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A REPORT
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



by
TASK FORCE "A"
of
PROJECT SOLARIUM

on
A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT
PRESENTLY OR IN THE FUTURE UNDERTAKE WITH RESPECT
TO THE SOVIET POWER BLOC - ALTERNATIVE "A"

16 July 1953
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Agency Case
NLE Case <u>MR 92-1841</u>
By <u>DJH</u> NLE Date <u>2/23/83</u>

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PREFACE



Pursuant to PROJECT SOLARIUM OUTLINE, 1 June 1953, we, the members of Task Force A, submit under this cover the written report called for under Section I, paragraph 3.

In submitting this report, we would wish it to be noted that both limitations of time and considerations of security made it impossible for us to conduct our inquiry with the thoroughness which many of the subjects demand, or to give to these subjects the exhaustive group study that would have been in order in other circumstances. While certain of the available governmental documents were of great value to us, we have had to rely extensively on peculiar knowledge and judgment of individual members of the group in individual fields of experience.

We entered upon this assignment with varying backgrounds and ideas concerning the U.S. policies called for by present world conditions. In the course of our studies and deliberations, however, we have increasingly found ourselves in agreement upon the basic solutions which our situation demands. As a result we are able to present the attached report with the comment that it does reflect our common conclusions.

Although originally undertaken as part of an exercise in the advocacy of a cause, over the selection of which the group had no influence, the

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report has been written in terms of honest and conscientious evaluation of the elements of the problem. Its contents may be taken in this respect as a sincere expression of our views.



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George F. Kennan, Chairman

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I - THE TASK

1. Task Force A understands its task to be: To study, develop, evaluate, and present a course of national policy designed to cope with the Soviet threat, and falling within the framework of present general policy directives.

2. Task Force A considers its task differentiated from those of the other Task Forces in that it would not be at liberty to sponsor and advocate any course of action which would drastically alter the present basis of U.S. policy.

3. In the definition of Alternative A, it was envisaged that the policy of the U.S. would be:

a. To maintain over a sustained period armed forces to provide for the security of the United States and to assist in the defense of vital areas of the free world;

b. To continue to assist in building up the economic and military strength and cohesion of the free world; and

c. Without materially increasing the risk of general war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviets and their satellites by political, economic, and psychological measures.

4. It was indicated that these three points should be understood "as elaborated more fully in NSC 153."

5. Task Force A has studied carefully the above language, plus the provisions of NSC 153/1, with a view to ascertaining in what degree this material presents a policy sufficiently specific to be measured in terms

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of its probable results. It has arrived at the conclusion that there are areas in which significant improvements in performance could be made within the framework of the policy directives contained in NSC 153/1. In evaluating this alternative, therefore, the Task Force has considered itself at liberty to examine not only what has been and is being done under this directive but also what could be done within the framework of its provisions.

6. In order to carry out this approach, it is necessary first to take a glance at the major outlines of our international situation as of today, and then to review our program to date and possibilities for improvement in terms of the accomplishment of specific objectives of U.S. policy. The following sections of this report are drawn up to conform with this pattern.

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II - THE SITUATION BEFORE US

1. The alternative we are asked to examine and evaluate is one designed to deal with what we call the Soviet threat without unduly increasing the threat of general war.

2. It would be well to begin this discussion by an attempt to assess in broad terms what this threat consists of.

3. During World War II the western powers, feeling this to be necessary in the interests of the prosecution of the war against Germany and Japan, were obliged to accept the advance of Soviet military power to the center of Europe and to its extension eastward to a line that placed it in control of Manchuria and northern Korea. At the same time, active participation by the communists in the resistance movements in east and west (again with western tolerance and support) greatly increased the capabilities of communist elements for making trouble in areas beyond the zones of Soviet military occupation and for capitalizing, in particular, on the social unrest that naturally and invariably follows on any great military conflict.

4. Heartened by these events, by the crushing of the power of its two leading enemies, Germany and Japan, and by the rapid dismantling of American military strength after termination of hostilities, the Kremlin was encouraged to believe that a favorable moment had come for the extension of its dominant influence to the entire Eurasian land mass.

5. The result of this was a Soviet post-hostilities policy arrogantly contemptuous of western feelings and interests, exclusive and vengeful in the areas overrun by Soviet forces, uncollaborative, secretive and



disingenuous in the handling of questions relating to the defeated enemies, as in the deliberations of the United Nations. This was a policy animated among other things by a jealous desire to see the U.S. expelled from participation in European and Asian affairs, discredited in the eyes of the world, and powerless to impede the accomplishment of Soviet purposes.

6. The lines by which the Kremlin proposed to pursue its purposes were many and diverse. They do not appear, in retrospect, to have included the launching of a military attack by the Soviet forces on U.S. forces anywhere, or on the territory of western Europe. They did include practically every other conceivable device.

7. These Soviet hopes were largely frustrated in the immediate post-war years in Europe and the Middle East. Instead of expanding the area of direct Soviet control, it became necessary in each of these areas to accept certain retractions of it.

8. In Europe, the actual retraction was primarily the result of the fact that Soviet political frontiers had been permitted to overrun in certain instances the Soviet military frontiers. This represented an over-extension of Soviet power (Finland and Yugoslavia) which soon corrected itself by the force of circumstances.

9. The initial frustration of Soviet designs for extension of its dominant influence to other areas of Europe was largely the result of the fact that the U.S. soon became alarmed by Soviet post-war policies and took energetic steps, beginning in 1947, to encourage resistance to them on the part of the western European peoples.



10. These steps, the most important of which were the Marshall Plan, NATO, the revival of independent political life in western-controlled Germany, and the demonstration of western determination in the Berlin blockade, were sufficient to frustrate Soviet political designs in western Europe. By 1948, the strength of communist elements began to decline everywhere in western Europe except Italy. With them declined the Soviet hopes of gaining dominant influence over the western European area by political means at that juncture.

11. This western victory, however, was accomplished only at a cost. Part of this cost was the long-term involvement of the U.S. in a series of continuing military and economic aid relationships with the countries of western Europe. These relationships, while basically useful and necessary, had many disadvantages. They were humiliating to one party and annoying to the other. They tended to tax the pride and undermine the self-reliance of the recipients, while placing heavy demands on the understanding and patience of the donor. They were constantly raising painful questions and comparisons as to precise amounts and reciprocal contributions -- straining at every turn the relations of the parties -- providing fertile material for demagogues on both sides of the water. The second part of the cost was that the Kremlin, frustrated on the political plane and suspicious of the ultimate trends of western policy, fell back increasingly (1948-49) on a policy of determined rearmament (exploiting here to good effect the technological and economic resources of the new areas under its control in eastern and central Europe), and at the same time switched the emphasis of



its political interest to the Far East.

12. Here, the problem of promoting indigenous resistance to Communist pressures was more complicated and less promising, from the American standpoint. China, weakened by social upheavals and by years of Japanese occupation, succumbed rapidly to the disciplined, determined Communist element in its midst. (In the resulting soul-searching concerning the degree of U.S. responsibility, this development probably did more to tax the internal unity of this country than any external event in its history.) Anti-colonial resistance in Indo-China, where the French hold had also been weakened by Japanese occupation, provided a further fertile field for Communist intrigue and support. This resistance drew new strength from the Communist triumph in China, and it proved generally beyond the capacity of the French to eliminate. It became increasingly evident, with the years, that the outcome of this struggle for Indo-China might prove decisive for the political future of most of southeast Asia, by virtue of which fact it acquired a symbolical significance far outstripping its actual local importance. Finally, there was the series of events in Korea, with which we are all familiar, ending in a frustrating and costly involvement of U.S. forces and, again, straining seriously the patience and understanding of the U.S. public.

13. We must note here that Soviet purpose in Asia have been very much aided by the existence of powerful indigenous sources of restlessness and resentment against the West through the Asiatic world and the underdeveloped countries generally. These feelings are compounded of many factors, including racial feeling, anti-colonial sentiment, a sense of frustration and



bitterness among the western-educated elements in these countries, breakdown of old social patterns by modern technology, rising nationalistic feeling, and a demand for rapid social and economic change on a basis of national independence. These are all factors that exist independently of Soviet doing, but they have been ably and effectively exploited by the Communists everywhere.

14. In addition to all this, great and cumulative uneasiness has been produced in the U.S. during recent years by the increasing evidence that the Soviet Union in addition to maintaining conventional armaments of formidable dimensions, is developing a strong capability in the field of weapons of mass destruction, a capability which means that within a few years' time, if this process continues unimpeded, the Soviet leaders will presumably have it in their power to inflict massive damage on the cities, industries and facilities of this country and its major allies, though presumably not without suffering retaliation in kind.

15. From these conditions there emerge quite clearly the elements of what we call the Soviet threat.

16. The first of these is the development of a strong and dangerous military posture on the part of the Soviet Union, in the service of a political leadership we have learned to recognize as hostile, resentful of American power, dedicated to aims incompatible with our security. It is important to note that the threatening quality of this military posture does not derive from any overt threats uttered by the Soviet leaders or from any certain evidence of any probable intent on their part to launch a major war with these forces in the immediate future. It arises from the strength and disposition of these forces,

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coupled with the attitude of the political leaders by which they are controlled and above all their ideological commitment to the destruction of Western Capitalism in processes which involve at some point the use of violence.

17. Closely linked with this is the Soviet position of predominance in Eastern and Central Europe: A position which not only makes impossible the restoration of normal conditions and full stability in Europe as a whole but which also has contributed extensively, through both its technological and geographic resources, to the development of precisely the military posture we find disturbing.

18. The third element of the threat is the possibility that further nations will be brought under Communist control through the effective operations of indigenous Communist factions, acting with or without overt support from Moscow. We must note that the possibility for this sort of development exists almost exclusively, as of today, on the continent of Asia, but with menacing implications for the future stability of Africa and other areas further afield.

19. From these elements of the Soviet threat there flow what seem to us to be the obvious practical objectives of U.S. policy.

20. First of all, we must do what we can to assure the security of our country in the light of the Soviet military posture. This seems to us to involve a program which achieves a reasonable and realistic balance between a number of important, and sometimes competing, requirements for our armed forces, among which might be mentioned: their deterrent effect on the Soviets, their value as reassurance to our allies, their effectiveness from the

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standpoint of initial defense and retaliatory action in case general war should develop, their value as a platform for rapid mobilization in the case of general war, and the extent to which they help us to achieve some measure of real protection against the disaster of an eventual atomic attack.

21. The second objective is the prevention of further Soviet expansion through seizure of additional countries by local Communist minorities. We should note that this is by far the most likely pattern in the threatened Asiatic area. The overt use of Soviet forces for this purpose is highly unlikely. The possibility of the use of Chinese Communist forces in any offensive across international borders also may, in our opinion, have been somewhat overrated. Except for Korea, Chinese Communist support of local communist movements seems more likely to remain on the military supply and training level.

22. The third U.S. objective which flows logically from the nature of the threat is the reduction of the area under Soviet control, first and foremost in the satellite area in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to that, it must be a long-term ^{aim of} / the U.S. to bring about a situation in which China would no longer be dominated by a regime allied with Moscow in a framework of ideology hostile to this country.

23. Beyond this, there is the general repugnance of our people to the Soviet philosophy and method of government - a repugnance which of course causes people to wish that this power might be eliminated and replaced by something else throughout the entire Soviet Union. This leads to frequent demands that the destruction of Soviet power per se be considered a major

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objective of U.S. policy, even in peacetime.

24. It should be noted that, in the struggle over these various elements of the Soviet threat, there has been, contrary to a fairly widespread popular impression, no very drastic advantage to one side or the other, in sum total, over the past few years, with the single exception of China. Otherwise, Communist power has not expanded territorially since the recent war, and in some areas of Europe and the Middle East it has actually receded to some extent. While the Soviet military posture has been growing and has recently come to include an atomic capability, the Western coalition is in a better position with relation to Soviet power today than it was two or three years ago. This, however, refers only to the visible net balance. Under the surface, the recent period has seen changes of major significance for the future of the East-West conflict.

25. First of all, the last couple of years have witnessed a marked decline in the confidence with which the U.S. is viewed in a great many parts of the non-Communist world. The extent and seriousness of this deterioration of our relations with some of our allies and with the major European neutrals has probably not yet been fully appreciated in this country. If unchecked, this trend can well undo a great deal of what has been achieved in the way of unity within the non-Communist world.

26. At the same time, in very recent months, developments have been noted in the Soviet Orbit which have a somewhat comparable effect in weakening Moscow's range of influence, and which are, in their entirety, of the greatest importance. It is plain that the death of Stalin has not left a

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stable situation with respect to the top leadership of the Soviet Union. The absence of any institutional framework for legitimatizing supreme personal power leaves open the possibility of still further deterioration of unity within the Soviet regime. This internal instability within the Soviet Union has been accompanied by (and has probably in part produced) a marked restlessness among the satellite peoples. We can conclude that the state of mind of the satellite leaders must today be one of great confusion and uncertainty. Furthermore, in the immediate months following Stalin's death there were signs of serious changes in Soviet policies, in the direction of seeking the reduction of internal and external tensions. While these new policies may change with evolutions in the rivalries of the top leaders, they are signs of a high state of instability and unclarity in the workings of Soviet power.

27. Plainly, both of these developments reflect the reduction of the element of bipolarity that has characterized the world situation since 1945 and the rise to new vigor and self-assertion of numerous forces between the American and Soviet centers of power. This need not in itself be worrisome to us, but only on the condition that our approach to these rising forces is a wise and effective one.

28. All of these considerations point to a situation in which crucial importance may attach to the courses of action the U.S. Government adopts in this immediately forthcoming period. It is evident that this is a time for the greatest of prudence and penetration in the selection of the lines of conduct which this Government pursues, and for a clear identification

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and strict observance of the basic realities of the situation. Whether these qualities are or are not achieved in the formulation of American policy, represents in our opinion a large part of the answer to the question as to whether time is on our side.

29. The members of Task Force A are struck with the fact that there is one single factor which is essential to the successful pursuit of all our objectives with regard to Soviet power: that is the political climate of the non-Communist world, and particularly its response to American policies and initiatives. No adequate U.S. military posture seems possible, except at great and exorbitant expense, unless it assumes and embraces the collaboration and support of a number of our allies in the Free World. The trend of the struggle against Communism in the key undecided areas of Asia is extremely sensitive to the feelings of people everywhere about the quality of American leadership and the wisdom of American policies. Even the problem of the strength of Soviet control in the Satellite areas is deeply affected by what people feel to be the alternative to Soviet power — by the question, that is, as to whether there exists a non-Communist world marked by such things as unity and confidence and mutual respect, into which the Satellite peoples could eventually move. Finally, even a great part of the rationale of Soviet power within the Soviet Union rests on the thesis that the Western powers are greedy and blind and disunited, bound eventually to fall out among themselves and to make a mess of things in those areas in which their influence is felt. To the extent this thesis is to be effectively disproved, Soviet ideology comes under heavy strain.

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30. This being the case, the members of Task Force A see as a first and indispensable requirement of U.S. policy the repair and cultivation of our own relations with the governments of the non-Communist world generally and the promotion of an atmosphere of confidence and purposefulness and hope throughout this area. They note that any U.S. policy directed toward the reduction of the Soviet threat which does not take into account this need and which has the opposite effect -- namely of causing anxiety, discouragement and paralysis of will generally among the non-Communist governments -- is self-defeating. They note that this last applies particularly to policies which create the impression either that the U.S. wants general war, or sees no other alternative, or believes it inevitable. A similar effect is produced if the impression is conveyed to others that the basic aim of U.S. policies is to destroy Soviet power by direct American effort, for people feel that in this case the Soviet leaders, who were not born yesterday, will fight at some point before they permit this to be done to them.

31. Three principles appear to the members of Task Force A to flow from this analysis of the situation.

First, the U.S. must avoid pursuing its policies in such a way as to give the impression that it is pursuing in time of peace aims which have essentially a wartime objective: namely, the complete destruction or unconditional surrender of the enemy. Accordingly, we must see to it that our negotiating positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union appear sincere and reasonable, and that U.S. power appears everywhere as power for peace.

Secondly, the U.S. must take great pains to create an impression of



steadiness and reliability in the formulation and implementation of its foreign policy. This means that special emphasis must be laid both on discipline and unity of approach within the widespread ramifications of our governmental establishment, and also that shifts of purpose or emphasis must be carefully prepared and effected smoothly and gradually, avoiding every indication of abruptness or erratic behavior.

Third, the positive emphasis of U.S. policy must be placed on the strengthening of the American position with the countries of the non-Communist world and the creation generally within the non-Communist area of an atmosphere of confidence and hope. These efforts should not be openly related in each case to the winning of the cold war, but should be addressed in good faith primarily to basic and long-term problems of the non-Communist world -- problems, many of which would exist in important degree even if there were no Soviet Union. This does not preclude, or weaken the need for, military aid to provide reassurance against any attempt on the Soviet part to exploit their strong military position; but it means we must not permit the emphasis given these military programs to overshadow the positive undertakings.

32. In the succeeding sections of this report, an attempt is made to relate these principles to specific problems and to explain where and how their application could be beneficial to the purposes of our national policy.



III - COURSES OF ACTION FOR U.S. POLICY

FOREWORD

1. On the basis of its analysis, Task Force A has concluded that the present position of the U.S. and the rest of the Free World is basically sounder and more powerful than that of the Soviet-Communist Orbit. Furthermore, Task Force A believes that, with the wise and flexible application of the integrated national strategy which it proposes, this basic advantage can be maintained and exploited to bring about the diminution of Soviet-Communist external influence until it ceases to be a substantial threat to peace and security. Task Force A is well aware that, in terms of specific actions, there have been many contradictory aspects and seriously imperfect manifestations in the grand strategy that has been pursued by the U.S. since 1947. However, there have also been a number of moves by the Kremlin, arising from the miscalculations, inflexibilities, and tensions inherent in the Soviet system, which have hurt its position and aided ours.

2. Task Force A has further concluded that the broad design and intent of our strategy should, with certain clear changes in emphasis and execution, be carried on into the future. The Task Force believes we have reached a critical point in the application of our strategy, and in the Soviet situation, which should mark a phase line. We believe the U.S. should move forward from this phase line to rectify imperfections in our strategy and to give it a greater content of constructive confidence and boldness. We need to recapture essential flexibility, to effect better integration and cohesion within our strategy, and to improve its

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implementation. Task Force A believes that if such steps are taken, the more important of which are outlined below, the pursuit by the U.S. of this revised strategy will give the greatest assurance as against other possible alternatives for the successful disintegration of the Soviet threat without recourse to general war.

3. The two great questions which becloud this and any other judgment as to the best course to assure the future security of our country are what will be the result of the atomic armaments race and how will national societies react when the two greatest powers on earth each has it within its capacity to wreak massive destruction upon the other. No one, as we have said earlier in this report, can answer these questions conclusively. The best that can be done in their regard is: to maintain a strong, resolute and effective military posture; to work steadfastly and unafraid toward positive, constructive goals in our own country and throughout the Free World; and above all to keep the constancy and determination in our policy which may be required for many years.

4. Task Force A believes the U.S. is today in a position to assume the strategic offensive in its conflicts with Soviet-Communism. The death of Stalin and the strains this event have imposed on the Soviet system; the flaring up of overt opposition and deep resentments in the Soviet Satellites and Eastern Germany; what appears to be a growing stature of Red China vis-a-vis Russia; and a number of other current circumstances seem to indicate that the Soviet oligarchy is at least tactically off balance. The numerous concessions by the Soviets, whatever their motivation, to the



appearance of relaxation on points of tension they have previously created, provides a good context within which the U.S. and the rest of the Free World can move boldly and with assurance to exploit the current Soviet tactic or unmask it.

5. Earlier in this report we have mentioned the great stirrings of dissatisfaction, of rising aspirations, and of intense nationalism among so many of the national groupings throughout the Free World. This so-called socio-economic revolution exists quite apart from Soviet-Communism, but it is an inchoate force which, if not recognized and taken account of, can seriously weaken Free World strength and cohesion. It cannot be treated by opposition or negation. The Communists exploit it. We must help guide its forces toward mutual benefit and strength for all the Free World.

6. Task Force A believes, therefore, that our new strategy must be constructive, and its boldness and assurance should manifest itself most in actions aimed at the creation of common purpose and the resolution of weaknesses and divisive tendencies within the Free World -- steps which can best be initiated during a lull, slight though it be, in tensions between us and the Soviets. Such emphasis must, however, depend on adequate and equally confident policies and actions on our part to perfect and maintain the military posture and economic strength fundamental to our national strategy. It in no way precludes, but instead encourages, effective actions designed further, without risking war, to increase the stresses and strains showing up in the Soviet system.

7. On the basis of our evaluation of the current stage in the

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development of our strategy and of our situation vis-a-vis Soviet-Communist activities, Task Force A has phrased the following as our statement of the objectives of U.S. policy with regard to the U.S.S.R.:

"With the assistance of Allies to achieve through progressive steps and without undue risk of war, but recognizing that the threat of war must not inhibit our unfolding courses of action, a stop to Soviet expansion; the diminution and progressive retraction of Soviet control over its east European Satellites and Red China; the discrediting of Soviet power and Communist ideology as effective instruments of Soviet foreign policy; and a maximum contribution to the increase in internal stresses and conflicts within the Soviet system; to the end that the Soviet rulers will be forced to accept the necessity of adjusting their objectives to those of peaceful co-existence with the Free World."

8. Task Force A envisages our integrated national strategy, aimed at achieving this objective, as comprising policies and actions in three major fields, all interacting and interrelated, as follows:

a. Those within and primarily concerning the United States itself;

b. Those involving the rest of the Free World, wherein are included those nations actively allied with us in opposing Soviet-Communism and those "neutralist" nations who want primarily to achieve or consolidate their independence without declaring themselves actively in opposition to Soviet-Communism; and

c. Those primarily aimed at the Soviet-Communist system itself.

9. In succeeding sections, which cover the three major fields just described and which follow generally the breakdown of U.S. objectives in paragraph 8 (page 3) of NSC 153/1, the Task Force sets forth its analysis of, comments upon, and changes in our present courses of action which it believes will give our national security policy a new character, coherence,

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and direction, make it more positive and constructive, rectify serious deficiencies which now threaten its effectiveness, and add a bold and confident tone. The result should be, if these courses are well implemented, to assure greatest progress toward our objectives of debilitating the Soviet-Communist threat to the point where it will no longer be a matter of concern, and of creating a stable Free World.

A. MAINTENANCE OF U.S. STRENGTH

1. The portion of NSC 153/1 containing courses of action pertinent to the above heading is concerned almost entirely with maintenance of military strength since our economic and political courses are covered under later sections of the policy. It is the maintenance of military strength that is discussed in this section of our report.

2. As a preliminary step in examining our military policy, Task Force A considered a large number of factors and problems which underlie the necessity for a strong U.S. military position and which set the dimensions for any realistic policy. The Task Force believes that a summary of its thinking on these matters may be useful to readers of this report and includes some of its considerations in the following sections.

3. The Risk of General War

a. The Task Force considers that the Soviet Union, under its present leadership, is unlikely to initiate general war, unless:

(1) It is convinced that war will materially contribute to its aims abroad and will not materially jeopardize the security and stability of the Soviet system within the U.S.S.R., and, in addition, is convinced that

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Soviet aims abroad can no longer be successfully pursued by means short of war, or

(2) It is convinced that its internal security is immediately and gravely threatened by Western action and that the regime's chances of surviving this threat will best be served by seizing the initiative and attacking first.

b. The Task Force thinks either of these possibilities unlikely so long as the U.S. maintains a strong military posture, but both must be guarded against with vigilance and constancy.

c. It is possible, but not probable, that the Kremlin might deliberately initiate general war as a result of a Soviet estimate that the world power balance was about to shift decidedly and irretrievably to the disadvantage of the Soviet Orbit.

d. There is a continuing possibility that general war may result through miscalculation, or through an unfolding chain of circumstances in which neither side desired war but in which both felt impelled to pursue certain courses culminating in war. The prestige of a great power is an important element in the equation of international affairs. There is an indefinable but certainly existing line beyond which a great power cannot be pressed without grave danger of its resorting to military action. Put another way, we should not press the enemy too hard against a closed door unless we are prepared for and willing to accept the possible consequences. We believe that the Soviet Union understands this also.

e. General war could be initiated in any of several ways and our

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military and other preparations must take account of possibilities other than a surprise attack on the U.S. These possibilities include:

(1) Some obvious augmentation and redeployment of Soviet forces to better positions of readiness to initiate an attack. Such measures might conceivably be a part of the Soviet program of political warfare with the Soviet decision as to initiation of general war deferred until the reaction of the Western powers could be appraised. When the Soviet Union achieves a considerable capability for massive destruction (which will be soon), its ability to use military power as a negotiating instrument in political warfare will be improved and times of tension will be more dangerous.

(2) It is conceivable that general war might grow out of peripheral war, initiated either directly by Soviet forces, or by satellite or Communist China forces. Or general war might grow out of disturbances in the satellites which drew aid from other countries both inside and outside the Iron Curtain and which moved progressively to some sort of showdown situation between the U.S. and Russia.

4. The Calculated Risk that War Will Not Occur

a. Since we conclude that the risk of war is not high, we have examined the soundness of a course of action which accepts the calculated risk that the Soviet Union will resort to war, and reduces our defense establishment accordingly. The acceptance of such a risk would obviously establish a different and less costly basis for our military program. But the present risk of war is low only because the U.S. and its Allies have already

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built and are building further forces able to meet Soviet forces. The most likely invitation to aggression would seem to be a return to weakness such as that which resulted from the hasty demobilization of our military power after World War II.

b. If we accept the risk, suggested above, and changed our military policy accordingly, there would result a growing lack of confidence on the part of countries in the in-between world, an increasing temptation for the Soviet-Communists to engage in peripheral war and internal communist aggression since no ultimate sanction existed against them, and the elimination of most of our reasoned hopes for rolling back Soviet communism in the coming years.

c. Task Force A therefore recommends that the U.S. Government continue to reject any policy based on acceptance of a calculated risk of general war, as being full of risk, empty of calculation, and unwarrantedly hazardous to the continued existence of the U.S.

5. Soviet Military Threat and the Leadtime in Military Preparedness

a. The high state of military readiness of the Soviet Union is so generally known that it needs no detailed discussion here. This readiness includes stockpiles of military equipment and supplies capable of maintaining major military operations for several months without material dependence on industry. The Soviet industrial complex is being developed so as to present minimum vulnerability to attack by the U.S. The growing Soviet atomic capability, together with the readiness of the Soviet Orbit's conventional forces and the ideological commitment of the Soviet regime to

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the establishment of a communist world order -- these constitute the Soviet military threat.

b. Task Force A believes that this military threat does not change with the ups and downs of political tensions; it is always there as a backdrop of Soviet political policy. Because of this situation of ready forces, the Soviet Union is able to shift tactics from hard to soft tactics and back again without being handicapped by the factor of leadtime of military preparations. This factor of leadtime has been, on the other hand, a major element influencing U.S. policy because of the long leadtime between decision and implementation of a U.S. program to move to a higher level of armament.

c. Our U.S. program may soon face the difficult test of a major shift toward "softness" in Soviet political tactics. Task Force A recommends that our military program continue to be related, in its basic elements, to Soviet military capabilities for general war and that it not become captive of the zigzags of Soviet political policy.

d. This element of leadtime for preparations applies not only to tangible military measures such as the building of active forces. It also applies to arrangements with allies which, as our NATO experience shows, take a long while to bring into being on an operationally effective basis.

6. Cost of Future General War

a. The objective of our military arrangements is stated in NSC 153/1 as including provision of "a reasonable initial defense and an adequate basis for victory, in the event general war is forced upon us."

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b. Because the maintenance of an adequate military position is costly, we have looked to the possible cost of a general war as a yardstick of what might constitute a reasonable sustained effort. The dollar is of course an inadequate measure of the cost of war but one of the few tangible ones we have. The current U.S. industrial mobilization plan provides for a possible impact on the U.S. economy of around a trillion dollars -- or 20 to 30 years of current expenditures. But there is no way to put a dollar sign on other costs such as the losses of millions of civilian lives and a substantial portion of residential and industrial construction which would result if the Soviet Union were able to make its atomic capability effective. In fact, if the U.S.S.R. were able to execute massive destruction on the U.S., our rough figure of a trillion dollars would probably prove very wrong because the productive capacity would not then be available to produce the goods to expand in the war effort. It seems certain that we would not, after a general war, recover our way of life in our time or perhaps that of our children. ?

c. Task Force A in its brief study of data on the U.S. industrial mobilization plan reached a tentative conclusion that the portion of the economy proposed for allocation to the war effort is too high to be realistic. It seems that the proposed industrial effort, coupled with personnel, operational, and other costs, might require up to a peak of 66% of the gross national product. This seems unlikely to be attained even in a struggle for survival. In showing the possible cost of a general war starting in the near future on Chart A1, we have used 52% of a national production

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which is not adjusted for any destruction by enemy atomic attack.

d. If the estimates now being used for industrial planning purposes in the government are materially different from likely reality, there are elements of our military program which may be affected. Some of these are the stockpiling of raw materials and semi-fabricated items, and the rate of mobilization of manpower. Task Force A recommends that the point raised here be checked by the responsible agencies and, if found to be valid, that programs be adjusted accordingly. Current build-up and maintenance costs, including inventories of finished items, may be affected.

7. The Question of Peripheral War

a. NSC 153/1 states, as one of the three objectives of our military strength, that we "deter or counter peripheral aggression wherever and whenever necessary for U.S. security."

b. The U.S. is now plagued by one costly peripheral aggression (Korea) and one internal communist aggression (Indo-China), both of which receive support from outside communist sources. The Indo-China situation contains major elements of a nationalist character.

c. Task Force A considers that the problem of peripheral war must be appraised on the basis of specifics rather than as a generality. We do not consider that the Chinese Communist regime is so subject to Moscow's dictation that peripheral aggression or support of internal communist disruption by the Chinese can always be interpreted as supported, or even encouraged, by Moscow. The Chinese are undoubtedly dependent on the Soviet Union for logistical support for major military operations but they are much

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less dependent, and in the future may have very little dependence, on the Soviet Union for minor military operations and for support of guerrilla activities.

d. There are only three nations which have boundaries in common with the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites and which are not now covered by a U.S. commitment of a sort implying general war in case of overt Soviet or satellite aggression. These states are Finland, Iran, and Afghanistan. As to the latter two, Task Force A considers that a formal U.S. guarantee to go to general war in case of Soviet attack would be most unwise since it would place the vital interests of the U.S. in the not always responsible hands of Iranian and Afghan leaders, perhaps even of tribal leaders in the northern areas. Task Force A is inclined to think that Soviet aggression, if it came at all in these peripheral areas, would be through internal dissension inspired by communism. We believe we should guard against exaggerating the probability of peripheral war clearly directed by Moscow. Peripheral war is becoming harder and more hazardous for the Kremlin leaders. These comments are not directly applicable to free areas contiguous to Red China. Moscow may not desire the rapid expansion of Chinese Communist power which might come from adoption by the Chinese of policies of peripheral aggression, but the increasing stature of the Peiping Government may lead to independent action which the U.S.S.R. would not wish to challenge. Recognizing the current situations in Korea and Indo-China, Task Force A believes peripheral war can be made increasingly unlikely in the near and mid-term future. To this end we recommend that U.S. efforts to prepare military,



political and psychological deterrents to peripheral aggression include:

(1) Considering the question of announcing that the U.S. will feel free to use atomic weapons in case of local aggression in the future (including violation of a truce in Korea), where their use against military forces and the bases of supply for such forces may be effective in saving the lives and property and protecting the territory of those experiencing aggression.

(2) Emphasizing the development of indigenous forces capable of maintaining internal order within countries which are likely targets.

8. Military Force as an Instrument of Policy

a. NSC 153/1 gives as the first of its three part objective for U.S. military strength that it "deter war". This approach makes the primary purpose of military power to be use of that power as an instrument of political policy. Military power is the background against which our other security policy is painted. It is necessary that the power be adequate and be designed in scope and readiness to be consistent with the needs of political policy; on the other hand, political policy must be continually related to the capabilities of military power as judged by friends and potential enemies.

b. Military power, if properly designed and built, is power to enforce our national will without resort to hostilities -- power for peace. But even this sort of military power is usually properly built only if designed to meet the variety of possible general war and peripheral war situations. Below the level of the top policy makers, most individuals



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involved in building this power naturally talk as if a war situation is certain to be upon us within the near future. That is the frame of the immediate responsibilities within which these individuals work. Most of these people are rightly not concerned in their business with such vital intangibles as deterrent effects on a possible enemy, persuasive effects on friends and enemies, strengthening of negotiators' voices so that they may win objectives without the use of force, and confidence building aspects which rally allies and strengthen the resolution of wavering neutrals.

c. There is, Task Force A feels, a need to generate increased public understanding of the deterrent value and the confidence building aspects of military power and to stress that the military arithmetic customarily used as a medium of presentation of this instrument of policy does not always give a complete, or even the important part of, the picture.

9. Summary of Current Policy on Maintaining Military Strength

a. NSC 153/1 (p. 5), after stating that the objectives of our military preparedness are: (a) to deter war, (b) to deter or counter peripheral aggression, and (c) to provide a reasonable initial defense and an adequate basis for victory in the event of general war, states ten courses of action for implementing this objective. We summarize these courses here for ready reference, noting that five of them are more exactly subordinate implementing programs for the others:

- (1) Develop and maintain capacity for massive damage on enemy war-making capacity
- (2) Emphasize continental defense

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- (3) Strengthen non-military defensive measures within U.S.
- (4) Maintain security of key areas outside the U.S.
- (5) Maintain superiority in quantity and quality of weapons
- (6) Develop military force
- (7) Continue limited mobilization
- (8) Provide reserve stocks
- (9) Provide industrial mobilization base
- (10) Provide internal security against sabotage, etc.

b. These courses of action are all stated in quantitative terms with, in certain cases, some indication of the quantitative aspect through use of an adjective or adverb. Task Force A considers all of these measures are necessary and does not consider that the Task Force is capable in the time available of producing better quantitative judgements than have been and are being provided as the result of many years of study by professionalized individuals in the government agencies concerned with these matters. We do, however, raise some questions in this report concerning those quantitative aspects. The Task Force recognizes that there are several important studies recently made or currently in process. We have drawn on some of these studies in connection with our analysis and include some of their recommendations in this report.

c. Task Force A considers the problem of continental defense, now being studied by another group under the direction of the NSC, as of particular importance and hence includes below a summary of some of its thoughts on this problem.



d. In examining the ten courses of action outlined above, the Task Force concluded that there were at least five other areas of military policy which deserve mention. These areas, in general, raise problems of integration of different components of our security policy. Hence they are perhaps the most difficult and, for the same reason, perhaps extremely important. After discussing continental defense, we will discuss these five areas: intelligence, basis for planning, manpower, the degree of dependence on allies, and the longer range development and maintenance of public support for needed military strength.

10. Continental Defense

a. Our Task Force believes that it will be necessary to commit resources not yet programmed for security purposes in order to build up the continental defenses of the U.S. rapidly. By reducing the damage the U.S.S.R. can inflict upon us, we can delay and perhaps prevent the development of a condition under which the Soviet Union could deal us a knockout blow. This makes our continental defense a program for reducing Soviet power and hence a powerful deterrent to war. It shields our retaliatory power and productive capacity, lends confidence to our people and allies, and gives strength to our posture in political negotiations.

b. There are three aspects of the continental defense program which concern us particularly and on which we are not sure that past and current studies give the best insight and guidance than can be obtained.

(1) There is the complicated internal military-political aspect of preparing to execute a policy of immediate all-out atomic war in

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case of enemy aggression against the U.S. As the Soviet capability increases during the coming years, our constitutional processes may somewhat inhibit a policy of immediate retaliatory action, particularly as general war may start through some process yet unimagined -- for example, an emotional unification of the western and eastern Germans which the Soviet Union tried to check by force.

(2) There is the external political-military aspect with particular reference to Western Europe, of the effect of Soviet possession of a massive destruction capability in time of tension approaching a war crisis.

(3) There is the danger of disruption in our civilian population some years from now in case of a rising tension with Russia which might result in mass exodus from target areas, absenteeism from industry, and similar possible occurrences. A strong continental and civilian defense will be an essential in meeting such a situation. But there will still be some disruption and the program for leadership through the echelons of government will need to be very carefully arranged. If we ever adopt a policy of issuing an atomic ultimatum to the Soviet Union, problems of the type just indicated will be upon us immediately.

c. Task Force A urges that studies of the atomic threat include attention to the problems just mentioned. Our program of action in these fields and that of continental defense may determine whether the U.S. ever faces the danger of something like a Free World Munich in a diplomatic showdown with the Soviet Union.

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11. Intelligence

a. The courses of action in NSC 153/1 do not include specific mention of intelligence. Like research and development, this is an area where relatively small costs may give us huge gains. Also like research and development, it requires constancy and high calibre personnel. Sound intelligence can contribute substantially to a reasoned basis for material shifts in size, composition and deployment of military forces and hence affect economic costs of the military effort. Furthermore, while wars are won or lost on the basis of capabilities, they are initiated as the result of a specific intent to resort to armed force. The degree of readiness of a potential aggressor is very important in estimating this intent. This degree of enemy readiness and the direction of his preparations are factors which should guide our state of readiness and level of capabilities. Intelligence and research and development are the two principal programs to give us both strength for the future and a basis for planning the most efficient utilization of the billions we have to commit to the security effort.

12. Basis for Future Planning

a. The U.S. is now entering an era of atomic plenty. Weapons of massive destruction are rapidly becoming standard for all three military services and the bottleneck in use of atomic weapons is not fissionable material but is rather in delivery vehicles for that material. In fact, unless we find other uses than in weapons for fissionable material, the time may come when the current rate of expenditure on operating our atomic

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industry as an arsenal will be no longer justified by military requirements.

b. The U.S. will move into another era in two to five years when the Soviets will also possess sufficient atomic weapons and carriers therefor to deliver a massive blow at the industrial and population centers of the U.S. and the remainder of the Free World. This era will change (although the change may not be too material a one) to a third period, when the Soviet Union also has atomic plenty and can employ tactical atomic weapons in any battle area. These rapid changes in the atomic arms race create a probability for a need for increasingly rapid changes in the military programs to carry out the courses of action stated in NSC 153/1. This rapid evolution in the field of security matters is such that material changes may occur during one cycle of the U.S. budgetary-legislative-arms-production process -- a cycle which is always at least three years long and may be eight or ten years long. The situation is further complicated by the natural tendency that vested interests and long-accepted plans and policies tend to get the priorities in governmental operations and in allocation of resources within the budget.

c. Task Force A raises a question as to whether our current programs are really moving so they cover the span of likely situations five to ten years from now and properly emphasize likely future situations. For instance, we question that our mobilization base program, both for industry and for manpower, is now consistent with the atomic threat as set forth in reports already presented to the National Security Council. We question that indicated changes arising from the use of special weapons are completely

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reflected through the logistical chain back to the mobilization base. These and similar questions are beyond our capacity to check. We recognize that many talented and responsible individuals are working on them in the various agencies from the agency standpoint.

d. We recommend that, if there is any possibility of our conjecture having a basis in fact, a new and hard over-all look be taken at the whole impact of special weapons on our security program (including the mobilization base, manpower reserves, civilian defense, etc.) from the standpoint of five or more years from now. Any such review, if it is to accomplish the purpose, would have to be done on a high level and using the best qualified personnel in the country.

13. Manpower ✓

a. NSC 153/1 contains no statement concerning human resources policy whereas at least three of the ten military sections apply themselves to industrial resources. Manpower is one of our most scarce national resources. Our huge security programs involve the employment of millions of individuals in the business. Many of them, from the top level through levels to include non-commissioned officers have to be dedicated professionals of high calibre. The profession of serving the security of the U.S. must compete with the civilian professions in recruiting and retaining top calibre personnel. Competition is stiff because of the great economic and other attractions of our presently high standard of civilian living. It is made stiffer by current indications that the prestige, economic security and respect for personal integrity previously associated with being a member of

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the Armed Forces, of the Foreign Service, or of other services in the security field, is lessening. Put bluntly, and over simply, the professional in this area of service to our country must have both a reasonable salary and, in lieu of more material recompense, at least feel a status which recognizes the worth-whileness of the career. Otherwise the Government will not be able to continue to recruit and retain the large numbers of capable individuals needed. We are concerned over what appear to be certain adverse trends in this respect. If our security program comes to depend on mediocrity and inexperience, it can produce no better than a mediocre performance and may experience worse than a mediocre performance in furthering U.S. policies or in war if it comes.

b. Task Force A believes that the effective formulation and implementation of U.S. security policy is increasingly dependent upon developing and maintaining high standards of competence among the career personnel of both the armed services and the civilian agencies. We therefore recommend that career personnel policies be developed which will offer the prestige, the security and the other appropriate tangible and intangible rewards necessary to attract public servants equal to the responsibilities involved.

c. Like other difficult areas of policy, the solutions in this one are very dependent on civilian leadership. Task Force A recommends that human resources policy be given the status in the considerations and the policy statements of the National Security Council of the same order as policy concerning industrial resources.

14. Dependence on Allies

a. NSC 153/1 is unclear as to the extent the U.S. security

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program and policies depend on allies. This unclarity is reflected, we believe, to some extent in the actual operations of the Government. A clarification will greatly improve the integration and constancy of the military, economic, and political policies for security.

b. Our allies hold bases and operational areas in case of war which are the only justification for part of our current expenditures and mobilization programs. If those areas fell to the enemy, he would obtain more industrial capacity than we can eliminate by dropping bombs on Russia, and a capacity which we would hesitate to destroy by atomic attack. He might also obtain indigenous forces to assist in holding areas quickly overrun. Even if we successfully executed massive destruction upon the U.S.S.R., the enemy still has the capabilities to make very effective war across his periphery for some time, due to his deployment of massive reserves of equipment relatively safe from destruction by atomic attack. To clarify our policy as to dependence on allies, we recommend that the NSC make studies to include:

(1) Clearer determination of the extent of the dependence of our over-all security program on allies. Priorities and allocations within our security budget may then be clearer. For instance, this is the sort of choice that perhaps we really may be facing soon: should we be putting our dollars into armament of three or four German divisions on the Elbe or, alternatively, into one U.S. division in Texas plus the necessary transportation, naval and air support, etc., to get it to Europe to fight in case of need.



(2) Continuation of the stress on our forward strategy of collective security. This gives the maximum number of strategies from which to select when the future becomes more clear and we may perhaps have a justification for changing it.

(3) Recognition of and establishment of U.S. policy regarding the dependence of our allies upon us for maintenance and replacement of equipment in peacetime. This action will materially improve our political position with allies and may decrease some of their reluctance to go forward faster with rearmament.

(4) Face squarely the very substantial logistical dependence of allies on the U.S. in case war should come and a balancing of our programs and plans accordingly. If, as certainly would be true, we provide logistical support to allies in the event of war, on the principle of "first to fight," and yet have not programmed such support for our inventories and industrial mobilization base, then we do not have the proper balance in our programs.

15. Maintaining Public Support

a. The key to sustaining our military program is public support. The main internal threat which our Task Force sees is the danger of lack of constancy in our security program. There is a human tendency to search for and believe in "easy strategies." Success in our deterrent strategy is likely to generate a rising tide of public questioning and argument that the things being done are not necessary -- rather than the logical reaction of increased resolution to continue the commitment of adequate resources. In light of the lessons we have learned, we are unlikely to experience again

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the military demobilization which occurred after World War II, but in the future a creeping disarmament might prove even more disastrous than was the outcome of the post-World War II disintegration. Our security program will be critically weak without continuous positive actions drawing public support. These actions should be devised so as to link various components of the Soviet threat with the services, sacrifices, tax payments, etc. which the U.S. people need to provide to meet that threat.

b. Task Force A has been much impressed by the report and recommendations of Dr. Oppenheimer's group of consultants. Following the thought of that report, we believe it is possible to turn some of our seeming liabilities, such as the necessity for increased expenditure on continental defense, into assets by coupling the explanation of the problem to the American people with an explanation of the taxes and services necessary to solve the problem. We do not believe that a good purpose is served by telling the American people of the rising Russian atomic threat without explaining that something can be done about it and what needs to be done including stress on the deterrent strategy and collective security aspects thereof. Also we do not consider that the mathematics of the number of bombs and such statistics are important or even useful, since public discussion of these matters may detract from their comprehension of the basic judgements which have to be made as to how we improve our position to meet the situation flowing toward us out of the future.

16. Cost of Military Program

a. The directive of Task Force A requires that an effort be made

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to estimate alternative course of national policy which we are presenting. These costs are primarily military, although the essential elements of atomic production, foreign aid, adequate conduct of foreign relations, intelligence, and other costs are importantly involved.

b. Task Force A can do no better than accept as a base line in estimating costs the judgements of those who have struggled with this problem over the past few years. We have studied, insofar as practical in the time available, the shifts in the military program indicated by recent changes in budget planning. We do not pretend to be able to pass judgement on the several areas of controversy which have arisen in connection with these shifts, but do comment that we find difficulty in seeing how the military build-up of ourselves and our allies programmed up until the end of last year, can in fact be effected under current forward budget planning as we understand it. Task Force A recognizes that estimates in the complicated security field are often subject to justified change as more information becomes available and as more time permits studies of higher refinement. It is true, we think, that in this period of rapid change in many aspects of the security situation, including weapons, political arrangements, etc., programs to implement policies are often, and justifiably, likely to experience material change before they can be completed.

c. Based on our studies and the considerations set forth in the preceding paragraph, Task Force A sees five ways of change in our security program as envisaged at the beginning of this year which may materially



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affect its cost:

(1) There will always be adjustments in components of the original program resulting from the increased efficiency which should be achieved with passage of time. These adjustments may be either upward or downward as determined by further studies and experience.

(2) There could be a shift of emphasis among components of our very complicated security program as a result of the long-term appraisal on which we have raised a question under the heading Basis for Future Planning. All information presented to us indicates that shifts toward new weapons do not necessarily indicate a material reduction in cost. The outcome of the most careful studies may at best be in the area of more efficient procurement and prevention of long-range commitments which viewed from several years later, would be clearly unnecessary.

(3) The U.S. certainly must allocate funds for continental defense which are additional to the current military program. On the basis of incomplete information, it appears that this cost will average more than two billion dollars a year for the next few years.

(4) We understand that special weapons are now being considered for incorporating into the defense plan for western Europe. This action may affect arms aid somewhat, although certainly not in the short-term since, as our Task Force understands the situation, the U.S. is now behind in its deliveries to meet its commitments for assistance as part of the mutual defense effort within NATO.

(5) There are the continuing dollar costs for the maintenance

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and replacement of military equipment given our allies. Reliable estimates in this area do not exist so far as we can determine, but information indicates that these costs may be somewhere between two and three billion dollars a year, depending in part on future quantities of weapons to be given Asiatic countries, and on the degree to which using countries can provide dollars to buy that part of their maintenance needs which their industry cannot produce.

d. Sometime in the next few years, we may have been successful in pressing Russian armed forces back toward their own territory and there should also have been an increase in allied strength. These two factors, taken together, may justify some reduced costs, though well in the future, through our acceptance of a lowered state of readiness of some of our forces.

e. Out of the summation of these factors, which we think are likely to add up to an increase, Task Force A estimates the cost of its course of national policy will exceed during the build-up period the funds allocated to security programs as currently contemplated in the most recent budget planning. (Task Force A understands that the now contemplated long run annual rate for all national security costs, including foreign aid and atomic energy, is about \$40 billion a year). As we see it, however, our Task Force program in the long run will cost not materially less than about \$40 billion annually and may be somewhat but not significantly higher. We recognize that this estimate is not a close one but any pretense at a closer estimate than, say, of 10%, which might be higher or lower than the currently programmed security program, would imply an accuracy in our studies which

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does not exist.

f. In a few years the security program advocated by Task Force A, though no less costly in absolute figures of dollars, will be materially less costly in relationship to the total gross national production of the economy it shields. Task Force A considers that absolute dollar costs are neither comprehensible to the average American nor a proper yardstick for estimating the capabilities of our economy over the long-term. The costs of military power, like power itself, are relative matters, in this case relative to the threat it meets and to the gross national product, and should be viewed as such.

17. Evaluation of Military Program

a. Task Force A is required to evaluate the military program it suggests. We do this by reference to the three part objective stated in NSC 153/1. As to the missions of (1) deterring war and (2) deterring and countering peripheral aggression, the program is, in our opinion, militarily adequate if implemented by effective actions and wisely used in support of and supported by political and economic measures. As to the third part of the objective -- "to provide a reasonable initial defense and an adequate basis for victory in general war" -- Task Force A sees no better alternative than that which we advocate. As years pass, there is, however, less chance of maintaining a reasonable initial defense and there may be no true victory. We believe we would survive if war came. Task Force A, however, believes that it is far better to survive without war and that the sum total of all aspects of its program give a reasonable assurance of doing this.



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b. All will be developed in more detail in the next section of this report, the program is well within U.S. sustained economic capabilities. It is consistent with U.S. economic and political objectives, both foreign and domestic, and it does maintain the maximum number of alternative strategies to choose from in the future. Put another way, it keeps the future open.

c. Looking into the long-term, we see no other solution than to maintain a see-through constancy of preparedness until we have had a long continued demonstration that the spirit and intent of Soviet-Communism have changed -- or even longer, until we effectively regulate armaments.

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