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U.S. COMMITMENTS IN REGARD TO THE DEFENSE OF COUNTRIES
SUBJECT TO ARMED ATTACK BY THE SOVIET BLOC

In general, the areas which the United States is committed to defend, as a result of its alliance obligations, its position as occupying power, or the presence of its armed forces, extend from the Western Hemisphere (included in its entirety) across the Atlantic to include most of western and southern Europe, and across the Pacific to include most of the island chain off east Asia from Japan to Australia. These commitments are not necessarily automatic, being drafted with a view to our constitutional system, but nevertheless they are generally understood as meaning the United States will fight a general war against the aggressor in the event that one of these areas is directly attacked.

There is another series of countries toward which the United States does not have specific alliance obligations but to which we stand more or less committed as a result of authoritative public statements, whether in the nature of a pledge or of a statement of intention or policy.

Beyond these are countries on which no such specific statements have been made but to which military assistance is being granted under the Mutual Security Program on the ground that their strategic location and their will and ability to defend themselves are important to the security

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of the United States.

A fourth group consists of countries not presently receiving aid but which under current NSC policy are regarded as of such great importance to U.S. security that the United States would probably take military action of some kind if they were attacked. There are, of course, among the countries in this group some variations in the degree of U.S. security interest involved.

Subsequent sections will take up the individual countries in each of the above four broad categories, giving the precise nature of the United States commitment, policy or expression of interest.

It should be recalled that the United States, whatever its specific commitments to particular countries and in particular regions, has not indicated indifference to the fate of other countries and other regions where aggression might take place. The decision to defend South Korea in 1950 illustrated our conviction that our own ultimate security and hopes of maintaining a collective effort to preserve the Free World from piecemeal destruction required action in an area where we had no legal commitment and which lay beyond the perimeter of the zone considered vital, from the military standpoint, to our immediate security. Shortly after the attack on South Korea President Truman declared that any further act of aggression might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace. In this and other authoritative statements American concern over direct Soviet or satellite aggression anywhere beyond the periphery of the Soviet

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Bloc, and the possibility that it would bring on general war, have already been made clear. Under NSC 153/1 it is a U.S. objective "to prevent significant expansion of Soviet Bloc power, even though in certain cases measures to this end may be used by the Soviet Bloc as a pretext for war."

A. AREAS WITH RESPECT TO WHICH CLEAR COMMITMENTS EXIST.

1. Latin America (20 republics)

The relevant articles of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (signed 2 September 1947 , entered into force 3 December 1948) are as follows:

"Article III.

"1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

"2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may immediately take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing on the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

"3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 (Western Hemisphere) or within the territory of an American State

"4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace

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and security."

"Article V.

The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security."

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Canada, U.K., France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Greece, Turkey).

The relevant articles of the North Atlantic Treaty (signed 4 April 1949, entered into force 24 August 1949) are as follows:

"Article V.

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

"Article VI. (Revision of former text as result of protocol of amendment which entered into force 15 Feb. 1952):

"For the purposes of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack (1) on the

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territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
(2) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

The United States has special relationships with two of its NATO allies, Canada and Iceland.

Canada.

Ever since President Roosevelt's statement in 1938 that "the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened", it has been clear from the facts of geography, from the subsequent statements of leaders on both sides of the border, and from the joint planning and cooperation for defense that an attack on Canada would immediately involve the United States in war at Canada's side. No formal commitment exists, however, beyond the NATO obligations.

Iceland.

The United States, acting on behalf of NATO, has assumed a special responsibility for the defense of Iceland. The relevant clauses of the U.S. - Iceland Defense Agreement (signed 5 May 1951, entered into force 5 May 1951) are the following:

"Preamble: Having regard to the fact that the people of Iceland cannot themselves adequately secure their own defenses . . . , the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has requested, because of the unsettled

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state of world affairs, that the United States and Iceland, in view of the collective efforts of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to preserve peace and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area, make arrangements for the use of facilities in Iceland in defense of Iceland and thus also the North Atlantic Treaty area,"

"Article I.

The United States on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in accordance with its responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty will make arrangements regarding the defense of Iceland subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement. For this purpose and in view of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Iceland will provide such facilities in Iceland as are mutually agreed to be necessary."

"Article VII.

Either Government may at any time request the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to review the continued necessity for the facilities and their utilization, and to make recommendations to the two Governments concerning the continuation of this Agreement"

3. Western Germany, Western Sectors Berlin, Western Austria, Western Sectors Vienna, U.S.-U.K. Zone Free Territory of Trieste.

Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty specifically covers the case of an armed attack on the forces of any NATO power in these occupied areas. A U.S.-U.K. French declaration issued at the signing of the EDC Treaty reaffirmed this commitment with respect to West Berlin. Existing directives to CINCEUR and CG/USFA state that in the event of deliberate armed attack by Soviet forces against occupation forces of the U.S.-U.K. or

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France, or against their installations or the lines of communication to or within their occupation areas, of such a nature as to jeopardize the security of United States forces in Europe, they are authorized to implement existing emergency war plans (NSC 39). In the event of a Soviet or satellite attack on West Berlin, the United States "will have to act on the assumption that general war is imminent." In addition to resisting the initial attack and placing itself in the best possible position for immediate global war, the United States should, if circumstances permit, address an ultimatum to the Soviet Government before full implementation of emergency war plans, and should act with its NATO allies if possible and obtain the widest possible support in the United Nations (NSC 132/1).

4. Japan.

By a Security Treaty concluded with Japan at the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the United States undertook responsibility for the defense of Japan, as a provisional arrangement until Japan could defend itself, and obtained the right to maintain U.S. armed forces in Japan. The relevant articles of the Security Treaty (signed 8 September 1951, entered into force 28 April 1952) are the following:

"Preamble On the coming into force of (the Peace) Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world . . . Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for

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its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter."

"Article I.

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers."

"Article IV.

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area."

5. Ryukyu Islands and Pacific Trust Territories.

These territories, insofar as a commitment and decision to defend them are concerned, are considered as United States territory. The

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Pacific islands are held as a security trusteeship approved by the United Nations. While the final legal status of the Ryukyus is not yet settled, they were occupied during the war and have been governed by the United States ever since; U.S. forces are stationed there. Any attack on them would clearly mean war.

6. Republic of the Philippines.

Through the agreements providing for the maintenance of U.S. forces in the Philippines the United States has assumed responsibility for the external defense of that country. There is also a Mutual Defense Treaty (signed 30 August 1951, entered into force 27 August 1952), the relevant clauses of which are as follows:

"Article IV.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

"Article V.

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."

7. Australia and New Zealand.

The relevant clauses of the Security Treaty with Australia

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and New Zealand (signed 1 September 1951, entered into force 29 April 1952), which is of indefinite duration, are as follows:

"Preamble:...Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area."

"Article IV.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international security."

"Article V.

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."

"Article VI.

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

"Article VIII.

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative

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relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area."

B. COUNTRIES WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS DECLARED OR PUBLICLY IMPLIED IT WILL DEFEND.

1. Republic of Korea.

The situation with respect to South Korea is complicated by the fact that the United States is now engaged in hostilities in Korea as an ally of that government. What the nature of the U.S. commitment will be in the future will depend on the armistice terms, the terms of any political settlement which may be concluded, and bilateral U.S.-Korean negotiations. In any case it seems probable that the United States will have a de facto commitment for some time to come, first, because U.S. forces will remain in South Korea after an armistice, and second, because the President has announced this Government's willingness to negotiate a mutual defense treaty with South Korea. The relevant portion of President Eisenhower's letter to President Rhee, released on 7 June 1953, is as follows:

"I am prepared promptly after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice to negotiate with you a mutual defense treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, and the United States and Australia and New Zealand...It would cover the territory now or hereafter brought peacefully under the administration of the Republic of Korea. Of course you realize that under our constitutional system any such treaty would be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate. However, the action which the United States has heretofore taken, and the great investment of blood and treasure which has already been made for the independence of Korea, are certainly clear indications of American temper and intentions not to tolerate a repetition of unprovoked aggression."

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2. Formosa.

The intention of the United States to protect Formosa against any Communist attack was set forth in President Truman's statement of 27 June 1950 as follows:

"In these circumstances (the attack on South Korea) the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary to this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done."

President Eisenhower later repealed the corollary, stating in his State of the Union message of 2 February 1953 that "there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists... I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China."

It is current United States policy to "deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the USSR and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa." (NSC 48/5).

C. COUNTRIES RECEIVING MILITARY GRANT AID FROM THE UNITED STATES.

Most of the countries which are our formal allies or which the United States is publicly pledged to defend are receiving military assistance on a grant basis under the Mutual Security Program. Certain other countries outside our alliance system are considered sufficiently important to U.S. national security to warrant this effort to strengthen their

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capacity for defense. The Mutual Security Act provides with respect to Europe, for example, that military assistance will go, in addition to NATO countries, to any other country "which the President determines to be of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and whose increased ability to defend itself the President determines is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States." (Section 101, a). With respect to the Near East the Act states that the President may provide assistance to any country in that area "if he determines that the strategic location of the recipient country makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near Eastern area, such assistance is of critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and the immediately increased ability of the recipient country to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the area and to the security of the United States." (Section 202).

While the United States has undertaken no obligation to fight in the event that the countries listed below are attacked, their importance to our security is emphasized both by their inclusion in the Military Assistance Program and by special circumstances in each case; thus there is a strong possibility that an attack on one of them would involve the United States in war.

1. Yugoslavia.

The United States is now providing Yugoslavia with military equipment at the rate of about \$300 million per year. Most of that now

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being furnished is being used, under an informal understanding on the military level, to equip Yugoslav forces whose mission is to defend the Ljubljana Gap, the main approach to Italy from the East. Military talks between Yugoslav and Western representatives have been initiated with a view to coordinating war planning. Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish staff talks are also in progress, although no firm defensive alliance of these three countries has yet been concluded. In short, measures are being taken which should have the effect of bringing Yugoslavia into close alignment with NATO so that operations may be adequately coordinated in case of war. The United States has encouraged this trend and has supported formal recognition by NATO of the vital importance of the maintenance of Yugoslavia's independence to the security of the NATO countries.

High U.S. officials have stated publicly that the United States would take a serious view of aggression against Yugoslavia and have made clear the importance we attach to the continued independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet control. The British and Yugoslav Governments announced, at the time of Tito's visit to London this year, their belief that a conflict starting with an attack on Yugoslavia could not remain localized. The United States has made no binding commitment as to action to be taken in the event of a Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia. However, in order that the United States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate at the time, it is existing policy to "make and keep current plans to provide Yugoslavia appropriate military support" in the event of Soviet or satellite attack, such plans to be implemented in the light of the

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circumstances then existing and recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time" (NSC 18/6). It must be recognized that the growing military cooperation between Yugoslavia and NATO countries increases the likelihood that an attack on Yugoslavia would result in general war.

2. Iran.

The modesty of the U.S. program of military aid to Iran reflects the uncertainties of the present political situation and Iran's delicate position between the West and the U.S.S.R. rather than any tendency on the part of the United States to minimize the importance of Iran to our own security. This importance has been made clear in a number of authoritative public statements, especially during the Iranian crisis of 1946 when President Truman declared that the rivalry of the great powers in that area could erupt suddenly into conflict and that the United Nations, to which we were giving the lead in the crisis, "have a right to insist that the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration" (Army Day Speech, 6 April 1946).

At present the United States is proceeding on the basis that it is of critical importance that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the U.S.S.R. In the event of a Soviet armed attack on Iran, "the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent". (NSC 136/1).

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3. Indo-China.

The United States is providing large-scale assistance to French and Vietnamese forces fighting in Indo-China. It is American policy to prevent Indo-China and the rest of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit, and vigorously to oppose an overt attack on those countries by Communist China (NSC 124/2). Official U.S. spokesmen have indicated that the United States would not allow Communist China to take advantage of an armistice in Korea by attacking in Indo-China. The President, in his speech of 16 April 1953, referred to "direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indo-China" and stated that "any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud".

This subject has been discussed officially with the French Government in the same sense, but without the giving of any precise commitment to the French as to what military action the United States would take in the event of obvious and direct Chinese aggression in Indo-China. The United States has, however, favored the idea of issuing a tripartite U.S.-U.K.-French warning to Communist China of the grave consequences of such aggression. Since agreement has not been reached on the military action to be taken by the three powers in such an event, the warning has not yet been issued.

In case of overt intervention by Chinese Communist forces or of covert participation to such an extent as to jeopardize retention of the Tonkin Delta by French Union forces, it is presently contemplated that the United States would take military action against China but not against the

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U.S.S.R. We would take the following measures (NSC 125/2):

a. Support a request by France or the Associated States for immediate action by the United Nations which would include a U.N. resolution declaring that Communist China has committed an aggression, recommending that member states take whatever action may be necessary, without geographic limitation, to assist France and the Associated States in meeting the aggression.

b. Whether or not UN action is immediately forthcoming, seek the maximum possible international support for, and participation in, the minimum courses of military action agreed upon by the parties to the joint warning ("c" below).

c. Carry out the following minimum courses of military action either under the auspices of the U.N. or in conjunction with France and the U.K. and any other friendly governments: (1) a resolute defense of Indo-China itself to which the United States would provide such air and naval assistance as might be practicable; (2) interdiction of Chinese Communist communication lines including those in China. The United States would provide the major force for the latter task and would expect France and the Associated States to carry the burden of providing ground defense forces. The United States would also, if appropriate to the situation, establish a naval blockade, in conjunction with the U.K. and France, of Communist China, intensify covert operations to aid anti-communist guerrilla forces in China, utilize as desirable and feasible anti-communist Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces, in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea,

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or China proper, and provide assistance to cover necessary evacuations of allied forces. If, subsequent to aggression against Indo-China and execution of the minimum necessary courses of action mentioned above, the United States should determine jointly with the U.K. and France that the situation required expanded military action, the United States and those two allies would take air and naval action against all suitable military targets in China, avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in areas near the boundary of the U.S.S.R. in order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement. If French and British concurrence to expanded military action against Communist China were not obtained, the United States would consider taking unilateral action (NSC 124/2).

4. Thailand.

Military equipment is being provided by the United States to Thailand to assist it in creating conditions of internal security and maintaining its alignment with the Free World. In the event of communist domination of either Burma or Indo-China, the United States would immediately put into effect whatever measures may be determined as feasible to forestall an invasion of Thailand or a seizure of power by local Thai communists. In the event of Chinese Communist aggression against Thailand, the United States would (a) support an appeal to the U.N. by the Thai Government; (b) consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments, take appropriate military action against Communist China as part of a U.N. collective action or in conjunction with France and the U.K. and any other friendly governments; (c) employ as desirable and feasible anti-communist Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist

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forces, in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper (NSC 124/2).

D. COUNTRIES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY BUT TO WHICH NO MILITARY GRANT AID IS BEING GIVEN.

Several countries whose strategic location or resources make them particularly important in terms of our security interests are nevertheless not participating in the program of military grant aid, because of traditional neutrality, fear of American "imperialism", fear of provoking the U.S.S.R. or China, or special circumstances of one kind or another, although some of them are purchasing considerable military supplies in the United States under the "reimbursable aid" provisions of the Mutual Security Program. While in no sense members of an American-led alliance system or bloc, however, their loss by the Free World would seriously affect the strategic and political position on which our alliances and our security rest. Therefore, it is most likely that an attack launched on any of these countries from the Soviet bloc would carry with it the likelihood of a general war.

1. Sweden.

By its attempts to include Sweden in NATO at the time of its formation, the United States showed its conviction with respect to Sweden's strategic importance in the system of Western defense. It is current United States policy to encourage closer association of Sweden with its NATO neighbors and with the United States, recognizing the importance of adequate Swedish defense to the defense of Denmark and Norway. While it would be to our interest to have Sweden in NATO, Sweden's policy of avoiding alliances

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is recognized as a political fact to be taken into account as the United States does what it can to strengthen Sweden's military establishment, increase its contribution to Western defense, and place it in the best possible position to resist Soviet pressure or aggression (NSC 121).


Sweden is so closely tied to its Scandinavian neighbors that it seems likely that any Soviet attack on Sweden would soon involve them and thus the rest of NATO.

2. Switzerland.

Switzerland also follows a traditional neutrality policy and has not wished to accept military grant aid from the United States. On the ground that Switzerland's ability to defend itself is important to our security, we have provided reimbursable military aid and have attempted to expand the area of Swiss cooperation with the NATO defense effort. It is our purpose ultimately to work out with Switzerland coordinated defense plans which would become effective in the event Swiss territory is violated by the Soviets or the Swiss determine that an attack is imminent (NSC 119).

As Switzerland is not adjacent to the territory of the Soviet Bloc, any Soviet attack on Swiss territory would probably follow Soviet aggression elsewhere against an area to the defense of which the United States is formally committed. The question of a commitment or policy decision to fight in case of aggression against Switzerland is therefore somewhat academic.

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3. Spain.

Spain is still in the category of countries not receiving military aid, for which Congress has already appropriated funds, only because the negotiations involving this question and that of U.S. naval and air bases in Spain have not been completed. Geographically, Spain is surrounded by NATO countries, which could not permit it to fall under Soviet control. For political reasons, however, it has not been taken into NATO, and neither the United States nor its NATO partners are formally committed to Spain's defense. It is an objective of U.S. policy to obtain early Spanish participation in NATO, and pending that eventuality to conclude alternative mutual security arrangements which would include Spain and which would not prejudice the above objective. While these matters are under negotiation and it is not clear to what extent Spain will be committed to more than defense of its own territory, American policy is directed toward developing urgently the military potentialities of Spain's strategic geographic position for the common defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, not solely for the defense of the Iberian Peninsula (NSC 72/6).

4. Morocco, Tunisia, Libya.

Morocco and Tunisia are French protectorates, with which the U.S. Government does not have direct diplomatic relations or military agreements. They are not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, as is Algeria. However, their strategic location and particularly the existence of U.S. air bases in Morocco give the United States a vital interest in their defense against any attack.

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The United States also has an important air base in Libya, which presumably it would defend, but has not assumed any direct obligation to the Libyan Government concerning action to be taken in case of aggression against Libya.

5. Arab States and Israel.

The United States is not committed to the defense of the Arab states or Israel, but it recognizes the political and strategic importance of this area as so great that it is in its own security interest to take whatever appropriate measures it can to prevent the extension of Soviet influence, strengthen the will and ability of these countries to resist possible future aggression by the U.S.S.R., and insure that the resources of the area are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the Free World (NSC 129/1).

By proposing jointly with the U.K., France and Turkey the formation of a Middle East Command (October 1951) and by later declaring its interest in a Middle East Defense Organization in which both Middle Eastern countries and outside powers having interests in the area would cooperate in its defense, the United States has publicly indicated that it is prepared to undertake specific obligations for the defense of the Middle East whenever it becomes possible to build the necessary alliance or defense organization, which presumably will require prior settlement of the major Arab-Israel and British-Egyptian disputes. It is current U.S. policy to continue efforts to establish MEC or MEDO in concert with the U.K., France and Turkey, making every appropriate effort to obtain the participation of the

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states in the area and the contribution of at least token forces from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and when practicable, from Pakistan. While maintaining flexibility as to the commitment of U.S. forces for the local defense of the area in the event of general war, the United States is prepared to assign token forces in a Middle East defense arrangement if U.S. willingness to take this action is seen to be the key to the establishment of such an arrangement and to the settlement of the dispute between the U.K. and Egypt (NSG 129/1). Official U.S. statements of willingness to participate in MEDO obviously do not commit us to anything at this time. But they may be taken as indicating that the United States is prepared, in some circumstances, to accept a commitment to take military action in the event of Soviet aggression in the Middle East against an Arab state or Israel, Iran, or even Pakistan.

Since the Arab states and Israel do not border on Soviet territory, the question of direct aggression probably would not arise until there had been earlier Soviet aggression or internal take-over in Turkey or Iran. The vital American concern with the entire Middle East, however, makes it impossible to ignore the threat which the instability, weakness and vulnerability of these states represents. It is recognized that until some progress is made in the political sphere, it will be most difficult to build a regional defense organization or to gain much through military programs to individual countries. Saudi Arabia is in a rather special position in that it is less vulnerable to attack, contains the most important petroleum resources, and has an agreement with the United States granting use of the

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air base at Dhahran. The United States has a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia (18 June 1951) providing for the extension of procurement assistance in the purchase of military equipment in the United States, under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.

6. Burma.

Burma concluded an agreement with the United States in 1950 on the provision of military assistance, in which Burma accepted in very watered-down form the principles laid down in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, but only a limited amount of aid was provided under this agreement and Burma has since crossed itself off the list of recipients not only of military aid but of economic and technical aid as well. Following a policy of "neutrality" in the cold war, Burma has shown no inclination to seek any alliance or guarantee from the United States. Burma is nevertheless of great importance to the security of the United States as a key position in Southeast Asia, the loss of which to the Soviet Bloc would render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East. In the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression against Burma, the United States would support an appeal to the United Nations by the Burmese Government, and consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments, would take appropriate military action against Communist China as part of a U.N. collective action or in conjunction with France and the U.K. and any other friendly governments, employing as desirable anti-communist Chinese forces in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper (NSC 124/2).

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7. Malaya.

The United States has no specific commitments to or aid programs for Malaya, since it is a dependent territory of the United Kingdom. Because of its particular strategic and economic importance, however, it is recognized that the loss of Malaya by the Free World would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests and could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it difficult to prevent Japan's ultimate accommodation to communism. It is United States policy to support the British in their measures to eradicate communist guerrilla forces in Malaya, and, in the event of Chinese Communist aggression against Malaya, in addition to appropriate military action contemplated against Communist China, to assist in the defense of Malaya as appropriate, as part of a U.N. collective action or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments (NSC 124/2).

8. Indonesia.

Indonesia, like Burma, has tried to follow a policy of neutrality and non-involvement in the cold war. It has received only limited military aid, in 1951, in the form of equipment for the national police. It has been reluctant even to agree to the terms required for the receipt of economic aid from the United States. Indonesia is of such strategic and economic importance to the United States and the Free World, however, that the consequences of its falling into Communist hands would be very serious. It is current U.S. policy, in the event of a seizure or attempted seizure by internal communist action in Indonesia, to seek maximum international response to a request by the legal government for friendly nations to come

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to its assistance against the insurgents, and, consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments, to take appropriate military and other action to wrest the area from communist control. In the event of Chinese Communist aggression against Indonesia, the United States would, in addition to military action contemplated against Communist China, take appropriate military action to assist in the defense of Indonesia as a part of a U.N. collective action or in conjunction with other friendly governments (NSC 124/2).

9. India.

India is vociferously "neutral" in the cold war and has tried to avoid measures which would seem to align it with the United States and other Western nations, although it did go so far as to conclude an agreement with the United States (16 March 1951) covering the furnishing of military equipment by the latter, accepting the obligation "to use such items as may be provided to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the U.N. through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the principles and purposes of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles..." There has been, however, no program of military grant aid to India.

The United States is proceeding on the basis of the proposition that the loss of India to the Soviet Bloc "would mean that for all practical purposes all of Asia will have been lost; this would constitute a serious threat to the security position of the United States" (NSC 98/1). U.S. policy is therefore directed toward improving our security position by pursuit

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of the following objectives, among others: (a) development of sound, enduring friendly relations with India; (b) continuance in power of a non-Communist Government, the strengthening of its ability to resist Communist Imperialism in Asia, and its association with the United States and like-minded countries in opposition to Communism; (c) development of attitudes which would assist the United States and its Allies to obtain the facilities desired in time of peace or required in the event of war, and which would prevent the U.S.S.R. from obtaining military support or assistance from India either directly or indirectly. While there has been no decision on how the United States would react to an attack on India by the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, the critical threat to our security position which such an attack would represent is clearly recognized (NSC 98/1).

Nepal and Bhutan, which border on Communist-controlled Tibet and have a protected status in relation to India, presumably would be considered as falling within whatever policies the United States adopts with respect to India.

10. Pakistan.

The position of Pakistan relative to U.S. security interests is roughly similar to that of India. Pakistan also concluded a military aid agreement with the United States (15 December 1950) but has not been a recipient of grant aid. The same U.S. objectives and policies mentioned above in relation to India apply also to Pakistan. As in the case of India, the geographical location of the country, its size and resources, the prestige and influence of its leaders, and other factors make it an important

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U.S. interest to deny Pakistan to the Soviet Bloc. Pakistan, however, has been more inclined to cooperate with the West than has India; the chief difficulty from our viewpoint has been that to encourage this tendency, so long as Kashmir and other issues divide the two nations, is to run the risk of alienating India.

Pakistan has been considered by the United States as a logical eventual member of MEDO (NSC 129/1) and also of a possible South Asian regional grouping of non-Communist countries including India and possibly Afghanistan and Ceylon (NSC 98/1). Neither of these regional defense organizations is anywhere near realization at the moment. Accordingly, the United States may have to decide with reference to Pakistan alone what action it will take in the eventuality of aggression against that country.

E. OTHER COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE AGGRESSION FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.

Two other countries to which we have no commitments deserve mention because they border on the Soviet Bloc and are open to possible attack from that direction, an eventuality which would require, either in advance or at the time, policy decisions for appropriate action on the part of the United States.

1. Afghanistan.

The U.S. objectives with respect to India and Pakistan, mentioned above, apply also to Afghanistan although with lessened force because India and Pakistan are the "key" nations of the South Asian area (NSC 98/1). Continuance in power of a non-Communist Government in Afghanistan and the strengthening of its ability and determination to resist

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Communist imperialism, individually and collectively with other South Asian nations, are the principal American objectives. Limited U.S. economic and technical assistance is furnished in support of these objectives. However, there is no military assistance program for Afghanistan, and there is no policy decision on how the United States would react to a Soviet attack on Afghanistan.

2. Finland.

Finland is in a special position in that it is not Soviet-dominated and therefore not a member of the Soviet Bloc, but it has treaty relationships with the U.S.S.R. providing for a Soviet naval base on its territory (Peace Treaty of 1947) and establishing certain mutual defense obligations in case of an attack on Finland or on the U.S.S.R. through Finland (Treaty of mutual assistance, 6 April 1948). The latter treaty specifically takes into consideration "Finland's endeavors not to be involved in clashes between great powers" and also provides that neither party will enter into any alliance or take part in any coalition against the other.

From the standpoint of military strategy, Finland is already in Soviet hands. Destruction of Finland's independence, therefore, would not greatly increase the Soviet threat to the NATO position in the Baltic although it would have important political significance and would be a shock to the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden.

The key to U.S. policy with respect to Finland is to avoid any steps which would threaten the delicate balance of Finnish-Soviet relations and call forth drastic Soviet measures inimical to Finnish

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independence (NSC 121). It is in our interest that Finland maintain its independence, but since there is little the United States can do directly to help Finland resist Soviet pressures, it is considered unwise to assume the role of Finland's protector. Nevertheless, a clear-cut aggressive Soviet move, in violation of existing treaties, to occupy Finland and impose a Soviet-dominated regime would present the United States with the need for deciding whether to take action, through the U.N., through NATO or unilaterally, or to accept the aggression as a fait accompli.

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