

NSSM 104

SRG Mtg 12-9-70.

Copy of HAK's memo on
Redefinition of Advanced Computers
dated 4/21/71 in NSM 103 folder

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December 17, 1970

For HAK

PRESIDENT'S FRIDAY BRIEFING

7024429

Diego Garcia: The initial reaction around the Indian Ocean littered to the announcement of our intention to set up a small communications facility on Diego Garcia has been fairly much as expected. Most of the governments did not seem to be particularly disturbed, at least at first blush, although there did seem to be considerable suspicion that we would be developing more than an austere facility. The most negative reaction not unexpect^{ed}ly came from Somalia which was "strongly opposed." The Indians, in what appeared to be a prepared ~~response~~ statement, also registered a negative response insisting that Diego Garcia was a "base" and deploring the whole operation.

We have not yet heard the last word on Diego Garcia since there is likely to be a second, and in some cases more important, wave of reaction. When the final results are all in we should have an interesting test of sentiment around the Indian Ocean ~~to~~ ^{against} ^{which to judge} possible naval moves we might wish to make in the future.

(Saunders/Hoskinson)

Att: Letter from T. L. Eliot, Jr. -- December 16, 1970

Enclosure: summary of reactions to notifications regarding plans for Diego Garcia

70 24429

Indian Ocean



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 16, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reactions to Notifications Regarding
Diego Garcia Project

I enclose for your information a summary of
reactions to notifications regarding plans for
Diego Garcia.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

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Summary of Responses to Notifications Regarding Plans
for Diego Garcia as of 12 noon, 16 December 1970

1. In general, the responses were favorable or non-committal. There were, however, two countries, India and Somalia which responded in a strong negative fashion. A number of posts have not reported.

2. Favorable responses were received from -

Australia (expressed strong approval)
Iran Singapore
Malawi Japan

3. Unfavorable responses were received from -

India: Eric Gonsalves, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, expressed GOI regret since Diego Garcia "base" will increase tension in area and earlier decisions on BIOT had probably contributed to Soviet build-up in Indian Ocean. Gonsalves deplored manner in which US/UK decision reached in disregard of views of India, the non-aligned nations and UNGA resolutions. Gonsalves stated there was regrettable lack of consultations with India on a subject of direct concern to Indian security. He charged US had been taken in by the UK. Gonsalves stated the GOI would express its regrets and views in Upper House of Parliament on December 18 in response to a pending question. Gonsalves refused to accept Political Counselor's characterization of Diego Garcia as austere Naval communication facility. Gonsalves concluded that the facility will undoubtedly have some actual and more potential military capability and that other littoral states will also react adversely.

Reaction to UK High Commissioner: Similarly negative and disgruntled.

Somalia: Acting Head of Foreign Office was courteous in tone to the Ambassador but strongly disapproving in content. Somali official said he refused to believe there was any need for this facility, given other means of communications. Moreover, his government was strongly opposed to

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anything which involved additional big-power installations in the Indian Ocean, as, indeed, it was opposed to present installations.

4. Non-Committal responses were received from -

Indonesia

Kenya (UK reported receiving response "It's fine with us")

South Africa

Pakistan

Thailand

Malagasy Republic

Saudi Arabia

Uganda

New Zealand

Tanzania

Zambia

5. Unreported responses -

Burma

Kuwait

NATO (NAC)

Ethiopia

Malaysia

Portugal

France

Mauritius

6. US Notification Delayed

Bahrein

Ceylon (Ambassador to follow-up UK on December 17;
Reaction to UK notification was non-committal)

Maldives

Seychelles

7. From among the nations responding favorably or non-committally there were questions as well as concerns or speculations on a variety of aspects including bearing of the project on Indian Ocean security, Soviet presence in the region, relationship to Vietnam, future claims to sovereignty over Diego Garcia, relocation of inhabitants and US/UK cost sharing, future Chinese missile tests, use of satellites for communications, arms to South Africa, the Heath visit to Washington and the January Commonwealth Conference. Posts report answers to questions were available from the guidance provided prior to notification.

8. With regard to the United Kingdom the following is pertinent.

Parliamentary Reaction: The Commons did not get to Diego Garcia in the Prime Minister's oral Question and Answer period yesterday (December 15), so Heath submitted his announcement for the record. It is therefore too early to report on Parliamentary reaction.

Press Reaction: Almost all British papers today, December 16, carry the Diego story, for the most part on inside pages. In general, papers link the facility to the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. They also note that the announcement comes shortly before the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. Some stories also refer to the issue of arms for South Africa, and differ on whether the Diego announcement supports the case for arms sales, or makes the sales less necessary.

9. With regard to the Soviet Union the following is pertinent.

Moscow has not yet reacted directly to the announcement on Diego Garcia. Prior to the announcement there was a limited amount of propaganda attention to Diego Garcia, based mainly on Western press stories.

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File Julian Ocean Study
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NEA INC MR. QUANTON
AFI MR KORMANN
OASD ISA FMRA - MR. BARRINGER
ISA I&L MR. BANDJUNIS
OSD PA CAPT BARBER
ISA COMP - MR. SOUTH (SUBS) OP61 CAPT LEDDICK
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BEHR
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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T STATE 194511

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DIEGO GARCIA

REF: A. STODDART/FROM OPLINGER TELECON, NOV 24
B. LONDON 9729
C. STATE 191767

1. CONGRESS APPROVED DEFENSE MILCON APPROPRIATIONS BILL WITH FUNDS FOR BIOT MODEST COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY (REINDEER STATION) INCLUDED. THIS OF COURSE INDICATES THERE WAS NO RPT NO REQUEST TO CONGRESS TO HOLDUP DECISION PENDING INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGIC REVIEW.

2. EVEN WITH THIS ACTION WE FEEL IT NECESSARY TO HOLD OFF

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PRESS AND PARLIAMENT UNTIL AFTER NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS AS MUTUALLY AGREED BETWEEN USG AND HMG. IN MEANTIME AGREED PRESS LINE IS TENABLE AND ACCURATE AS APPORTIONMENT REQUEST MUST BE APPROVED BY OMB BEFORE FUNDS MAY BE EXPENDED ON PROJECT. THIS PROCESS COULD TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS. WE PLAN TO HEW TO PREVIOUSLY AGREED LINE IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES.

3. WE PLAN TO FORWARD PACKAGE TO YOU IN NEXT FEW DAYS SETTING FORTH PROPOSALS IN THE AREAS OF NOTIFICATION TO GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, RELOCATION OF WORKERS FROM DIEGO AND UK MANNING LEVELS FOR THE FACILITY. FAIRLY DETAILED CONSTRUCTION PLAN AS TO TIMING, SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL INVOLVED WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED IN PACKAGE. IN ANTICIPATION OF FAVORABLE APPORTIONMENT DECISIONS WE EXPECT AUTHORIZE YOU TO CONSULT NEXT WEEK WITH HMG AND OBTAIN AGREEMENT FOR OUR PROPOSALS.

4. AS FOLLOW UP TO LAIRD-CARRINGTON MEETING NOV 24, SECDEF WILL SEND LETTE TO MOD FORMALLY REQUESTING BRIT PARTICIPATION IN FACILITY. JOHNSON

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ACTION SS=45

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2780
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
COMIDEASTFOR
CINCUSNAVEUR

SECRET TEHRAN 05011

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MIDEASTFOR

REF: STATE 187449

1. IN CONSIDERING TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF APPROACH TO SHAH RE FUTURE OF COMIDEASTFOR, PRIMARY CONCERN MUST OBVIOUSLY BE TO MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY OF NEGATIVE REACTION/OBJECTIONS.

2. WE BELIEVE TWO POINTS IN DEPT'S THINKING AS DESCRIBED PARA 5 REFTEL WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THAT END, VIS:

(A) WE SHOULD INFORM (RATHER THAN SEEK APPROVAL OF) LITTORAL STATES RE OUR PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH BAHRAIN MIDEASTFOR'S CONTINUED USE OF FACILITIES ON BAHRAIN. APPROACH OF THIS NATURE WILL PROVIDE SHAH WITH OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT WITHOUT REQUIRING HIS SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF USG POLICY DECISION TO MAINTAIN MIDEASTFOR IN PERSIAN GULF. WE BELIEVE HE MIGHT PREFER NOT GIVE SUCH "APPROVAL", PARTLY TO AVOID REDUCE POSSIBLE ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM SOVIETS AND RADICAL ARABS, PARTLY TO KEEP OPEN HIS OWN OPTIONS FOR FUTURE;

(B) WE SHOULD INFORM IRAN FIRST AND THEN, BARRING STRENUOUS OBJECTIONS, INFORM SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS. WE WOULD, IN ADDITION, URGE THAT SHAH BE TOLD WE APPROACHING HIM FIRST BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH GULF OF IMMENSE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO FREE WORLD (INCLUDING MANY

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OF OUR NATO ALLIES AND JAPAN), WE RECOGNIZE IRAN'S VITAL AND PARAMOUNT INTEREST IN FUTURE OF GULF.

3. WE SEE FOUR OTHER POINTS RE SUBSTANCE OF APPROACH WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD MINIMIZE CHANCES OF NEGATIVE REACTION FROM SHAH:

(A) WE SHOULD ADVISE HIM THAT OUR PLANS FOR CONTINUED USE OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES BY MIDEASTFOR ARE INDEFINITE IN TERMS OF TIME AND THAT IRAN WILL, OF COURSE, BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF ANY FUTURE CHANGES;

(B) WE SHOULD EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT MIDEASTFOR'S CONTINUED USE OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES WILL ENBALE MIDEASTFOR (IF THIS IS SO DESIRED BY GOI) TO PLAY MODEST ROLE IN ASSISTING DEVELOPMENT OF EXPANDING IRANIAN NAVY (E.G., THROUGH JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES);

(C) WE ARE CONFIDENT BAHRAIN WOULD LIKE USG TO CONTINUE USE OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES BY CGQIDEASTFOR; AND

(D) ANY ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO CONTINUE USE OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES WILL BE PLAYED BY USG IN VERY LOW KEY, BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY.

4. IN DISCUSSING WITH SHAH RATIONALE OF CONTINUATION OF MIDEASTFOR IN GULF, I WOULD PLAN TO REMIND HIM OF HIS STATEMENT TO ME ON OCT 3 RE IMPORTANCE OF US PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST (PARA 6 OF TEHRAN 4336) AND THEN POINT OUT (PARTICULARLY IF SHAH OBJECTS OR DEMURS) THAT WHEREAS FOR SIXTY YEARS FOLLOWING DESTRUCTION OF RUSSIAN IMPERIAL NAVY BY JAPANESE IN 1905 NO RPT NO RUSSIAN NAVAL VESSELS HAD VISITED GULF, IN LAST 2-1/2 YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN FIVE VISITS BY GROUPS OF RUSSIAN WARSHIPS WHICH HAVE INCLUDED GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER, SUBMARINES, ETC. FURTHERMORE, SOVIETS ARE CONSTRUCTING PORT WITH NAVAL FACILITIES FOR IRAQ AT UMM QASR WHICH COULD OBVIOUSLY SERVE AS HOME PORT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS, AS WILL PORT OF MAS-AL-MATRUH WHICH SOVIET CONSTRUCTING IN EGYPT. FINALLY, WHETHER ONE LIKES IT OR NOT, IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT SOVIETS INTEND TO HAVE SOME FAIRLY CONTINUOUS NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF. IF WE WITHDRAW MIDEASTFOR, WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE ABANDONING GULF TO SOVIETS SINCE IT WOULD NOT SEEM VERY LOGISTICALLY FEASIBLE FOR US TO CONTINUE OUR MODEST PRESENCE THERE FROM ANY OVER-THE-HORIZON PORT. WE WOULD ASSUME THAT SHAH WOULD ALSO SHARE OUR STRONG AVERSION TO SEEING SOVIETS PROVIDING ONLY FOREIGN NAVAL PRESENCE IN GULF.

5. ON TIMING OF APPROACH TO SHAH, MY OVERRIDING CONCERN

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RELATES TO USG POSITION RE IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF 7TH AND 8TH SQUADRONS FO F4S AND WHICH I UNDERSTAND HE INTENDS TO RAISE WITH ME. IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AN AFFIRMATIVE AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE FROM SHAH RE MIDEASTFOR, I WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE APPROACH UNTIL I AM IN POSITION TO ASSURE SHAH WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION THAT USG APPROVAL FOR F4S WILL BE FORTHCOMING IF AND WHEN GOI HAS MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FINANCING ACQUISITION.

6. FINALLY, I BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE (ALTHOUGH THIS IS HARDLY VITAL) IF WE COULD ARRANGE IT SO THAT: (A) BAHRAIN RULER, DURING FORTHCOMING VISIT TO TEHRAN (ABOUT DECEMBER 20, SEE TEHRAN'S 4954) WOULD TELL SHAH DIRECTLY OF HIS WISH TO HAVE USG MAKE EARLY AND POSITIVE DECISION RE CONTINUED USE OF BAHRAIN FACILITIES BY MIDEASTFOR; AND (B) OUR APPROACH TO SHAH FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WOULD MEAN POSTPONING APPROACH TO SHAH FOR ABOUT A MONTH. GP-3. MACARTHUR.

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RESEARCH STUDY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NATIONAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Kennedy
Mr Crocker
file Indian Ocean
December 3, 1970

THE SEYCHELLES: WESTERN DOTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The British colony of the Seychelles comprises 92 islands in the Indian Ocean 1,000 miles east of Tanzania and 600 miles north-east of Madagascar. Its population is 50,000. The island of Diego Garcia--where a British/American joint naval facility may be located--is administered from the Seychelles. With somewhat increased Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, and the Heath government's effort to justify arms sales to South Africa on the grounds of a communist threat to the area, political developments in the Seychelles are of more than usual interest.

ABSTRACT

The conservative Seychelles Democratic Party, led by James Mancham, won the national elections held in the British colony of the Seychelles in November 1970. Mancham will become Chief Minister of the Indian Ocean islands for five years under the new constitutional arrangements which give increased self-government to the Seychellois. The Seychelles are unlikely to become independent under Mancham's leadership since he favors total integration with the UK. The islands, presently dependent on British subsidies and the export of copra, may experience greater economic growth when a new international airport is completed in 1971, facilitating increased tourism. If economic development

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does not occur at the hoped-for rate, the less conservative Seychelles People's United Party (which won five out of the fifteen seats in the Assembly) may greatly increase its strength.


US interests in the area are almost entirely strategic. A satellite tracking station in the Seychelles and the possibility of constructing defense facilities on the island of Diego Garcia (administered separately from the Seychelles, but with offices in the Seychelles' capital) make it desirable that the Government of the Seychelles be friendly to the United States. The new government, under pro-Western local leadership and ultimate British control, promises to be sympathetic to US interests for the foreseeable future.

INR/Africa
Director : William C. Harrop
Analyst : Alison Palmer
Ext. : 22297
Released by: *DEM*


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DIEGO GARCIA



INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS



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Seychellois Assume Broader Political Responsibilities.

Under a new constitution (which should be fully implemented before the end of 1970), the Legislative Assembly of the British Indian Ocean colony of the Seychelles consists of 15 elected members plus a Speaker and three ex-officio members. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) has a Chief Minister and several other ministers, all appointed by the Governor from the Assembly, plus three ex-officio members. While the Governor retains control of defense, foreign affairs, and internal security and has the right to veto legislation, the new government has greater powers than any local government has ever had.

Coming at a time of accelerating economic change, this increased political power in the hands of the Seychellois involves some risks to local stability. Each of the two major political parties depends heavily for support on labor unions which include almost all of the colony's 7,000 wage and salary earners. If enough new jobs are not forthcoming as a result of economic development, labor leaders may decide they have little to lose by pressuring their respective party leaders--through boycotts and unofficial or official strikes--to take a more radical stance. In the past such activities have pitted the Seychellois against the British government. Under the new constitution, the Chief Minister will have to decide whether to turn down such demands, risking the loss of labor's support for his party, or accede to them, leaving the possibility of a veto by the Governor.

New Chief Minister Mancham is a conservative, young, British-trained lawyer. His Seychelles Democratic Party won 10 of the 15 Legislative Assembly seats in November's national elections. His principal aim is to achieve total integration of the Seychelles with Britain, even though the British government has indicated that it is very unlikely to grant such status. Mancham receives support from the upper middle class as well as from some labor unions. In personality Mancham is somewhat flamboyant, and it is difficult to predict how he will react to the day-to-day responsibilities of Chief Minister. He may be sobered by the intractability of the Seychelles' economic problems. Since the British are unlikely to grant all the aid the Seychellois want, Mancham may find himself in a difficult situation.

The opposition party, the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), is led by Albert René, who is also a young, British-trained lawyer. While René is often referred to as a radical, his policies are only slightly to the left of the SDP's ultra-conservatism. When he first formed the SPUP in 1964, René called for immediate independence. But as

he found this idea was unattractive to many Seychellois, he now espouses independence "sometime in the future." He has also tried to sell the idea that the Seychelles should join the OAU and the East African Community after independence, but these ideas are equally unacceptable to many Seychellois, most of whom do not consider themselves Africans. René has lately tended to play down these points in favor of economic issues; he criticizes the UK for not having done more for development and is trying to create the image of SPUP as the party of the working people.

Both the SDP and the SPUP are essentially one-man parties, and their role during the next five years is uncertain. Mancham should be fully occupied with his new responsibilities as Chief Minister, and René may find it difficult to keep the SPUP from lapsing into dormancy until it is time to start campaigning for the 1975 elections. The Seychelles' third party was a one-woman operation started shortly before the 1970 elections by Hilda Delhomme. Her Seychelles Party (SP) won no seats in the election but may have helped René's SPUP by diverting votes from the SDP. Whether Madame Delhomme will try to create a political base for 1975 is unknown.

The large copra plantations are owned by a handful of descendants of early European settlers, known locally as the Grands Blancs. Historically, they have invested most of their profits outside the Seychelles and have shown little interest in participating publicly in political activities. However, they are a powerful influence behind the scenes and, under the new constitution which gives the Seychellois a greater say in internal policies, the Grands Blancs may decide it is time to play a larger role in local affairs. They will need to establish a new and more attractive image to counteract their old reputation for aloofness from the problems of other Seychellois, who are mainly mulatto. Despite this cleavage, it is economic and political factors, rather than color, which divide different interest groups (both Mancham and René are light-skinned). There is so far no significant racial problem.

Economic Prospects Are Less Than Exciting.

With fish in the sea and coconuts on the trees, no Seychellois starves, although he can avoid malnutrition only by purchasing imported rice, flour, and other foods. However, the population growth rate of 2 percent per year and the shortage of arable land (population density: 700 per square mile) means that survival by subsistence farming cannot go on indefinitely. Self-sufficiency in food production might be achieved by an effective family planning program

coupled with government take-over of some arable land now devoted to the production of copra, which accounts for 75 percent of the colony's exports. However, 95 percent of the population is conservative Catholic; this contributes to the difficulty of implementing family planning programs. The copra plantation owners also would expect compensation for expropriation, but the British government is unlikely to provide any additional financial aid for this purpose. It is already subsidizing the Seychelles at the rate of \$1 million per year.

London is clearly hoping that the new British-financed airport will stimulate a tourist boom which may make the Seychelles viable. If population growth can be brought under control, if some increase in local food production is achieved, and if the tourist industry generates sufficient jobs, a level of economic growth acceptable to the Seychellois may be achieved. These are a lot of "ifs", and meanwhile the presently apathetic population will probably become increasingly discontented.

Employment opportunities are limited. Many Seychellois have emigrated to East Africa, although they maintain some ties with their homeland. Productivity of workers in the Seychelles is low; as new jobs are created by the increased tourist trade, employers may tend to import more highly-qualified workers rather than try to improve local productivity. In such circumstances, labor union leaders will certainly react sharply and demand imposition of strict controls, including requirements to train locals.

Good Relations with the West Likely to Endure; Ties to Southern Africa May Increase.

The new constitution, which will presumably be in force for several years, leaves control of foreign policy in the hands of the British Governor. Both Mancham and René are pro-West, although René has said he thinks the Seychelles would be in a better position economically if it were free to accept aid from both East and West. Both men have visited the United States on leader grants, and both men have been friendly in their dealings with American officials. Under these circumstances, the present pro-West posture of the Seychelles Government may be expected to continue.

The new government of the Seychelles will be interested in attracting tourists from Africa, including white residents from the Republic of South Africa, Mozambique, and Rhodesia. This may lead to a desire to build up closer commercial ties with white-dominated areas. Since the Seychellois do not consider themselves African, they will probably be relatively insensitive to criticism they may incur from

Black African countries for doing business with governments in southern Africa. The only possible Black African retaliation would be to harass or even expel the several thousand Seychellois living and working there. This would place a dual economic burden on the Seychelles: finding employment for the displaced persons and replacing the revenue from emigrant remittances.

What Matters to the United States

The US has two tangible interests in this area: a satellite tracking facility located outside the capital city of Victoria, and a 50-year agreement with the UK for use of the island of Diego Gracia located in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which is administered separately from the Seychelles, but with its offices based in Victoria (see map). The Seychellois consider the tracking station to be an asset because it employs several hundred local workers. Diego Garcia is a potential site for communications and support facilities for joint US-UK defense activity in the Indian Ocean. The future of this project is still uncertain, but if it is implemented, Seychellois now working on copra plantations in Diego Garcia would be removed (the British government is looking into re-employment possibilities for them elsewhere). Funds for military construction on Diego Garcia are under consideration. Assuming that the facility is eventually constructed, Seychellois leaders (some of whom protested the "loss" of this island when it was placed under the administration of the BIOT in 1966), would likely press the US for more aid. Present US aid consists of a PL-480 food program and a handful of college scholarships and leader grants.

The Indian Ocean Area - Soviet and Chinese Capabilities,
Intentions and Opportunities

Soviet Capabilities at Present

The Soviet Squadron in the Indian Ocean, though it cannot always be at operational readiness, has the capability of being the most powerful naval force in the area. With their facilities at airfields in the UAR the Russians can fly reconnaissance, air cover and strike missions over the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The port facilities which they have acquired, e.g. in Aden and through fisheries agreements with 13 countries in the area, could help to maintain their military presence. Aid agreements and political support have given the Russians additional influence in a number of countries, e.g. India and PRSY. With these resources the Russians are capable of giving aid and comfort to friendly governments or opposition parties in such a way as to intimidate their domestic opponents and to inhibit Western intervention. They have also a modest capability to interfere with the large amount of Western shipping in the area. But the most important capability they have so far achieved is a foot in the door, that is to say the capability of expanding their power and influence so that it might come to rival that which Britain formerly exercised in the area.

Soviet Potential Capabilities

2. With the Suez Canal open and Alexandria available as a naval base, it will be easier and cheaper for the Russians to maintain their presence and operational efficiency in the Indian Ocean and hence their naval superiority there. They will also be able to reinforce it more quickly. If they were

to acquire a naval and air base within the area, e.g. Aden, their operational readiness and power would be still more enhanced. They would be better able to shadow Western surface forces in the area: they would also be better able to threaten Western shipping and they could effectively deny certain parts of the sea to it: they would have a considerable capability to intervene in internal security situations in favour of their friends: they might thus be able to secure pro-Russian governments in such countries as Mauritius, PRSY and Somalia. Finally they would be able to place considerable inhibitions on Western freedom of action while at the same time increasing their own options.

Chinese Activities and Intentions

3. In the next 5 years the Chinese will not make much headway in the Indian Ocean area as a whole, although they will make a major effort to secure the success of the Tanzam Railway, will take a close interest in Pakistan, India, Ceylon and PRSY, and will enter into relations with nearly all the countries in the area. Just as the Russians have an anti-Chinese motive and will be spurred on by Chinese activities, so the Chinese have an anti-Russian incentive. The objectives of the two countries are different and the Chinese will probably be more interested than the Russians in creating political instability and fragmentation in the area. China will probably not be in a great hurry, if only because her resources are so comparatively slender.

Soviet Intentions and Opportunities

4. The Russians are acquisitive of power for its own sake. They think of it like money in the bank - if you have it people respect you. You can always use it if you want - or not use it. It gives you freedom of choice. The Russians are determined to be a super power on the American scale. They intend to have their views taken into account when anything important is done anywhere. They want a finger in every pie. Little by little they intend to accustom the world to this situation and to the reality of a Soviet military presence. They will exploit the freedom of the air and of the sea. They will probe Western reactions and seek opportunities to enlarge Soviet influence. These are the main intentions underlying the expanding Soviet power in the Indian Ocean area. At present the Russians are operating on an experimental basis. If the results look good they will press further.

5. Soviet policy is opportunistic in the sense that it is looking for opportunities to enlarge Russian power and to damage Western and Chinese interests. It is also opportunistic in the sense that the Russians are prepared to deal differently with the different parts of the area. The Soviet leadership (as apart from the Soviet Navy) probably do not see the area as a unit. Despite the growing amount of Soviet merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean the Russians do not have a very strong defensive reason for exercising military power in the area. The defence of the homeland is the first priority of Soviet defence policy and at present the security of the USSR is not directly menaced from the Indian Ocean area. Thus as things stand

the Indian Ocean area does not have a very high place in Soviet military priorities. The gains they seek there are primarily political. Their first priority in the area may be to drive the West out of the Arab countries and to acquire the use of local naval and air facilities, leading on eventually to the establishment of subservient governments. Their second priority may be to gain as much control as possible over every aspect of Indian policy and in this they will not neglect Pakistan and Ceylon. Their third priority may be to acquire the use of naval and air facilities and to encourage the formation of friendly governments in other strategic countries e.g. Mauritius and Somalia. But in trying to recreate for themselves something approaching the former British dominance in the area, the Russians will not be bound by pre-determined priorities. They will probe where there seems to be weakness and take opportunities as they find them, for example, social and political instability in Mauritius, or black/white tension in Southern Africa. They will be on the lookout to create opportunities both by overt and also by covert means, e.g. to supplant the Chinese in Tanzania or to overthrow the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. With some luck and depending on the Western response, the Russians could before long be a highly influential power in the area; they might well dominate critical parts of it. They are already well on the road to this goal.

December, 1970

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Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean

February 15, 1972

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Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean

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Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean

I. Summary and Conclusions

Separate statements concerning the summary and conclusions of this paper were prepared by the State, ACDA and CIA representatives and the OSD and JCS representatives.

A. The following views are those of the State, ACDA and CIA representatives.

1. A US-Soviet agreement to avoid competition by limiting their permanent naval deployments in the Indian Ocean may prove to be in the US interest. While the US plans to upgrade MIDEASTFOR qualitatively, it does not now plan to increase the size of that force or to make other permanent deployments. The Soviet Union may continue to increase its deployments, as it has in the last few years. Hence, it may be in the US interest to bind the Soviets to a level comparable to our own.

2. The Indo-Pak war and the surge of the Enterprise task force, which were not considered in this study, could affect the timing of any US initiative with the Soviets for naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. It would be best to await further clarification of the situation on the subcontinent and in the area before undertaking such an initiative, although a naval limitation understanding with the Soviets might well form part of our efforts to normalize the situation in the area.

3. A US-Soviet agreement to limit their permanent naval presences need not affect either our right or our ability to "surge" temporarily into the Indian Ocean if we needed to and as we have done with the Enterprise. We could do it again - if this seemed advisable and effective -- even if we had concluded an agreement with the Soviets similar to those considered in this study, since only permanent deployments would be limited. On the other hand, frequent surges, even though called "temporary", would vitiate an agreement.

4. The Soviets do not have direct land access to South Asia and would have to cross international borders to send ground forces to intervene there. Such a move would entail serious international political risk with implications far beyond local effect in the Indian Ocean area. There is no evidence that the Soviets are prepared to take those risks.

5. Relative geographic propinquity may give the Soviets some advantage over us in influencing states of the Indian Ocean area -- although great power "influence" is based on a whole array of factors in addition to geography. Nonetheless, if geography somewhat favors the Soviets, they should not also be allowed the additional advantage of a greater naval presence as well.

6. In accordance with the terms of reference in Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of October 28, the study analyzed certain specific issues of non-strategic naval limitations and their comparative impact on the US and USSR. These issues and the conclusions of the analyses are as follows:

a. Bases and Support Facilities

A prohibition on bases would probably favor the Soviets. They have developed a modus operandi which allows them to support their forces without a base structure comparable to ours. Although we have not developed such a modus operandi in the case of MIDEASTFOR, it would be possible to maintain that force without a base, if we were willing to spend the extra resources involved in deploying another auxiliary ship to the area. However, for a number of reasons primarily political in nature, it is important that the base at Bahrain be retained. It is also important that Diego Garcia be retained, at least as a communication facility.

b. Surge Capabilities

"Surge" capabilities involve the insertion of forces from outside the area. They would not be affected by an agreement limiting permanent naval deployments within the area.

Surge capabilities depend on the location and nature of the forces surged. US forces would probably

come from the Seventh Fleet, as recently demonstrated by the surge of the Enterprise. The Soviets would most likely send their forces from their Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok as they also did recently or, if the Suez were reopened, from their Mediterranean squadron. In the latter case surging forces of the two sides would arrive at about the same time. In the former, US forces from the Seventh Fleet would arrive sooner. A Soviet surge force cannot match the amphibious and air capabilities of a US surge force; thus the Soviets would not have the same capability to project power ashore.

c. Possible Precedents

A US decision, in agreement with the Soviets, to exercise restraint in naval deployments to the Indian Ocean would not be a limitation on our rights with respect to the international waters of the world. Those rights are based on principles of international law and on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and cannot be affected by a bilateral US-USSR agreement to limit their own naval deployments. The US and the Soviet Union would not be "legislating" for others. Limitations of the nature considered in this paper could be structured so as not to establish precedents adverse to our interest in freedom of the seas or the Law of the Sea. In fact, voluntarily accepted restraints would tend to strengthen rather than weaken the rule of law.

d. Distinguishing Naval Activities

Distinguishing between naval activities might be done in terms of time in the area, or in terms of specific types of activities (e.g., transits, visits, training exercises, maneuvers, port visits). An agreement which attempted to sanction some but prohibit other types of activities might be difficult to formulate and might establish an undesirable precedent.

A generalized understanding (Option 1) would probably not require definition of naval activities, in terms of time or otherwise. On the other hand, for reasons of both policy and precedent, an agreement which placed specific limitations on sailing days or number of

ships (Options 2, 4 and 5) in terms of time in the area should only limit their "permanent presence". This could be defined as naval deployments in the Indian Ocean for X months or longer. Transits or visits of shorter duration would not be limited. The US would remain free to introduce forces for a temporary period.

e. Caveat Clauses

Various caveat or escape clauses which recognize the right of withdrawal under certain circumstances should be part of any specifically worded naval limitation agreement. A generalized understanding limiting US-Soviet naval competition in the Indian Ocean would require less caveating and might not require a specific "escape clause".

7. Options

Two types of options have been considered in this study, as they relate to the above issues:

a. A Specifically Worded Agreement

Such an agreement would place numerical limitations on the total number of certain types of ships and limitations on total ship days. Only permanent deployments would be limited; short term visits and transits would be allowed. The agreement would include an escape clause. Bases and SSBNs would not be limited. This type option would present obvious problems of negotiability since the Soviets would probably press for limitations on bases and submarines. Also, a formal and detailed agreement, in contrast to a general understanding, would seem to be disproportionate to the magnitude of the problem it would seek to solve.

b. A General Understanding

Potentially undesirable features of a specifically-worded non-strategic naval limitation could be avoided or minimized by casting an agreement in general terms. A general understanding would place inhibitions on sharp increases in the level of Soviet naval forces, while allowing us the flexibility to match low level increases.

Such an agreement might consist of declarations of restraint by the US and USSR, with the definition of "restraint" being part of the negotiating record.

B. The following views are those of the OSD and JCS representatives.

1. OSD and JCS representatives believe that recent events in the Indian Ocean area make it inadvisable to enter into a dialogue with the Soviet Union on naval arms limitations at this time. It is certain that the Indo-Pak war will have significant effects on political relationships and major power influence in the area. It is not at all clear, however, what these effects will be. Until the results of the recent war can be better assessed, it would not be prudent to undertake discussions with the Soviets leading toward closing of some of the US political and military options in the area. To a lesser (but still important) degree, this argument also applies to the UNGA resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace."

2. Further, aside from recent events, OSD and JCS representatives believe that neither a specifically worded agreement nor a general understanding (Option 1) with the USSR which places restrictions on naval activity in the Indian Ocean would be in the best interests of the United States for the following reasons:

a) The USSR occupies a central geographic location while the US does not. They are less dependent on overseas sources of supply and are less involved with overseas allies. Primarily for these reasons, the Soviets have developed a naval strategy designed to disrupt our sea lines of communication and to obstruct the projection of our sea power ashore. In the political arena, they have traditionally pressed for the concept of closed seas, which would transform the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas contiguous to the Soviet Union into "Soviet lakes" and facilitate achievement by the Soviet Union of military and political preponderance in these areas.

The naval strategy of the US on the other hand, is designed to maintain control of the vital sea lines of communication on which we and our allies depend and to project military force inland from the sea when necessary. Thus any agreement or understanding which would place "equal" restrictions on the US and Soviet naval forces would tend to support the Soviet strategy while, at the same time, it would counter the US

strategy. Likewise, any agreement or understanding which would advance the principle of closed seas to the detriment of free seas would tend to work to our disadvantage and establish a damaging precedent.

b) Any agreement or understanding (Option 2) reducing or limiting US naval forces in the Indian Ocean would be viewed by the littoral nations as reflecting a lessening of US interest in the area at a critical time. The importance of MIDEASTFOR has increased now that the British have withdrawn their forces from the Persian Gulf area. The Trucial States in particular view MIDEASTFOR as a stabilizing influence between the Arab world and the expanding Iranian interest in the Persian Gulf area.

c) Any agreement or general understanding (Option 1) that would place restrictions on the use of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area could serve to complicate efforts to settle the situation in the Middle East. At the present time the options available to negotiators include the possible use of US naval forces. However, the flexibility afforded by this range of options could be reduced by placing restrictions on the number, size or time on station of naval units in the Indian Ocean area.

d) A naval arms limitation agreement or even a general understanding (Option 1) with the USSR in the immediate aftermath of the Ceylonese peace zone resolution would be viewed by many as major power accession to pressure by littoral states and as a tacit acceptance of the principle that coastal states have a right to regulate activities of other nations in high seas areas adjacent to their territorial waters. Such negotiations would thus weaken the US position on Law of the Sea, would lead to additional pressures at the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference to limit naval uses of the high seas even further and could cause us to fail in achieving our overriding ocean policy objective -- to preserve the freedom of the sea in the largest possible area of the world's oceans.

e) The incorporation of a caveat or "escape" clause could not adequately serve our national interests in regards to limitations of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area. The invocation of an escape clause would have a political price which might be significant in any specific instance. Since the US in all likelihood would be more reluctant than the Soviets to implement the

escape provisions of an agreement, the delay involved in considering the decision would operate to give the USSR a time advantage.

f) Naval units can be deployed around the world without crossing national boundaries. To enter into an agreement or understanding that in any way restricts the use of naval forces would be to give up an option of great flexibility and value to US national security interests.

g) A naval arms limitation in the Indian Ocean would not necessarily serve to hinder or dampen the efforts of either the US or USSR in seeking greater influence with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean area. The problem involves the various means of access to the sub-continent area. A naval limitation in the Indian Ocean would not reduce competition equally since the Soviets would still have a distinct advantage by being part of the Euro-Asian continent. In addition, we cannot overlook the military and political power of the Chinese and their influence in the sub-continent.

h) Finally, OSD and JCS representatives do not believe it would be feasible to have meaningful discussions with the Soviets since SSBN's will not be included in any such negotiations. It is not realistic to believe that the Soviets would seriously discuss limitations on their anti-submarine forces without demanding similar restrictions on our SSBNs. If talks are started, we expect that the Soviets would press hard to include SSBNs and would propagandize in an effort to bring maximum pressure on the US to accommodate the Soviet demands.

3. The OSD and JCS representatives' conclusions as regards limitations on Indian Ocean bases and support facilities, distinguishing between various naval activities and US and USSR surge capabilities are as follows:

a) Any agreement or understanding that restricted bases and support facilities in the Indian Ocean area would favor the Soviets. The Soviets to date have not relied on establishment of a specific base in the area. Their present modus operandi allows them to operate by relying on their support ships in the area rather than local area facilities. Conversely, it would be very expensive for the US to maintain any presence

in the Indian Ocean if denied access to base facilities. The expense would involve the reassignment of a considerable number of ships from other forces both for rotational purposes and logistics.

b) The question of distinguishing naval transits from exercises, "show of force" maneuvers and rotation of naval forces, and of distinguishing all of these from a permanent presence in the area would be both difficult and argumentative. Any definition distinguishing between mobile force and permanent presence would, of necessity, be restrictive. Acknowledging this type of restriction is not in our national interest. Basically, it is inconsistent with our view of freedom of the seas. Further, it could later lead to undesirable applications in other ocean areas of higher US interest.

c) A comparison of the impact of deployment limitations in terms of surge capability and reaction time on US and USSR non-strategic naval forces tends to favor the US at the present time. However, the likely opening of the Suez Canal coupled with the present Soviet/Egyptian relationship would give the Soviets a decided advantage in the more economically important western part of the Indian Ocean area. The US would be restricted in the use of an open canal primarily because of the size of our aircraft carriers. The possibility also exists that, with Egypt in control of passage through the canal, our ships could be delayed by passage procedures. The Soviets would not be similarly restricted.

Non-Strategic Naval Limitations
in the Indian Ocean

II. - Introduction

A. Purpose and Scope

This paper responds to Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of October 28, 1971 which requested further analysis of non-strategic, surface ship naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. It focuses on specific issues raised by such naval limitations in relation to Options 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the NSSM-110 follow-on and compares the resulting impact on the capabilities of US and Soviet forces. Option 1 calls only for a general understanding between the US and Soviet Union to exercise restraint in naval deployments. The limitations contained in the other options are:

Element	Limitation		
	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Bases	No bases	No bases	-
Surface Combatants*	4	8	5
Tonnage/size*	14,000	14,000	14,000
Ship days*	1,000	2,000	--
Embarked Troops*	--	--	100

This paper does not duplicate the background and analysis in NSSM's 104 and 110 which are more comprehensive, especially with regard to political considerations.

* The limitations might apply to all ships in the area or only to permanently deployed units. This paper recommends they apply only to the latter.

B. Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made.

1. The postulated level of Soviet activity is as assessed in NSSM's 104 and 110 and NIE 11-10-71 of 15 December 1971. During the Indo-Pak war, the Soviets tripled the size of their Indian Ocean force. By late December the total reached 25 ships including 12 combatants. *

2. The recommendations of the follow-on study "Proposal for a US Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean for FY 1972" remain US policy.

3. The level of the US national interest in the Indian Ocean is as stated in NSSM-110.

4. "Non-strategic" naval forces include surface combatants such as cruisers, but specifically exclude SSBN's. ** It is difficult to detect and localize nuclear submarines; once they are detected however, it is possible, with the exception of the "H" class, to distinguish SSBN from non-SSBN submarines.

* NIE 11-10-71 estimated that in the absence of a crisis or US strategic naval presence, the number of Soviet combatants would grow to 5-7 over the next five years. If the Suez Canal were reopened, it estimated that that figure might reach 7-13.

** Carriers, which the Soviets might view as a strategic system, would not be allowed as part of our permanent presence due to the tonnage limits in Options 2, 4 and 5. They would be allowed as part of surging or transiting forces.

5. The terms "agreement" and "understanding" are used inter-changeably, in order not to predetermine the form of limitation.

6. The limitations discussed would apply only to the naval forces of the US and USSR.

7. The Indian Ocean is an area bound by Cape Agulhas in the Southwest, Tasmania in the Southeast, a line through the Straits of Malacca north of Singapore in the East, Bal el Mandeb in the Northwest and the 60th parallel in the South. The Persian Gulf is within this area. For a discussion of alternative definitions see page 16.

In addition to the foregoing, the following assumptions were made by the OSD and JCS representatives in preparing their views:

8. "Non-strategic" naval forces specifically exclude SSBN's. Because the movement and presence of all nuclear submarines are difficult to determine, all submarine limitations have been excluded from consideration.

9. The term "agreement" is taken to mean the result of negotiations under Options 2, 4 or 5 while the term "understanding" is the result of action taken under Option 1.

10. It should not be assumed that the Red Sea is not part of the Indian Ocean as has been done in Item 7. It is not realistic to place arbitrary boundaries on the Indian Ocean which would exclude vital contiguous areas such as the Red Sea.

11. The reopening of the Suez Canal would benefit the Soviet Union more than it would the US. Therefore, any arms control agreements reached with regard to the Indian Ocean should take into account the likely reopening of the Canal during the life of the agreement.

12. The USSR's increased visibility in the Indian Ocean includes not only its growing naval presence, but also its civil air routes, arrangements for facilities for the Soviet fishing fleet, a large merchant fleet, and increased diplomatic and trade relations.



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13. As industries in both China and Japan continue to expand, both countries will probably become more interested in securing their access to the natural resources in the Indian Ocean area. A limitation on US naval forces in the area would degrade the stabilizing influence of the US at a time when the interest and influence of other major powers would be increasing.

C. Background

The US Government has been studying the subject of naval forces in the Indian Ocean and is presently assessing the impact of limiting the use of such forces through arms control.

In a conversation with Gromyko on July 28, Ambassador Beam referred to Dobrynin's informal approach to Secretary Rogers of March 26 and informed Gromyko that the US agrees "in principle with the proposition that it would be in our mutual interest to avoid military competition in the area," and that "it would be useful for us to know more about what the Soviet side has in mind." Gromyko said that he was not briefed on the subject but would look into the matter.

The OSD and JCS representatives note that the Soviets have not raised the subject of the earlier Dobrynin conversation since Ambassador Beam's talk with Gromyko. Further, in the judgment of NIE 11-10-71, the Soviets are probably not, at this time, prepared to enter into a formal understanding with the US on a mutual limitation of military forces solely in order to reduce the risk to themselves of political conflict or military confrontation with the US or to avoid a costly competition.

In the past several months international political activity centered first on the Ceylonese proposal for an Indian Ocean "zone of peace" and then on the Indo-Pak war. The Ceylonese resolution, which calls upon the great powers to enter into consultations with the Indian Ocean littoral states to halt expansion of their military presence and to take action to eliminate "any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power

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rivalry", was adopted in the UNGA by a vote of 61-for, 0-against, 55 abstaining, in December. All major maritime powers abstained. It is too early to assess fully the political effects of these two events.

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III. IssuesA. Bases and Facilities1. Problems of Definition

What bases or other facilities do we and the Soviets have in the Indian Ocean? A clear-cut, meaningful comparison in this regard is very difficult since our two navies operate according to different modi operandi. The Soviets, who depend on support from tenders using international anchorages*, do not control any facility in the area. The US Navy, which utilizes the "homeport" concept, in part to solve growing personnel retention problems, has acquired physical facilities on Bahrain.

There are reports that the Soviets may be contemplating establishing a base at Alula, Somalia. Also, in March 1969, Marshal Grechko reportedly made a request for Soviet naval access to Indian facilities. In the wake of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty and Soviet support for India in the recent Indo-Pak war, India might reconsider its refusal of that request, although there is no evidence of such reconsideration nor of a new request. Such facilities would make it easier for the Soviets to increase the size of their deployed naval force which presently rotates on a three-month cycle. However, the Soviets currently possess nothing similar to Bahrain or Diego Garcia.

So far as the US is concerned, the facilities at Diego Garcia are intended to serve as a communications link and not as a support base for combatant forces, and even some littoral states such as Ceylon seem inclined to accept our view that Diego Garcia is not a base. In view of the stationing and lease agreement we have negotiated with Bahrain, our facilities at Bahrain fit even the tightest definition of "base". In both cases, however, the criterion we use internally is probably not as relevant as Soviet or

* These are in the vicinity of Socotra; at Fortune Bank near the Seychelles and Cardagos Shoals north of Mauritius where mooring buoys have been laid; and in the Maldives area.

littoral nations' perceptions. They can be expected to define both Bahrain and Diego Garcia as bases. The Soviets, of course, seek to reinforce such perceptions by their propaganda. They have already begun such a campaign, hitting particularly hard at Diego Garcia which they evidentially fear will become a base for SSBNs. Thus, the Soviets would probably claim that both Bahrain and Diego Garcia are bases that would have to be closed under any agreement that prohibited bases in the Indian Ocean.

But what is the Indian Ocean? Are Bahrain and Diego Garcia within that area? While the definition in the "assumptions" section is generally agreed, some geographers contend that the Persian Gulf is not a part of the Indian Ocean but a separate body of water. Although such a contention is hard to defend in the face of the fact that the Gulf has no outlet other than the Indian Ocean, it could be argued that the Persian Gulf as well as Red Sea should be excluded. The Red Sea, with outlets to both the Mediterranean (at Suez) and the Indian Ocean (at Bab el Mandeb), is an access between those two bodies of water rather than an adjunct of either. In geographic terms, its character is more ambiguous than that of the Persian Gulf.

Political and military advantages would accrue to one side or the other depending upon how the area were defined. For example, if bases should be prohibited and if the limits generally agreed to by geographers were adhered to, use of Singapore would be allowed but transformation of Diego Garcia into a base would be prohibited as would acquisition of new facilities (e.g., by the Soviets in Somalia and India) within the area from the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman south to the 60th parallel. If, as seems likely, the Persian Gulf were included in the area under consideration, the special facilities on Bahrain would have to be included in the area. If limits of the area were drawn at Bab el Mandeb, thus exempting the Red Sea, MIDEASTFOR could be homported at Massawa; Ethiopia. The Soviets, of course, would also be free to continue to use Red Sea ports such as Port Sudan. In the unlikely event the Red Sea were included, negotiations of a conventional naval limitation in the Indian Ocean might become bogged down in Middle East issues.

Thus, it appears that in any discussion of bases in the Indian Ocean the status of Bahrain and Diego Garcia would be raised by the Soviet Union. It also seems likely that any agreement banning bases in the "Indian Ocean" would: 1) end our special facilities at Bahrain; 2) at least "freeze" the present status of Diego Garcia; and 3) preclude the establishment of any true Soviet bases in India or elsewhere.

The OSD and JCS representatives agree with the point that the Soviets would probably claim that both Bahrain and Diego Garcia would have to be closed under any agreement that prohibited bases in the Indian Ocean. However, they believe that the current status of both facilities should be protected. In addition to its present role as a communications link, Diego Garcia will provide a reduced lead-time capability for subsequent expansion to meet other defense requirements should such a course of action later prove to be in the national interest. The facilities at Bahrain have been used by MIDEASTFOR since 1948. To move the force outside the Indian Ocean would place it at a considerable distance from its major operating areas and especially from the one of greatest importance, the Persian Gulf.

The OSD and JCS representatives feel that any agreement on a naval arms limitation in the Indian Ocean that did not include the Red Sea would not be realistic from a strategic point of view. Additionally, any agreement which prohibited bases would probably not prohibit the use of the facilities of the littoral nations. Thus the US would probably give up Bahrain and Diego Garcia and use the facilities at Singapore or Massawa while the Soviets would give up nothing and possibly use the facilities in India or Somalia. They would, of course, be careful not to refer to either as a Soviet base.

2. Impact on the U.S.

a. Bahrain

Regardless of the value of MIDEASTFOR, how important is Bahrain to it? If denied use of Bahrain, the following

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could result.*

Operations. To maintain an acceptable state of readiness without Bahrain, an oiler and repair ship would be required to provide POL and upkeep services with a consequent increase in MIDEASTFOR from 3 ships to 4 ships. With all ships deploying for about a four-month period** in MIDEASTFOR area, this would involve an annual total of about 12 ships (six DDs, three AD/ARs to be used as flagship, and three AOs) instead of 7 at present. The loss of Bahrain's support services, such as pierside upkeep/maintenance accommodations and logistic support facilities would make maintaining the operational effectiveness of the force more difficult. But such repairs and pierside upkeep would also be obtainable at Singapore where we are negotiating for the use of Sembawang repair facility. In any event, major repairs requiring docking are not now obtainable at Bahrain nor would they be obtainable from a deployed repair ship.

In the opinion of the OSD and JCS representatives, the use of the facilities at Singapore by MIDEASTFOR does not present a realistic alternative to those at Bahrain. Singapore is 3650 miles and 9 1/2 sailing days away from the Persian Gulf area. Additionally, the capability of Bahrain to accommodate additional ships on short notice has eased the problems involved in the scheduling of port visits by the MIDEASTFOR ships. Problems arise when a visit to a particular port is unexpectedly cancelled or when it is felt that the frequency or duration of MIDEASTFOR visits to an area is creating a false indication of increasing US interest. In the past when

* The impact could be softened by alternative basing of MIDEASTFOR just outside the area (e.g., at Singapore or at Massawa).

** Prior to the closure of Suez, MIDEASTFOR's two destroyers were rotated from the Sixth Fleet on just such a schedule.

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either problem has occurred and no other port was available, the practice has been to send the ships to Bahrain. Without Bahrain considerable time might have to be spent at anchor in international waters because of the non-availability of ports to visit.

Political. MIDEASTFOR's mission is primarily political in nature, namely to shore up the pro-Western Arab states in the Persian Gulf and to show the flag elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. The latter objective might actually be better achieved without Bahrain. By utilizing indigenous facilities and purchasing local fuel and provisions, the visibility of our presence would be enhanced. The withdrawal of MIDEASTFOR from the Gulf would undoubtedly be viewed by the pro-Western Arab states there as a sign of decreased US interest. This would be a cause of concern to the weaker Arab states in the Gulf who have considered MIDEASTFOR as a counter-balance against Iran. In view of Arab sensitivities about Western imperialism and neo-colonialism, however, it is far less certain that these same states feel as positively about having MIDEASTFOR's base on their soil. As a matter of fact, public recriminations in the area about the US-Bahraini stationing and lease agreement suggest that they may have strong negative feelings in this regard. For its part, Iran would probably prefer the removal of both the base and the force.

b. Diego Garcia

The communications facility now under construction at Diego Garcia will provide an improved communications capability in the Indian Ocean area but not "base" facilities. There would be a political cost involved in transforming Diego into a base in view of our repeated public statements that it is not and that we have no intention to make it one.

If the US were denied the use of Diego Garcia as a small communications facility, the immediate impact would be in the lack of a satisfactory communications capability in the Central Indian Ocean - Bay of Bengal area. Additionally, expansion of the currently planned communications

facilities on Diego Garcia would enhance the effectiveness of HFDF surveillance in the Indian Ocean area by a factor of over 50%. Current approved plans for Diego Garcia include the construction of a specialized ocean surveillance capability using a combination of sonar systems. This capability will be provided within the approved manpower authorization and military construction (MILCON) program for Diego Garcia.

3. Impact on the Soviets

Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean would be limited to their present inefficient mode if an agreement were concluded banning bases in the area. Soviet operations in 1969 and 1970 showed that to maintain an average number of 3 combatants and 4 survey and space related ships in the Indian Ocean they used an annual total of 9 combatants and 15 hydrographic or space related auxiliaries, all supported by 5 oilers and 4 miscellaneous auxiliaries.

Soviet combatants are able to spend about four months in the Indian Ocean even though they have no bases there, but they spend a great deal of the time sitting at anchor probably because of fuel and maintenance restrictions. The Soviets would have to provide more oilers or borrow more heavily than they do now from their merchant tanker fleet to do much more in the way of exercising their combat units in the Indian Ocean.

With the present foreign basing outside of the Indian Ocean, the Soviets are at a disadvantage because the US can operate its Indian Ocean naval force from Subic Bay in the Philippines or even from Japan, Guam, or Singapore, while Vladivostok is the nearest Soviet naval base to the Indian Ocean. Also the Soviet Navy in the Pacific has been hampered somewhat by the Soviet Pacific Fleet's poor record of ship availability and an apparent insufficient amount of naval repair facilities in the Soviet Far East.

B. Distinguishing Among Various Kinds of Naval Activities

The purpose of this section is to consider what types of naval activities might be included in or excluded from an Indian Ocean arms control agreement and how such activities might be defined. A generalized understanding

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(Option 1) might not require any definition. However, options which specifically limit ship days and/or number of ships would require some definition to make clear what ships would be included in whatever limits would be imposed. There are two ways to distinguish between naval activities. Though difficult and perhaps undesirable, this might be done by defining specific types of activities permitted or prohibited (e.g., transit, training exercises, visiting ports, etc.). A simpler and more acceptable way of distinguishing between activities would be to define them only in terms of time in the area.

The great variety of naval activities makes comprehensive definitions of types of activities difficult to formulate and perhaps undesirable. An agreement which sanctioned certain types of naval activity but limited other types might establish an undesirable precedent and might constitute a basis for encroachment upon naval activities elsewhere.

The OSD and JCS representatives agree with the points made above concerning the undesirability of defining specific types of naval activities. It should, however, be emphasized that this undesirability stems from the possible establishment of a precedent that there are certain types of naval activity which are acceptable and certain which are unacceptable on the high seas. The security of the United States depends, inter alia, on freedom of the seas, which is only limited by the requirement that it be exercised with reasonable regard for the rights of others. In particular, any international agreement or generalized understanding (Option 1) to limit or reduce high seas freedoms could undermine long term US security interests. A principle of unacceptable activities on the high seas which might be set in the Indian Ocean could have critical ramifications for national security if extended to other, more important, ocean areas (e.g., the Mediterranean or Caribbean).

However, simple definitions based on time in the Indian Ocean may be acceptable and adequate. Based on time in the Indian Ocean, naval deployments can be divided into three categories: (1) transit; (2) short-term visits; and (3) permanent presence.

A US-Soviet agreement could cover all ships in the Indian Ocean except those in "transit". Such transit is important for the Soviet Union as well as the US. Not having any large combatant building yards, only one submarine yard and insufficient repair facilities on their Pacific coast, the Soviets must rely on inter-fleet transfers across the northern route (closed in winter) or across the Indian Ocean to maintain their Pacific Fleet. "Transit" might be defined as simply as passage from Atlantic to Pacific exits or vice versa within a specified period of time. Transits routinely include activity which could be called maneuvers or exercises. A destroyer, for instance, needs to exercise its fire control systems, guns, and radar equipment. A carrier with its embarked air wing maintains operational proficiency and readiness by the regular launching and recovery of aircraft. It would not be desirable to prohibit these activities by more restricted definitions of transit.

"Short-term visits" (perhaps of less than 1 month) might be either prolonged transits or visits other than transits. (i.e., failing to cross the Indian Ocean). These visits might also acquire the character of permanent presence, depending on how they were rotated. The history of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean includes many examples of short term visits and for this reason it can be argued that it might be desirable to include such visits in the limits of an agreement. However, the US interest seems to dictate that short-term visits like the recent one of the Enterprise task force not be constrained. The agreement should therefore be written with a rather narrow and tightly drawn definition of "permanent presence."

On the assumption we want to retain the option of "transit" and "short-term visits," the limitation should only be to "permanent presence" or "permanent deployments" with all other naval activities permitted. "Permanent presence" could be defined as including all naval ships in the area for longer than a given period of time, perhaps 1 month. A US-Soviet agreement which limited the permanent presence of their naval ships would include US MIDEASTFOR and the Soviets' principal rotational units. Other naval activities on the part of the US and Soviets would remain unrestricted.

The OSD and JCS representatives concur in the desirability of retaining the option of "transit" and "short term visits." They also believe, however, that limitations on "permanent presence" are not desirable. In any event, a definition of "permanent presence" based on a period of time in the Indian Ocean as short as one month would be clearly infeasible from an operational standpoint. A "rather narrow and tightly drawn definition" of "permanent presence" would not leave "other naval activities" unrestricted as has been stated. For example, it might prove desirable to deploy ships to the Indian Ocean to observe a series of Chinese missile tests. These ships would be restricted to a particular time in the area by the definition of "permanent presence." Of course, the ships could be rotated frequently to stay within the time limit but this would greatly increase the costs and assets required for the operation.

C. Surge Capabilities.

There is a potential for crisis in the nations of the Indian Ocean littoral which could make temporary increases in their naval presence desirable for the US or USSR.* Both the Soviets and ourselves have found it advantageous to maintain relatively modest forces by surging from outside the area. What is the comparative capability?

* Although this analysis treats surge and reaction time of naval forces, the Soviet and Chinese capability to base tactical aircraft and land forces in their own adjacent territory cannot be ignored. Nor can the capability of the US to put forces in or stage them through Turkey and Iran or Thailand. It would be well, however, not to allow the limited capabilities of both sides in this regard to cloud the issues of naval arms control being discussed in this paper. The Soviets, for example, could not easily or lightly introduce land forces into the area. The Soviets in South Asia would have to cross international borders to intervene with ground forces. Such a move would entail serious international risks; there is no evidence the Soviets would take such risks. It would almost certainly be viewed by the US as a serious escalation and could also lead to a direct Sino-Soviet confrontation.

The Analysis of reaction times is unrelated to the type of agreement in force, or even of whether or not there is an agreement. Surging forces are entering from outside the area, and the steaming time from a point outside the area to another inside the area is a function of the capability of a ship's engineering plant rather than of the terms of agreement.

The following assumptions have been made in developing the analysis:

-- Advance warning of an impending situation to which the US/USSR would react would be available to both sides at approximately the same time.

-- Due to the proximity of the Seventh Fleet and since CINCPACFLT now has responsibility for the Indian Ocean, US surge forces most likely would come from the Seventh Fleet. Under existing circumstances, the most meaningful comparison is one matching the Seventh Fleet against the likely source of a Soviet surge -- their Pacific Fleet. If the Canal were open, a comparison between Soviet and American resources in the Mediterranean would also be useful.

The OSD and JCS representatives are concerned that since a reopened Suez Canal would remain under Egyptian control and considering the Soviet influence with Egypt and their antagonism to the US, US access to the Canal in reaction to a situation in the Indian Ocean would not be assured while Soviet naval units would have free access.

-- European political consideration militate against other than small-scale diversion of Sixth Fleet assets to the Indian Ocean without replacement. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron is probably subject to a similar constraint vis-a-vis the Soviet client states.

The OSD and JCS representatives feel that the nearness of Soviet and Chinese land masses is a factor that is not ignored by the countries bordering the northern part of the Indian Ocean and can not be ignored when considering an arms limitation in the Indian Ocean area which would apply to naval forces only. Any limitation which placed equal restriction on naval forces would not place equal restriction on the Soviet influence in the area.

Though the Soviets would probably not move their Mediterranean Squadron into the Indian Ocean without first considering the effects on their Arab friends, the OSD and JCS representatives do not believe that their commitments to the Arabs are nearly as significant as ours are to NATO.

An illustrative situation, a requirement for a "show of naval force" in the vicinity of Bombay has been chosen for specific examination. The magnitude of the US show of force can vary from two or three destroyers to a large amphibious force and/or an Attack Carrier Strike Group depending upon the objectives to be achieved. The Soviets could provide a limited amphibious capability and/or a surface force of several modern warships. However, the Soviets could not match the capabilities of the forces the US surged.*

* An amphibious assault ship such as the USS TRIPOLI -- which deployed as part of Task Force 74 in the Indian Ocean -- embarks a battalion landing team of 2,000 men with accompanying equipment and helicopters. An attack aircraft carrier embarks between 80-90 fighter and attack aircraft for support. The Soviets have nothing comparable. They generally have one of their ten ALLIGATOR class LSTs deployed in the Indian Ocean, and such a ship could embark as many as 550 men with organic equipment. However, such a force would have difficulty making an opposed landing without air support.

The time and distance factors from possible points of origin for naval forces to provide a show of force in the vicinity of Bombay are as follows:

TO BOMBAY FROM LIKELY SURGE SOURCES

<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>STEAMING TIME (DAYS)</u>	
		<u>@ 18 KTS</u>	<u>@ 20 KTS</u>
Central Med via Cape Good Hope	10,664	24.7	22.3
Central Med via Suez*	4, 165	9.9	9.0
Alexandria via Suez*	3,200	7.4	6.6
Black Sea via Cape Good Hope	11,484	26.6	23.9
Black Sea via Suez*	3,853	9.3	8.4
Singapore	2,441	5.6	5.0
Vladivostok	5,445	12.6	11.3
Subic Bay	3,766	8.7	7.8

*Allows 8 hrs canal transit

The steaming times shown above and discussed below are exclusive of time lost for refueling. The US has an advantage in this area. The US Navy normally can replenish underway at speeds of about 16 knots along the proposed track given suitable weather conditions. The fast pumping rates built into our ships will cause only minor delays if replenishment ships are prepositioned or rendezvoused with the surge unit. Approximately one hour per ship (on the average) per refueling will be required by US ships. This time is as high as 3 hours for an aircraft carrier and varies with wind and sea conditions.

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The Soviets on the other hand must either lie-to for refueling or travel at very slow speeds (less than 5 knots). Through the use of such limited techniques as the "single hose" method, approximately 6-8 hours per ship, per refueling will be lost by Soviet ships in transit.

In practical terms, the above refueling considerations mean that, if both sides surged with a four-ship force (including a carrier for the US), the Soviets would lose 24-36 hours per refueling while the US would lose only 5-6 hours.

Intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets are placing emphasis on replenishment at sea and have just begun using the alongside method and refueling or more than one ship at a time. Therefore, their refueling capabilities will probably improve in time (i.e., over the next decade).

Under Option 5 both the US and USSR would retain naval forces in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis and bases would not be affected. If existing Indian Ocean forces were in the vicinity of Bahrain and Socotra at the time of a crisis, Soviet forces would probably arrive slightly sooner due to the increased state of readiness afforded by their modus operandi. Follow-on forces would be provided from outside the area. The optimum sources of US augmentation of MIDEASTFOR would be from the Sixth or Seventh Fleet. An augmenting force from Subic Bay would require 8-9 days to close Bombay; or, from the Central Mediterranean, 9-10 days. However, if the force were in the vicinity of Singapore Straits, this time would be reduced to about five days. Soviet augmentation from the vicinity of Vladivostok would require 11-13 days, while forces from the Eastern Mediterranean would require about seven days if the Canal were open.

For any prolonged operation the availability of ports or bases for fuel and other support (whether our own or third country) would be highly desirable. The Soviets, lacking the US logistic force structure would be even more dependent upon shore support facilities for sustained operations.

The above examination leads to the following conclusions:

-- Surge capabilities and reaction times are a function of location, duration, and intensity of operations.

-- With the canal remaining closed and with the US using Seventh Fleet assets, the US has a clear initial advantage over Soviet naval forces from whatever source.

-- Should the US utilize Sixth or Seventh Fleet assets and the canal is open, the initial surge capability for both the Soviets and US would be nearly equal in the Central Indian Ocean. The US, however, would enjoy an advantage in the Eastern Indian Ocean.

-- If deemed necessary the US and Soviet navies both have the capability to operate independently for limited periods any place in the Indian Ocean.

-- For long term operations, Soviet logistic problems would be eased in the Western Indian Ocean with the canal open due to availability of facilities in Alexandria, Port Said and Mersa Matruh. In the Eastern Indian Ocean, access to Singapore would ease our problems. Additionally, both sides would probably have access to some third country ports and bases within the area for fuel, supplies, and repairs.

The preceding examination is based on the assumption that the limitations of Options 2, 4 and 5 apply only to forces defined as a "permanent presence". The OSD and JCS representatives note that if the nature of the operations being performed by the surging forces requires their presence in the area longer than the time specified in the definition of "permanent presence" (one month was suggested by the State, ACDA and CIA representatives) then a decision must be made to either terminate the operations and depart the area or invoke an escape clause and face the probable accusations of escalation.

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D. Possible Precedents

Any non-strategic naval arms limitation arrangement in the Indian Ocean involving surface combatants and bases should be examined not only from the standpoint of the effect it would have on the US and Soviet naval balance within the area but also on precedents it might create in other contexts and for other regions. Such precedents, if in fact they did arise, would be essentially of either a Law of the Sea or a political nature.

1. Law of the Sea

While the Ceylonese "zone of peace" scheme might be viewed as an attempt to establish a special regime in the nature of a "closed sea" and to confer upon the littoral states of the area and the UNGA the "right" to limit the use of the Indian Ocean, the types of limitations discussed in this paper clearly involve nothing more than voluntary restraints on the part of two countries on the level of their permanent naval presence. A bilateral Soviet-American understanding on the Indian Ocean could not presume to bind other nations not party to the understanding nor could it affect the general validity of freedom of the seas which is based on customary international law as codified in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. A US-Soviet understanding to exercise restraint in naval deployments does not involve unilateral assertions of jurisdiction over the high seas affecting, say the 200 mile territorial issue or unilateral closing of high seas areas (e.g., Peter the Great Bay).

It is possible, of course, that the Soviet Union would claim otherwise and would attempt to draw analogies between, say, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.*

* In view of their own interests in the Mediterranean, it appears unlikely that Soviets would actually try to draw such an analogy.

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This need not succeed, however, since, in the absence of some domino theory for the oceans, we should be able to find acceptable ways of saying "no" to any Soviet proposal based on an Indian Ocean precedent. The Soviets share with us an interest in avoiding unilateral extensions of jurisdiction over ocean space and they join us in favoring a multilateral solution to ocean problems at the 1973 LOS Conference. As a great power with increasing maritime interests and resources, the Soviet Union would also stand to lose from a narrowing of freedoms of the seas. In this regard, for example, in an October 31 commentary on the Indian Ocean, Radio Moscow supported the position that the Straits of Malacca are "part of the worlds's oceans and may be used by all the nations."

In any event, we will wish to be alert to protect ourselves against contentions on the part of the Soviet Union or third countries that one or another undesirable precedent had been set, in order to insure that an Indian Ocean limitation not conflict with our objectives at the 1973 LOS Conference or with our oceans policy in general.

The OSD and JCS representatives view the foregoing precedent in the wider, more important, context of freedom of the seas. NSDM 122 recognizes national security as the preeminent US oceans policy interest. This interest consists chiefly of guaranteeing the mobility of US forces to operate on, under, and over the high seas. The US has historically been well served by the doctrine of freedom of the seas which is embodied in the 1958 Geneva Convention of the High Seas. US atomic tests in the South Pacific, the deployment of submarine detection devices, the patrols of the US Polaris/Poseidon force, the patrols of SAC bombers, the maneuvers of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, US assistance to Lebanon, South Korea, and South Vietnam, the recent deployment of Seventh Fleet units to the Indian Ocean--all of these activities have relied in whole or in part of the freedom of the high seas for their lawful execution.

A bilateral agreement or even a generalized understanding (Option 1) with the USSR in the aftermath of the recently adopted Ceylonese resolution that the Indian Ocean be declared a "zone of peace" is inconsistent with

our overriding objective--to preserve freedom of the seas in the largest possible area of the world's oceans--and in preserving the unhampered right of transit between one part of the high seas and another part. Such an agreement or understanding would be viewed by many as major power accession to pressure by littoral states and a tacit acceptance of the principle that coastal states have a right to regulate activities of other nations in high seas areas adjacent to their territorial waters.

Negotiations which limit mobility of US forces might encourage similar proposals for other areas of the world's oceans. For instance, the possibility of demilitarization of the Mediterranean has been mentioned by Spanish representatives. If a principle of closing oceans to military operations were to be accepted by the international community, the US would be unable to prevent its application to ocean areas where the US has strategic interests of the highest order.

A naval arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union would affect the negotiating tactics of the US and other states in a number of ways. For instance, we are seeking Indonesia's acceptance of the US position with respect to free transit through and over straits. If we were to agree to naval limitations, Indonesia might clearly conclude that we had little need on security grounds for free transit through her straits and stiffen her opposition. The Philippines, closely allied to Indonesia in LOS matters as an archipelago state, would be less inclined to support us.

An Indian Ocean naval limitations agreement would also improve prospects for those countries which seek to postpone the 1973 Conference because they feel that delay will mean further gains in current LOS positions which they support (e.g., 200-mile claims). The Latin American 200-mile group might well be joined by others who would seek further naval limitations, which in effect would restrict freedom of navigation, with the result that the Conference would be delayed. Thus it would be far more difficult, if not impossible, to attain the national security objectives which the President's oceans policy is meant to achieve.

2. Political

One Soviet objective might be to use an agreement on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean to further their claim to global naval parity. Such a claim by the Soviets would have little "cutting edge". Global naval parity is a reflection of our relative naval strengths. This would not be affected by an agreement limiting deployments in the Indian Ocean.

The OSD and JCS representatives feel that "relative strength" is often a matter of perspective. If an agreement of even a generalized understanding on a naval arms limitation in the Indian Ocean was reached with the USSR, the littoral states would probably see this as being based on naval parity. In addition, the Soviets would probably push this theme in their propaganda. This intent is indicated in Brezhnev's June 11 speech.

Another negative precedent might arise if a naval arms limitation agreement were allowed to take precedence over our mutual defense commitments or interfere with our ability to honor such commitments. Since the limitations contained in Options 1, 2, 4 and 5 would apply only to permanent presence and not to surge forces, no problem could be created in this regard. Acceptance of limitations on their naval deployments by the US and Soviets might be viewed by littoral states as reflecting a lessening of US--and Soviet--interest in the area. On the other hand, it might also be viewed as a step by the superpowers to prevent the escalation of local conflicts and by widely welcomed for this reason.

Again, the OSD and JCS representatives do not agree that applying the limitations in Options 2, 4 and 5 only to "permanent presence" completely removes the restrictions from surge forces. It is true only as long as the surge force moves into and out of the area within the time specified in the definition of "permanent presence." If a defense commitment required an US presence in the area longer than that time then an escape clause would have to be invoked and the political costs accepted.

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E. Caveat Clauses

A conventional naval limitation in the Indian Ocean would serve essentially as a peacetime limitation on naval force deployments to the area. It could serve the purposes of improving the state of US-Soviet relations, responding to regional concerns, and avoiding escalation involving resources that might be better used in more important areas. The intention is not to tie our hands in the event the Soviet Union or some third party should try to take advantage of the agreed constraints in such a way as to be harmful to our national interests. Neither is it the intention to set legal or political precedents that would harm those interests elsewhere or in the future.

Any naval arms limitation agreement in the Indian Ocean should include an adequate provision allowing us to withdraw from or suspend the limitation agreement, if that should prove necessary. Restricting limitations to permanent presence, as is the case with the limitations discussed in this paper, makes it unlikely that such a necessity would arise.

In the opinion of the OSD and JCS representatives restricting the limitations of an agreement or understanding to "permanent presence" simply makes the possibility of invoking of an "escape clause" less likely than if the limitations applied to all the ships in area. Anytime a force was required for any reason to be in the Indian Ocean longer than the time specified in the definition of "permanent presence", the limitations in the agreement would apply and an "escape clause" would have to be invoked.

Of course, any caveat language should not be so sweeping as to vitiate the spirit and purpose of an agreement. We cannot, for example, sign such an agreement and expect to retain undiminished flexibility in the exercise of naval power within the area. The purpose of an agreement would be to restrict that very flexibility in return for an equivalent restriction on Soviet flexibility. In the final analysis, the best guarantee of Soviet compliance

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with the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement can be the value that they attach to it. Quite a few adjustments can be made if the parties are genuinely interested in doing so. Alternatively, no mechanisms will be of much use if a signatory feels he has to act unilaterally in contravention of the agreement. It must also be borne in mind that the taking of such action, regardless of the wording of an "escape clause", could confront inhibiting political considerations not the least of which would be that such action, if taken during crisis, could be considered escalatory.

In light of these general considerations, the following caveat clauses might be considered:

- Nothing in this agreement can or does abridge the inherent right recognized under Article 51 of the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a member of United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
- Nothing in this agreement can or does conflict with or affect the provision or effectiveness of treaties entered into earlier by either Party.
- Nothing in this agreement can or does affect the freedoms of the sea based on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and other applicable principles of international law.
- Neither Party shall seek to circumvent the provisions or effectiveness of this agreement through third countries.
- Either Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from or suspend its adherence to this agreement if it

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decides that events, related to the subject matter of this agreement, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice to the other Party of its intention to withdraw from or suspend its adherence to this agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the events it considers have jeopardized its supreme interests.

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TAB B

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