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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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
January 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR

John A. Wickham, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Military Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Pacific Force Structure

The NSC has no objection to DOD's removal of the temporary moratorium imposed May 7, 1975 on U.S. Army reductions and internal realignments in Japan. We approve the planned reduction of 2000 U.S. Army military support personnel and 6000 local national employees.



William G. Hyland
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs



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KBH 1/14/00

MEMORANDUM

177

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Walt

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

January 19, 1976

Walt OK signed

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND

FROM: JAY TAYLOR

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Reductions on Japan



Last May, following the Southeast Asian events, DOD imposed a temporary moratorium on U.S. Army reductions and internal realignments in Japan. This moratorium affected reductions scheduled to take place by FY 1977 involving some 2000 military personnel and 6000 local national employees, all of whom performed support functions.

DOD has informed us that it would like to remove the moratorium and proceed with the scheduled reductions (Tab B). The DOD's proposed implementing memorandum (Tab C) directs that in implementing the reduction program, logistics and facilities in Japan should not be diminished to the point they can no longer support a Korean contingency. Support functions that are still required will be transferred for the most part to other services. The memorandum also directs that, in implementing the reduction, efforts be made to minimize the impact on civilian employees by transferring as many as possible to the service assuming the function previously performed by the Army.

DOD points out that the political considerations behind the moratorium have diminished in importance and that further deferment would result in increased budgetary problems for the Army.

Secretary Kissinger has been informed of this proposed move. The Department of State has no objection.

I also concur in the proposed move.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to General Wickham approving the planned reductions.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines, DOD Directive
By KAT, NARA, Date 11/7/00



CONFIDENTIAL

staff 177
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**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301**

8 January 1976

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

SUBJECT: Pacific Force Structure

Last May, following the Southeast Asia events, a temporary moratorium was imposed by DOD on U.S. Army reductions and internal realignments in Japan. These reductions, to take place by FY 1977, would involve some 2,000 military personnel and 6,000 local national employees, all of whom perform support functions. The support functions that are still required will be transferred, for the most part, to other Services. (Some portion of the local national work force will be transferred along with the residual functions.) The intent of the moratorium was to preclude any immediate adverse political reaction to further military withdrawals from Asia, even though the programmed reductions involve only support elements.

The political considerations behind the moratorium now have diminished in importance. Continued U.S. military presence in Asia has allayed political fears of U.S. withdrawal. Therefore, we believe reduction actions should be resumed. Further deferment would serve no good political purpose, and only result in increased budgetary problems for the Army.

Accordingly, the attached draft memorandum lifts the moratorium. I am informed that the State Department at staff level has no objection to the memorandum. Unless the NSC staff has objections, the Department intends to issue the attached memorandum no later than 16 January.

Attachment
As stated

John A. Wickham, Jr.
JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
Major General, USA
Military Assistant



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 *not directive*
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH, NARA, Date 11/10



Sec Def Cont Nr. **X-0071**

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and
Logistics

SUBJECT: Pacific Force Posture (U)

(C) The political considerations that led to the 7 May 1975 moratorium on PBD 280CR actions in Japan have diminished in importance. Accordingly, the program of reductions and transfers deferred in May may be implemented, under ASD/I&L administration. Internal U.S. Army realignments deferred by the moratorium also may be implemented.

(C) Two considerations must be kept in mind while implementing the reduction program. First, the logistics organization and facilities in Japan should not be diminished to the point that they can no longer support a Korean contingency.

(C) A second consideration is the potential adverse political impact of the sizeable RIF associated with the U.S. Army drawdown in Japan. Careful timing of RIF announcements can limit that impact. Transfer of civilian employees to the Service assuming a function previously performed by the Army also can limit RIF impact. Finally, any adverse impact can be partially offset by an accompanying release of any facilities and areas no longer required.



Classified by ASD/ISA
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 81

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X- 3789

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: Wickham, J REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

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
SUBJECT: Pacific force structure re lifting of Dad monstarium

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

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STAFF SECRETARY			MEMO FOR PRES _____
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS _____
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO _____
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			DUE DATE: <u>1/14</u>
NSC PLANNING			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE			

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
1-19		Hyland	X	Sgn ltr to Wickham (1/24)	
1/25		NEL/S	C	Hyland sgn ltr to Wickham	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH: 1/27/76 W/inside/outside kept

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT ACTION

February 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES *JB*
SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Message to the
ASEAN Summit

Following up on a telegraphic recommendation (Tab C) from Ambassador Newsom in Jakarta, the Department of State has forwarded to you a proposal (Tab B) for a Presidential message (Tab A) to the ASEAN Summit. The Summit is scheduled to convene February 23.

In informal consultations with State, we have discovered that there are mixed feelings about the proposal, and no universal enthusiasm for it. State does not want to take the onus for quashing an Ambassadorial recommendation out of hand, and I agree that we should make the decision on the issue here.

My View

I recommend against the sending of this message for the following reasons:

-- The President endorsed ASEAN in his December 7 Honolulu speech. In the opinion of some, the manner of the endorsement, which the President's personal speech writers arranged, was too effusive.

-- We should thus avoid a further Presidential embrace of ASEAN at this juncture.

-- ASEAN leaders recently turned off Japanese and Australian requests to participate in the ASEAN Summit. They would have been even less enthusiastic about such a request from us had we exhibited the lack of wisdom to proffer it.

-- We broached the subject of economic consultations with ASEAN over a year ago, and have yet to receive a meaningful ASEAN response.

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KB# 1/11/00



*Ken Quinn advised
8:37 PM
2/20/76*

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-- Our most successful dealings with ASEAN countries have been on a bilateral basis and should continue that way.

Moreover, a Japanese foreign office official, whom I have known since 1958 and have a great deal of respect for, paid a call on our Embassy in Tokyo February 20. He offered a suggestion that the U.S. refrain from sending a congratulatory message to the ASEAN Summit (Tab D). He based his stance on his conversation with the local Thai Ambassador. The Ambassador said that a message from the United States or other superpower would be embarrassing in view of ASEAN sensitivities toward involvement with superpowers during its delicate formative state.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the President not send the message at Tab A to the ASEAN Summit meeting.

Approve *B* Disapprove _____

Should you disapprove my recommendation, I have prepared a memo at Tab I from you to the President recommending that he approve sending the message at Tab A.



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Message to the
ASEAN Summit

Ambassador Newsom in Jakarta has suggested that you may wish to send a congratulatory message to the ASEAN Summit meeting scheduled to convene in Bali February 23. There is a precedent for such messages in that both you and former President Nixon sent messages to the summit meetings of the Organization of African Unity. A message would be particularly appropriate because this is the first summit meeting since ASEAN establishment some nine years ago. We wish to encourage regional cooperation among ASEAN's five countries -- Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines -- since we enjoy friendly relations with all.

The message at issue is addressed to President Suharto, who is hosting the conference. We propose to keep the message private in consonance with our objective of maintaining low-key relations with ASEAN. We would have no objection if the ASEAN leaders themselves wish to release the text.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the congratulatory message at Tab A to the ASEAN leaders.



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KBA 1/11/60


Proposed Presidential Message to ASEAN Leaders

Dear President Suharto:

The first meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs of Government in Bali is an event of historic importance. On this occasion I would like to convey through you, as host for the Conference, my best wishes to each of the assembled leaders and my sincere hope that their deliberations will yield many positive benefits to the peoples of the ASEAN nations.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

February 19, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Presidential Message for
the Summit of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Ambassador Newsom has proposed that the President send a letter of greeting for the ASEAN leaders to President Suharto who will be host to the ASEAN Summit Meeting, which convenes February 23. The U.S. has sought to avoid any over-identification with ASEAN which might prove embarrassing to this group which seeks to convey an image of independence and moderate non-alignment. At the same time we do not wish to appear aloof or unfriendly, particularly if other countries were to send similar greetings. Moreover there are precedents for such messages. For example, both Presidents Ford and Nixon have sent greetings to the Summit Meetings of the Organization of African Unity.

On balance, the Department of State believes that a Presidential message along the following lines would be useful as a demonstration of good will towards ASEAN's five member countries.

Dear President Suharto:

The first meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs of Government in Bali is an event of historic importance. On this occasion I would like to convey through you,

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GDS KSH 1/14/76

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -


as host for the Conference, my best wishes to each of the assembled leaders and my sincere hope that their deliberations will yield many positive benefits to the peoples of the ASEAN nations.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

We would propose to keep the message private, in line with our desire, and particularly that of the ASEAN nations, to keep our relations with ASEAN low key. We would have no objection, of course, if the ASEAN leaders wish to release the text although that is unlikely.

It is accordingly recommended that the attached telegram to Embassy Jakarta agreeing to the text of a letter from the President be approved.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Incoming telegram Jakarta
2160
2. Draft telegram



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 9605

PAGE 01 JAKART 02160 180453Z

22-12
ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CPR-01 IO-11 OIC-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SS-15
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
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AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ JAKARTA 2160

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDIP, ASEAN, ID
SURJ: PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR ASEM SUMMIT

1. IT OCCURS TO US THAT FIRST ASEM SUMMIT MEETING BEING HELD FEBRUARY 23-25 WOULD BE APPROPRIATE OCCASION FOR PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE OF GREETING. SINCE NO INDIVIDUAL IS DESIGNATED AS CHIEF OF ASEM ORGANIZATION, WE SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BE DIRECTED TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS HOST OF CONFERENCE. WE RECOMMEND THAT MESSAGE BE TREATED AS PRIVATE AND THAT LEAVE TO GOI QUESTION OF RELEASE.

2. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT: DEAR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: THE FIRST MEETING OF ASEM CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT IN BALI IS AN EVENT OF HISTORIC IMPORTANCE. ON THIS OCCASION I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY THROUGH YOU, AS HOST FOR THE CONFERENCE, MY BEST WISHES TO EACH OF THE ASSEMBLED LEADERS AND MY SINCERE HOPE THAT THEIR DELIBERATIONS WILL YIELD MANY POSITIVE BENEFITS TO THE PEOPLES OF THE ASEM NATIONS. SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD. END TEXT.



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02160 180453Z

3. IF MESSAGE APPROVED, RECOMMEND WE RECEIVED TEXT BY NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY 21 IN ORDER TO INSURE DELIVERY BY OPENING OF CONFERENCE.

4. WE HAVE NO CLEAR INFORMATION YET AS TO INTENTION OTHER GOVERNMENTS. THERE IS SOME EXPECTATION THAT AUSTRALIANS AND PERHAPS EASTERN EUROPEANS MAY SEND MESSAGES.
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 009881

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Cable

CREATOR'S NAME Hodgson

CREATOR'S TITLE U.S. Ambassador to Japan

RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger

RECEIVER'S TITLE Secretary of State

TITLE Congratulatory Messages to ASEAN

CREATION DATE 02/02/1976

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400022

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE Southeast Asia (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 01/10/2000

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST KBH

DECLASSIFIED with portions exempted
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 State Dept. Guidelines, State visit 6/00
 By KBH, NARA, Date 5/18/01

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AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 1508
AMEMBASSY MANILA 6837
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1649

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 2574

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, ASEAN, US
SUBJEC: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO ASEAN

1. [REDACTED] CALLED FEBRUARY 20 TO OFFER "PERSONAL SUGGESTION" THAT US REFRAIN FROM SENDING CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO OPENING OF ASEAN SUMMIT FEB 23. HE BASED SUGGESTION IN PART ON CONVERSATION BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND THAI AMBASSADOR DURING LAST FEW DAYS. LATTER, RESPONDING TO CASUAL QUESTION [REDACTED] ON SUBJECT OF CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES, SAID ASEAN WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH MESSAGES FROM JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA, COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND MESSAGE FROM US OR OTHER SUPERPOWER WOULD BE EMBARRASSING IN VIEW OF ASEAN SENSITIVITIES TOWARD INVOLVEMENT WITH SUPERPOWER AT DELICATE FORMATIVE STATE.

|||

2. [REDACTED] SAID HIS "SUGGESTION" ALSO BASED ON REPORT FROM EMBASSY WASHINGTON THAT US SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SENDING MESSAGE. HE ADDED PERSONAL ADVICE THAT ANY MESSAGE US MIGHT SEND WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE AS COMMENT ON RESULTS OF CONFERENCE AFTER CLOSE. A SIMILAR LOW KEY SUGGESTION WILL BE PASSED IN WASHINGTON, HE CONCLUDED.

3. COMMENT: PERSONAL SUGGESTIONS OF THIS SORT BY GOJ OFFICIALS ARE HARDLY EVER PERSONAL, BUT RATHER REPRESENT THE LOWEST LEVEL FORM OF OFFICIAL DEMARCHE.



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, State Visit 8/00
By KSH, NARA, Date 5/15/01

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
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EA:RHMILLER

S/S -

NSC



IMMEDIATE JAKARTA

IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, CANBERRA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDIP, ASEAN, ID

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR ASEAN SUMMIT

REF: JAKARTA 2160

RHM
RJM
S/S
NSC

EMBASSY IS AUTHORIZED TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SUHARTO IN CONNECTION WITH ASEAN SUMMIT MEETING PER TEXT IN REFTEL. WE WISH TO AVOID OVER-IDENTIFICATION WITH ASEAN ORGANIZATION THAT COULD EMBARRASS ASEAN MEMBERS OR BE CONSIDERED BY THEM TO BE INJURIOUS TO IMAGE THEY SEEK TO CONVEY. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WANT ASEAN COUNTRIES TO FEEL WE ARE EXCESSIVELY ALOOF. YOU SHOULD INDICATE TO INDONESIANS THAT MESSAGE IS PRIVATE ONE TO OUR ASEAN FRIENDS AND NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION. WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION IF ASEAN LEADERS WISH TO PUBLISH IT. YY

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER, H _____ S/S 7603524 REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

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
SUBJECT: Pres mem for the Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES (_____)
FAR EAST <u>Barnes</u>	<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>	REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE <u>to state</u> (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: <u>2-22</u>
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<u>2/20</u>		<u>Scowcroft</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>Decision (2/22)</u>	
<u>2/21</u>		<u>NSC/S</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>Scowcroft approved recom</u>	



NSC/S INSTR DISP

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CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

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FEB 24 1976

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 23, 1976

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
As you requested, we have prepared an expanded paper on international developments in Southeast Asia since the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia.

Thomas J. Barnes



SECRET

Foreign Policy Ramifications of the Fall of Indochina



Summary

While the internal political, social, and economic consequences of the Communist victories in Indochina have clearly emerged in the past year, the international ramifications and the effects upon U.S. foreign policy are just beginning to come to the surface. The disengagement of U.S. forces from mainland Southeast Asia has left a partial vacuum requiring all countries to readjust their positions. There is no doubt that the fall of Vietnam has caused some of our friends to reappraise their relationship with us, move closer to other powers in the region, and question the credibility of U.S. commitments. Others are moving quickly to fill the void which our military departure created. Our adversaries, Vietnam and the Soviets, are on the offensive seeking to expand their influence and further reduce U.S. power and prestige. Our allies, Thailand and the Philippines, partially in response to these pressures, are seeking accommodation with Communist powers and are moving away from their previously tight relations with the U.S. Other friends, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, alarmed at the prospects of Communist gains, are hoping the U.S. will remain involved in the region to counter the presence of the Communist powers.

Our Adversaries

The Soviets

The Soviets have made advances in Southeast Asia since the fall of Saigon. A prime indication of this progress is the fact that the People's Republic of China (PRC) now privately cautions Southeast Asian leaders to be careful not to "let the bear sneak in the back door after driving the tiger out the front."

Soviet foreign policy goals in the area appear to be to:

- end the U.S. military presence and diminish U.S. influence in the region;
- increase its own diplomatic, economic, and intelligence presence;
- enjoy good state to state relations with all nations;
- create an image of the Soviet Union as a benign super power seeking to preserve peace and stability through peaceful coexistence, while labeling China as the cause of instability because of its support of local revolutionary movements.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines, State Visit 7100

By KBN, NARA, Date 5/18/01

SECRET

To achieve these ends, Moscow is seeking to strengthen its relationship with Vietnam and Laos, and use them as the cornerstone of its policy in the area. Other Soviet activities in support of these goals have run the gamut from heightened diplomatic, political, and economic initiatives to covert intelligence operations.

There is no doubt that the Soviets see Vietnam as the firm base of their foreign policy in Southeast Asia, especially since Vietnam's deteriorating relationship with the People's Republic of China over territorial disputes has caused Hanoi to definitely tilt toward the Russians. Vietnamese Communist Party First Secretary Le Duan's trip to Moscow and Peking in October 1975 offered clear evidence of this Soviet advantage. During his stop in Russia, the Soviets promised Duan lavish support for Vietnam's economic reconstruction. In contrast, during an earlier stop in Peking, discussions were apparently so sterile that the two Communist states did not even issue a final communique, a most unusual omission indicating the depths to which Sino-Vietnamese relations had plunged.

The Soviets and the Vietnamese are cooperating to try to further reduce the U. S. military presence in Southeast Asia and thereby diminish our power and prestige. Some Asian officials believe that the Soviets are behind harsh Vietnamese verbal attacks against Thailand and the Philippines on this subject. While it would be wrong to consider the Vietnamese as Soviet frontmen or puppets, they at least see a common goal with the USSR on this subject.

Moscow is also seeking to manipulate Thai domestic politics, apparently to help ensure that anti-U. S. elements remain strong. While it would be wrong to consider Soviet influence in Thailand to be extensive, or that Soviet diplomacy has entranced Southeast Asians outside Vietnam and Laos, Soviet agents reportedly have been active in covertly infiltrating student and labor movements in Thailand, while at the same time conducting overt cultural programs at Thai universities. Thailand saw as its own self-interest its recent decision to end U. S. military presence in that country, and Soviet and North Vietnamese efforts helped to make up the Thai mind.

The Soviets have also been busy making inroads in other countries. In Malaysia, on a government to government basis, they are seeking to finance the large Tembeling hydroelectric project. They have also undertaken an ambitious cultural program which encompasses the press, trade unions, students, and literary circles. The Malaysians are extremely



reluctant to get further involved with the Soviets, but top officials are reportedly finding it difficult to rebuff all Soviet proposals. At the same time, the Soviets are taking steps to indirectly increase their influence in internal Malaysian politics. Since 1974, apparently as part of an effort to penetrate Malaysian unions, they have invited over 40 trade union representatives to visit the USSR. Most of their attention is directed at ethnic Malays, raising the spectre that the Soviets wish to take advantage of the strong racial antagonism which exists between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia. Apparently conceding that ethnic Chinese will look to Peking, the Soviets are attempting to make themselves known as friends of the poorer Malay farmer. There apparently is a program of covert activity as well. After some members of the class became involved in unusual political activity, the Malaysian government recently closed a Russian language course which a Soviet national taught.

Soviet activities are more limited in Indonesia and Singapore which are both well known for their tough anti-Communist regimes. Nonetheless, Russia does carry on a brisk commerce in Singapore through its Narodny Bank, and from having its ships repaired in Singapore port facilities. While Singapore had been reluctant to admit Soviet vessels to its government-owned Sembawang shipyard (where U. S. Navy ships are serviced), the recent worldwide downturn in shipping made the Soviet business too attractive to resist.

Perhaps the Soviets' most significant inroad since the fall of Indochina has come in the Philippines, one of the U. S. 's oldest friends. Philippine-Soviet relations began improving after the war, and in May 1976 President Marcos and Foreign Secretary Romulo went to Moscow on a state visit. While there, they formally agreed to establish diplomatic relations and also signed a joint trade agreement. Displays of Soviet military power and scientific capability in Moscow greatly impressed both Marcos and Romulo. During the visit, the Soviet leaders told Marcos that the presence of U. S. bases on sovereign Philippine soil made him look like a U. S. puppet, and urged him to terminate the U. S. use of these bases, and no longer permit U. S. forces on Philippine soil. Marcos replied that while he could not end the American presence now, he might do so in about five years. While Marcos is still probably formulating his ultimate intentions toward a U. S. military presence in the Philippines, the fact that he would suggest the possibility of terminating our use of Philippine bases indicates a breach in our close relationship.

Since the PRC has the inside track with all insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, Moscow is not involved in directly supporting any armed



insurgents in Southeast Asia, and appears rather to be concentrating its activities on state to state relations and covert activities aimed at urban interest groups.


Vietnam

After a year of concentrating on consolidating power in the South, Hanoi has once again turned its attention to foreign affairs. Its major goals would seem to be:

- maintaining its position of influence, verging on control, over Laos;
- further eroding U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, and ending or rendering ineffective the U.S. military presence in Thailand and the Philippines;
- supporting, to the extent possible, revolutionary activities in Northeast Thailand, while vying with the PRC for influence with the Thai insurgents;
- establishing diplomatic relations with all states in the region and obtaining the maximum amount of economic assistance from them;
- seeking foreign technology to exploit its unproven oil reserves.

One of Vietnam's main concerns during the past year was Thailand's toleration of U.S. bases on its soil. Hanoi made it clear that as long as these bases remained, relations between the two countries could not improve. Hanoi added to its pronouncements explicit expressions of support for groups in Southeast Asia seeking "genuine independence." The message to the Thai was perfectly clear: If you continue to allow U.S. bases on your soil, we will support the growing insurgency in your country. The Thai, under major influence from this pressure, ordered all U.S. forces out of the country by July 20, 1976. As a result of Thailand's ending its special relations with the U.S., Hanoi now appears ready to normalize relations with Bangkok and exchange ambassadors. A Thai delegation will travel to Hanoi in August 1976 to discuss this possibility.

Hanoi's willingness to open relations with Thailand comes at a time when Vietnam is seeking to sweeten its diplomacy throughout the region. In



July, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien went on a goodwill mission to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines -- all of the ASEAN countries except Thailand. Later he made stops in Burma and Laos. While the Vietnamese clearly designed this trip to improve Hanoi's state to state relations with these countries, Hanoi is apparently not ready to renounce supporting revolutionary groups. When Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew asked Hien directly whether Vietnam would continue to aid insurgents, he evaded the question by saying he was authorized to discuss only formal state to state matters. From his refusal to answer, Lee concluded that Vietnam is really trying to "lull its non-Communist neighbors to sleep" and have them drop their guard. He believes that Hanoi, like the PRC, will follow a two pronged policy of supporting insurgent groups through its party apparatus, while maintaining good government to government relations.

One of the major successes of Hien's trip was obtaining agreement in Manila for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Philippines. In this process, Hanoi did not miss another opportunity to attack U.S. military capabilities. In the communique announcing the agreement, the Vietnamese inserted language stating that neither country will allow its territory to be used as a base for foreign aggression, or for direct or indirect intervention against the other or any other country in the region. The Philippines agreed to this provision. Since the Vietnamese and the Soviets consider practically any U.S. military operation to be either an aggression or an intervention, the Vietnamese have thus laid the groundwork for future complaints should we use our Philippine bases to conduct operations such as: rescuing another Mayaguez; transporting military equipment to Israel; or projecting U.S. power into East Africa as we did in support of Kenya after the Entebbe raid. That the Philippines would agree to such language is another indication of the changing situation in Southeast Asia.

Hanoi continues to exhibit an interest in the insurgency in Northeast Thailand, but is competing with the predominant PRC influence on the Thai Communists, and combating an almost visceral Thai dislike for the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese have political cadre among the approximately 90,000 Vietnamese who reside permanently in Northeast Thailand, and train some Thai insurgents in Vietnam. There is no evidence, however, to suggest any significant increase in these activities since the end of the Indochina war.



People's Republic of China

Peking set the example for Vietnam of striving for good state to state relations while maintaining support for Southeast Asian Communist parties, almost all of which are Maoist in orientation. While it has achieved successes in establishing diplomatic relations with all Southeast Asian countries except Singapore (and has yet to revive them in the case of Indonesia), the PRC has a difficult balancing act since it is ideologically or logistically involved with insurgents in Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and perhaps Indonesia, not to mention its substantial troop presence in Laos. Thailand's diplomatic embrace of the PRC carried the hope of Chinese willingness to lessen support for insurgents, and to help stave off the Vietnamese.

If the case of Malaysia is any example, at least PRC moral support for the rebels will continue. Malaysia in May 1974 became the first ASEAN state to enter into diplomatic relations with Peking. Kuala Lumpur has been severely disappointed that its actions has not brought about a reduction in propaganda broadcasts from the "Voice of the Malaysian Revolution" located in southwest China. In addition, the Malaysians are upset that the PRC Embassy has been "cultivating" the ethnic Chinese population and that their trade balance with the PRC remains unfavorable. Thailand is already learning this lesson as the China based Voice of the People of Thailand radio continues its vitriolic railing against the government in Bangkok.

Cambodia

Cambodia represents China's great triumph in Southeast Asia. Pro-Peking Khmer cadre gained control of the Communist Party, and severed all command relationships with the Vietnamese Lao Dong Party which had originally founded it. With the end of a Vietnamese role, Soviet influence in the country ended as well. China is the primary external influence in Cambodia today. While they refuse to label themselves as Communists, the Khmer leaders espouse a Maoist line and are carrying out a radical economic and social revolution which has parallels only in left wing Chinese Communist programs. The unceremonious way in which the Cambodian Communists literally booted the Soviets out of the country, and the exclusive use of Chinese military supplies during the last three years of the war are further evidence of Peking's unique hold on that country.

While its international role will be limited, Cambodia has indicated through its public statements that it will follow a harsh anti-American line in the third world and non-aligned movements.



Laos

The new Lao government is beset with difficult international problems, most of which are located within its own borders. Approximately 20,000 Chinese engineering troops are in northwest Laos with no apparent intention to leave anytime soon. The North Vietnamese also have a sizable presence with some 32,000 military spread throughout the eastern and southern parts of the country. Soviet advisors are present in considerable numbers, and a Cuban advisory team is on hand. The Lao Communists seem to have balanced off these contending parties so far, and have maintained better relations with the PRC than have their Vietnamese mentors.

The Lao, with Vietnamese support and backing, provide support to the Thai insurgency. Thai Communists have safe havens and logistical storehouses in Laos. Supplies from the PRC and perhaps Vietnam are transhipped through Laos. Lao and Vietnamese are continuing to train some insurgents.

Our Friends

There is no doubt that our withdrawal from Indochina and the subsequent Communist victories caused our allies and friends in Southeast Asia to reconsider their relationship with us, and reevaluate the credibility of our commitments and our pledges to remain involved in the region. These reactions have taken various forms and have caused them to act in varying ways.

Thailand

The U.S. disengagement in Indochina had a special effect on the Thai, causing them to seriously question U.S. commitments to their security under the Manila Pact. This perception, combined with North Vietnamese veiled threats that a continued U.S. presence would result in Vietnamese support for Thai insurgents, caused Thai leaders to see accommodation with Vietnam as their safest course. Hence their mid-1976 deadline on U.S. troop withdrawals, despite PRC endorsement for a continued U.S. presence. Thai Foreign Minister Phichai, in a recent major foreign policy speech, indicated that friendly relations with the Communist states of Indochina will be one of the cornerstones of Thai policy. In actual terms, Thailand still remains closer to the U.S. than to either the PRC




or Russia. We still give \$16 million a year in security assistance and continue certain limited security cooperation by sharing intelligence, but the Thai move toward the Communists has clearly lessened U. S. ability to collect regional intelligence, support Indian Ocean operations, and project power into Asia.

While the Philippines has not gone so far as to terminate our military presence there, nor sought to abrogate our mutual defense treaty, it too is moving away from us. The Philippines took the lead in dismantling the formal SEATO organization, and is seeking to restrict how we use our military bases. While there is no question but that the GOP still considers the U.S. its closest ally, President Marcos has taken a number of major steps to improve his country's standing in the third world, and to achieve more balance in its relationship with the super powers. In the past year, he has traveled to both the PRC and the Soviet Union, and opened diplomatic relations and signed trade agreements with them. In addition, he moved to achieve a leadership position among Third World and non-aligned countries through chairmanship of the Group of 77 meeting in Manila, and acting as its spokesman at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi.

Others

Singapore and Indonesia, while equally concerned about a possible U. S. retreat from Southeast Asia, have reacted in a different fashion. While trying not to give the outward impression of doing so, they have endeavored to move closer to the United States and to enhance their security relationship with us. President Suharto, in talks in both Washington and Jakarta, expressed reservations about Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese intentions toward his country. He made a strong request for a continued U. S. military role in the area and for significantly increased military assistance. Cuts in our assistance to Indonesia have undermined efforts to assure the GOI that we are genuinely concerned with helping it to remain strong. In the first joint U. S. -Indonesian consultations, held June 25-29 in Washington, Indonesian representatives made it clear that our actions so far had not matched our words and that, as a result, they were beginning to wonder whether we are really interested in playing a positive role in Southeast Asia.

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has a pessimistic view of both Malaysia and Thailand's chances of dealing with their Communist insurgencies.



He believes there is a strong chance that Communist forces will threaten Singapore from Malaysian territory in the next five to ten years. To counter this threat, Lee has sought to purchase significant quantities of U.S. military equipment and to obtain U.S. help in training his forces. Lee has also urged that the U.S. retain a military presence in the area and the Indian Ocean to counter increasing Soviet pressure. Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam recently publicly called for the U.S. to stay involved in the region as long as the other super powers are present, and chided certain ASEAN colleagues who have 'haively' called for a precipitous U.S. withdrawal. To facilitate our remaining, Singapore has allowed the servicing of U.S. naval ships in its ports, and permits the transiting of a limited number of Diego Garcia support flights.

Malaysia has an ambivalent approach to the new situation in Asia and has attempted to hedge all its bets. Publicly it has continued to support late Prime Minister Razak's call for a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia. The current Prime Minister Hussein Onn, however, troubled by the increasing level of the insurgency, privately has told top U.S. officials that he supports a continued U.S. presence in the area. He has asked us for credits to purchase U.S. military equipment.

Conclusions

The fall of the non-Communist governments in Indochina has set off a process of readjustment which may have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy. A unified Vietnam in close concert with the Soviet Union is slowly moving to expand its influence as a regional power. Moscow is gradually increasing the role it plays in the region despite PRC efforts to keep it out. Thailand and the Philippines clearly have rethought their previous extremely close relationship with the U.S., and are seeking to move some distance away from us. Thailand ended our military presence on its soil and the Philippines is at least thinking about following suit in the mid term. Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia all look to a continued U.S. military involvement in the area as the key to continued stability. The final conclusion therefore must be that a continued U.S. security role is the key to political developments in Southeast Asia.



MEMORANDUM

4101

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

July 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT


FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: **Assessment of Developments in Indochina Since the
End of the War**

Bud indicated that you wish to have a detailed assessment of developments in Indochina since the communists came to power. The paper at Tab A summarizes events there and points out general trends which have emerged both internally and in the foreign relations of each country. The paper deals first with regional comments, then in depth with Vietnam, and finally Cambodia and Laos.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the study is that it points up the considerable political and economic changes Hanoi instituted in South Vietnam. Most journalistic accounts have tended to portray life there as relatively unchanged from the Thieu period.

*Mary
Hanks
Bud
Scowcroft
has*



One Year After the Fall of Indochina

The internal political, social, and economic consequences of the communist victories in Indochina have clearly emerged in the past year. The international ramifications and the effects upon U. S. foreign policy are just beginning to come to the surface.

Life in Cambodia has been radically altered amidst what can only be called a brutal bloodletting. In Vietnam and Laos, changes have come more gradually, but in South Vietnam the patterns for the future seem unmistakably clear. Laos, as it always did in the war, is following slowly in the footsteps of its Vietnamese brethren.

International Aspects

The international impact of the communist victories and the U. S. pull-back from Asia is becoming clearer. Vietnam and the Soviets are on the offensive; Thailand and the Philippines are seeking accommodation with communist powers; and Singapore and Indonesia are hoping the U. S. will stay around. The Thai, anxious to appease the North Vietnamese whom they consider their greatest threat, have ended their special relationship with the United States. Certain limited cooperation will continue, but the Thai have deliberately moved toward a more "balanced" foreign policy which includes good relations with the new communist governments of Indochina, and acquiescence in Hanoi's demand that all U. S. bases be removed. Thailand has been communicating with Cambodia for some time, and a Thai delegation will visit Hanoi in August to consider normalizing relations.

Singapore and Indonesia are more pessimistic about being able to deal with communist regimes. Singapore in particular has been outspoken about the need for a continued American presence in Southeast Asia as long as the "other super powers" are present. Malaysia is disappointed that its establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC has not dampened the ardor of its communist insurgents.

The Soviets have continued to take steps to gradually increase their influence in Southeast Asia, and have established diplomatic relations with the Philippines. Numerous Soviet and Cuban advisors are in Laos helping "socialize" that country.



After a year of limited activity, newly united Vietnam has embarked on a diplomatic campaign aimed at improving state-to-state relations in Southeast Asia. Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien is currently on a good-will mission to all of the ASEAN countries except Thailand, and announced July 12 the opening of diplomatic relations with the Philippines. One feature of the joint communique was agreement to not allow their territories to be used as bases for foreign aggression or intervention against each other or other countries in the region. Vietnam has serious problems closer to home with both China and Cambodia, and has had border skirmishes with both. Hanoi has departed from its previous balancing act between the USSR and the PRC, by clearly tilting toward the Soviets. Laos feels compelled to be more even in its approach to these two powers, particularly since the PRC has some 20,000 troops on its soil, but Laos remains under the principal tutelage of Hanoi, which still has about 32,000 troops on hand.

Life in South Vietnam Under Communist Rule


Many recent accounts have portrayed life under the communists in South Vietnam as relatively unchanged from that under the Thieu Government. Careful reading of communist media, statements from refugees fleeing there, and available intelligence, however, show that life in South Vietnam has changed considerably, since the North Vietnamese have:

-- Moved to eradicate the vestiges of "capitalism," eliminate political opposition, and construct a socialist state.

-- Incarcerated a large number of former GVN officials.

-- Instituted more stringent political restrictions and harsh punishments, including the death sentence.

-- Undertaken a campaign to lessen the influence of religion.



-- Begun a significant cultural transformation.

-- Started to restructure the economy along collectivist lines and relocated portions of the urban population to remote areas to begin agricultural production.

Specific details about each of these subjects are listed below.

Administrative and Political Control: Who is really in charge

Senior NVN General Van Tien Dung's recent article detailing how the North Vietnamese Politburo planned the final attacks on Saigon and how the North Vietnamese Army executed it, should have ended any question about who really ran the war for the communists. All sources of information indicate that the South is really in the hands of the North Vietnamese, and that southerners are just beginning to realize that the basic fact of the war is that the North conquered the South. Southern Viet Cong cadre are reportedly so few in number, and so inept that northerners give them office only as front men. Everyone who has left Saigon recently indicates they have dealt with northerners in all of the ministries of the former government in Saigon.

Communist media have revealed that in some provinces the North Vietnamese Army has had to put soldiers into all villages and hamlets to administer the government.

Refugees report that in the Saigon area North Vietnamese soldiers are quartered in people's homes, and that there they perform a function of political control and watching over the population.

Executions and Death Sentences

The Communist Government in SVN established on March 23, 1976 a new set of punishments for both ordinary and political crimes which in



effect makes activity against the new government punishable by death. In contrast, under the Thieu Government, no one had ever been executed for any crime. The premiership of Nguyen Cao Ky was the last time when the government executed anyone, a Chinese rice merchant who had allegedly been hoarding during a period of extreme shortages. The new communist decree provides the death penalty for a large number of crimes including "plotting to overthrow the government, spying, stealing public property, murder, and rape." The new code, however, also provides the death penalty for such "crimes" as producing faked goods, illegal business transactions, forgery, speculation, hoarding, raising and lowering prices, corruption, burglary, and for actions aimed at "sabotaging national unity, unification and national defense." While there is no evidence to suggest that there has been a "bloodbath," communist media have reported the sentencing of at least 17 men to death in the last year. Vietnamese communist media have also announced that the Can Tho military tribunal tried a number of ARVN officers, including the former Province Chief of Chuong Thien, and sentenced them to death. A refugee who escaped from Can Tho stated that he witnessed a number of these executions, and said that there may have been 30 over the past year. Many of the executions were by strangulation, including some in which men were choked to death with barbed wire. Others died by having their throats cut. The Chuong Thien Province Chief had his trachea torn out by hand. Most other executions that we know of occurred by the firing squad. Giai Phong, the South Vietnamese communist newspaper, carried a picture May 27, 1975 of one man being killed by a firing squad in Saigon. Both the Washington Post and the New York Times also carried photos last May of "peoples' trials" which ended in executions. The Times article showed one man about to be shot. While Giai Phong states that all of those executed were men who committed crimes such as murder or rape, some refugees have stated that at least some are men accused of "political crimes" while serving in the old government. Giai Phong on September 6, 1975, for example, reported a death sentence for a former GVN village chief, a police sergeant, a CIA agent, and the commander of a reconnaissance unit.

Political Restrictions

While prior to the fall of Saigon the communists had promised political freedom and voiced support for "third force" and neutral elements within Vietnamese politics, following their takeover of South Vietnam, they have taken a number of steps to restrict political activity and the dissemination of ideas opposed to theirs. For example, they:



-- Issued a decree May 20, 1975 ordering all political parties in South Vietnam to cease activities. Included in this order were a number of "reactionary parties" such as the VNQDD, the Dai Viet, and the Cong Nong, all of which had been independent of or in opposition to President Thieu. Shortly thereafter, on May 23, the Saigon Military Management Committee ordered that "all organizations, associations, and parties (except the Communist National Liberation Front) must register with the government and may function only after government approval has been granted." To date there has been nothing to indicate that any organization or association or party has received such approval. Along with this order to halt activities was a strict prohibition against erecting signs, holding meetings, or raising funds.

-- Compelled the leaders of these "reactionary political parties" to undergo "collective reform" and sign statements acknowledging anti-revolutionary activities and pledging to end all opposition to the new administration. These political party leaders along with other party officials have also lost all rights of citizenship, although the government may restore them after a period of "good behavior."

Most notable in this group is Vu Hong Khanh, the head of the VNQDD, who had been an anti-French revolutionary since 1925. The communists had previously thought so much of Khanh that in August 1945 they made him a Deputy Minister in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's first government in Hanoi. He later broke with the communists and joined the Bao Dai government, thus probably accounting for his being branded a dangerous reactionary.

Suppression of Religion

While publicly acknowledging freedom of religion, the communists have also publicly stated that they will not allow those elements within any religion who might cause them any trouble to continue their activities. To achieve this end they have conducted a coordinated and systematic campaign to gain a degree of control over organized religion.

Their attack on the Catholic church began shortly after the takeover of Saigon with a "popular campaign" to drive the apostolic delegate, a Frenchman, from that city. Following demonstrations against him, the PRG ordered him to leave June 5, 1975. Bishop Nguyen van Thuan, the auxiliary bishop of Saigon and incidentally a nephew of Ngo dinh Diem, also known for his staunch anti-communism, was exiled to Nha Trang



shortly thereafter. At that time, communist spokesman Mai Chi Tho justified the government's actions by saying that the appointment of all bishops within the country is a matter which the state must approve. In the fall of 1975, the French bishop of Kontum, along with a number of French priests and nuns, was told to leave the country without being given any reason. This attack on foreign clergy continued until July 1976, when the last group of non-Vietnamese priests and nuns arrived in Bangkok after the PRG evicted them. A purge of the Vietnamese clergy reportedly began in the latter part of 1975. Communist media indicated that priests who were known for their anti-communist activities were branded as criminals and accused of "abusing religion." Communist cadres organized meetings of their parishoners at which they denounced these priests. Some refugees have reported that some priests were then arrested and sent to prison. In at least two cases, the refugees said they knew the men were executed. Other priests have reportedly undergone torture such as being staked out in a tiger cage. The communists have used force against some Catholic parishes and may be resorting to false charges to arrest their most obstinate opponents. There is evidence that the regime based the Vinh Son incident, in which troops stormed a church and arrested the rector and several other persons on charges of resistance activities, on pre-fabricated information. The intention was to discourage outspoken clerics.

Another part of the anti-church campaign has been the physical takeover of church buildings. The state has confiscated all private schools and, in some cases, closed seminaries. In other cases, North Vietnamese soldiers have moved into church properties. North Vietnamese soldiers regularly camp and conduct exercises on Catholic church grounds in Saigon. Refugees say that churchgoers believe that anyone attending the church thus comes under NVA scrutiny. Moreover, the North Vietnamese sit in the church during the services and listen carefully to every word spoken. The result is that attendance at mass and church is down, and the authority of the clergy is breaking down.

The regime recently permitted the Archbishop of Hanoi to travel to the Vatican so that the Pope could elevate him to the rank of Cardinal. A seemingly liberal act, the real purpose of it was probably to further eclipse the power of the Archbishop of Saigon, who in the newly unified Vietnam will now have less prestige than the Hanoi Cardinal, who over the years has proven no impediment to government policies.




Attacks on the Buddhists are not so well reported as those on the Catholic church. There is nevertheless evidence of a similar campaign against the Buddhists. Communist radio broadcasts state that a number of Buddhist monks were denounced as being false religious leaders. In addition, some refugees indicate that pagodas in Can Tho and other parts of the Mekong Delta have been closed and that some monks were sent away for re-education. Other refugees say pagodas are open but only the most elderly monks remain. Particularly significant is the apparent disappearance of Thich Tri Quang, the leader of the anti-Thieu An Quang Buddhist faction in Saigon who has not been heard of since the "liberation" of Saigon. The government may be sending these religious and other opinion leaders to forced labor camps. Recent newspaper and radio articles indicate that priests and monks, along with artists and intellectuals, are being sent to do "voluntary" manual labor in the new economic areas.

The communists have also disbanded the governing boards of the Hoa Hao Buddhist sect, no doubt because the Hoa Hao has always been anti-communist and continues to resist to this day.

The Anti-Decadent Culture Campaign

One of the first programs which the North Vietnamese instituted was the campaign to "eradicate the decadent U. S. puppet culture in the South." This effort, which began in May 1975, initially took the form of "students" being sent into the streets to collect books, songs, tapes, cassettes, and any other type of printed or written material which exemplified the "decadent culture" which the United States "had brought" to South Vietnam. American and French journalists reported that while communist soldiers kept the press from getting too close, they observed that the students entered book stores and emptied them of every type of publication except for mathematical and technical books. The students next reportedly removed "objectionable items" from private homes. According to a French journalist's report, while some of the items they rounded up were "pornographic" publications such as Playboy and Oui, they also picked up every type of political writing and Vietnamese history along with translations of all foreign works. Since then the authorities have extended the campaign to include a prohibition against singing songs which the new regime has not approved, as well as a total proscription against foreign music unless specific prior approval is obtained. This



mass roundup of literature seems to have taken on striking proportions. At the end of the campaign's first month, Radio Saigon reported that several "tons" of books had been collected. In one village alone in the Saigon area, almost 50,000 books and close to 20,000 tapes and cassettes had been collected in that month. The campaign has continued for a year and continues to receive considerable press attention. An official list of blacklisted authors and books was published, and the roundup of forbidden material continues. An amusing sidelight to this campaign is that communist cadres are apparently not destroying all of these objectionable materials. Recently, Vietnamese media have complained about the proliferation in Hanoi of wild American rock music and nude pictures that North Vietnamese cadre and troops returning from the south have brought home.

Destructions of Symbols of the Old Government

Many remember that the communists tore down the large monument featuring ARVN soldiers charging toward the National Assembly building in downtown Saigon. Few have regretted its loss from an aesthetic point of view. A more disconcerting report we have heard from several refugees is that communist forces desecrated the large ARVN cemetery, just outside Saigon, where hundreds of soldiers are buried. Included in this action was the destruction of the large monument which had been erected in memory of these men.

Corruption and Other Social Problems

One thing that has seemingly not changed from the old regime is the extent of the corruption which permeates the new communist government. Refugees tell stories of demands or bribes from officials at all levels, and comment that in this respect there is absolutely no difference between the new government and the old. Many Vietnamese who have left Saigon on French flights report paying bribes of several thousand dollars for exit permits. Communist media have indirectly acknowledged this problem and prescribed penalties for those caught. The refugees describe North Vietnamese soldiers as the only ones now regularly having any amounts of money and as dealing wildly on the Black Market. They can buy hard to get items now such as rice and meat from state commissaries, and are reselling their purchases on the Black Market with large profits. Prostitution is proving as persistent as financial corruption, and may have even increased because so many people are out of work. Reportedly, only the North Vietnamese have enough money to pay the going rate.



Collectivization of the Economy

While private individuals still own land, major changes in agriculture have taken place:


-- Labor exchange teams now operate throughout the country. These teams, made up of all farmers in an area, pool all-manual labor, farm machinery and animal resources to collectively plow, plant and harvest the rice crop. While most individual ownership of land plots has not ended, the establishment of these labor exchange teams is apparently the first step on the way to total collectivization.

-- Collectivized state farms in which all land is worked in common are in existence in a few areas. These entities, which cover 4000 to 5000 acres, are so far found only in the new economic zones, areas which the government only recently reclaimed and to which it is relocating urban dwellers.

-- While the state has not collectivized the harvest on individual farms officially, the state is in fact taking a large part of the rice crop. A new rice tax has resulted in farmers being forced to give up anywhere from 50 to 75 percent of their rice crop to the government. While an individual has his own plot of land and theoretically gets to keep what is grown on it, the communist tax is so high that the state is achieving just about the same results as it would through a collectivized system.

In urban commerce, the communists have taken more direct and drastic steps to gain control of the economy. In the fall of 1975 the government began a campaign to arrest the "comprador bourgeoisie," leading ethnic Chinese businessmen who exercised a cartel over many important commodities such as rice, metals, and textiles. In a nationwide roundup the police arrested these men and summarily confiscated all of their goods and property. For a time their fate was uncertain but in late May 1975 the government issued a news circular indicating that they would be tried and that minimum sentences for those guilty of speculating or hoarding would be five years while in the most serious cases the death penalty would be exacted.

In addition, the North Vietnamese have stripped Saigon of certain technical equipment such as medical x-ray machines and shipped them North. Perplexingly, in view of the current food shortage and the U.N. desire to provide food aid, they also disposed of the valuable huge rice supply which the U.S. left in Saigon by selling at least part of it to foreign countries.




Reeducation

The communists themselves have admitted that over one million former GVN officials have registered with the new government, and that at least 500,000 have undergone reeducation. Some reeducation was done in place while other higher ranking persons have gone to reform camps. Of those sent away, some lower ranking officers have returned home, many reportedly suffering from a number of diseases and extremely emaciated. Refugees confirm, however, that most of those who have gone off to reeducation have never returned, and their ultimate fate is uncertain. At first the new government stressed the leniency of its policy. But in late May 1976 it issued a new statement which revealed that those who had been stubborn or unreformed, presumably this category applies to all of those who have not yet returned, may have to undergo reeducation for at least three years. Furthermore, the new statement indicated that those guilty of crimes with "blood debts" to society will stand trial. We do not know the exact nature of reeducation, but the few reports available indicate that it includes much hard labor, little to eat aside from rice, and large doses of communist propaganda about how bad the Americans were. Other unconfirmed reports indicate that some reeducatees are being forced to clear mine fields, and that some have been killed while doing so.

New Economic Areas


One of the most vigorous communist campaigns has been a year-long concerted effort to have people leave Saigon and other cities, and resettle at locations -- referred to as new economic areas -- which had lain fallow or had never been farmed. In many cases the land is almost untillable, and is located in a remote area where farming is difficult under the best of circumstances. The new government has told people moving there that there will be a house ready for them, as well as free tools and a monetary stipend. Many people, lured by government promises, apparently at first went voluntarily. Later as the word seeped back to the cities that the government's promises were hollow, the refugees said the authorities introduced a degree of coercion. Local security forces physically rounded up some people, particularly young men not having any means of employment, and sent them to these areas. At the end of 1975, Radio Saigon reported the existence of a campaign to round up such "bad elements." In other places the authorities used a quota system in which they required large families to send a certain number of family



members to the new areas. They also chose persons who signed up for free rice at government stores, thus indicating that they had no job or income in the city. In at least one case they used religion to draw people there. First, they required a Catholic priest to relocate to one of the new areas. After a short time, they brought him back to make a speech to his parishoners describing the new zone in laudatory terms and urging that they return there with him. The relationship between priest and parishoners being what it is, most people reportedly did go with him en masse.

Elections

An election for a new unified national assembly was held in both North and South Vietnam on May 25, 1976. There were four noteworthy aspects about the election: First, no politicians from the previous GVN period ran or were elected with the exception of several "third force" figures who most official Americans believed to be at least communist fellow travellers. Secondly, 605 candidates ran for the 492 seats available, practically a one-to-one ratio. Thirdly, the ranking members of the North Vietnamese Politburo who ran all received 99.5 percent of the votes cast in their district or higher. These totals are an interesting contrast with President Thieu who, running alone in 1971, received only slightly over 93 percent. Finally, in the new government formed under the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam, no NLF/PRG personality is in a position of any real power. Unconfirmed intelligence reports indicate that the southern communists are resentful over their diminished role.



Since their April 17, 1975 capture of Phnom Penh, the communists have moved ruthlessly to establish their domination over the people, and have tried to reduce or eliminate all vestiges of such basic institutions as family, religion, and education. Millions of people, including the sick and aged, have been uprooted and forced to work in the countryside, under extremely austere conditions, on agricultural and reconstruction projects. Disease pervades everyday life, malaria and dysentery are common, and there is little or no medicine available.

Numerous interviews with Cambodian refugees who have fled to Thailand and information available from other sources indicate that the Cambodian communists are radically reconstructing that country using extremely harsh and brutal methods including large scale executions to implement their policies. Some of the more notable aspects of their rule are:

-- The regime is extremely anti-intellectual. One former school teacher described book burnings in Phnom Penh following the communist takeover including one instance in which the entire contents of the National Library were destroyed.

-- Education has virtually ceased to exist save for some ideological training for children between the ages of 7 and 12.

-- Organized religion is apparently being eradicated. Monks are forced to do work in the fields. Most pagodas have been either dismantled or are being used for other purposes such as to store grain.

-- Standards of health have apparently declined seriously, and disease is rampant. There are reports of widespread epidemics of malaria, dysentery, and cholera in various parts of the country. Remaining medical facilities are open only to communist cadre. Most doctors are no longer allowed to practice but are either forced into manual labor or executed.

-- In several areas the family unit is being destroyed with children permanently separated from their parents, and husbands and wives placed in separate work groups.

New Government

Phnom Penh formalized its new governmental structure under the constitution announced in early January. On March 20 communist authorities staged nationwide elections to elect representatives of the

250-member National Legislative Assembly. The Khmer Communist Party (KCP) maintains overall control of the governing apparatus. Khieu Samphan will chair the State Presidium, but we do not believe he is the top man. Prince Sihanouk has been relegated to the role of elder statesman and will play no consequential part in Cambodia's future. The new Prime Minister, who may be Saloth Sar under the pseudonym of Pol Pot, is probably the overall leader of the Party and the country.


Executions

Refugee reports and other information indicate that arbitrary executions are commonplace, and there is a widespread fear of arrest and subsequent elimination. Members of the former government's political elite, bureaucracy, and military -- including doctors, educators, and engineers -- apparently have no immunity and are prime targets for execution along with their families.

Reports say that since January 1, 1976 the communists have even executed former teachers, students, and even low ranking enlisted men of the Lon Nol military forces. These killings are reportedly widespread and in many cases members of the entire family of former government officials or soldiers are executed along with the head of the family. According to one report, the communists executed approximately 700 Lon Nol officers from Battambang Province in late April 1975. Another report indicates that they machine-gunned to death over 350 soldiers who returned from Thailand where they had been in training.

Journalistic Accounts of Atrocities in Cambodia

Journalists have also documented communist brutality following the conquest of Phnom Penh. Henry Kamm in the New York Times July 15, 1975 reported refugee accounts of brutal executions, old people and children dying in the forced exodus from Phnom Penh, and the mass resettlement of the Cambodian population. The April 26 Asian edition of Time magazine estimates that, "Since the Communist victory, 500,000 to 600,000 people -- roughly one-twelfth of Cambodia's population -- have died from political reprisals, disease or starvation." It also reports that a Khmer Rouge order went out to kill all Army officers and civilian officials in the Lon Nol government. It describes one such execution as follows:



"At Mongkol Borei, the local Khmer Rouge commander ... ordered ... a squad of young Communist soldiers to punish ... a group of civilian officials of the fallen government The 15 Khmer Rouge rounded up ten former senior civil servants and their wives and children -- about 60 people -- tied their hands behind their backs ... and drove them ... to a banana plantation

"... Scattered about the place were the bodies of people killed one or two days earlier The Khmer Rouge thrust each official forward one at a time and forced him to kneel between two soldiers armed with bayonet-tipped AK-47 assault rifles. The soldiers then stabbed the victim simultaneously through the chest and back

"... As each man lay dying, his anguished, horror-struck wife and children were herded up to the body. The women, forced to kneel, also received the simultaneous bayonet thrusts. The children, last to die, were stabbed where they stood.

"Of the 60 or so executed, only about six were spared the bayonet. These were very small children, too young to fully appreciate what was happening. In a killing frenzy now, the two executioners each grabbed a limb -- one an arm, the other a leg -- and tore the infants apart."

According to the Time story, other larger scale executions took place as well. In Battambang, hundreds of former officers were found, loaded onto trucks, and machine-gunned outside the city. In other places, execution by shooting was considered a waste of bullets. Some victims were clubbed with wooden hoes or tied together and buried alive by bulldozers; others suffocated when plastic bags were tied over their heads; still others died by bayoneting and dismemberment.

While their brutal methods have received most attention following the fall of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, the Khmer Communists actually instituted the use of terror and execution prior to that date. An American Embassy Saigon study on Communist rule in Southern Cambodia dated February 19, 1974 noted that, "Harsh punishment is widespread with reports of it emanating from every province." It added that "death sentences are fairly common" Journalistic accounts from this same period tended to confirm this conclusion. The Washington Post on November 24 quoted refugees who fled to South Vietnam as saying that the communists punished infringements of even minor rules by death.

Donald Kirk in the Chicago Tribune of July 14, 1974 reported a refugee as seeing the Khmer Rouge "saw off the neck of a civilian with the sharp edge of a sugar palm leaf." Kirk added that this episode was not an isolated case but "one of many I heard during visits to refugee camps."

Tammy Arbuckle in the April 10, 1974 Washington Star News wrote that refugees told him that "people who protested against the Communist policy of food distribution were taken into the forest and beheaded and mutilated with ax and hammer."

According to U. S. Embassy reports, the communists executed approximately 700 civilians and surrendered soldiers in Battambang Province on July 1, 1974. Five minutes after the surrender, the communists began firing indiscriminately into the group killing 200 people.

Following that, they systematically executed all the men remaining alive by stabbing them with bayonets while the men were sitting on the ground with their hands tied behind their backs. They marched off the women and children, and put them to work in the fields.

Radical Social-Economic Changes

Practically everyone in the country is now engaged in collectivized rice farming. Private land holdings have ended and people live and work in commune arrangements, often segregated by sex. Although Cambodia has managed an ample rice harvest, grain is carefully rationed, and little else is available to augment the basic diet.

Despite this lack of nourishment, the population is being forced to work long, arduous hours on a variety of agricultural and reconstruction projects. Working conditions are described as severe, with little mechanized equipment available. As a result, most people who escape to Thailand are emaciated and describe the population as badly underfed.

Resistance

Indications of armed resistance to the communist regime have periodically surfaced, but the dissidents lack the strength and organization to pose a serious threat. Resistance forces with bases in Thailand have proven ineffectual, and their forays amount only to harassment. Although increasing popular dissatisfaction has been reported, communist brutality and stringent population control have prevented a viable opposition from organizing.



Diplomatic Relations

Countries with resident diplomats in Cambodia include the PRC, North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Laos. Resident envoys live an austere existence, and their activities are closely controlled with the exception of the Chinese.

Cambodia recently expanded its international contacts, and has now established ties with all ASEAN nations except Indonesia. Outside ASEAN, relations with Burma and Denmark are normalized. Japan has also been investigating the possibility of establishing a diplomatic dialogue and has apparently broached the subject to Cambodian officials. Moscow is still anathema to the KC. While Phnom Penh may be softening its position, any significant warming between the two would irritate Peking. Cambodia would probably not do anything that might endanger its close relationship with China and will probably not renew ties with the Soviets. Because of continuing border incidents and disputed claims to offshore islands, relations with Vietnam are correct but strained.

Ties with China

The KC rely heavily on the PRC for external support and assistance. Up to 2000 Chinese advisors may now be in Cambodia working on agricultural, mechanical, and industrial projects. Peking also provides aircraft to fly KC diplomatic missions around the world. Despite the KC refusal to acknowledge that it has any ties with communism, there is obviously a close ideological relationship between the two parties.

Prospects

The Khmer leadership will most likely maintain its xenophobic orientation, and will concentrate on internal matters for some time. Selective executions and disregard for human rights will continue. In foreign affairs, Phnom Penh will probably continue to expand its international affiliations and seek to play an expanding role in the non-aligned movement, the U. N., and other international fora. Resistance poses no threat to communist control, although some dissident activity is likely. Periodic border clashes with Thailand and Vietnam will persist but remain limited in magnitude.



Laos

The communist takeover in Laos was accomplished in more gradual fashion employing traditional political tactics during the 19 months that a coalition government existed. The communists, in response to "popular" demonstrations, formally dissolved both this government and the monarchy on December 2, 1975 and replaced them with the People's Democratic Republic of Laos. Prince Souphanouvong is the nominal Chief-of-State but Communist Party Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane holds the real power in his position of Prime Minister. Kaysone has a long history of close ties with Hanoi and may be a member of the Lao Dong Party politburo. Because of this relationship, we still believe Hanoi is providing a good deal of guidance to the Lao Party on both internal and international affairs.


Since their takeover, the communists have begun a number of programs similar to those in Vietnam aimed at imparting significant political, social and economic change: civilian and military leaders of the non-communist element of the coalition government have been sent off for reeducation and most have not returned; a small number of executions have been reported; the old currency has been replaced with new "liberation Kip;" political dissidents have been rounded up; the State has taken over some business operations; and some people have been sent to new economic zones.

Resistance to the communists has been more virulent in Laos than in Vietnam or Cambodia. Meo tribesmen in the north and former FAR personnel in the south have both engaged Pathet Lao forces in significant military actions, at least one of which necessitated the sending of NVA troops to halt insurgent advances. While the resistance will continue as a prickly problem, it poses no real threat to the communist government's survival.

The new Lao government is beset with a difficult set of international problems most of which are located within its own borders. Approximately 20,000 Chinese engineering troops are in northeast Laos with no apparent intention to leave anytime soon. The North Vietnamese also have a sizeable presence with some 32,000 military spread throughout the eastern and southern parts of the country. Soviet advisors are present in considerable numbers, as well as a Cuban advisory team. The Lao Communists seem to have balanced off these contending parties so far, and have maintained better relations with the PRC than have their Vietnamese mentors.

Thailand is a problem as well. The Lao have engaged in several military confrontations with Thai forces along their extensive common border. These incidents have soured Thai-Lao relations and resulted in Bangkok temporarily closing its border to Laos' economic detriment. Recent Thai public overtures for better relations may signal a mend in this rupture, but mutual suspicions will remain, and any improvement will be gradual.

Available evidence suggests that the leaders of the Thai insurgency still haven in Laos, which serves as a logistics highway for weapons, ammunition, and other supplies emanating mainly from China and destined for Thailand. So far there has been no indication of significant escalation of Lao, Vietnamese, or Chinese assistance to the Thai insurgents.



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
SUBJECT: Info Memo re Assessment of Developments in Indochina Since the End of the Vietnam War

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

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INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO ()
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 6


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TO BUD MCFARLANE

I question the necessity of sending this to the President. If it does go forward, it should be drastically shortened.

JWD



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

760 4498

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

ACTION

August 6, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: Ambassador Underhill's Assessment of the U. S. Position in Southeast Asia: "For the time being, we're ahead in Southeast Asia."

Ambassador Underhill cabled July 29 his analysis of the balance of power in Southeast Asia one year after the fall of Saigon. He also included U. S. policy recommendations. His analysis is unusually thoughtful, and contains novel observations. Because it is intellectually provocative and illustrates the positive aspects of the American versus the Soviet and Chinese presence, I have prepared a summary (Tab I) for you to send to the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

*8/7/76
This is an interesting piece, but I think not for the President's time just at this moment. B*



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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

ANALYSIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Underhill's Assessment of the U. S.
Position in Southeast Asia: "For the time being,
we're ahead in Southeast Asia."

Francis Underhill, our Ambassador to Malaysia, recently cabled to the State Department his assessment of where the U. S. stands in Southeast Asia. From the title of his analysis, Underhill clearly believes we are one up on the Soviets and Chinese there. Because his commentary looks at the problem from an unusual perspective, I thought it worthy of providing you the following summary of his assessment.

Underhill begins by rejecting what he says is the usual framework we use in looking at the area. That framework sees the U. S., USSR, and PRC in competition for power and influence with each trying to limit the others' presence while seeking a dominant role for itself. Instead, Underhill begins at the other end by assessing those basic strengths which the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia have demonstrated. He posits that these states have reached a level of political organization, economic development, and regional cohesion that keeps them from being easily susceptible to outside interference or manipulation. They are governed by authoritarian, relatively sophisticated, nationalist regimes which are alert and sensitive to any such attempts.

While intra-regional differences exist, Underhill sees ASEAN as providing a framework of conciliation and cooperation, thus further reinforcing each country's fundamental strength. Dissident movements, where they do exist, are too weak, and their prospects for power too slim, to justify any of the major outside powers taking the risk of providing direct support. Moreover, with the end of the Vietnam War, a de facto zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality is evolving which will not attract or encourage foreign intervention.

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While admitting that China and the Soviet Union have made gains in the past year, Underhill sees them as still without significant influence. Southeast Asian nations regard both with deep suspicion, particularly since they suffer from the ideological handicap which obliges them to assert a difference between party-to-party and government-to-government relations, a distinction completely unacceptable to the ASEAN countries.

Using Malaysia as an example, Underhill points out that neither Moscow nor Peking is making any extraordinary effort to win influence there. There have been no high-level visits of senior officials of either country in the past 12 months, nor has either sent a major cultural or sports attraction. Their low-level trade further accentuates their impotence. The USSR provides .1 percent of Malaysia's imports and takes 4.1 percent of its exports. The PRC furnishes 2 percent of Malaysia's imports, and receives .9 percent of its exports. In contrast, the U. S. accounts for 9.5 percent of Malaysia's imports and 14 percent of its exports. Underhill further notes that this limited Soviet and Chinese economic involvement pertains to ASEAN as a whole. The USSR exports .2 percent and imports 1.5 percent of ASEAN's goods, while the PRC handles 2.2 percent of its exports and imports 2.1 percent from ASEAN.

Underhill then takes note of the Soviet attempt to hasten the closing of American bases in Southeast Asia in the belief that the removal of an American military presence will reduce our influence. Such an expectation is wishful thinking, he contends. Our experience in Southeast Asia clearly shows that a military presence, while it may bring other benefits, is a net consumer rather than a producer of influence. Underhill, therefore, clearly expects that with the departure of our military units from Thailand, influence will increase. This is an interesting thesis which probably has a number of adherents in the U. S., but also elements of naivete.

Underhill comments that "It is evident we are not now making a major effort in Southeast Asia." He sees us devoting less attention to the area and allocating it fewer resources. Our acceptance of Thailand's decision to end our military presence is a clear demonstration to him that we see no overriding U. S. interest at stake in the region. The Ambassador adds, however, that it would be wrong to describe this change as a withdrawal or a retreat. It is rather a correction of past gross imbalances in the allocation of our resources, and a re-establishment of a proper relationship between involvement and national interests.



Underhill concludes that the current popular assertion that American influence in Southeast Asia is on the wane is "pure bunk." Our influence is so pervasive and widespread that we do not notice it. The non-communist countries, he argues, have adopted our mixed public-private approach to national development, our social values, our business methods and management techniques, and our definition of the good life. He notes that, while they do not practice our political ideals, they at least pay tribute to them by holding elections. The elites of these countries are in fact closer philosophically to the U. S. than they are to their own masses. The PRC and the USSR models have no current appeal. He proves this thesis by asking rhetorically "Who would buy a Russian computer or consult an economist from Peking?"

Underhill turns finally to the question of what is the proper role for the U. S. and what should be the direction of U. S. policy. His answer incorporates the following guiding principles:

-- We should give up the search for regional equilibrium since Southeast Asia is under no significant danger from either Moscow or Peking.

-- We should not devote U. S. resources to resisting aggression and maintaining territorial integrity in Southeast Asia. So many of the countries are already involved in minor squabbles with each other over territorial questions -- Timor, Sabah, the Spratly Islands, Northeast Thailand -- that we do not need to get involved. We should permit Asian solutions to emerge to Asian problems.

-- The ASEAN nations are most threatened from weaknesses within their own societies and not from outside aggression or insurgencies. We can help only indirectly by assisting the governing elites to acquire the resources and knowledge needed to cope with these problems. Such assistance would come in commodity price stabilization, trade concessions, private investment, training programs, and educational exchange.

-- For military relationships, we should move to make these contacts as "politically sterile" as possible while at the same time allowing our friends to acquire the military equipment and technology they need. We should end forever the "patron-client relationship" which our military assistance groups have fostered.

-- Finally, we should endorse the ASEAN concept of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Even though we would not fully adhere to it because we would maintain our military presence in



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the Philippines, our public endorsement would nonetheless be welcomed and would generate positive support for us.

While a ready embrace of all of Ambassador Underhill's premises would be imprudent, his approach to analyzing Southeast Asia allows us to see the area in a better and more balanced light. Too often we tend to focus on shortcomings and inadequacies of our allies. In examining their strengths, we become more cognizant of their self-reliance, and more confident that they will be able to maintain their integrity and their non-communist systems.



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
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SUBJECT: Comm Underkill Assessment of the U.S. Position re Southeast Asia; for the time being we're ahead in Southeast

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INTELLIGENCE						RECOMMENDATIONS: _____
LATIN AMERICA						JOINT MEMO: _____
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		<u>Barnes</u>		<u>any further action</u>		
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				<u>(per Ken Quinn)</u>		



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

September 8, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM GLEYSTEN *WJ*

SUBJECT: Recommended Meetings with Ambassadors Holdridge,
Whitehouse and Sullivan

Ambassadors John Holdridge, Charles Whitehouse and Bill Sullivan will be in Washington the week of September 13-17 on consultation, and all three have asked to call on you. I believe your meeting with each of them would be useful in providing you an update on where we stand in Southeast Asia and also to give them the benefit of White House thinking on their countries. If you approve receiving them, I will work out the timing of their calls with Lora and with State.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you meet with Ambassador Holdridge.

APPROVE *WJ*

DISAPPROVE _____

That you meet with Ambassador Whitehouse.

APPROVE *WJ*

DISAPPROVE _____

That you meet with Ambassador Sullivan.

APPROVE *WJ*

DISAPPROVE _____



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUM
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
9	8	9	8	17	7604996

INITIAL ACTION 0

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE *Wheeler* S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT *L* _____ SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS
 HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S CODEWORD
 OTHER _____ TS SENSITIVE


SUBJECT: *Request for Capt w/ Draft for Capt John Haldridge, Charles Whitehouse & William Sullivan Week of 13 Sept 1976*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS SCROFT/ WGH						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. ()
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. ()
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR ()
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS						MEMO TO ()
FAR EAST/ PRC					<i>X</i>	RECOMMENDATIONS ()
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO ()
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO FOR: ()
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: ()
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	BY
9/8		<i>Scroft</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Decision</i>	9/13	<i>Janner</i>
9/10		<i>NSC/S</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>Scroft approved all recommendations</i>		



NSC/S INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED *X*

SEP 20 1976

CRT ID: *NSC* IF *NS* BY *NS*
 OPEN *NS* WH SA FP
 CLOSE *NS* PA