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A REPORT
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by
TASK FORCE "B"
of
PROJECT SOLARIUM

on

A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT
PRESENTLY OR IN THE FUTURE UNDERTAKE WITH RESPECT
TO THE SOVIET POWER BLOC - ALTERNATIVE "B"

16 July 1953
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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By <u>LH</u>	NLE Date <u>1/14/2000</u>

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PREFACE

Pursuant to Project Solarium Outline, 1 June 1953, we submit herewith a report setting forth our advocacy of Alternative "B". Essentially, Alternative "B" is the assertion of a new basic principle of U.S. political and military strategy. For that reason the main argument is devoted to developing that principle and analyzing the probable effects of its application. We have dealt with specific aspects of existing policy only in those instances where we thought there could be real question whether they should be revised or abandoned if the principle were put into force.

In conformance with the directive we have presented our best advocacy of the policy assigned to us for analysis. We believe that Alternative "B" does merit serious consideration as a basic element in U.S. foreign policy. Otherwise, in the nature of the assignment, the members of Task Force "B" do not assume personal responsibility for the conclusions expressed.

Parts I and II of the report cover the same subject matter. Part I, a record of the oral presentation, to which we were directed to devote our major effort, is the more compact and closely argued. In Part II, the Task Force Study, the arguments are developed in more detail.

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PART ONE

MANUSCRIPT FOR ORAL PRESENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE "B"

I - THE DIRECTIVE TO TASK FORCE "B"

This is the advocacy of Alternative "B", which in our directive is stated as shown on this chart.

"The policy of the United States would be:

"(1) To complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and the Western Pacific so as to form a continuous line around the Soviet Bloc beyond which, the United States will not permit Soviet or Satellite military forces to advance without general war;

"(2) To make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appropriate and unmistakable way that the United States has established and is determined to carry out this policy; and

"(3) To reserve freedom of action, in the event of indigenous Communist seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all measures necessary to reestablish a situation compatible with the security interests of the United States and its Allies."

We would like at this juncture to set forth our interpretation of five points in our directive which we have found to be essential to a clear understanding of our task.

First, this policy is, in final analysis, unilateral: a line "beyond which the U.S. will not permit, etc." This, however, seems to us no more than a recognition of the facts that any nation always reserves to itself the right to take any action it considers vital to its national security, and that U.S. security interests today reach throughout the world.

Second, the advance of military forces which would bring on a general war can be no trifling border incident of the sort that has happened many

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times in the past and will presumably happen from time to time in the future. We are speaking of armed aggression that would be clearly recognized as such by the President and the people of the United States, and in fact by the Free World as a whole.

Third, we would like to give our definition of the general war we are talking about. It is a war in which the U.S., assisted by those allies it might have at the time, would apply its full power -- whenever, however, and wherever necessary to defeat the main enemy, and to achieve its other war objectives. Bombs would not fall automatically on Moscow on H-hour; that would depend entirely on the war plan for the situation at the time. On the other hand, such a war would not be a repetition of World War II, or anything closely resembling it. To give maximum emphasis to this point, we suggest that it is possible, though admittedly unlikely in the near future, that the historical U.S. allies in Western Europe might not be touched by destruction at all.

Fourth, we would emphasize that Alternative "B" furnishes a new frame for the fabric of U.S. policy, which will substantially resize and reshape that fabric. However, it by no means replaces the myriad of threads that now go to make up that fabric, most of which are the same for any reasonable basic pattern of policy. In this regard, we accept many of the concrete recommendations you have heard and will hear in the presentation of Alternatives "A" and "C". We would modify these, or those of any other reasonable policy, only as necessary to accommodate the one new premise: that is, the warning of general war as the primary sanction against further Soviet-Bloc aggression,

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under clearly defined circumstances, is the best means available for insuring the security of the United States, for the present and the foreseeable future.

Fifth, there can be no doubt that Alternative "B" requires the U.S. to maintain for the foreseeable future the military capability necessary to meet the Soviet Union in general war. This will be expensive. But we wish to make it entirely clear that this is an expense which must be borne by any policy that purports to insure the security of this country, be it the present policy or any alternative thereto. We emphatically reject any suggestion that there is a place in the atomic age for a U.S. military establishment having less offensive power than that which the rulers of the Soviet Union must regard as an unacceptable risk in war.

So much for our interpretation of our directive. We would like next to comment briefly on the Soviet threat, as it conditions U.S. policy, and is conditioned by the facts of atomic weapons.

II - THE SOVIET THREAT

In its efforts to contain Communist expansion the U.S. has thus far reacted to Soviet pressures and aggressions as they have appeared at one point or another on the periphery. This policy has not been entirely successful. It has inherent limitations which seem to us to make it less likely to succeed in the future.

Not knowing where Soviet-Bloc pressures may appear, the United States must be prepared to meet them everywhere. This strategy leaves the initiative with the Kremlin. If continued, it may be beyond the economic

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capabilities of the U.S. to support. It diverts the American people from the vital task of making the best possible use of their power and resources to be prepared to inflict decisive defeat on the Soviet Union if it continues its active policy of expansion.

Above all, this strategy seems to us to indulge in the false comfort which comes from avoiding the real meaning of atomic weapons.

It is clear that the U.S. stockpile of atomic weapons will grow to such enormous proportions within the next five to ten years that the critical military factor will no longer be their number, but rather the capability for their employment. This we describe as the age of atomic plenty for the U.S. We can only assume that the U.S.S.R. will not permit its own program to lag far behind, five to ten years at the outside.

We strongly believe in bettering the defenses of the U.S. against air attack; indeed not to do so will hasten the day when the Kremlin can calculate that atomic plenty has arrived for the U.S.S.R. However, as regards the interplay of the technology of offense and defense, we cannot set aside the fact of today that means of offense can now be foreseen against which the means of defense cannot yet be visualized.

The NSC's experts have found that a knock-out attack on the United States will not be within the Soviet capabilities during the next two years. We suppose that improvements in U.S. defenses can postpone the date another few years. Further, we believe that in due course, with sufficient effort, the U.S. can, and must, again balance the scales in one respect, and have a military offensive capability so invulnerable to Soviet attack that regardless of

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the damage that might be done on this continent, the U.S.S.R. could not expect to escape an unacceptable counterblow. Thus the advantage to the U.S.S.R. of a surprise attack on the U.S. may largely be made to disappear.

However, whether or not we are entirely correct in these suppositions, we are convinced that certainly in time, perhaps within ten years, peripheral wars in the Korean context will have lost most of their meaning as a major element in the military support of foreign policy.

These overriding atomic considerations confront the United States with two major alternatives: either a preventive war while the U.S. has a wide lead in atomic weapons and their means of delivery, or the adoption of a policy that will do most to insure the longest possible period of peace.

The first of these, preventive war, is rejected. The second presupposes that changes within the Soviet Bloc, and in the balance of basic forces in the world, can be made to serve the cause of freedom. At least the strength and freedom of the United States would be preserved up to the time when its security will depend on a new set of factors, rather independent of the policy pursued before that time.

We will turn now to where and how Task Force "B" drew its "line of no aggression."

III - THE "LINE OF NO AGGRESSION"

Because it was convenient as a beginning, and because it is a possibility we were instructed to examine in any case, we looked first at a line which would include only the minimum areas necessary to U.S. security, without consideration of present obligations, sentiment or past associations. In

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this examination, our instructions excluded only a line which would leave the defense of the United States resting solely on U.S. economic and military strength.

We must report that we could find no close-in line that was at all satisfactory. The objective would be to gain freedom of action by withdrawing from awkward alliances. However, it is on these alliances that the U.S. now depends for a most important, perhaps critical, part of its military capability. That is, overseas naval and, particularly, air bases. If these were discarded, much of the hypothetical gain in freedom of action would become meaningless.

Furthermore, such a withdrawal from present commitments could hardly be called substantial unless at least the lines were drawn this side of Japan or Continental Western Europe. In either case, the Soviet Union, whether through aggression or more peaceful dominance, would surely gain enormously in political prestige while fattening on the resources of the areas thus available to it, with incalculable damage to the position of leadership of the U.S., and to its own security.

Such a concept of withdrawal may have at least some military validity at the future time when U.S. forces have a much improved intercontinental capability, but it does not apply at present.

Next we looked for a line which would exclude areas not absolutely vital to U.S. security, while not discarding the overseas military bases which we consider so very important for the present, and without handing large industrial resources to the Soviet Union. With these stipulations, one quickly

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finds that the partners of the U.S. who most restrict its freedom of action are at the same time the most important to have as partners.

Moreover, we could not disregard the lesson from Korea that the Kremlin may regard a disclaimer of interest in an undefended area as an invitation to aggression.

With these thoughts in mind one notes, as Task Force "A" has pointed out, that at all points around the periphery of the Soviet Bloc, except for Finland and Afghanistan, the U.S. either has actual defense commitments or at least security interests substantial enough to have been treated in classified NSC documents as requiring possible U.S. military action.

We therefore asked ourselves: if we want to rule out of bounds for further aggression the territory of security interest to the U.S., why leave out any free country?

Existing agreements in NATO, all the way to Turkey, and in the Western Pacific from Hokkaido to the Antarctic, while reserving the final prerogative to declare war, nevertheless indicate that the U.S. would almost certainly go to war in defense of any of these nations. Alternative "1" would clear up this final uncertainty in these alliances, leaving only the gap across the Middle East and South Asia.

Our Task Force decided that this gap should be closed by a line along the present Soviet Bloc periphery. We decided further that the line in other areas should also include all other countries now outside the Iron Curtain, and that this policy should be made publicly clear.

In all cases, we found detailed reasons for this conclusion, but the

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main basis for the conclusion is that we think Alternative "B" will have a much better chance of succeeding everywhere if it bars further aggression anywhere. The moral foundation for the policy seems to us to be of critical importance, and we think it would be inadequate unless the policy were put forth in terms of an unassailable statement of principle.

IV - THE POLICY RESTATED

Having thus drawn our "line of no aggression" we can turn to a question we were directed to examine: whether aggression across the line in particular regions should be met at the outset by general military action against both the Soviet Union and China or only against the one most directly involved. In presenting our conclusion, it seems to us that the compelling point is that the Soviet Union, which is the power center of the Soviet Bloc, despite the troubles it is now having, still has effective control over the Bloc. We think this situation may change; that it must be a U.S. objective to make it change. However, we believe that the ostensible conditions of the present require that U.S. policy look on the Bloc as an entity. Within such a policy framework, it will of course be necessary to maintain up to date at all times war plans covering the more likely possibilities of how a war might start, the initial military action in each of which will depend on the specific conditions in each case.

We will turn now to the second point in the policy set forth in our directive; the question of making the policy unmistakably clear to the Soviet rulers.

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We concluded, as will emerge from this presentation, that support of the policy by the U.S. public is vital to its success. In truth, it is the will of the American people which must be made unmistakably clear.

Except for the third point in the directive, our policy would then read most clearly as shown on this chart.

"(1) That any advance of Soviet-Bloc military forces beyond the present borders of the Soviet Bloc be considered by the United States as initiating general war in which the full power of the United States will be used as necessary to bring about the defeat of the U.S.S.R. and the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc.

"(2) That the United States make known publicly in an appropriate and unmistakable way that it has established and is determined to carry out this policy."

This third point we believe needs no expansion. It is a necessary point in any effective U.S. policy.

We were assigned an additional task: to explore the effect of a complete outlawry of the Soviet Bloc, in other words, the sealing off of "Two Worlds."

As regards military considerations, we submit that Alternative "B" applies the seal, wherever and however the line is drawn.

As regards economic considerations, we think that a policy of Two Worlds could not in fact be enforced, and even if it could, it would not be very useful. It would be a hindrance to the economy of the Soviet Bloc, but could not delay substantially the economic build-up which the policy would presumably seek to inhibit.

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Psychologically, it would reduce the awareness within the Soviet Bloc of conditions in the Free World, which we count on to contribute to the decay of the Communist system in the long term.

Meanwhile, the political implications to U.S. relations among its less wealthy allies would, in our opinion, rule out such a concept even if it offered much larger economic advantages than we can see for it.

In short, we rejected the absolute concept of "Two Worlds."

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V - PREDICTED EFFECTS OF THE POLICY

We will turn now to the effects we predict for Alternative "B", as we have developed it.

1. A clear indication that further military aggression by the Soviet Bloc would result immediately in general war will reduce the likelihood that such a war will occur.

Supported by informed opinion, we are convinced that at present the U.S.S.R. does not want general war. There is, however, always some possibility that it might occur, and we suggest there are two ways this might come about:

- a. Accidentally, growing out of a series of incidents or a peripheral action, unwanted even by the Kremlin.
- b. By miscalculation on the part of the Kremlin as to the events which start it.

Alternative "B" eliminates both of these sources of general war.

As for the possibility that the Kremlin may deliberately accept a high risk of general war, "B" would at least restrict Soviet freedom of action for the longest possible time. Before deliberately pushing their policy into the area of high risk, the Kremlin planners must calculate that, on balance, they have the necessary preponderance of military force necessary for winning a general war. Alternative "B", by eliminating peripheral wars, with their consequent mal-deployment of U.S. forces in being, will hinder the creation of this preponderance. Even more important in the long term, Alternative "B" will guide the development of U.S. forces along lines best directed at meeting the requirements of a general war, thus



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making a Soviet preponderance in that regard always more difficult to attain.

It may be argued for less positive policies that the U.S. should avoid publicizing the possibility that it might itself initiate a general war which could severely damage the civilized world. We believe that the Free World knows that any general war which might follow the announcement of the new U.S. policy would come only by the deliberate choice of the U.S.S.R.; also, that it is most unlikely to come before a time when the U.S.S.R. calculates that it has an adequate atomic capability, and even then only if the Kremlin believes also that conditions are such as to enable the Soviet Union to escape being destroyed and to enlarge its power base.

The growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile is inevitable, but not the creation of the conditions prerequisite to its employment. We believe that the Free World, with the application of the policy of Alternative "B", will give vigorous support to an effort to insure that such conditions are not going to be created.

We do not pretend that such a war, if it occurred, would be less than terribly destructive even to the victor. We submit only that if the U.S. flees from its responsibilities in the face of the atomic reality of the present and near future, the nations of the Free World will recognize our fright for what it is, will continue to fall successively by the wayside, and will assist the U.S.S.R., at least passively, in bringing about the only circumstances in which such a war would in practical fact become a probability.

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It may be argued that we are entirely mistaken on this point -- that our policy will hasten rather than inhibit general war. Obviously, we would disagree, but, without advocating preventive war, we would still point out that the U.S. chances for surviving in an atomic war with the U.S.S.R. are about as good now as they will ever be, perhaps better.

2. Our policy makes most effective use of U.S. power, and exploits Soviet weakness.

a. It will reduce the effectiveness of Communist power politics and penetration in free countries. As long as the United States foregoes the firm threat of general war as its primary sanction against further Soviet aggression, free nations close to the Soviet Bloc must constantly calculate the danger that one by one, or in groupings, they may be eliminated as the Kremlin decides.

Our policy will reduce this fear by eliminating the possibility that Soviet armed forces can ever, short of general war, assist in a take-over by the local Communists. Consequently, local Communist blackmail of the timid will be less effective.

b. It will make clear that the U.S. does not hire others to fight its war for it, and will provide a firmer basis for U.S. relations with other Free World countries.

Our policy will bring into focus the central fact that U.S. strategic power is the ultimate military deterrent to Soviet aggression. No action, we believe, could do more to undercut the suspicion in the Free World, widely propagated by the Communists, that the U.S. aim in giving

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economic and military aid to its friends is to get them to fight its own war for it.

The nations of the Free World will then be better able, and also more forcefully impelled to decide firmly how much they are willing to do in their own interests: to strengthen their internal security against subversion, to raise the cost of Soviet aggression, and to improve the prospects of their survival in the event of general war. Further, they will have some assurance that this effort will not be frittered away in peripheral actions that do not attack the source of the danger.

In the case of Britain and France the application of our policy will make clear to them that the U.S., in looking realistically to its own long-term security, is with equal realism affording them added protection, not only against direct attack on their homelands but also against peripheral areas where they have interests, thus promoting stability in those areas.

In the case of Germany, we believe that there is no question but that time will bring about the removal of all occupation forces, and that the German people see this prospect clearly. What they can not see clearly is how they can expect then to remain peaceful and at the same time free of foreign political and economic dominance. Our policy provides a framework in which Western Germany can be held by the West, and when the present artificial separation is eliminated, a United Germany will have added chance of maintaining its independence against Soviet pressure.

The same considerations apply to Austria and, at least in part,

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to Korea and Free China.

Elsewhere, among the free countries of Asia and the Middle East the problem is different in many respects from that in Western Europe, but not in the essential one that some of the apparent adherence to Communism outside the Iron Curtain is no more than insurance against Communist takeover.

c. It will assist the growth of dependably anti-Communist regional groupings of nations.

If this be too much to expect quickly in South Asia, we believe it a distinct probability in due course for the Middle East, and a certainty for NATO. Because we believe our policy will reduce the danger to individual nations, we believe that in time it must also strengthen their alliances. Strength is a more permanent cement than fear, and there are lasting interests, wholly apart from the Soviet threat, which draw together the NATO countries, and also those of the Middle East and South Asia.

d. It will on balance strengthen the United Nations.

The U.N. was established in the concept that the great powers have an overriding joint interest in maintaining peace. The U.N. security machinery is designed to facilitate giving effect to that interest, not to supply the interest if it does not exist.

The vital missing element thus far in the development of the U.N. is the application of U.S. power to counterbalance Soviet power, which is continuously applied outside the U.N.

Our proposed policy places U.S. power behind the right of every state to be free of "the threat or use of force against its territorial

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integrity or political independence", which is set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.

It also rests firmly on the critical provision of Article 51, that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member".

Thus we believe that Alternative "B" will bring realistic strengthening to the U.N. by advance warning that the U.S. will be an immediate, full partner of any nation attacked.

e. It will on balance improve the basis for resistance to Soviet domination in satellite countries.

U.S. policy has never promised liberation by military force, and it is vital that the captive peoples understand the limits of the U.S. undertaking. False hopes of early U.S. military rescue lead only to exposure and destruction of valuable elements of resistance.

These captive peoples widely believe that the Soviet Union will eventually bring on a war with the United States. By clearly stating that any further Soviet aggression would initiate that war, the U.S. will sustain their belief without encouraging false hopes. Resistance based on realistic long-term prospects will be tenacious and stable.

Meanwhile, the fact that U.S. power is thrown into the balance to restrain Soviet external ambitions may inhibit to some degree the ruthlessness with which the U.S.S.R. can deal with the Satellites, and may increase the bargaining power of Satellite leadership in its dealings with

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f. It provides a safeguard against aggression by Communist China, while also providing a basis for friction between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin.

If Soviet discipline of Chinese Communist leadership continues to be effective, Alternative "B" will succeed as a positive deterrent to new peripheral aggression.

As for the possibility that Soviet discipline may not be effective in China, we think that new armed aggression by the Chinese Communists would be a most unlikely manifestation of such a breakdown in cohesion. If the Chinese Communists decide to free themselves of Soviet dominance in the foreseeable future, with the example of Tito before them, and Chinese Nationalist forces on their flank, they will see several ways of doing so that are less dangerous for themselves and more profitable for China than calling the U.S. hand under the policy of Alternative "B".

We cannot of course assess the extent to which Communist China is now restive in its unequal partnership with the U.S.S.R. We note that differences of interest between the two regimes are inherent in the situation and believe that these potential frictions can best be made useful to the Free World by galling the Chinese Communists, and treating them as a Soviet Satellite so long as they act as such.

g. Alternative "B", although it will be most effective in maintaining stable peace over a period of years, offers considerable assistance also in the settlement of the current peripheral wars in Korea and Indo-China.

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It will create a new climate of thinking among the men in the Kremlin which should inhibit Soviet support of these wars.

Given a truce in Korea, it will furnish an additional deterrent to resumption of the military action.

In Indo-China, it at least rules out the sort of organized participation by the Chinese Communists that alone has kept the U.N. from winning in Korea long ago.

3. Our proposed policy clarifies the principal purpose of U.S. forces and enables their most economical development and maintenance.

The cardinal element in U.S. military policy must be to develop and maintain the military posture necessary to enable the defeat of the main enemy.

A national policy which depends on trying to stalemate, or even win, a number of peripheral wars precludes the development of the strategic concept needed as a basis for deciding even on the sort of forces needed for the war which would put this country in mortal danger.

A new basic policy which honestly and courageously recognizes this fact will provide a firmer basis for selectivity in deciding on forces to be built and maintained.

It is the sort of policy the American people can understand, as opposed to one which accepts a series of costly peripheral wars, each one of which leads only to another. Public support therefore will stand best chance of continuity.

Military programs will be stabilized, minimizing peaks and valleys,

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false starts, and extravagant obsolescence of equipment. The result will be better order and economy in the application of resources made available.

4. By clarifying the principal purpose of U.S. military forces, and the circumstances in which they would be employed, the U.S. will similarly clarify the size and nature of other necessary military forces around the Soviet periphery.

At present, partly because the Free World cannot be sure whether, when or how the U.S. would fight to stop further aggression, most efforts at rearmament suffer from confusion as to the type and size of forces needed.

Friendly forces around the Soviet periphery will continue to be needed for the foreseeable future, to stabilize the peripheral zone. Without them it would be difficult in some instances even to tell when aggression occurred.

They would be needed in the event of war as protection against being easily overrun, and in the same role would undoubtedly be able to shorten the war in some areas. They would be essential in restoring post-war order in enemy territory.

They are valuable for many other purposes. We do not see that our policy will reduce the requirement for them.

It will, however, clarify the fact that in an atomic war they would not be depended upon for the main effort to defeat the U.S.S.R. itself. Their task is therefore not hopeless, and it is the sort of task that is subject to analysis and sound decisions as to the level and nature of effort that is necessary. We believe that the outcome would be a substantial

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increase in the effectiveness of the military programs of our Allies, while charting more accurately the requirement for U.S. military assistance to a realistic level.

5. Our proposed policy will help stabilize the economy of the Free World, by stabilizing the cost of defense and providing a confident political atmosphere for economic development.

We believe that the total U.S. military effort through the years will depend largely on two factors somewhat apart from the specifics of formal U.S. foreign policy. One is the continuing public realization that the U.S. may have to defeat the Soviet Union in war, which acts to raise the level of military expenditures. The other, which acts to lower these expenditures is, of course, the desire for lower taxes.

The relation between national income, defense expenditures, taxation and budgetary deficits is both complex and controversial. Task Force "B" has not considered that attempts at precise estimates of these interrelated magnitudes would be a useful feature of its presentation.

Whatever our defense necessities, they must be met. We agree with Task Forces "A" and "C" that the upper limit on the ability of the United States to bear the costs of defense and of a minimum civilian economy in case of ultimate need, is not the danger of national bankruptcy but the capacity to produce gross national product. Whatever the evils of inflation, whatever the economic problems involved in efforts to control it, these cannot be weighed in the same scales with the grave danger to our national survival.

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We do not contend that our policy will enable Free World defense expenditures in the long term to be reduced from present levels, but we do contend that it will stabilize defense requirements, furnish a better basis for public understanding of them, and above all provide a framework for most rewarding expenditure of the money that is in fact made available.

Meanwhile, by diminishing the element of fear in individual countries, our proposed policy would provide a necessary foundation for improving the political confidence and stability upon which economic strength and progress in these countries so largely depend.

By the elimination of peripheral war as a direct threat to the security of the United States, the strategic significance of East-West trade may be reduced. Noting the frictions caused by the present stern U.S. policy on trading with the Soviet Bloc, we believe this to be a point of some importance to the U.S. position of leadership over the years. We think Allied demands on the U.S. economy might be reduced, while increasing Allied respect for the remaining trade restrictions.

6. Soviet reaction to our proposed policy.

a. They will most probably adopt a defensive posture.

Our policy will present obvious propaganda possibilities to the U.S.S.R., which must be overcome by a vigorous effort to make clear its defensive nature. We believe the Soviet rulers themselves will see that it is defensive, and threatens them only if their Bloc persists in aggression.

Since they are not willing (we believe) to face general war with the present imbalance in atomic capabilities, and in order to make it

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appear that the Soviet military posture is also defensive, they will neither precipitate nor support any new military aggression, at least before this imbalance is corrected to their satisfaction.

b. The Soviet economy will not adjust quickly to meet our policy, or derive any particular economic advantage from it.

Soviet economic capabilities are probably developing somewhat more rapidly than our own although not spectacularly so. No U.S. policy affords the possibility of altering significantly this somewhat greater rate of Soviet economic growth. We believe, however, that during the next decade the economic strength of the U.S.S.R. will not nearly attain parity with that of the U.S., nor will the relative economic position of the U.S.S.R. vis-a-vis the U.S. improve to a degree involving an unacceptable risk to the U.S.

If the U.S. makes it clear that any war which would be fought would be a general war, it can be expected that the U.S.S.R. will shift more of its economic resources into preparation for this type of war than would otherwise be the case. However, much of their conventional military strength is needed in any case to keep their subject peoples quiet. Moreover, traditional Russian reliance on large land armies will act as a brake on such a readjustment.

There is no reason to believe that total Soviet expenditures for war preparation will be reduced. The elimination of peripheral wars by the U.S. will, however, rob Moscow of the advantage it now possesses in being able to use the resources of a subordinate country in war against the U.S.

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while conserving Russian resources.

c. As further expansion is made more risky by a U.S. policy which clearly defines the retaliatory threat of general war, Soviet leadership must reckon with the latent risk of losing control over its own masses in a war which would bring destruction directly upon them.

In time, without peripheral wars to confuse the issue, we believe the defensive purpose of U.S. policy will become clear to the people inside the Iron Curtain, as well as to their rulers. Indeed we do not reject the possibility that there will ultimately evolve in the Soviet Union a government permanently inclined to avoid the risk of aggression.

Such, in brief, are our views on the probable effects of our policy.

7. We were instructed, further, to examine its probable effects in the face of three stated Soviet courses of action.

Our report on that examination is the following.

a. Should the Soviet Bloc seek a military decision with the West at any time and resort to war, the recommended policy would find the Free World best prepared to conduct a general war (for reasons we have previously discussed), and with a lead in the development and production of atomic weapons until some time in the future when both sides reach the age of atomic plenty. Thus, the sooner the Soviet Bloc initiates general war the less its chance of victory.

b. Should the Soviet Bloc maintain, at some risk of general war, aggressive pressure, continuously or interspersed with "peace offensives",



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the recommended policy would:

(1) Ensure that Soviet aggressive pressures would not result in draining the strength of the Free World in a succession of "Koreas", because general war would result from any Soviet military aggression.

(2) Act as the strongest possible deterrent to Soviet military aggression for the longest period of time.

(3) Call for a Free World posture of readiness for general war whether the Soviet Bloc was in an aggressive or temporarily placatory mood.

c. Should the Soviet Bloc accept a defensive posture in order to consolidate its present position and encourage the divisive forces of the Free World, the proposed policy would give best assurance that the United States would maintain effective military strength because its firm tone of warning will require preparedness.

VI. HAZARDS AND WEAKNESSES

As instructed, we have examined Alternative "B" for its inherent weaknesses. We can report that we find none which would rule it out as an effective and workable basic U.S. policy. In all cases, we have found the countervailing arguments satisfactory as they are set forth throughout this presentation. /

There are, of course, hazards inherent in the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which are not eliminated by Alternative "B", although we believe they are reduced.

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In addition, there will be difficulties in implementing Alternative "B" which will require great care and forceful leadership. We do not believe that the total of such difficulties exceeds that of any alternative, basic U.S. policy designed to give positive protection to the national security.

Listed here are those hazards and sources of difficulty which we consider to have enough significance to merit bringing to your attention.

1. Alternative "B" depends on the warning, or threat if you wish, of a war of mass destruction. We have discounted the possibility that the Kremlin will deliberately accept or even gravely risk such a war, but we do not deny that the possibility exists, and may increase with the inevitable growth of the Soviet atomic capability.

2. Alternative "B" places in the hands of Soviet satellites, and also of U.S. allies, a more potent capability than before, at least ostensibly, for bringing on a general war. We rate this danger low, but not at zero.

3. U.S. allies may feel that Alternative "B" destroys their dignity as independent nations by reducing them to the role of satellites. They may fear that through inexperience and impetuosity the U.S. may plunge them into a war for the destruction of the Soviet regime, rather than being primarily concerned with helping prevent their being overrun in a war. On the other hand, they may seize on our announcement as an excuse for slackening their own defense efforts. The result in either case would be a weakening of present Free World alliances.

4. Alternative "B" imposes on U.S. policy an unaccustomed rigidity,

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and this may create difficult problems in U.S. relationships with the Free World. We believe, however, that the U.S. must decide on some geographical limit beyond which Soviet-Communist power cannot be permitted to expand by force of arms. Our best estimate, on balance, is that the limit has already been reached. We believe further that necessary rigidity in this one respect by no means rules out a great deal of flexibility in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in all of its other aspects.

5. The policy may not be given full and unwavering support by the people of this country. In this case, the results could be most unfortunate. We recognize the demands that may be placed on leadership to prevent this.

VII. IMPLEMENTATION

The tactics of policy implementation must of course be conditioned by circumstances as they exist at the time. In the case of a major addition to current U.S. foreign policy the steps best designed to put it into force with the desired impact would necessarily require decisions by the Chief Executive that cannot now be forecast except in very general terms.

It could turn out, for example, given a truce in Korea, that in order to stabilize the situation the President may find it necessary to announce that if hostilities are renewed, he will ask the Congress to recognize the real enemy and to approve the kind of warning inherent in Alternative "B". Even with a stable situation, some such action may be necessary to permit the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. In either case, Alternative "B" would be launched, at least in part, and further implementing action could

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could proceed from that fact. However, this is speculative, and we have thought it best to outline for you a rather straightforward series of supporting actions which looks best to our group in the circumstances of today as we understand them.

1. It seems to us very important that the new policy be set forth, and followed up, in terms which emphasize that a decisive step has been taken; that U.S. policy now has a dramatic difference in substance. To indicate why we stress this point, we might note that the U.S. public has now forgotten, and the world therefore presumably largely disregards, a Presidential statement of only 3 years ago this month: "that those who have it in their power to unlease or withhold acts of armed aggression must realize that new recourse to aggression in the world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace."

2. To have the desired effect on the rulers of the U.S.S.R., and on the Free World as well, it will be essential to drive home the point that the U.S. stands solidly behind its proclamation.

A joint resolution of Congress will be the most powerful means of making this point. We therefore believe that such a resolution should be an early step, perhaps the first step, in putting the policy into force.

3. It is important to attract the maximum of support from our allies. Informal diplomatic discussions with them, particularly Canada, Britain and France, should be a part of the program for obtaining the most favorable climate for the policy. It will also have to be explained and defended in the U.N. This is not to imply that it is subject to the veto either of our

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4. There will be numerous corollary actions which may be taken to make the policy more attractive to the nations of the Free World. If, for example, it were the U.S. intention to permit expanding the area of atomic cooperation with the British, or to relax certain restrictions on East-West trade, such moves could be exploited to enlist support for the policy.

5. It may well be possible also to accompany the announcement of the policy with other actions which will help produce the desired effect on the rulers of the U.S.S.R., or at least make it more difficult for Soviet propaganda to attack it. An offer to reopen negotiations with the U.S.S.R. for the settlement of certain outstanding issues would be an obvious example.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Such is the case for Alternative "B" as we have conceived it. A fitting conclusion might be to note again that it could have been developed differently.

We chose to develop into it the maximum of flexibility, still keeping the fundamental of the clear warning of general war as the primary deterrent to further armed aggression. This, we believe is a logical concept.

The American people have come a long way during the last dozen years toward accepting the great global responsibility of the United States. We believe that the additional step represented by Alternative "B" will seem to them a realistic move in living up to this responsibility; to bring the full power of this country into play for safeguarding its own security, and for maintaining peace in the world.

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