanding of the physical, chemical and biological cycles are provided through studies on such subjects as global weather patterns and ocean circulation, marine and terrestrial ecosystems, permafrost and sea-ice properties, upper atmospheric phenomena, and archaeological, social and anthropological investigations of native populations.

Internationally, the Arctic Ocean makes us neighbors to four other nations -- USSR, Norway, Denmark and Canada. Although Finland, Sweden and Iceland do not abut the Arctic Ocean, they too share our concern for exploration, development, settlement and exploitation of the Arctic region. The United Kingdom and France, too, have a long tradition of exploration and research in and on the Arctic. Japan, a natural resource-starved nation, has shown increased interest in Arctic

resources as manifested by investment and commerce, primarily with Alaska and Canada in oil and timber resources. Through international cooperation in science the knowledge essential to effect optimum development of the Arctic's resources balanced against the need for environmental preservation can be most effectively accumulated.

Summary of Activities of Arctic Ocean Nations

Table I compares interests of the five Arctic Ocean nations in terms of territory, continental shelves, population, natural resources, relative investments in transportation facilities, and commercial and scientific activities.

USSR

A rigid application of the permafrost definition of the Arctic Region would exclude the Kola Peninsula of the USSR, the highly developed logistical center for Soviet military, scientific, and economic activities in the Arctic Basin. To present a more comprehensive and realistic picture of Soviet activities and operational capabilities in the Arctic Region this discussion of the Soviet Arctic includes the area to the southern limit of permafrost or the Arctic Circle, whichever lies further south.

The USSR is developing and using the Arctic Region more extensively than any other country. The Arctic part of the USSR, which constitutes one-third of its territory, is being systematically interwoven into the Soviet political, social, economic and military fabric. Approximately two million citizens live in the Soviet Arctic, and are engaged in mining, forestry, fishing, and limited agriculture. The region furnishes virtually all of the natural industrial diamonds used in the national economy, as well as 95% of the platinum-group metals, nearly 50% of the gold (219 million in 1969), 40% of the tin, 85% of the nickel, 15% of the tungsten and 15% of the copper. There has been extensive military and economic development on the Kola Peninsula in the last 15-20 years, so that today this region is a strategic bastion in the north and makes a sizable contribution to the country's economy. A key factor in the development and operation of the Arctic economy is the coordinated water transportation system of ocean-going vessels on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and river fleets on the northward flowing rivers. The NSR stretches some 3,400 nautical miles from Murmansk (on the Kola Peninsula)

to the Bering Sea and links twenty or more ports (10 of which are deep water) on the Arctic coast with the outside world during a three- to four-month summer navigation season. Operation of the NSR requires a huge investment in ancillary services including a fleet of fifteen large ice-breakers to convoy vessels through the ice-choked waters. In 1967 the Soviets "offered" use of the NSF to foreign commercial vessels as a short route from Northern Europe to Japan and eastern Asia, but no foreign ship-owners accepted the offer. The offer was withdrawn in 1968. A number of naval units are annually transferred over the NSR to the Pacific Ocean.

Soviet military use of the Arctic is extensive and includes elements of ground, naval, air, and missile test units.

On the Kola Peninsula the Soviets maintain extensive military facilities including the Northern Fleet surface and air units, Army elements of the Leningrad Military District, Air Defense units including fighters surface-to-air missiles and radar, naval missile test ranges and nuclear weapons storage facilities.

The Plesetsk Missile Test Center is just south of the Arctic Circle near the White Sea.

The entire Arctic littoral is dotted with operational airfields used by heavy and medium bombers of Long Range Aviation (LRA) during their Arctic exercises. In addition, airfields on the Arctic Islands (Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land, Severnaya Zemlya and Wrangel) are also used by LRA bombers. Long Range Aviation units routinely fly missions throughout the Arctic as do some units of Soviet Air Defense Command (PVO), while Arctic Military Transport units are permanently based at Vorkuta and Tiksi.

Anadyr, on the Chukhotsk Peninsula, ranks second to the Kola Peninsula in military use. It supports air defense units and reconnaissance operations by LRA Badgers against our Alaskan ADIZ. A nuclear storage site and some Army units of the Far East Military District are also based there.

Overall, the Soviet military has obtained experience in Arctic operations for all its major force components.

The Soviet Union has long claimed broad jurisdiction over the part of the Arctic basin north of the USSR. A 1926 Soviet decree claimed all land and immovable ice formations within the triangular area bounded by the Arctic

coast on the south and the meridians 32° 04' 34" E and 168° 49' 30" W, excluding Svalbard in the west and Little Diomedede Island in the east. Later, Soviet jurists broadened this claim to include open polar seas and drift ice. The Soviet government continues to delimit the sector on all current maps with a symbol defined as "Polar Domain (Vlardeniya) of the USSR", but it has not excluded foreign vessels, aircraft or drift ice stations from this broad sector. In marginal seas and adjacent straits, however, Soviet claims of exclusive jurisdiction are most rigorously enforced. These claims have not been recognized by other nations.

Transit of the Norther Sea Route is not feasible without Soviet technical assistance. When U.S. icebreakers attempted in the summers of 1963-67 to test freedom of these areas, the Soviets harassed the vessels in the open sea and later effectively blocked their passage through the key straits by a series of legal technicalities, threats and diplomatic notes. Although recent diplomatic talks still give the impression of Soviet determination to keep the northern straits closed to international traffic, Soviet attitudes toward the marginal seas may be changing. A 1969 book by a Soviet legal expert omits listing the marginal seas (except the White Sea) in the Arctic as internal waters for historic reasons.

Although the Soviets have not led in the development and exploitation of offshore mineral resources in the Arctic, the shelf adjacent to the USSR's Arctic coast is long (4,500 nautical miles), broad (up to 500 nautical miles) and reportedly rich in hydrocarbons. They must soon begin to look to development of this area if they are to maintain hydrocarbon self-sufficiency in this century. The Soviets probably recognize, however, that it may take their technology as long as 20 to 30 years to get large-scale production of oil and gas from Arctic offshore areas.

Soviet future "projects" for the "transformation of nature" appear to have some potentially adverse implications for the Arctic Basin. The Soviets continue to discuss two grandiose projects which would dam and divert waters of several large northward flowing rivers to augment scarce water resources in the southern USSR. The implementation of such projects could have drastic effects on the environment of the Arctic and possibly the entire earth. Scientists believe that the water from these Siberian rivers keeps the top layer of the Arctic Ocean comparatively fresh so that it freezes more easily. Any significant reduction in the

supply of fresh water would precipitate large-scale melting of the icepack and result in a disastrous shift in climatic zones throughout the Northern Hemisphere. The Soviets have recently decided to initiate the first stage of a diversion of the upper reaches of the Pechora River into the southward flowing Kama and Volga Rivers. While this may not be enough to seriously disturb the ecological balance in the Arctic, it may be a forerunner to other such projects and consequently the ramifications of such projects must be considered.

Soviet Arctic scientific research in the last half century has sought to improve environmental knowledge and the prediction of associated dynamic phenomena. This has provided the base for the development of the Northern Sea Route and the economic resources of the region. More than 100 polar research stations are strung along the coast and on some of the islands. The Soviets have maintained year-round research camps on two drifting ice floes--the latest established in October 1968 on an ice island 300 miles off Point Barrow, Alaska. Extensive meteorological data collections are made by aircraft, rockets and telemetering drifting buoys as well as by their research camps. Oceanographic observations are made by the Hydrographical Patrol, naval submarines, special cruises of icebreakers, large freight ships and aircraft which land on the icepack. Aircraft are regularly used to reconnoiter ice conditions for navigational forecasts.

As leaders in Arctic research the Soviets hold a vast store of data. Although they publish extensively on many topics, they often exclude the basic data from which their findings are derived. In the absence of an international program or arrangements for data exchange, much of the vast store of primary data is not available to us. Moreover, in the absence of a U.S. scientific effort of commensurate size and quality to theirs, and for other reasons, the Soviets to date have been generally unreceptive to U.S. moves to begin scientific cooperation in the Arctic. They have discouraged efforts to collect oceanographic data from the Soviet side of the pack ice, although they sometimes operate in the western sector of the Arctic Ocean.

Canada

The Canadians have for several decades claimed sovereignty over land areas in the Arctic North. Her declared interest in the area was evident as early as 1897. when the Arctic Archipelago was included as part of the

new District of Franklin. A 1904 map showed Canada extending clear to the North Pole, via sector lines along the 60th and 141st meridians. By the 1920's territorial outposts were established and regulatory practices put into force, many of which were complied with by foreign interests doing business in the area.

Sovereignty over the non-land areas has been less clear. Conflicting interpretations by various Prime Ministers and other officials have reflected the complexities of determining policies on waterways which, for most of the year, are solid ice and unnavigable; the Northwest Passage is iceblocked for 8-10 months every year. In any case, the determination of Canadian territorial waters according to her traditional 3-mile limit would put much of the non-land area of the Archipelago under Canadian sovereignty, and according to a newly declared 12-mile limit nearly all of it under her sovereignty, unless clear exception is made for freedom of navigation through and over international straits.

The transit of the Northwest Passage by the Humble Oil Company's tanker, Manhattan, in late 1969 examined the feasibility of this route for commercial traffic on an international scale. The implications were far-reaching, especially for the Canadians who traditionally have had the only western icebreaker fleet available to provide assistance in the ice-bound Arctic waters -- a status that gave them nominal control. The possibility of foreign vessels plying these waters independently in the future precipitated proposals for new and stringent legislation for environmental protection of the Canadian North. Contending that the dangers of pollution are immediate, while the formulation and enactment of international laws to guard against pollution would require considerable time, Canada chose to extend her claims to jurisdiction unilaterally in order, in her view, to prevent irreversible damage in the Arctic. On April 8, 1970, legislation was introduced in the Canadian Parliament establishing pollution zones in Arctic waters extending 100 miles seaward from every point in Canadian territory above the 60th parallel. In these zones the Canadian government would exert control over shipping, including the establishment of required ship construction standards, and also control the navigation of vessels through the areas included in the zones. The Canadian government has stated that she stands ready to participate in multilateral discussions on navigation safety and environmental protection, which should in her view "transcend traditional concepts of sovereignty and national jurisdiction".

The Canadian Arctic (north of 60°) consists of two sectors, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. Both have limited self-government, but the Federal Government in Ottawa exercises primary control. The Canadian Department of National Defense is responsible for all aspects of maritime, land and air defense of the Canadian Arctic. In some areas these tasks are done in cooperation, or shared, with the U.S. under joint agreement. The Canadian armed forces also share mapping responsibilities with the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. They provide search and rescue facilities and additional assistance to other government activities where commercial services are not available. In the area of science, the Defense Research Board supports and conducts research relevant to military problems, especially in communications techniques and equipment.

Their Department of Transport coordinates and carries out delivery to the Arctic of cargo and passengers for government and commercial concerns. Aided by Navy clearance diving teams they resupply the Arctic weather stations which were until recently jointly operated with the U.S. The Canadians will staff them entirely in the future. The Department of Transport also assists commercial carriers in supplying the DEW Line. The Canadian DOT operates ten icebreakers. Approximately 108,000 short tons of dry cargo and bulk oil were transported to the Arctic in 1967. The Canadian government is advised on operations in the Arctic by the Deputy Minister level Advisory Committee on Northern Development, whose responsibilities are:

"To advise the government on questions of policy relating to civilian and military undertakings in northern Canada and to provide for the effective coordination of all government activities."

Eighteen agencies concerned with northern affairs are represented on this Committee.

The largest single Canadian Arctic program is the Polar Continental Shelf Project, a comprehensive research and mapping venture of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. It will eventually cover all parts of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Permanent observatories for geomagnetism, gravity and seismology have been established at the eight major Arctic stations and settlements.

The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development operates a research station at Inuvik on the Mackenzie

delta and assists in funding the McGill University at Schefferville, Quebec. This Ministry is in general quite influential in Arctic matters and its Minister often speaks for the Government on Northern questions. Among other Canadian agencies with major Arctic programs are the Defense Research Board, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Forestry and Rural Development, the Fisheries Research Board, the National Museum of Canada and the National Research Council of Canada.

These activities have involved on the order of 9000 employees and a budget of \$96.8 million.

Denmark

As a country that builds and also operates a large fleet of ice-strengthened merchant ships, Denmark has a strong interest in the maximum commercial development of polar regions. The popular ice-strengthened Dan-class vessels are used not only in Greenland waters by the Danes, but are also chartered by several other nations for use in the Arctic and Antarctic.

Danish views on national jurisdiction of the seabed in Arctic regions is likely to be influenced by the size of the continental margin around Greenland. When measured to the 2,500 meter isobath, this seabed area is huge and includes vast sedimentary basins that are considered locally favorable for petroleum.

Greenland, which is an integral part of Denmark, has been a significant element in the defense structure of North American and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During World War II the U.S. established three air bases in Greenland--Narsarsuak, Sonderstrom and Thule. Narsarsuak was turned over to Denmark after the war as was part of Sonderstrom Air Base. Defense early warning sites (DEW Line) and ballistic missile early warning sites (BMEWS) are still in operation.

Economic activity in Greenland is in three main categories, most important being the fishing, hunting and sheep raising pursued by the Greenlanders themselves without direct government regulation. The second comprises government-operated trading transport, building and public installations. The third is mining, mostly carried out by Danes for export. Valuable minerals are not very abundant--cryolite mined near Ivigtut and lead near Mestersvig are the most notable.

Denmark has sponsored scientific investigations in Greenland for more than two centuries, mainly geological and biological surveys. Many expeditions for the study of meteorology, ionospheric physics and glaciology have centered on Greenland. The U.S., Canada and France have participated in cooperative scientific activities in Greenland. Meteorological, ionospheric and radio propagation studies are the major effort at established stations, which include Nord, Thule, Qanaq, Narssarsuak and Godhavn. Denmark has encouraged international cooperation in scientific research in Greenland, involving whenever possible the participation of Danish scientists.

Norway

Norway, a maritime state, has a keen interest in maintaining maximum freedom of the seas, particularly in Arctic waters. Each summer a number of Norwegian timber vessels travel the Northern Sea Route under Soviet control and surveillance to Soviet ports on the Yenisey River. In 1957, Norwegian shipowners showed strong interest in the possibility of using the North Sea Route to trade with the Orient.

The Norwegians are very sensitive to Russian submarine activity which has occurred in various fiords along their coast in the last several years.

Norwegian views on seabed jurisdiction are likely to be favorable to any proposal which would give them exclusive rights to exploit the mineral resources that may be found in offshore sedimentary basins at depths below 200 meters on either side of the northern end of the Norwegian Trough, as well as in the northern region around Jan Mayen Island and Svalbard and beyond towards the Pole.

Norway has a special situation among Arctic nations since nearly half the country is north of the Arctic circle. Yet from a climatic, vegetation, or permafrost sense this country would not be considered "Arctic". The Norwegian islands: Spitzbergen (Svalbard), Bear Island and Jan Mayen are true Arctic -- glaciated and desolate. As a member of NATO, Norway contributes to the defense of the North Atlantic especially through its strategic location and through the provision of specialists in Arctic mountain and Arctic maritime operations.

Spitzbergen was until 1920 officially unclaimed. Because of proximity to the islands and the long-standing

Norwegian interest in marine science exploration activities including seal and walrus hunting, they took the lead in intensive scientific exploration of the islands in 1906. By 1920 enough world-wide interest had developed so that nine* interested countries signed a treaty which assigned sovereignty to Norway, prohibits the use of the archipelago for warlike purposes and provides that all parties have equal liberty of access and entry for any peaceful reason or object. The USSR later acceded to this treaty.

Most of the efforts on Spitzbergen are carried on by Norway and the USSR. Both countries are mining coal there with Norway producing about 480,000 tons annually and the Soviet Union producing some 300,000 tons annually. Both countries have explored for oil with little success to date but a renewal of efforts can be expected as a result of the Prudhoe Bay discovery. A satellite tracking station has been built there. The Norwegians, long prominent in polar science, have worked to the limit of their means and are seeking cooperative efforts with friendly countries.

United States

Arctic Alaska, an area of approximately 150,000 square miles north of the Yukon River basin, has but 13,500 inhabitants scattered along the seaboard in villages and a few defense and communication centers.

The economic development potential of the region is now being identified and characterized. Recent discoveries and geological studies by government and commercial interests indicate that the area and its adjacent continental shelf have what may be one of the world's richest petroleum provinces, and possibly important deposits of copper, gold, tin and other strategic materials needed for our modern economy.

More than twenty federal agencies with a total budget of more than \$20 million** involving some 600-700 people including scientists and technicians are engaged in programs of science, resource development, health and welfare, and military R&D. (Military operations are not included in the

* United Kingdom, United States, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.

** Senate Document No. 71 on Federal Arctic Research lists a total expenditure of \$40 million, but this includes activity in the whole state of Alaska for some agencies.

budget estimate). Some limited work is carried out on the Arctic Ocean and in cooperation with Canada and with Denmark in Greenland. U.S. research programs represent a broad spectrum of disciplines including oceanography, glaciology, earth sciences, meteorological and ionospheric sciences and the biological sciences. Technical research activities include surveying and mapping, natural resource inventories, weather observations, ice patrol, reclamation, transport, construction and various military projects. Some 11 Federal facilities and Federally supported facilities serve as centers for most of this work. Two groups currently exist that are serving to coordinate Federal plans and activities with respect to the Arctic: the Interagency Arctic Research Coordination Committee, chaired by the National Science Foundation, and the Task Force on the Alaska Pipeline, chaired by the Department of the Interior. Cooperation in research among agencies and institutions is carried out through informal person-to-person contacts and through the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee. In addition to general research activities, Federal development activities in the State of Alaska are coordinated through the Federal Field Committee for Development and Planning in Alaska, but there is no mechanism for overall coordination and planning for the Arctic per se. In fact, many agencies find it difficult to separate the cost of Arctic activities from the rest of their Alaskan programs or from general global problems. There is a need for broader interagency coordination; however, there is no one agency that has clear responsibility and scope of interest to assume a lead agency role.

Economic and social problems of the U.S. Arctic have to do with development of natural resources and with the betterment of the indigenous population. It is one set of problems to search for, identify and map the resources and another set to recover them. Geological, geophysical and geochemical maps necessary to mineral exploration and prospecting have yet to be made; the continental shelf area is almost entirely unexplored. Arctic equipment and techniques for mineral extraction need to be developed. Mineral refineries need to be established. Bulk transport systems which can cope with the Arctic environment are needed to carry the products to market. At present there is no deep water port facility in Arctic Alaska. Overland transport by truck and rail is feasible. However, such facilities have not yet been expanded nor has the full impact of such construction on the environment been evaluated. Tracked vehicles and sleds which are now used over snow, ice, and frozen ground are being considered for future transport.

systems although other systems, possibly more economical, are being instigated and may prove feasible. Aircraft are now the principal mode for moving personnel and light freight. The larger helicopters, air cushion vehicles and the new C-5 Galaxy may play a major role in future transportation systems. Pipelines to southerly open water ports, and tankers via the Northwest Passage are other possible modes of transport to be considered. Submarines may be especially appealing for transit to the east coast and Europe. Barge transportation on the rivers may also be possible.

More than 11,000 of the 13,500 citizen residents of Arctic Alaska are natives; 43 percent live in the settlements of Nome, Kotzebue and Barrow; most live on a bare subsistence economy of hunting and fishing; unemployment, poverty, education and health problems are among the worst in the Nation. Yet, the Eskimo is intelligent and skillful, quick to learn to operate and maintain machines and equipment. However, opportunities for economic employment have been scarce.

Inflation is a serious problem in Alaska which attenuates economic growth and development; it results in capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive operations. This is partially caused by the practice of paying inflated wages to attract skilled, technical and professional workers from the U.S. labor market. (The USSR and Canada have similar problems). Development of natural resources will not be a panacea to the economic development problems. New job opportunities in this area will in large proportion require highly skilled, professional and sub-professional workers. Because of Alaska's relatively small population it is expected that a large part of these jobs will be filled from outside the state, at least for the immediate future, although major efforts should be made by the government and private employers to train and employ natives in the work force. General economic and regional development in Alaska is coordinated by the Federal Field Committee for Development and Planning in Alaska, established under Executive Order 11182 on October 6, 1964. The mission of the Federal Field Committee importantly includes the submission of a comprehensive overall plan for economic development in that State. This plan will be reviewed by the Federal Advisory Council on Regional Economic Development, established by Executive Order 11386 on December 28, 1967.

The Federal Field Committee is almost entirely concerned with economic and resource development of the State

alone and is not concerned with national, scientific, military or international strategies and policies except in the economic sense. Likewise, the Federal Field Committee is little concerned with the Arctic Ocean and continental shelf development except by way of developing the fishing and mineral industries, and other economic as well as social potential.

Over-twenty Federal agencies and bureaus currently conduct activities in the Arctic region, including Alaska and other parts of the Arctic. Until the establishment in 1967 of the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee, these agencies conducted their research programs more or less independently. Coordination previously on an informal basis, is now more formal. However, programs are still planned and executed by each agency in accordance with its individual mission.

There is some need to reexamine the adequacy of organizational arrangements of the U.S. Government with regard to:

(a) coordination of plans and projects. The Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee collects and collates agency budgets, promotes cooperation in logistics and international projects, identifies scientific problems, promotes international meetings and coordinates the research of the Arctic with that of the Antarctic. Research pertaining to the classified military, social and economic sciences is not included in the Interagency Committee's present scope of interest.

(b) balanced consideration of budgets and financial considerations. The largest part of existing budgets goes for logistical support, this likely will be true also for future budgets.

(c) provision of a focal point for information on Arctic activities.

The scientific problems of the Arctic region center on five unique natural phenomena: (1) the polar icepack and its role in the earth-atmosphere heat-engine; (2) polar magnetic field and its effects on communications and space electromagnetic phenomena; (3) geologic structure which links North America with Eurasia and involves a component of the global mid-ocean ridge system; (4) a simple but delicately balanced ecological system; and (5) the presence of permafrost.

Although some laboratory and theoretical analysis based on satellite observations or data from past expeditions can be accomplished at home laboratories, most Arctic problems require observatories and field investigation in the Arctic itself. Many of the phenomena which vary in both time and place require international cooperation in the collection and exchange of information.

The growing feasibility of resource development will inevitably expand the interface between nations in the Arctic and affect their national and international policies regarding the Arctic region. The U.S. oil find at Prudhoe Bay has caused a significant spurt in Canadian oil exploration in the North. The Soviets, likewise are exploring their Arctic for petroleum deposits. Japan, a non-Arctic nation, has shown increased interest through investments in the resources of Arctic U.S., Canada and USSR.

The USSR and Canada have in the past made "sector claims".* By a 1926 decree the USSR claimed all lands in the Arctic Ocean lying within its longitude boundaries extended to the North Pole. For the first half of this century Canada periodically reiterated the sector claim for the lands and frozen seas to their north; since 1955 the Canadian position on sovereignty in the North has not been entirely clear. However, as stated earlier, the Canadian have recently introduced legislation establishing jurisdiction over a 100 mile pollution zone north of 60° and also a 12 mile territorial sea. Although the USSR has not excluded foreign vessels from their claimed sector and has not pushed the concept in recent years, it has consistently demonstrated a strong proprietary interest in the area. They are especially resolute in maintaining their authority over coastal waters, 12 miles, which causes difficulty in transiting several strait areas. The U.S. has not recognized either USSR or Canadian sector claims and considers the Arctic Ocean to be free high seas.

* The "sector principle" states that all lands, discovered or undiscovered, within a spherical triangle formed by the North Pole and the easterly and westerly limits of the country's Arctic coast, belong to that country or that it should have at least a preferential right to their acquisition. Canada first set forth such a sector claim in the early 1900's. Were all countries to agree to such an arrangement, the approximate percentage of the Arctic Ocean area which would be held by each of the countries would be USSR 57%; U.S. 12%; Canada 17%; Norway 9%; and Denmark 3%.

Military operations and facilities essential to the security of the U.S. are located in the Arctic areas of Alaska, Greenland, Norway and Canada and the international portions of the Arctic Region. Intimately related and supporting facilities are located in areas in close proximity to the Arctic Region in Alaska, Canada, and elsewhere. These facilities include BMEWS sites, DEW Line stations, air bases and a variety of related facilities. Also carried out in various of these areas are air, surface and under-surface military operations.

The capability for U.S. forces to operate in the Arctic region needs improvement, particularly in communications, weapons, sonics, navigation, construction, environmental services, and search and rescue. Scientific research programs, complemented by appropriate military operations, should be designed to improve our military capability in the region. Accordingly, in developing a U.S. policy concerning the Arctic Region the following military considerations apply:

(a) The necessity for freedom of action to conduct those military operations or scientific support of possible military operations essential to the security of the U.S.

(b) The capability to establish facilities on snow, ice, icecaps, land, or permafrost which can be used to support land, sea, or air operations.

(c) The capability of equipment and logistic support systems to permit sustained operations in the Arctic.

(d) The capability to carry out air, surface, and undersurface military operations in the Arctic.

Logistics is the basis on which military, scientific and commercial developments must build. Yet, transportation and supply depots for Arctic Alaska and the Arctic Ocean are largely ad hoc, makeshift and prohibitively expensive. There are no overland roads nor railroads in Arctic Alaska; distances are vast and construction techniques require extensive improvement. The airfields are most commonly improved only with steel landing strips and are limited in capacity. There are no developed deep water ports. Most logistical support now is by aircraft or ship; some is by tractor train over the frozen terrain in wintertime, although off-road truck and other wheeled vehicle operations are carried out occasionally. Ship supply routes need icebreaker support-- which now is severely limited in terms of icebreaking ability and available time. The voyages of the SS Manhattan, a

prototype icebreaking tanker may however indicate a solution to the problem of sea transportation in Arctic waters. Ships anchor offshore and their cargoes are brought ashore by lighters up to a distance of 14 miles. Scientific study of the deep Arctic Ocean is limited to that which can be carried out from ice floes serviced by aircraft and this restricts the kind of studies that can be conducted. All but one of the U.S. fleet of eight polar icebreakers are under 5,000 tons. Seven of these are WIND class built in World War II and have been used continuously since then. Two of them usually are assigned to Arctic Alaska and the remainder are employed as needed elsewhere. Some ocean research has been conducted from submarines, a practical way to circumvent ice pace problems. There are no civilian submarines capable of under ice studies.

Trained manpower for work in the Arctic, is a scarce resource. To date, job opportunities, except for scientific research, have been scarce. When opportunities do appear, such as the oil exploration and development, trained manpower is recruited from the U.S. labor pool with substantial financial inducements. However, many of these workers are not accustomed to nor experienced with the Arctic environment. Living conditions are somewhat primitive and difficult. Consequently, turnover rates have been high. A greater effort to train and employ natives needs to be made. Significantly, greater employment of natives should assist in reducing personnel turnover. In the case of scientists, there have been no centers of learning for combined Arctic sciences; however, the University of Alaska is developing in this direction. Arctic marine science, even today, has no center of expertise for training or information, outside of the USSR.

TABLE 1 - COMPARATIVE ARCTIC REGION STATISTICS
(1967)

| | <u>USSR*</u> | <u>USA</u> | <u>CANADA</u> | <u>DENMARK GREENLAND</u> | <u>NORWAY</u> |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------|------------------------------|---------------|
| Coastline (miles) | | | | | |
| Islands | 8,166 | 1,066 | 5,725 | 25,000 | 1,500 |
| Continental Shelf (sq. mi) | 2,000,000 (est) | 120,000 | 1,500,000 | 200,000 (est) | |
| Permafrost area | 1,400,000 | 150,000 | 1,100,000 | 840,000 | |
| Population | 2,000,000 | 13,500 | 38,000 | 44,000 | 2,000 |
| Icebreakers | 10 | 0 | 4 | 20 | 5 |
| Arctic Service | 40 | 8 | 10 | 5 | 0 |
| Arctic Supply Vessels | 15 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Arctic Supply Vessels | 200 | 2 | 9 | 6 | 3 |
| Oil fields | | | | | |
| Oil reserves area | 90 | 6 | 5 | - | - |
| Oil weather | 20 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Arctic freight (tons) | 3,000,000 | 10,000 (est) | 110,000 | 10,000 (est) | 600,000 |
| Minerals | | | | | |
| Oil (mined, tons) | 25,000,000 | - | - | - | 450,000 |
| Oil (reserves, bbl) exploring | 5 billion | 900 | exploring | - | - |
| Gas (reserves, cu.ft) exploring | 900 | " | - | - | - |
| Titanium-group metals | | | | | |
| Aluminum (mined, oz) | 1,900,000 | - | - | - | - |
| Gold (mined, oz) | 3,000,000 | - | 380,000 | - | - |
| Silver (mined, oz) | - | - | 1,400,000 | - | - |
| Nickel (mined, metric tons) | 110,000 | - | - | - | - |
| Copper (mined, metric tons) | 150,000 | - | 3,900 | - | - |
| Lead (mined, tons) | - | - | 140,000 | - | - |
| Zinc (mined, tons) | - | - | 2,000,000 | - | - |
| Fluorspar (mined coproduct) | 2,500 | - | - | - | - |
| Uranium (mined) | 7,500 | - | - | - | - |
| Mercury | development stages | - | - | - | - |
| Vanadium (mined) | 2,000 | - | - | - | - |
| Research Effort | | | | | |
| Personnel (est) | 20,000 | 600-700 | ca 3,000 | - | - |
| Expenditures (millars) | - | 22,000,000 | 97,000,000 | - | - |

For statistical purposes the USSR's arctic region is defined as the southern limit of continuous permafrost or the Arctic Circle, whichever lies further south. This includes the Kola Peninsula, a highly developed Soviet logistical center for military, scientific and economic activities in the Arctic Basin.

FEDERAL BUDGET FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH, FY 1968 & FY 1969
 PLANNED EXPENDITURES, FY 1970 and FY 1971

| | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Department of the Army | 919,000 | 476,000 | 476,000 | 1,201,000 |
| Department of Navy | 4,041,000 | 5,133,500 | 5,133,500 | 4,745,000 |
| Department of Air Force | 1,574,000 | 918,000 | 757,500 | 913,000 |
| Department of Transportation ¹ | 6,300,000 | 451,000 | 907,900 | 600,000 |
| Department of Commerce ² | 1,900,000 | 221,300 | 267,200 | 215,000 |
| Department of Agriculture | 380,000 | 364,300 | 364,300 | 364,300 |
| Department of HEW | 1,895,800 | 1,474,000 | 1,474,000 | 1,500,200 |
| Department of the Interior | 1,171,000 | 729,550 | 729,550 | 3,700,600 |
| National Science Foundation | 2,215,600 | 2,157,650 | 2,200,000 | 4,250,000 |
| | 1,467,000 | 912,000 | 1,467,000 | 1,467,000 |
| | 201,100 | 3,617,000 | 3,397,000 | 3,271,500 |
| | <u>\$22,064,500</u> | <u>\$16,454,300</u> | <u>\$17,173,950</u> | <u>\$22,227,600</u> |

Does not include logistic costs.

Does not include logistic costs of joint U.S.-Canadian Weather Stations.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE


SUBJECT: United States Arctic Policy and Organizational
Arrangements for Implementation

The President has expressed concern that there exists no coordinated United States policy on the Arctic and Arctic affairs.

In view of the critical need for an overall policy framework to preserve the environment of the North, to provide guidelines for decision-making on several issues of international concern, and to focus United States activities, longer-range interests and objectives in the Arctic, the President has directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee undertake a review of United States policy on the Arctic. This review should consider the political implications of United States policy, and explore all opportunities for international cooperation on Arctic matters. It should also include consideration of the necessary interagency coordinating mechanisms and budgetary implications.

For the purposes of this review, the Under Secretaries Committee should include the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality and representatives of the Departments of Interior, Commerce, Health Education and Welfare, Transportation, the Office of Science and Technology, the National Science Foundation, the Bureau of the Budget.

The Committee's recommendations regarding United States Arctic policy and organizational arrangements for implementation should be forwarded to the President by or before May 18, 1970.


Henry A. Kissinger

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC RECD LOG NBR INITIAL ACTION OFF
 MO DA MO DA HR 080908010 31425

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PA FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 ROSSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 IRWIN _____ S CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *US Arctic Policy & Organizational Arrangements for Implementation*

REFERENCE: S/S *7/12/22* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

| INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION | | | | ACTION REQUIRED | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|--|---|
| | ACTION | INFO | REC CY FOR | | |
| ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG | | | | MEMO FOR HAK | (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) |
| STAFF SECRETARY | | | | MEMO FOR PRES. | (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) |
| FAR EAST | | | | REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE | (_____) |
| SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | | | | FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH | (_____) |
| NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA | | | | MEMO _____ TO _____ | (_____) |
| EUROPE/CANADA | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | RECOMMENDATIONS | (_____) |
| LATIN AMERICA | | | | JOINT MEMO | (_____) |
| UNITED NATIONS | | | | REFER TO STATE | (_____) |
| ECONOMIC | | | | ANY ACTION NECESSARY | (_____) |
| SCIENTIFIC | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | CONCURRENCE | (_____) |
| LR PLANNING | | | | DUE DATE: <i>0820</i> | |
| PROGRAM ANALYSIS | | | | COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) | |
| NSC PLANNING | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| CONGRESSIONAL | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| <i>Welander</i> | | | | | |

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

| DATE | FROM | TO | S | ACTION REQUIRED | CY TO |
|--------------|---------------|----------------|-------------------------------------|--|-------|
| <i>0927</i> | <i>GOTTIN</i> | <i>HAK</i> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <i>Pres for discussion (1004)</i> | |
| <i>0928</i> | <i>HAK</i> | <i>GOTTIN</i> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <i>Further action (1005) (Red)</i> | |
| <i>9/29</i> | <i>Daker</i> | <i>HAK</i> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <i>Pres for discussion / Sign NSDIT 10/4</i> | |
| <i>12/17</i> | <i>Haig</i> | <i>Kennedy</i> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <i>Further action</i> | |
| <i>12/22</i> | <i>Haig</i> | <i>Kennedy</i> | | | |
| <i>12/27</i> | <i>DAVIS</i> | <i>S</i> | | <i>Close out</i> | |
| <i>12/27</i> | | | | <i>Duplicated by IL</i> | |

TION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SITATION COMMENTS: _____

ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO *IRWIN*

INIT _____

DATE *DEC 29 1971*

ORIG) NSC _____

TO) PAF _____

WHC _____

SUBF