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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: CLINTON E. GRANGER
SUBJECT: Military Balance in the Far East

Basic force levels and situation assessments for the Far East are contained in the annexes, as follows:

ANNEXSino-Soviet

Sino-Soviet Area of Confrontation	A
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Sino-Soviet Assessment (CIA)	C
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Other

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Indonesia Order of Battle	J
Japan Order of Battle	K
Lao Order of Battle	L
Malaysian Order of Battle	M
Philippines Order of Battle	N
Singapore Order of Battle	O
Thailand Order of Battle	P
Vietnam Order of Battle	Q
DOD Military Personnel Strength	R

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Soviet and PRC Military Forces

SOVIET

PRC

Total

Soviet Far East^{1/}

	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Not Operational</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Not Operational</u>
--	--------------------	------------------------	--------------------	------------------------

I. Strategic

A. Missiles

ICBM	1401	220 ^{2/}	(200)	0- 1 ^{3/}
IRBM	87		(41)	30-35
MRBM	496		(12)	25-35
SRBM				5-10

B. Naval

Submarines	78 ^{4/}	16	(28) ^{4/}	5
Launchers	800 ^{4/}	236	(258) ^{4/}	60

C. Air

Long-Range A/C	195		(84)	
Medium-Range A/C	650		(136)	74
Backfire A/C	15 ^{5/}			

D. Air Defense

PVO Interceptors	2570		(611)	
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1. Includes four military districts and Mongolia.
2. Includes launchers at reduced readiness, under construction, or being modified.
3. 3,200 nm range missile cannot reach continental US.
4. Includes units on sea-trials or undergoing repair.
5. Includes some six Backfires subordinate to the Long Range Air Training Division.

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	SOVIET		PRC
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Far East</u> ^{1/}	
II. Conventional			
A. Ground Forces			
Combat units			
Tank Div.	49	(4)	10
Motorized Rifle Div.	111	(38)	122
Airborne	7		3
Artillery	-	-	22
AAA	-	-	15
Combat Equipment			
Tanks & assault guns	48,500	(12,850)	6,000
APCs	25,000	(8,000)	1,200
Artillery	-	-	14,000
AA guns	-	-	6,500
B. Naval			
Major surface ships	219	(58)	20
Minor surface ships	1,023	(238)	940
Amphibious	83	(20)	520
Attack subs	253	(80)	72
Aircraft			
Strike/Recce	595	(170)	-
ASW	150	(55)	-
Helicopters	265	(80)	-
Transports	115	(20)	-
C. Air			
Air Defense	1,953	(360)	4,020
Ground Attack	1,842	(578)	890
Reconnaissance	812	(231)	60
Transport (planes & helos)	3,500	-	970
Trainers	-	-	850

^{1/} Includes four military districts and Mongolia.

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
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
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Sino-Soviet Assessment

The military situation along the Sino-Soviet border continues to be relatively stable. Some sources report occasional clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces along the border and earlier this year the Soviets complained of Chinese provocations. We have, however, no direct evidence of unusual Chinese activity along the border.

The Soviet buildup of forces on the border seems to have peaked in the late 1960s and the major part of the Chinese response to that buildup was completed by late 1970. Since then, both nations have slowly added to forces in the border regions, but at present neither side could launch or maintain a major offensive without reinforcements. As one example of this gradual upgrading, the Soviets are now delivering the advanced Fencer light bomber to tactical air units in the Far East Military District.

Soviet forces on the ground are postured generally for both offensive and defensive operations. Chinese forces are better suited for the defense. Not surprisingly, the Chinese have the advantage in manpower, the Soviets in critical categories of weapons.

Measuring the Sino-Soviet balance in terms of real combat potential is not easy. By any standard measure the Soviets enjoy clear superiority. But standard measures are hard to apply to the Sino-Soviet balance. First of all, despite its very small size and very slow growth, the Chinese nuclear force probably presents a form of minimum deterrence against Soviet attack because it would be hard to destroy with confidence in a lightning attack . . . this, at least, is the way the Soviets appear to see it and that is what counts. Second, while the Soviets enjoy military superiority in land combat forces, it is hard to see them defeating China in the common sense of the word except at very great cost over a long period of time. We know little about the strategies that either side would apply in an actual conflict. And much would depend on how it came about. But judging from military capabilities and expressed doctrine on each side we conclude that in the event of conflict:

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
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-- The Chinese would attempt to hold Soviet ground forces with their own forward conventional forces, backed by a form of widespread unconventional or people's war. They might refrain from using any surviving nuclear weapons against Soviet civilian targets in the hopes of restraining Soviet use of nuclear weapons.

-- The Soviets would attempt to prevent local Chinese incursions into their territory, to defeat Chinese main force units with operations as shallow into China as possible, and to bombard China out of the war from the air, probably with nuclear weapons.

If the Soviets conceived of their conflict objective as driving the Chinese out of the war but not defeating and occupying all of China, we believe the Soviets would win such a war. But they in no way relish the prospect. While there is ample possibility for explosive crisis on the Sino-Soviet frontier, perhaps growing out of post-Mao political struggles, we do not see either side as having a near-term incentive to provoke a major conflict.

The main Soviet military objective on the Sino-Soviet border, in our view, is to maintain a posture suitable for what we might call "active containment." That is, it would be fully adequate to deter and, if necessary, to defeat provocative Chinese military actions on the border, but also sufficiently superior and offensive in character to exert a constant influence over Chinese foreign policy and also, to an extent, in Chinese internal affairs. The Soviets do not expect much in the way of improvement in their relations with China. But they continue to hope that some improvement could be obtained under a new leadership. Their military forces are designed both to guard against the prospect of continued Sino-Soviet hostility but also to help persuade new Chinese leaders that it would be better for them to seek improved relations with Moscow.



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Soviet and Chinese Armed Forces Personnel

	<u>USSR</u>	<u>PRC</u>
Ground Forces	1,810,000*	3,510,000*
Air Forces	496,000	431,800
Naval Forces	372,000	278,000
Strategic Rocket Troops	397,000	90,000-150,000
Air Defense Forces	559,000	
MOD Command & Support	<u>786,000</u>	<u> </u>
TOTAL	4,420,000	4,309,800-4,369,800
Non-MOD Security Forces	335,000	
GRAND TOTAL	4,755,000	

*Five days after mobilization the USSR would have approximately 3,000,000 men mobilized in the ground forces. The Chinese could have approximately 6,000,000 within 15 to 30 days.



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FACT SHEET

Subject: US, USSR, and PRC Forces in Asia (U)

1. (U) The attached spread sheet provides a summary of current US, USSR, and PRC combatant forces in Asia (Notional).
2. (S) The following significant trends in force deployments in Asia have occurred since the beginning of 1972:

a. US

- Conducted a major force withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
 - Strategic air (B-52s) reduced from a high of 205 aircraft to 14 aircraft.
 - WESTPAC carrier deployments reduced from six to three.
 - Tactical air (including AC 130 gunships) reduced from high of nearly 500 land-based aircraft to 128.
 - All ground forces withdrawn from SE Asia.
- Increased US Naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with one deployment per quarter (average).
 - Moved forward on buildup of Diego Garcia to support Indian Ocean deployments.

b. USSR

- Maintained relatively stable force levels.
 - Air capabilities increased through modernization and qualitative improvements.
 - 10% increase in number of ASW aircraft.
 - Improved air-surface missile capabilities.
 - Soviet SSBN deployments have increased.



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- Out-of-area deployments of major surface combatants to the Indian Ocean continues.
- Ground forces continue to show qualitative improvement.
- ICBMs, improvements through MRV/MIRVing, silo hardening, and increased accuracy.

c. PRC


- Ground forces estimated to number over 3.5 million.
 - Nearly one half (1.6 million) stationed in four MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia.
 - Rate of total strength increase is leveling off.
 - Qualitative improvements in equipment, organization and training have been occurring and are expected to continue.
- Navy remains equipped and trained to carry out its highly specialized role as a coastal defense force.
 - A nuclear powered submarine building program is under way but has experienced difficulties.
- The deployment of the CSSX-3 (limited range-ICBM) is limited, one silo is completed, one is nearing completion, a third is a possibility. The Chinese are developing a full-range ICBM similar to the US Titan and the Soviet SS-9. It is expected to be operational in 1979.

Prepared by:
Col S. E. Daniel, USA
Northeast Asia Br, J-5
Extension 72400



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MR08-53, PL; DIA JCS 313108; CIA 229100108

MILITARY FORCES

BY del NARA DATE 11/12/08

Republic of China

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength	
Army (Current/M+30)	325,000/350,000
Combat Units	
Infantry Divisions	18/20
Armored Infantry Brigades	1
Armor Brigades	3
Airborne Brigades	2
Combat Equipment	
Tanks, Medium	160
Tanks, Light	940
APCs	250
Assault Guns	215
Artillery	1,500
AA Guns	300
Air Defense Missiles	300

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength (Current/+30)	68,000/90,000
Navy	35,000/42,000
Marines	33,000/48,000
Ships	
Destroyers & Destroyer	21
Escorts	
Submarines	2
Patrol	22
Other	122

C. AIR FORCE

Personnel Strength	72,000
Aircraft (Total/Operational)	598/460*
Fighters	305
F-104	64
F-100	91
F-5	58
F-86 (used as trainers)	51
T-33 & T-38	41



*Does not include 144 aircraft of the Army and Navy
NOTE: Data derived primarily from DIA factbooks.

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C. AIR FORCE (continued)

Republic of China

Transports	103
Helicopters	13
Utility	39



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KOREAN MILITARY BALANCE

Comparison of Forces

	<u>North Korea</u>	<u>South Korea</u>
A. <u>GROUND</u>		
Personnel Strength		
Army	408,000	527,000
Reserves	1.3 million	2.5 million
Combat Units		
Infantry and Mechanized		
Infantry Divisions	23	18
Armored Divisions	2	0
Infantry Brigades	2	0
Armored Brigades	0	2
Armored Regiments	7	0
Airborne Brigades	0	3
Airborne Battalions	5	0
Marine Corps Divisions	0	1
Combat Equipment		
Tanks	1,500-1,700	800
Assault guns	60-100	0
Artillery pieces	2,650	2,160
B. <u>NAVAL</u>		
Personnel Strength	25,000	41,900
Ship Types		
Destroyer and Destroyer Escort	2	10
Submarines	9	0
Guided Missile Patrol Boats	18	0
Amphibious-related craft	60	93
Other Patrol Boats	270-300	32
C. <u>AIR</u>		
Personnel Strength	44,400	28,500
Total Aircraft	920	850
Fighters - subsonic	250-300	101
Fighters - supersonic	230-240	100
Bombers	86	0
Transports, helicopters, utility aircraft	295	600
Surface-to-air missile launchers	250 (SA-2)	108 (Hawk & Nike/
Anti-aircraft artillery pieces	2,700	150 Hercules)


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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Report
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entitled Military Balance in the Far
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CREATION DATE 08/1975
VOLUME 1 page
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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
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BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE Southeast Asia (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN 01/07/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST KBH

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11/9/01

Assessment of Military Balance on Korean Peninsula*

The factors that have restrained Pyongyang from launching major hostilities continue to do so. These are the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence of US troops, the lack of an across the board superiority over ROK forces, especially if they are supported by US tactical air and naval elements, and the need for support from either Moscow or Peking in a sustained, large-scale conflict.

On the ground, the South has the numerical advantage while the North has the edge in combat units, firepower, and armor. Each is capable of penetrating the frontline defenses of the other, but neither is capable of over-running and holding targets deep within the territory of the other.

The North Korean navy is clearly superior to that of the South in terms of ships in active service, readiness, and firepower. The North Korean navy because of its missile boats and submarines, can effectively neutralize any purely South Korean naval threat.

The air forces of both Koreas are well trained and in a high state of readiness. The North Koreans have the numerical edge in aircraft and perhaps the better air defense system. The South Koreans have the qualitative advantage in aircraft and have more proficient pilots. At this time neither side appears able to neutralize the other's air force nor gain air superiority over the other's territory.

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BY del NLF, DATE 11/8/01

* Assessment based on North vs. South only.

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FORCE COMPARISON
(NOTIONAL)

<u>MAJOR FORCES</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>PRC</u>
<u>Air</u>			
Bombers	14	120	75
Naval Air	520	170	650
Fighter	360	1700	4800
<u>Naval</u>			
Carriers	8	0	0
Submarines			
(Ballistic Mx)	9	27	0 1/
(Attack)	35	80	66
Major Combatants	76	56	21
<u>Ground</u>			
Divisions	3	40	267
Tanks	250	7100	10500
Artillery	220	3000	24800
<u>Strategic Missiles</u>			
ICBM	0	200	1
MRBM	0	0	30
IRBM	0	0	30
SLBM	144	218	0

1/ Under development



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines, 200 Guidelines
By KSH, NARA, Date 1/14/00

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
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entitled Military Balance in the Far
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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
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BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE Southeast Asia (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN 01/07/2000
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MILITARY FORCES

Cambodia

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength	60,000-70,000
Artillery 105 and 155mm	274

B. NAVAL

River Patrol Boats	60
Coastal Patrol Boats	17-19
Sub Chaser	1

C. AIR

T-28s	Approx. 100
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NOTE: Accurate current information on the status, composition, and disposition of the Cambodian armed forces is almost totally lacking.

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MILITARY FORCES

Indonesia

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength	
Army (Current/M+5)	200,000/200,000
Civil Defense	25,000/25,000
Combat Units (Current/M+5)	
Independent Brigades	17/17
Combat Equipment	
Tanks, Medium	0
Tanks, Light	176
APC	565

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	38,500/38,500
Ship Type*	
Destroyer	8/9
Submarine	3/3
Patrol/Missile Equipped	8/8
Patrol	18/38
Mine Warfare	9/13
Amphibious Warfare Craft	10/11
Auxiliaries	18/21

C. AIR

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	28,000/28,000
Total Aircraft*	178/239
Fighters	42/42
F-51	11/11
T-33	16/16
Avon Sabre	15/15
Transports	59/59
Helicopters	23/23
Trainers	49/49

* The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventory.

Note: Data from DIA factbooks

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
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
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MILITARY FORCES

	<u>Japan</u>
A. GROUND	
Personnel Strength	155,000
Combat Units	
Armies	5
Infantry Divisions	13
Mechanized Divisions	1
Airborne Brigades	1
Artillery Battalions	13
Tank Brigades	1
Combat Equipment	
Tanks - medium	563
Tanks - light	69
APCS	866
Artillery Pieces	1,356
B. NAVAL	
Personnel Strength	37,000
Ship Types	
Destroyer and Destroyer Escort	47
Submarine	15
Other Naval craft	290
C. AIR	
Personnel Strength	42,000
Total Aircraft	947
Fighters	
F-86	253
F-104	168
F-4	40
RF-86	15
T-33	167
Transports and other aircraft	294

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DIA ltr 2/6/09
MR08-53 #11; CIA ltr 9/30/08

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MILITARY FORCES

Laos

A. GROUND

National Army

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
33,000

46,000 (Being demobilized
or integrated into
PL forces)

B. NAVAL

Insignificant

Note: Reliable current information on the Laotian military forces is lacking.



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BY KBH NLF, DATE 1/29/00

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.3

MR 08-53 # 12: DIA-12, 5/31/08: CIA/12, 9/30/08

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BY dal NARA DATE 11/12/08

MILITARY FORCES

Malaysia

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength	
Army (Current/M+5)	51,500/51,500
Special Services	1,200/1,200
Combat Units (Current/M+5)	
Independent Battalions	33/33
Combat Equipment	
Armored Cars	334
Scout Cars	600
APC	140

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	4,500/4,500
Ship Type*	
Destroyer	1
Patrol	27/34
Mine Warfare	6
Amphibious Warfare Ships	1
Amphibious Warfare Craft	20/24
Auxiliaries	2

C. AIR


Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	5,000/5,000
Total Aircraft*	135/136
Fighters	43/43
CL-41G	20/20
Avon-Sabre	15/15
F-5s	8/8
Transports	33/33
Helicopters	39/39
Trainers	14/14

* The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventory.

Note: Data from DIA factbooks

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MILITARY FORCES

Philippines

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength	
Army (Current/M+5)	36,000/36,000
Home Defense Force	223
Combat Units (Current/M+5)	
Armored Cavalry Troop	1
Infantry Division	3
Independent Brigades	2
Combat Equipment	
Tanks, Medium	0
Tanks, Light	21
APC	35

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	14,600/14,600
Ship Type*	
Patrol	51/64
Mine Warfare	4/6
Amphibious Warfare Ships	9/11
Amphibious Warfare Carft	2/26
Auxiliaries	9/11

C. AIR

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	15,000/15,000
Total Aircraft*	275/294
Fighters	55/55
F-5s	17/17
TD-28s	7/7
T-34s	6/6
F-86	21/21
SF-260	4/4
Transports	74/74
Helicopters	34/34
Trainers	64/64

* The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventory.


Note: Data from DIA factbooks

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

MR 08-53, #14, DIA Ltr. 3/3/08; CIA Ltr 9/30/08

BY dal NARA DATE 11/12/08

MILITARY FORCES

Singapore

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength	
Army (Current/M+5)	12,000/12,000
Combat Units (Current/M+5)	
Independent Brigades	4/4
Ranger Battalion	1/1
Combat Equipment	
Tanks, Medium	0
Tanks, Light	50
APC	250

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	1,200/1,200
Ship Type*	
Patrol/Missile Equipped	6/6
Patrol	5/10
Amphibious Warfare Ships	0/1
Amphibious Warfare Craft	4/4
Auxiliaries	1/1

C. AIR

Personnel Strength (Current/M+5)	1,600/1,600
Total Aircraft*	88/106
Fighters	55/55
Hunters	38/38
A-4s	17/17
Transports	6/6
Helicopters	7/7
Trainers	33/33

* The first figure represents number of units operationally assigned; the second number represents total in inventory.

Note: Data from DIA factbooks

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MILITARY FORCES

Thailand

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength 132,000

Combat Units

Infantry Divisions	5
Regimental Combat Teams	2
Special Forces Groups	3
Airborne Battalion	1
Aircraft (attached to Ground Forces)	257

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength 27,000

Ships

Principal Combatants	7
Medium Patrol/ASW	9
Coastal Patrol Craft	22
River Patrol Craft	28
Other	41
Aircraft (attached to Navy)	29

C. AIR

Personnel Strength 43,000

Aircraft 373

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

DIA JUL 21/09

MR 08-53, #15; CIA JUL 9/30/08

BY dal NARA DATE 4/14/09



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 009862

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL List
DESCRIPTION Annex Q to Clinton Granger memo
entitled Military Balance in the Far
East
CREATION DATE 08/1975
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400019
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE Southeast Asia (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN 01/07/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST KBH

SANITIZED
11/9/01

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MILITARY FORCES

Vietnam

A. GROUND

Personnel Strength 380,000-398,000

Combat Units

Infantry Divisions	27
Independent Infantry Regiments	15
Training Divisions	2
AAA Regiments	55
SAM Regiments	20
Armor Regiments	5
Artillery Regiments	20
Engineer Regiments	14
NVA Sapper Battalions	33

B. NAVAL

Personnel Strength 4,000-8,000

Ships

Komar class PTG	3
PGM	30
PT/PB	4
PCS	2
Service Craft	50
US and SVN	?

C. AIR

Personnel Strength 10,000-12,000

Aircraft

MIG 15/17	115
MIG 19	67
MIG 21	68
F-5	75
A-37	113

Transports 139

Helicopters

Soviet	44
US	469

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DOD MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	Army	Air Force	Navy Ashore	Navy Afloat	USMC Ashore	USMC Afloat	TOTAL
West Pacific	41,139	35,322	11,989	20,911	25,093	14	134,468
Japan*	5,823	14,826	6,604	4,588	23,586	11	55,438
Philippines	32	9,955	4,630	4,516	1,459	3	20,595
South Korea	34,781	7,110	194	372	37	-	42,494
Taiwan	503	3,431	561	92	11	-	4,598
Other Afloat	-	-	-	11,343	-	-	11,343
Other Pacific	45	377	471	732	61	3,413	5,099
Australia	7	269	374	-	8	-	658
Burma	3	2	1	-	6	-	12
Indonesia	20	38	18	-	18	-	94
Malaysia	5	3	-	-	6	-	14
Singapore	1	8	15	326	6	-	356
Other Afloat	-	-	-	-	-	3,413	3,413

*Includes Okinawa

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines, *DoD Guidelines*
By 11/94, NARA, Date 11/14/00

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
8	4	8	5	10	15	05324

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES _____	FROM: KISSINGER, H _____	S/S _____	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
	KISSINGER _____	COLBY, W _____	OTHER _____	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
	SCOWCROFT _____	SCHLESINGER, J _____		LOU NO FORN NODIS
	DAVIS _____	ST EX SEC _____		C EYES ONLY EXDIS
				S CODEWORD
				TS SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: <i>Military Balance in the Far East</i>				

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	ACTION	INFO		
	STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR HAK ()
	FAR EAST <i>Loche</i>		<i>+</i>		MEMO FOR PRES ()
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				REPLY FOR ()
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
	EUROPE / CANADA		<i>+</i>		MEMO TO ()
	LATIN AMERICA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
	UNITED NATIONS				JOINT MEMO ()
	ECONOMIC				REFER TO FOR: ()
	SCIENTIFIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS				CONCURRENCE ()
	NSC PLANNING				DUE DATE:
	CONGRESSIONAL				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
	OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	8/4		<i>HAK</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>Info</i>	
	8/7		<i>NSC/C</i>		<i>Noted by HAK</i>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	M/F'D _____	BY _____
	NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____	CRT ID: _____	SA SF
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	OPEN _____	HP NS
	CROSS REF W/ _____	CLOSE <i>42</i>	WH EP
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <i>YES</i>		FOLDER: _____	PA DY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET - GDSINFORMATION

August 29, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT *OK*
FROM: CLINTON E. GRANGER *CG*
SUBJECT: U.S. Military Equipment Lost in Indochina

The ultimate disposition of the very significant quantity of weapons lost to the Communists in Indochina is, and will remain, a problem of concern to the United States. State has addressed the problem, in part, and George Vest has made a recommendation to the Secretary that "would adopt a policy of passivity wherein the USG would not take any formal position on the transfer of captured arms but would maintain complete flexibility to provide spare parts and rehabilitation services after the US equipment has been exported out of Vietnam." (Tab A)

The State memorandum is based on a query from a U.S. private company concerning acquisition and resale of the captured equipment, but there is an additional intelligence report indicating that Nigeria is considering purchase of captured U.S. equipment from North Vietnam.

The only factor that State does not address which might weigh on the Secretary's decision would be the present levels of stockage of some of the captured items in U.S. inventories (e.g., M113 armored personnel carriers, artillery, and selected aircraft). There are some advantages in permitting states friendly to the U.S. to acquire the captured equipment, rather than to either take the items from the U.S. active inventory, or by waiting for the very long production lead times to meet friendly nation requirements. The acquisition of such equipment would immediately tie the friendly nation to the U.S. for spare parts and related services, without impact on inventory levels of our own armed forces.

I have also explored, informally, the question of title to the property which was captured. Here the legal variables are so great that we could probably pursue any approach which might support our political objectives, ranging from ignoring title and permitting the equipment to be sold without any claim on ownership, to the opposite end of the spectrum, where we could seek possession in the International Court of Justice or by litigation in the courts of the


SECRET - GDS*KSH 1/14/00*

purchasing nation. Attempts to secure ownership through claim of title to the property would, however, appear to serve little if any purpose in diplomatic dealings with friendly nations.

Another area where the State paper is incomplete is in the full examination of the ramifications of U.S. unilateral limitations (e.g., cut off of MAP grant or FMS credit to nations that might not do as we would wish), in response to purchases of captured arms. Or, from the opposite view, the possibility of even encouraging friendly powers to buy the captured U.S. material, perhaps trading economic assistance to them for agreement for them to purchase the items through a third power.

In short, while the State memo does not reflect the full facts of the situation, it does not appear that the findings would be changed materially by an intensive examination of the details of the problem, and I have not initiated any additional action to study the disposition of the captured equipment beyond that reflected in Mr. Vest's memo.

cc: Bill Stearman





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DRAFT ACTION MEMORANDUM
8/25/75

To: The Secretary
Through: P - Mr. Sisco
T - Mr. Maw
From: PM - George S. Vest



American Arms Captured in Indochina

The Problem

The Department has recently received a proposition (Attachment A) from an American firm concerning the purchase from the Governments of Vietnam and subsequent resale of American-manufactured military hardware captured by North Vietnam and the NLF. It should be noted that the purchase would be accomplished through a foreign entity. Furthermore the Department has been asked for its views regarding the purchase of this equipment by other countries. Some of the equipment may find its way into the international arms market or be supplied to revolutionaries and terrorists. The immediate issue facing the USG is whether to attempt to control the transfer of this equipment out of Vietnam.

Background/Analysis


The captured military equipment, mostly of United States manufacture, includes aircraft, ships, ammunition, weapons of all calibre, tanks, and electronics systems. Several options for disposal of this equipment are open to the Communists.

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Some could be utilized in their own armed forces, some could be sold or traded abroad for money or commodities, and some could be used to support "wars of national liberation" and other dissident or extremist terrorist groups in the name of international communism and anti-imperialism. The Communists will probably choose a combination of these options and will be very selective both in the materiel retained for their direct use and that sent abroad.

The very size of the capture indicates that the final disposition will probably be worldwide. We have received various unconfirmed reports of captured arms turning up in Burma, Sri Lanka, and enroute via trawler to the southern Philippines to support the Moslem insurgency. There is even a report that Israel may try to swap Russian tanks captured in the Middle East for American tanks captured by Vietnam. The friendly governments of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are also reportedly interested in acquiring some of this equipment from the Communists.

Estimated quantities and major types of equipment and weapons captured in Vietnam and Cambodia are shown in the Attachment B table. Some of these items are undoubtedly non-operational because of battle damage, lack of parts, or other reasons.

Most of the captured equipment was provided to the Government of South Vietnam under the Military Assistance

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


Service Funded (MASF) program, whereas most of the equipment in Cambodia was provided to the Khmer Government under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Although the United States has asserted its residual rights to ownership of the war materiel removed from Indochina during the collapse of the friendly governments, the United States probably does not have a sustainable claim to the weapons and materiel captured by the Communists, which under customary international law belongs as war booty to the victors. However, if such articles come into possession of other governments, their requirements for spare parts and other support and their desires for cordial relations with the USG may provide opportunities for re-establishing some USG control over further transfers.

Existing provisions of law affecting transfers of the captured arms include (a) a ban on participation by any American citizen or entity in trade with North or South Vietnam or Cambodia, under the Trading With the Enemy Act, as implemented by the Department of the Treasury's Foreign Assets Control regulations (specific transactions can be authorized by Treasury); (b) a prohibition on agricultural assistance to any country engaged in trade with North Vietnam (sections 102 and 103, PL 480); and (c) restrictions on port and bunkering facilities for vessels engaged in trade with North Vietnam, South Vietnam, or Cambodia (50 USC App. 2154; 15 CFR 371.9).

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These statutory sanctions are likely to be of limited usefulness insofar as foreign governments are concerned. They do not, for example, offer a disincentive to acquisition of arms from North Vietnam or Cambodia where the purchasing government receives no benefits under PL 480 or where the arms are transported in vessels or aircraft of other than its own registry. Nevertheless, while there exist no automatic statutory sanctions applicable in the event of trade per se with Vietnam or Cambodia, termination or curtailment on policy grounds of economic or military assistance to any recipient government acquiring captured arms remains an option.

Much more effective control may be asserted against persons or firms falling within the reach of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. Under the regulations as they now stand, virtually all financial dealings with Vietnam or Cambodia on the part of US nationals or firms subject to US jurisdiction are prohibited in the absence of a Treasury license. However, the legal position of a US citizen or corporation which may enjoy financial benefits from transactions between a foreign entity and Vietnam is not clear. ✓

The policy decision on whether to permit a US citizen or corporation to participate in transactions with Vietnam

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must rest on the following considerations (assuming no legal inhibitions):

a. Is it in the US interests for Vietnam to obtain large amounts of foreign exchange? (The best guess at this time of the resale value of the American equipment range from \$1 billion to \$2 billion, although no sound estimate can be made until the equipment has been surveyed and sale negotiations begun).

b. Is it in the US interest to attempt to maintain some control over the flow of the equipment out of Vietnam?

c. Will the participation of a US corporation in the purchase and resale of the equipment give the USG sufficient control over the final destination of the materiel?

d. Will the USG sanction of the participation of a US corporation in this activity be worth the public and Congressional relations problems that might well arise?

e. Are there other means whereby the USG can exercise some control over the flow of this equipment (e.g. strong representations to potential purchasing countries, public or private statements to potential purchasers that no spare parts will be provided, private encouragement to friendly countries if they are interested in obtaining some of the equipment, etc.)?

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f. Is the international arms trade so well organized that the USG in fact can have little influence and therefore must be prepared for an uncontrolled flow?

g. Will Vietnam be able to increase its political influence detrimental to the USG if permitted to distribute the US equipment in an unrestrained manner?

h. Will the flow of this equipment create or exacerbate areas of tensions?

Discussion

If we assume that much of the US equipment still remaining in Vietnam is in useable condition, we are caught on the horns of a cruel dilemma. On the one hand, it is probably not in the US interests to permit a sizeable increase in foreign exchange available to Vietnam. Not only might this greatly increase Vietnam's influence in Southeast Asia, but it would also create major public relations problems for the USG and could have a large negative impact both in Congress and with the American people on US foreign policy, particularly those aspects that relate to arms transfers.

On the other hand, assuming that in fact the USG can have some measure of control over the outflow of this equipment, its sanction, whether explicit or implicit, of Vietnamese sales will raise major public relations problems. It must be assumed

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that Vietnam, one way or another, will be able to dispose of much of the equipment. That argument, valid as it may be, is not likely to have much impact in what will be primarily an emotional discussion. Just the very fact that the USG has participated in one way or another in the disposal of captured US equipment will be keynote. In essence therefore, regardless of the position we take on this issue, there will most likely be a major public and Congressional problem.

A position of passivity has risks. It will leave the entire disposal decision to Vietnam. It can be assumed that this government will act in a manner inimicable to our interests. Some of the equipment will be provided to insurgent groups. Some may well go to unfriendly governments or to governments whose security requirements do not call for the kind of US equipment available in Vietnam. These kind of sales may bring pressures upon us for offsetting sales to neighboring countries.

Finally, we must recognize that there are severe limitations on our ability to influence the flow of arms from Vietnam and that regardless of the course upon which we embark, we cannot hope to be completely successful.

Options

Option I -- USG would use all available means to prevent the outflow of US equipment from Vietnam. We would inform all possible purchasers that we would strenuously object to any

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acquisitions and would consider it an unfriendly act. We would make our views known to any US citizen or firm and if our positions were disregarded, we would take administrative or legal remedies.

Although this option could not be completely successful, it should have considerable impact on Vietnam's ability to earn sizeable amounts of foreign exchange. Furthermore, the US' efforts to minimize proliferation would be well received by a considerable part of the American public and Congress. This policy would be very defensible.

On the other hand, this option does eliminate any possibility of influencing the potential arms flow. We would have to recognize that once the USG takes this position, some equipment will undoubtedly be exported by Vietnam to governments and groups whose objectives are inimicable to our interests. This may occur under any circumstances, since there is no practical way of preventing it, but the magnitude of the outflow to unfriendly customers might be increased under this option.

This option could also involve the US in lengthy disputes with foreign governments entailing dangers of hostile publicity, strained relations, and adverse judgements which could undermine our position.

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Option II -- The USG would take all possible actions to insure that the equipment is acquired by friendly governments. We would encourage these governments to undertake negotiations with Vietnam and would guarantee them provision of spare parts and rehabilitation assistance. We would also encourage American individuals or firms, within the provisions of existing legislation, to utilize their resources in the acquisition of the materiel with the understanding that any resales would require the approval of USG.

This option would provide USG with the best means of controlling the outflow of the US equipment. Although we could not prevent entirely the delivery of some of the equipment to unfriendly governments or groups, we would have a better opportunity for control since this option would be financially more profitable to Vietnam than any other process. The rationale for this option would be based on the assumption that Vietnam will export much of the equipment in any case and that therefore it is in the US interest to manage the flow to the maximum extent possible.

The USG's participation in arms exports from Vietnam will undoubtedly raise serious Congressional and public relations problems. We can expect efforts on part of the Legislative Branch either to block the Administration's efforts or at least

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introduce legislation which will further restrict future management flexibility. The basic rationale will obtain some Congressional support, but will certainly not eliminate opposition. For this reason, this option should not be pursued until wide consultations have been held with Members of Congress.

This option would also greatly increase Vietnam's access to foreign exchange. On the other hand, it will minimize any political influence that Vietnam may be able to exercise through the disposition of the US equipment.

Option III -- This option would place the USG in a passive mode. We would not take any formal action concerning US equipment in Vietnam. We might voice opposition to the trafficking of these arms, but not take any overt action to prevent their transfers. We would respond to US individuals and firms by stating that we would not respond to inquiries but that they are free to proceed as long as their actions are consistent with existing legislative provisions. We would respond to potential foreign governmental purchasers by stating that we would not comment on their inquiries on this matter but that we would review the question of spare parts and rehabilitation assistance if and when it arose.

This option would provide the USG with greater flexibility since it would not require us to take any actions until after

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Vietnam has made its sales. Therefore, in some cases we could be helpful to friendly governments who may have acquired the equipment; in other cases, we would just refuse to provide spare parts and rehabilitation assistance.

We should however under this option make all efforts to inhibit the transfer of US equipment to Palestinian guerillas or any other extremist terrorist or subversive groups. We would inform pertinent governments that we would view most seriously any transfer or import of US equipment from Vietnam destined to extremist organizations. We should consider encouraging such direct clandestine actions as appeared necessary to interdict the US equipment.

Despite our efforts to prevent this equipment from falling into the hands of terrorist groups, this option will be seen as the "no policy" option. We will be criticized for not attempting more vigorous efforts to control the flow of the equipment. We will also be criticized for assisting some recipients with spare parts and rehabilitation support, while denying others.

Bureau Views

(To be provided)

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Recommendation

That you approve Option III which would adopt a policy of passivity wherein the USG would not take any formal position but would maintain complete flexibility to provide spare parts and rehabilitation services after the US equipment has been exported out of Vietnam. American firms or individuals would be permitted to participate in arms transfers from Vietnam within the framework of existing legislation. The only exception to this posture would be exercised in attempting to prevent US arms from falling to terrorist or subversive groups.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter from T. Weller Smith
Aircraft, Inc. of July 7

Tab B - Table--Types of Equipment

Drafted: PM:TStern:bpw
8/25/75 x20440

~~SECRET~~

T. Weller Smith Aircraft, Inc.

AIRCRAFT SALES / LEASING / PARTS

*3110 Maple Drive, N. E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30305**Recd 7/10**Telex 54-9590*

July 7, 1975

Telephone (404) 237-3773

Mr. Thomas Stern
United States Department of State
Bureau of Politico - Military Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520



Dear Mr. Stern:

Pursuant to our discussions in your office last Wednesday, we would like to outline by means of this letter, our thoughts regarding the possibility of purchasing certain items of aviation and related military equipment from Viet Nam for sale internationally.


It is our intention and desire to purchase certain items of military equipment, particularly, fixed wing and rotary aircraft spare parts, shop equipment and salvageable aircraft, for resale internationally. However, it is not our intention to do so without the either formal or informal approval and "blessing" of the United States Government. In that regard, as you know, we have discussed the legal considerations involved with Mr. Ben Forman, and we have also discussed our concept with Mr. Eric F. von Marbod in an effort to ascertain his opinion regarding the availability of such equipment. We have now determined that it would be worthwhile for us to proceed further than a preliminary investigation into actual pre-planning. However, we consider it imprudent for us to expend further time, effort and money in such pre-planning without some indication on behalf of our government regarding the possibility of ultimate approval of such a venture. Therefore, we would like to outline herewith in general terms our concept and our proposed general method of implementation. In essence, our plan would be the following:

A. Our purchases and sales would be accomplished through either an established foreign company or by setting up a new foreign enterprise, which would be a resident of either the United Kingdom, Switzerland, or France, whichever may be most acceptable to the Vietnamese and to our government's interest.

B. Our foreign associate, which is a multi-national enterprise, composed entirely of non-U. S. individuals, with substantial expertise and contacts in the aviation industry and world-wide marketing connections, will

Mr. Thomas Stern

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July 7, 1975

assist in the location or establishment of such above-referenced foreign entity. Additionally, our foreign associate will provide a knowledgeable non-U. S. citizen who is sophisticated in the negotiation of international aviation sales, to negotiate an agreement with the government of Viet Nam regarding the overall project and to also negotiate subsequent price bargainings for each shipment.

C. Our foreign associate will provide financing necessary to accomplish substantial purchases contemplated in this project.

D. Following negotiation of the overall project agreement, specific price negotiations regarding individual shipments will be accomplished; and shipments will be made from Viet Nam to a geographically favorable neutral country for warehousing and staging.

E. Upon arrival at such staging area, if necessary, the goods will be transferred for reinspection and recertification to insure their air worthiness.

F. The goods will then be marketed through our existing connections and marketing network internationally.

Initially, our foreign associate, until we receive some evidence of support for this proposition from our government, desires to remain anonymous; but as the project develops, our associate will be willing and available to discuss its participation in such a project and its involvement will be subject to ultimate approval by the appropriate agencies of our government.

Throughout the performance of this project, our entire activities will be open and subject to the scrutiny, if desired, of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and any other appropriate governmental agencies. In fact, we would welcome and expect the United States Government's interest and over-view of our project.

We understand that our government is interested in the ultimate disposition of other, non-aviation military equipment which, because of the substantial volume currently located in Viet Nam, could have an overall strategic impact. We would certainly be willing to assist the United States in its efforts to remove any such equipment through the conduit established by us.

Mr. Thomas Stern

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July 7, 1975

It is our firm belief that we have a unique combination of personal expertise and foreign associates which provide us with a capability to accomplish the project which we have described hereinabove. In that regard, we believe that we can provide a valuable service to our country and to international security, and we offer our services in full realization of the desires and interests of our nation regarding the ultimate disposition of such equipment.


We look forward to receiving some suggestion of our government's position regarding our participation in this project as soon as may be reasonably possible so that we may proceed, as appropriate.

Thank you for your assistance.

Very truly yours,

T. WELLER SMITH AIRCRAFT, INC.

By


T. Weller Smith, President

twS/lw



CONFIDENTIALTYPES OF EQUIPMENT 1/

	<u>VIETNAM</u>	<u>CAMBODIA</u>
M-41A3	300	-
M-48A3	250	-
M-113 APCs	1,200	181
105mm HOWITZERS	1,000	265
155mm HOWITZERS	250	22
175mm SELF PROPELLED GUNS	80	-
M-16 RIFLES	791,000	155,000
RIFLES (various other types)	**	104,000
M-60 MACHINE GUNS	15,000	320
M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS	47,000	18,500
LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS (LAW)	63,000	-
45 CAL PISTOLS	90,000	24,000
60, 81, 90mm MORTARS	12,000	3,100
PRC 10/25 RADIOS	42,000	9,700
VRC-46 RADIOS	6,000	-
F-5A/B AIRCRAFT	51	-
F-5E AIRCRAFT	22	-
A-37 AIRCRAFT	113	-
A-1 AIRCRAFT	36	-
C-130A AIRCRAFT	10	-
C-119 AIRCRAFT	40	-
C-7 AIRCRAFT	40	-
UH-1 HELICOPTER	430	24
CH-47 HELICOPTER	36	-
O-1/O-2 AIRCRAFT	159	18
C-47 HELICOPTER	36	7
T-28 AIRCRAFT	-	22
C-123 AIRCRAFT	-	7
T-41 AIRCRAFT	-22	12
AMMUNITION	130,000 tons	235,970 rounds
TRUCKS (1/4, 3/4 and 2-1/2 ton)	42,000	4,600
NAVAL SHIPS/CRAFT	940	115

* The majority of ammunition captured is 40mm, 60mm, 81mm and 105mm.

1/ Sources: DIA/APPR 94-75 and 103-75, June 1975

** Number of older rifles unknown, but believed to be substantial.

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GDS KBH 4/1/00




NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
8	29	9	1	11	7505755	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES _____	FROM: KISSINGER, H _____	REFERENCE: _____	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
	KISSINGER _____	COLBY, W _____	S/S _____	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
	SCOWCROFT ☒	SCHLESINGER, J _____	OTHER _____	LOU NO FORN NODIS
	DAVIS _____	ST EX SEC _____		C EYES ONLY EXDIS
				S CODEWORD
			TS SENSITIVE	
SUBJECT: U.S. Military Equipment lost in Indochina				

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
		ACTION	INFO.		
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK ()
	STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES ()
	FAR EAST <i>Steigman</i>		<i>X</i>	<i>X</i>	REPLY FOR ()
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
	EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
	LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
	UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
	ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
	SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: _____
	NSC PLANNING			<i>X</i>	COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
	CONGRESSIONAL				<i>Index Vest, G</i>
OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	9/1		<i>Scroft</i>	<i>Cix</i>	<i>Info</i>	
				<i>C</i>	<i>Noted by Scowcroft</i>	



NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D <i>SEP 03 1975</i>		
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____			
	NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____			
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____			
	CROSS REF W/ _____			
	SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ☒ _____ FOLDER: _____			
		CRT ID: _____	SA _____	SF _____
		OPEN <i>(initials)</i>	HP _____	NS _____
		CLOSE <i>(initials)</i>	WH _____	EP _____
			PA _____	DY _____