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Fernando DE VACA
asesor del presidente de los Estados Unidos
White House Washington D.C.



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8L!

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: STEPHEN LOW
FROM: FERNANDO E. C. DE BACA *FEB*
SUBJECT: Panama Canal Issue

Attached for your review and files are letters with enclosures from Mr. Phillip Harman of Los Angeles.

The letters deal with the Panama Canal issue and reflect Mr. Harman's strong point of view that the U. S. ought not to bargain away its hold on the Panama Canal Zone.

Enclosed also are copies of my letters of acknowledgment to Mr. Harman which indicate action taken with respect to his correspondence. Do you feel that an additional reply would be in order from either you or someone at the State Department? If so, would you be kind enough to send to send me a copy of your reply.

Mil gracias.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 19, 1975




MEMORANDUM FOR: FERNANDO De BACA
FROM: STEPHEN LOW 
SUBJECT: Philip Harman and the
Panama Canal

I understand that Harman has written over 500 letters to members of the White House over recent years, many of which end up here. He is, as you can observe, very much interested and involved, and probably very close to people who may be engaged in activities which we do not condone, if they are not illegal. To say he is inclined towards hyperbole is an understatement. In any case we have found it advisable not to reply to his letters and would suggest that you follow the same practice.

We would be glad to be of any help we can in responding to letters of this kind on foreign policy matters.

Attachments: Correspondence with Mr. Harman



PHILLIP HARMAN
POST OFFICE BOX 25100
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025

April 14, 1975

Hon. Fernando E.C. DeBaca
Special Assistant to the President
for Hispanic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. DeBaca:

I am enclosing an article in Spanish by the well known Cuban leader in Miami, Dr. Manolo Reyes, concerning his open letter to all the countries of the American continent concerning Panama and Cuba.

As I believe Dr. Reyes' open letter is of paramount importance, I have sent copies to all of the Latin American presidents with the exception of Cuba, Panama, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela all whom have close ties with Cuba and the Kremlin. I also sent it to their foreign ministers and their envoys to Washington, the OAS and the United Nations.

In Dr. Reyes' open letter he also points out the activities of the Russians in his country with their Migs, soldiers and submarines. Because of the presence of Russia's Naval forces in the Caribbean, Guantanamo, the key to the control of the Caribbean, is a major curb to the Soviet's Naval strategy in that area. However, if the vital and strategic U.S. Panama Canal is closed as threatened by the illegal chief of government of Panama, Omar Torrijos, on March 24 to the AP which would be done by stopping the water that supplies the canal, the Russian Naval forces would immediately adapt their strategy to take advantage of this closure which would effect the security and economy of the United States.

With my warmest regards and I would appreciate hearing from you and your comments concerning Dr. Reyes' open letter to all the countries of the American continent.

Ever sincerely,

Phillip Harman

Phillip Harman

cc: Dr. Manolo Reyes



PHILLIP HARMAN
POST OFFICE BOX 25100
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025

file

April 7, 1975

Hon. Gale McGee, Chairman
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
Foreign Relations Committee
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator McGee:

I read the copy of your letter of March 3 that you sent to all the members of the Senate concerning the de facto treaty negotiations with the illegal and pro-Castro-Soviet military dictatorship in Panama. The negotiations are de facto and non-valid inasmuch as the present government in Panama is non-constitutional. By Panamanian law, the 1946 constitutional Constitution states that only a constitutional government can negotiate treaties with a foreign country. Even a plebiscite would not be valid.

You stated in your letter that the Statement of Principles outlines "the broad, general framework within which the negotiations would proceed" that was signed by Secretary Kissinger and the Foreign Minister of Panama. The Senate should be reminded that the Foreign Minister of Panama who was trained for Communist leadership in Paris (1965-68) is also the person who was accused by the U.S. in 1972 of being in the illegal narcotics traffic from Panama to the U.S. As for Secretary Kissinger, he is the only Secretary of State in U.S. history who stated in his Statement of Principles (points 3 & 4) that the U.S. owned territory of the Canal Zone is Panamanian territory. Why did he make this erroneous statement?

You stated that "the U.S. negotiators are keeping the Senate leadership and the appropriate Committees informed and that a public debate at this time on the pros and cons of a new treaty would be premature and have an adverse impact on the key issues important to our national interest." As I am in daily contact with a great number of Senators, I have been told that no information has been given them. Concerning a public debate on the pros and cons of a new treaty, I believe this should be done immediately so that all of Congress and the American people be aware of the present Communist controlled government in Panama who is dedicated to nationalize the U.S. Panama Canal and to bring Panama into the Marxist fold.

You stated that a "full debate of the issues will be needed to guarantee we have properly safeguarded U.S. interests in the Canal Zone." How can you safeguard U.S. interests in the Zone when Panama's illegal and pro-Soviet Red dictator stated in Bogota, Colombia, last Dec. 13 that he would "attain 'Panamanianization' of the canal in the interim before its total recovery by Panama." "Panamanianization" means nationalization of the canal. Also, the Red dictator told the AP on March 24 that he would bring the canal's operation to a complete halt if Congress does not ratify a treaty. Can Congress afford to negotiate with these blackmail threats that indirectly come from the USSR?



Hon. Gale McGee, Chairman

April 7, 1975
Page 2

As one who speaks in the U.S. on behalf of the gagged people of Panama who cannot express themselves as they would be jailed, deported or executed, I was disturbed to read the Communist propaganda "Why A New Panama Canal Treaty Must Be Signed Now" that is being widely circulated throughout the U.S. in which it states for Americans to write to Senator Gale McGee and Congressman Dante Fascell "For Congressional Pressure Through Committee."

To sum up this letter, I do not think any Senator wants it on his record or his conscience that he voted yes to ratify a treaty that would surrender for the first time in history, U.S. owned territory to a Communist regime in Panama that is controlled by the Kremlin through their Panamanian Communist Party. Nor do I think any Senator or members of the House or the American people believe that the effective use of the canal remains dependent upon a government in Panama that was conceived in a military conspiracy with Castro and Russia, born through revolution and nurtured by terror.

Ever sincerely,

Phillip Harman

Phillip Harman

cc: Hon. Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States
U.S. Senate
Chairman, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Chairman, House Subcommittee on International Political & Military Affairs
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Panama Canal



May 12, 1975

Dear Mr. Harman:

Thank you for your most recent letter of May 5, 1975 and for your previous letters dealing with the very delicate issue of the Panama Canal.

I have taken the liberty of sharing your letters along with the various enclosures with appropriate staff members at the Department of State and the National Security Council. As you are probably aware, this matter is also scheduled to come before the Organization of American States currently meeting in Washington, D. C.

Thank you once again for sharing your views on this important issue. Do stay in touch.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Fernando E. D. De Baca
Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Phillip Harman
Post Office Box 25100
Los Angeles, California 90025

BCC: Mr. Stephen Low, NSC

FECDeB:mmd:5/12/75



PHILLIP HARMAN
POST OFFICE BOX 25100
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025

May 5, 1975


Hon. Fernando E.D. De Baca
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. De Baca:

I am enclosing a copy of my letter to His Holiness that I thought you would like to see as well as a copy of a letter in Spanish. This letter dated April 18 outlines the plans the present de facto and pro-Castro military dictatorship in Panama have for the acquisition of all businesses. So far, the schedule is on time.

With warmest regards and I would appreciate hearing from you.

Cordially,



Phillip Harman

(714) 325-0585



PHILLIP HARMAN
POST OFFICE BOX 25100
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025

May 1, 1975

Your Holiness
Pope Paul VI
The Vatican
Italy

Your Holiness:

I am enclosing a copy of Congressman Daniel J. Flood's speech before the U.S. House of Representatives on April 22, 1975 regarding a resolution of the Administrative Board of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops that pertains to Panama and that the treaty of 1903 between the U.S. and the Republic of Panama be revised. In Congressman Flood's speech he also included an article by Major General Thomas A. Lane, USA (Ret.) entitled "Bishops Misled on Panama Issue." General Lane's informative and factual article exposes the fallacies of the Bishops' resolution and the danger to the United States and to the nations of the world who use the strategic Panama Canal if this existing treaty is changed. Throughout General Lane's article he cites statements of Archbishop Marcos McGrath of Panama. As you know, Archbishop McGrath is an American whose first name is Mark.

If you recall from my previous correspondence during the past five years to Your Holiness, I have exposed the objectives of the illegal and pro-Castro-Soviet military dictatorship in Panama and their dedication to the nationalization of the strategic Panama Canal and to bring Panama into the Marxist fold. You are also very much aware of the sadistic murder of Father Héctor Gallego on June 9, 1971 when the Communist controlled military regime threw Father Gallego from an airplane into the sea so his body could not be found. The Vatican documented this by the official statement of Father Pedro Hernández Rabadal:

"The Colombian priest, Father Héctor Gallego, 30 years of age, was thrown into the sea from an airplane on June 9, 1971, by order of General Omar Efraim Torrijos."

Also, if you recall, Archbishop Tomas Clavel of Panama resigned his archdiocesan post in December, 1968 after the Communist controlled military grabbed the country by gunpoint. He said he deplored what the military did to his country and that he believed he could not work with such a government and he would be a problem for the church.


Archbishop Clavel's problem is shared by all the gagged people of Panama as to protest means to be deported, jailed or executed by this anti-Christian regime such as Father Gallego's murder whose only crime was protesting the tyranny of the Torrijos' regime and it cost him his life.

Sincerely in Christ,

Phillip Harman

Phillip Harman .

cc: Hon. Daniel J. Flood
Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane



Bishops Misled On Panama Issue

By THOMAS A. LANE

On Feb. 24th, 1975, the Administrative Board of the U.S. Catholic Conference issued "A Resolution Regarding Panama," based on an assumption that the U.S. Canal Zone is Panamanian territory occupied by the United States under terms of

build at Nicaragua, the province of Panama seceded from Colombia and negotiated with the United States to build the canal at Panama.

The French builders had failed at Panama. There was no assurance that the

available to the world at less than the cost of producing and protecting it; but would give Panama untrammelled authority to exploit this U.S. project for whatever the traffic would bear.

The Marcos McGrath depiction of injury

Panamá, Abril 18 de 1975.

Señores,
Consejo Nacional de Economía Privada
Apartado; 1276
Panamá 1,
Rep. de Panamá.

A quien concierne:

Considero un deber y obligación moral el advertir y prevenir a Uds., con alguna anticipación, para que investiguen a fondo por sus medios y tomen las medidas pertinentes, que dentro de las sesiones que hemos estado llevando a cabo últimamente en el "comité nacional de legislación", hemos preparado con el asesoramiento directo de técnicos cubanos y peruanos, un anteproyecto de ley destinado a regir en breve, la operación futura, dentro del marco estatal, de las industrias y comercios nacionales.

Dentro del anteproyecto de ley, se considera en primer lugar, que ciertas Industrias serán consideradas como de "utilidad pública" exclusivamente, y que por lo tanto deberán ser operadas y regidas, sin excepción, por el Gobierno Nacional, sin intervención de la Empresa Privada. Entre estas industrias cabría mencionar las Productoras de gas, embotelladoras de gas licuado, generadoras de electricidad, potabilizadoras de agua, telecomunicaciones en general, refinerías petroleras, fábricas petroquímicas, oleoductos, plantaciones y refinerías de azúcar, industria del alcohol en general, fábricas de cemento, fábricas de concreto y productos relativos inherentes a la industria de la construcción, fábricas de productos de arcilla sanitarios y para la construcción de viviendas, las empresas destinadas a la explotación y refinado de los recursos minerales (cobre, etc.), fábricas procesadoras de harina de pescado y camarones incluyendo sus flotas pesqueras, etc.

Las industrias nacionales que desde el instante de la promulgación y vigencia súbita de esta ley se encuentran en manos de la Empresa Privada, serán conminadas a emprender "negociaciones" obligatorias con el Gobierno Nacional que culminarán con su traspaso total a ésta, quien de allí en adelante las controlará a su libre arbitrio.

En el segundo grupo dentro del citado anteproyecto, se han clasificado las industrias y comercios de los que se deriva directamente el "bienestar del pueblo". Estas empresas estarán obligadas a "negociar" con el Estado, el traspaso o venta, según condiciones previamente determinadas por éste, de una porción mayoritaria de sus acciones. Es decir, el Estado en todas ellas sin excepción será el mayor accionista.

Dentro de las industrias y comercios catalogados en éste segundo grupo, estarán comprendidas las fábricas de productos farmacéuticos y sus derivados, las farmacias, las fábricas de textiles, fábricas de prendas de vestir en general y ciertos comercios dedicados a la venta de éstas, las fábricas de calzados y ciertos almacenes dedicados a venderlos, fábricas productoras y procesadoras de alimentos en general, las lecherías y plantas procesadoras de productos lácteos, los supermercados, comisarías y bazarías de cierta importancia, las industrias productoras de detergentes de todo tipo, jabones y dentífricos, fábricas de muebles y ciertas mueblerías, ciertos restaurantes y expendios de alimentos preparados, etc.

Dentro de un tercer grupo se han clasificado a todas las empresas privadas relacionadas con la educación pública, información y divulgación popular, a impresión comercial en general, que están destinadas a ser gobernadas y operadas por los sindicatos obreros existentes, o los nuevos que serán organizados para éste fin, de no existir. Dentro de éste grupo se encuentran las librerías, servicios de publicaciones, de relaciones públicas, de publicidad y propaganda, las Escuelas, colegios o universidades particulares, ciertas radioemisoras, las televisoras, la prensa escrita en general, imprentas comerciales, etc., etc.

Dentro de un cuarto grupo, han sido catalogadas las empresas que podran seguir operando con capital privado o particular, pero regidas dentro de una legislación posterior. Entre estas estarán las no citadas en los tres grupos que anteceden y todas las que en general, aún estando clasificadas, no cuenten con un capital social de o mayor a diez mil balboas.

Con la exposición a grandes rasgos arriba expuesta, considero haber cumplido con mi deber, ahora toca a Uds., estando prevenidas, reaccionar con energía y exigir la discusión pública del anteproyecto.

MUY ATENTAMENTE,



PHILLIP HARMAN
POST OFFICE BOX 25100
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025

April 26, 1975

Miss Margaret M. Dress
Secretary to Fernando E.C. De Baca
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Miss Dress:

Thank you for your cordial letter of April 21 and your courtesy in informing me that Mr. De Baca is out of the city. I shall look forward to hearing from him.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter that I am sending to the Chief Justice concerning the validity of the U.S. Canal Zone. Would you be kind enough to give Mr. De Baca this copy.

With my warmest regards.

Ever sincerely,



Phillip Harman



PHILLIP HARMAN
POST OFFICE BOX 25100
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025

April 29, 1975

Hon. Warren Earl Burger, Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543

Dear Mr. Chief Justice Burger:

In 1907, the U. S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of U. S. ownership of the territory of the Canal Zone (Wilson vs. Shaw, 204, U.S. 24, at 30-35) ruling:

"This new republic (Panama) has by treaty granted to the United States rights, territorial and otherwise. A treaty with it (Panama) ceding the Canal Zone, was duly ratified. Congress has passed several acts based upon the title of the United States, among them one to provide a temporary government. It is hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is imperfect, and that the territory described does not belong to this nation, because of the omission of some of the technical terms used in ordinary conveyances of real estate."

The June 30, 1974 tabulation of Canal Zone acquisition cost as reflected in Panama Canal Company accounts, is \$166,362,173 dollars.

On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed an eight point document (Statement of Principles) in Panama with the de facto foreign minister, Juan Tack, who in 1972 was accused by the U.S. of being in the illegal narcotics (heroin) traffic from Panama to the United States. In this document, Secretary Kissinger stipulated in points 3, 4 and 5 that the territory of the U.S. Canal Zone is Panamanian territory:

3. "Termination of United States jurisdiction over Panamanian territory shall take promptly..."
4. "The Panamanian territory in which the canal is situated shall be returned to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama."
5. "The Republic of Panama shall have a just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the operation of the canal in its territory."

Furthermore, Secretary Kissinger in his speech in Houston, Texas, on March 1, 1975 before the Combined Service Club said, "We are ready to acknowledge that it is reasonable for Panama to exercise jurisdiction over its territory..."

As Secretary Kissinger is cognizant of all U. S. territorial acquisitions and has now stated officially that the canal is situated in Panamanian territory, could you tell me when did the U. S. Supreme Court rescind its ruling of 1907 that the territory of the U. S. Canal Zone is no longer owned by the United States?

cc: Hon. Gerald R. Ford
Justices of the Supreme Court
U. S. Senate

Ever sincerely,

Phillip Harman
Phillip Harman



PHILLIP HARMAN
POST OFFICE BOX 25100
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025

Carta de Manolo Reyes
DIARIO DE LAS AMERICAS
a Todos los Pueblos
MARZO 30 1975
del Continente Americano

En relación a la carta que los Presidentes de Colombia, Costa Rica y Venezuela enviaron recientemente al Presidente de los Estados Unidos, Gerald Ford, tras una

Rechazo la carta de los presidentes latinoamericanos porque entiendo que con ello están interfiriendo en los asuntos internos de otras naciones. Creo que la tan profunda doctrina de la no

aceptación por parte de aquellos que nacieron al Sur del Río Grande.

Por mí hasta ahora, como estoy en el exilio, no habla nadie mas que yo mismo. Rechazo la carta de los presidentes latinoamericanos porque entiendo que con ello están interfiriendo en los asuntos internos de otras naciones. Creo que la tan profunda doctrina de la no

Ya Torrijos ha logrado algo al efecto. Hace unos pocos días el Gobernador de Estados Unidos en la Zona del Canal de Panamá le entregó el aeropuerto llamado "France Field", que está dentro del perímetro norteamericano. Ya los aviones de Fidel Castro podrían aterrizar en ese aeropuerto, dentro de territorio norteamericano a la zona del Canal, ya que Panamá y la Habana tienen ahora relaciones diplomá-

espoledados por el comunismo internacional, a fin de forzar a los Estados Unidos a producir un baño de sangre.

Hasta aquí parte del análisis que obra en mi poder.

Es significativo que los tres Presidentes Latinoamericanos que enviaron la carta al Presidente Ford, sean de tres naciones que han restablecido o están en vías de reanudar relaciones con el régimen tiránico de Fidel Castro. Es significativa también la frase del Presidente Carlos Pérez cuando dice en la carta: "El Canal pertenece a Panamá y al mundo, no a poderes extranjeros". Basado en esa preocupación contra poderes extranjeros, es que no me explico cómo el Presidente Pérez y los co-firmantes de la

DATE SENT: 5/1/75

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
Copy for Addressee

V 1522017

FROM: William L. Simmons ARA/CCA 4915 NS
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

TO: Mr. Fernando DeBaca White House 197 Old
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)


PART V

(Old Executive Office Bldg.)
Washington, D.C.

EOB

IDENTIFICATION

Cuban Exile Activities



FORM JF-6
2-70
[Formerly DS-406]

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DESTRUCTION - 5 FAM 975.6 AND 960.4
RETAINED FOR 3 YEARS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

White House - Mr. DeBaca

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

file

DATE: April 29, 1975
PLACE: Department of State

SUBJECT: Cuban Exile Activities

PARTICIPANTS: Alejandro Fidel Valdes, President, "Comite Pro
Gobierno Cubano en el Exilio", Miami
Luis Fuentes, Miami
Francisco Battle, Miami
Culver Gleysteen, ARA/CCA
William L. Simmons, ARA/CCA

DISTRIBUTION: ARA - Mr. Rogers
Mr. Luers
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ARA-LA/CEN - Mr. Lazar
L/ARA - Mr. Gantz
White House - Mr. DeBaca
AmEmbassy Santiago -
Attn. Pol. Officer
FBI - Mr. Nasca
NSC - Mr. Low


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This group had earlier requested in writing an appointment with the President, but were informed that they should meet with CCA since the President's heavy schedule precluded his meeting them. These individuals had met with President Pinochet in Santiago in February.

Mr. Fuentes, who spoke English (badly), acted as interpreter/spokesman for the three. He explained that the Committee hoped to encourage unity within the exile community and sought support from Latin Governments for large-scale efforts directed at Castro's overthrow. They had traveled to Chile for this purpose. They had sought an interview with the President to report on their confidential talk with President Pinochet. Fuentes cited his personal involvement in an exile plot against Cuba based in Costa Rica which he said was aborted because of USG complaints to then President Figueres. The main purpose of their call was to ascertain whether the USG would interfere or not in their plans to launch activities against the Castro Government from third countries. Fuentes made it clear that they proposed to undertake no actions from US soil. He said that Chile was providing some "support" but he declined to be drawn out on the form this support took.

ARA/CCA:WLS:Simmons:jm:4/30/75
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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- 2 -


Mr. Gleysteen said that exile activity against Cuba originating in the US violated our neutrality laws and could not be condoned. Moreover, we could not look the other way when US citizens or permanent resident aliens undertook actions against other governments even though the US was not used as a staging point. He emphasized that, while we had no sympathy for the Castro Government, it had nonetheless remained in power for 16 years - it was a political reality. He offered his personal view that activities such as proposed by the Committee were doomed to failure in view of Cuba's strong army.

The group asked about the US position on Cuban sanctions at the forthcoming OASGA and were told that we are consulting with other members of the OAS on this question but could not predict either the US or OAS attitude at this time.

Fuentes indicated they still wished to meet with the President. Mr. Gleysteen said that he could not speak for the White House, but he thought the President's many commitments made it unlikely he could meet them.

Comment: The Committee is one small group of frustrated Cuban Nationalists among many such groups in Miami which have elaborate stationery, some access to the media and little else. It did achieve a coup of sorts by meeting with Pinochet which was widely publicized in Miami. Fuentes implied that the Committee received moral support, if not funds, from the Chilean Government.

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DATE SENT: 4/22/75

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V 1522004


FROM: Hugh V. Simon ARA/CCA 4915 NS
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

TO: Mr. Fernando DeBaca 197 Old BOB
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

PART V

DATE RECEIVED _____

IDENTIFICATION: Memcon re Espanosa



FORM JF-6
2-70
[Formerly DS-406]

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RETAINED FOR 3 YEARS

Mr. DeBaca

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 17, 1975
PLACE: ARA/CCA

SUBJECT: Espinosa's Recent Trip to Cuba

PARTICIPANTS: Rev. Manuel Espinosa, Pastor, Evangelical Pentacostal Church, Miami
Mr. Wade Coggins, Executive Secretary, Evangelical Foreign Visitors Association
Rev. Gabriel Caride, Pastor, Evangelical Pentacostal Church, Miami
Culver Gleysteen, Coordinator, ARA/CCA
Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Political Officer, ARA/CCA

DISTRIBUTION: ARA - Mr. Rogers
 - Mr. Luers
 NSC Staff - Mr. Low
 FBI - Mr. Nasca
 White House - Mr. DeBaca ✓


Rev. Espinosa related his impressions of his recent trip to Cuba via private boat. He and 7 other religious figures and newsmen sailed to Cuba without State Department permission in order to talk with Cuban authorities about reunification of families.

A Captain Alejo Martinez, "Chief of the Immigration Department", spoke frequently with Espinosa and was his point of contact during his 5 day stay, the first 3 of which were spent in jail. Martinez said that some numbers of people might be able to depart Cuba after diplomatic relations with the U.S. are restored, but not before. Martinez said Cuba had sent us its undesirables and criminals as a package. Many who came over in the airlift would never have been given US visas before diplomatic relations were severed. Such people will never be allowed back to Cuba. The two questions of families and of political prisoners would not be allowed to become a part of negotiations. There were only 500 political prisoners, those being held at Bonito near Havana who had refused to be rehabilitated and are awaiting "liberation" by a Cuban exile army. All the "other" prisoners were working, being paid, and could visit their nearby families.

^{HS}
ARA/CCA:HVS Simon: jm: 4/21/75
(Drafting Office and Officer)

FORM DS-1254
2-65

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


Rev. Espinosa spoke with Premier Castro for ten minutes at the Hotel Atlantico, where a solidarity conference for Puerto Rican independence was being held. Castro asked him how he liked the various visible signs of progress in Cuba, about several Miami exiles who had been earlier associates of Castro, and how much unemployment pay Cubans draw upon weekly. Castro commented, "No wonder they do not work, collecting \$90 per week, but earning only \$2 per hour." Espinosa's impression from Castro and other Cuban officials was that the Cubans were very well informed about Miami Cuban exile disputes and conditions.

The Cubans paid for everything, even his fuel for the return to the U.S., said Espinosa. The officials were extremely polite both to him and in their references to Americans. Captain Martinez held that Cuba "needs" good relations with the U.S., if only for reasons of geography. According to Martinez, the U.S. and Cuba also had a long history of friendly relations. He said Cuba would move 20 steps towards us if we moved only 10 steps towards them.

Espinosa said he attributed his good treatment mainly to the fact that the Cubans were convinced he did not shake down Cuban exiles by promising help to get their relatives out of Cuba. The exiles are fleeced \$800 to \$2,000 and not in one case has a relative come out this way. The Cuban authorities know who these fleecers are and will deal very harshly with them if they get their hands on them because they have done so much to enflame the Cuban exile community.

Rev. Espinosa stated that they had collected no money for their trips to Mexico and to Cuba on behalf of Cuban families. He said that he supported the resumption of diplomatic relations, as did many others in the exile community. If there were anything that he could do for his country, the U.S., with respect to Cuba, he was willing.



DATE SENT: 5/1/75

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V 1466397

FROM: CGleysteen ARA/CCA 4915 NS
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)


TO: Mr. P. Debasca Room 197 Executive Off. Bui
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

PART V

DATE RECEIVED _____

IDENTIFICATION _____

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2-70
(Formerly DS-406)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

Subject: An Interesting Republican/Cuban Approach

Mr. Raul Espinosa and Mr. Guillermo Cabrera called on me April 25. Espinosa is head of the Spanish speaking Section of the Republican National Committee. Cabrera, a former OAS employee and now a journalist, working for Diario Las Americas and a new Spanish-language journal Critica. Critica is a monthly published in Washington whose first issue came out last week and being turned into a weekly this summer. Both Espinosa and Cabrera are interested in jobs--Espinosa has already applied for "diplomatic work" in the Department, evidently through the Republican National Committee. These gentlemen were introduced to me via Frank Ortiz.

Espinosa said he and Cabrera wanted to be helpful in influencing the Cuban community in the right direction. They said they accepted as inevitable a normalization of US-Cuban relations, even though this is personally distasteful.


I gave them a conventional expose of our policy, no change, but changes probably in the cards if one thinks about the implications of the Harris poll. I gave them copies of the analysis of the poll on the condition that they not reveal the source and also copies of the Secretary's Houston speech.

Culver Gleysteen
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

cc: ARA - Mr. Luers
White House - Mr. Dibacca
Mr. Low

CG
ARA/CCA:CGleysteen:yt

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DATE SENT:

4/17/75

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V 1412259

TO: William L. Simmons ARA/CCA 4915 NS

FROM: Mr. Fernando DeBaca 197 Old EOB


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Washington, D.C.

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Exile attitudes on US-Cuban Relations

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4/17/75

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V 1412259

FROM:

William L. Simmons ARA/CCA 4915 NS

(Name)

(Office Symbol)

(Room No.)

(Bldg.)

TO:

Mr. Fernando DeBaca 197 Old EOB

(Name)

(Office Symbol)

(Room No.)

(Bldg.)

PART V


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Exile attitudes on US-Cuban Relations



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 14, 1975
PLACE: ARA/CCA

SUBJECT: Exile Attitudes on US-Cuban Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Rev. Manuel Viera, ex-President, Association of
Cuban Protestant Ministers in Exile, Miami
Rev. M. Germinal Rivas, Asst. Professor of Social
Ethics, Boston University
Mr. Fuster, student
Culver Gleysteen, CCA
William L. Simmons, CCA

DISTRIBUTION: ARA - Mr. Rogers White House - Mr. DeBaca ✓
ARA - Mr. Luers NSC - Mr. Low
FBI - Mr. Nasca

Mr. Gleysteen explained that Mr. Rogers was unable to meet with the group because of his heavy schedule.

Rev. Rivas said that they had called on a number of persons in Washington in an effort to present another side of Cuban exile opinion which was seldom heard. The group which they represented, "Cuban Christians for Justice and Freedom", favored removal of the economic embargo and resumption of relations between the United States and Cuba. In their view such steps would facilitate travel by exiles to Cuba permitting family visitation and might possibly lessen Cuban dependence on the USSR.

According to Mr. Fuster, perhaps 10% of the exile community agreed with their position. Another 10% who had money and influence were opposed to any change in policy. The great majority of the exiles were opposed to Communism but subject to persuasion on US-Cuban relations. Most of these are too frightened to say openly that they do not oppose or could live with normalization. Proponents of change were arguing for an unpopular cause and Rev. Viera had been threatened with reprisals. (Mr. Gleysteen

ARA/CCA:WLS/Simmons:jm
(Drafting Office and Officer)

FORM DS-1254
2-65

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- 2 -

counseled Rev. Viera to report threats to local law enforcement officials.)

The group sought to get a prominent Floridian to speak out against violence and had made this point with a staffer of Senator Chiles. They had also met with Congressman Fascell who heard them out sympathetically.

Mr. Gleysteen thanked the group for visiting the Department and indicated they would be welcome if they returned to Washington again.

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DATE
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2/28/75

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TO:

ARA/CCA Mr. Hugh Simon

4915

NS

FROM:

Mr. Fernando DeBaca

Rm. 197 Old EOB


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2/28/75

Mr. Hugh Simon 4915 MS

Mr. Fernando Casaca 107 Old 208

Mar. 11, 1975 20306

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Hanson

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
V 1466388

FROM: ARA/CCA Mr. Hugh Simon 4915 NS
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

TO: Mr. Fernando DeBaca Rm. 197 Old EOB
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

PART V
Wash. D.C. 20506
DATE RECEIVED 28

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
from Washington. He said that the working Cubans knew that a resumption of diplomatic relations was the only way in which families could be brought together. He therefore favors diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana as do the vast majority of all Cuban exiles, even though when the time came it would be a difficult moment.

Mr. Gleysteen said his time had been limited in Miami and he was unable to see everyone he would have liked to but he was always prepared to receive Cuban exiles in his office in Washington and hear their views.

When questioned about the recent slaying of the Cuban exile Nieves, a proponent of relations with Cuba in Miami, Rev. Espinosa replied that a man came to him in tears and reported that he had been offered \$10,000 for Espinosa's own murder. Everyone knows who these people are, said Rev. Espinosa; there are only 7 or 10 of them. Espinosa described Nieves as a "Don Quixote" but said he was telling the truth. Espinosa said he conducted a memorial service for Nieves attended by 2,000 people.

Rev. Espinosa said he will regard himself as a Cuban all his life, but his 13 year-old son regards himself as an American.

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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 28, 1975

To: Mr. Fernando de Baca

FYI (as we discussed)

Steve
Stephen Low



PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS

TALKING POINTS

1. The relationship worked out in the 1903 treaty simply doesn't meet the needs of the present day. The situation now is one in which it isn't possible any longer to operate the Canal without Panamanian cooperation. It is just too vulnerable. (9,000 of the 12,000 workers are Panamanian; we couldn't operate it ourselves, and if we try we would have to do so from an embattled enclave.)

2. We are facing the united opinion of the Latin American and Caribbean nations. Failure of these negotiations would provide an issue that would focus anti-American sentiment against us in a way which could severely damage our interests throughout the Hemisphere.

3. We now have an opportunity to engage the Panamanians in a mutually advantageous relationship which they desire as much as we. The Panamanian Government seems to be strong enough to negotiate in a confident but cooperative way and to deliver on its commitments. If we are unsuccessful, the task will become infinitely more difficult. The time available to work out a satisfactory relationship is growing shorter.

4. Progress has been steady although we have quite a way to go. Some major issues remain to be taken up, like duration of the treaty. So it is too early to describe the contents of a treaty in any meaningful way.

5. The eventual treaty will take full account of our defense and security interests. We think we can satisfy the Panamanian desires for a greater share in the enterprise and more visible authority and still protect our own vital interests.

6. We hope people will reserve their positions in this matter until we have a document and can lay out the situation in its entirety. It is a matter of great importance to our lasting relationships in this Hemisphere.



MIAMI, FLA., MARTES 4 DE MARZO DE 1975

Las Declaraciones del Secretario Kissinger sobre Cuba

El miércoles 26 de febrero, en la ciudad de Hollywood, contigua al área metropolitana de Miami, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, Sr. Gerald Ford, contestando preguntas formuladas por la prensa, manifestó con respecto a

MAR 7 1975

Pág. 4 - DIARIO LAS AMERICAS MARTES 4 DE MARZO DE 1975

Secretary Kissinger's Statement on Cuba

Last Wednesday, February 26th, while visiting Hollywood, next door to the Miami metropolitan area, the President of the United States of America, Gerald Ford, answering press questions said that regarding U.S. policy towards Cuba, the Castro regime was the one that should change its attitude. And he added—something very important—that there were no signs of any change from the Havana regime. However, Saturday, in Houston, Texas, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, made a very delicate and serious statement on the same subject. And that statement was part of a carefully worded and prepared speech, which lends it more importance.

It is clear that Secretary Kissinger, no matter what exceptions or conditions he might have expressed regarding the possibility of restoring diplomatic and commercial relations with the Castro dictatorship, shows a marked inclination towards what Russia and Castro want for Cuba. And what Russia and Castro want for Cuba is that the United States of America follow a diplomatic, commercial and political course that might help the Soviet Union bear the heavy economic burden represented by the maintenance of that gigantic base of subversive operations that communist imperialism holds in the heart of the Caribbean, in the strategic island of Cuba.

For the lifting of sanctions, as things now stand, it would be required first a modification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the Rio Treaty, because the Treaty requires the vote of two-thirds of its members to lift these sanctions. And it is hoped that the modification might



**COLEGIO NACIONAL
DE ABOGADOS DE CUBA, INC.**
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CUBAN LAWYERS, INC.
P. O. BOX 450116 — SHENANDOAH STATION
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33145

VIA AIR MAIL



Honorable Fernando de Baca,
Special Assistant to the President
White House, Executive Office Buidl,
Washington, D.C.

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ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 7, 1974

Mr. Joseph E. Puente
P. O. 440121
Miami, Florida 33144

Dear Mr. Puente:

President Ford has asked me to reply to your comments on Cuba. We are pleased that you have given us the benefit of your thinking.

United States policy toward Cuba is one of isolating Cuba economically and diplomatically. The policy is based on the collective decisions and recommendations of the Organization of American States banning diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Cuba until such time as the member states conclude that Cuba is no longer a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. This policy was stated by President Ford in his August 28 press conference, when he said:

"The policy that we have toward Cuba today is determined by the sanctions voted by the Organization of American States and we abide by those actions that were taken by the members of that organization."


The question of a change in US policy toward Cuba is also related to changes in Cuban attitudes toward the United States and Latin America. President Ford stated this position in his August 28 press conference:

"If Cuba changes its policy toward us and toward its Latin neighbors, we, of course, would exercise the option, depending on what the changes were, to change our policy. But before we made any change, we would certainly act in concert with the other members of the Organization of American States."

Sincerely,

Carol C. Laise


Carol C. Laise
Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs



exiles

By HILDA INCLAN
Miami News Reporter

The United States will vote against lifting economic sanctions against Cuba at an Organization of American States meeting Nov. 9, Cuban exile leaders here say President Ford told them.



← Not true

← Not true

← is it true?

← true?



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NEWS

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publican Assembly and president of the United National Bank of Westland and has been active in Cuban refugee programs.

-MASTER-

Distinguido señor Director:

Como usted seguramente sabe, ha existido cierta confusión sobre los motivos que impulsaron al Comité Hispanoamericano, del Partido Republicano, a solicitar de la Administración del ^{Republicana} Presidente Ford la celebración de vistas o audiencias con líderes del exilio cubano, para ^{que se} ~~conocer~~ la opinión de los mismos antes de ^{que se} ~~formular~~ la política que ^{se} ~~ha~~ de seguir el ~~Gobierno~~ respecto de Cuba.

Por otra parte, muchos cubanos ^{en el exilio} no se han percatado de la oportunidad que se les ofrece a través de estas vistas para hacer sentir sus criterios y opiniones, y han puesto en duda su utilidad o conveniencia.

Los párrafos siguientes tienen por objeto explicar las razones que se tomaron en consideración al recomendar la celebración de las ~~vistas~~ vistas o audiencias entre el exilio y la Administración del Presidente Ford.

1. Interés constante de la administración republicana

En primer lugar es conveniente consignar que las administraciones Republicanas, especialmente la Administración del Presidente Ford, se ha caracterizado por ser una administración abierta, que trata de escuchar toda opinión responsable antes de tomar decisiones.

El Partido Republicano ^{Por otra parte} siempre ha demostrado su simpatía y comprensión hacia el exilio cubano, y sus ^{oficiales} ~~veces~~, casi sin excepciones, se han pronunciado siempre contrarios a tomar acciones precipitadas en las cuestiones de Cuba, según lo demuestran las intervenciones de los Senadores Buckley, Gurney, Helms, McClure, ^{otros en el} etc.

^{pleno del senado} Lo cual pone de manifiesto que el criterio Republicano está más cerca de los ideales cubanos que el partido opuesto.



La Administración del Presidente Ford, al acceder a celebrar estas vistas demuestra su constante interés por el problema cubano, así como el respeto y la consideración que le merecen las opiniones del exilio. Por otra parte, la idea ^{de las vistas conto} ha ^{decenas de líderes del} ~~contado~~ ^{que en su estmulo de y contribuyen} con el apoyo del exilio, cuyos líderes se han mantenido ^{a su adaptación mediante sus cartas y mensajes a} ~~en comunicación~~ con nuestra oficina y con la Casa Blanca.

2. Importancia de las vistas


Las vistas se celebrarán bajo la presidencia del señor Fernando de Baca, asistente del Presidente Ford para Asuntos Hispánicos, quien al término de las mismas estará en condiciones de elevar un informe al Presidente, con los puntos de vista del exilio cubano.

Tal como el señor Linowitz presentó al Dr. Kissinger su informe recomendando el restablecimiento de relaciones con Cuba, el señor de Baca a su vez, conociendo el criterio del exilio cubano, tendrá la oportunidad de incluir en su informe al Presidente Ford las razones que el exilio tiene para oponerse a los argumentos del señor Linowitz.

El Presidente Ford, una vez que haya recibido el informe de su Asistente, Sr. de Baca, podrá transmitir al Secretario de Estado los criterios del exilio cubano recogidos en el documento, facilitando de esta manera al Dr. Kissinger los elementos de juicio que le permitirán elaborar en forma más completa sus recomendaciones sobre el caso de Cuba.

3. Presencia del Departamento de Estado

El Departamento de Estado ^{como todos sabemos} es la rama del Poder Ejecutivo encargada de llevar a cabo las recomendaciones sobre política



terior. Sin embargo, los funcionarios a quienes corresponde formular dichas recomendaciones son subalternos que a veces no conocen en todo su alcance el problema cubano, y no saben lo que piensa el exilio sobre el caso de Cuba.

Las vistas autorizadas por la administración del Presidente Ford servirán para darles a conocer a esos funcionarios cuáles son los criterios del exilio cubano, para que los tomen en cuenta al formular las recomendaciones sobre política exterior respecto de Cuba.

4. Status del problema cubano

A diferencia de otros países, el caso de Cuba tiene una situación especial en cuanto a las relaciones con los Estados Unidos se refiere, por encontrarse dichas relaciones sujetas a lo que dispone la Ley 87-733, de 3 de octubre de 1962.

Para modificar el actual status habría que derogar la citada Ley. Esto lo han intentado algunos miembros demócratas del Senado, como por ejemplo el Senador Fulbright, quien lo intentó mediante el Proyecto de Ley S-3880, y el Senador Pell, mediante el Proyecto de Ley S-2802.

Consideramos que las vistas permitirán al exilio cubano hacer sentir su opinión, y que ésta pueda despertar el interés del Congreso en autorizar también vistas antes de ^{que se proceda} proceder a la derogación de la citada Ley 87-733.

5. Necesidad de información imparcial

Como todos sabemos, existe una fuerte campaña de tendencia liberal en los medios de ~~publicación~~ información, que favorece el restablecimiento de relaciones entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos. Esta campaña, en mi opinión y en la de todo el exilio cubano, no refle-



ja la verdadera situación que prevalece en Cuba, y sólo toma en cuenta puntos de vista favorables al régimen cubano.

Hasta ahora el exilio cubano no ha tenido la oportunidad de ser escuchado por el pueblo norteamericano, y la opinión pública del país sólo ha conocido un aspecto del problema.

Las vistas, a las cuales tendrá acceso la prensa nacional, permitirá a ésta informarse debidamente del caso cubano, y trasladar al público todos los aspectos de la situación.

Esperamos que estas explicaciones contribuyan a esclarecer ante la opinión pública cubana en el exilio, la necesidad de las vistas o audiencias que ha autorizado la Administración ^{del Presidente} ~~republicana~~ ^{Gerald Ford}, y las razones que la justifican.

Una vez considerados los puntos que dejamos expuestos, sería muy conveniente que la prensa hispana promueva, en la medida que juzgue pertinente, una campaña a través de editoriales y artículos de fondo en que se destaquen la urgencia de las vistas y ^{la necesidad del} éxito de las mismas.

Al agradecerle ^{de} antemano su atención que preste a esta comunicación, y rogándole su más amplia difusión por todos los medios de publicidad, aprovecho para reiterarle de usted con la mayor consideración.

Por el Comité Hispano Americano del Partido Republicano



Rep. Manuel Logan, Jr.
Chairman



Republican
National
Committee.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mary Louise Smith, Chairman


FROM: J. Raul Espinosa *RE*

DATE: November 19, 1974

I have drafted this letter and hope you will approve of it.

It is vitally needed to maintain Republican support in Florida.

ATTACHMENT



I personally offer these recommendations which the community should consider if and when your representatives ~~are asked to~~ appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (There should be NO discussion on the part of the United States Government with Cuba until Mr. Castro agrees to:

- (1) Grant freedom to all political prisoners;
- (2) Arrive at an agreement dealing with the ex-appropriated properties in Cuba;
- (3) Cease his policies of intervention and subversion in the countries of our hemisphere;
- (4) Call for free elections to be supervised by appropriate international organizations.

The American people should not be impressed with rhetoric as presented by those who are anxious to establish relations with Cuba at the expense of the interests of our country and the aspirations of the Cuban people.

We trust you will inform the Cuban community of Dade County of our feelings on this subject.

With kindest personal regards,

Mary Louise Smith
Chairman

APPROVED: _____

NO!

*W. Thayer
please discuss*



Republican
National
Committee.

PROPOSED LETTER

Mary Louise Smith
Chairman

TO: PUBLISHERS OF CUBAN NEWSPAPERS
DIRECTORS OF CUBAN RADIO STATIONS
KEY REPUBLICAN LEADERS (CUBAN)

Dear _____:

I want to take this opportunity to convey through you to the Cuban community of Dade County the satisfaction of the Republican Party and its leaders over the defeat of the effort of certain Latin American countries to lift the Organization of American States' political and economic sanctions against Castro's Cuba.


Our Party has stood firmly behind President Ford's position not to change our present foreign policy with Cuba until such time Cuba changes its policy toward us.

Republican Senators, Congressmen, and other elected officials have repeatedly spoken against ties with Cuba based on ideological feelings and philosophical principles which our Party shares with your community. Democrats, on the other hand, have long favored normalization of relations with Cuba.

The Spanish Speaking Advisory Committee of the Republican National Committee pledged several months ago to fight against any move to influence President Ford's position on this issue without first consulting with representatives of the Cuban community in exile. We want to let you know that White House officials have given us assurance that the Republican Administration will comply with the Party's recommendation, if and when the United States decides to consider a new foreign policy toward the Cuban Castro regime.

We believe the place for the Cuban community to voice its opinions would be the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and you can be sure that Republican elected leaders will once again invoke the Republican philosophy, which your community shares with us in defending the aspirations of the Cuban people.

The issue of relations with Cuba is far from being resolved, and we urge your community to be prepared to present its case before the American people.





MIAMI AL DIA

By Hilda Inclan

Exile leaders want a say in nation's Cuba policy

Cuban Republicans want the U.S. administration to consult with exiled Cubans in case of any U.S. policy change toward their country.

Arturo Hevia and Armando Lacasa, the only two Cubans among 13 national members of the Spanish Speaking Advisory Committee, of the Republican National Committee (RNC), forwarded the proposal to the committee for approval.



Piden que el Gobierno Consulte Antes a los Líderes del Exilio

Por Evaristo R. Savón

Con la presencia del señor Raul Espinosa, Director del Consejo Hispanoamericano del Partido Republicano en Washington, y la participación del doctor Arturo Hevia y del señor Armando Lacasa, miembros en esta ciudad de

relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba por el Representante John A. Ashbrook (republicano por Ohio) en el Record Congressional del primero de Mayo, y por el Senador Edward J. Gurney (republicano por la Florida)

hispanos que residen en los Estados Unidos".

El señor Lacasa reiteró las palabras del señor Espinosa y recalcó "que la Resolución aprobada por el Consejo establece el principio de que cualquiera posibilidad de

soslayable apoyar y defender a quien está siendo atacado injusta y diariamente por instituciones, congresistas y políticos sin respeto alguno para su investidura y sin consideración alguna para su persona.

tiene que triunfar".

El Senador Gurney —reiteró la señorita Welch— dio su apoyo a la recomendación del Comité de "que la Administración (de Nixon) consulte con líderes cubano americanos antes de que se



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WHAT DOES RESUMPTION OFFER U.S.?

Soviet Military Binds Cuba Hard and Fast

By DR. LEON GOURE

IN his "deliberative and carefully constructed" speech in Houston on March 1, Secretary of State Kissinger indicated that the Ford administration was prepared to move in a "new direction" in its policy toward Cuba. In his speech Kissinger signaled the willingness of the United States to vote for the lifting

University of Miami, indicates that after years of effort, the Soviet Union has succeeded in absorbing Cuba into and firmly tying it to its bloc, and that at present Cuba is, in fact, a political and military proxy of Moscow.

SOVIET efforts to integrate Cuba into the "socialist community of states" led by Moscow and to make




Thus, as the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Patolichev, has declared, "Cuba is one of the Soviet Union's basic trading partners."

Although the current high sugar prices in the world market have considerably boosted Cuba's earnings for the approximately 2 million tons it is free to sell to non-Communist countries, much of the gain

cerned with the preservation of the U.S.-Soviet detente. The cessation of Castro's efforts to export revolution to Latin America is one of the stated conditions for U.S. resumption of relations with Cuba.

WHILE it is true that the Soviet Union has proclaimed its preference for a strategy of "peaceful" conquest of power by the Communist



¿Quién Gobierna en EE.UU.: Ford o Kissinger?

Por Eduardo Suárez Rivas

Hace breves días durante su estancia en el cercano Hollywood, el presidente Ford pronunció un alertador discurso sobre diversos tópicos que necesitan solución de su Gobierno. Con el carácter y la franqueza que le es proverbial, planteó sus argumentos en materia económica, energética, etc., y trató el tema en relación con la política con Cuba comunista. Mantuvo que no había ningún cambio en la política norteamericana respecto a Cuba o sea el mantenimiento del status quo, que aunque no es una solución para las ansias de los cubanos libres, permite la persistencia de nuestra lucha, que impide la coexistencia pacífica con el castrismo y el que logremos la nueva independencia, soberanía, libertades

Cuba, la aliada y amiga. Para el discípulo de Metternich "la política es utilitaria y no ética". ¿Qué le interesa al exprofesor de Harvard, cuya prédica de la "detente" ha fracasado en el S.E. del Asia, no arriba a una solución definitiva en el Medio Oriente a pesar de su importancia energética, se ha producido por la URSS la impugnación del convenio comercial celebrado con E. U. en 1972 y no ha logrado como Meternich en la Santa Alianza, el impedir la expansión revolucionaria de los ejércitos de Napoleón? ¿En dónde y en qué tratado se ha logrado una decisión de paz para el mundo, cuando crece a diario el poderío armamentista y los créditos para las fuerzas armadas en la península



NOSOTROS CREEMOS EN LA JERARQUIA

Por Armando Garcia Sifredo

CREER en la declaración del Presidente de Estados Unidos, es tener confianza en la palabra de un hombre que merece respeto por su jerarquía.

Por eso, cuando el señor presidente Gerard Ford afirmó que los Estados Unidos no cambiarían su actitud con respecto a Cuba, hasta el instante en que Cuba no cambiara su actitud hacia Estados Unidos, asegurando a su vez que se mantenían los mismos criterios sostenidos durante estos últimos años, nosotros creimos —porque no podíamos dudar— en la palabra del Primer Magistrado de Estados Unidos, aunque en este caso no fuera el elegido por el pueblo y sí por las

PATRIA
1975
Editorial



Las Declaraciones del Secretario de Estado

Por Ariel Remos

Las declaraciones que formuló hace pocos días a los periodistas el presidente Ford, en el sentido de que los Estados Unidos de América no variarían su política respecto a Cuba, fueron asombrosamente desmentidas por su Secretario de Estado, Henry Kissinger, en el discurso que pronunciara tres días después en Houston, Texas, de cuyo contexto se deduce claramente la decisión del gobierno norteamericano de ir a la reconciliación con

que muy bien pudo haber adaptado sus principios básicos a los complejos factores políticos, sociales y económicos de nuestro tiempo, productos del desarrollo de la tecnología y de la necesidad de nuevas estructuras funcionales. Lejos de ello, permitieron que el peso de la historia se inclinara en una lenta pero continua socialización de vastas regiones del planeta, cuyo proceso ha alcanzado ya el meollo de nuestra sustancia



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- CONFIDENTIAL -

A
POSITION PAPER
ON
UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CUBA

OFFICE OF SPANISH SPEAKING AFFAIRS
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
310 FIRST STREET, SE
WASHINGTON, DC 20003



terms perhaps increasingly costly efforts to discredit the animal in the hope of minimizing his potential for damage."

The many arguments in favor of normalized U.S.-Cuban relations center on the point that U.S. policy has failed to isolate Cuba, and that the changing international environment render our present policy nugatory. Few critics of our present policy seem willing to ask what the U.S. stands to gain--or even lose--from a resumption of relations.

The argument that the U.S. should be willing to make any sacrifice to give Communist nations a greater stake in continued and improved relations with the United States has proven to be increasingly costly and futile. Such a policy can only undermine U.S. credibility and consequently lead to a more adventurous policy on the part of our adversaries in the international arena.

The Republican Administration, while it moves to review U.S. relations with Cuba, should demonstrate a clear desire to learn the views of those who oppose normalization of relations. Furthermore, they should determine whether or not the incorporation of views and recommendations of that group is a feasible and desired political move on their part to keep Cuban-Americans a strong Republican constituency.

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