

**TOP SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOL-TF/C-1

COPY NO. 24

A REPORT  
to the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



by  
TASK FORCE "C"  
of  
PROJECT SOLARIUM

on

A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT  
PRESENTLY OR IN THE FUTURE UNDERTAKE WITH RESPECT  
TO THE SOVIET POWER BLOC - ALTERNATIVE "C"

16 July 1953  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

I

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLE 2011-122  
para page 37  
By MMK NLDD Date 6/27/12

**TOP SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

WASHINGTON, D. C.  
16 July 1953



PREFACE

Pursuant to its directive, Task Force C of Project SOLARIUM has studied, developed, and evaluated a course of action to carry out the broad line of policy for the United States set forth in Alternative C. The results of our work are presented in the attached report.

As directed, the Task Force has focussed its efforts particularly on the oral presentation to the National Security Council, the full text of which is contained in Part Two of the report. The presentation is supported by, and was derived from Part Three, the main body of the report, in which is set forth our more comprehensive staff study and plan.

The work of our Task Force has had as its purpose "to assist the National Security Council in making its recommendations of the best courses of action to be adopted by the United States."

We were instructed to act as advocates of Policy C in developing our presentation and report, but to express any individual reservations or dissents considered necessary. There have proved to be no reservations of this nature on the program as a whole. Details and particulars, however, remain subject to further evaluation and study.

We are agreed upon the program of action set forth in our report as a generally valid and feasible means of carrying out Policy Alternative C. We are further agreed that Policy Alternative C, thus carried into effect, offers major returns and advantages as a basic policy for the United States. These advantages are set forth in detail in the report.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**



We respectfully recommend this report to the consideration of the National Security Council.

*R. L. Conolly*  
Vice Admiral R. L. Conolly, U.S. Navy, Chairman

*L. L. Lemnitzer*  
Lieutenant General L.L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army

*G. F. Reinhardt*  
G. F. Reinhardt

*Kilbourne Johnston*  
Kilbourne Johnston

*Andrew J. Goodpaster*  
Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army

*Leslie S. Brady*  
Leslie S. Brady

*Harold K. Johnson*  
Colonel Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army

**TOP SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS



	<u>Page</u>
Preface	i
PART ONE	
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM	1
II. SUMMARY OF COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED; RECOMMENDATION	3
PART TWO	
III. ORAL PRESENTATION	
A. The Problem	9
B. The Program	15
PART THREE	
IV. THE TASK ASSIGNED	
A. Clarification and Differentiation of Alternative "C"	71
B. Basic Reasoning Supporting Alternative "C"	73
V. METHOD OF ATTACK EMPLOYED	78
VI. PLAN IN BROADEST TERMS	
A. Basic Premises	83
B. Principles of Aggressive Cold War	85
C. General Objectives in Over-all Concept	91
VII. MAIN COURSES OF ACTION	
A. Functional Actions	
1. Political and Diplomatic	97

III

**TOP SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

**~~TOP SECRET~~**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

	<u>Page</u>
2. Military	106
3. Economic	111
4. Propaganda and Education	122
5. Covert Operations	131
B. Regional Actions	
1. U.S.S.R.	144
2. Satellites	156
3. China	165
4. Free Europe - Northwest Africa	171
5. Middle East - Northeast Africa	182
6. Sub-Equatorial Africa, Latin America	190
7. Northeast Asia	202
8. Southeast Asia	208
C. U.S. Governmental Procedures for Implementation	228
VIII. EVALUATIONS OF RESULTS, RISKS, AND COSTS	
A. Analysis of Soviet Reactions and Evaluation of Risk	232
B. Evaluation of Results	239
C. Evaluation of Costs, Legislative Requirements, Public Opinion, and Reactions of Allies	244
IX. SUMMARY OF LINES OF ACTION - SHORT TERM	257



~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

	<u>Page</u>
ENCLOSURE 1. MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMY	1-1
APPENDIX A. COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES	A-1
APPENDIX B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON INDO-CHINA	B-1



~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.  
16 July 1953



PREFACE

Pursuant to its directive, Task Force C of Project SOLARIUM has studied, developed, and evaluated a course of action to carry out the broad line of policy for the United States set forth in Alternative C. The results of our work are presented in the attached report.

As directed, the Task Force has focussed its efforts particularly on the oral presentation to the National Security Council, the full text of which is contained in Part Two of the report. The presentation is supported by, and was derived from Part Three, the main body of the report, in which is set forth our more comprehensive staff study and plan.

The work of our Task Force has had as its purpose "to assist the National Security Council in making its recommendations of the best courses of action to be adopted by the United States."

We were instructed to act as advocates of Policy C in developing our presentation and report, but to express any individual reservations or dissents considered necessary. There have proved to be no reservations of this nature on the program as a whole. Details and particulars, however, remain subject to further evaluation and study.

We are agreed upon the program of action set forth in our report as a generally valid and feasible means of carrying out Policy Alternative C. We are further agreed that Policy Alternative C, thus carried into effect, offers major returns and advantages as a basic policy for the United States. These advantages are set forth in detail in the report.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



We respectfully recommend this report to the consideration of the  
National Security Council.

*R. L. Conolly*  
Vice Admiral R. L. Conolly, U.S. Navy, Chairman

*L. L. Lemnitzer*  
Lieutenant General L.L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army

*G. F. Reinhardt*  
G. F. Reinhardt

*Kilbourne Johnston*  
Kilbourne Johnston

*Andrew J. Goodpaster*  
Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army

*Leslie S. Brady*  
Leslie S. Brady

*Harold K. Johnson*  
Colonel Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



PART ONE

I - STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To study, develop and evaluate a course of action designed to carry out a broad line of policy for the United States as set forth in Alternative C:

"a. The policy of the United States would be:

- (1) To increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and strengthening of the free world to enable it to assume the greater risks involved; and
- (2) To create the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout the Soviet bloc.

"b. The purpose of this policy would be, by actions such as those suggested below, to force the Soviets to shift their efforts to holding what they already have rather than concentrating on gaining control of additional territories and peoples and, at the same time, to produce a climate of victory encouraging to the free world. While this policy is not designed to provoke a war with the Soviet Union, it involves a substantial risk of general war which will vary according to the nature and timing of the steps taken to implement it.

"c. The following actions should be among those considered, with proper time phasing, as means of implementing the above policy:

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION



- (1) To remove the threat arising from the Moscow-Peiping axis by (a) bringing about the overthrow of the Peiping regime or (b) separating Peiping from Moscow.
- (2) To take such steps as are practicable to separate selected peripheral areas from the Iron Curtain. Examples might be Hainan, Albania, and possibly Kwantung Province, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
- (3) To bring about clear-cut defeats, by military and other means, of present local Communist aggressions in Indo-China and Korea and the effective suppression of Communist-inspired guerrilla operations in Malaya, the Philippines, and other areas."

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**



II - SUMMARY OF COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED;  
RECOMMENDATION

A. SUMMARY OF COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED

1. There follows a brief summary of the course of action envisaged by Task Force C for the accomplishment of Alternative C set forth above. This course of action has been time-phased, in that a time-table involving three distinct phases of action has been developed. In establishing this time-table the basic problem has been to correlate the timing of actions (political, military and economic) by the United States against the time when the Soviet Union will be capable of dealing a destructive blow to the United States. A realistic estimation and assessment of Soviet capabilities has been developed and presented. It leads us to the conclusion that by the end of five years, our current atomic capability, while growing, will be neutralized largely by decisive stocks and delivery capabilities in the hands of the Soviet Union. For timing purposes then, the short-term period, and the one in which specific tasks are recommended, is set at five years (although certain courses of action initiated during this period may continue into later periods). The mid-term period is set at seven years beyond the end of the short-term. For this period no specific tasks but rather general courses of action are recommended. The long term is that period beyond the mid-term, with no set terminus. For this period neither specific tasks nor specific courses of action are recommended--rather, we merely summarize our ultimate objectives, which should be attained during this final phase.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



2. In broad terms, the first phase involves the following general courses of action:

- a. Development of a suitable posture of strength by the United States and its Allies.
- b. Development of a world-wide covert apparatus.
- c. Initiation of attacks on the Communist apparatus, particularly in the areas outside the borders of the Soviet Bloc.
- d. Penetration by all possible means of the Soviet Bloc.

3. In the mid-term (1958-1965) the following general guidelines are established:

- a. Continued development of covert apparatus.
- b. Mop-up of Communist control apparatus outside of Soviet Bloc and continued surveillance to prevent resurgence.
- c. Direct attacks (not military) on Satellites.
- d. Continued effort against Communist China.
- e. Continued pressure on the Soviet Union.

4. In the long term, after 1965, will occur the reduction of those Satellites not defected earlier and direct pressure against the Soviet Union.

5. Section IV in the body of this report indicates the specific courses of action to be taken within the short term by area and country, where applicable.

6. Mid-term courses of action:

- a. It is not deemed feasible to specify courses of action under

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**



Alternative C for a period that is five years away, except to point out general actions that would be initiated but would culminate during the short-term period. At the end of the short-term period, in 1958, we believe that under Alternative C we would have increased strength around the world. No lasting peace would have been attained in Korea due to Communist intransigence. We would have dealt a severe blow to Chinese prestige through the administration of a sound military defeat and the destruction of some of their industrial centers. We would have imposed a severe drain on Soviet industries to re-equip the Chinese and at the same time have imposed a strain on relationships between the two countries. China would have demonstrated no progress toward self-sufficiency. Current conditions of poverty would exist and unrest would be on the rise.

b. In Europe, we would present a united front. Germany would be united and ostensibly committed to neither side, although definitely oriented toward the free world which would provide the bulk of her markets; or, alternatively, she would still be divided but Western Germany would be an armed and active partisan of the West. [Soviet armed forces would be withdrawn within the borders of the Soviet Union, although poised on the border to bolster control over the Satellites.] There would be continued governmental shifts in the Satellites and general conditions pertaining to living standards would show continued deterioration giving rise to more unrest. This condition might well arise in particular countries at any time during the short-term period, but would be general by the end of the period, unless there were a turn-about on the part

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



of the Kremlin which is held by this Task Force to be unlikely.

c. In the Middle East, an acceptable degree of internal stability would have been attained. Only a limited military capability would have been developed beyond Turkey, although this capability would be such as to counter anything less than an all-out effort on the part of the Soviets if they were to decide to encroach upon this territory.

d. In Sub-equatorial Africa and in Latin America an acceptable degree of stability would be attained and a substantial part of the Communist conspiracy destroyed.

e. Within this framework we propose the following guidelines for the second phase:

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
(1) Political:

(a) Continued "hard" policy toward our enemies, but tempered by an increased willingness to bargain, since we will be negotiating from a position of strength.

(b) Continued friendship toward those areas, primarily Latin America, neutralist Asia and Sub-equatorial Africa, in which the Communist threat has been materially reduced.

(c) Continued effort to maintain the support of Allies, although resorting to a "hard" policy when required. Our task is to command respect, not necessarily love and devotion.

(d) All-out political offensive to overthrow Satellite governments and bring them into the family of free nations.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



(2) Military:

(a) Continued maintenance of a strong base at home, with forces deployed world-wide as best serves the interests of moving in on the Soviet Union--actually tightening encirclement, not overt military attack.

(b) Continued stress and support of preparedness on the part of our Allies, with emphasis on those countries adjacent to Satellite territories.

(3) Economic:

(a) Continued limited aid in those areas where Point IV aspects of current aid have been stressed.

(b) Reduced economic aid where applicable but continued support of military forces in being on a sustaining basis. This envisages a marked reduction in economic aid in Western Europe and in Japan.

(4) Propaganda and Education: Increased tempo of the attack on the Soviet Union.

(5) Covert:

(a) Use of covert elements in the Satellites as they are marked for overthrow or subversion.

(b) Increased covert effort within the Soviet Union and within Communist China.

7. Long Term:

a. At the end of the mid-term or in 1965, it is envisaged that the Satellites will be freed, or in such a state of disaffection with the U.S.S.R. as to constitute a serious weakness rather than strength in the

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



Soviet Bloc. The strains between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. will have reached a point where prospects are favorable for driving a final wedge between them.

b. There will be two ultimate objectives in the long term:

(1) The reduction of Soviet power and militancy and the elimination of the Communist conspiracy; and

(2) Overthrow of the Communist regime in China.

Since this phase of the conflict is in the distant future, no specific courses of action are recommended. It is important to keep these objectives in mind throughout all periods. No action should be undertaken that does not lead ultimately to the goal of liquidation of the Communist menace.

B. RECOMMENDATION

1. Task Force C recommends the adoption of Alternative C as a policy for the United States. It is our considered judgment that the most feasible method of attaining our objectives and, at the same time, of avoiding general war is to end the cold war. We are convinced that the only way to end the cold war is to face up to the challenge posed by the Communist conspiracy and devote the necessary effort to the task of winning the cold war. Alternative C should be adopted because it is a positive course of action designed to seize the strategic initiative and deliberately undertake the task of eliminating the Communist threat to the free world.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



PART TWO

III - ORAL PRESENTATION

A. THE PROBLEM

1. In accordance with the directive of the National Security Council, Task Force C has formulated and now presents an alternative course of action. Our concept of planned action requires that the United States seize the political initiative and operate aggressively against the Soviet Bloc by waging a political offensive. Such a strategy would, while not designed to provoke war, accept a substantial risk of war, whenever justified by the gains to be achieved. With the belief that we cannot live with a political stalemate because of the rising threat to our existence posed by our adversary, Task Force C recommends that the United States unequivocally accept the challenge. It should be made plain that our real enemy is the organization in the Kremlin which has usurped power and exercises control over the world-wide Communist apparatus, the Soviet armed forces, the secret police and thus the enslaved peoples of the Soviet Union. It has announced intentions to overthrow our government, subvert our institutions and absorb us into its system. (We have no reason to doubt that it means just that.) In this struggle we want victory and to attain our ends and frustrate theirs, we must proceed to bring about the political subversion and liquidation of the conspiracy against us.

2. In order that we gain victory, in this so-called cold war, the United States must set as its goal the same objectives or aims that we would require for an acceptable end to a "hot war." Sufficient to say that

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



if we could achieve these aims by political means, even combined with military operations short of general war, we would have eliminated this mortal threat and have secured the nation and the free world from subjugation.

3. Courses of action previously followed have at various times employed the measures prescribed by Alternatives A and B. Task Force C believes that restrictions imposed on such courses of action have greatly limited their effectiveness. While results have been sometimes rewarding, usually resulting from sporadic and localized departure from a passive attitude, the whole underlying philosophy has been negative and defensive. Implied acceptance of the status quo disqualifies both those alternatives as means to lasting security and a free world. Time has been working against us. We must arrest, reverse the trend by positive action. What is needed is dynamic, offensive, political action started now and progressively accelerated. We would proceed to the attainment of definite middle-term goals but always with sustained and unrelenting resolution to achieve our ultimate aim, the downfall of our enemy. It is time that we began to force the pace.

4. In this conflict one is either winning or losing. There can be no continuing balance, no state of real world stability in the face of this implacable conspiracy. We have lost ground for a decade. Loss of our exclusive atomic supremacy and growing Russian atomic capabilities further reduces our margin of security.

5. The present situation cannot be considered as an acceptable basis for a settlement. We are still losing. It is explicitly stated in our

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



directive that Task Force C would propose action that accepts greater risks, involves greater efforts. It is unmistakably implied that we must procure greater results sooner and with more certainty.

6. The fundamental danger in the world situation is due to a relative preponderance of ready military power available to our enemy on the Eurasian land mass coupled with his aggressive imperialistic intentions. The power imbalance has existed ever since the defeat of Germany and Japan and our precipitate demobilization, together with tardy and sometimes reluctant rearming, and that only since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The intentions of our adversary have been increasingly evident from the end of the war and were unmistakably disclosed by the subversion of Czechoslovakia in 1948. In spite of the present "Peace Offensive" and the possible temporary assumption of a defensive attitude, there is no real reason to believe that these intentions have been lastingly modified. In spite of some disarray in the command organization, we find its sources of power intact and its menace unabated.

7. Before proceeding further, it would be profitable to define the term "cold war." We have searched for a better term but found none. We intend to use it to describe the condition of international struggle in which we are now engaged. This encompasses every form of military and political conflict short of a general war of global scope with our principal adversary, the U.S.S.R. itself.

8. Task Force C believes that there is only one central threat to our security: the combination of "the formidable power and aggressive policy of

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



the Communist world led by the U.S.S.R." This threatens many of our basic institutions including our powerful economy, the political freedom of the individual, and our whole national manner of free life. But the primary threat is certainly to our existence as a free and sovereign nation. The others should, we believe, be considered as stemming from it.

9. The political strategist must form his own estimate of the risk involved in each proposed action. It is estimated that the Soviet Union will not be satisfied with maintaining permanently a defensive posture in order to avoid risk of general war and with the purpose of consolidating its present position. It will accomplish this purpose by continued aggressive pressure accepting some considerable risk of general war, interspersed with active phases of "Peace Offensives." This has been the pattern of its action and obviously indicates a policy that it has followed with success. There seems to be every indication that it will continue such a policy but with variations to suit the times and in readiness to exploit opportunities. One variation might be: assumption temporarily of the passive defensive. This would provide the Soviet Union opportunity for consolidation of position and controls. But the worst possible effect would be to undermine the determination and resistance of the United States and its Allies.

10. We have accepted the National Intelligence Estimate No. 65, which sets forth Soviet capabilities. We believe that the U.S.S.R. will have by 1955 a considerable stock pile of atomic weapons and a capability of delivering it against vital targets in the Continental United States. This threat, within a few years, if not effectively countered, would dangerously imperil

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



our ability to wage a general war against the U.S.S.R. The rapid development of defensive measures therefore is imperative. It is necessary that we prosecute our intensified campaign during the period when our atomic superiority is significant and to reach a decision before our enemy has achieved the atomic "enough" point.

11. We believe that our present military strength justifies the initiation of the first phase of our program. As the intensity of our attack there after increases, we will require increased military strength to back our action. This must be both "ready," to deal with localized situations, and "potential" (including the ready strength), to deal with the possibility of general war and to serve as a deterrent to it.

12. Alternative C will produce added strains upon ties with our Allies. Where any positive course of action is projected, we cannot expect unanimity. While not advocating a policy of "going-it-alone," we would be forced on occasion, after exhausting every means to secure concurrence of Allies, to proceed unilaterally. Effective action must not be inhibited nor achievement of our ultimate aims frustrated.

13. We must not be content with our present position. Mere containment is sterile as a continuing policy. Threat of retaliation by invoking general war will not suffice to restrain our enemy from continued erosive action against our world position. It is necessary that we create a climate of victory. Success in our cold war operations will encourage our Allies and cement them to us. It will favorably influence friends and neutrals and make possible their adherence to us. It will weaken our enemy and create

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOL-TF/C-1  
SEC. III

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



defection in his Satellites and unrest and deterioration in his state-  
structure. We can make no acceptable peace with the group in the Kremlin.  
We must proceed to bring about the destruction of its power and the over-  
throw of its leadership.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



B. THE PROGRAM

1. Objectives and Over-All Concept

a. I will now take up the over-all concepts and objectives which we have adopted as the framework for action. We have developed a statement of objectives paralleling closely the general peacetime objectives of NSC 153/1, but have added the wartime objectives.

b. We retain unchanged the basic purpose stated by the NSC -- to maintain the fundamental American values and institutions which rest on the essential dignity and worth of the individual in a free society. Likewise, we have not changed the objectives which call for: building of U.S. military and non-military strength, that envisaging a strong U.S. economy and that calling for free political institutions and informed public opinion. We have re-worded for added clarity the objective concerning the strengthening of our Allies: to achieve their stability, to prevent Communist domination of them short of war, to deter Soviet recourse to war, and to enable them to act at the limit of their capabilities against the Soviet Union in case of war.

(SHOW VISUAL AID)

c. We differ materially from NSC 153/1 on the objective of preventing further expansion of Soviet Bloc power. Instead of preventing "significant expansion", Alternative C is categorical as to preventing any further expansion, which we interpret to be Soviet domination of, or entry into, additional territorial areas. We have also changed the objective on reduction of Soviet power and influence. Instead of "without unduly risking

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



a general war". Alternative C calls for this action "without however initiating general war". We feel that these changes, which have far-reaching consequences, are inherent in the more aggressive policy of Alternative C.

d. By the shorthand term "reduction of Soviet power", we refer to steps generally as enumerated by the NSC in peacetime courses of action -- straining Soviet-Satellite relations and disruption of Soviet power. But we will add to these the wartime objectives: ① ending Soviet domination outside traditional borders, ② destroying the Communist apparatus in the Free World, ③ curtailing Soviet power for aggressive war, ④ ending the Iron Curtain, and ⑤ cutting down the strength of any bolshevik elements left in Soviet Russia.

We wish to emphasize that the inclusion of these war objectives in our policy makes it fundamentally and radically different from the policy of Alternatives A and B and the approved policy of the NSC. We consider, in fact, that NSC 153/1 is defective in that it provides no means of attaining these so-called war objectives -- certainly the true objectives of the U.S. -- other than by recourse to general war. We aim to achieve them by our Cold War.

e. We have identified certain policies and guidelines which have general application under Alternative C to govern our courses of action:

(1) Prosecute relentlessly a forward and aggressive political strategy in all fields and by all means: military, economic, diplomatic, covert and propaganda.

(2) Evolve and maintain a military policy that will support the strong political line until a real and permanent decision has been secured.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**



(3) Establish, perfect and employ an executive Cold War machinery that can plan and execute a dynamic program of action.

(4) Continue integration and build-up of all elements of anti-Soviet strength.

(5) Exploit to the fullest, use of military forces as instruments of national policy to achieve political, propaganda and prestige objectives by both military and diplomatic means.

(6) Utilize the technical and productive genius of the United States combined with the power of our matchless industrial plant, our skilled manpower and a largely self-sufficient economy.

(7) Educate the public of the U.S. in the nature of our enemy, the threat to our freedoms and existence and the necessity for intense and sustained attack against our real political enemy, the Kremlin group.

(8) Employ negotiations as a means for exploiting favorable developments and improving our political position but bar those in which the United States would be on the defensive or which could risk loss of certain vital elements of strength and position.

(9) Prosecute initially a large part of our intensified Cold War covertly using a national program of deception and concealment from public disclosure and Soviet discernment as to the depth and extent of our challenge.

(10) Miss no opportunities to confuse and unbalance our enemy nor any to discredit him: within his own borders, in the eyes of our public and in satellite and international circles. Keep on the pressure.

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**



(11) Attain limited but definite time-phased objectives of an operational nature leading progressively to more comprehensive distant objectives.

(12) Limit political commitments so that the United States can retain its initiative and freedom of action and exercise Free World leadership.

\* \* \*

f. We now will proceed from the general to the more specific. Within the scope of the above policies, General Lemnitzer (to be followed by Mr. Kilbourne Johnston) will present specific courses of action which are designed to lay the ground work during the first time-phase (approximately five years). This action is designed to accomplish what is shown on this chart (show Visual Aid). During the second phase (1958-1965) we cannot foresee so exactly what our courses of action will be, but we will be proceeding according to our policies and guidelines toward our objectives. In phase three (1965 onward) we will be on the borders of the Soviet Union and our objectives will be clearly in sight. We will be in a position to exploit the opportunities earlier created. ....  
General Lemnitzer .....

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



2. Political, Economic and Military

a. As Admiral Conolly has stated, ours is a dynamic policy designed to seize the initiative from the Soviets, wage a political offensive against them and create a climate of victory which will be encouraging to the Free World and attract doubting nations to our side. It exploits the principle that "nothing succeeds like success."

b. We in Task Force C believe that the free nations need early tactical victories if they are to reverse the trend of Communist successes in the cold war. We believe important opportunities are being presented every day. While admitting that it is desirable to strike at the very heart of the predatory enemy in the Kremlin, our program begins with actions that are local in nature and may appear to be far from the principal objective. We believe, however, that they all contribute toward the effective carrying out of the policy assigned this Task Force. Most of our recommended actions will require considerable time to make the necessary preparations and we believe we should begin those preparations now. We believe, however, that our present military posture is sufficiently strong to initiate many of the proposed actions now, although prompt build-up of our strength is necessary to meet later requirements.

c. (1) The successful carrying out of our policy will present the people and government of the United States with a challenge that is unparalleled in the peacetime history of this nation. Our traditional concepts of war and peace are not applicable to the situation in which we find ourselves today.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



c. (2) At home it would require Congressional and popular support of the costs of building up a stronger military establishment than presently contemplated. It would require the acceptance of more positive, and sometimes potentially more dangerous, political positions in the international field.

(3) Toward the Soviet Union and satellite governments it would require an increased tempo of diplomatic activity. Immediate objectives such as securing unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country and from Austria, would require continuing diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Government and a readiness on our part to exploit any breaks or favorable developments. Where direct negotiations run into obstacles raised by our adversaries we would wage a relentless propaganda battle supporting our point of view. For example, instead of denying that that we encouraged riots in Eastern Germany, we would take advantage of that development by vigorously seizing the political and propaganda initiative. We would condemn the Soviets for exploiting the people of Eastern Germany beyond human endurance and demand the withdrawal of their forces from East Germany and the unification of Germany. We would not permit ourselves to be put on the defensive because of actions such as the Republic of Korea releasing anti-Communist prisoners. On the contrary, we would condemn the regime that that is unable or unwilling to account for thousands upon thousands of United Nations and ROK prisoners that they have captured in Korea. We would also continue to focus the spotlight of public opinion on the U.S.S.R., which, eight years after the conclusion of World War II, still holds hundreds of

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/C-1  
SEC. III

thousands of German and Japanese prisoners. We would employ the forum of the United Nations to expose and censure the Soviet's relationship with its satellites, particularly the mockery they have made of their commitments under the peace treaties to establish free and democratic governments in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.

d. Allies would be both a source of strength and weakness in implementing our policy. They would be an element of defensive strength, but there is little doubt that most of our allies would draw back in terror at the thought of our adopting a policy that would risk war. They would no doubt take heart and claim partial credit for each advance that is made but they would deplore each retreat. However, with few exceptions, they would probably not be willing to join in carrying out such an aggressive policy. Indeed, they would probably seek actively to block any move on our part which in their opinion exposes them to a risk of war. It is therefore imperative that the full scope of our plan become apparent to them only gradually as our over-all position improves.

e. The first step in consolidating and strengthening our over-all position would be for our allies and ourselves to meet commitments under the recently amended force goals in NATO. This means that we would meticulously meet our own commitments in this regard and we would insist that they meet theirs. We would resist every tendency on the part of our allies to further revise these goals downward on the grounds that the Soviet threat is diminishing or that new and wonderful weapons will reduce the requirement for

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION



forces to employ them. Every impartial study made in this regard has failed to support such a thesis.

f. In carrying out our policy, we recommend that this Government aggressively, both overtly and covertly, attack the Communist apparatus wherever it may be found in the world. To this end, and as a necessary first step, we would outlaw the Communist Party in the United States. It has been demonstrated over and over again that it is not really a political party at all but is in fact part of an international conspiracy having as its objective the overthrow of this and all Free World governments. We realize that this recommendation will be opposed by some with the often-mentioned objection that such action would drive the Communists underground and thus make it difficult to observe and deal with them. This view fails to take into consideration the fact that much of the present Communist mechanism - the most dangerous part - is already underground. We have full confidence in the ability of our FBI and other governmental agencies to deal effectively with the resultant underground threat. What we seek to do is to harass and hound every conceivable Communist activity using all available political, legal, financial and economic devices in our possession. Such action would immediately put the Communists on the defensive. It would force them to utilize most, if not all, of their effort merely to survive and keep a semblance of their organization in being, instead of devoting most of their effort toward the attainment of their announced objectives as they do at present. Having taken this step, but recognizing that the situation in



~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOL-TF/C-1  
SEC. III

allied countries, particularly France and Italy, may not permit identical actions on their part at this time, we would press our allies to take every feasible action under their respective forms of government to harass their Communist parties and render them as impotent and as ineffective as possible.

g. We note a recent tendency in the United States to criticize and play down nationalism as something undesirable. We regard this as a mistake. We believe that in many areas the forces of nationalism offer a strong and effective weapon against international Communism and Soviet ambitions. Under our policy we would exploit these forces.

h. The United States has in the past effectively used the deployment of its military forces in peacetime as an instrument of national policy to achieve diplomatic objectives. The presence of military forces gives visible proof of national interest and influence in a given area. Accordingly, in carrying out our assigned policy we would move immediately to stop the growing Soviet encroachment on the tradition of freedom of the Baltic Sea. We would "recapture" the Baltic by resuming naval visits in force to Danish and Swedish Baltic ports.

i. We would take full advantage of our recent experience in the military and diplomatic fields; particularly in dealing with Communist forces with which we are engaged in actual hostilities. We would, for example, not suspend the tempo of those hostilities or reduce military pressure on the enemy before a settlement is actually reached. In addition, we would limit participation in the military and political conferences held to end

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/C-1  
SEC. III

hostilities to those nations who have provided forces and participated with us in those operations.

j. The essential element in the political field is that the policy advocated by this Task Force, though more vigorous, must never be made to appear as a policy of aggression. It would be portrayed as being in response to requests for assistance from people struggling for freedom and independence. We would play down disagreements with our allies and not have them appear as major international strife. Then, too, we would avoid over-publicizing inter-departmental disputes and difficulties in our own Government.

k. (1) Despite its weaknesses and tensions, the only center of power outside the U.S. and the Soviet Bloc, which possesses resources of comparable magnitude, is Western Europe. Loss of this area would be an enormous gain to the U.S.S.R. and a very serious loss to the Free World. Any strengthening of the area represents an improvement in our power position. Within the area, Germany represents the most serious problem and the key to the future.

(2) Under our policy we would seek a united and rearmed Germany integrated in the European Community. A lesser objective would be a neutralized East Germany and a rearmed West Germany. In seeking these objectives we recognize the possibility that an agreement with the Soviet Government for unification of Germany could only be obtained on condition that it would be neutralized though permitted a small national defense establishment.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



Under our policy we would be prepared to accept such a risk as an interim step toward attainment of our main objective. Our minimum objective, however, is a rearmed West Germany associated with the West. We recommend that we press forward toward all of these objectives until a point is reached which requires that we make a final choice in the light of realities of the then existing situation.

(3) We further recommend that the European Defense Community nations be given to understand that if they are unable to institute their defense community by the end of this year, the United States will be compelled to rearm West Germany on a bilateral basis. Concurrently, we would assure the NATO nations that the United States will honor its commitments to them under the North Atlantic Treaty and will come to their aid if they are attacked by anyone, including Western Germany.

l. In addition to the problems involved under EDC, France poses the greatest single political problem to the U.S. because of its instability and the role it plays in resolving our security problems both in Europe and in Indo-China. Under our policy we would tactfully but firmly inform France on the highest level that the U.S. has now embarked on a new course of action which requires an end to delays in getting our mutual security interests in order.

m. In the economic field, we believe that damage can and should be done to the Soviet economy through the application of East-West trade on a selective basis - with maximum advantage to ourselves and minimum

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



gain by the enemy. We would exploit those areas in which the Soviet Bloc is not economically self-sufficient. We would take every advantage in those areas where transportation is a factor in alleviating their problems of maldistribution of raw materials and of finished products. For example, there is a million-barrel refinery in southern Manchuria at Dairen that stands idle for lack of crude oil. Accordingly, we would prevent tankers from the world fleet being used to haul oil to Dairen. If this is not completely successful because of shipments of oil in Soviet vessels from relatively nearby sources in the Far East, such as Borneo and the Celebes, we would resort to preclusive buying to deny that oil to Communist controlled areas in the Far East.

n. Since the Trans-Siberian Railway cannot fill the gap created by the lack of a merchant marine, we would, through the application of sanctions and heavy financial pressures, prevent non-Communist world shipping being employed between countries of the Soviet Bloc or between the Bloc and the outside world. Augmenting the foregoing, particularly with preclusive buying and sanctions, we would:

(1) Deny the Soviet Bloc all forms of military and electronic equipment, natural rubber, tungsten wire and machine tools.

(2) Deny repair facilities to Soviet shipping in Free World shipyards and effect maximum delay in the operation of Soviet shipping through sanitary inspections and the strictest application of maritime laws and regulations;

o. In order to strengthen the economic position of our loyal



allies we would advocate the reduction of tariff on a selective basis and the simplification of customs procedures to permit them easier access to our markets. We understand that legislation designed toward that end is currently being considered in the Congress - its passage will contribute materially to the success of the policy advocated by Task Force C.

p. Adoption of our policy will require continuation of aid to our allies, at least on a maintenance basis, for as long as the cold war continues. While some of these allies have succeeded in equalling, or even in surpassing pre-war levels of production and enjoy higher standards of living, nations like Italy, Greece and Turkey can never maintain the required levels of modern armed forces from their own economics - accordingly, they will continue to require our help. Previously mentioned selective tariffs would provide marginal assistance but would not eliminate entirely the need for limited direct aid from the United States.

q. Adoption of the policy advocated by Task Force C will require certain important military actions. Since a greater risk of general war is involved, we and our allies, as a preliminary step, would immediately have to strengthen our military posture, both offensively and defensively, to carry out the military operations contemplated under the policy and, at the same time, be prepared to meet any risks of general war resulting from those operations. We would:

- (1) Promptly organize, train and equip the additional ready forces required.
- (2) Prepare for early and expeditious mobilization of the reinforcing units required.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



(3) Deploy additional forces to sensitive areas to meet our commitments or D-Day requirements in those areas. An example would be the deployment of the additional armored division in the case of NATO.

(4) Accelerate improvements in our Continental air defenses to insure that our vital mobilization and industrial base would not be critically damaged by atomic attack. The Free World cannot conduct and win a general war without it. Improvements in our continental defense would reduce the damage the Soviets could inflict with an atomic attack at any time and would, we believe, decrease the risk of war. It would also sharpen our awareness to danger and thus would help the United States face the greater risks which our policy involves. In addition, improvements in our air defense would have an important impact on the Soviet mind and create doubts as to their ability to deliver a decisive atomic attack against us and thus would lessen the likelihood of their ever launching such an attack. Our study of this problem indicates that our most immediate requirements in the air defense field are:

(a) Development of a much improved early warning capability.

(b) Early completion of an integrated Army-Navy-Air Force air defense plan that is closely coordinated with the Canadians.

(c) Expedite research, development and early production of new air defense weapons, some of which are already in sight.

(d) In addition, we would establish a workable civil defense program which concentrates on areas most likely to be attacked

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



and avoids needless expenditure of money and effort on areas that do not contain important military, industrial or population targets.

(5) In the field of atomic weapons:

(a) We would insure that our counter-air-strikes could be launched without any delay whatsoever. This requires that important governmental policy decisions regarding the use of atomic weapons be taken beforehand and that the weapons required are in the hands of tactical units at the bases from which the initial strikes are to be launched. We would clear up now details of consultations with our allies regarding restrictions on the use of bases located in their territories and required for these strikes, or required for the employment of atomic weapons in tactical operations and direct support of allied ground forces.

(b) We would expedite development of a logistic capability for handling atomic weapons, particularly for employment by ground forces so as to insure their availability to tactical units when and where required. We would also expedite the development of operational procedures for the timely and effective employment of atomic weapons on tactical targets in the forward areas, particularly against fleeting ground targets.

(6) Equipment reserves would be built up so as to support combat operations until wartime production could meet the total requirement. Adequate stockpiles would be established overseas to meet requirements during periods of initial transportation deficiencies.

(7) The build-up and readiness of the Armed Forces of our allies depends in large measure on the deliveries of equipment furnished

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



under our Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Because of the unprogrammed requirements of the Korean war, some deliveries are as much as a year behind schedule. Under our policy, deliveries of this equipment would have to be stepped up and slippages eliminated.

(8) Faced as we are by an enemy with massive human resources, we must maintain and even widen our technical lead over that enemy. To carry out our policy, a vigorous research and development program is imperative. We regard it as the key to survival of the Free World.

(9) We would not, through participation in additional regional pacts, lose our freedom of action and thus be forced by commitments therein always to react wherever the enemy acts.

(10) We would minimize our participation in disarmament discussions and would make it clear to the world that henceforth we intend to employ any weapon in our arsenal, when and if we consider it in our interests to do so.

(11) We would urge the adoption by the U.S. of a basic system of universal training and service to provide a more permanent, stable and equitable system of military service than we now have. It would, we believe, be more effective and economical and would certainly have a profound effect on our friends and enemies alike.

r. In addition to the foregoing courses of action, we would take the following actions in various parts of the world to implement the policy advocated by Task Force C:

(1) In the Western Hemisphere. We would move promptly to clean up principal Communist footholds on our own continent. We would,

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



for example, organize a coup d'etat in Guatemala at an early date to eliminate the present Communist domination of the government and labor unions in that country.

(2) In Europe.

(a) We would launch a strong and coordinated covert effort to detach Albania from the Soviet Bloc. It is separated geographically from the Bloc and is a very favorable target for such action.

(b) We would strongly support the development of closer Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav political and military cooperation. We would press for more frank and substantive military planning with Yugoslavia which is currently being developed in cooperation with the British and French.

(c) We would expedite the development of a Volunteer Freedom Corps as a nucleus for subsequently organizing large forces comprising anti-Communist personnel from East European states. Initial units would be attached to U.S. divisions in Europe for training and organization of cadres for larger units.

(3) In the Middle East.

(a) Under our policy, we would, as a preliminary step in the formation of a Middle East Defense Organization, promptly and secretly establish a U.S.-U.K.-Turkish Planning Group patterned after the Military Committee of the Five Powers in London in 1948, which was the forerunner of the NATO military planning staff. After the development of a general plan for the defense of the Middle East, all the other governments in

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



the area, including Pakistan, would be informed of the existence and purpose of the Group and would be cordially invited to participate.

(b) No pressure whatsoever would be employed to induce membership. It would be made clear that our aid to member nations would be directly proportioned to their needs for internal security and their ability to contribute toward the general defense of the area. We would not permit traditional feuds, such as those between the Arabs and the Israelis or between India and Pakistan, to influence either the amount or nature of the aid provided any nation.

(4) In the Far East considerable early action would be required under our policy.

(a) As to Indo-China, we would,

(1) Upon reaching a position within the U.S. Government as the result of General O'Daniel's mission to Indo-China, press for a high-level conference to be held in Paris to arrive at a complete understanding with the French for vigorous prosecution of the war in Indo-China.

(2) We would press the French to announce their intention of granting full independence - that is, dominion status - to the Associated States by early 1954 and, at war's end, to permit them to vote on membership in the French Union if they so desire.

(3) We would urge the election of a Viet Nam National Assembly at an early date.

(4) We would press the French Government to

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**



clearly define the status of their nationals continuing to live in Indo-China.

(5) We would expand the native forces and adopt U.S. training methods; we would press for the organization of units of division-size. They would be equipped to operate under the special conditions existing in Indo-China. We would press the French to accelerate the training of native officers, non-commissioned officers and technicians.

(6) As a basis for continued U.S. military aid, we would insist on closer collaboration between French and U.S. military authorities and a more vigorous and aggressive conduct of military operations in Indo-China to include driving to and sealing off the Tonkin frontier at an early date and effectively blockading all other Viet Minh supply routes.

(b) As to Communist China, we believe that the greatest problem facing the Chinese Communists in consolidating their hold on the Chinese people is that of convincing the Chinese millions of their ability to improve China politically and economically. Under our policy, we recommend actions that would isolate Communist China politically and prevent her being seated in the United Nations or any other international body. We would take every feasible means to weaken her economy. To that end we would maintain an embargo on trade with Communist China and induce our allies to do the same. If fighting continues in Korea we would, with the assistance of the Chinese Nationalists, blockade the Chinese Coast. If a cease-fire agreement is reached in Korea we would utilize the war between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists as a basis for a blockade, provide the Nationalists

**TOP SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**



~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



with the means to blockade the Chinese coast and thus augment the effectiveness of our embargo. If, as threatened, Britain escorts her shipping, we would widely expose her actions in this regard.

(c) As to Nationalist China.

(1) Under our policy we recommend that forces of the Nationalist Government be employed for conducting active military operations against the Chinese Communists. Despite the increased military assistance and logistic support required, we believe that the time has now come to make greater use of those forces. They have been relatively inactive for five years. They need combat experience, particularly a victory over the Communists to bolster their morale and give them confidence.

(2) We recommend that before risking substantial operations against the mainland, these forces be first employed to recapture the island of Hainan. It is not strongly held nor can it be easily or promptly reinforced. A successful operation against Hainan would be the beginning of a "march back" and would have a profound effect on the Chinese people. It would also assist materially in interrupting sea traffic supporting Viet Minh forces in Indo-China.

(3) Furthermore, it would enable us to test and evaluate the Chinese Nationalist forces and determine whether they have the capability of being developed into an effective military force capable of operating against the Communists on the mainland or whether their capabilities are limited to the defense of Formosa, in which case the materiel

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



support we provide them in the future would be tailored to fit that task.


(d) With regard to Japan, we agree with the analysis of the situation and the actions recommended by Task Force A. It seems to us, however, that under our policy the United States would have to take a much stronger hand in pressing the Japanese to remove their present obstructions, such as constitutional restrictions, political excuses and general indifference, in developing, with our material aid, their 10-division National Safety Force by June 1954 as originally scheduled. Certainly with our help they have the resources to do so and have the industrial capacity to support such a force.

(e) Korea.

(1) We are uncertain as to what situation will face us in Korea in the immediate future. If the Communists are willing to go through with the cease-fire it is a clear indication that they are finding it increasingly difficult to support combat operations in Korea and are desirous of ending this costly venture so that they can consolidate their position or concentrate their effort elsewhere. We believe, however, that they have not changed nor will they abandon their original objective of establishing a unified Communist state on the Korean peninsula.

(2) Under Task Force C's policy, if a cease-fire agreement is reached in Korea, our position at the political conference would demand the establishment of a unified, independent and non-Communist Korea. We would not agree to withdrawal of U.N. forces from Korea in exchange

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION





for withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces north of the Yalu. The strategic advantage which they would enjoy from such withdrawal is obvious. We would suggest, in the interest of avoiding future frictions, that a 10-mile demilitarized border zone (five miles north and five miles south of the Yalu and the present border) be established and observed by a neutral commission.

(3) If no cease-fire agreement is reached or if a political conference fails and fighting is resumed in Korea, our policy would require that the U.N. promptly take advantage of its sea and air superiority and intensify military operations. These would include naval and air action against Communist China and Manchuria. When the additional forces could be made available in Korea we would launch a coordinated air-borne, amphibious and land offensive to:

(i.) Seize a position across the waist of Korea.

(ii.) Capture or destroy maximum enemy forces and equipment, and

(iii.) Create conditions that would force the enemy to accept a settlement favorable to the U.N.

We believe this operation would be required to restore our prestige in Asia. We would employ atomic weapons in these expanded and intensified operations. While casualties and costs would be high, particularly during the actual conduct of the operations, we regard this action preferable to continued stalemate in which, over a long period, casualties and costs also mount to high totals but no important results are achieved - a situation that is totally



inconsistent with the objectives of our assigned policy.

(4) Finally, a brief word about economic aid for Korea. We believe that under our policy Korea represents a very important symbol. The eyes of the world, particularly in Asia, are focused on Korea to see how it fares in its association with the Free World. If, in observing the situation, they are led to believe that resistance by them to Communist aggression will result in their obtaining strong military, moral and economic support from the Free World, they also will be more inclined to associate themselves with us and resist aggression - if not, they will, in the face of similar aggression, lose their will to resist and their desire to remain free. Therefore, we believe that an effective United Nations economic and rehabilitation program in Korea is absolutely essential to the attainment of the objectives of Task Force C's policy in the Far East.