

European Satellite Air Forces

137. Development of Satellite air strength and effectiveness is dependent primarily upon the Soviet estimate of the political reliability of these forces. While substantial progress <sup>has</sup> ~~has~~ been made in the build-up of Satellite air strength, the current operational capabilities of these forces in required air roles are unevenly developed. ~~To date, the Polish Air Force probably ranks first, followed by Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and East Germany and Albania in order.~~ *To date, the Polish Air Force probably ranks* Emphasis will probably be placed on the strengthening of the Satellite fighter and light bomber establishments. By the end of the period, the Satellite air forces will constitute a significant increment to Soviet air power in Europe.

138. The Satellites will remain greatly dependent upon the USSR for logistic support, and virtually all aircraft will be Soviet types. ~~The Satellites, primarily Czechoslovakia and Poland,~~ will probably increase their production of jet fighter ~~and piston light bomber~~ aircraft, but total Satellite production will probably not exceed 15 percent of Bloc production.

Communist Air Forces in China (CAFIC)

139. CAFIC is equipped primarily for defensive operations. However, the acquisition of some medium and jet light bombers has

given it some capability for offensive operations. The combat effectiveness of CAFIC is only fair, but will probably improve somewhat throughout the period of this estimate, mainly through increased proficiency of flying personnel and improved quality of aircraft. However, since Communist China will probably not produce combat aircraft during the period of this estimate, over-all effectiveness will be largely determined by Soviet willingness to continue to supply additional aircraft, especially jet fighters, jet light bombers, and medium bombers, together with the necessary parts and equipment.

#### Bloc Air Defense System

140. The Soviet air defense system includes the active air defense elements of all military services under the operational control of a single air defense organization (PVO-Strany). The European Satellite and Chinese Communist air defenses are integrated with those of the Soviet system. Soviet Bloc defense forces are not uniformly distributed, and in general are more concentrated in the eastern and western, and less in the northern and south central border areas. Interior defenses are stronger in the European USSR than in areas east of the Urals or in most of the inland area of the Soviet Far East.

#### Soviet Civil Defense

141. The USSR has a large <sup>and</sup> complex, ~~and well organized~~ civil defense system which is integrated into the over-all Soviet air

defense organization. The system includes a full-time civil defense staff organization, but there is no evidence of present mass participation in civil defense, or of a program of passive defense measures specifically designed for atomic attack. The potential effectiveness of civil defense in the USSR is probably greater than that in any other major country except perhaps the UK. The elaborate totalitarian controls, the highly regimented character of the population, and, to some extent, the dispersal of population and industry, constitute strong points of the system. However, we believe civil defense operations in the event of an air attack would be handicapped by a shortage of transport facilities and materials.

#### XVII. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC

##### General

142. During the postwar period a rough balance of military power has existed between the Soviet Bloc and the US-NAFO coalition, Soviet superiority in conventional forces-in-being having been generally offset by the Western possession of superior nuclear capabilities and economic potential. Since 1951 the margin of Bloc numerical superiority in forces-in-being and conventional ground and air armament has been narrowed markedly, ~~and in air armament may have been reversed.~~ On the other hand, while still inferior in nuclear weapons production and delivery capabilities, Soviet efforts to overcome these deficiencies have greatly narrowed the gap.

*In addition, the increasing Bloc capability to interfere with the flow of reinforcements and material from the US to its allies overseas will be an important factor in the relative military strengths of the Bloc and the Western coalition.*

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143. The development of nuclear weapons and of the ability to deliver such weapons on target will probably in future be the most decisive factor in determining the relative military strengths of the Communist Bloc and the US-NATO coalition. During the period of this estimate Soviet capabilities in the use of nuclear weapons will continue to increase. At present, the USSR's highest capability for delivering nuclear weapons lies in open military attack by aircraft. However, Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack by means of guided missiles, including missiles launched from submarines and aircraft, will increase, especially in the latter part of this period. Nevertheless, provided there are no significant alterations in present political alignments, we believe that a rough balance of military power between the Soviet Bloc and the West will continue during the period of this estimate.

#### Offensive Capabilities\*

144. The core of Soviet offensive strength at present <sup>is an</sup> ~~lies in~~ <sup>and the UK.</sup> the ability to mount ~~an~~ attacks against Western Europe. The USSR could launch a surprise attack against Western Europe with the 25 to 30 Soviet ground divisions now in East Germany and Poland. By prior concentration of forces west of the Oder-Neisse line, involving almost certain loss of surprise, the USSR could attack with 50 to 60 divisions. A build-up to 75 to 140 divisions could be accomplished by D-plus-90. Air support for these operations could come from the approximately

\* No estimate of the success of the offensive operations describes in this section can be made without considering the effects of the actions of opposing forces.

air attacks of great weight and involving nuclear weapons could be launched with little or no warning against any strength exposed in Western Europe or the UK.

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<sup>2,200</sup>  
~~2,500~~ Soviet aircraft presently stationed in East Germany and the Satellites, <sup>with reinforcements available from the</sup> reinforced as necessary from the more than ~~8,700~~ aircraft stationed in the Western USSR. <sup>any</sup> In ~~such a~~ campaign against Western Europe we believe it unlikely that European Satellite armies would be used independently, except as security forces or to protect Soviet lines of communication.

145. In a maximum single-lift operation the USSR also has the capability of utilizing 32,000 well equipped and trained airborne troops in an assault against the Western Zones of Germany. These troops could be assembled in 10 days, and could be delivered to Rhine river crossing sites and nearby military installations by aircraft utilizing bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Successive lifts would be on a decreasing scale because of combat and operational attrition. During a five-day maximum-effort we believe that the USSR could deliver approximately <sup>77,000</sup> ~~70,000~~ troops. These capabilities will probably increase through 1959 with the addition of new medium transports, ~~and could be further increased by utilizing civil transports.~~

146. In the Far East, Soviet capabilities for long-continued full-scale war are somewhat limited by the capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway, the only route by which supplies in large amounts could be brought from other parts of the USSR. However, the USSR has about 30 divisions in the Far East, together with more than 5,000

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aircraft and a sizeable naval force. Stockpiles of supplies exist sufficient for a considerable period of combat. These Soviet forces could, in conjunction with Chinese Communist forces, renew hostilities in Korea. They could launch an amphibious invasion of Japan, we believe, with an initial assault strength of one airborne and two or three waterborne divisions, with about six divisions supporting. These attacks could be launched concurrently with campaigns in the Middle East and in Western Europe.

147. The USSR is now capable of undertaking concurrent strategic air operations against the US, the UK, continental Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and the offshore island chain of Asia. Operations against the US will, however, continue to be attended with great difficulties.\*

148. At the present time, it would be technically feasible for the USSR to attack targets within the US with missiles launched from long-range aircraft and from submarines; however, we have no evidence that the USSR has developed this capability either as to production of the missiles or as to conversion of submarines to missile launchers. The USSR could at present have V-1 type missiles for launching from submarines, and in 1955 could have for this purpose subsonic turbo-jet

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\* For detailed treatment of this subject, see SNIE 11-7-54, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks On the US and Key Overseas Installations Through 1 July 1957," published 17 August 1954. ~~See maps depicting Soviet long-range bomber capabilities for attack on the continental US, see Appendix D, Maps 1-6.~~

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powered pilotless aircraft missiles with a maximum range of 500 nautical miles and a warhead of 3,000 pounds. We believe that it will not be within Soviet capability within the period of this estimate to attack continental United States with guided missiles launched from Soviet Bloc territory.

149. If the USSR in fact develops the guided missiles which we have estimated to be within its capabilities, the following possibilities for attack would exist during the period of this estimate:

a. At present, Soviet missiles launched from advanced bases in Eastern Europe could reach targets in Western Germany and the southeastern portion of the Scandinavian peninsula.

b. In 1955, from advanced bases in Eastern Europe, targets could be reached in Western Europe as far west as London, Paris, and Rome. In the Far East, if launched from Soviet or North Korean territory, these weapons could reach targets in western Japan; <sup>and Alaska;</sup> if launched from Chinese territory, they could reach targets in the Ryukyu Islands.

\*  
c. In 1957, Soviet guided missiles could reach all of the UK, France, Italy, Scandinavia, and Turkey. In the Far East, if launched from Soviet or North Korean territory, these weapons could reach all of the Japanese islands, and if launched from China they could reach all of Hainan.

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d. In 1958-60 Soviet missiles could reach US North African bases in Tunisia, in addition to the targets listed above.

\* Air Force believes this date should be 1955. See footnote, page 58.

\*\* Air Force believes this date should be 1957. See footnote, page 58.

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150. During the period of this estimate Soviet offensive naval capabilities will still be limited to undersea warfare, surface operations involving vessels no larger than cruisers, and air operations utilizing shore based naval aircraft. The Soviet submarine force will greatly increase its capability to undertake offensive patrols and mining operations along most of the world's strategically situated sea lanes, and possibly simultaneously to launch guided missile attacks against targets on both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the US.\* Major Soviet surface units and supporting shore-based naval aircraft will probably continue to increase their capability to undertake ~~limited~~ offensive operations in Bloc coastal areas, especially in the Baltic and Black Seas, and to protect the seaward flank of ground campaigns. The Soviet Navy will almost certainly have no long-range amphibious capability within the period of this estimate, but it will remain capable of mounting short-range amphibious lifts in considerable force.

151. We estimate that the USSR now has a stock of over 500,000 mines and the capability to employ them to interfere seriously with allied sea communications. In the European area, this effort could include all the ports and approaches of the UK and Western Europe. In the Far East, most of the vital allied port areas and sea lanes around the perimeter of the Bloc could be similarly attacked.

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\* We believe the USSR capable of adapting submarines to this use, but we have no evidence that such modifications have been made.

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Air Defense Capabilities

152. We estimate that at present Bloc defensive capabilities against air attack are insufficient to provide an adequate defense under the variety of conditions which could be expected to prevail. Against daylight bomber formations between 10,000 and 30,000 feet in clear weather the Bloc air defense systems could probably inflict severe losses against piston bombers and moderate losses against jet bombers. Because of difficulties in detection and tracking, anti-aircraft fire controls, and fighter maneuverability at higher altitudes, Soviet air defenses would be less effective against bombers at altitudes above 30,000 feet, <sup>They would be</sup> and markedly less effective against bombers <sup>or at very low altitudes.</sup> above 40,000 feet. Against multiple-pronged penetrations utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary tactics and electronics counter-measures, the air defense system is subject to serious breakdowns which would tend progressively to lessen its effectiveness. Because of inadequacies in equipment and training for all-weather air defense operations, the system would be ineffective against air attacks conducted when visibility is poor.

153. Through 1957 Bloc air defenses will probably be gradually strengthened by the introduction into operational units of new fighter aircraft, new radar equipment, new anti-aircraft weapons, and surface-to-air guided missiles. All-weather fighters in limited quantities are probably already being introduced into operational units, but problems related to the operation and maintenance of airborne intercept radar will probably take a

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minimum of 18-24 months to solve. The filtering phase of air raid reporting (combat information control) is expected to continue to be a major problem during the period of this estimate. However, the gradual improvement of weapons, equipment, and training will be sufficient by 1958 to provide a Bloc air defense system substantially more effective than that now existing.

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XVIII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

154. The Soviet leaders view the world as an arena of conflict between the Communist and non-Communist camps. Soviet policy is therefore extremely sensitive to changes in world power relationships, and the Soviet leaders' current estimate of the capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities of the non-Soviet world is a decisive factor in determining the course of action which the USSR will pursue during the period of this estimate.

Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist Capabilities

155. Soviet leaders have long recognized that the core of non-Communist strength lay in the productive power of the US economy, and especially in its industrial capacity. They recognize that the US is economically capable of supporting very powerful military forces in time of peace, and of waging full-scale war for a longer period than any other major power. They also understand the economic power of the US to be a great political asset, giving the US the capability of supporting and strengthening the military and political establishments of its allies, and at the same time of employing resources for political use throughout the underdeveloped countries and areas of the non-Communist world.

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They recognize the economic capabilities of the US and its allies to be greatly superior to those of the USSR and the Bloc, but they almost certainly believe that capitalist society will in the long run inevitably decay because of its own inherent contradictions, and, therefore, that the US and its allies are incapable of maintaining this superiority permanently.

156. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that during the period of this estimate the non-Communist world will possess such strength in major components of military power that general war would involve not only the certainty of widespread destruction within the USSR but the possibility of the destruction of the Soviet system itself. They almost certainly believe that the West has and will maintain through 1959 superior naval and strategic air power, greater nuclear capability, and greater industrial potential. However, they almost certainly believe that the increase of their own nuclear capabilities will, even if these capabilities remain inferior to those of the West, tend to nullify the significance of the Western superiority.

157. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that if the US should use its nuclear capability to the maximum in the event of general war, the USSR would be unable to prevent destruction of

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major portions of the industrial and military strength of the Soviet Union. They probably recognize that the possession by the US of air bases encircling the USSR provides the West with an advantage which probably could not be entirely overcome even by surprise attacks upon these bases. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that even if most of these bases were denied the US by military or political action the US would still be able to deliver severe attacks against the USSR.

158. Under the most optimistic assumptions, the Soviet leaders might believe that US nuclear capabilities could be at least temporarily neutralized by political arrangements or by threat of Soviet retaliatory power upon the US or its allies. Under such conditions, the Soviet leaders would probably estimate that present Western capabilities would be insufficient to prevent considerable initial Soviet successes including the overrunning of Western Europe. They would probably believe, however, that the war would not be ended with these original successes and that grave danger would remain that the ~~full~~ US nuclear capability would in the end be employed. The Soviet leaders probably believe, therefore, that during the period of this estimate Western capabilities will remain sufficient to make the outcome of general war extremely hazardous and uncertain for the USSR.

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Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist Intentions

159. Soviet leaders probably estimate that the US is unlikely deliberately to initiate general war during the next few years. They probably estimate however, that the US would not be deterred, by fear of the consequences of general war, from using its full military capabilities if it believed that its security was imminently threatened. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that the US would consider as such a threat any overt armed aggression by Bloc forces against any country formally allied with the US. They probably also estimate that such aggression against a state not formally allied to the US would involve risk of US military reaction, but that the degree of this risk, and the dissuasives of the US reaction, would depend upon the importance to the US of the country attacked, the circumstances of the attack, and the political situation within the US and the non-Communist world generally. Soviet leaders almost certainly estimate that extensive Communist political warfare will be unlikely to provoke large-scale US military reaction, and they probably believe that the US would be unlikely to initiate general war against the USSR even if the activities of political warfare should lead to the establishment of Communist governments in countries presently non-Communist.

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160. The USSR probably estimates that the US will continue its development of overseas military bases, and it probably views this development with genuine and profound suspicion of US motives. These suspicions are probably increased by such apparently hostile indications as the undisguised discussion in the US press of the vulnerability of Soviet cities to air attack, the reports that the US is storing nuclear weapons at overseas installations, and the widely discussed "new look" in US defense policy emphasizing "massive retaliatory power." Many US defensive measures probably appear to the Kremlin to be aggressively-motivated. We believe the USSR considers the US military base program a serious threat to its own security, but we also believe its estimate of the imminence of the threat will depend upon its view of the world political situation rather than upon the existence of the bases themselves.

161. In Europe the Soviet leaders probably expect the US to persist in its efforts to bring about ratification of ECDC or some other arrangement that would bring a rearmed West Germany into alliance with the West. We believe that the Kremlin considers the prospect of a rearmed West Germany, closely allied with the West, as one of the most serious potential long-range threats to Bloc security. The Kremlin almost certainly estimates that the

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US will agree to the unification of Germany only if it is confident that a reunited Germany will not fall under Communist domination, and probably only if it believes that Germany will be linked with the West. ~~The Soviet leaders probably estimate that the US is unlikely to press for a revision of the Oder-Neisse boundary.~~

162. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that the US intends to maintain troops in Europe indefinitely, and will support with force its position in Berlin. They clearly recognize the great political advantages which the possession of West Berlin provides the allies, and they almost certainly estimate that the US would accept the risk of war rather than relinquish Berlin under Soviet pressure. Nevertheless, the <sup>Kremlin</sup> ~~Soviet Union~~ may estimate that the other Western Powers would be less disposed than in 1948 to resist harassment of the Western position in Berlin, especially if made to appear an East German rather than a Soviet action.

163. The Soviet estimate of US intentions in the Far East is probably less confident than that for any other area of the world at the present time. This uncertainty probably arises because of the conflicting manifestations of opinion within the US, the apparent conflict of policies among the Western nations revealed during

the Indochina crises, and the apparent reluctance of the US to adopt courses of action in the Far East which would alienate the neutral nations of Asia or threaten the harmony of the Western alliance. At the same time, the Soviet leaders are aware of many statements by US leaders indicating determination to resist the further expansion of Communism in the Far East, *including the defense of Formosa and the Pescadore.*

164. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders probably believe that the US will seek to avoid courses of action carrying grave risk of general war or seriously alienating its allies, but will attempt to prevent the consolidation of present Communist gains and to resist further Communist advances. Furthermore, they almost certainly estimate that the US will attempt to bring the policies of Western and Asian nations into harmony with those of the US during the period of this estimate and will push forward with the development of an Asian defense arrangement similar to NATO.

Soviet Estimates of Non-Communist Vulnerabilities

165. In the Kremlin view, the ability of the Western Powers to give effect to their intentions during the period of this estimate will be limited by a number of political and economic factors which

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will operate to weaken the Western alliance and undermine its capabilities. The factors discussed below are probably those which the Soviet leaders believe constitute the principal vulnerabilities of the non-Communist world.

166. Fear of Nuclear Warfare. The Soviet leaders probably calculate that increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities will have a growing influence on the policies of non-Communist states. They probably estimate that no government will willingly run grave risks of war unless interests are at stake which it considers vital, and that the threat of nuclear weapons will almost certainly tend to narrow the range of interests that any government will consider vital. They apparently estimate that the temper of world opinion is such that latent fears in the non-Communist world can be stimulated to encourage neutralist sentiments, shake confidence in the stability, moderation, and maturity of US policy, and undermine US ability to lead the non-Communist world.

167. Moreover, the Soviet leaders probably estimate that growing aversion to general war with nuclear weapons will cause both the US and its allies to show increasing concern to deal with local aggression without resorting to acts which might lead to general war. The Kremlin probably estimates, therefore,

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that opportunities may arise in certain local situations to employ limited military action without running serious risk of general war.

168. Political Conflicts. Clashes of interest and policy among European states are probably expected by the Soviet leaders to hamper US efforts to maintain an effective alliance during the period of this estimate. They apparently believe the following issues are particularly divisive: the EDC treaty and the general problem of German rearmament; problems of East-West trade controls; Far Eastern problems, including the issue of recognition of Communist China; problems of nuclear weapons control. In the long run, Moscow apparently calculates that differences of attitude toward these and related issues will produce wider schisms among non-Communist countries.

169. The Soviet leaders probably estimate that French and Italian social cleavages, economic problems, and political weaknesses will remain the most serious obstacles to the building of a strong and stable Europe. They probably estimate also that the French may continue to veto West Germany's rearmament and admission to the Western alliance, and that as a result the Bonn Government

may modify its presently strong pro-Western policy. Even the differences which on occasion agitate Anglo-American relations may be calculated by the Kremlin to carry the possibility of future estrangement between the two strongest countries in the anti-Communist alliance.

170. The Soviet leaders probably estimate that serious differences among non-Communist countries will ~~arise~~ <sup>continue</sup> ever policies in the Far East, and they probably hope that these differences over the next few years will result in an increasing isolation of the US from the other countries of the non-Communist world. They almost certainly believe that the armistice in Indochina has improved Communist capabilities for further advances, further undermined Western prestige in Asia, and weakened Western capabilities to mobilize local opposition to Communism. On the other hand they probably recognize the chance that a too aggressive Communist policy in Asia might tend to catalyze resistance in the non-Communist countries of Asia, and contribute to the development of a strong anti-Communist alliance in the area. In any event, the Kremlin probably believes that the US will continue to face complex problems, during the period of this estimate, in harmonizing its policies in the Far East with those of its allies and the non-Communist nations of Asia.

171. Economic Conflicts. The Soviet leaders probably expect economic problems to assume greater prominence, during the period of this estimate, and to test the strength and cohesion of the Western alliance. They profess to believe that the capitalist economy is afflicted by a deepening and irremediable crisis. In particular, the Communist leaders state that the capitalist world market has been fatally constricted by the expansion of the Communist sphere, and that the re-emergence of Germany and Japan will produce critical conflicts of economic interest.

172. Anticolonialism and Nationalism in Underdeveloped Areas. The Soviet leaders have long estimated that conditions in the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world constitute vulnerabilities for the West. They probably believe that in some countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, Communist opportunities are enhanced by political immaturity, economic and social grievances, inadequate material and technological resources, resentment of Western imperialism, and extreme nationalism. The Communists are aware that these areas are undergoing a social and economic revolution which is conducive to political instability. The Kremlin probably estimates that US economic aid and military assistance will not wholly overcome anti-Western attitudes and that prospects for the encouragement of anti-Westernism will continue to be good.

173. Popular Aspirations. The weaknesses of the non-Communist world are intensified and complicated, in the Kremlin view, by the pressures of discontented populations upon governments which are sensitive to popular desires and incapable of totalitarian political controls adequate to suppress popular demands. Demands for an improved scale of living, for economic security and social welfare, for greater political freedom, for independence in colonial areas all serve, from Moscow's viewpoint, to create disunity and instability within non-Communist countries. The Kremlin probably believes that some governments in the non-Communist world will be increasingly subjected to unrealistic demands far beyond the capacities of the governments to grant, and that the stability of such governments will be sufficiently disturbed to produce weaknesses in the non-Communist world.

174. In summary, the Soviet leaders probably believe that present world trends are not unfavorable to Soviet strategic interests. They may expect that the next few years will see a deterioration in relations among the Western allies and a gradual isolation of the US from the rest of the non-Communist world. They almost certainly believe that the US will face increasingly complex problems in dealing with its allies and with the other states that make up the non-Soviet world. They probably estimate that developments which will take place within

and among the states of the non-Communist world during the period of this estimate will enhance Soviet opportunities for further expansion, and will reduce the likelihood of concerted Western counteraction.

XIX. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

Present Soviet Objectives

175. We believe that the developments within the sphere of Soviet power and the Soviet estimate of the world situation which have been discussed in the foregoing sections have led the Soviet leaders to assess their own situation somewhat as follows: the balance of military power in the world <sup>and the increasing destructiveness of nuclear weapons are</sup> ~~is~~ such that ~~open military~~ <sup>general war</sup> aggression would involve very heavy risks to the Communist sphere, <sup>extending</sup> and possibly to the <sup>destruction of the</sup> Soviet system itself. On the other hand, non-Communist <sup>strength</sup> ~~power~~ is not so <sup>great</sup> ~~imposing~~ that withdrawals from the present advanced positions in Europe and Asia seem necessary. Moreover, the prospects probably seem good that the increase of Bloc military capabilities, together with political defections or disunity of the non-Communist side, will gradually shift the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Bloc. In the meantime, the Bloc has a full agenda of internal problems which, while they do not imply a

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weakness requiring abandonment of expansionist aims or even the neglect of opportunities for expansion under circumstances of limited risk, do call for attention during the next five years at least. These problems include the ~~consolidation of Communist power in the European Satellites and China~~, the further buildup of economic power in ~~these countries and the USSR~~ <sup>The Bloc</sup> as a step toward balancing the vastly greater economic potential of the West, and the correction of certain weaknesses in the Bloc economy, particularly in agricultural production.

176. We therefore believe that the Soviet leaders will concentrate on the following principal objectives during the period of this estimate:

- a. To expand Soviet economic potential;
- b. To maintain a high level of military readiness and to improve the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces, emphasizing the development of greater nuclear capability;
- c. To increase the political and economic instability of non-Communist states, and to render them incapable of decisive action by fostering and exploiting dissensions within and among them;
- d. To weaken and disrupt the mutual defense arrangements of non-Communist states, and in particular to prevent the rearmament of West Germany in close association with the Western alliance;
- e. To isolate the US from its allies in Europe and Asia;
- f. To expand the area of Communist control in southeast Asia.

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External Courses of Action

177. General War. We believe that the Kremlin will, during the period of this estimate, try to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. Nevertheless, the USSR or one of the Soviet Bloc countries might take action creating a situation in which the US or its allies, rather than yield an important position, would decide to take counteraction involving grave risk of general war with the USSR. Moreover, we believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against a Western action which it considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. Thus general war might occur during the period of this estimate as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, which neither side originally intended to lead to general war.

178. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the ~~certainty~~ <sup>unwillingness</sup> of the US and its allies to <sup>risk</sup> general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to promote its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. As the period of this estimate progresses, the USSR will probably be increasingly ready to apply ~~heavy~~ <sup>heavy</sup> pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. On the other hand,

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we believe that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would <sup>expect to</sup> be subjected to nuclear attack. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities appear to give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

179. Diplomacy and Propaganda. We believe that the USSR during the period of this estimate will almost certainly be unwilling to settle any East-West differences at the cost of major concessions. Nevertheless, the USSR will probably seek to continue discussions of major issues, and may make proposals for settlements which will be plausible to some non-Communist nations but unacceptable to the US. The Soviet leaders probably hope that such tactics will carry an implication to the non-Communist world of Soviet willingness to negotiate outstanding issues, and stimulate doubts in the non-Communist world regarding the reasonableness of US leadership. Moves apparently intended to ease international tension will probably be alternated, however, with political warfare pressures calculated to play upon the non-Communist world's fear of war.

180. We believe that the USSR will place emphasis in its diplomacy and propaganda, during the period of this estimate, upon

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proposals for the control or abolition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders will probably try by such maneuvers to hold out to the non-Communist world the prospect of release from the threat of nuclear warfare and, by seeking to place upon the US the blame for the failure to achieve workable control arrangements, to stimulate doubts about the reasonableness and moderation of US policies in this field.

181. We believe it highly unlikely that the USSR during the period of this estimate will agree to a system of nuclear weapons control which would involve inspection within the USSR under provisions acceptable to the Western Powers. Soviet proposals regarding the control of nuclear weapons will probably be designed primarily to erect political and moral barriers to US freedom of action in the use of nuclear weapons.

182. Trade. The USSR will probably seek to support its propaganda and diplomacy with new overtures indicating willingness to expand its trade with non-Communist states. Soviet trade with the non-Communist world will probably increase somewhat during the period of this estimate, but this trade will continue to be small in proportion to intra-Bloc trade. New trade agreements will probably be intended not only to obtain desired imports but also to weaken the economic ties of non-Communist states with the US, and to make strategic trade controls a subject of controversy

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between these states and the US. While the Soviet Union will not be able to bring about a major shift in present trade patterns, the Communists probably estimate that political dividends can be earned from even small increases in their current volumes of trade with individual non-Communist states.

183. Europe. We believe that in Europe the Kremlin will continue to pursue its general objective of weakening Western governments and impeding Western defense. It will continue its campaign against the present form of NATO and against American bases in Europe. The Kremlin's immediate aim remains to prevent the rearmament of West Germany and its alliance with the West. France will probably remain the principal target of Soviet policy designed to achieve this end. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy will be designed to strengthen French confidence in the USSR's peaceful intentions and in the reasonableness of Soviet proposals, to stimulate French fears of future German aggression, and to sow resentment of US policy. <sup>In</sup> Italy ~~where~~ as in France, the USSR possesses a powerful weapon in the ~~existence of a~~ large native Communist party, <sup>and Italy</sup> will probably continue to be an important target in the Soviet campaign to alienate Western Europe from US <sup>the</sup> leadership and <sup>undermine</sup> ~~present~~ NATO defense concepts.

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184. If the Soviet leaders come to believe that there is little prospect for French approval of EDC or any other formula for the admission of West Germany to the Western defense system, they will probably shift their main diplomatic and propaganda effort to West Germany. This would be in accordance with their present aims, first to deny Germany to the Western defense system and ultimately to bring it within the orbit of Soviet influence. A major effort will probably be undertaken to develop cultural and economic relations between East and West Germany aimed at direct political negotiations between the two for German unity. Attractive trade offers are likely to be employed to undermine support in powerful industrial circles for present Western-oriented policies.

~~economic relations between East and West Germany aimed at direct political negotiations between the two for German unity.~~

185. ~~If EDC should be ratified, or~~ if West Germany should be rearmed and **brought** into the Western alliance ~~under some other formula~~, we believe that Soviet leaders would estimate that this development involved potentially a substantial threat to the security to the Bloc. In particular, they would probably fear that a rearmed West Germany might ultimately dominate the EDC-NATO structure and might, in the future, influence the Western alliance

to adopt a more aggressive policy towards the Soviet Bloc. However, the Soviet leaders would probably estimate that considerable time would elapse before the threat to Bloc security through German rearmament became critical, and that during the interim the German question might create serious dissension within the Western coalition. Accordingly, we believe that the Kremlin would react to the beginning of German rearmament mainly be intensified efforts to divide and destroy the Western alliance. These efforts might include a new proposal for German unification which would appear to satisfy the principal conditions which the Western powers have maintained on this issue. If these efforts should fail, and if the threat to Bloc security appeared to the Kremlin to be markedly increasing by reason of the growth of West German armed forces, the Soviet leaders would probably increase the scale of their own defense effort. A step-up in the armaments race might therefore develop, accompanied by an increase in international tension.

186. Asia. We believe that the USSR regards the situation in Northeast Asia as stabilized for the present. We believe the Communist leaders will not renew hostilities in Korea, or agree to a political settlement which would endanger Communist control of North Korea. Soviet policy toward Japan is probably based on the assumption that Japan is at present effectively under US influence. However, Soviet diplomacy and propaganda will attempt to disturb

US-Japanese relations and to prevent any substantial contribution by Japan to US military power. The Japanese Communist Party, whose propaganda impact is disproportionate to its size, is an important instrument <sup>for</sup> ~~to~~ this purpose. In their intent ultimately to detach Japan entirely from US influence, the Soviet leaders probably count on the long-run effect of possible further Communist gains in Asia, on Japanese political instability, and on the urgent Japanese need for markets.

187. Southeast Asia almost certainly appears to the Kremlin to be the most profitable field for Communist subversion and armed revolt during the period of this estimate. The Soviet leaders will probable continue to give covert support to such activities. However, if the activities of local Communist groups stimulate anti-Communist attitudes within these Asian states or tend to unite these states in a program of joint resistance with Western powers, the Kremlin may chose to hold local Communist movements in check. The principal concern of Soviet policy in South Asia will be to encourage and exploit the neutralism already present in the area. The Soviet leaders probably hope thereby to promote differences within the British Commonwealth over ways of dealing with Communism in Asia. They would expect such differences to affect Anglo-American relations adversely, and to render difficult the efforts of the Western powers to enlist the support of Asian peoples in effective opposition to further Communist advances in Asia.

188. We believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general share Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests in Asia. During the period of this estimate, Communist China will probably be reluctant to undertake courses of action which it considers might involve substantial risk of provoking unlimited war with a major power. The major deterrents will be: (a) Communist China needs time to consolidate the Communist state as well as to modernize its economy; (b) its strong ground forces are limited in service and support units, its expanding air force has certain limitations, its navy has extremely limited capabilities, and it will remain militarily dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and naval support; (c) its industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of available resources over minimum domestic requirements will be narrow.

*In spite of these limitations and deterrents, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Chinese Communist may, at some time during the period of this estimate, well attempt to carry out recent threats to "liberate" Formosa and the Pescadore.*

Moreover, Communist China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of its capability, any action which it considers to be a military threat to its borders or to constitute an imminent threat to its vital interests, accepting the risks of war inherent in such action.\*

189. Chinese Communist leaders probably share the Soviet view that Southeast Asia offers the most favorable opportunities for Communist expansion, not only because of the vulnerability of

\* The Director of Intelligence, USIA, believes that paragraph 188 should read as follows:

"We believe that Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests. Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare are such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

the states in the area, ~~but~~ ~~however~~ ~~is~~ ~~the~~ possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies. The Communists will almost certainly attempt to extend their gains in Indochina, and will probably expand their efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections. ~~The aggressiveness with which such a policy is pursued will depend upon the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction. We do not believe, however, that the Communists will attempt to secure their objectives in southeast Asia by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces, at least during the early period of this calendar.~~

~~the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction.~~

190. Middle East. Since its withdrawal from Azerbaijan in 1946 the USSR has, apparently, <sup>not</sup> given <sup>high</sup> ~~low~~ priority to Communist activities in the Middle East. This may have been due to such factors as Soviet preoccupation with more important theaters elsewhere, the weakness of local Communist cadres in the area, and the fact that even without Soviet initiative the trends in the area were already unfavorable to the West. In recent months, however, there have been signs of increased Communist activity in the area. To the extent that the Western powers succeed in reversing the trends unfavorable to them and in building toward a situation of strength in this area, we believe that the USSR will increase its activities. If, for example, progress is made in the development of the "northern tier" plan for

Middle East regional defense, the USSR will probably increase its efforts to arouse anti-Western feelings and influence the states of the area against cooperation with the West.

19I. Latin America. The <sup>USSR</sup> ~~Soviet Union~~ will continue its efforts through local Communist parties and front groups, appealing particularly to labor, students, and intellectuals, to promote anti-US sentiment, to embarrass US business interests, and to obstruct economic and military cooperation of Latin American governments with the US. The type of political action the Communists pursued in Guatemala, where a small Communist element was able to obtain a decisive influence over policy by operating through front groups, will be the most likely pattern of Communist tactics in Latin America. Communist strength is insufficient to attempt open seizures of power or to run the risk of interventions by other American states. At present, Soviet aims are probably limited to establishing governments which would pursue policies calculated to disrupt the Organization of American States and to damage US prestige. The <sup>Bloc</sup> ~~Soviet Union~~ will probably try to increase its trade with Latin America. In addition to providing a source of needed raw materials, such trade might be calculated to contribute to the softening of inter-American solidarity and to the creation of a more receptive atmosphere for Bloc propaganda.