

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



clear to the Soviet people. This awareness will in turn increase, from within the Soviet power-bloc, the pressure on the leadership to restrain its own expansionist ambitions and thus to avoid putting its control over its own people and its satellites to the test of severe destruction and, presumably, of defeat. Such a change in Soviet policies offers the best basis for avoidance, over the long term, of general war. Alternative "B" offers the best chance of using U.S. power to promote conditions favorable to the "settling down" of the Soviet regime and gives time to internal Soviet factors of development to work in this direction.

V. WEAKNESSES OF ALTERNATIVE "B"

A. INTRODUCTORY.

1. Task Force "B" has examined its advocated policy particularly with a view to determining its inherent weaknesses, those which may develop, and the difficulties which may arise in connection with its implementation. There are, in the view of the Task Force, no weaknesses sufficiently grave to warrant not undertaking the policy at all. There are various hazards and difficulties which Task Force "B" does not wish to minimize, but many of them will confront whatever policy is adopted and they are all, we believe, capable of being reduced to acceptable proportions by wise and determined U.S. leadership.

2. The countervailing arguments to the weaknesses and difficulties set forth below are not given fully in this section but appear in other parts of the paper where the positive arguments in favor of Alternative "B" are presented.

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. V

B. SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS.

1. Alternative "B" does not, as has been pointed out, solve the problem of the growing Soviet atomic capability. It is based on the thesis that the threat of the use of U.S. strategic atomic power will deter the U.S.S.R. from starting a war, little or big, at least until the period of Soviet atomic plenty. At that time, the United States may face the ultimate in danger. This would certainly be the case if it ever allowed its own atomic capability and defenses to fall to the point where the U.S.S.R. could calculate a good chance of knocking out the United States while itself escaping destruction. In that event, no U.S. warning, or lack thereof, would have much practical bearing on Soviet action.

2. No absolute prediction can be made, moreover, concerning the position the Soviet leaders will take over a period of years, and more particularly, concerning the way in which they will react to the announcement of the policy set forth in Alternative "B". It is barely possible that they might read the warning as an indication that the United States was preparing to attack the Soviet Union. In that case, Alternative "B" might hasten the war which it seeks to deter.

3. The Soviet Bloc may continue to enlarge its economic capacity at a more rapid pace than the Free World, although the latter will continue for many decades to possess far greater productive capacity. It may be argued that, being ensured by Alternative "B" against a preventive war, or any war except that provoked by its own decision, the Soviet Union will be able to

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



utilize its long-run economic potential more rationally and to greater long-run efficiency. However, Task Force "B" considers that the Free World has far greater resources, flexibility and ingenuity and can thus take full economic advantage of the protection which the proposed policy offers.

C. EFFECTS ON OTHER FREE WORLD COUNTRIES.

1. Despite our best efforts to allay their fears, our allies may feel that Alternative "B" means that the United States is basically interested in destroying the Soviet war-making capacity rather than in preventing the Soviets from overrunning them. On the other hand, they may tend to rely too much for their defense on U.S. strategic power and not enough on their own efforts. Either reaction could lead to a relaxation in the build-up and maintenance of their conventional forces, a development which could be increasingly dangerous as conventional forces assume greater importance with the approach of atomic plenty. These same risks, however, may be even greater under Alternatives "A" or "C". Under "A", the nations of the Free World will have no assurance in advance that they will be adequately protected. Under "C", they will fear that U.S. policies over which they have no control may jeopardize their very existence.

2. Although Alternative "B" is intended to operate as a joint policy for the defense of the Free World, other Free World countries may (a) resent it as an assertion of U.S. world hegemony which makes them "protectorates" of the United States, deprived of some of the traditional attributes of sovereignty and equality, and (b) distrust it as an assumption of

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. V

too much responsibility for world peace by a nation which they regard as "trigger-happy" and likely to engage in impetuous and ill-considered actions. Alternative "B" may also polarize more sharply pro-American and pro-Soviet political forces in the Free World. It may stimulate the concentration of long-standing political, economic, social and national grievances around the pole of anti-American sentiment and thus enhance Soviet capacity to promote internal disunity and instability. In the extreme case, forces of disunity might disrupt the present U.S. alliance system and deprive the United States of bases necessary for the most effective application of strategic power. This is a danger, however, which steady American leadership can do much to allay and which, in the extreme case of successful Communist subversion, can presumably be dealt with under paragraph 3 of Alternative "B", behind the protective barrier established by the warning of general war.

3. The existence on the periphery of (1) divided states (Germany, Austria, Korea) and (2) dangerously unstable areas (e.g., Korea, Indo-China, Iran) increases the difficulty of maintaining the clear and unequivocal character of the policy which is so important to its success. It also offers the Soviet leadership opportunities to attempt to create, in connection with Alternative "B", confusion, uncertainty and embarrassment for the United States and its allies. This situation poses the problem of how to reassure those peoples of the U.S. interest in their eventual unity, in the case of the divided states, and in their security. There is no reason why the United States, rather than the U.S.S.R., should not take and keep the initiative on these issues.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



4. Alternative "B" might tend to encourage activities embarrassing to the United States by irresponsibly inclined Free World politicians. For example, leaders like Mossadegh and Rhee, confident that they could provoke Soviet intervention in their respective countries, might attempt to exploit this potential to blackmail the United States into greater concessions. They might also feel that they could with impunity embark on irresponsible adventures against the Soviet Bloc, relying upon an automatic guarantee of U.S. intervention to inhibit Soviet armed retaliation against them. However, as compared with Alternatives "A" and "C", Alternative "B" limits this risk more effectively by making clear to both friend and foe the basic purposes of U.S. policy. It would be up to the U.S. Government to restrain any such adventuresomeness and to make clear that the sanction of general war would be applied only in case of clear and unprovoked aggression on the part of the Soviet Bloc.

5. While Alternative "B" is couched in clear and unequivocal terms in order that it may be understood and respected by the U.S.S.R., some of our allies may regard it as unduly harsh and provocative. It might also be argued that the policy as stated imposes upon the United States a rigidity and lack of flexibility which could be avoided, while retaining the deterrent effect of the policy, by phrasing it in just as determined but less explicit terms. Task Force "B" holds that, while the essence of its policy is rigid, it can be and must be implemented with wisdom and flexibility. And the rigidity considered necessary in this one aspect of U.S. policy to prevent further

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



Soviet expansion does not rule out flexibility throughout the many other fields of U.S. foreign policy.

D. SUPPORT OF THE POLICY BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

1. Alternative "B" may not receive from the American people the unwavering and unquestioning support which is vital to its long-term effectiveness. Recent events have again demonstrated that the continuity of judgment of many Americans -- even of well informed and responsible observers -- concerning the ultimate purpose of Soviet policy can be shaken overnight by a few Soviet gestures. It is not improbable that some substantial and genuine concessions by the Soviet leadership might have an effect on American (and Free World) opinion which would necessitate reconsideration of the policy.

2. As emphasized above, wholehearted public and Congressional support would be vital to the success of Alternative "B" and, in the case of Congress, constitutionally necessary. In the case of direct attack on the United States or U.S. forces, it could confidently be assumed that full-scale retaliation would inspire such support and would receive ex post facto Congressional approval. If, however, the war should begin with peripheral aggression by the Soviet Bloc against some area remote from both Soviet and U.S. territory, for example in Burma or Indo-China, the Congress might not be willing to find that a state of war automatically existed directly between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the same problem faces Alternatives "A" and "C", which rely upon an unstated threat of general war for their successful implementation. The difference is that under Alternative "B", Congress, the

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. V/VI

American people, the entire Free World, and even the Soviet leadership will know in advance the settled purpose of the United States to retaliate by general war against any new Soviet attack upon the peoples of the Free World.

3. The problem of inspiring initial American support for the proposed policy differs somewhat from the problem of maintaining that support over the long term. While Task Force "B" believes this initial support would be forthcoming, it recognizes that no one can predict the reactions of American public opinion with certainty and that it is important to avoid a situation in which policy gets too far ahead of public opinion, such as occurred at the time of President Roosevelt's "quarantine the aggressors" speech in October 1937. While not attempting to pose as experts on American public opinion, we have framed our recommendations on implementation of the policy with this problem very much in mind.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. So far as the Task Force is aware, Alternative "B" is unprecedented in the history of U.S. foreign policy in that it is a clear and unmistakable commitment to wage general war under certain specific conditions. All previous American "hands-off" statements have rested on implied rather than explicit sanctions. Even President Truman's statement of 19 July 1950 after the attack on South Korea warned only that "new recourse to aggression in the world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace."

- 90 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



2. At the same time it is widely, if in many cases subconsciously, believed throughout the world that the United States has in effect already adopted, without specifically declaring it, a policy indistinguishable from Alternative "B".

3. This near-paradox creates a very delicate problem in presentation. To be fully effective as a deterrent, Alternative "B" must be made to appear in all its stark reality; at the same time no opportunity can be left to permit its interpretation as a chip-on-the shoulder warning of imminent preventive war.

4. Another vital characteristic of the policy is that its effectiveness will depend to an unusual extent upon the degree of public support which it attracts both in the United States and in other Free World countries. If it had only limited support at home and was rejected by our allies, its probable effectiveness would be so low that consideration would undoubtedly have to be given to abandoning it. On the other hand, in the event that it received immediate and overwhelming support in the United States and among our allies, it could greatly reduce the fear of war and spectacularly improve Free World stability and morale. This factor makes the public relations aspects of implementation of extraordinary importance.

5. A third feature of the policy is that, in contrast to almost all major American foreign policy developments, such as the Open Door and the "Truman Doctrine", it is a statement of principle not necessarily associated with any specific actions or set of existing circumstances. This obviously

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. VI

greatly increases the difficulty of planning effective specific steps to implement the policy. These difficulties would be eased if some specific situation could be found -- the signature of a Korean truce, for example -- which could be used as a peg upon which the policy could be hung. Task Force "B" recommends that if possible such a peg be found and used.

6. The tactics of any policy implementation must of course be conditioned by circumstances as they exist and develop. In the case of a major addition to current U.S. foreign policy the actions best designed to inaugurate it effectively and establish it firmly necessarily require decisions by the Chief Executive that cannot be forecast in advance except in very general terms.

7. The proposals which follow, made with the above considerations and reservations in mind, are to be understood as an approach which seems reasonable to Task Force "B" in the circumstances of today. They might well be modified by a fuller understanding of the detailed realities of the domestic and foreign political scene, particularly as that scene may change, in Korea for example, in the future.

B. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

1. Establishment of the policy by a single, highly publicized and emphasized act would, on balance, be preferable to its establishment by secret decision and step-by-step promulgation to the world; to attempt to do it by revising and extending our alliance obligations would be wholly impractical. The gradual procedure might inspire less unfavorable reaction in the Free

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. VI

World but it would substantially increase the difficulty of developing the policy into the clear and forceful instrument it must be. It will be essential to drive home to the rulers of the U.S.S.R. and to the whole world that this is a clear commitment and that the United States stands solidly behind it.

2. A large measure of public support for the policy could probably be inspired by its establishment as a result of ostensibly legislative rather than executive initiative, e.g. a Joint Resolution of Congress followed by appropriate statements by the Executive Branch fitting it into general foreign policy. This method would also have the advantage of giving the Executive Branch an opportunity to judge public reaction before committing itself firmly and thus enable it to frame its supporting action with maximum effectiveness.

3. This Joint Resolution would include a statement of the American people's abhorrence of war, their intention of continuing to abstain from all acts of aggression, and their support of the principles of the U.N. Charter, as well as the warning to the U.S.S.R. However, it would not inhibit the President in the use of the power which he already has to order the armed forces to take military action essential to the national interests of the United States, nor would it affect the Constitutional power of Congress to declare war. It would be so worded as to allow the procedure to be determined according to the circumstances. For example, if direct Soviet aggression against Iran took place, the President presumably would ask the Congress to declare war before he gave orders undertaking acts of war; on the other hand,

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. VI



if in such a crisis, word was received that a Soviet air fleet was on the way to drop atom bombs on the United States, the U.S. counter-offensive obviously could not await a formal declaration of war. This problem is not peculiar to Alternative "B" but would exist as well under any other policy in the event that general war suddenly broke out.

4. During the time which would be required for legislative action on the Joint Resolution, informal diplomatic discussion with our allies, particularly Great Britain, Canada and France, would be carried on to ensure as favorable a climate for the Policy as possible.

5. Simultaneously with the adoption of the Joint Resolution, efforts would be made to induce our allies, particularly the above three powers, to express approval of this action by the United States.

6. The U.S. Government would explain and defend the policy in the United Nations, without attempting to obtain any vote of approval. It would probably be necessary to give some general form of assurance that the United Nations would be consulted before the United States embarked upon general war in retaliation against Soviet aggression. It would probably be necessary, in addition, to agree to consult with the British and possibly the French in this connection. However, the agreement to consult would be left in general terms and would not amount to a right of veto, either by the United Nations or by the British or French Governments. In fact, the United States would have to reserve to itself the right to take action immediately if the situation necessitated it, so that consultation would under some circumstances be only

- 94 -

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION



TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. VI

nominal and in an extreme case would consist of notification simultaneously with military action by the United States against the Soviet Bloc.

7. It will be desirable to take such corollary actions as may be appropriate to make the proposed policy more palatable to the Free World and more difficult for Soviet propaganda to attack. The adoption of Alternative "B" might be timed to coincide with an ostensibly conciliatory offer to carry on negotiations with the Soviet Union or with specific proposals for the settlement of one or more issues (e.g., Germany). This would tend to vitiate Soviet attempts to make the policy appear to be a "warmongering" move and would help to attract Free World support. At the same time the United States would press vigorously in the United Nations for proposals it has previously made to make the U.N. more effective, such as implementation of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 3 November 1950. It should also be prepared to state its continued adherence to the goal of eventual limitation and international control of armaments and willingness to consider any straightforward Soviet proposal for dealing with this problem. However, in the context of the new policy, the United States would have to look more closely than before for evidence of good faith on the part of the U.S.S.R. in any such move.

8. If, at the time the policy was adopted, consideration was being given, for example, to expanding the area of atomic cooperation with the British, or to making arrangements for the use of tactical atomic weapons in European continental defense, it would be desirable to postpone announcement

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/B-1
PART TWO
SEC. VI

of the policy until decisions on these matters were reached. If the decisions were favorable in either or both cases, they should be used as bargaining factors to assist in enlisting British and French support. Similarly, if a decision in favor of alternative 4 of NSC 152 (some relaxation of East-West trade restrictions) had been reached, transmission of the decision to our allies should be coordinated with our efforts to enlist their support for Alternative "B".


9. In view of the importance of implementation and the difficulty of reducing the policy to specific actions, Task Force "B" felt that it would be helpful to consider in some detail the general flow of events that might be expected to follow a decision to adopt Alternative "B". Accordingly, an illustrative timetable of possible action is attached as Enclosure 2. It is included with full realization that it is wholly hypothetical and would inevitably be greatly modified in practice.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



968

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9600

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



ENCLOSURE 1

THE ROLE OF GENERAL WAR UNDER ALTERNATIVES "A", "B", AND "C".

1. According to any of the three alternative policies, the United States must be prepared at all times to wage a general war in the event of an attack upon any one of a considerable number of countries. One difference between "A" and "B" is that "A" leaves open until the last moment the question whether the United States would tolerate by inaction, or resist by general war, a Soviet encroachment on the Free World. Alternative "B", on the other hand, states in advance that, in attempting by military force to expand the Soviet Bloc beyond its present boundaries, the U.S.S.R. must reckon on U.S. retaliation by general war. Under both "A" and "B", the threat of general war is the ultimate deterrent to Soviet aggression but "B" makes that deterrent unmistakably clear.

2. Alternative "A" also leaves open until the last moment the question whether Soviet peripheral aggression will be opposed by peripheral defense alone or by general war. Alternative "B" assumes that the principal deterrent to Soviet aggression, and the principal instrument of U.S. victory, is general war, and that Soviet Union can be deterred from aggression by the foreknowledge that aggression will subject it to general war.

3. The threat, under Alternative "A", to counter Soviet expansion by means short of general war may tempt the Soviet leadership to undertake peripheral aggressions at places and times of its own choosing and through

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



SOL-TF/B-1
ENCLOSURE 1

employment of strategies and resources which are convenient to the Soviet Bloc and are costly and risky to the United States. While under any of the three alternative policies the final deterrent to continued Soviet aggressive expansion is the Soviet fear of provoking the United States to wage general war, under "A" it is not clear at what point this deterrent may be effective, and the U.S. decision to invoke it may be postponed until Soviet aggression has overrun one or several additional countries. Alternative "B", on the other hand, sets up the strongest available deterrent against committing aggression in the first place.

4. To be internally consistent with their refusal to use the explicit deterrent of general war, supporters of Alternative "A" must decide in advance what territories they are prepared to defend by means of general war and what territories they are prepared to abandon to Soviet control in order to avoid or postpone the initiation of general war by the United States. Alternative "B" avoids this fatal moral and political dilemma by stating in advance that any Soviet Bloc encroachment will be met by the initiation of general war. It is based on the thesis that if the threat of general war can deter any Soviet aggression, it can deter all Soviet aggressions. Under Alternative "B" it is no longer necessary to decide which are "first-class" nations that must be protected from Soviet aggression and which "second-class" ones that can be thrown to the wolves.

5. The considerations mentioned above in relation to Alternative "A" also apply generally to "C". Furthermore, the success of Alternative "C" also depends ultimately on the probable or certain resort to general

1-2

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



war by the United States as a deterrent to compel the Soviet Union to acquiesce in the loss of its control over outlying areas of the Soviet Bloc. If Alternative "C" is to be successful in detaching such areas from the Soviet Bloc, the Soviet leadership must conclude either that it will be defeated by the United States in any given peripheral war or that the United States will resort successfully to general war rather than accept defeat in a peripheral war or allow the U.S.S.R. to retake territory lost to the Soviet Bloc through local action. Thus, Alternative "C" proposes that the threat of general war should be exerted to roll back Soviet control at a number of points around the Soviet periphery, whereas Alternative "B" proposes that this threat should be applied primarily to defend the Free World against new Soviet aggression.

6. Task Force "B" believes that the purpose of promoting the security and strength of the Free World, which presumably is common to all three proposed policies, will be better served by Alternative "B" than by "C", which may disrupt the unity of the Free World because of the greater risks of general war and because of the more aggressive policies to be pursued under it. Thus, Alternative "C" may deprive the United States of the political alliances and advanced bases which it requires in order to carry out any of the policies, particularly "C". It will also, especially if the Soviet response to Alternative "C" is conciliatory in words and manner, tend to drive the countries "in-between" the United States and Russia into a political and geographical "Third Force" position which would

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOL-TF/B-1
ENCLOSURE 1

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



eventually be vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Meanwhile, U.S. power would no longer be pressing against the Soviet periphery and would therefore be unavailable to support continued pursuit of Alternative "C".

7. Alternative "B" offers the best opportunity to unify the Free World against the dangers of Soviet encroachment while leaving it free to take advantage of any opportunities which may appear for diminishing the power and extent of the Soviet Bloc.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



ENCLOSURE 2

POSSIBLE MEASURES OF IMPLEMENTATION

INTRODUCTION.

In view of the importance of implementation and the difficulty of reducing Alternative "B" to specific actions, the Task Force felt that it would be helpful to consider in some detail the general flow of events which might be expected to follow a decision to adopt it. The following illustrative timetables are the result of this consideration. They are included in this study with full realization that they are wholly hypothetical and would inevitably be greatly modified in practice.

A. Alternative "B" tied to a specific development.

Illustrative assumptions: One, a Korean truce is concluded, or, two, negotiations with the Soviets result in agreement on a unified Germany not included in NATO and not otherwise guaranteed against aggression.

1. Shortly before it was anticipated that negotiations on one of the above problems would be successfully concluded, appropriate friendly governments would be confidentially informed of the President's intention to announce Alternative "B". These governments would include Britain, Canada, France and perhaps in addition all members of NATO and ANZUS. In order to emphasize the importance of the subject the allied governments would be informed by the Secretary of State calling in their Ambassadors in Washington, by our Ambassadors in the various capitals calling on Foreign Ministers or, preferably, Prime Ministers, and through regional pact channels such as the

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



NATO Council. A very full explanation of the policy would be given, emphasizing its defensive character, the solemn sense of responsibility with which it would be adopted and, without actually denying its unilateral character, the great extent to which its application would be made a matter of joint consultation.

2. At the same time the appropriate governments would be informed of any other recent policy decisions which might be expected to influence them favorably toward Alternative "B", such as an expansion of the scope of British-American atomic cooperation or a relaxation of East-West trade restrictions.

3. Initially no attempt would be made to high-pressure allied governments into accepting the policy. The line would be that the U.S. Government realized the importance of the policy to the Free World and was sure its advantages would be recognized upon full study and consideration; in the meantime it would hope that an attitude of at least benevolent reserve would be maintained.

4. Simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of the hypothetical agreement with the Soviet Union on the German or Korean question, the President would make a formal statement (a regularly scheduled speech would probably be an impractical vehicle for the announcement because of the timing requirements), enunciating the policy as a principle and associating it appropriately with the agreement.

5. Immediately thereafter the President would initiate action in the Senate (either by formal communication or by talks with individual Senators) on a Joint Resolution supporting the policy.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



6. U.S. Ambassadors in countries on the Soviet periphery with which the United States did not already have mutual defense treaties would be instructed that, in response to possible official inquiries, they should state that the United States is prepared to discuss the possibilities of negotiating treaties embodying the U.S. commitment under the announced policy (assuming that further study indicated the practicability of such treaties and that satisfactory drafts had been worked out).

7. An ostensibly conciliatory offer would be made to the Soviet Government to negotiate some outstanding issue or issues. If time and circumstances permitted, this offer would involve the abandonment of some particularly intransigent position which the United States had built up with this end in view.


8. Public information resources of the U.S. Government would be mobilized in support of the policy.

B. Alternative "B" implemented without reference to other developments.

1. After the decision to adopt Alternative "B", the President would wait for an appropriate juncture in Congressional activity. He then (on X-Day) would call in a Senator in whose reliability and discretion he had complete confidence and who, he had reason to believe, would be sympathetic to the proposed policy.

2. He would describe the policy to the Senator, explain his conviction that it could only be successful if it had firm, wholehearted support in the United States and at least widespread "benevolent neutrality" elsewhere in the Free World, and his opinion that this could best be ensured if the policy

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



emerged ostensibly as a result of Congressional initiative. If the Senator was receptive, he would give him a suggested Joint Resolution and ask only that the Senator give him a few days warning before a Resolution was introduced.

3. On X-plus-10 the Senator would inform the President that he intended to introduce a Resolution on X-plus-14 and would perhaps hand the President a copy of his final draft.

4. On X-plus-11 the President would inform the Ambassadors in London and Ottawa and perhaps the Ambassador in Paris that he had just learned of the imminent introduction of the Resolution and would instruct the Ambassadors to see the respective Prime Ministers and explain to them personally and confidentially that the Administration had just learned of the impending resolution, that the President did not intend immediately to take a strong position on the subject but saw advantages to the Free World in the policy, and that he therefore very much hoped that the British, Canadian and French Governments would at least maintain a reserved attitude until its advantages and disadvantages became clarified in the course of Congressional consideration.

5. At his first press conference after X-plus-14 the President would be asked about the policy. He would reply that he had been informed of the Senator's intention to introduce the Resolution only a few days previously, that he had raised no objections to its introduction, that its advantages and disadvantages were being studied by the Administration, and that the Administration's views would be made clear in the course of the Congressional

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



hearings on the Resolution. All other Government officials would be under instructions to refer all inquiries on the subject to the White House.

6. Hearings would be scheduled for X-plus-30. If public reaction by that time was sufficiently favorable to warrant the expectation that the policy might eventually receive a full measure of support, the Administration would support it vigorously with such amendments as seemed wise in the light of public reaction. If, on the other hand, reaction in the United States and abroad was so unfavorable as to make it unlikely that firm support could be rallied, the Administration could withhold support from the Resolution without loss of prestige or substantial weakening of the U.S. position vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.

7. Assuming a decision to support the Resolution, the President on X-plus-28 would instruct the U.S. Permanent Delegate to the United Nations to discuss the policy informally with his principal colleagues. Permanent U.S. representatives to regional organizations such as NATO and the O.A.S. would be similarly instructed. Chiefs of all U.S. diplomatic missions in Free World countries would be circularized on the subject and given authority to take it up, within their discretion, with the governments to which they are accredited.

8. On X-plus-28, U.S. Ambassadors in countries on the Soviet periphery with which the United States did not already have mutual defense treaties would be given appropriate instructions regarding the possibility of negotiating such treaties (See A, 6 above).

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



9. Beginning on X-plus-30, speeches favorable to the policy would be made by high U.S. Government officials and all other public relations resources of the Government, both in the United States and abroad, would be mobilized behind the policy.

10. At appropriate moments on or after X-plus-30, the United States would inform the concerned governments of any previously decided upon conciliatory actions such as expansion of the scope of British-American atomic cooperation or relaxation of East-West trade relations.

11. Also at an appropriate time after X-plus-30, the United States would make an ostensibly conciliatory offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate some outstanding issue (See A, 7 above).

2-6

DECLASSIFIED	
MR 92-1941 v	
Authority	State guidelines
By	LPS
NLE Date	1/14/2000

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



ANNEX I

EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE "B" IN THE LIGHT OF
"MEMORANDUM ON BASIC ISSUES"

A. GENERAL

1. In the Annex to the directive given to Task Forces "A", "B", and "C" of Project Solarium, entitled "Memorandum on Basic Issues", are listed many problems which "cut across all lines of action" and affect any general foreign policy. Since the Task Forces are not asked to consider these problems specifically, Task Force "B" has confined itself to a study of them in the light of its own proposed policy. The following comments reflect that study.

B. NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

1. Alternative "B" does not rule out negotiation with the Soviet Union on any question in which there might be a conflict of interest and on which there is a reasonable chance of reaching agreement. To the contrary, if the policy is effective and the Soviet Union must accept the confines of the present borders of the Soviet Bloc for the foreseeable future, it will most probably attempt to accomplish its immediate objectives, at least in part, through negotiation. There are many questions of interest to the Soviet Bloc and to the Free World that are susceptible of negotiation. It may be useful for the United States to negotiate on such questions, in order both to advance its own objectives through satisfactory agreements when possible and to expose Soviet intransigence or bad faith when satisfactory

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



agreements prove unattainable.

2. Alternative "B" creates a posture of confidence and tranquillity which strengthens the negotiating position of the United States and the Free World. Under the proposed policy the Free World will be able to insist on suitable guarantees that decisions reached through negotiation will be implemented in both letter and spirit.

3. Task Force "B" believes that the United States should welcome negotiation on any question it considers is open to negotiation. Many of the questions raised in the "Memorandum on Basic Issues" are subject to negotiation. Many are not. It is difficult to say whether a question is subject to negotiation until the full context of the proposal for negotiation is known. For instance, the United States and its allies might profit by the opportunity to put forward new proposals for negotiation on Germany. On the other hand, the NATO countries would certainly refuse to negotiate a proposal that NATO should be dissolved, except against a satisfactory quid pro quo such as full restoration of the independence of the Soviet satellites. For this reason Task Force "B" has gone no further than the generality expressed above in connection with the many outstanding questions of difference between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World listed in the "Memorandum on Basic Issues".

C. IS TIME WORKING ON OUR SIDE?

1. Task Force "B" has given much time and thought to the study of this question. It has reached conclusions identical with those contained in the most recent CIA study on the subject - chiefly, that it is impossible

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



to say.

2. In the military sense time is working against us in that at some juncture, say in ten or fifteen years, both the Soviet Bloc and the Free World will have atomic weapons and the means for their delivery sufficient to destroy completely the war making capacity of each other regardless of the strength of presently known defenses or regardless of which side has the advantage of surprise - the age of atomic plenty. If we believe that at that juncture one side or the other will make an atomic attack, then the only way that time can be made to work for us is to make such an attack before the Soviet Bloc reaches the age of atomic plenty. For many reasons, not the least of which is that of morality, we reject preventive war. We then must hope that the time gap that will exist before the Soviet Bloc will have an adequate atomic capability will be sufficiently long (1) to allow for favorable changes in world tensions, including favorable changes within the Soviet Bloc, (2) to bring a realization that atomic warfare means universal destruction, which realization should be the greatest deterrent, (3) to allow for development of presently unknown means of atomic defense, and (4) to permit greater development of the Free World's military strength in case general war becomes unavoidable.

3. In brief, Task Force "B" believes that time must be utilized for the continued development of the strength of the Free World in atomic weapons, atomic defense, conventional forces and weapons, and economic and political solidarity of the Free World. We must have a policy in which we refuse to be diverted from the development of these strengths by costly

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



peripheral actions. Alternative "B" offers the best means of accomplishing this objective.

D. THE ROLE OF GENERAL WAR

Task Force "B" believes that general war, even on the scale on which it could be carried out if initiated today, would be so devastating that it is impossible to predict its effects. One can only speculate to what degree society or any of its institutions could survive. As time goes on the destructive potential increases.

In putting forth its recommendations, Task Force "B" offers no great promise that the Free World and its institutions will survive atomic war whether it be sooner or later. Resort to general war is the ultimate sanction. Alternative "B" is in effect an announcement that the United States and the Free World will accept the risk of annihilation before they accept Soviet domination. Should the Soviet leadership violate the policy set forth in Alternative "B", it in effect announces that it will accept the risk of annihilation of the U.S.S.R. before it will abandon the objective of world domination. If this be the Soviet leaders' attitude, it follows that they would initiate atomic war if that be the only way to attain the objective of world domination. In that case general war becomes inevitable regardless of the successes we may have had in a series of peripheral wars. In the light of these considerations, Task Force "B" believes that its proposed policy offers not only the greatest deterrent to general war but also the best state of preparation if it must come.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



E. THE ECONOMIC LOAD-CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Task Force "B" has made no attempt to carry out the economic research which would be required to provide even speculative answers to the economic questions raised in the "Memorandum on Basic Issues." The interrelationships among such factors as defense expenditures, national income, the level of taxation and budgetary deficits are complex and controversial. Attempts to arrive at reasonably precise estimates of these interrelated magnitudes have not appeared a rewarding expenditure of the time available. The Task Force did agree, however, on the following general conclusions.

The basic limit upon our national capacity to provide the means for national defense is simply our physical ability to produce goods and services and not any danger of national bankruptcy. The willingness of the American people to bear taxes cannot be expressed in percentages of the national income because the willingness is conditioned to a vital degree by whether they think that the taxes they are called upon to pay are necessary and equitably shared. Upon this willingness to bear the burden of taxation may depend the success of maintaining the correct ratio between taxation and budgetary deficits necessary to avoid the evils of inflation.

The evidence indicates that the economy of the Free World and particularly the United States is not seriously nearing the limits of the capacity to support defense measures. Thus far we have engaged in the "cold war" on a reasonable basis of military readiness and with extraordinary allocation of resources to defense purposes while indulging "as usual" in all of the luxuries and refinements of our standard of living - indeed, we have

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



increased them. This, while opposed to an enemy that has the capability of devoting a somewhat greater percentage of a much lower gross national product to war preparations because its people are accustomed to and expect a much lower standard of living.

Task Force "B" wishes to point out that in connection with the increases in defense expenditure since the beginning of the Korean War it has not yet become necessary to invoke austerity or belt tightening. At the same time it suggests that U.S. policy must be such as to keep American resources from being dissipated in peripheral wars as epitomized in Korea, since the possibility cannot be ruled out that even greater expenditures might at some time become necessary to insure national security.

F. ELEMENTS OF A FREE WORLD COALITION

The questions raised in this section of the "Memorandum on Basic Issues" present so many intangibles and imponderables that they defy definitive answers.

Task Force "B" recognizes that the basic world struggle is between Soviet imperialism under Russian leadership on the one side and the forces of freedom under United States leadership on the other. In this, as in any struggle, friends and allies are important for the material and spiritual strengths they bring with them and to preserve the widest possible area of freedom. It is not probable that in the end there can be neutrals; thus no effort should be spared to bring those who are now neutrals over to the side of freedom - indeed in almost all cases their natural leaning is in our direction.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION



The differences that exist between the United States and many of its friends and among those friends themselves impose strains on the Free World coalition. But these are differences that can and should be negotiated to satisfactory settlements. With these people we know that agreements have sanctity. No valid generalization can be made as to how much the United States should defer to the views of other Free World nations, or how far it should go in promoting settlement of issues in which it is not a party immediately concerned. But in all matters vital to the strength and unity of the Free World coalition the United States must exert a wise, benevolent but nonetheless firm leadership. To the extent that the U.S. fails in this responsibility, weakness in the Free World will inevitably ensue.

Task Force "B" believes that the adoption of Alternative "B" would be a new and unmistakable sign of responsible U.S. leadership for which the remainder of the Free World has been perhaps unconsciously but nonetheless hopefully waiting.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION