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SALT: WHY STALLED

WHERE WE WERE: FIRST, AGREEMENT 1972 FOR FIVE YEARS: COVERED ONLY MISSILES. NEW AGREEMENT INCLUDED HEAVY BOMBERS, MIRVs AND LASTS THROUGH 1985.

VLADIVOSTOK: HAS TO GET CEILINGS AND EQUALITY FOR BOTH SIDES, NO SPECIAL COMPENSATION TO SOVIETS: I ACHIEVED THIS AT VLADIVOSTOK: WAS MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.

REDUCTIONS: ALSO HAVE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO REDUCE CEILINGS.

PROGRESS SINCE: DURING LAST TWO YEARS TREATY 90 PERCENT COMPLETE: HAVE GOOD VERIFICATION: CEILING ON HEAVY MISSILES.

REMAINING ISSUE: NEW WEAPONS: CRUISE MISSILES AND NEW SOVIET BOMBER IN GREY AREA: ARE THEY STRATEGIC? HAVE NARROWED DIFFERENCES, CAN SOLVE.

NON PARTISAN: TWO IMPORTANT FOR PARTISAN ADVANTAGE: COMPLETE AFTER ELECTION, SUBMIT TO NEW CONGRESS.

ALTERNATIVE: GOOD SALT AGREEMENT IN LONG TERM NATIONAL INTEREST; ALTERNATIVE IS ARMS RACE: HAVE TO SPEND 20 BILLION; OWE IT TO AMERICAN PEOPLE TRY FOR AGREEMENT.



REBUTTAL ON SALT

TOO HIGH: ACTUAL LEVELS (2400) REQUIRE SOVIET REDUCTIONS BY 100-150.

ALREADY HAVE AGREEMENT TO MOVE TO REDUCTIONS

MISSILE THROW WEIGHT: SOVIETS HAVE HEAVIER MISSILES, BUT WE HAVE MORE ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, MORE WARHEADS BY 3 TO 1; THERE IS OVERALL BALANCE, CAN MAINTAIN IF CONGRESS SUPPORTS OUR PROGRAMS: TRIDENT, B-1, NEW ICBMs.

SOVIET ADVANTAGES: WON'T SIGN AGREEMENT THAT IS NOT EQUAL, IN OUR INTEREST, AND CAN BE VERIFIED.

CRUISE MISSILE RACE: STILL NEGOTIATING: CRUISE MISSILES NEW TYPE WEAPON, MAY OR MAY NOT BE IN SALT BUT U.S. NOT OPENING NEW RACE.

CONTINUATION OF NIXON-HAK FOREIGN POLICY



ISSUE: IMPACT OF GRF UPON FOREIGN POLICY INHERITED FROM RN-HAK

1. IN EARLY DAYS OF MY ADMINISTRATION, I MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO CARRY FORWARD THE GREAT FOREIGN POLICY TRADITIONS OF THE POST-WAR ERA:

-- IT WAS URGENT THAT OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES UNDERSTOOD THAT AMERICA WOULD REMAIN THE STRONGEST PEACEMAKER IN THE WORLD. WE HAVE ENDED THEIR FEARS. (FOR EXAMPLE, I CALLED NATO AMBASSADORS IN FOR A MEETING THE DAY I TOOK OFFICE TO REASSURE THEM THAT AMERICA WOULD BE STEADFAST IN ITS COMMITMENTS. )

-- IT WAS EQUALLY URGENT THAT OUR ADVERSARIES UNDERSTAND THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT LOSE ITS CAPACITY OR ITS RESOLVE IN THE  
(OVER)

MIDST OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS. IT WAS A TIME OF GREAT TESTING FOR US. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SHOW FIRMNESS, AND CONFIDENCE -- TO DEMONSTRATE THE STABILITY OF OUR POLICY AND OUR WILL. THE STATE OF THE WORLD TODAY ATTESTS TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

2. SO CONTINUITY WAS IMPORTANT IN EARLY DAYS, BUT SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE MOVED VIGOROUSLY ON SEVERAL FRONTS WHERE NEW PROGRESS AND NEW INITIATIVES SEEMED POSSIBLE. AND WE'VE MADE STRIKING BREAKTHROUGHS:

- NEW ACCORDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST;
- NEW AGREEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA;

(CONTINUED)

CONTINUATION OF NIXON-HAK FOREIGN POLICY (CONTINUED)

-- COORDINATED ATTACK ON WORLDWIDE RECESSION LED BY U. S. ;

-- NEW U. S. PROPOSALS TO MEET FUTURE FOOD NEEDS, ASSIST  
DEVELOPING NATIONS.

EACH OF THESE REPRESENTS A FORD ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVE AND  
A FORD ADMINISTRATION BREAKTHROUGH. EACH HAS FURTHERED THE CAUSE  
OF PEACE.

IMMEDIATE  
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS  
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: STEPHEN HERBITZ

DEK \_\_\_\_\_

DAC 62

GPS \_\_\_\_\_

TO: FOSTER CHANOCK

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:



1976 OCT 6 01 15

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
Interviewed by  
Mr. Frank Tomlinson, ABC News  
At the Pentagon  
Tuesday, October 5, 1976



Q: Mr. Secretary, we've got the highest defense budget in history right now. Why is it so high?

A: We really don't. We really don't. Because it is down, if one corrects the budget for inflation, which is an interesting point. It is the highest in terms of the numbers of dollars in the figure for the overall total. But in point of fact, the budget today is lower in real terms, after correcting for inflation than it was ten years ago.

The important thing, I think, in looking at a budget of that type is to look at it several ways. One is the absolute number, and it's a lot of dollars, there is no question. A second way is, what kind of a burden is it on the society. It is the lowest percentage of our gross national product and the lowest percentage of our federal budget since before the Korean War. So it's not a burden in that sense as a percentage burden.

The most important way of looking at the budget, however, is, is it enough. That is to say, if freedom is a very precious thing, and it is, and if the world is not a perfectly friendly place, and it isn't; then, indeed, are we investing the kind of resources we need to have the defense capability, the deterrence, to deter war, to contribute to peace and stability in the world. I think that's what's important.

Q: Well, in the face of the world situation as it is today, do we stand any chance of seeing the defense budget go down in the future?

A: Well, I think that what's happened is that the budget that Presidents have proposed, of both parties, over a period of a decade, have been cut each year from their proposals. The effect of it is that our budget today is lower than 10 years ago if you correct for inflation. Now what the future would hold I think is a function of what the environment in the world is. And to the extent that the Soviet Union continues its steady expansion as it has during this period when we have not, then I think it's clear that the United States cannot allow our country to move to a position of inferiority. So we have to invest to see that we have a balance and stability and peace in the world.

Were there to be a change of circumstance, obviously, it wouldn't require the kind of investment we're making. We take the world like we find it and try to make it better, but the way to make it better is not to become weak and inject an instability into the world.

Q: There have been some charges by some of the people on the Hill that the Defense Department is spending too much for exotic, expensive weapons, such as the B-1 and so on. Do we really need what they call exotic, expensive weapons?

A: There is historically, of course, in the Defense Department and in the defense area been a tug of war over the question of continuing to produce a current weapons system or reaching out to the next level of technology and in fact taking that step to develop a new system. It's always a compromise and a set of balances and eventually, new technology takes over inevitably. It has in the past, it will in the future.

MORE

In the case of the B-1, we have a strategic nuclear balance, it is important that we keep that balance. It's based on a nuclear Triad of three separate systems so that we don't have all of our eggs in one basket, so to speak. The B-52 is one element of the Triad. To the extent the B-52 ages, as it does, as all systems do, and some of them are you know, 10, 15, 20 years old, it's important to see that there is a follow-on system. Successive Secretaries of Defense and Congresses have authorized the investment in research and development for a follow-on system. Later this year, the Defense Department will be making the judgment as to whether or not that particular weapons system is ready; the performance data and the tests and everything will be available and the costs at that time and we will approach it in an orderly way.

Q: I was reading in the Congressional Quarterly about the budget and so on, and it had listed that it was \$28 million in there that went to the CIA Retirement Fund. Why would that go to the CIA?

A: Well, I don't know what particular part of the budget you were looking at, but there are several ways of arraying the budget figures. One can look at simply the Department of Defense or you can look at the defense function, and group other things in. I would guess that that is why, it was probably under the category of Defense Function.

Q: I think probably one of the most important things that people would want to know is if we're talking about \$104 billion dollars, are we really getting our money's worth in what we're spending today?

A: Well, the answer is, I think we are to the extent it's humanly possible at this point in time to do it. I would never suggest that the Pentagon is a model of perfect efficiency. There is waste. There is waste in most human activities -- in domestic departments, in the private sector. We have had cost overruns in the Department. We're breaking our necks to try to see that the dollars go in the most efficient way possible so that they are in the highest priority areas and the taxpayer is getting their money's worth.

We find that when comparing our cost escalations against things like the John Hancock Building or the Washington Metro or the Rayburn Office Building in the Congress or the Bay Area Transit, that we do pretty darn well. But is it perfect? No. Will it ever be perfect? I doubt it. But are we breaking our necks to try to make it more perfect? You bet your life we are.

Q: If we should get a SALT agreement and MBFR, do you think that might cause us to lower our military stance somewhat, as far as spending money goes?

A: I think that the reason that the President has pursued so vigorously the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and the Mutual Balance Force Reduction Talks is because there is no question but that there is at least the prospect for a better world if we are able to agree on some caps on some of these systems. Now, no one suggests that were you able to achieve those caps on some of the weapons systems that it would solve all of your problems and suddenly you could reduce all your defense spending and that type of thing. No one is suggesting that.

But it's a step. It's a step in creating a more rational environment and as long as it is consistent with our national security interests, as long as we're patient and cautious and recognize who we are dealing with, it does offer that prospect of avoiding some increases that otherwise would inevitably have occurred. So we are working on it.

Q: Well, when we go after these weapons systems, is there more than you ever expect in research and development on these? I mean the cost of research and development. Does that seem inordinately high?

A: Well, if one thinks about science or technology, take something like research in cancer. One doesn't know when the progress will be such that there will be a cure for cancer, but we make that investment. In certain scientific areas you are right on the edge of new technology; it's not really possible to predict with certainty when you will be able to achieve a certain threshold or goal. As a result, we work with the Congress to try to see that our research and development is sensible, that we are working on the things that are important, and will have the greatest potential payoff. There is no question but that in any scientific endeavor you can make an investment and have it be a dead end. That does not necessarily mean it was a failure, because you've learned that that is not an area where you are going to achieve success.

Q: Well, just one final question. When the Pentagon goes after a budget, does it act like something like a Union negotiation, do you go after the stars when all you really want is the moon and when they cut it it really does not hurt you that much?

A: I think that the truth is there was a pattern to that in past years. I cannot speak from personal knowledge, but my impression has been that in past years there might have been an element of that. There has not been during my time. We made a conscious decision that we would develop a budget which I could defend to the Office of Management and Budget and to the President in good conscience; that we really believed was necessary, and that we would not kind of wink and close our eye when the Congress cut it by a certain amount as could be the case. Instead, we put forward what we honestly believe is necessary for the country. If we want to have a stable world, a peaceful world, and assure ourselves that we aren't inferior, that in fact we have the capability to deter a war, that was the budget we really believed was necessary.

We even went a step further. We told the country and the Congress that it was not a one year fix, that is to say, we would have to sustain a higher level of effort over a period of years to assure that the adverse trends as between the United States and the Soviet Union over the past decade and a half in fact were arrested, because they were unacceptable trends. They were adverse to our interests and they couldn't be continued.

October 5, 1976

SUBJECT: SHARE OF GNP

Mr. Aspin agrees with our current estimate that the Russians are spending from 10-15% of their GNP on defense. He concurs in our assumption that this in some way reflects upon the efficiency of the defense industry in the Soviet Union. He criticizes our calculation of these statistics. However, the level of their defense spending relative to their GNP is an indication of their national commitment to defense. In contrast, it should be noted that the U.S. spends approximately 5% of its GNP on defense.

SUBJECT: SPENDING TRENDS

Mr. Aspin concurs with our assessment that the Soviets have increased their defense spending by approximately 3% per year over the past decade. He fails to note that during the same period U.S. defense spending has steadily declined.

SUBJECT: WEAPONS PRODUCTION

Mr. Aspin concurs with our position that the Soviets have a great many more weapons than the U.S. and continue to produce their weapons at a higher rate. He argues that their quantitative rate is "to a certain extent" offset by the increased quality of U.S. weapons. This is true, however, he fails to recognize that in the past decade the Soviet Union has made significant progress in improving the quality of all their weapons systems.

SUMMARY OF ASPIN FACT SHEET

"The overall thrust of the Aspin piece is clear: the statistics which the U.S. administration has been using about the relative size of the U.S. and Soviet defense efforts are being distorted to serve the Pentagon's purposes; moreover, even if Soviet defense budgets have been increasing, we need not worry particularly, for only half of the purported increases can be viewed as 'threatening' to the United States.

"Although the facts force Aspin to admit that U.S. and Soviet defense program trends are adverse to the United States -- the central point of the article -- he spends the bulk of his essay deprecating the significance of this. The remainder of the article is devoted largely to the red herring of conceptual problems in the CIA's method of comparing the absolute size of the Soviet and U.S. defense program. Thus, he mostly ignores the data showing that, for the better part of a decade, in manpower, force levels, equipment, and various other measures, Soviet military strength has been increasing while ours has been declining...."

SOURCE: Amos Jordan, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, April 1976

## SPENDING TRENDS

CHARGE: About half the Soviet increase has gone into manpower and equipment destined for the Sino-Soviet border, internal security forces and other missions that cannot be considered threatening to the United States or its allies.

ANSWER: It is not clear on what basis Representative Aspin calculates that only about one-half of the Soviet growth is threatening to the U.S. It is true that a significant portion of the Soviet growth supported her build-up along her border with China. But not all of these Soviet forces are "pinned-down" and incapable of threatening U.S. interests in Europe or elsewhere. In fact, only about one-fourth of the Soviet ground forces are in the Far East, and one-half are facing NATO -- a very important difference for defense planners. (Of overall Soviet forces, far less than 25% are committed against China.) His related observations that Soviet Far Eastern deployments do not threaten U.S. interests (or, indeed, Japan's), presumably because they are anti-Chinese, not only ignores the security interests and troop deployments of the United States in Northeast Asia but also presupposes an unwarranted Soviet force inflexibility.

Indeed, apart from data inadequacies, the flexibility of Soviet forces and the variability of Soviet marginal resource allocations over time are crucial weak points in his case. In the past several years, for instance, the Soviets have not put increased military resources into a build-up against China or in other areas Aspin delineates as "nonthreatening" but overwhelmingly into "threatening" strategic offensive systems and associated research and development (R&D).

October 5, 1976

SUBJECT: OVERALL DEFENSE SPENDING

CHARGE: Determining who is spending more on defense depends on what currency is used. Use a dollar comparison and the Soviets are spending more, use a ruble comparison and the United States is spending more.

ANSWER: The Soviets spend rubles, while the U.S. spends dollars.

A comparison between the amount of rubles the Soviets spend on defense and the dollars we spend is virtually meaningless.

So far as spending for military capability is concerned, we have observed a steady increase, in real terms, on the part of the Soviet Union over the past 10-15 years. During the same period U.S. defense spending -- again, in terms of real purchasing power -- has decreased steadily. This has resulted in a greatly expanded research and development base and production rates in the Soviet Union that, in most instances, exceed ours. On a comparable basis, while the Soviet Union has been increasing those resources it devotes to defense at an average of three percent a year since 1965 in real terms, our baseline defense budget has been declining in real dollar terms.

By any reasonable measure of the size of military programs -- ruble-based or dollar-based -- the Soviets have been growing steadily while the U.S. has declined. As a result, the Soviet program has exceeded our own for some years and now does so by a substantial margin.

October 5, 1976

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC WEAPONS

CHARGE: The Pentagon likes to point out that the Russians have more missiles and more explosive power in their warheads. But, the United States has more warheads and, in fact, the United States lead in warheads has been growing. We have 1,656 missiles; we have thrown away more than 1,500 missiles. The Russians have 2,330, many of which are older.

ANSWER: Not only do the Soviets have more missiles, as Mr. Aspin acknowledges, but they also have significantly greater throwweight and megatonnage. It is true that the U.S. has more MIRV launchers and deliverable warheads. When all factors are considered -- including bombers and hard target destruction potential -- the net assessment is that rough equivalence in strategic nuclear forces exists today between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As to Mr. Aspin's notion that many of the Russian missiles are older ones, current trends indicate that, by the early 1980's, all or most of the Soviet Union's existing ICBM's could be replaced with a new generation of missiles. Indeed their new ICBM's, currently being deployed, have substantially greater throwweight and are significantly more accurate than their predecessors.

The growing numbers and technological sophistication of Soviet strategic forces suggest that, unless countered, the strategic balance that exists today could shift in favor of the Soviet Union in the period ahead.



October 5, 1976

SUBJECT: MILITARY MANPOWER

CHARGE: Russian military manpower vastly outnumbered ours, but it always has, in a large part because they use servicemen where we use civilians.

ANSWER: The Soviet Union has not, until recently, established forward operating bases that are remote from her borders. The extension of Soviet power into Central Europe and along the Sino-Soviet border does not require the extensive out-of-area logistical and support forces that the U.S. requires. Rather, the Soviets have historically built roads and railroads as far forward as possible, enabling them to load combat equipment at the factory and unload it near the front line. Road and Railroad troops contribute to the specific mission of maintaining these lines of communication; they are organized to complete this mission in peace or war. To ignore the contribution of 100,000 Road and Railroad troops is naive. It would be similar to ignoring the contributions of the "Red Ball Express" and other such transportation units during the Allies' dash through France in 1944, as well as our support units today. Similarly, we should not ignore the contribution of some 250,000 Soviet construction troops maintaining re-supply routes and engaging in combat engineer activities, including assault forces. To eliminate KGB border guards from consideration by comparing them to border patrols is to ignore Soviet history and the mission of their forces. These units have been used in some cases as the first wave of shock troops to attack across an international border. Their armament

SUBJECT: MILITARY MANPOWER (Cont'd)

includes tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored personnel carriers. They are not, as some believe, analagous to the U.S. Border Patrol. In summary, this list of troops, members of the Soviet armed forces with military organization, equipment, and combat missions, totals 500,000 to 550,000 men who have been incorrectly categorized as non-threatening.

Some analysts have made the simplifying assumption that Soviet manpower levels which exceed U.S. manpower levels in strategic offensive and defensive forces are excess and non-threatening. Quite the contrary, the Soviets have more strategic weapons to man and they have manned vast numbers of intermediate range ballistic missiles which threaten our allies in Europe and Asia. While it is known that the U.S. military has offset manpower requirements with technological sophistication, it is faulty logic to assume that any Soviet manpower strength above U.S. figures is excess to their mission. Are air defense interceptor regiments, which can be moved to "the sound of the guns" excess? If war were to break out near the Soviet borders, near China or West Germany for instance, could decision makers exclude the contributions of 150,000 men and several thousand aircraft? Some analysts also suggest that political officers be excluded from comparing forces. Political officers are the second in command of most Soviet combat units, army companies and battalions, navy ships, and air force regiments; they are akin to the Executive Officer in U.S. military units. While these political officers are selected for their political orthodoxy, they are trained to assume the commander's mission: to fight.

(continued)

SUBJECT: MILITARY MANPOWER (Cont'd)

Hence, it is difficult to exclude much Soviet manpower on the premise that they are "non-threatening." In fact, Soviet manpower levels have become more threatening in that their force level has increased from 3.4 million men to something in the neighborhood of 4.4 million -- even excluding some 400,000 border guards and internal security forces. The U.S. presently has 2.1 million Americans in uniform.



Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Carter has said that he thinks this nation ought to have as its ultimate goal zero nuclear weapons for any nations in the world. We must demonstrate meaningful progress toward the goal of control and then reduction and ultimately elimination of nuclear arsenals.

1. The United States has, does, and will continue to support and pursue a goal of reducing nuclear weapons for all nations.
2. There are two superpowers on this earth and both must agree to any reductions.
3. I will not become party to an agreement that in any way detrimentally affects the national security interests of the United States or any of its allies.
4. It would be naive and dangerous to act unilaterally.
  - (a) The United States would act in good faith, but it is highly unlikely that most other nations, whatever they claimed, would do so.
  - (b) Atomic weapons can be made smaller than a briefcase and easily hidden.
  - (c) Those nations with the least moral restraint about using nuclear weapons would also have the fewest scruples about concealing them.
5. We cannot depend on the good intentions of others for our national security. When the very existence of our nation is involved, we must be vigilant, we must be tough, and we must move deliberately, giving full consideration to the effect of each step.

Q.

Mr. President, isn't it true that your nuclear effort was developed purely as a response to Governor Carter's proposals in May and September?

Q.

Mr. President, how do your policies differ from Governor Carter's in the nuclear area?



## Overview Response on Nuclear Issues

Nuclear power is one of the most complex issues we face. It is also one of the most difficult to discuss in a campaign because it lends itself so easily to demagoguery. Fortunately, nuclear power has traditionally been approached in a bipartisan manner. There has never been a Republican or Democratic position on questions of nuclear safety or preventing nuclear proliferation. I hope there never will be.

As President I have dealt with nuclear issues from three different perspectives:

First, in assuring that our domestic nuclear power plants are safe and environmentally acceptable;

Second, preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials which can be used to make weapons;

Third, in developing a balanced program of nuclear and non-nuclear research and development which will contribute to reduction of dependence on foreign oil and our vulnerability to embargoes.

My Administration has taken strong action in each of these areas. For example:

1. Shortly after I took office, I signed into law the bill creating an independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Its primary mission is to oversee the development of the nuclear industry from



the standpoint of protecting public health and safety. This legislation eliminated the potential conflict of interest that existed in the old Atomic Energy Commission where the regulatory and promotional responsibilities were combined.



2. In the last two years, I have increased the budget for nuclear safety regulation by more than 60% from \$148 million when I took office to nearly \$250 million this year.

3. In the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some other nations, eager to become nuclear suppliers, were being tempted to offer laxity in the treatment of nuclear materials as a competitive device. I directed the Secretary of State to find ways of eliminating this dangerous form of competition. As a result of this effort, the first Conference of Nuclear Supplier Nations was convened in London in April 1975. That Conference has met 6 times and the seven nations have agreed to a much tighter set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I have directed that the United <sup>states</sup> adopt these guidelines as our policy.

4. In the area of energy research and development, I have increased our commitments in both the nuclear and non-nuclear areas. By far the greatest increase, however, has occurred in the non-nuclear area. Coal research has tripled in the last two years. Solar energy research has increased about 8 times--conservation research more than 4 times. We now have a balanced program, and we expect results in both the nuclear and non-nuclear areas

that will contribute substantially to reducing our dependence on foreign oil.

But the effort to insure that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh its risks have not stopped. Several months ago, I initiated a complex review of the entire nuclear fuel cycle in both its domestic and international aspects. That review has now been completed. In the context of this debate, there is obviously not enough time for me to explain fully the decisions that I have made on this entire range of issues, but I shall announce them in a very short time.

There is one final point that I would like to make on this whole question of dealing with nuclear energy, particularly on the question of proliferation. As in so many other areas of foreign policy, the real issue which confronts the President is to make very sure that what he proposes is effective. He cannot be satisfied with mere words. In nuclear proliferation this means making sure that other countries which have the ability to export nuclear materials and technology abide by the same set of rules as the United States. If they do not, then all of our words and all of our efforts are in vain and the world becomes an even more dangerous place than it is. Achieving cooperation in these areas requires leadership on our part and a willingness to negotiate positively but firmly to apply strong pressures, as we have in some cases, to discourage undesirable developments, and to offer incentives, as we have in other areas, to encourage cooperation. Unilateral declarations, no matter how good they may sound, will not prevent nuclear



proliferation, and it is with such proliferation that the President of the United States must concern himself.

10/4/76

REBUTTAL - NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Mr. Carter's remarks on nuclear proliferation suggest that he has not followed what has been happening in U. S. foreign policy and he does not know how an effective foreign policy is made.



His claim that the proliferation issue has been ignored is flatly wrong. Shortly after I took office I became concerned that some other nations, eager to improve their nuclear business, were enhancing their competitive position by offering customers easy access to plutonium. As a nation, we had three choices:

-- compete along with them. But if we did, the world would become an even more dangerous place than it is today;

-- issue a unilateral declaration like Mr. Carter has proposed announcing that we did not like what was happening and threatening other countries with ~~sanctions~~ they could easily avoid or ignore;

-- Finally, we could take the initiative to eliminate this dangerous form of competition once and for all on a world-wide base.

I choose this third course. As a direct result of our efforts, the first Nuclear Suppliers Conference convened in London in April 1975.

That conference has met six times and the seven nations have agreed to a much tighter set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I directed that as an interim step, the U. S. adopt these guidelines as our policy.

But I was not satisfied that we had done all in our power to effectively prevent nuclear proliferation. Last summer, therefore, I called for a complete review of our policy toward plutonium both here and abroad. That review was completed a month ago. I have made my decision. We are now in the process of ensuring that we get the kind of international cooperation necessary to make an effective worldwide policy.

Unlike Mr. Carter, I cannot be content with settling for a speech which sounds good at home but makes no difference abroad. In the area of nuclear proliferation this is particularly true. The blunt fact is that there are other nations who have the technology, the resources and the will to supply nuclear materials no matter what we do or say. In order to stop proliferation we must get the cooperation of all of those nations. We won't get that cooperation by issuing unilateral declarations. We have gotten it, and we will continue to get it, by developing wise policies, and by pursuing those policies through a course of quite, firm and patient negotiation.



THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON PROLIFERATION



When the President took office, the United States had three ways of dealing with nuclear proliferation and preventing the spread of plutonium:

- no U.S. export of reprocessing facilities
- support for Non-Proliferation Treaty
- support of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Program

Since taking office, he has expanded enormously U.S. efforts:

- bilateral pressure on those who would acquire plutonium facilities elsewhere
  - South Korea
  - Taiwan
- much greater financial commitment to research in U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency to develop ways of detecting diversion of plutonium.
- multilateral cooperation to develop common guidelines for all nuclear suppliers.
- London Suppliers Conference, beginning April, 1975, produced new, tougher guidelines on all nuclear exports. U.S. has adopted as interim policy.
- comprehensive review (Fri report) begun summer '76 to review entire U.S. stance toward plutonium:
  - question assumption whether use of plutonium is either necessary or desirable.

As a result of Fri report, President has made decisions dramatically changing U.S. stance toward use of plutonium:

- it is not certain that plutonium use is either necessary or desirable;
- before we or others commit to it, it is necessary to establish that the material can be handled in such a way as to ensure both safety and non-proliferations
- calls for a three-year worldwide moratorium on export of all reprocessing facilities;
- for those countries which do produce plutonium, to put it in the custody of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- U.S. initiative to undertake agreements restricting reprocessing and plutonium use;
- development of financial and technical alternatives to use of plutonium until and unless its safety is assured.



Rebuttal to Carter if Nuclear Proliferation Issue is Raised by Him

I am glad to see Governor Carter is concerned with the issue of nuclear proliferation. He has aligned himself with a great number of Republicans and Democrats who have treated this as a serious, but bipartisan, issue over the past three decades. I cannot imagine any sane person who would be against nuclear safety or for a system which would permit nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of irresponsible groups or nations.

As in so many areas the real issue which confronts a President is to make very sure that what he proposes is effective. He cannot be satisfied with mere words. In nuclear proliferation this means making sure that other countries which have the ability to export nuclear materials and technology abide by the same set of rules as the United States. This requires leadership on our part and a willingness to negotiate patiently, but firmly. Unilateral declarations may sound good, but they aren't sufficient to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Let me give you an example, Shortly after I came to office, I directed the Secretary of State to explore ways to prevent suppliers of nuclear materials from competing by being lax on the issue of safeguards. In April, 1975, as a direct result of this effort the first conference of nuclear supplier nations opened in London. That conference has met six times and the seven nations involved have agreed on a set of much stricter guidelines to govern nuclear exports. I have directed that

these guidelines be adopted as U.S. policy. The effort hasn't stopped. Several months ago I initiated a comprehensive re-examination of our nuclear policies. That effort is now just about completed. We are now consulting with other major suppliers and I expect to announce my decisions in the very near future.

Editorial Publiised Friday, October 1, 1976  
in the "OREGONIAN" (State's largest newspaper)



### THE NUCLEAR CARTER

When Jimmy Carter was campaigning the the May Primary in Oregon, he told newsmen in Eugene, "If I lived in Oregon, I'd vote for the nuclear safe-guard measure". Four months later Carter told an audience of labor leaders in Portland, "I am not in favor of any moratorium on atomic power plants".

Ballot Measure 9, to which Carter referred during the Primary, would impose an effective moratorium on nuclear power construction in Oregon, and as many of the Measure's supporters hope, it might well block all future nuclear development by imposing on the utility industry conditions that are impossible to meet.

In May, Carter took a characteristic State's right stance by declaring, "I have no objection to States declaring a moratorium if they understand the end results." He went on to say that nuclear power should be used only as a "last resort". Referring to Ballot Measure 9, Carter said he understood it to be "more liberal" than the nuclear power measure in California (later defeated 2-1 by a turnout of 6 million voters), and is "thus more acceptable to me".

Judging by Carter's remarks to the Portland labor gathering (organized labor strongly opposes nuclear measure, believing it will cause high unemployment) the Democratic nominee sounded considerably more pro nuclear in September than he did in May.

"For the foreseeable future", Carter said this week, "we'll have to continue to operate and build atomic power plants." Further, he said, "As a nuclear engineer, I know nuclear power can be safe." Carter shifted his position of last May when he said he had no objection to States declaring a moratorium and gave his support to the Oregon measure.

"We should not permit the 50 states to do the regulation, but the Federal government should let the people know it will be safe. We can't have 50 different states doing different things with nuclear power", he told AFL-CIO labor leaders in Portland. The idea that the Federal government should be paramount in nuclear regulation goes beyond the position of many opponents of Ballot Measure 9 who have cited regulations already incorporated into Oregon law as being so tough that a moratorium Ballot Measure is not needed to ensure the safety of nuclear power in the State.

Carter's aides in Atlanta said Thursday, the candidate has

not changed his position in opposing nuclear moratoriums, but they seemed surprised to learn that the Oregon Supreme Court in reviewing the material provided by opponents in the Voters Pamphlet<sup>1/</sup> did not consider misleading the contention that the measure would halt nuclear power development in Oregon.

Carter, in reconsidering his May position, perhaps in light of the California vote and more knowledge about Ballot Measure 9, intimates that he would not block the expansion of nuclear power plants if elected President. On the contrary, he has said he would support some of the things the utility industry would like to see done, such as the standardization of nuclear plants to hold down/<sup>their</sup> costs and arésolution of development conflicts that now prevail in Government agencies..



Note: Oregon Labor Press, official publication of AFL-CIO published yesterday has headline -- "Carter Opposed Nuclear Moratorium Measures".

<sup>1/</sup> The Voters Pamphlet is informational voters piece that goes to every registered voter in Oregon--prepared by the Secretary of State--Federally subsidized--in an attempt to fully inform electorate on position of candidates and Ballot Measures. It goes to approximately 1.5 million voters.

Carter is listed on page 28 as a supporter of this nuclear safeguards measure.

Governor Carter has tried to picture himself as having seized the initiative on nuclear proliferation policy and forced the country into action.

His facts are wrong; his recommended policies are wrong.

Less than a month after I took office, Secretary Kissinger addressed the United Nations and set forth in detail United States concerns about nuclear proliferation.

In January of 1975 -- under my direction -- the first meeting of the world's nuclear suppliers met at the urging of the United States in London to discuss restraints necessary to foster non-proliferation. That group has now developed a common set of guidelines and their work will continue.

*I mix*  
Bilaterally, in each and every attempt at proliferation -- South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Pakistan -- the U.S. -- under my orders -- stepped in and tried to in an attempt to prevent it.

In my term of office, 16 additional countries have become signatories of the non-proliferation treaty -- many at the strong urging of the United States. These included such countries as Germany, Japan, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium.


Governor Carter's lack of familiarity with these facts --disturbing as it is -- is not as disturbing as his policy direction.

He is suggesting that the U.S. act unilaterally -- he "will make no new commitments of nuclear technology ... to countries which refuse" to follow U.S. directions. Such a policy fails to address the very simple point that even though we might not export these facilities, other countries can and will. Unless we secure their agreement to act with restraint, we have done nothing to further non-proliferation.

This is why it is absolutely essential that we cooperate with other nuclear suppliers -- in the negotiations I set in motion more than a year and a half ago.

*I mix*  
A second disturbing policy direction is his willingness to have the Federal Government keep its monopoly on certain aspects of nuclear supply. There isn't a reason in the world why private industry -- the big corporations he always talks about -- shouldn't be spending their billions of dollars to produce nuclear fuel -- especially when it can't even be used for weapon purposes. But he wants to let Government continue to do it.

The policy we ought to have is the U.S. Government -- acting together with other supplier governments -- is providing common non-proliferation guidelines which private industry follows. That will achieve both our non-proliferation objectives and our free enterprise objectives.



10/4/76

Mr. Carter's remarks on nuclear proliferation suggest that he has not followed what has been happening in U. S. foreign policy and he does not know how an effective foreign policy is made.

His claim that the proliferation issue has been ignored is flatly wrong. Shortly after I took office I became concerned that some other nations, eager to improve their nuclear business, were enhancing their competitive position by offering customers easy access to plutonium. As a nation, we had three choices:

-- compete along with them. But if we did, the world would become an even more dangerous place than it is today;

-- issue a unilateral declaration like Mr. Carter has proposed announcing that we did not like what was happening and threatening other countries with ~~actions~~ actions they could easily avoid or ignore;

-- finally, we could take the initiative to eliminate this dangerous form of competition once and for all on a world-wide base. I choose this third course

I choose this third course. As a direct result of our efforts, the first Nuclear Suppliers Conference convened in London in April 1975.



That conference has met six times and the seven nations have agreed to a much tighter set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I directed that as an interim step, the U. S. adopt these guidelines as our policy.

But I was not satisfied that we had done all in our power to effectively prevent nuclear proliferation. Last summer, therefore, I called for a complete review of our policy toward plutonium both here and abroad. That review was completed a month ago. I have made my decisions. We are now in the process of ensuring that we get the kind of international cooperation necessary to make an effective worldwide policy.

Unlike Mr. Carter, I cannot be content with settling for a speech which sounds good at home but makes no difference abroad. In the area of nuclear proliferation this is particularly true. The blunt fact is that there are other nations who have the technology, the resources and the will to supply nuclear materials no matter what we do or say. In order to stop proliferation we must get the cooperation of all of those nations. We won't get that cooperation by issuing unilateral declarations. We have gotten it, and we will continue to get it, by developing wise policies, and by pursuing those policies through a course of quite, firm and patient negotiation.

10/4/76

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Carter Promises

1. World-wide voluntary moratorium on national sale or purchase of enrichment or reprocessing plants and withholding authority for U.S. domestic commercial reprocessing pending
  - satisfactory completion of a multinational program designed to develop experimentally (not full scale demonstrations) the technology, economics, regulations and safeguards
  - development of mutually satisfactory ground rules for management and operation, including next generation of material accounting procedures and physical security requirements.

If both conditions met, all ensuing commercial reprocessing plants should be on a multinational basis.

"We have no firm domestic policy on reprocessing ..."

2. No new U.S. commitments on nuclear technology of fuel would be allowed unless recipients agree to
  - forego possessing nuclear explosives
  - refrain from reprocessing

President's Performance

1. Domestically, Administration has prevented export of all reprocessing facilities through authority under Section 810 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Internationally, U.S. has

- bilaterally, attempted to stop all sales of reprocessing equipment and has stopped a sale to South Korea and development of a facility in the Republic of China (Taiwan); negotiations are proceeding to stop sales to Pakistan and Brazil
- multilaterally, developed through the London Suppliers Group a common set of guidelines requiring safeguards and security measures in connection with export of sensitive facilities, including reprocessing facilities.

\*The President now proposes

- not accepting reprocessing as inevitable
- undertaking realistic demonstration program to determine the safeguards, economics and technological performance of reprocessing
- undertaking extensive research on potential alternatives to plutonium recycle
- encouraging other nations to participate in the demonstrations and offering to share information obtained with other nations.

2. Administration's policy

has been

forego possessing nuclear explosives but only with regard to U.S.-supplied materials and facilities

obtaining a U.S. veto over reprocessing on U.S.-supplied materials and facilities

\*will be

forego possessing nuclear explosives with respect to all nuclear materials and facilities

insisting on recipient foregoing reprocessing, whether or not U.S. supplied material or facilities are involved

\*Fri recommended new proposal.



- place all national nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards

requiring IAEA safeguards on U.S. supplied materials and facilities

requires IAEA safeguards on all civil nuclear materials and facilities

Renegotiate existing agreements to include reprocessing safeguards

renegotiating agreement only if amendment to them required for other reasons

\*to seek to negotiate changes to provide U.S. veto of reprocessing involving U.S. supplied material and facilities

3. Call for World Conference on Energy (along the lines of the World Food Conference) to develop world-wide information on energy supplies and needs with a view toward establishing a permanent World Energy Agency

3. Through U.S. initiative in 1974, the International Energy Agency, consisting of 18 industrial consumer nations, was established to consider common problems. In December 1975, U.S. participated in French-initiated Conference on International Economic Cooperation (Producer/Consumer Conference) consisting of 27 countries. The Conference is in the process of developing world-wide information on energy resources and needs, common research strategies, capital sources and needs, etc. U.S. has also proposed an International Energy Institute to provide technical assistance on energy matters to developing countries and that proposal will probably be finalized in December. U.S. has proposed an International Resources Bank to guarantee against political risk on investments for development of energy resources and other minerals.

4. Support strengthening of IAEA safeguards and inspection authority

4. In 1976, Administration requested \$5 million increase in IAEA voluntary contribution; in addition, U.S. has over past 2 years more than doubled other technical assistance to IAEA. \*Even more assistance would be recommended.

5. Place U.S. civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards

5. The Administration has been negotiating placement of U.S. civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards for some time. Formal submission of agreement was made to, and accepted by, the IAEA Board of Governors on September 17. The Administration will now proceed to implement the agreement.

"We have failed to fulfill our ... under international safeguards."

6. Support enlargement of U.S. Government-owned enrichment facilities to insure that U.S. is a reliable supplier

6. Administration has proposed legislation, passed by the House of Representatives, which would authorize both public and private expansion of enrichment facilities.

"We have no ... clear programs to deal with ... uranium enrichment."

\*Fri recommended new proposal.

7. Explore international initiatives for

- multinational enrichment plants
- multinational spent fuel storage areas

as alternatives to national enrichment and reprocessing plants.

8. Correct disproportionate emphasis in energy R&D, placing more emphasis on renewable energy technologies, and relatively less emphasis on nuclear power

"Over the last eight years, our government has failed to explore non-nuclear alternative energy research and development budget in nuclear fission."

9. Convert breeder reactor research to a long-term, possibly multinational effort.

10. Negotiate with the Soviet Union

- comprehensive test ban treaty, with a five-year moratorium on testing of both weapons and "peaceful nuclear devices" while treaty is being negotiated
- through the SALT talks, strategic nuclear forces and technology reductions

There are already two multinational plants -- both in Europe -- and Administration has encouraged foreign investment in new privately-owned U.S. enrichment plants.

U.S. has encouraged IAEA consideration and possible implementation of multinational spent fuel and plutonium storage under IAEA auspices; other participants are receptive and \*President would now announce need for IAEA study to proceed with such a regime.

8. Of the Nation's total energy research and development budget, private industry provides about 90% of the amount spent on non-nuclear research (oil, gas, coal, etc.) but only 15% of the Nation's nuclear energy research. The Federal Government, fulfilling its historic research role in the sensitive nuclear area, has tended to equalize this disparity and this role needs to be continued. Nevertheless the President has increased the non-nuclear energy R&D budget by \$202 million to \$671 million in FY 1977. This increase changed the proportion of non-nuclear items from 20% to 35% of Federal research. Currently, we estimate that 60% of the total Nation's energy total research efforts are in in the non-nuclear field and 40% are in the nuclear field.

9. The breeder reactor is the only demonstrated, inexhaustible source of energy. (Large-scale solar and fusion plants are decades away.) To stretch out current levels of breeder reactor research -- as the phrase "long-term" implies -- can only delay answering crucial questions on environment, economics and safety.

10. The Administration has

- proposed on several occasions over the years a comprehensive test ban treaty; obstacles have been failure of the Soviets to agree to on-site verification procedures and the unwillingness of France and the Peoples Republic of China to become parties; since prospects of progress appear to be dim, continuing negotiations are not likely to be fruitful in the near future
- reached accords at Vladivostok which limits numbers of strategic weapons; Administration is currently negotiating remaining issues, once limits of numbers are in place, President intends to commence negotiations on reductions in numbers.

\* Fri recommended new proposal.

## Carter's Charge

1. "We have no ... clear programs to deal with ... management and storage of radioactive wastes."
2. Our Government is now unable to account for some 100,000 pounds of nuclear material, of which 6,000 pounds is weapons grade.
3. "President Ford has shown us where his priorities lie by holding legislation to strengthen U.S. nonproliferation hostage to his highly controversial proposal for private ownership and operation of nuclear fuel and facilities."



## President's Performance

1. The President has committed to having a licensed facility for long term storage of high level wastes when the facility is needed, generally agreed to be 1985. To that end he has directed the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency to develop and publish necessary standards and environmental statements. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has agreed to cooperate. ERDA will build the facility. The President's 1977 budget increased funding for the nuclear waste management program from \$12 million to \$66 million.
2. Differences between amounts of nuclear materials carried in the book accounts and the results of a physical inventory in Government facilities have been less than a fraction of 1% and represents an accumulation -- in some cases -- of 29 years. The discrepancy does not represent material that has been lost or stolen. However, every discrepancy has been thoroughly analyzed to determine the reason for its occurrence. These reasons have included personnel errors, instrumentation errors and deposits of material on the literally hundreds of miles of piping and valves within large plants.  
  
To further increase accuracy and timeliness of such materials accounting, the President has increased ERDA's safeguards research and development program from \$7 million in FY 1975 to \$20 million in FY 1977. Likewise, overall support for safeguarding ERDA's facilities has been doubled by the President over the last two years to \$176 million.
3. The President's proposal for new nuclear fuel facilities was unanimously reported out by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and has passed the House of Representatives. It would not only provide for the needs of the Nation -- with minimal government of financial assistance -- but would also reestablish the important role of the United States as a worldwide nuclear fuel supplier. U.S. fuel supply agreements with other countries have always been conditioned on the recipients'

undertaking strong measures to safeguard nuclear facilities -- and thereby contribute significantly to the world's nonproliferation goals. A number of Senators refused even to let this House passed proposal come to a vote in the Senate.

The President has worked closely with the sponsors of the non-proliferation bill in an effort to reach agreement on key provisions and fully supported the non-proliferation initiatives with his suggested changes.

The President sought to have both measures considered by the Senate since both bills aid in our non-proliferation objectives.

4. During the years of Republican indifference we have done little to encourage the dozen or more non-NPT countries with active nuclear programs to join."

4. During the President's Administration, 16 countries joined the NPT including Germany, Japan, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. The U.S. played a key role in encouraging these countries to sign.

10/4/76

REBUTTAL - NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

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His claim that the proliferation issue has been ignored is flatly wrong. Shortly after I took office I became concerned that some other nations, eager to improve their nuclear business, were enhancing their competitive position by offering customers easy access to plutonium. As a nation, we had three choices:

-- compete along with them. But if we did, the world would become an even more dangerous place than it is today;

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
THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON PROLIFERATION

When the President took office, the United States had three ways of dealing with nuclear proliferation and preventing the spread of plutonium:

- no U.S. export of reprocessing facilities
- support for Non-Proliferation Treaty
- support of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Program

Since taking office, he has expanded enormously U.S. efforts:

- bilateral pressure on those who would acquire plutonium facilities elsewhere
  - South Korea
  - Taiwan
- much greater financial commitment to research in U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency to develop ways of detecting diversion of plutonium.
- multilateral cooperation to develop common guidelines for all nuclear suppliers.
- London Suppliers Conference, beginning April, 1975, produced new, tougher guidelines on all nuclear exports. U.S. has adopted as interim policy.
- comprehensive review (Fri report) begun summer '76 to review entire U.S. stance toward plutonium:
  - question assumption whether use of plutonium is either necessary or desirable.



As a result of Fri report, President has made decisions dramatically changing U.S. stance toward use of plutonium:

- it is not certain that plutonium use is either necessary or desirable;
- before we or others commit to it, it is necessary to establish that the material can be handled in such a way as to ensure both safety and non-proliferations.
- calls for a three-year worldwide moratorium on export of all reprocessing facilities;
- for those countries which do produce plutonium, to put it in the custody of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- U.S. initiative to undertake agreements restricting reprocessing and plutonium use;
- development of financial and technical alternatives to use of plutonium until and unless its safety is assured.

Overview Response on Nuclear Issues

Nuclear power is one of the most complex issues we face. It is also one of the most difficult to discuss in a campaign because it lends itself so easily to demagoguery. Fortunately, nuclear power has traditionally been approached in a bipartisan manner. There has never been a Republican or Democratic position on questions of nuclear safety or preventing nuclear proliferation. I hope there never will be.



As President I have dealt with nuclear issues from three different perspectives:

First, in assuring that our domestic nuclear power plants are safe and environmentally acceptable;

Second, preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials which can be used to make weapons;

Third, in developing a balanced program of nuclear and non-nuclear research and development which will contribute to reduction of dependence on foreign oil and our vulnerability to embargoes.

My Administration has taken strong action in each of these areas. For example:

1. Shortly after I took office, I signed into law the bill creating an independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Its primary mission is to oversee the development of the nuclear industry from

the standpoint of protecting public health and safety. This legislation eliminated the potential conflict of interest that existed in the old Atomic Energy Commission where the regulatory and promotional responsibilities were combined.

2. In the last two years, I have increased the budget for nuclear safety regulation by more than 60% from \$148 million when I took office to nearly \$250 million this year.

3. In the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some other nations, eager to become nuclear suppliers, were being tempted to offer laxity in the treatment of nuclear materials as a competitive device. I directed the Secretary of State to find ways of eliminating this dangerous form of competition. As a result of this effort, the first Conference of Nuclear Supplier Nations was convened in London in April 1975. That Conference has met 6 times and the seven nations have agreed to a much tighter set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I have directed that the United <sup>States</sup> adopt these guidelines as our policy.

4. In the area of energy research and development, I have increased our commitments in both the nuclear and non-nuclear areas. By far the greatest increase, however, has occurred in the non-nuclear area. Coal research has tripled in the last two years. Solar energy research has increased about 8 times--conservation research more than 4 times. We now have a balanced program, and we expect results in both the nuclear and non-nuclear areas

on foreign oil.

But the effort to insure that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh its risks have not stopped. Several months ago, I initiated a complex review of the entire nuclear fuel cycle in both its domestic and international aspects. That review has now been completed. In the context of this debate, there is obviously not enough time for me to explain fully the decisions that I have made on this entire range of issues, but I shall announce them in a very short time.

There is one final point that I would like to make on this whole question of dealing with nuclear energy, particularly on the question of proliferation. As in so many other areas of foreign policy, the real issue which confronts the President is to make very sure that what he proposes is effective. He cannot be satisfied with mere words. In nuclear proliferation this means making sure that other countries which have the ability to export nuclear materials and technology abide by the same set of rules as the United States. If they do not, then all of our words and all of our efforts are in vain and the world becomes an even more dangerous place than it is. Achieving cooperation in these areas requires leadership on our part and a willingness to negotiate positively but firmly to apply strong pressures, as we have in some cases, to discourage undesirable developments, and to offer incentives, as we have in other areas, to encourage cooperation. Unilateral declarations, no matter how good they may sound, will not prevent nuclear

proliferation, and it is with such proliferation that the President of the United States must concern himself.

DETENTE



We have deep differences with the Soviets. But we both have the capacity to destroy the world. This imposes an obligation to reduce the danger of nuclear war and confrontation.

My policy is to start from a position of unquestioned strength.

-- The Soviets will not negotiate if we are weak; on this basis I believe we can make progress in areas of mutual interest -- particularly in controlling nuclear arms.

We will always resist when challenged, but also be prepared to negotiate if there is good will. The record will be uneven; this is not surprising after decades of hostility. But we owe it to our children to persist in the search for peace between the two strongest nuclear powers.

Rebuttal

We have struck hard bargains in every area; the  
In SALT, we insisted on equality and I got it in/Vladivostok  
agreement;

At Helsinki, we insisted on greater freedom of movement for people and exchange of ideas, and we are holding the Soviets to it;

In trade, we got a good five year grain deal for our farmers with the Soviets barred from raiding our markets and driving up prices.

We can't call for defense cuts, and expect the Soviets to respect weakness.

We can't confront the Soviets and then have Congress back down ~~as~~  
in Angola.

## SALT

If we want long term peace, we have to control the nuclear arms race. Otherwise we risk an explosion.

In 1972 we froze the number of missiles but only for five years. I got a new agreement in 1974 with Brezhnev on equal ceilings through 1985 for heavy bombers as well as missiles. This is a major breakthrough.

We can go even further. We have agreed that we can reduce these weapons, and that will be the next major step, after we complete the current negotiations.

This effort at nuclear arms control is in our national interest. We owe it to future generations to limit these weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear war. The alternative is to pour billions of dollars into a new round of weapons -- and both sides will come out about equal. But any agreement will have to be equal, and one we can monitor against violations.

### Rebuttal

I will not sign any agreement that is not equal, that can be<sup>it</sup> verified against cheating, or that gives the Soviets an advantage.

We have agreed to equal ceilings at a level that will force the Soviets to reduce next year. We can proceed with our programs -- Trident and B-1 and a new missile so there can be no Soviet gain in strategic balance.

We have a good agreement, we will finish it, and then go to reductions.

# The ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION


11 Dupont Circle, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 797-6450

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
Saturday, October 2, 1976

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CALL:  
Tom Halsted (202) 797-6450  
(202) 363-7505

## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ANSWER TEN ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS

The Arms Control Association today released the texts of the responses of Presidential candidates Ford and Carter to a ten-part questionnaire the Association had submitted to them earlier this year. They were asked to describe their arms control and disarmament views and to set forth their specific ideas on how to deal with the dominant problems in the field, among them SALT, nuclear proliferation, nuclear weapons testing, nuclear and conventional weapons deployment, and the growing trade in conventional arms. The responses provided by the Ford and Carter campaign committees, together with the Arms Control Association's questions, are enclosed.



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The Arms Control Association is a nonpartisan national membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of effective policies and programs in arms control and disarmament. The Association's Directors are: William C. Foster, Chairman, Archibald S. Alexander, Anne H. Cahn, Barry E. Carter, Joseph S. Clark, William T. Coleman, Jr., William H. Dodds, Adrian S. Fisher, Thomas L. Hughes, James F. Leonard, F.A. Long, Saul H. Mendlovitz, David A. Morse, Robert R. Mullen, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Gerard C. Smith, Barbara Stuhler, Lawrence D. Weiler, and Herbert York. The Executive Director is Thomas A. Halsted.

OCTOBER 2, 1976

Question 1: Do you support the proposition that arms control and disarmament objectives are central to national security? If so, what would you do in your Cabinet appointments and through your policies to implement this view?

FORD:

President Ford most definitely feels that continued negotiations with the Soviet Union, in an effort to reduce both the level of tensions between the two nations and the dangerous arms race, are necessary to protect the interests and security of the United States. As he stated in February of this year:

"it is my duty . . . to do all that I can to reduce the level of danger by diplomatic means. So my policy for national security can be summed up in three words: peace through strength. I believe it is far better to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union . . . (based on strength) . . . than to permit a runaway nuclear arms race and risk a nuclear holocaust."

To implement these views the President has appointed and retained men, dedicated to such policies, both to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions: Donald Rumsfeld, formerly our Ambassador to NATO, later the President's chief of staff, and now serving in another position of high responsibility as Secretary of Defense; Secretary of State Kissinger; Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the President for national security affairs; and Fred Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The President will continue to appoint men of such high quality to these and other positions in the future. Furthermore, the policy of attempting to negotiate with the Russians will continue. Arms control and disarmament efforts in other parts of the world will be continued as well.

CARTER:

I believe that the mutual balance of terror is an inadequate foundation for a peaceful and stable world order. While maintaining our military strength and the American nuclear deterrent are essential to world order under today's conditions, we also need a positive arms control program as a coordinate element of national security policy. The specific steps I favor in the various major arms control areas are outlined in my answers below.

(MORE)

Question 2: Do you believe that cessation of the arms race and general nuclear disarmament should be the objective of the United States? If you do, what specific proposals would you put forward?

FORD:

While cessation of the arms race and general nuclear disarmament are the ultimate goals of United States policy, they cannot be attained easily or quickly. The immediate aim, therefore, of the President's policy of negotiations is the relaxation of tensions and continued steady gains in our relations with the Soviets. The US policy of controlling the strategic arms race has been carried on under five Presidents; the agreement at Vladivostok is aimed at quantitative limitations on such weapons. Continuation of our present policy of peaceful negotiations is our best hope for ever attaining nuclear disarmament.

Question 3: Do you believe that The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be strengthened and given a more important role in developing and implementing national security policies? If so, how?

FORD:

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency occupies a prominent position within the decision-making structure of the Ford Administration with regard to national security policies, and no change in that position is foreseen. President Ford regards the Agency as an important factor in the development of policies in its area. The current Director, Dr. Fred Ikle, participates in National Security Council meetings when arms control, disarmament, and arms transfer questions are under consideration, and ACDA also plays a prominent role as a member of the Verification Panel where basic policy discussions in this field are studied. This indicates the esteem in which the President holds the Agency and its officers, and the responsibility he is willing to lay upon it in elaborating upon his policies in this complex and crucial policy area.

CARTER:

The international atomic weapons race must stop. I believe that the ultimate goal of this nation should be the reduction of nuclear weapons in all nations of the world to zero. Clearly, this is an ultimate rather than an immediate objective, and it may not occur in my lifetime. But I would work toward ending the world's growing dependence on atomic weapons by specific measures in the areas of SALT, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear testing, as outlined below.

CARTER:

An early task of my Administration would be reform of the organization of our national security agencies. In such a reform, I would emphasize that arms control considerations must be given a major voice in national security deliberations.

The Republican Administration has gutted ACDA, and that is one of the reasons they have made so little real progress in arms control. Its functions must be revitalized.

The exact role of ACDA, or any other agency, would be established in the context of my general review of organizational questions. Certainly I would insure that my Administration would abide by the spirit as well as the letter of the Zablocki Amendment, which requires arms control impact statements on major new weapons programs-- a requirement which the present Administration has slighted.

## Question 4: SALT:

- a. Do you favor a SALT II Treaty based generally on the 1974 Vladivostok Accords? If not, explain your objections.

FORD:

President Ford views SALT II as an extension of SALT I, inasmuch as both are parts of our major, over-all arms control objectives. He feels that SALT I was quite successful and deserves to be followed up:

"Those who argue that SALT talks jeopardize the security of the United States are badly mistaken. In Vladivostok we began negotiating an agreement which, if successfully completed, will place equal ceilings on missiles, heavy bombers, and multi-headed missiles . . . We are continuing the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union for the simple but very good reason that these negotiations offer the best hope for sanity in super-power relations".

- b. Do you believe the SALT II Treaty should place restrictions on the deployment of strategic cruise missiles?

FORD:

Although cruise missiles may eventually have some limitations placed upon them as part of a comprehensive arms control plan, the Administration does not favor the imposition of unilateral restrictions on their development prior to firm commitments by the other side. At present the development of a US cruise missile is well advanced over Soviet efforts and is continuing as an essential element in our strategic arsenal.

CARTER:

The Vladivostok levels are too high. Moreover, despite the ballyhoo, the Administration has not been able to produce an acceptable agreement on the Vladivostok guidelines in two years of trying and there still appear to be important issues unresolved. Information on the details of the obstacles have not been made public. Whether next year it would be best, if there is still no agreement, to seek to implement the Vladivostok ceilings and go on from there to agreements on reductions and technological controls, or whether a new approach would be required is a judgment on negotiating policy that I would make only after careful review of where the talks stand in January, 1977.

CARTER:

I recognize the possible utility of cruise missiles of certain kinds for maintaining the effectiveness of our bomber deterrent. On the other hand, strategic range cruise missiles also present important arms control issues because of the difficulty in verifying their characteristics and the number of platforms from which they could be launched. So cruise missiles pose a case of the need for arms control factors to be considered before deployment decisions by the United States. If I were satisfied that an agreement would be adequately verified, I would accept, in return for appropriate Soviet commitments regarding controls on their weapons, some limits on strategic range cruise missile deployments in a new SALT agreement.

c. After SALT II, what should our goals for SALT III be?

FORD:

President Ford sees the intent of SALT III as a continuation of attempts to negotiate limits on strategic nuclear arms. The particular goals will depend upon the exact achievements of the SALT II negotiations and the stage of technological development when the SALT III negotiations begin. As a general concept, SALT II is intended to apply quantitative limitations on numbers of vehicles, while SALT III would provide the upper limits on quantitative capabilities and stabilize the strategic positions of the two super-powers.

CARTER:

The core of our dealings with the Soviet Union must be mutual reduction of arms and halting the race in strategic technology. We should negotiate to reduce the present SALT ceilings on offensive weapons before both sides start a new arms race to reach the current maximums, and before new missile systems are tested or committed for production. Attaining these objectives will require hard bargaining with the Soviets, but I'm not afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union, and it would strengthen the support for the agreements that can be reached and show that SALT is not a one way street.

Question 5: Nuclear Proliferation:

a. What steps should the United States take to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?

FORD:

President Ford believes that there are several steps the US must take, and must continue, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons:

Through diplomatic channels, encourage universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The recent ratification by Japan, and the accession of many of the Western European countries over a year ago, demonstrate the viability of the Treaty.

Through mutual security arrangements, create the protection that permits countries to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons. By seeking to lessen regional tensions, the President hopes to reduce the motivation for the development of nuclear weapons by states in that region.

CARTER:

We must make halting proliferation of nuclear weapons a top national priority.

As President, I would take the following eleven steps to control further nuclear proliferation:

1. I would call upon all nations to adopt a voluntary moratorium on the national sale or purchase of enrichment or reprocessing plants-- a moratorium which should apply retroactively to the recent German-Brazilian and the French-Pakistan agreements.
2. I would make no new commitments for the sale of nuclear technology or fuel to countries which refuse to forego nuclear explosives, to refrain from national nuclear reprocessing, or to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

(MORE)

By following a policy of imposing international safeguards on all exported nuclear facilities, and avoiding the transfer of sensitive materials, help to meet the legitimate needs for electrical power generation without providing a capability for weapons development. At the same time, we must not be quixotic in our supply policy since we will drive recipients to other sources or to develop their own independent capacity, and thereby lose our influence and ability to exert control over international nuclear affairs.

Because the US is not the only supplier of nuclear technology, President Ford wants to obtain the cooperation of other suppliers in applying safeguards and restrictions on exports. We recently have had good results in concerting the export policies of the major supplier nations, but the President will continue to press for even stricter, and more broadly based, controls and restraints.

The effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency is an important key to achieving an international nuclear regime where power needs are met under appropriate safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials to weapons. The President believes we should work with the IAEA, both through contribution of money, and the provision of technical support to continuously update and enhance its effectiveness.

3. I would seek to withhold authority for domestic commercial reprocessing until the need for, the economics, and the safety of this technology is clearly demonstrated. If we should ever decide to go forward with commercial reprocessing, it should be on a multinational basis.

4. I would call for an international Conference on Energy, to provide a forum in which all nations can focus on the non-proliferation issue. Such a Conference must also explore non-nuclear means of meeting energy demands of other nations so that no state is forced into a premature commitment to atomic power.

5. I would support a strengthening of the safeguards and inspection authority of the IAEA and place all of our own peaceful domestic nuclear facilities under those safeguards.

6. I would seek to renegotiate our existing agreements as a nuclear supplier, many of which were entered into before we began insisting on reprocessing safeguards and which are now inadequate.

7. I would take steps to ensure that the U.S. is once again a reliable supplier of enriched uranium - the fuel for civilian reactors which is unsuitable for weapons - by supporting enlargement of our government-owned facility.

8. I would explore international initiatives such as multinational enrichment plants and multinational spent fuel storage areas which could provide alternatives to the establishment of enrichment or reprocessing plants on a national basis.

9. I would redirect our own energy research and development efforts to correct the disproportionate emphasis which we have placed on nuclear power at the expense of renewable energy technologies. Our emphasis on the breeder reactor must be converted into a long term, possibly multinational effort.

(MORE)

10. Finally, I would follow through on my belief that the United States can and should negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, and reduce, through the SALT talks, strategic nuclear forces and technology.

11. I would encourage the Soviet Union to join us in a total ban of all nuclear explosions for at least five years. This ban would include so-called "peaceful nuclear devices."

b. Should the United States export nuclear fuel and equipment for nuclear power plants to countries which have refused to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

FORD:

The President has not restricted US nuclear cooperation to only those countries that have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, because such a policy would not effectively function as a non-proliferation tool. Other suppliers, who may themselves not be parties to the Treaty, could step in and provide the nuclear facilities and materials, with fewer restraints than we require. The US not only insists that all of its exported nuclear material be under international safeguards, but also exercises some additional bilateral controls over the development of the recipient countries' nuclear program. For example, nuclear fuel cannot be reprocessed abroad without US approval.

CARTER:

I believe it is important that we create incentives for all countries to participate in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For that reason, we should refuse to sell nuclear power plants and fuels to nations who do not become a party to the NPT or who will not adhere to strict provisions on international safeguards of nuclear facilities or who refuse to refrain from national nuclear reprocessing.

c. (If your answer to b. is "yes") Should the United States insist that non-parties to the NPT to which such materials are exported be required to place all their peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards?

FORD:

The President considers it an important objective to achieve full safeguards on all nuclear facilities in non-weapon states. As the first major step in this direction, the key suppliers have undertaken to require safeguards on all their exports, thereby closing off

CARTER:

I believe such a requirement would be a wise one, and that the United States should negotiate with other supplier nations to make it a condition of all sales. The possibility of achieving such a common position has not been fully explored by the present Administration.

external sources of unsafeguarded facilities. He would, of course, encourage the application of safeguards to all indigenous facilities as a condition of export, but does not believe we can enforce such a policy without the cooperation of the other suppliers. Again, a unilateral US policy simply would not be effective. We are, however, continuing to meet with the other suppliers, and expect further progress toward this objective.

Question 6: Nuclear Testing:

- a. Do you support a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, verified by national technical means? Please state your position.

FORD:

President Ford does indeed support a Comprehensive Test Ban backed by adequate safeguards, and has taken steps to bring us closer to such a goal. Such a ban would be useful in stemming the tide of the arms race, first by the ban itself, and second, by fostering a spirit of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

CARTER:

I support a comprehensive test ban agreement with the Soviet Union, covering both weapons tests and so-called "peaceful" nuclear explosions. The United States and the Soviet Union should conclude such an agreement immediately, to last for five years, during which they should encourage all other countries to join. At the end of the five year period the agreement can be continued if it serves the interests of the parties. Such a ban would be a significant arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, as other nations joined, could have highly favorable effects in reducing the dangers of nuclear proliferation. National verification capabilities over the last twenty years have advanced to the point where we no longer have to rely on on-site inspection to distinguish between earthquakes and even very small weapons tests, so a comprehensive test ban verified by national technical means would be acceptable.

b. Do you believe that the proposed Threshold Test Ban (permitting underground tests up to 150 kilotons and Soviet peaceful explosions of multiple devices totaling higher yields with U.S. observers present) will be a useful step in controlling nuclear weapons? Please state your position.

FORD:

The President sees the Threshold Test Ban as a useful step toward the ultimate goal of controlling nuclear weapons, in that it brings us closer to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban with its attendant benefits to the world. As the President said on June 7, 1976:

"For 25 years, American Presidents have been trying to negotiate the peaceful experiments in nuclear explosions. We have been trying for 25 years to get on-site inspection in the Soviet Union, to see whether they were living up to those agreements. I have just signed, about 10 days ago, a negotiated settlement that gives the United States the right to make certain-- to make positive--in the Soviet Union, that the agreement they signed is lived up to".

President Ford is concerned that we not stop there, but continue to press forward in our negotiations to achieve still more gains under the nuclear test policy of his Administration.

CARTER:

The so-called Threshold Test Ban Treaty represents a wholly inadequate step beyond the limited test ban of 13 years ago. The so-called "on-site" inspection provisions of the peaceful nuclear explosions agreement signed recently may be a concession in Soviet eyes, but contrary to Administration claims, they are no compensation for the PNE agreement's dangerous legitimizing of peaceful nuclear explosions, which are indistinguishable from bombs.

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Question 7: Would you increase, reduce, or maintain the present levels of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea? in Western Europe? If you favor reductions, over what time frame?

FORD:

President Ford has no plans for altering the current level of US military commitments overseas; the present deployment represents a careful balance of forces worked out over a period of many years and is tailored to meet the security needs of the US and our allies. In Western Europe, however, we can visualize that under the proper circumstances such as a reduction in Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe, the US could withdraw a limited number of tactical nuclear weapons, and in fact NATO has offered to do just this. At the same time, the President is determined to resist attempts at unilateral US disarmament.

CARTER:

We have many tactical nuclear weapons, some of great size, both within this nation and outside the continental limits of the United States. The present deployments are more than adequate to accommodate our deterrence needs. Tactical nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from unnecessarily exposed positions and their numbers related to realistic missions for such weapons. In particular, tactical nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from Korea as a part of a gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces which in turn would be part of an overall coordinated plan to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. This would involve several steps:

- we must see that Korea can defend itself;
- we will leave adequate air support and build up South Korean air capability;
- we will act only in full consultation with both South Korea and Japan. It is essential that nothing be done to cause turmoil in Japan;
- we will seek to encourage the Communist powers to engage their North Korean friends in a search for a reduction in tensions in the area.

Question 8: Do you believe the United States should make it a policy not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances? If so, under what circumstances?

FORD:

The policy of the United States, as expressed by the Ford Administration, has always been that it will not precipitate a nuclear war. The nuclear capacity of the United States will be used only when it is seen as absolutely essential to the security of the United States and its Allies; for example, an actual nuclear attack upon this nation. Except in such circumstances, the task of our nuclear forces is to act as a deterrent to an attack by any aggressor.

CARTER:

The use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances would be an awesome step. I am not hopeful that any nuclear war could stay limited. The present Administration has been entirely too casual in discussing the possibility of nuclear war, and in appearing to threaten initiation of nuclear war for political purposes, or for fighting so-called limited nuclear wars. The concentration of our defense policy, especially our nuclear policy, must be on deterrence. Unfortunately, we cannot renounce

first use of nuclear weapons in those limited situations where vital and essential United States interests maybe threatened by military aggression against us or our allies. This is part of deterrence; of ensuring that a war will never begin. However, I believe we need to insure that we and our allies have conventional capability to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons.

Question 9: Should the United States initiate efforts to control the sales abroad of conventional armaments? What specific steps should be taken?

FORD:

The demand for armaments of all types around the world is great, and the number of suppliers is large. Therefore, any attempt to curtail arms sales will probably be unsuccessful unless all nations involved in the sales of weapons can come to some sort of agreement. Otherwise, the market will be open only to those who choose not to participate in the agreement. President Ford is unwilling to create a situation in which the more responsible nations are forced to sit by, having agreed to cease arms sales abroad, while the less scrupulous nations who opt not to join the agreement are allowed to be the sole suppliers to the ever-increasing market. Such a unilateral curtailment would do little to restrict the traffic in arms.

Furthermore, the President is determined that the United States retain the option to provide our friends and allies with the weapons necessary to protect themselves. If we expect them to assume the burden of their own defense, they must be able to obtain the resources necessary for that defense. The United States cannot be a party to any agreement that would prevent us from aiding those who depend on our support.

The Ford Administration is, however, being very judicious in the sales of US arms abroad so that arms are provided only to those who can demonstrate a valid need for them. We are encouraging other friendly supplier nations to exercise equal caution along these lines. The President has directed that all possible steps be taken to prevent acquisition of arms from us by those who would put them to illegitimate uses.

CARTER:

I am particularly concerned by our nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman. Our sales of billions of dollars of arms, particularly to developing nations, fuel regional arms races and complicate our relationships with other supplier nations. We cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of weapons of war. If I become President I will work with our allies, some of whom also sell arms, and also seek to work with the Soviets, to reduce the commerce in weapons. We must assess every arms sale on an individual national basis, to insure that the only sales we make are those that promote peace in the regions and carry out our committed foreign policy. At the same time, there are certain arms sales programs, notably those to Israel, which are necessary so that Israel can pursue peace from a position of strength and security. Our diplomacy in this area should be based on a four part approach: (a) An international conference of suppliers and consumers to put the issue to the forefront of the world's arms control agenda, (b) greater US self-restraint, (c) work with western suppliers and the Soviets to dampen down arms sales promotion, and (d) support for regional efforts to limit arms buildup.

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Question 10: Do you believe the United States should support the proposed World Disarmament Conference?

FORD:

The concept of a World Disarmament Conference has been employed as part of a Communist propaganda campaign for many years; the US has consistently held that such a broadside approach is unlikely to yield real results. In keeping with his policy of seeking to achieve peace through negotiations, President Ford has supported plans for various meetings in which nations could gather to formulate programs for specific disarmament objectives. In fact, the US has participated in meetings in Geneva of this nature. The President would not favor our participation in large and unstructured conferences if they appeared to be simply a tool by which certain groups of nations would elaborate unworkable proposals, and subvert such meetings to their own purposes.

The President is of the opinion that the results of arms control and reduction conferences must fully protect the security of the United States. The costs, benefits, and responsibilities of disarmament plans must be fully shared on a fair basis by all nations involved. No nation should be allowed to gain an advantage at the expense of another. An equitable agreement would be one which will bring about true world disarmament.

CARTER:

Arms control is a worldwide concern: Nonproliferation is important to both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states. SALT is in the interest of all, not just the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. arms sales divert resources from development and build regional tensions that could lead to world war; the whole world ultimately bears the burden of expending our planet's resources on arms. Therefore, all elements of the world population must be fully represented in arms control efforts. At the same time, we must treat arms control as a serious business, not an occasion for posturing or propaganda. For that reason, I am skeptical about very large scale disarmament conferences with no clear agenda. But if we can develop an appropriate agenda, I would favor as broad a conference as possible on the control of conventional weapons in order to move this issue to the front rank of the world's concerns. I also favor an international conference on energy to provide a forum in which all nations can focus on the non-proliferation issue as well as other energy issues.

SALT: WHY STALLED

WHERE WE WERE: FIRST, AGREEMENT 1972 FOR FIVE YEARS: COVERED ONLY MISSILES. NEW AGREEMENT INCLUDED HEAVY BOMBERS, MIRVs AND LASTS THROUGH 1985.

VLADIVOSTOK: HAS TO GET CEILINGS AND EQUALITY FOR BOTH SIDES, NO SPECIAL COMPENSATION TO SOVIETS: I ACHIEVED THIS AT VLADIVOSTOK: WAS MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.

REDUCTIONS: ALSO HAVE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO REDUCE CEILINGS.

PROGRESS SINCE: DURING LAST TWO YEARS TREATY 90 PERCENT COMPLETE: HAVE GOOD VERIFICATION: CEILING ON HEAVY MISSILES.

REMAINING ISSUE: NEW WEAPONS: CRUISE MISSILES AND NEW SOVIET BOMBER IN GREY AREA: ARE THEY STRATEGIC? HAVE NARROWED DIFFERENCES, CAN SOLVE.

NON PARTISAN: TWO IMPORTANT FOR PARTISAN ADVANTAGE: COMPLETE AFTER ELECTION, SUBMIT TO NEW CONGRESS.

ALTERNATIVE: GOOD SALT AGREEMENT IN LONG TERM NATIONAL INTEREST; ALTERNATIVE IS ARMS RACE: HAVE TO SPEND 20 BILLION; OWE IT TO AMERICAN PEOPLE TRY FOR AGREEMENT.



REBUTTAL ON SALT

TOO HIGH: ACTUAL LEVELS (2400) REQUIRE SOVIET REDUCTIONS BY 100-150.

ALREADY HAVE AGREEMENT TO MOVE TO REDUCTIONS

MISSILE THROW WEIGHT: SOVIETS HAVE HEAVIER MISSILES, BUT WE HAVE MORE ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, MORE WARHEADS BY 3 TO 1; THERE IS OVERALL BALANCE, CAN MAINTAIN IF CONGRESS SUPPORTS OUR PROGRAMS: TRIDENT, B-1, NEW ICBMs.

SOVIET ADVANTAGES: WON'T SIGN AGREEMENT THAT IS NOT EQUAL, IN OUR INTEREST, AND CAN BE VERIFIED.

CRUISE MISSILE RACE: STILL NEGOTIATING: CRUISE MISSILES NEW TYPE WEAPON, MAY OR MAY NOT BE IN SALT BUT U.S. NOT OPENING NEW RACE.