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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

As Prepared for Delivery March 29, 1995

U.S. Policy toward the New Independent States: A Pragmatic Strategy Grounded in America's Fundamental Interests

Secretary of State Warren Christopher

March 29, 1995

Good afternoon. I would like to thank President Brand for that warm welcome, and Indiana University for inviting me to speak today. I am pleased to be here with Robert Orr, former Indiana Governor and former Ambassador to Singapore.

Four decades ago, Indiana President Herman Wells showed foresight in founding the Russian and East European Institute. Today, the Institute is among the country's most respected centers of regional study. And many of its graduates have forged distinguished careers in this field, including Jim Collins, my special advisor for the New Independent States.

Your state's political leaders have played a crucial role in shaping our policy toward the former Soviet Union. When I called Senator Lugar to ask if he could join me here today, he said he really needed to be in Washington shepherding the ratification of our START II Treaty with Russia through the Senate. Under these circumstances, I reconsidered my invitation. And I will always be indebted to your highly respected Congressman, Lee Hamilton, for his counsel and support. You should be proud that Indiana has produced two such outstanding leaders of both parties.

Since his first day in office, President Clinton has pursued a pragmatic policy of engagement with Russia and the other New Independent States as the best investment we can make in our nation's security and prosperity. Our approach is to cooperate where our interests coincide, and to manage our differences constructively and candidly where they do not. We support reform because in the long run, its success benefits not only the people of the region, but the American people as well. We understand that Russia and the other new states face a tumultuous future. For that reason, our policy is focused on the long haul. In sum, our approach is realistic and grounded in America's strategic interests.

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The successful transformation of the former Soviet empire into a region of sovereign, democratic states is a matter of fundamental importance to the United States. These 12 nations cover one-sixth of the world's surface. Their territory is home to tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Their people and resources give them vast economic potential.

Twice in this century, political events in this region have remade the world -- profoundly for the worse in 1917, and profoundly for the better in 1991. The events of 1991 set in motion two historic transformations, both of which served our fundamental interests and those of the people of the region. The first is the disappearance of a hostile totalitarian empire, and its replacement by twelve newly independent states. The second is the collapse of communist dictatorship, and the movement toward democratic institutions and free markets.

These transformations have presented us with a remarkable opportunity to encourage stability in the region and enhance the security of the American people. We have taken advantage of that opportunity in ways that have paid enormous dividends. Indeed, our engagement with Russia, Ukraine, and their neighbors has made America safer than at any time since the end of World War II. Thousands of nuclear warheads, built to destroy America, are themselves being destroyed. Those that remain no longer target our cities and homes.

Last year, President Clinton negotiated a trilateral understanding with Russia and Ukraine that sets Ukraine on the path to become a non-nuclear power. In so doing, Ukraine joined Kazakhstan and Belarus in agreeing to give up nuclear weapons. We are leading efforts to dismantle their weapons and safeguard nuclear materials under a bipartisan program sponsored by Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar. In Defense Secretary Perry's words, it literally "removes the threat -- missile by missile, warhead by warhead, factory by factory."

Last December, President Clinton and the leaders of the region's nuclear states brought the START I agreement into force and paved the way for implementing START II. Together, these important treaties will cut strategic nuclear forces in Russia and the United States by almost two-thirds.

Our diplomacy has also made Europe more secure. After patient but firm efforts by President Bush and President Clinton, Russian troops completed their withdrawal last August from Germany and the Baltic states. Now, for the first time since World War II, the people of Central Europe are free of occupying forces.

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Despite the progress that has been made, we have no illusions about how difficult the region's transformation will be, or how long it will take to overcome centuries of empire and autocracy. Ultimately, only the peoples of the region can assure their success.

From the outset, our approach has been focused on the entire region of the former Soviet Union, in part because the futures of all these countries are closely linked. I am convinced that the success of reform in each of these countries will have a positive impact on success in the others.

Our region-wide approach can be seen in the emphasis we have placed on financial support to the non-Russian states -- which in 1995 will represent two-thirds of our assistance to the region. Increasingly, we are supporting private sector trade and investment. American firms have signed multi-billion dollar energy deals in Kazakhstan and in Azerbaijan -- the latter country so rich in oil that its capital was described in the 12th century as "blazing like a fire all night." Last year, our Overseas Private Investment Corporation provided almost $1 billion in financing for projects in the region. These programs will generate new exports and jobs for Americans.

The Clinton Administration has been steadfast in support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the new independent states. The region's history of imperial conquest underscores how important it is that all countries scrupulously respect international law and the rights of their neighbors.

Of course, some states of the former Soviet Union command particular attention because of their potential to influence the future of the region. Ukraine is critical. With its size and its position, juxtaposed between Russia and Central Europe, it is a linchpin of European security. An independent, non-nuclear, and reforming Ukraine is also vital to the success of reform in the other New Independent States. That is why the United States has joined Britain and Russia in providing security assurances for Ukraine.

The United States has consistently led the international effort to support economic reform in Ukraine. Last year, we convinced the G-7 to pledge over $4 billion for that country. In October, Ukraine's government launched a courageous program of market reform. We responded by increasing our assistance for 1994 by $250 million, to a total commitment of $900 million. Ukraine is now the fourth largest recipient of U.S. assistance after Israel, Egypt, and Russia. It is important that the Ukrainian Rada fully support President Kuchma's economic reform program.

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Of course, the future of Ukraine and every other state in the region will be profoundly affected by the outcome of Russia's new revolution. That is why the deliberations of Russia's parliament and the fate of the ruble are on everyone's mind, not just in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok, but also in Kiev, Almaty, and Baku.

In May, President Clinton will travel to Moscow to meet President Yeltsin for the seventh time. This summit comes at an important moment. Reform in Russia is under strain. The war in Chechnya continues. We have differences with Russia in foreign policy.

But whatever the problems, we must not lose sight of the breathtaking changes we have witnessed since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ten years ago, almost 400 million people from the Baltic to the Bering Seas were subject to totalitarian dictatorship and hemmed in by minefields and barbed wire. Today, Vilnius, Warsaw and Kiev are free. Moscow is alive with political debate. Siberia is becoming a synonym for opportunity, not oblivion.

Perspective and a sense of history are also important. Not long ago, a severe disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union could threaten a nuclear confrontation. Today, we do not always agree, and there are obviously new challenges in our relationship. But every difference is not a crisis. We address our differences constructively, without threatening to blow up the world.

Today, the real question is not whether we should engage with Russia, but how. We will reject policies that reflect short-term political pressures, but undermine the long-term interests of the United States. We will continue to work with Russia where our interests coincide. We will not hold our relationship hostage to any one issue. But we will remain ready to speak openly and act appropriately when Russian actions run counter to our interests.

Our policy toward Russia has been and will continue to be based on a clear-eyed understanding of the facts on the ground. As President Clinton has stressed, we reject the superficial caricature of Russia that suggests it is predestined to aggression, predisposed to dictatorship, or predetermined to economic failure. At the same time, we are under no illusion that success is assured.

The truth is, Russia has a choice. It can define itself in terms of its past or in terms of the future.

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In many areas Russia is courageously making the right choices. It has a freely elected President and Parliament and a democratic constitution. It has an independent press, which often criticizes central government policies. Debate in the parliament is vigorous and open.

Economic reform is continuing. The government has acted boldly to bring inflation down. An ambitious privatization program has altered Russia's economic landscape. The private sector now accounts for 50 percent of Russia's GDP.

Two weeks ago, Russia initialled a $6.4 billion agreement with the IMF, which requires Russia to continue its fight against inflation, implement an austere budget, liberalize the energy sector, and free more prices from state control. This agreement is a significant landmark on the hard march to a stable market economy.

These positive changes are all the more notable in light of the ruinous legacy that Russian reformers are having to overcome. After 75 years of communism, much of the old elite remains entrenched in government and industry. Trust in democratic institutions is fragile -- and so are the institutions themselves. The rule of law is in its infancy. Crime and corruption are rampant. These problems could undermine democracy if they are not dealt with effectively.

The economic legacy is also difficult. The new Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a decrepit industrial base that has wasted natural resources and produced a string of environmental disasters -- from Chernobyl, to chemical pollution in the Urals, to the drying up of the Aral Sea.

And then there is the legacy of empire. Some 150 ethnic groups live within Russia's eleven time zones. During the Soviet period, borders between the internal regions and republics of the empire were changed by communist leaders over 90 times. The central government of Russia has made progress in improving relations with the diverse peoples within the Russian Federation. But its actions in Chechnya today threaten its ability to emerge as a democratic, multi-ethnic state.

The Chechnya crisis began as Russia sought to deal with a complex problem with deep historical roots. Now a city and many villages have been destroyed, thousands have died, and the tensions that led to the fighting have surely been exacerbated. Russia's conduct in Chechnya has been tragically wrong. Its decision to escalate fighting there in the last week is a serious mistake.

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That is why I have urged the Russian government to end the carnage, to accept a permanent mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to provide humanitarian relief and to reach a political settlement. It is patently clear that the Russian government is paying a very high price for Chechnya both at home and internationally.

It is easy enough to enumerate our differences with Russia, or with other states of the former Soviet Union. But I do not have the luxury of making a list and walking away. My job is to build areas of agreement, to develop policies to manage our differences, and always to advance our nation's interests. Let me describe the five key goals of our strategy for the coming year, as they relate to all the states of the former Soviet Union.

First, we aim to resolve a number of important security issues vital to every American. In 1995, we are pursuing the most ambitious arms control agenda in history. President Clinton and I have urged the Senate to ratify START II before the U.S.-Russian summit in May. The Russian parliament should act promptly to do the same. We are working closely with Russia to achieve the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will also press to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- thereby realizing the vision set forth three decades ago by President Kennedy.

We are also determined to combat the growing threat posed by nuclear smuggling. We must prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons and materials. Nunn-Lugar programs will help us achieve this goal by dismantling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and safeguarding the resulting nuclear materials. Full funding for Nunn-Lugar is vital to our nation's security.

Because of the importance we attach to fighting the spread of nuclear weapons, we are firmly opposed to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Russia is a neighbor of Iran. It will rue the day it cooperated with this terrorist state if Iran builds nuclear weapons with the benefit of Russian expertise and equipment. Russia should take note that no major industrial democracy cooperates with Iran on nuclear matters. It is simply too dangerous to be permitted. For this reason, it is important that in our meeting last week, Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I agreed to set up a working group to examine non-proliferation issues, including the consequences of nuclear cooperation with Iran.

A second goal for 1995 will be to cooperate on a newer set of global or transnational issues, including crime, energy, the environment, and space. During the Cold War, such cooperation was impossible. Today it is essential.

International crime is a growing threat to the lives and livelihoods of countless Americans, and to the prospects for reform in the former Soviet Union. I have made the fight against global crime a top priority of U.S. foreign policy. FBI Director Louis Freeh and I have worked together to set up an FBI office in Moscow -- to cooperate with the Russians to combat organized crime, corruption and drug trafficking.

Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin are spearheading efforts to improve the efficency of the Russian oil and gas sector, thereby raising productivity and reducing that industry's high levels of pollution. They are also strengthening our cooperation with Russia in space -- symbolized today by the space station Mir, with its first American crew member on board.

Our cooperation on these issues is not limited to Russia. We will continue to work with Ukraine and our G-7 partners to overcome the dangerous aftermath of Chernobyl. We are also helping Kazakhstan to manage its enormous energy resources in economically sound and environmentally safe ways.

Third, we will continue carefully targeted assistance programs that increase our security, expand our prosperity, and promote our interest in democratic reform. Nunn-Lugar monies will continue to advance our strategic interest in dismantling nuclear weapons. Our assistance will also continue to support the vital elements of a working democracy and civil society, including a free press and jury trials. And by supporting privatization and small business development, it will encourage free markets, and open new opportunities for American companies. Most of our assistance will go to private organizations and local governments outside Moscow.

Assistance has put America on the right side of the struggle for change in Russia. Some people say we should end these programs to punish Russia when it does something we oppose. I am all for maximizing our leverage. But I have personally reviewed our assistance programs and concluded that cutting them back now would make no sense. The critics of those programs need to ask themselves some tough questions. Would they stop the funding necessary to dismantle the nuclear weapons that once targetted American cities? Would they cut off support for privatization and free elections -- wiping out programs that strengthen the very forces in Russian society that share our interests and values?

I believe that when they understand these choices, the American people will adopt the only course that makes sense: That is, to make the necessary investments now to make our nation more secure and prosperous for generations to come. I call on both the House and Senate to fund fully our request for assistance to the New Independent States.

The fundandamental basis of the assistance program is to encourage all of the New Independent States to move forward with reform. Free elections are especially vital. President Nazarbayev's recent effort to extend his term unilaterally is a step backward for Kazakhstan. We call on him to renew his commitment to hold timely parliamentary elections, followed by scheduled presidential elections in 1996. We applaud President Yeltsin's commitment to hold parliamentary elections at the end of this year and presidential elections next year. When President Clinton goes to Moscow in May, you can be sure he will underscore the importance we attach to that commitment.

In meeting with President Yeltsin, President Clinton will be dealing with the first freely elected leader of Russia. But he will also talk directly to the Russian people and meet a cross section of Russian society -- especially those who are committed to reform. The United States will continue to cultivate strong ties with a wide range of leaders and institutions in and out of the Russian government. To encourage pluralism in Russia, we will deal with Russia as a pluralistic society.

Fourth, we will reinforce the independence of Russia's neighbors and support their further development as market democracies. We will also use our good offices to help resolve conflicts in the region. Last December, we persuaded Russia that an OSCE-led peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh was preferable to unilateral action. If a settlement is reached, such a mission would set a powerful precedent for conflict resolution in the New Independent States. It is vital that Russia continue to cooperate with the OSCE to ensure its success.

Fifth, we will advance the President's comprehensive strategy for building a stable, peaceful and integrated Europe. Just as we had in Western Europe after World War II, we now have a rare and historic opportunity to build a new security architecture for all of Europe that will last for generations.

President Clinton's vision includes several key elements. The OSCE will have a larger and more operational role. NATO's Partnership for Peace will strengthen its ties to Central Europe and to the New Independent States. NATO will move forward with its steady and deliberate process to accept new members, following the approach laid out by the NATO ministers last December. And we will seek a stronger relationship between NATO and Russia in parallel with NATO expansion.

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In the process of NATO expansion, each potential member will be judged individually, according to its capabilities and its commitment to the principles of the NATO treaty. The fundamental decisions will be made by NATO, in consultation with potential members. The process will be transparent to all and there will be no vetos by third parties.

As I emphasized to Foreign Minister Kozyrev last week, it is in Russia's interest to participate constructively in the process of European integration. Russia has an enormous stake in a stable and peaceful Europe. No country has suffered more when Europe has not been at peace. Russia's path to deeper involvement in Europe is open. It should not choose to isolate itself from this effort.

Building a new security architecture in Europe is part of a larger strategy of integrating the new democracies of the former Soviet Union into the major institutions of the West, including the European Union, the World Trade Organization, the OECD, and the G-7. These institutions give structure, legitimacy, and strength to the common enterprise of the Western democracies -- namely, promoting peace and economic growth. It will serve our interests to extend the benefits of integration -- as well as its considerable obligations -- to Europe's new democracies, including the New Independent States.

The pace of integration, however, will depend on the extent to which the nations of the former Soviet Union continue on the reform path and adhere to international norms. WTO membership, for ecample, is only possible for nations that adopt trade and investment rules consistent with world standards. Likewise, the evolution of Russia's participation in Western institutions will be affected by the world's judgment of its conduct in Chechnya and its respect for international norms.

The United States will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic course toward all the New Independent States -- a course that has produced concrete benefits for Americans. We will not take for granted the success of the historic transformations now under way in the former Soviet Union. But we will continue to work to bring about the best possible outcome. Our enduring interests demand that we stay engaged. Our policy is rooted in American interests. We will protect our security, our welfare, and our values.

As we travel this difficult yet promising path, we will call upon the same qualities that have sustained American leadership in the past: steadiness, consistency, and reliability in pursuing our interests and upholding our commitments. These are the qualities that have kept America strong and free. These are the qualities that must guide us now as we build the more secure and integrated world that is in the fundamental interest of the American people.

Thank you very much.

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

95 MAR 29 P6:20

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S/S #

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION UNCL No. Pages 9

FROM: Bennett Freeman (Officer name) PA/S (Office symbol) 647-9943 (Extension) 7538 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Please deliver a copy of the Secretary's statement to the individual(s) listed below.

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3/13

Response to Kissinger Op-ed (Draft 8/22/94, 9:30 am)

Henry Kissinger is right when he claims that a coherent Atlantic security policy requires us "to infuse the core Atlantic Alliance with a new sense of direction." (It's an Alliance, Not a Relic," W. Post, Aug. 16) But he's wide of the mark in his analysis of the challenges and opportunities facing NATO. Keeping NATO as it was is the best way to transform it into the relic he fears. The U.S. is playing a leadership role in adapting NATO to the risks of the 21st century.

The Atlantic Alliance remains central to U.S. political and security commitments in Europe, commitments embodied visibly in our pledge to maintain roughly 100,000 troops there. As Secretary Christopher has said, NATO "will remain the core of American engagement in Europe and the heart of European security."

But the Berlin Wall is gone, and NATO must do its part to meet new challenges--from ethnic strife, aggressive nationalism, and nuclear proliferation--and new opportunities presented by the emergence of young democracies, transforming economies, and the process of European integration.

That is precisely what this Administration has done in launching the Partnership for Peace and other NATO initiatives over the past two years. Contrary to Kissinger's view, the Partnership will not submerge the Alliance. It will renew and strengthen it, not least by providing NATO with the ability to work with a wide range of states in addressing regional crises and other new challenges. So far, 22 nations have joined the Partnership. Next month, in Poland, we will participate in the first joint military exercises with former Cold War adversaries.

The Partnership is not an end in itself, an act of "reconciliation," or a replacement for NATO security commitments. It does not alter NATO's core functions or key institutional arrangements among current members, including its integrated military structures. The Partnership is a process for building practical ties between NATO and partners.

The Partnership is a clear path to NATO membership for those willing and able to make the necessary commitments. President Clinton has made plain that "the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how we will do so." At the same time, the President has underscored that expansion "will mean extending commitments that must be supported by military strategies and postures." The Partnership and other links to NATO will foster habits of practical political and military cooperation crucial to effective integration, while allowing NATO to assess the suitability and desirability of states becoming new members on a case by case basis.

The Administration is actively discussing with our Allies the key questions related to expansion, including a timetable and criteria for admission. Future enlargement will be decided on the basis of core principals of the Alliance supported with adequate resources. We must be sure that we have the means and the political will to make such guarantees sustainable, unlike Locarno and the hollow treaties of the 1930s.

Some countries have farther to go than others; some may not choose this path at all. But it is in America's interest to help their democracies succeed, and the Partnership holds out the prospect that former adversaries can be integrated into cooperative security structures with the West, as Japan and Germany were after World War II.

Dr. Kissinger seems to hold to Lord Ismay's 1949 definition of NATO's role--keep Russia out and Germany down. This approach ignores the new opportunities for stability in Europe. His implication that even a democratic Russia must be viewed as a nascent threat to European security risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. We owe it to future generations to give Russia the chance to prove him wrong, while prudently hedging against less desirable outcomes. And we have made it clear that Russia's relationship with the West will be shaped by its actions, particularly respect for the sovereignty and independence of its neighbors, not merely by its promises.

Dr. Kissinger's specter of Germany throwing its weight around Central and Eastern Europe does grave injustice to Germany's leaders and its people. Since Adenauer, Germany has been committed to building relationships with its eastern neighbors only from a solid home in the Western alliance. That remains as true today in an undivided Germany as it did in Adenauer's time. Germany does and should have a prominent role to play in ensuring stability, economic development, and democracy in the region. It will remain U.S. policy, as it has consistently been for over forty years, to encourage that role. But it is not a unique role. Rather, we are working with all our Allies to integrate the new democracies into Western economic, political, and military structures.

Meanwhile, NATO must adapt to a changing world. The strategic threat in Europe today comes not from the risk of invasion, but from instability and ethnic bloodletting, to which NATO is turning its attention. In Bosnia, NATO is playing an important role in enforcing no-fly and exclusion zones, implementing sanctions, and conducting air strikes when necessary. Under President Clinton's leadership, NATO is also adopting more flexible structures to address new security risks, and to support the development of a stronger European Security Defense Identity. And the Alliance has recently approved a policy framework on non-proliferation to improve allied capabilities to respond to this threat. NATO's political cohesion and military power remain critical forces for stability in the region.

In the words of the late Manfred Woerner, NATO's courageous Secretary General during this remarkable period of change in Europe, "NATO will not be kept alive solely by nostalgic memories of past historic achievements, nor by purely philosophical reflections on common values and destinies. Either NATO is needed to meet the concrete requirements of its members, or it will wither away." It is to meet that challenge that the Partnership for Peace and our efforts to renew NATO are addressed.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6.23.94

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 6:30 P.M. (EDT)
TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1994

**TEXT OF REMARKS AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ANTHONY LAKE
AT THE SOREF SYMPOSIUM
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
MAY 17, 1994**

It's a real pleasure to be invited to address The Washington Institute's Soref Symposium. I know from Martin that you are a serious audience with an interest in, and deep knowledge of, the Middle East. As the old story goes, I feel like the professor asked to lecture on the subject of floods -- knowing full well that Noah is in the audience.

With Secretary Christopher in the midst of intensive talks, I will focus tonight not on the current state of negotiations, but on our conceptual approach to the Middle East. For in many ways, the Middle East is a paradigm for our nation's approach to the post-Cold War world. And it is our challenge and responsibility to build a regional environment in which the promise of a future of peace and hope can be realized.

In essence, the Middle East is now faced with a choice between two futures. One path leads to a future in which extremists, wielding weapons of mass destruction, hold sway over a region torn by inter-communal and inter-state conflicts. The other alternative yields democratic progress, the free movement of people and goods, and dialogue leading to regional security. Violence or peace; regression or freedom; isolation or dialogue: these are the choices.

On any particular day, we can witness examples of these futures. Consider events of recent days. Efforts to unify and democratize Yemen fell apart when northerners and southerners chose the battlefield over the negotiating table. At the same time, in a step critical to ending a seemingly intractable conflict, Israeli soldiers peacefully transferred authority in Gaza and Jericho to Palestinian authorities.

In the middle of this era of turmoil and hope, the United States cannot afford to be a bystander. Despite the end of the superpower rivalry, the region remains of vital interest to our nation. The free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the Gulf....The security and well-being of Israel.....A secure and lasting Arab-Israeli peace....The stability of friendly Arab countries....Our need to contain Iraq, Iran and Libya, the Middle East reactionary, "backlash states"....And efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction: all these reasons give our nation a very real and vital stake in ensuring a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic future.

We do not seek, however, to dominate the future of the Middle East. Too much of the troubled history of the region has been preoccupied with a struggle for dominance; too little effort has been devoted to a cooperative effort to promote common interests and shared values in a better future for all the peoples of the region.

Nor do we see this battle for the future of the Middle East as a "clash of civilizations." Let me emphasize this point. Some suggested that in the post-Cold War world, there is a fundamental divide pitting Western liberal democratic traditions against ostensibly opposing "civilizations" based on Islam and other religious traditions. These theorists believe there is no common ground for understanding between "the West and the rest" -- only the prospect of confrontation and conflict. They assert that the United States, as the sole remaining superpower in search of a new ideology to fight, should be bent on leading a new crusade against Islam. In a quest for a new ideology to rally against, fundamentalism would replace communism as the West's designated threat.

We strongly disagree. In the Middle East as throughout the world, there is indeed a fundamental divide. But the fault line runs not between "civilizations" or religions. No, it runs instead between oppression and responsive government, between isolation and openness, and between moderation and extremism. And it knows no distinction by race or creed. In South Africa as in China; in Burma as in Russia; and in Gaza as in northern Iraq, the universal language of personal and political freedom is being spoken by brave men and women who are fighting for human rights and democracy. And the dramatic global changes of the past four years have shown that it is a language capable of transcending the past and transforming the future.

This is as true in the Middle East and Muslim world as it is elsewhere. Our foe is oppression and extremism, whether in religious or secular guise. We draw the line with those who seek to advance their agenda through terror, intolerance, or coercion. And I can assure you that President Clinton will continue to steadfastly oppose acts of terrorism aimed at stopping the peace process or denying the people of the Middle East a future of hope. The enemies of peace have not hesitated to use violence to advance their goal. But the President has affirmed that we will not allow them to succeed.

We also reject the notion that a renewed emphasis on traditional values in the Islamic world must inevitably conflict with the West or with democratic principles. These values -- of devotion to family and society, to faith and good works -- are not alien to our own experience. It should come as no surprise that citizens throughout the Middle East and North Africa are testing and debating the role of these values in society and

government. People in the region -- as is the case around the world -- are searching for ways to achieve responsive government, guarantee basic human rights and guide their lives. That many of them look to Islam is neither unusual nor unique. This is a universal quest. Islam is not the issue.

Today, the real conflicts which offend the conscience of the world are manifestly not "conflicts of civilization." In Bosnia, we are opposing hatred and the use of force. Our enemy is bigotry and ruthless nationalism. Serbian leaders may seek to legitimize their conquest with claims that they are holding off a Moslem threat to the West. But the world should not accept such patently false claims. Certainly, we will not accept it. We support a democratic Bosnian state in which Muslims and Christians live together in peace. We believe that the West has an interest in demonstrating that such a state -- in the heart of Europe -- is welcome and can survive and prosper.

Saddam Hussein's explanation of his invasion of Kuwait -- to defend Islam against a Western invader -- was as transparent as Slobodan Milosevic's claim of a civilizing battle is today. No one was fooled. The Gulf War was seen for what it was -- a bid for conquest and regional supremacy that a coalition of Islamic and non-Islamic nations faced down.

In the wake of that war, the United States has been forced to deal with two hostile regimes in the region -- secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. Elsewhere in the region we oppose the extremist policies of secular Libya and fundamentalist Sudan. And we watch carefully from Algeria to southern Lebanon, from the West Bank and Gaza to Egypt and Jordan, where extremists threaten to divert the region onto the old path of violence.

There should be no doubt. Islamic extremism poses a threat to our nation's interests. There are forces which use the cover of Islamic revival to suppress freedom, withdraw from the world and justify hostilities. These movements threaten the United States and the global community of nations because they speak in a powerful and all too seductive language -- the age old cant of hatred, fear and prejudice. But above all -- as we have learned -- they threaten the future of the Middle East.

Although the circumstances vary, the phenomenon of extremism around the world shares a common cause: disillusionment, a failure to secure basic needs, dashed hopes for political participation and social justice. Widespread disenchantment breeds an extremism of hatred and violence -- an extremism by no means unique to the Middle East or the Muslim world. What distinguishes Islamic extremism is that it uses religion to cover its real intentions -- the naked pursuit of political power.

In the midst of this challenge, the United States must join hands with willing nations and build regional bulwarks against extremism. In Central Asia, we are cultivating relations with newly independent Islamic states like Kazakhstan. Elsewhere -- from Turkey to Saudi Arabia, from Pakistan to Indonesia -- we are maintaining long-standing alliances and friendships with both secular and fundamentalist states with Muslim populations. Our task in the Middle East must be the same.

In confronting the challenges ahead, we must energetically pursue Arab-Israeli peace; actively contain those states and organizations which promote or support religious or secular extremism; and help form a community of like-minded Middle Eastern states which share our goals of free markets, democratic enlargement and controls on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Each of these elements complements and reinforces the other. Progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking helps place extremists on the defensive and increases their isolation. Undermining extremist forces makes it easier for peacemakers to proceed. When peacemaking and containment work, moderate governments find it easier to bolster their legitimacy and face down extremists within their midst. And that moderation is mutually reinforcing, building relationships which hold the promise of greater regional stability.

Actively pursuing peace in the Middle East is one of the Clinton Administration's highest foreign policy priorities. It is the cornerstone of our efforts to help transform the region. If, after so much hatred and strife, Arab and Jew can live in peace in the Holy Land, they can harness their immense talents and resources to the tasks of progress. And they can set an example -- create a peacemaking dynamic -- which can positively influence all the other conflicts in the region.

What happened in Gaza and Jericho last week is, therefore, both simple and profound. In a literal sense, Palestinian police took over responsibility for maintaining order from the Israeli army. But this simple transfer of authority also symbolized the transformation of relations between Palestinians and Israelis. For the first time in their history, Palestinians have achieved the right -- and responsibility -- of governing themselves. For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israelis and Palestinians have agreed to pursue peaceful coexistence in the Holy Land.

We are all acutely conscious of the difficulties and dangers involved in this process. Between the historic handshake on the White House lawn last September and the Cairo signing nine months later, we have been constantly reminded that the forces of extremism and reaction are determined to kill the hope of peace.

We cannot -- and must not -- allow them to succeed.

Some in this audience may question the wisdom and viability of the course that Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat have chosen. But this is not the moment for second-guessing. Israelis and Palestinians have decided that the status quo is intolerable and that peaceful reconciliation is preferable to endless conflict and violence. We owe them more than just the benefit of the doubt; we owe them our support and encouragement. If they fail -- if we allow them to fail -- the hopes for a peaceful Middle East will be dashed. And who can say how many more lives will be lost, families torn apart or battles will be fought before its courageous leaders can try to build peace again.

Nor can we afford to stand back and watch history unfold in Gaza and Jericho. The complexities of peacemaking are only beginning to be revealed. The Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles calls for the extension of critical elements of Palestinian self-government to the West Bank. Elections in the West Bank and Gaza should take place this year. And no later than two years from now, Israel and the PLO will begin final status negotiations.

Difficulties will arise at every step of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. They involve making peace between a state and an organization composed of very diverse elements. They include the most complicated conflicts to resolve -- and the easiest to disrupt. A permanent regional peace cannot be constructed on this fragile foundation alone.

It is precisely because of the difficulties that the Israelis and Palestinians now confront that the President has sent Secretary Christopher and his team back to the region to work on the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

A Syrian-Israel agreement, however, would be a decisive settlement between strong states entering together into a "peace of the brave." It would put an end to the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. Jordan and Lebanon would be able to resolve their differences with Israel in short order. Full normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states of the Maghreb and the Gulf would quickly follow. In short, the logjam would be broken.

An Israel-Syria peace would do more than just shore up the agreement between Israel and the PLO and ensure a transformation in relations between Israel and the Arab world. It would also do much to advance our efforts to widen the circle of peacemakers, bolster the network of Middle East moderation and construct a bastion against the backlash states.

In the wider sweep of regional peace, Syria plays a critical role. Historically, its alliance with Iran and its support for rejectionist groups have given the forces of extremism a vital base in the Middle East. By invoking Arab nationalism, Syria has given these forces an important source of legitimacy. It has used that legitimacy for ill -- when it rejected Sadat's peace with Israel; and for good -- when Damascus joined the Gulf War coalition against Saddam Hussein, and most importantly, when Syria entered into direct, bilateral negotiations with Israel.

Thus, when President Asad took the significant step of announcing in Geneva that Syria had made a strategic choice for peace with Israel, his nation's erstwhile extremist allies quickly grew nervous. Hezbollah leaders argued how best to pursue an extremist agenda in an era of Israeli-Lebanese peace. Palestinian rejectionist leaders, fearful they would lose their bases in Lebanon and Syria, went off to Libya in search of new havens. Iranian officials hurriedly visited Damascus, apparently leaving empty-handed; when they got home, the Iranian clergy began criticizing the leadership for failing to prevent the isolation of their nation.

In spite of these encouraging signs, we do not underestimate the risks and costs involved in achieving an Israeli-Syrian peace. As Prime Minister Rabin has noted, the wrenching internal debate in Israel will make the price of peace with Syria painful indeed. Although it will be hard for the United States to ease that pain, we can and will....as President Clinton has repeatedly made clear....we can and will help Israel minimize the risks at hand.

First, we will insist that the peace be a <u>real</u> peace -- not the absence of war, but a qualitative change in relations between Israel and Syria. Full diplomatic relations; an end to the boycott; open borders for people and trade; promotion of joint economic projects. As President Clinton noted in Geneva, we already have good reason to believe that Syria is now committed to real peace in the way that Israel and others define it.

Second, we will insist that the peace be <u>secure</u> -- the United States stands ready to participate in the security arrangements that the parties negotiate. Specific discussions on what form that participation may take have not yet begun, but our commitment is firm. And just as we have acted this past year to fulfill the President's pledge to sustain and enhance Israel's qualitative edge, so we will act decisively to bolster Israel's early warning capability and ability to handle longer-range threats to compensate for strategic advantages it may choose to give up for peace.

Finally, we will insist that the peace be <u>comprehensive</u>. We will work assiduously with Jordan and Lebanon to ensure that

their negotiations with Israel result in peace agreements. And we will insist that the wider Arab and Muslim worlds end their boycott and fully normalize their relations with Israel.

Dual Containment

Imagine the strategic impact of such a peace on the wider Middle East. We will dramatically reinforce our efforts to contain the threats from Iran and Iraq. Iran would be denied the means to make trouble in the Middle East heartland. Its message of hatred, its call for the destruction of the "Zionist entity," will appear as an empty, anachronistic threat. Similarly, Saddam Hussein's hopes to mobilize the Arab world behind an anti-Israel banner will be dashed.

We will be able to increasingly isolate these two backlash states and the groups they support. Through the peace process, a new regional environment will be created -- even now, it is taking form -- in which moderate Islamic states, from Turkey in the north to Saudi Arabia in the south, from Egypt in the west to Pakistan in the east, will constrain the capacity of these rogue states and organizations to extend their influence and message of hate and violence. With Syria and all other states in this camp at peace with Israel, the Middle East balance of power will shift decisively in favor of moderation. The extremists will be denied the claim that they are the wave of the future; they will have to confront the reality of failure.

Widening the circle of peace will also bolster the supporters of peace in their struggle against internal extremism. Governments will have the opportunity to counter disillusionment with failed ideologies and unmet expectations with the demonstrated results of peacemaking. Resources will be freed to provide for the basic needs of the people, rather than the destructive requirements of wars. Regional economic development, using technologies and capital previously denied because of boycotts and conflicts, will begin to offer the taste of a better life. And once governments are able again to cater to the economic well-being of their people, they will feel more secure in meeting the citizens' demands for greater political participation and accountability. Peacemaking contains the seeds to help governments find the strength to counter extremism at home as well as abroad.

We know that Middle Eastern realities will inevitably intrude to temper this vision. We do not underestimate the difficulties involved in peacemaking or the resilience of the extremist forces that prey on the region. But there is space in our memory for more than just the massacre at Hebron, the car bomb in Afula, the invasion of Kuwait and the revolution in Iran. We have already borne witness to two signing ceremonies on the South Lawn of the White House: the Camp David Accords as well as

the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. We now know that a peaceful and prosperous future for all the people of the Middle East is more than a mere mirage.

Let me conclude by invoking the Psalms:

The day is short
The task is great
It is not up to you
To finish the work
But you are not free
To desist from it.

The Clinton Administration is well aware of the daunting task involved in transforming the Middle East. But we will not shy away from this challenge. We are counting on you to join us in charting a brighter future.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7/14

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^EDWIN YODER COLUMN<
^(FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE, Normally Advance for Monday, July 11, 1994)<
^(For Yoder Clients Only)<
^By EDWIN M. YODER, JR.=

WASHINGTON--Quickly now, can you identify Sudre Dartiguenave? Never heard of him? For your information, Dartiguenave was the last president imposed on Haiti by U.S. military and political pressure way back in the summer of 1915, when our excuse was that Haiti's proneness to revolutionary violence had become intolerable.

The Navy and the Marines policed Haiti until October 1934, affording the island its only interval of decent government. Dartiguenave's achievements, however, remain obscure and are not a happy precedent for Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whose restoration as president of Haiti has become a major objective of American foreign policy. Aristide's return is usually advertised as ''restoring democracy,'' a slogan whose patent absurdity lies in the fact that Haiti has never been democratic and lacks the economic base and political culture to become so. Aristide is no George Washington; he is an erratic ex-priest of leftist persuasion (he has called Pope John Paul II a ''racist'') whose pretensions are vastly inflated by public relations experts in New York and Washington.

The distinguishing mark of recent American policy toward Haiti, so far, has been its infliction of greater pain on the long-suffering Haitian masses than on the military junta the policy aims to dislodge. The Clinton administration, meanwhile, writhes and thrashes in the toils of a dilemma of its own devising; and it seems to worsen with every effort to solve it.

The latest turn in this process of self-torture was the announcement by William Gray, the president's special adviser, that Haitians fleeing the island by boat will now be ineligible for

(more)

admission to the United States as political refugees. They will be warehoused in ''safe havens'' in Panama and elsewhere, pending the arrival of the ''democratic'' millennium.

The new policy is an attempt to escape the embarrassing effects of the old one, announced in early May. Pilloried for embracing President Bush's policy on boat people that he had condemned, Bill Clinton announced that the United States would no longer return boat people unprocessed but would examine their claims to refugee status. Backed by tighter economic sanctions, that policy predictably generated a cascade of boat people seeking U.S. asylum, drowning by the hundreds while survivors of their leaky boats alarmed the already sensitive politicians of Florida, where most Haitian refugees end up.

Haiti is indeed a painful spectacle, but instructive. Haiti is one of dozens of chaotic Third World societies whose sad and seemingly insolvable ordeals, though hardly new, have suddenly become the fare of television ''news.''

Haiti above all illustrates the dangers of a foreign policy intimately tied to domestic politics. The great 1965 Voting Rights Act, as now amended and construed, requires Southern states to fashion gerrymandered ''majority minority'' congressional seats, tailored for minority representatives. Their capture in 1992 enlarged the influence of the Congressional Black Caucus, which has not been reluctant to exercise it. For the sake of his domestic agenda, Bill Clinton dare not ignore its demands, one blindly obsessive demand being the restoration of Aristide.

This may sound cynical, but it is merely a clinical description of a political process by which a minor hemispheric matter has ballooned into a huge Clinton administration embarrassment--one which could take a worse turn if the president were persuaded to intervene militarily.

There is a case against the military junta--and its puppet president--who ousted Aristide and are allegedly responsible for the misery of the Haitian people. But the personally and politically fragile Jean-Bertrand Aristide is not a durable solution. Duly Brutus,

(more)

a former president of the Haitian Chamber of Deputies, has described Aristide as ''a force for disunity and division ... rather than consensus builder,'' a judgment widely shared in Haiti, and not merely by the armed thugs left over from the Duvalier days. Could Aristide, restored by American force or pressure, survive the departure of his sponsors? It seems doubtful, and that is reason enough to dismiss the present policy as unsound.

But even if more artfully conceived, a policy which is so utterly an appendage of domestic politics, and in which sentiment so completely dominates sober self-interest, is a fiasco waiting to happen.

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bert Kuttner

Phony Litigation 'Crisis'

One of the epic corporate public relations ploys of our time is now pending before the U.S. Senate. And it could well succeed.

This is the crusade by organized business to make it harder for citizens to win damages when they are maimed by dangerous products or by negligent doctors.

This crusade calls itself "product liability reform" or "tort reform." Under the common law, a tort is a wrongful act that allows a plaintiff to sue for damages.

It's hyped by big business trying to evade responsibility.

For more than a decade, America's biggest businesses have painted a lurid picture of an overlawyered, overlitigated economy. Supposedly, an explosion of lawsuits has rendered American industry less competitive, has lined the pockets of trial lawyers and has inflated health costs.

Since the early 1980s the business lobbies have been promoting legislation—this year's version is called the "Product Liability Fairness Act"—to make it harder for people to collect damages. The highly technical bill would preempt a number of long-standing principles of common law.

But this supposed crisis in product-liability cases is based on several trumped-up claims.

According to promoters of "reform," product liability cases cost American business $100 billion a year. The actual figure, according to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, is about $4 billion. That includes all insurance premiums paid by business to cover possible damages, all actual damages collected by injured consumers and all legal fees.

To put that figure in perspective, $4 billion is less than what Americans spend annually on dog food. It is one-fifth of one percent of retail sales. It is less than corporations spend suing each other for commercial infringements. As for medical malpractice, damage awards account for half of one percent of U.S. health outlays.

Supposedly, runaway juries are increasingly siding with consumers. In fact, according to a new authoritative study by Jury Verdict Research of Horsham, Pa., the proportion of personal injury cases won by plaintiffs dropped from 63 percent in 1989 to 52 percent in 1992. The average damage award has hardly changed.

Supposedly, too, such cases are clogging the courts. In reality, according to the Conference of Chief Justices (of state courts), product liability suits are just three-tenths of one percent of all civil cases.

Former vice president Dan Quayle is a highly visible spokesman for this crusade. In his speech to the 1992 Republican National Convention, he railed against trial lawyers, darkly insinuating that liberals and Democrats supported consumer protection laws because they were bankrolled by trial lawyers.

In an overheated speech to the American Bar Association, Quayle asked rhetorically whether America really needed "70 percent of the world's lawyers." No, Dan, we don't. But the fact is, the United States has 9 percent of the world's lawyers.

A handful of lawyers do reap large windfalls from a small number of spectacular damage awards. We might want to limit the percentage that lawyers can take as fees. But to achieve that reform, it's not necessary to undermine the citizen's right to collect damages.

Proponents also argue that it's neither necessary nor fair to expose industry to expensive litigation, since citizens are already protected by regulation. Don't the Food and Drug Administration and the Consumer Product Safety Commission provide adequate seals of approval?

Consumer regulation doubtless prevents a lot of injuries and deaths. But regulatory agencies are not clairvoyant. And the limitations on their budgets and powers are often the result of lobbying by the same industries that oppose consumer litigation.

Some of the most infamous injuries inflicted on consumers were exposed and remedied mainly through lawsuits, not regulatory action. These included the Dalkon Shield, a contraceptive which rendered thousands of women infertile; the Pinto's exploding gas tank; the high absorbency tampons linked to toxic-shock syndrome; the damage to workers exposed to asbestos, and innumerable lesser-known cases. The crusade to limit corporate liability is especially ill-timed, given what we are belatedly learning about the tobacco companies.

Foes of regulation say the common law is superior to government intervention. But, hypocritically, when juries impose damage awards, the same critics want Congress to change the rules—hence this bill.

The Senate is closely divided on this bill. A vote could come as early as Tuesday. It's all too understandable why large businesses would want to evade responsibility for the injuries they inflict. Its harder to understand why a majority of the Senate would go along.

Charles Krauthammer

'Peace in Our Time'

"Lord," said Sen. William Borah after Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, "if only I could have talked with Hitler, all this might have been avoided." Now, 55 years later, with another tyrant threatening invasion if the world does not stop insisting that he abide by the rules of civilized conduct, there are still people convinced that all that stands between war and peace is their dining with a dictator.

"I don't know what would have happened today if no one had been willing to talk to anybody in North Korea," said a self-congratulatory Jimmy Carter upon returning from talks with Kim Il Sung with a promise of peace in our time. "The crisis is over," declared Carter.

The crisis is not over. Nothing has been done to stop the North Korean drive for nuclear weapons. But much was done by Carter to derail U.S. efforts to stop that drive.

The sanctions Clinton belatedly and tepidly began to press for are now, and possibly forever, dead. The coalition the United States was trying to put together is in disarray. Carter's visit—and the latest administration retreat that followed—destroyed what little was left of Clinton's Korea policy. It is now such a shambles that Clinton was reduced to holding a White House seminar (!) last Monday night with outside critics to figure out just where to go from here. (No luck.)

Just last month, after a year of provocation and prevarication by North Korea, Clinton had drawn the line in the sand: If North Korea unloaded plutonium-bearing fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and destroyed evidence of its past bomb building, the United States would withdraw any offer of talks and seek sanctions.

Well, within two weeks North Korea had done exactly that. Clinton, his bluff called, was forced finally to seek sanctions against North Korea. But now he has lost his nerve even for that.

Carter returns with a promise that North Korea will "freeze" future plutonium production, and Clinton then reverses himself, ignores the Yongbyon unloading he once warned was the Rubicon and prepares to drop sanctions and resume talks.

Okay, you say, another capitulation, but isn't a North Korean freeze a major concession? No. It is a sham. To safely reprocess the Yongbyon fuel rods into bomb material, the North Koreans have to wait a month or two anyway before extracting their plutonium (they bear enough for five new bombs). Why? Because the rods are now still relatively hot (radioactive). With time, they cool.

Having decided to treat Kim's accommodation to the laws of physics as a sign of conciliation to us, we have now reciprocated with a major concession of our own: high-level talks (about diplomatic recognition, trade and aid for North Korea) that we had solemnly warned could not take place if North Korea unloaded the Yongbyon reactor in the first place.

Moreover, even Carter had to admit that Kim promised not a permanent freeze but a temporary one. It would continue so long as Kim deems the United States to be negotiating in "good faith." I predict that within, oh, about two months—after the rods have cooled enough for easier bomb building—Kim will discern the first fatal signs of American bad faith and the freeze will be off.

The coalition the United States was trying to put together against North Korea is now in disarray.

But Carter—the most gullible political pilgrim since George Bernard Shaw said in 1931 of the Soviet Union, "Tomorrow I leave this land of hope and return to our Western countries of despair"—is not to blame. The real culprit is Clinton. Carter had twice before asked permission to go to North Korea to solve our problems by talking sweet reason with the planet's most megalomanic despot. Twice before, the State Department—seeing nothing but trouble—turned him down. This time, with sanctions negotiations at a delicate stage, Clinton personally approved Carter's mission.

Yet Carter has said explicitly that his intention was to destroy Clinton's sanctions option, which he thought a terrible and dangerous idea. He has succeeded. The sanctions strategy is now irreparably damaged. What weak or dependent country, what South Korea or Japan, will go along with a United States so irresolute that it allows itself to be derailed by a grandstanding ex-president who brought home nothing new?

After this display, what allies are going to join a U.S.-led coalition the next time talks break down or Kim crosses a line? You don't start and restart sanctions campaigns like a car. Why should potential coalition partners go out on a limb in the face of a belligerent neighbor, when Clinton might leave them hanging but there alone with his next change of mind, his next foreign policy seminar?

1.0

JUDY MANN

Underestimating the Rage of Women

The biggest issue among women these days is medical care. Anyone doubting that should have been in the Cannon Caucus Room last week when hundreds of women from all over the country jammed a town meeting with female members of Congress to tell good, bad and ugly stories about the health care system.

Women in Congress know how enraged women were when the General Accounting Office reported four years ago that women—as Rep. Constance A. Morella (R-Md.) put it—"are second-class citizens" when it comes to health care research and health care delivery. It launched a revolution, Morella says, that has resulted in a permanent office for women's health at the National Institutes of Health and an increase in funding for breast cancer and heart disease research.

The prospect of health care reform has generated even more militancy in the women's movement. It is fueled by a growing understanding of how women have been used and abused by the medical system, from unnecessary hysterectomies and Caesarean sections to sordid episodes of defective products made for women.

Despite the advances this growing populist movement has achieved, the U.S. Senate is once again going to provide us with a live demonstration of how big business, with its money and political clout, can steer Congress into shielding corporations from the consequences of irresponsible acts, many of which have ruined the health of millions of women.

During the next few days, the Senate is scheduled to take up the Product Liability Fairness Act. It sounds like something designed to protect consumers. In fact, it is designed to make it far more difficult for consumers to recover punitive damages from companies that manufacture defective products approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Michael Rustad, a professor of law at Suffolk University Law School, and Thomas Koening, a professor of sociology at Northeastern University, have analyzed the way product liability verdicts over the last 25 years have had different impacts on men and women. Their conclusion is that this bill would have a particularly damaging impact on the ability of women to recover punitive damages, since most of the cases that have resulted in large awards involved defective medical products placed inside women's bodies—the very products likely to need FDA approval. These are products such as the Dalkon Shield, the Cooper-7 intrauterine device, high-absorbency tampons linked to toxic shock syndrome, and silicone-gel breast implants.

Sen. Paul D. Wellstone (D-Minn.) says that for each of these products, "both the manufacturer and the federal government had information indicating the dangers posed by the product, but the products were allowed by the FDA to be marketed anyway." The agency's regulatory process is not strong enough to ensure the level of safety that the "FDA excuse" assumes, he argues.

Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen, which is leading the fight against the bill, notes that the FDA approved DES, an anti-miscarriage drug that was administered to some 10 million women between 1947 and 1971 and exposed them and their children to increased risks of cancers. Under the pending Senate bill they would not be able to collect punitive damages.

"These cases are important in terms of deterrence to manufacturers and in terms of disclosure so that the public knows, and regulatory agencies do their job right. These cases have a very broad impact."

The Product Liability Fairness Act first showed up in 1981 with the support of President Reagan. Although it would superimpose federal law over state laws, the level where these cases traditionally are tried, most conservatives are heeding the call of big business and supporting it. So are liberals from big insurance industry states. The bill has been dressed up as an attempt to reduce litigation and to keep U.S. companies competitive internationally. But in researching the facts, Rustad found only 355 product liability punitive damage awards during 25 years. The total cost to companies of awards per year is $3.5 billion, Claybrook says, "which is less than we spend on cat food."

Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), who has constituents who were DES victims, says the bill is not a reform measure; it's a way of rendering women powerless to fight an industry's "mistakes, misrepresentations and broken promises," she says.

Boxer says the bill is bad medicine for the country. Anyone with a modicum of knowledge of the women's movement should know that a vote for the measure could be a politically unhealthy thing to do.

For the Record

From remarks by Dr. Joshua Lederberg, chairman of the Defense Department report on "gulf war illness," at a department briefing yesterday:

Official reports from coalition members, and particularly the British and the French, have reported nothing comparable to what's been described in our own troops . . .

We couldn't find anything that would substantiate [the syndrome]. It's really quite important to note that there are no significant laboratory findings with respect to the individuals who remain undiagnosed. . . . There's fatigue. There's pain. There's self-reported fever. There's memory loss. These are not the kinds of things that you can get a laboratory measurement on that then gives you a clue as to what the ideological source is. So it just remains out there as a mystery in that regard . . .

But we see very similar disease in the civilian population, and I guess, if there's one other contribution that we may have made, it's correlating these findings to . . . chronic fatigue syndrome. . . . The probable common denominator is stress. The stress can be fever, a viral infection. It can be physical stress. It can be psychic stress. It's still a guess, but I think that's the one common denominator that might—one might be able to find among this—in this entire area . . .

Different names were given to those syndromes in different wars. Things like it were called soldier's heart, neurasthenia, combat fatigue, shell shock and so on. I mean, it's something we should, I think, come to expect as a fairly routine matter. Now, there are different sets of circumstances, and the kind of stress that was involved in protracted combat with well-founded fear whether you're going to survive day after day is not going to be the same thing that most of our troops experienced in Saudi Arabia, but don't underestimate the stresses that they were exposed to.

Fuel Efficiency and Foreign Trade

Peter Behr [Business, June 10] refers to the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards—requiring automakers to pay a hefty penalty unless their fleet averages at least 27.5 miles per gallon—as one of the most important U.S. environmental laws.

CAFE standards have been related to environmental protection only recently, but the fact that minivans and sport utility vehicles (now more than one-third of U.S. sales) are exempted casts doubt on the objective. How in environmental terms can it be explained that about 5 million minivans and sport utility vehicles sold each year are exempt from the requirements?

Clearly, Europe is not against the application of strong environmental protection policies in the United States. The European Union itself applies a rigorous environment protection policy. Remember that fuel taxes in Europe are much higher than in the United States, making the price of gasoline in Europe four times that of gasoline in America, leading to smaller engine sizes, better overall fuel economy and a low level of exhaust emissions.

The GATT case the European Union brought in 1992 is about fair competition between U.S.-made and imported vehicles. This objective can be ensured while maintaining or improving levels of environmental protection. The European Commission's action in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should not be misunderstood as neglect of environmental concerns in the United States or elsewhere.

GERHARD LOHAN
Trade Counselor
Delegation of the Commission
Of the European Communities
Washington

Notes to Clinton on Bosnia

By Albert Wohlstetter

Yesterday the House voted to order President Clinton to lift the U.S. arms embargo against Bosnia. The administration had told its supporters in Congress that allowing the Bosnians to be armed for their self-defense would:

(a) prolong, widen and intensify the war, and drag the U.S. into it.

But in fact, as many authorities on international law testify, the embargo in UN 713 (Sept. 1991) applied to a "Yugoslavia" that no longer exists and never had a valid application to Bosnia, a state whose independence has been recognized by the U.S., Europe and the U.N. Moreover, it was the arms embargo, requested by Slobodan Milosevic, that invited Serbian aggression by keeping his victims out-gunned. It has prolonged the war for three years so far, while its advocates have claimed the embargo would shorten it. Depriving the victims of arms invited the widening from Slovenia to Croatia to Bosnia, and now threatens to widen it further in Kosova, the Sandjak and Macedonia; and it increased the *intensity* of the genocidal slaughter.

It is the promise the U.S. has made to insert a large contingent of lightly armed ground forces in the guise of "peacekeepers," to enforce an ethnic partition between unarmed Bosnians and armed Serbs—which the United Nations and the EC have themselves stated would inevitably be unstable and unenforceable—that might drag the U.S. into a war of aggression, and on the wrong side.

(b) involve the U.S. in an infeasible program for transporting weapons that Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott says he "presumes" must match in number and caliber the heavy weapons, the medium tanks and the armored personnel carriers that have been supplied by Serbia to its proxies in Bosnia.

And *(c) that this would involve an infeasibly large and lengthy program of American soldiers training the Bosnian army in their use.*

But, in fact, what the Bosnians (and the new federation between Bosnians and Croats, whose alliance the administration has just brokered) need primarily are: light infantry weapons of the sort that can stop the tanks and armored personnel carriers of the ill-disciplined Serbian invaders, whom the Bosnians greatly exceed in number and motivation; rifles: e.g., Soviet-designed AK-47s; light and heavy machine guns; light mortars and some of more extended range; anti-tank guided missiles of the sort the U.S. provided to the Afghans; and light communications and jamming equipment of the kind that helped the Slovenian guerrilla operations rout the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav Army in less than two weeks at the start, in June 1991, of Serbia's genocidal aggression in the Balkans.

Such weapons are widely available and easy to transport. The Bosnians, who have had, for example, only one rifle for each four of its soldiers, have been receiving some such weapons since their new federation with the Croats, and this has already had an effect on turning the tide on the battlefield.

Gen. Martin Spegelj, formerly of the Yugoslav Army and former Croatian defense minister, has pointed out that Bosnians as well as Croats during their military service have been trained in the use of such weapons. To operate the Soviet-designed versions of them in particular, they will need little or no extra training.

(d) be acting unilaterally and would jeopardize relief efforts and endanger the United Nations Protection Force.

In fact, it is absurd to keep repeating that the U.S. would be acting unilaterally. One hundred and nine members of the U.N. General Assembly, including some of



our NATO partners, voted to allow Bosnia to receive arms in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense. No country voted against it.

Preventing the Bosnians from defending themselves has meant the slaughter of over 200,000 innocent men, women and children, and the maiming, torture and systematic rape of countless others. Softening this disaster slightly by sending bandages and anesthetics for surgeons forced to amputate a child's leg can hardly compensate for the continued shelling and maiming of children and other innocents. As for the dangers to the United Nations Protection Force, these have come almost exclusively from the Serbs, who haven't hesitated to harass, shoot at and take hostage the French, British, and even Russian soldiers whose operations have functioned to consolidate Serbian gains, releasing Serbian forces to seize more.

(e) jeopardize other U.N. sanctions, including those against Iraq, Haiti and Serbia.

This is the most outrageous claim of all. The sanctions against Iraq were a condition of the U.S.-led coalition's ceasing to fire at the end of Desert Storm, as well as of valid U.N. resolutions directed against Iraq rather than its victims. And also, the U.S., France and Germany—as well as the U.N. bureaucracy—are ignoring the most flagrant violations of the sanctions against Serbia. They are ignoring the network of drug smugglers, pickpockets and thieves in Europe who have been flooding Belgrade with luxury goods and hard currency. And, most outrageous, they are ignoring the thousands of vehicles that daily carry arms and supplies from Serbia to its proxies in Bosnia and Croatia, in direct violation of the *valid* embargo against Serbia embodied in UN 757.

As many Europeans and an increasing number of Americans understand, it is this that damages the reputation of the U.N. as an impartial, universal organization, and the genuine interests of Europe and the U.S. Congress should demand the enforcement of the valid embargo against Serbia's continuing supply of arms to its proxies in Bosnia and Croatia, and of the U.N.'s demand that Serbia withdraw the weapons and supplies it has sent its proxies in Bosnia.

(f) cause a rift between the U.S. and its NATO allies, and with Russia.

In fact, the interests of the U.S., of NATO and of Europe will be served only by the exercise of U.S. leadership—not by the collapse of the U.S. whenever some European government in disarray expresses misgivings. That this collapse disturbs some European governments has recently been observed by several thoughtful European experts on the defense of Western Europe. In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. led a coalition of willing NATO members and other interested powers—in spite of the fact that the Russians opposed it, the Greeks opposed it, the Belgians wouldn't sell ammunition to the British; and the French, who had opposed the use of force against Iraq, went along only when they saw that the U.S. was going to go ahead anyway with those who were willing.

The exercise of such leadership today would strengthen those democrats in Russia who oppose the resurgence of a Russian interest in dominating tens of millions of people who are against such Russian domination in the now-independent former Soviet republics. These democrats recognize that this resurgence is incompatible with the movement of Russia toward democracy and free markets.

Mr. Wohlstetter, president of the Europe-America Workshop, is University Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 23, 1994

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President

THROUGH: Anthony Lake

FROM: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Mike Oksenberg

RE: China Policy

We departed for China two weeks ago inclined to recommend that MFN be extended without precondition.

We return believing that renewal of MFN should be linked to some conditionality regarding China's human rights record over the coming twelve months.

Our views were altered by the extensive discussions in Beijing with the foreign policy community there (including lengthy sessions with Premier Li Peng and Defense Minister Chi Haotien) as well as by the impressions derived from our visits to Harbin in the northeast and to Shanghai. We saw many old friends and had several lengthy, private exchanges. The atmosphere was very relaxed, and we felt able to explore even the most sensitive topics.

I. Our Principal Conclusions

1) The domestic scene: Economically, while the performance of the past 10 years is extraordinary and the long term prospects remain quite positive, the leaders face significant immediate challenges: sustaining a high growth rate (10% per year) while curbing inflation (now about 20% per year); privatizing inefficient, state-owned enterprises while coping with the resulting unemployment; and retaining a coherent national development strategy while permitting localities to encourage their entrepreneurial talents to flourish. The leaders lack the requisite institutions to manage these challenges in sophisticated fashion. Socially, precisely because of the enormous changes of the past 15 years, the dangers of social instability are rising. They could become acute even in the near-run. Culturally, the Chinese people enjoy increasing freedom. The atmosphere is more liberal than at any time since 1949. Karaoke bars and fashion magazines are everywhere, and the cultural influences of the West, Japan, and Taiwan predominate. The younger generation has lost the patriotism, discipline, and idealism that enabled the passing generation to defeat the Japanese, unify the country, and embark on economic development. The youth are attracted to Western and East Asian popular culture

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and ideals. Politically, dissident activity is increasing because political controls have eroded. More dissidents are being arrested in part because there is more opportunity for dissident activity (such as religious proselytizing or union organizing) to occur. The communist party as a mass organization is moribund. Civil-military, central-provincial, and Party-government relations are unsettled. The political system is entering an unstable period; major changes are clearly in the offing.

2) Chinese foreign policy: In this context, the leaders are largely preoccupied with domestic affairs. While their economic successes have prompted self-confidence and even arrogance, their keen awareness of their domestic difficulties precludes concentration upon broad, strategic issues. Indeed, behind the facade, we sense a considerable sense of unease, vulnerability, and weakness. The leaders' overwhelming short-term objective is to sustain a tranquil environment. They do not wish to assume obligations that would tax their energies. They wish others to bear the responsibility for maintaining stability in the Asia Pacific region, and they seek to exact a price for cooperation even on issues of concern to them. Their ambiguous posture on North Korean nuclear issues exemplifies this. Russia is still their greatest security concern. They believe Russia has yet to abandon its imperialistic tendencies. The United States remains their preferred partner in the region militarily and economically, but they continue to doubt American intentions. Some of the leaders even believe that the American objective is to destabilize and divide China--a belief that provides added impulse to their efforts to suppress dissidents.

3) The role of Sino-American relations: Our conversations underscored the continued strategic importance that the Chinese attach to constructive Sino-American relations in the post Cold War world, but they suspect the U.S. government does not share this view. During the Cold War, this relationship proved central in countering Soviet expansionism. In the post Cold War era, they believe it remains pivotal, as it contributes to the stability of the region--and the world. We believe that the strategic importance of Sino-American relations in our overall foreign policy has not received sufficient attention in our dialogue with the Chinese. The Chinese side yearns for the status of a serious strategic partner, and it is in America's central strategic interest to reciprocate unambiguously.

4) The potential for discontinuity: Nonetheless, our conversations left us with a gnawing unease about the underlying strategies and intentions of China's leaders today or in the future. Their evasiveness on North Korea suggests their professed commitment to prevention of nuclear proliferation may be suspect. Their military attaches importance to modernization of their air force and navy. Neither on the Korean or Taiwan issues were we able to engage in meaningful exchanges with

officials, though we sense that in their foreign policy community, differences of opinion exist. The combination of likely domestic complications, political tensions, and foreign policy ambivalence means that the U.S. policy must seek to engage China strategically while subtly attempting to influence China's internal evolution.

II. Our Recommendations

First, we support an intensified and broadly focused dialogue with China's leaders, not deferring those consultations to the annual end-game negotiations over MFN, when they are bound to be tension ridden. The purpose of the dialogue should be to reassure Beijing of our intent, to review the wide range of bilateral issues (including human rights) and above all to shape Chinese strategic perceptions. After all, only when the Chinese understand how their security will be enhanced by the actions we recommend to them will they summon the will to alleviate contentious bilateral problems. There is another reason for expanding our consultations, especially between DOD and the Chinese military. Beijing is in an era of succession politics, and high level contacts yield information and influence at a decisive stage in China's evolution.

Second, we believe MFN should be renewed with a continuation of conditions on human rights performance, but with the conditions formulated in a more general form than last year. Total delinkage would be seen in Beijing as U.S. capitulation. It could even encourage a crackdown. And it would feed their own, excessive sense of their ability to shape our China policy. Selective sanctions, however, would satisfy neither our human rights community, not our businessmen, nor the Chinese, while producing an administrative nightmare. Sanctions also would enable the leaders to make the United States the scapegoat for economic difficulties they might encounter.

We believe human rights must remain a major element of our China policy. We also believe that the U.S. commitment to human rights can be couched in terms that are somewhat less threatening or offensive to the Chinese leaders. The emphasis on release of specific dissidents and on actions the Chinese need to undertake should be broadened to include activities our public and private sectors might undertake, in cooperation with the Chinese government, to assist China's political development: the fostering of a legal system; the strengthening of their judicial system; the training of journalists; and the upgrading of their parliamentary bodies.

We also believe--and Chinese confirmed--that establishment of a bilateral commission to define, monitor, and advance human rights would enhance Chinese self-esteem.

Jessica Mathews

Haiti's Problem —Or Ours?

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5.24.94

THE WASHINGTON POST TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1994

In what may be a new record, the most recent U.S. policy on Haiti, whose centerpiece is tougher sanctions, was declared futile even before it came into effect on May 21. Among widely opposing views on every other aspect of Haitian policy, all sides agreed on just one point: that the still untested sanctions would not suffice to drive Haiti's military regime from power.

Administration officials, who had just devised the policy, freely but anonymously admitted as much to reporters. Supporters of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who only a few weeks before were fiercely urging tighter sanctions, agreed. Their earlier conviction that "sanctions had never been given a chance" because the old set was too weak shifted almost overnight to the view that unmistakable readiness to use force was necessary. The president, listing reasons why an invasion would be in the U.S. interest, was described by aides as trying to build public support for military action.

If, as seems nearly certain, the sanctions don't do the job, the administration will have far fewer options than it had a few weeks ago. A policy designed to buy time and options already seems to have achieved the reverse.

Now, abandoning sanctions on the grounds that the necessary conditions for democracy don't exist today in Haiti, would seem too stark a retreat. Indefinite negotiations would seem obviously fruitless. Tightening the sanctions still further risks destabilizing the Dominican Republic and would bring unacceptable suffering for Haitians. The remaining option—unless President Aristide were to voluntarily step aside—is an invasion.

Five arguments have been advanced in favor of such a step: that U.S. values and post-Cold War global strategy demand that we "restore democracy" to Haiti; that U.S. credibility is unacceptably harmed by thugs who "thumb their noses" at us; that restoring President Aristide is the only way to reduce the number of refugees heading our way; that removing the current military leaders will reduce drug trafficking to the United States; that only such an all out-effort can dispel charges of a racist policy.

Close inspection reveals glaring weaknesses in most of these arguments. Haitian drug trafficking, for example, is not a large source of what's on America's streets. If that were motive for an invasion, a dozen other countries should come first. Other reasons offered by President Clinton—Haiti's proximity, the fact that many Haitians live here and Americans live in Haiti, and the fact that Haiti and Cuba are the only remaining non-democracies in the hemisphere—are accurate descriptions but hardly reasons for military action.

What is noteworthy about this list is that only the first argument addresses Haiti's problems; the rest address our own. Making foreign policy with an eye to domestic opinion is one thing. Making foreign policy to resolve domestic concerns with only an occasional eye to the actual problems abroad is quite another, and unlikely to end successfully.

"Restoring democracy," therefore, is the crux of the matter. But is it also a delusion? We can reinstate a freely elected president who is the choice of most Haitians. But a single election does not create a democracy. The election that brought President Aristide to power was an aberration in Haitian politics, made possible only by the presence of large teams of foreign observers. The political norm is rampant corruption, stolen or canceled elections, coups d'etat and violence.

Democracy can only be homegrown. An established democracy that has been usurped can be restored through outside force. A fledgling democracy, receptive to the rule of law and to the right of peaceful political dissent, can be helped along. But it is questionable—and worthy of a serious debate that has not occurred—whether Haiti can be lastingly helped at this point in its political evolution through armed intervention.

To leave behind a functioning democracy in Haiti, an invasion would have to: disarm the military; reinstate Aristide; prevent the traditional violent retribution against those leaving power; create Haiti's first well-trained, civilian controlled police, distinct from the military; keep order for months to years; uproot and remove anti-democractic elements of the military and economic elite; provide massive development assistance, get along with Aristide through thick and thin; help forge a moderate political consensus, and be prepared to re-intervene if it collapses.

These tasks get harder and more dangerous as the liberators become occupiers and the large initial force shrinks to a smaller number of peace enforcers. Lives will be lost to paid and random violence. At what point would the United States declare its job done?

Invasion advocates argue that it could be very early, with the longer, harder job turned over to an ad hoc international coalition or U.N. peace-keeping force. Other countries can be expected to hold a different view. Moreover, a U.N. force would have to be vetoed by the United States, since its open-ended mandate could not meet the conditions of the president's new peace-keeping policy.

If democracy cannot be restored because it hasn't previously existed in Haiti, Americans will have to decide how they feel about military action for the purpose of keeping out refugees or as a means of demonstrating the president's toughness. The threat to American credibility, however, does not come from Port-au-Prince. It lies in the possibility that we will start something we cannot finish out of little more than frustration, or become hopelessly tangled in a policy riddled with internal contradictions because it is principally designed to meet domestic imperatives.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/16

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^EDWIN YODER COLUMN<
^(Advance for Monday, May 9, 1994, and thereafter)<
^(For Yoder Clients Only)<
^By EDWIN M. YODER, JR.=

WASHINGTON--The more American foreign policy is distorted by domestic political pressures, the less candidly we can discuss the result.

Exhibit A is Haiti--a self-inflicted Clinton administration headache left over from the domestic politics of the 1992 presidential primary season. The long trek of would-be presidential nominees through dozens of state primaries (where single-issue zealots organize, while centrist voters doze) has become a nursery of nonsense.

The New York Democratic primary, with its mosaic of parochial ethnic interests and factions, is a special case of this. It was there that Bill Clinton courted the sympathizers of the Irish Republican Army. And it was there, too, that the cult of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the exiled president of Haiti, had its origins.

Aristide and his backers--notably Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, who is on a hunger strike--impudently charge that the Clinton administration is repelling Haitian boat people, who claim to be political refugees, because they are black. In fact, the reverse is closer to the truth. If poor, miserable and oppressed Haiti were mostly white, it would not and could not be a centerpiece of Democratic Party politics, hence of Clinton administration worry.

Aristide, a left-wing clergyman, may be admirable in many ways. But to look at this wispy little man, and to listen to what he says, is to recognize him as a man of the cloister, not of the political forum. No doubt the U.S. Marines could force him upon Haiti, where he won the presidential election in 1990. But for how long? Without their

(more)

indefinite protection, he would probably be dead or back in exile within weeks.

So how were Haiti, and Aristide, inflated into a major issue? In the New York primary, Bill Clinton faced a dangerous challenge on the left, making the black vote critical. For this reason in part--perhaps some principle was involved as well--he blasted George Bush's Haitian policy in unshirted terms. He was, he said, scandalized that Bush was doing what he himself is now doing--turning the Haitian boat people back at sea. It happens that the Bush policy was a defensible response to a core Republican constituency, the middle-class taxpayers of Florida, who are not eager to see Haitian refugees flood Florida and further burden the welfare and relief systems they must pay for.

You wouldn't have known it from the campaign rhetoric, but Bush's concern for Florida votes was an important consideration, as was Clinton's bid for black votes in New York. But Bush couldn't afford to explain his policy and Bill Clinton could hardly tell the whole truth about why he was attacking it.

None of this is to deny that Haiti is a problem. It has never been otherwise in this century. Restoring democracy in Haiti is a joke, inasmuch as that there is no tradition of democracy to restore. The military junta headed by Gen. Raoul Cedras and others may not be gentle custodians of Haiti, but they seem a marginal improvement upon Poppa Doc and Baby Doc Duvalier and the Tonton Macoutes. And whether nice or not so nice, they can't be brushed aside.

In short, the choices for American policy in Haiti are far more modest than the soaring debate would suggest. Aristide has taken a perverse and highhanded delight in ignoring the American politics of the Haiti issue. He has accused the president of racism and declined to make any sort of realistic deal with the several factions in Haiti without whose consent he cannot rule and who might at least accept him as a figurehead. And that is all he will ever be, for he is politically feeble.

Augmenting the economic sanctions will, as usual, intensify the squeeze on the poor and powerless, the real victims of the Haitian mess, while leaving wealthy Haitians and their military friends harmless. They manage to get what they want, and profit from getting it, from every direction and especially across the porous border with the Dominican Republic. Smuggling flourishes; and tougher sanctions are a recipe for more misery and more boat people.

Is U.S. military intervention a serious option? There was a time, before Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, when the U.S. Marines ran Haiti. If a reinvention of gunboat diplomacy is what Bill Clinton's advisers are pressing on him, he should at least be forewarned. Intervention is one way to turn a domestic headache into a bleeding ulcer.

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Diplomatic grumbles grow over Clinton foreign policy

By Paul Quinn-Judge
GLOBE STAFF

News Analysis

WASHINGTON – Some day in the not-too-distant future, CNN could begin its newscast with graphic footage of another atrocity in Haiti: bullet-riddled bodies in the street, smirking killers leaving in military vehicles.

The images would be repeated every hour on TV screens in the White House and around Washington, prompting senators to demand retribution, activists to denounce US passivity, newspapers to call for action – and US troops to quietly begin leaving the Guantanamo base in Cuba for the short ride to Haiti.

Judging from past experience, diplomats and analysts say, this could well be how the next round of President Clinton's Haiti policy is made.

While few pundits are willing to say what sort of foreign policy they would propose for the dangerously unpredictable 1990s, nearly all agree that in 18 months in office the administration has not even laid the basis for one. Western diplomats, meanwhile, say that the administration's foreign credibility has sunk to a new low.

There is "no clarity, no coherence and no coordination," an administration foreign policy official recently admitted, describing the situation as a "vacuum."

Specialists outside the administration say that Clinton's foreign policy is rapidly falling prey to what some call the "funnel effect" – a tight downward spiral of half-measures, ad hoc decisions and narrowing options leading, almost inexorably, to either humiliation or military intervention.

"It's a sort of peeling away of options: moderate measures prove ineffective, leaving you with the extremes, either intervention or capitulation," said Donald E. Schulz, associate professor of national security affairs at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute.

Clinton himself vehemently rejects allegations that he has no foreign policy.

"If you want to say that this administration has not waved a magic wand and solved all the problems that I dealt with that I was given when I came to office, that's one thing," he said at a press conference yesterday. His administration, he said, had shown "remarkable consistency" in foreign affairs.

Clinton's detractors disagree. They point to a pattern of half-measures or wild swings in US policy – the abrupt withdrawal from Somalia, ineffective sanctions in Haiti, perfunctory air strikes in Bosnia – that have led local leaders in those countries to assume that the United States can be outmaneuvered or manipulated. They are usually proven correct, Schulz says.

The Clinton White House seems profoundly susceptible to outside pressures, from the media or from a sudden dramatic turn of events, observers say.

Protest, hunger strike

Protests by black congressional leaders and a hunger strike by the activist Randall Robinson are credited with having prompted the change in policy last week in policy on repatriation of Haitian refugees. Footage of destructive shelling of a market in Sarajevo in February caused a similar change in Bosnia policy. Images of starving children took US troops to Somalia, and images of defiled American corpses brought them out.

"You can't say that Clinton is more sensitive than George Bush to CNN," said the administration official. But Bush had a clear-cut foreign policy. "With Clinton there is no skeleton, so it's easier for press coverage to blow him into a decision."

The decisions are piling up. Even before the Haiti crisis has reached its climax, another grim challenge is looming. North Korea's drive to develop nuclear weapons threatens to be the most nightmarish foreign-policy crisis yet. North Korea may already possess a nuclear weapon, and there are 36,000 US soldiers in harm's way on the Korean peninsula.

The United States says it will seek economic sanctions if North Korea is found to have diverted more nuclear fuel for military purposes. Pyongyang calls that an act of war. American specialists, meanwhile, are not sure economic sanctions will work on North Korea.

Skeptical view

New sanctions against Haiti, which will take effect tomorrow, are viewed by many specialists here with equal skepticism. Analysts inside and outside the administration warn that the measures do not stop fuel crossing from the neighboring Dominican Republic and are thus almost certain to fail. Sanctions will cause more pain for Haiti's already impoverished masses, but they will be little more than an inconvenience for the military junta that overthrew the country's democratically elected president 2½ years ago.

Failure this time, however, will push the administration further down the funnel, specialists say, forcing Washington either to invade or draft another policy – to the detriment of US credibility.

Washington's credibility in foreign policy has al-

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ready sunk to an unprecedented low, western diplomats say.

In a recent visit to the capital, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe barely attempted to conceal his disdain for the administration's vacillation on major issues such as Bosnia and Haiti.

Speaking privately, however, a senior European diplomat was even more scathing: "The Clinton administration's foreign policy has combined concern for the problems of the world with such inconsistency that, where it has tried to solve a problem, it has ended by dragging it out and leading to more loss of life," he said.

A joke among diplomats

A senior diplomat from another US ally said Washington's "ad hoc foreign policy" was understandable given the confused nature of the post-Soviet world. He added, though, that "the joke in the diplomatic community is that Clinton's biggest foreign success has been getting Singapore to reduce Michael Fay's sentence from six lashes to four."

The administration admits it is swamped. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, crises have broken out at regular intervals in parts of the world that were foreign-policy backwaters for much of the past half-century: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and now Rwanda. "The one thing that the crises have in common," a Pentagon official remarked, "is that they occur in places that you can't find on a map."

The result, wrote Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a recent article is that "we have less time to think before we act."

Most analysts agree that the collapse of the Soviet Union has presented Clinton with a geopolitical challenge of unprecedented complexity. But few feel that this lets him off the hook.

"It would have been hard for anyone to have a coherent view of what is happening in the world right now," said Eliot A. Cohen, professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University. "But what's so striking about this administration is that the process has been so chaotic and undisciplined."

From Boston Globe Page 3

Kennedy move advances health bill

By Peter G. Gosselin
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON – Sen. Edward M. Kennedy orchestrated a compromise yesterday in his effort to push a version of President Clinton's health plan through a Senate committee. But the agreement came at the expense of committee members at odds over what they had just approved.

The compromise, at the end of a second day of bill-drafting by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, of which Kennedy is chairman, was an object lesson in how Washington works and how the president's plan is being inched forward, one legislative maneuver at a time.

Kennedy was jubilant over the unanimous committee approval, which sidetracked a Republican move that would have snatched away Congress' right to decide what health benefits would be available to all Americans. Under the compromise, Congress would retain the right, but its handiwork would be reviewed by an independent commission to see if Washington could afford to pay for the benefits without running in the red.

"One small step for health care, one giant leap for bipartisanship," the Massachusetts Democrat asserted of the committee vote.

But the problem was that, in the aftermath of the vote, committee members could not agree on what powers they had just given the commission to handle instances in which Congress was overgenerous.

Some lawmakers said in interviews that they thought they had granted the commission only the power to recommend benefit cutbacks or increases in copayments, deductibles and other amounts that individuals must pay. But other legislators insisted they also had given the panel the right to cut insurance company premiums, doctor fees and hospital charges to bring benefit costs back into line.

Asked why lawmakers would agree to the compromise when they were so at odds over what it meant, Republican Sen. James M. Jeffords of Vermont offered this explanation: "It was a way to show unanimity. Without the ambiguity there would have been no unanimity."

Sen. Jeff Bingaman, the New Mexico Democrat who worked out details of the compromise with GOP colleagues, said that committee members would "have to do something to clarify what we meant."

Ambiguous or not, the compromise served a string of political purposes for Kennedy and other defenders of the president's plan:

- It suggested that the Labor committee, which appeared headed for deadlock in its first day of bill-drafting Wednesday, may yet be able to act.
- It advertised the fact that Kennedy, who has been thought by some to be a liberal zealot on health, is ready to bargain.
- And perhaps most important on a day when Clinton's plan seemed headed for trouble elsewhere, it hinted at congressional action to come.

The trouble elsewhere was clearest at the House Ways and Means Committee, which also is considering health legislation.

The committee spent the day in a holding pattern, with staff members reading details of legislation to the panel as members sought to work out a compromise bill.

Meanwhile, lawyers for the committee's chairman, Rep. Dan Rostenkowski, were reportedly trying to strike a plea bargain with federal prosecutors that would assure the Illinois Democrat does not go to prison and might retain his chairmanship. Rostenkowski has been the target of a two-year investigation of political corruption.

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Clinton Speaks Loudly and Carries a Tv

By Karen Elliott House

In the front row at President Nixon's funeral last week sat five U.S. presidents, each put in office primarily to deal with America's domestic agenda. Yet each, whether by action, reaction or inaction, left a presidential legacy largely defined by issues beyond America's borders.

Bill Clinton, the latest self-defined domestic president, believes he is different. But every day the odds grow greater that he is wrong.

The Clinton qualities that seem to work so well on television talk shows and even with Congress—his charm, capacity to compromise, cleverness in telling constituencies what they want to hear—are not the qualities that impress friends or foes abroad. To win U.S. elections requires a mere plurality of a popular vote. But to win respect around the world requires strategies and actions that are credible (if not successful) nearly 100% of the time. It is the 1%, the Saddam Hussein or Kim Il Sung or Slobodan Milosevic, who have the capacity to upset plans and priorities. Unfortunately, in foreign affairs an angry minority all too often rules.

Mr. Clinton, smiling and jiving through his first 18 months as commander in chief, from Bosnia to Haiti to China, seems oblivious to the chaos he is sowing and to the consequences he could reap even before 1996. In the political terms that he understands so well, the evidence was all around him as he spoke at President Nixon's funeral.

Jimmy Carter

There sat Jimmy Carter, who entered office with high-minded principles of human rights and an aversion to wielding American power. Four years later, despite success at Camp David, he was gone as Soviet troops marauded through Afghanistan and American diplomats sat blindfolded in Tehran.

Next to Mr. Carter sat the inheritor of an America held hostage, Ronald Reagan, who rode into the presidency pledging to restore respect for America. Americans then, as now, were primarily interested in jobs, taxes and other domestic issues. Then, as now, they were disinclined to play policeman to the world. But, by much the same instinct that leads Americans to become fed up with unsafe neighborhood streets, they understood there is a level of global chaos and violence that makes America unsafe. And this they do not tolerate.

Americans don't expect Mr. Clinton to fashion a tidy and total world order. But they do hold their presidents accountable when chaos mounts to a level that threatens a nebulous concept called national interest. Presidents can be excused for finding this unfair. For some years, they can coast along fulfilling domestic expectations as defined by public opinion pollsters, and then, wham, along comes some distant crisis—an invasion of an ally or 52 Americans held hostage—that public opinion decides is unacceptable. At its core, what this reflects is a public sense that America must remain respected and must, when it matters, be in control.

As America entered this century it was led by a president, Theodore Roosevelt, whose maxim was "Speak softly and carry a big stick." As America exits this century, it is led by a president whose maxim appears to be, "Speak loudly and carry a twig."

The paradox of Mr. Clinton is that he is smart enough to understand America is inextricably linked to trends and events beyond its borders; so far, however, he hasn't been wise enough to recognize his rhetoric must have some connection to realities.

When Mr. Clinton says the U.S.-China relationship is essential to a stable world order, but is ready to sacrifice it to the fate of Tibetan dissidents; when he says Serbian aggression in Bosnia is unacceptable, but accepts it; when he says Jean-Bertrand Aristide must be restored to the presidency of Haiti, but allows a clique of Haitian colonels to prevent it; when he says North Korea won't be permitted to build nuclear bombs, but mutely watches his defense secretary confirm Pyongyang has one—when rhetoric is so discordant with realities—our president is misleading the world's aggressors and confusing the American people.

A pattern of this ends up emboldening the former and frustrating the latter. And that is bad for both America's national interests and President Clinton's political survival.

Imagine a Symposium on Global Mischief. The speakers are Saddam Hussein, Kim Il Sung, Lt. Col. Michel Francois and Slobodan Milosevic. The invited audience is an assortment of bullies and prospective pirates: Iranian and Algerian fundamentalists, Russian reactionaries, Chinese military hard-liners, Third World tyrants and random terrorists. But there also are a variety of sane and law-abiding leaders auditing these lectures: assertive prime ministers of confident Asian states like Singapore and Malaysia, timid West European leaders from Germany to Britain, heads of fragile new nations from Latvia to Kazakhstan and, most important, leaders of dependent U.S. allies like South Korea and Turkey.

What invitees and auditors are learning is the all-too-obvious lesson that America neither says what it means nor means what it says—that there is no price to be paid for defying the world's leading power. No single misstep is all that consequential. But it is the repeated juxtaposition and cumulative effect of rhetorical excess and political/military impotence that emboldens adventurers and frightens friends.

Beyond this obvious lesson, there is a subtler and more important message at the meeting: Even in those parts of the world where American interests are obvious, American strategy is absent.

For instance, an administration that proclaims that America's interests lie with ascendant Asia has mired itself in bitter disputes with Japan over trade and China over human rights. The point here is not that the U.S. must go along to get along, but rather to define what issues are worth disputing in the larger context of relationships worth preserving. With China, for example, the larger strategic context should be America's cooperation in helping China build a vibrant free market economy in exchange for China's cooperation in curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is in contrast to a doomed and self-defeating policy of cutting off trade in order to free political prisoners.

In Western Europe, encouraging European unity and strengthening the Atlantic alliance presumably are America's goals. But on an issue like Bosnia, which challenges both goals, the U.S. these days simply lines up with whoever has the lowest common denominator of political will. Essentially the Clinton policy is bob and weave. It hides behind a fearful NATO, which in turn hides behind a feckless United Nations, thereby letting a Japanese U.N. bureaucrat in Bosnia dictate American policy. This, as opposed to a forthright U.S. policy of punishing Serbian aggression at its source in Serbia or at least insisting that the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims be dropped.

In the former Soviet Union, where American interests lie in supporting the forces of democracy and free markets in Russia and in former satellite states, the U.S. seems content to support the status quo by kowtowing to whoever occupies the Kremlin. If Boris Yeltsin says the nations of Eastern Europe don't belong in NATO, the Clinton administration demurs, rather than insisting it is East Europe's choice, not Russia's.



Bill Clinton

Absent a strategy for dealing with these larger issues and credibility in dealing with the smaller crises, the Clinton administration stands vulnerable to a variety of risks. Almost invariably, the one we cannot now predict is the one that will emerge to threaten America—and Bill Clinton's re-election.

It could be a military coup in Russia, or simply a Russian invasion of Ukraine; it could be a fundamentalist victory in Algeria that spreads through Egypt and North Africa; it could be America's old nemesis Iran, in economic shambles, using newly acquired Chinese weaponry to threaten Persian Gulf neighbors to boost oil prices; or it could be an isolated and intransigent Kim Il Sung assuming that the U.S. is a paper tiger and using one of his weapons on South Korea. The one predictable point is that such crises never occur at times or places of one's choosing.

But the best way to avoid facing and failing such tests is to set a clear strategy on the larger issues and to build a credible record of dealing, at least selectively, with the smaller ones. For example, few were under any illusions where Ronald Reagan stood on the largest foreign policy issue of his presidency—the "evil empire," as he called the Soviet Union. And, as a result of successful intervention in selective hot spots like Grenada and Libya, he put the world's pirates off balance enough to wonder whether adventurism would pay. George Bush made the same point on a larger scale in Kuwait.

Lack of Capability

Beyond a lack of international credibility, Mr. Clinton also will face a lack of military capability when his moment of crisis comes. Having steadily slashed military spending, he will be fortunate if remaining military strength can deal with one minor crisis, let alone the simultaneous crises previous presidents maintained the military might to meet.

Nor can he count on any strength from his foreign policy team, which increasingly is ridiculed around the world. A world that looked on men like Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Jim Baker and even Cyrus Vance with respect, if not always accord, now looks upon Secretary of State Warren Christopher most charitably as the hapless exponent of a feckless foreign policy.

Mr. Clinton would be well advised, if only for his own political fortunes, to replace his foreign policy team, arrest the nation's military decline and begin rebuilding American credibility abroad.

Ms. House is vice president, international, of Dow Jones & Co.

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If This Is Mail Fraud, Then Most Lawyers Are Guilty

Rule of Law

By Richard W. Painter

Imagine you are a prominent takeover lawyer. A corporation retains you to help with a hostile bid. Your client's CEO asks you to keep the impending bid confidential and not to mention takeover-related work in your bills. Because your firm specializes in takeovers, you send bills seeking payment "for services rendered" on the letterhead of a partner who does commercial litigation.

You also do lobbying work. An officer of another corporation asks you to lobby Congress. The lobbying is perfectly legal, but, once again, your client prefers that it be confidential. You are requested to send bills similar to those you sent to your takeover client.

In both situations, you know the work you are doing is legal. You also know that the requested billing arrangements should prevent, among other things, clerical workers from calling up stockbrokers during their lunch hour and your client's lobbying activities from appearing on the front page of some newspaper. The requests sound reasonable, so you do the work, send the bills and get paid.

The Justice Department has news for you—you mailed "misleading" bills to your clients and are therefore guilty of mail fraud. This may sound fanciful, but it's not. *United States v. Armand D'Amato* is a real case, and unless the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturns his mail fraud conviction in the Eastern District of New York, Mr. D'Amato will go to prison and be disbarred. His appeal is scheduled to be heard in June.

Between 1986 and 1988, Mr. D'Amato lobbied members of Congress, including the staff of his brother, New York Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, at the request of Charles Gardner, a vice president of Unisys Corp. Mr. D'Amato's law firm sent Unisys four bills, on the letterhead of a name partner, for "Professional Services Rendered Re: Monthly Retainer." While someone might make the case that his actions were questionable, Mr. D'Amato did not violate any law in providing lobbying services and did not kick back funds to anyone. He did all the work requested of him and all payments to his firm were properly accounted for in Unisys's books of account.

Mr. D'Amato's bills did not expressly state that he was engaged in lobbying, but neither did these bills expressly describe any of his activities. As the trial judge, Jacob Mishler, observed, "maybe one out of 100 [lawyers] would say no" to the billing arrangement at issue in this case.

Nonetheless, the jury decided it was mail fraud, a crime that requires, among other things, that the defendant deprive another person of property. Judge Mishler, in charging the jury, said that Unisys shareholders could be "deprived of a property interest based upon the failure of the books of the corporation to disclose complete and accurate information."

Mr. D'Amato's bills, the prosecution argued, failed to disclose his lobbying activities and thus contributed to the inaccuracy of Unisys's internal records. It did not matter that Mr. Gardner, and other senior managers of Unisys, knew that Mr. D'Amato was billing for lobbying activities, and it did not matter that the lobbying was perfectly legal. Nor did it matter that Mr. D'Amato's lobbying would never have come to the attention of shareholders, through SEC filings or otherwise, even if it had been described in bills buried in some corporate file drawer. As the New York Civil Liberties Union points out in its brief supporting Mr. D'Amato's appeal, the prosecution has succeeded in applying the mail fraud statute "well beyond the concealment of economically material information."

According to this logic, nothing matters but the fact that Mr. D'Amato could have provided more detailed information. Yet legal bills often seek to preserve confidential client information. If Mr. D'Amato's conviction is upheld on appeal, just about every corporate lawyer could be guilty of fraud. At the very least, other lawyers will know that bills for lobbying and similar activities had better have the "L" word written all over them.

> ***Armand D'Amato's bills did not expressly state that he was engaged in lobbying, but neither did these bills expressly describe any of his activities.***

The Supreme Court just last month barred civil suits against attorneys, accountants and others for aiding and abetting securities fraud, because such suits are not expressly authorized by statute. Criminal liability for mail fraud, however, if Mr. D'Amato's conviction is upheld, could be imposed in the most extraneous circumstances on anyone remotely connected with inaccurate corporate records. The prosecution's reading of the mail fraud statute, according to the New York Civil Liberties Union, "would reach so much day-to-day corporate activity as to render the statute entirely open-ended." Open-ended criminal statutes violate due process, and the mail fraud statute applied to Mr. D'Amato is open-ended beyond bounds of both reason and predictability.

Indeed, if Mr. D'Amato's conviction is sustained, imaginative prosecutors could use the mail fraud statute to create a host of new criminal prohibitions out of principles of corporate governance. After all, prosecutors secured Mr. D'Amato's conviction by arguing that shareholders have a "property" right protected by the mail fraud statute in the absolute accuracy of corporate books and records.

By the prosecution's reasoning, shareholders should also have a mail fraud property right to directors and officers acting in accordance with their fiduciary duty. Prosecutors and courts creating property rights under the mail fraud statute and imposing jail sentences thus could do something Congress so far has refused to do—federalize and criminalize corporate law.

Lawyers who engage in criminal activity should be prosecuted. However, it is not criminal for lawyers to omit description of perfectly legal activity from their bills, particularly when corporate officers request them to do so. If Unisys had sued Mr. D'Amato for misrepresentation, the corporation would have had to show that it was misled, something difficult to prove where, as here, no employee of Unisys testified that he or she was deceived by anything Mr. D'Amato did or said.

In Mr. D'Amato's case, the Justice Department pursued with vengeance a lawyer who did nothing illegal, and whose services were not even remotely connected with criminal activity by his client. Groups as diverse as the New York Civil Liberties Union, the New York State Bar Association and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have come to his defense.

It is not altogether clear why prosecutorial discretion, or indiscretion, led the Justice Department in such a wayward direction. Could it have had something to do with the fact that Mr. D'Amato's brother is a U.S. senator?

Mr. Painter is an assistant professor of law at the University of Oregon.

Gorazde Cease-Fire Is Irrelevant

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 1994

By Bernard E. Trainor

CAMBRIDGE, Mass.

Although the Clinton-NATO ultimatum on Bosnia has led to a Serb pullback from Gorazde, it has put compassion on a collision course with reality.

While the U.S. and Russia pledged yesterday to strive for a diplomatic solution to the war, that solution must recognize the Serbs' supremacy on the battlefield.

Spreading the protective wing of NATO airpower over the Muslim enclaves has ended the slaughter at Gorazde, as it did at Sarajevo. But the move is strategically and militarily irrelevant.

A Serb cease-fire will not change the fact that the Serbs, in a well-planned and executed strategy, have "cleansed" eastern Bosnia of their Muslim enemies. The Serbs drove the Muslims from their land and penned them in valley towns surrounded by Serb-controlled mountains. Gorazde and the other towns where the Muslims cluster are called "safe havens" but really are prisoner-of-war camps. Even though the Serbs have stopped shooting into them, the Muslims' plight has not changed.

The Serbs have won the war. Focus on that.

The Muslims depend on humanitarian aid delivered by the United Nations forces. But to provide it, the poorly armed blue helmets must negotiate passage with the Serbs. Even under air attacks, the Serbs can impede, even stop, substantial aid from reaching the "safe havens."

There is no need for the Serbs to capture the isolated towns. Sooner or later, the difficulty of sustaining the aid will make it necessary to evacuate the Muslims to Muslim territory further West. The sooner this deal can be struck, the better. Air attacks won't help. The Serbs are canny fighters. They can disperse and hide heavy weapons; supply dumps and command posts can be hidden. The Serbs can also strike back. Anti-aircraft ambushes can be expected in the mountains, and aircraft will be shot down, as a British Harrier was. The harder the Serbs are hit from the air, the more they will have an incentive to retaliate against U.N. soldiers on the ground.

Despite President Clinton's disclaimers, U.N. and NATO losses in the air and on the ground might well create an irresistible impulse to introduce ground combat forces. We could end up in the very war we have sought to avoid.

President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher both indicated that air strikes are intended to inflict pain on the Serbs in order to bring them to their senses. History tells us such thinking is a pipe dream. Since the advent of air power, bombing alone has only stiffened the resolve of a resolute enemy. No political objective has ever been achieved by air power alone.

Misapplication of force can be worse than no force at all. Not only is an air campaign likely to be ineffective, it is bound to raise the Muslims' hopes that NATO, the U.N. and U. S. will join the fray in their behalf.

Having suffered and lost so much, they are unlikely to negotiate a settlement based on the status quo if they think the international community will enter the war on their side, especially if President Clinton's proposal to lift the arms embargo comes to pass. It is a certain prescription for a longer and bloodier civil war.

The Serbs have won that war. The best we can hope is to convince them to settle for their gains and to press the Bosnians to accept their defeat. Allied energies should focus on that goal, not prolonging the agony through bombing.

The argument that the U.N., NATO and U.S. lose credibility in proportion to the size of a Serb victory is nonsense. The Persian Gulf War is ample evidence of credibility when military action stands a chance of success. That is not the case in Bosnia.

The failure of a just peace is no defeat for the international community. Rather, it is the defeat of the notion that outside powers can pacify a bankrupt state festering with age-old animosities.

Not only is President Clinton in danger of making the U.S. a party to a civil war, by drawing the sword on behalf of the Muslims he would make us morally responsible for the defense and well-being of a million people for a long time to come.

Bernard E. Trainor, a retired marine general, is director of national security programs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

A Step Toward Gift Reform

Yesterday the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee took an important step toward cleaning up a long-festering Congressional scandal: the gifts that lobbyists and other powerful interests give to lawmakers.

But in the process of doing so, a number of senators expressed resentment that anyone should think tighter restrictions are needed. From the standpoint of government ethics or personal self-awareness, the committee's discussion was not very reassuring.

On the table was a promising measure that would set strict new limits on the expensive meals, resort vacations and other dubious perks that special interests now bestow on members, all in pursuit of legislative advantage.

With a floor vote scheduled next week on a competing gift ban measure if the committee did not act, it was clear the issue was not going away. So in the end, the committee voted to approve the bill. In the process, its members gave the cause of serious gift reform a firm, if grudging, shove forward.

The measure, sponsored by Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, is a revised version of the strong gift-ban bill that three other Democratic Senators — Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, Paul Wellstone of Minnesota and Russell Feingold of Wisconsin — put in the hopper a few weeks back.

In a real advance, the Levin bill would change House and Senate rules to bar any gifts from registered lobbyists, and impose a new $20 limit on gifts from anyone else. Lobbyists' donations to members' legal defense funds would be prohibited, as would the free golf, tennis and ski vacations lobbyists now share with members in the guise of charity fund-raising events.

The Levin measure still has problems. It would permit special interests to contribute to a member-controlled foundation. An exemption provided for meals and entertainment in a lawmaker's home state could invite abuse. But over all, the bill is an impressive response to a genuine ethics problem, and a big improvement over the weak gift measure passed last month by the House.

Mr. Levin, who originally fought including any new gift limits or even enhanced gift disclosure in his broader lobbyist registration bill, has now taken a lead in trying to make the proposed gift ban part of the law.

The measure is scheduled for a vote by the full Senate next week. But the overriding challenge will be to get the Senate gift-ban approach accepted as part of the final House-Senate conference on lobbyist registration and gift reform legislation.

There is now a rare chance to move Congress to a higher standard of ethics. But it will happen only if the House Democratic leadership removes any procedural roadblocks, and if Mr. Levin stands his ground.

Democracy Won

By Craig Charney

JOHANNESBURG

Just before Nelson Mandela debated President F. W. de Klerk earlier this month, I asked one of Mr. Mandela's advisers, "Are you nervous?"

"Of course," he replied, chuckling. "After all, he's only 40 points ahead!"

As South Africans vote in their first multiracial elections this week, the question is not who will win but what it will mean. The African National Congress is a shoo-in — but will real democracy replace white minority rule? Despite months of tension during the campaign, terrorism in recent days and some disorganization during the vote, I think the answer is yes.

Rather than being propelled toward civil war by its cultural and ethnic diversity, South Africa has shown that it has the makings of a wobbly but workable, wheeling-and-dealing, pluralist democracy. The grass-roots movements that fought apartheid have given birth to a new political balance.

Ideological contrasts between the main parties — the A.N.C. and Mr. de Klerk's National Party — are less sharp than many outsiders realize. The parties differ not on absolutes but on questions of more-or-less, and there are many signs that their constituencies are beginning to accept a common nationhood.

Indeed, South Africa's experience may offer a broader lesson to other new democracies. Political analysts usually suggest that a successful transition from authoritarian rule requires a passive electorate, combined with cozy back-room dealing by insiders. But perhaps the crucible of genuine democracy lies in conflict and diverse social movements.

The roots of the new political alignment go deeper. The intense local struggles against apartheid in the 1980's forged a common South African political identity, forcing the legalization of the A.N.C. in 1990. Since then, the anti-apartheid movement's protests, boycotts and general strikes demonstrated that Mr. de Klerk could not ignore it. But neither could the National Party, with its strong base in the white, Indian and mixed-race communities, be wished away by A.N.C. followers.

True, polls show that the most important factor in South Africans' voting preferences remains racial and ethnic identity. Around 75 percent of blacks support the A.N.C., while the majority of whites back the National Party. In the mixed-race minority, those who identify with whites back the National Party, while those who identify with blacks tend to support the A.N.C. Classic left-right issues, such as attitudes toward redistributing wealth or federalism, have little impact on party preference.

Yet the consequence is not Bosnian-style polarization, but a hard-fought balance of power among leaders who accept the new South Africa. Despite the demagogy, Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk have joined hands — symbolically during their TV debate and in their commitment to a government of national unity after the vote. The search for common ground extends to black and white leaders in other walks of life as well. After consulting business, government and labor leaders, the A.N.C. put its 150-page Reconstruction and Development Program through seven rewrites. Now even Rudolf Gouws, chief economist at Rand Merchant Bank, says, "It is something I can start to identify with."

Indeed, although South Africa has hardly done away with ideology, the A.N.C. is moving to center-left, the National Party to center-right. Consider the A.N.C.'s formula for economic growth: investor confidence, government aid to small businesses and public works. The National Party's formula? Investor confidence, aid to small businesses and controlling inflation.

> A hard-fought balance of power in South Africa can make political pluralism work.

Surveys show that blacks and whites have a remarkably similar outlook: both groups tend to be conservative on values, liberal on economics. A large majority of both blacks and whites favor respect for authority and the work ethic, and oppose abortion. But there is also support for active government, a welfare safety net and stricter pollution controls.

In a land that has known few bonds between black and white, signs of a common nationalism can be found even in TV ads and on billboards, which increasingly show blacks and whites working and socializing together. Judging by polling results and anecdotal evidence, most black South Africans display remarkable good will toward whites.

And whites, though nervous, are also getting used to the changes. Two-thirds of them voted in 1992 in a referendum for a negotiated political settlement. In a survey last month, 90 percent said they "could accept an A.N.C.-led government, if it lets us get on with our lives."

To many observers, the democratic transition nevertheless seemed imperiled by ethnic violence, until the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party agreed last week to take part in the election. In March, a few thousand armed Inkatha marchers paralyzed downtown Johannesburg and clashed with the A.N.C in an incident that left 34 dead; more than 300 people have died since then in Inkatha's home province of Natal despite the Government's declaration of a state of emergency there.

But the "Zulu threat" that until recently dominated U.S. news coverage of the elections has probably been exaggerated all along. The dramatic TV images of weapon-laden Zulus facing armored personnel carriers in Natal obscured the fact that Inkatha supporters number perhaps 7 percent of the population, and are in the minority among Zulus. According to United Nations observers, 85 to 90 percent of the country remained peaceful in the months leading up to the election.

By focusing on the violence in Natal, the media also failed to note the momentum the electoral process had developed around the country. More than 22 million potential voters have followed the campaign through TV, radio, newspapers or contact with door-to-door canvassers. Only 3 percent of eligible voters were missed by nonpartisan voter education campaigns. Nor has the momentum been halted by the terrorist attacks this week.

Of course, it would be naïve to think that South Africa's first taste of democracy has had no sour moments. Both the National Party and the A.N.C. had meetings disrupted and supporters intimidated. The situation has been worst in Natal, where 40 percent of blacks live in areas where either the A.N.C. or the Inkatha Freedom Party could not campaign freely because of violent opposition. South Africa has a long history of racism and intolerance, and it will take time for it to be cured of these viruses.

Indeed, the voting process itself may be chaotic in places and might have to be extended. Yesterday, when votes were cast by the elderly, the disabled and workers in essential services, ballots were not delivered on time at many points around the country.

After the vote, Mr. Mandela's Government will face greater challenges. Billions will be needed to address the desperate basic needs in black communities, like housing, water, electricity, schools and health care. The situation is complicated by South Africa's increasing foreign debt, Government mismanagement of the economy and the lingering effects of international sanctions, all of which have helped push per capita income down to 1967 levels.

The Government's capacity to meet basic needs will thus depend on its ability to restore growth and move from an economy based on gold, coal and diamond exports to a value-added economy, one based on manufacturing for export, like such other middle-income countries as Mexico and Brazil.

Yet it must be remembered that South Africa is a third-world country, and it should be judged accordingly. While it is true that 10,000 people have died here in political clashes since 1990, the wonder is not that the transition from apartheid to democracy has been so violent but that it has been so peaceful.

Compared with other third-world countries, South Africa is fortunate to have relatively strong parties, responsible leaders and an emerging political system that has institutionalized mutual respect born out of collective organization and struggle. During the uncertain months before the election, inspiration has alternated with perspiration. Today, as South Africans vote, there is more reason to hope for democracy than to fear a descent into chaos.

Craig Charney, who teaches political science at Yale, is studying social movements in South Africa. He directed election polling for the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 1994

Clinton Abroad: All Politics Is Local

Potomac Watch

By Paul A. Gigot

Winston Churchill, surveying the 1930s from political exile, described a Britain "descending incontinently, fecklessly, the stairway which leads to a dark gulf."

There are no Nazis in the 1990s, just lesser thugs. But Bill Clinton is nonetheless descending his own foreign policy stairway, walking America down a path of eroding credibility. U.S. prestige, built over a decade from Grenada to Libya through the fallen Berlin Wall and the Gulf War, is being squandered step by step in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Korea and so on.

How has this happened? Do not blame the Joint Chiefs; they are reluctant to fight in Bosnia but would salute if they saw the political will. Chairman John Shalikashvili doesn't have the Colin Powell-like stature to resist a determined president. Anthony Lake has been right all along about the Serbs but still can't persuade his president to read a security briefing every day. Warren Christopher, burned on Bosnia a year ago, has decided his legacy will come as a Mideast envoy.

No, this buck stops in the West Wing, with political advisers and a president who believe in the Greenberg Doctrine. Pollster Stan Greenberg, earning his $2 million a year (or 10 times what George Bush paid for polls), is effectively moonlighting as Mr. Clinton's Henry Kissinger.

The Greenberg Doctrine isn't simply that domestic matters should dominate foreign policy. This is part of it and by itself would even be defensible. But like his Baby Boom peer and president, Mr. Greenberg is more politically complicated.

As a child of JFK's 1960s and observer of Reagan's 1980s, he knows Americans want their president to appear to lead the world; Buchananite isolationism is not a majority view. So one Greenberg tenet is to continue to speak the traditional presidential language of "enlargement," "engagement" and "leadership." But as a liberal child of Vietnam, too, he is extremely wary of risking the political capital necessary to fulfill such lofty aims. Thus the Greenberg Doctrine, which is to speak loudly but try like hell not to use a stick.

While this may play at home for a while, it has unraveled abroad because it marries Wilsonian rhetoric with Warren Harding means. It commits U.S. prestige without the will to follow through. So in Bosnia Mr. Clinton has continued to speak the language of intervention, without actually facing up to the consequences.

NATO's Gorazde bombing, indeed, was dential involvement. The matter was delegated to NATO and the United Nations by advisers who didn't want to distract their leader from health care. When the bombing first seemed to work, there was much private White House gloating that it had knocked Whitewater from the headlines. But after the Serbs called the bombers' bluff, it became clear the Clintonites had given no thought to what might happen next.

Regarding another mess, Haiti, one U.S. senator said this week that "President Clinton is a good and decent human being . . . but this policy towards Haiti is unconscionable. . . . The U.S. policy says one thing but does just the opposite." Republican John McCain? No, Tom Harkin, Iowa Democrat and liberal.

Mr. Harkin has figured out a Greenberg Corollary, which is that all foreign policy is a subset of domestic politics. Mr. Clinton's Haiti experts understand that U.S. sanctions aren't impressing the island's military rulers but are impoverishing its peasants. But liberals in Congress won't abide lifting sanctions, so look for Mr. Clinton to placate the liberals soon and toughen sanctions.

Congress in particular must be appeased under this corollary, especially if a member can help on health care. Thus the White House allows Irish radical Gerry Adams into the U.S. to please Ted Kennedy, even though this infuriates the same British Mr. Clinton might need to lift a Bosnian arms embargo. The State Department urges recognition of Macedonia, which abuts the Bosnian inferno, but the White House says no to satisfy Maryland Sen. Paul Sarbanes. And while most of his senior advisers think that revoking China's trade status would be dumb, Mr. Clinton still defers to trade hawk George Mitchell.



Stan Greenberg

The irony here is that decisions made to husband political capital in this way could squander it in the long run. "Bill Clinton was right that foreign and domestic policy are indivisible," says Will Marshall, erstwhile Clinton speechwriter and head of the Progressive Policy Institute. "People make a judgment about Bill Clinton as a leader that carries over to domestic politics."

Mr. Greenberg surely knows this, which is one reason why Mr. Clinton was suddenly paying more attention to Bosnia this week. But his latest proposal feels like another halfway step, a Greenbergian stab at the appearance of leadership laced with caveats about what "our allies will agree with."

All of which would seem to offer opportunity for the loyal opposition. In May 1978, all 38 Republican senators united to issue a blistering critique of Carter foreign policy. But when Bill Kristol talked to GOP senators last weekend about Clinton foreign policy, most replied that the public doesn't care. Apparently they believe in the Greenberg Doctrine, too.

Digital Music Transmissions Could Face Additional Royalties Under Proposal

By JEFFREY A. TRACHTENBERG
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NEW YORK – Legislation pending before Congress could affect the burgeoning new market for digital music transmissions over cable-television wires.

The legislation is sparking heated debate in the music industry because it would require that recording artists and record companies receive royalties for such transmissions. U.S. copyright law provides royalty payments only to composers and music publishers for the sale of albums.

While record companies support the legislation, music publishers – some of which are units of record companies – oppose it because they fear any new record-company royalties will come out of their pockets. Martin Bandier, chairman of EMI Music Publishing, a unit of London-based Thorn EMI PLC, said, "Yes, the record companies and artists should receive a performance fee for their music, but that shouldn't be done to the detriment of everyone else."

At least two companies already provide digital music transmissions via cable-TV systems, and the business is expanding rapidly. Radio and TV stations now transmit analog signals that move as imprecise waves through the air, but broadcasters are expected to also eventually transmit signals digitally. The proposed legislation wouldn't affect analog signals.

"What we're seeing is that these [digital radio] companies buy a single compact disk, play it, and then charge their customers monthly fees to listen to it," said Jay Berman, chairman of the Recording Industry Association of America, a trade group. "This isn't right."

Record companies also fear that digital transmission of high-quality recordings will encourage more home taping. "Eventually consumers will be able to acquire and copy digitally transmitted music in their homes, bypassing the stores entirely," said Tim Boggs, chief lobbyist for Time Warner Inc.

The Clinton administration is lining up support for the proposed legislation. In a letter to Rep. William J. Hughes, chairman of the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, Ginger Lew, general counsel of the U.S. Department of Commerce, said the administration fully backs "performance rights" for digital transmissions of sound recordings.

Yesterday, Mr. Hughes (D., N.J.), said he backs the legislation, adding that it has "a high priority."

International Cablecasting Technologies Inc., a Los Angeles-based service that digitally transmits music to 325,000 subscribers, would have to pay additional royalties under the proposed legislation. The company's chairman, Jerry Rubinstein, said he supports "performance rights" as long as all forms of digitally transmitted music are covered, including over-the-air radio.

The National Association of Broadcasters opposes performance rights for digitally transmitted music because NAB members already pay $300 million a year in copyright fees. A spokeswoman added that the trade group's members provide free promotion to record companies and performers by playing their music.

What most concerns the NAB is the possibility that the legislation may affect advertiser-supported radio. "Our members won't be providing uninterrupted album play that will allow listeners at home to tape entire albums," said Jim May, an NAB executive vice president. "If this legislation forces radio stations – and all of them will transmit digitally eventually – to pay performer fees, we will fight it."

FASB Is Likely to Postpone Requiring Stock-Option Deduction From Earnings

By LEE BERTON
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Financial Accounting Standards Board is likely to postpone until at least next year a controversial proposal that would require companies to deduct the cost of employee stock options from earnings.

The FASB, the chief rule-making body for accountants, proposed last year that companies treat employee stock options as other corporate expenses and charge the cost of the plans against earnings. Despite receiving a storm of criticism over its proposal, particularly from high-technology companies that use stock options to attract and retain executive talent, the FASB said it would issue rules related to the options late this year.

But at a "roundtable" meeting at FASB headquarters earlier this week in Norwalk, Conn. it became evident that the board won't meet that timetable. Twenty-one participants – including four companies, one accounting firm and one benefits consulting firm – suggested a wide range of changes in the FASB's proposal. Although FASB officials say they remain committed to changing the way companies account for stock options, they indicated that they need more time to "redeliberate and reconsider" alternative ideas, said Elizabeth Fender, an assistant project manager for the FASB. As a result, the new deliberations are likely to slow the FASB's issuance of a final rule on options, some roundtable participants said.

The FASB's current proposal would price stock options based on how long they are typically held – a less costly approach than pricing them based on an option's full term, typically 10 years. Certain participants at the roundtable favored a bigger reduction in measuring the cost of a stock option.

Others have privately suggested a compromise plan that would treat stock options in two ways: Those that are considered compensation would be charged against earnings, while those that provide an equity stake in the company would not be deducted. Although many companies have been quietly supporting this plan, it did not attract much attention at the roundtable talks. Ms. Fender said only one participant offered that approach. "I don't see a lot of support," for the plan, she said.

In addition to delaying a decision on stock options, the FASB is also expected to postpone for at least a year a separate plan that would require companies to simply disclose the cost of stock options on their financial statements – but not charge them against earnings. That rule was supposed to take effect with this year's financial statements.

"At this point, it seems unlikely that the FASB will be able to get out a standard in time to require disclosure for 1994 financial statements," Ms. Fender said. The FASB may approve such a delay when it meets next month, she added.

–Joann S. Lublin contributed to this article.

Benefits of Smoking Ban Outweigh Costs, EPA Says

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL *Staff Reporter*

WASHINGTON – A proposed ban on smoking in virtually all nonresidential buildings would yield net annual benefits to society of $39 billion to $72 billion, the Environmental Protection Agency said.

An EPA cost-benefit analysis of a bill proposed by Rep. Henry Waxman (D., Calif.) that is awaiting subcommittee vote counted among the benefits of the plan reduced deaths and illnesses such as respiratory-tract infections among nonsmokers, mainly children (total savings: as much as $71 billion); reduced costs for building maintenance such as emptying ashtrays (as much as $6 billion); and savings in smoking-related fires (as much as $700 million).


Costs imposed by the proposal, the EPA said, would include implementing smoking policies (as much as $500 million); construction of special smoking lounges (as much as $3.6 billion); and enforcement (as much as $400 million).

"There's nothing that I've ever seen that would lead to such huge net benefits," Rep. Waxman said at a news conference to announce the findings.

Thomas Lauria, a spokesman for the Tobacco Institute, which represents cigarette manufacturers, said of the report that his group disagreed with "some of their basic assumptions," such as that "millions of people" will quit smoking because of the new restrictions. He said his group was reviewing the findings.

WILLIAM BUCKLEY JR.

Without strategic direction



"IN TODAY'S BOSNIA POLICY, WE WILL HAVE CLEAR NON-INTERVENTION IN THE MORNING, FOLLOWED BY INCREASING INTERVENTION AND BOMBING IN THE AFTERNOON... CHANGING TO QUALIFIED INTERVENTION BY EVENING."

Just how many rings does this circus have? Bosnia is central and outstanding in public view, but North Korea could in a flash throw all the balance into the shadows. Much attention is given to Rwanda, because on-the-scene holocausts tend to attract public attention. Granted, it gives the satisfaction of remoteness and inaccessibility; not so the little Haitian problem, in which there are historical U.S. commitments to worry about, even if they were only verbal, made by a candidate, not a president.

And of course a few weeks from now South Africa might be in flames. If that were to happen, such responsibility as we have for it would be philosophical and political in nature (we too preached one-man, one-vote, and never mind the consequences). But nobody would expect us to intervene, beyond loudly deploring the violence. Violence we deplore everywhere — though granted not in the identical tone of voice.

What is causing a true disequilibrium in the American people is the utter shapelessness of the ringmaster. Nobody knows — *nobody* knows — what we are going to do, e.g., in Bosnia. A couple of weeks ago we actually used NATO — to be sure, only after a nod from the supremest commander, the United Nations' Boutros Boutros-Ghali. A little earlier we had threatened force, and the mere enunciation of that threat, backed up by Russian acquiescence in it, had the effect of relieving Sarajevo.

But the aggressors all but seamlessly moved in on another front, and although we threatened — and then didn't threaten — and although Russia said, "Don't worry, we have the situation under control," the war machine continued to march, and Gorazde is theirs. The public's mind was distracted from contradictory statements made by our Defense Department and our State Department on that theater, by contradictory statements made by U.S. missions on another theater. In Germany, one of our representatives said Germany is an inherently racist country, the other one said no, it isn't.

The sensation one has is of living in a country in which an assassin has executed the leader. We know there is a successor, because there is a constitution that prescribes that there shall be. What we do not know is what will be the policies of the successor. What causes the special anxiety in the current situation is that the successor was sworn in 15 months ago.

It can be maintained that it is not obvious what our foreign policy should be. Two schools of thought on Somalia were morally and strategically presentable. As much is true of Bosnia. Almost as much is true of North Korea. Of China. Of Haiti.

What is morally decomposing is the failure to enunciate a policy on the basis of which there can be a consolidation either of support or even of opposition. President Clinton's emphatic declarations during the presidential campaign, to the effect that we needed to commit ourselves against the genocidal and disruptive war in Yugoslavia, were certainly persuasive, even though they were not dispositive: Many sophisticated strategists continue to resist U.S. involvement in that theater. But neither side is able to dig in, because digging in against a Clinton policy is on the order of nailing down quicksilver.

About a week ago, Les Aspin, who until very recently was the primary strategist of the Clinton administration, answered a question put to him about North Korea. What he said was that North Korea is threatening in two senses. In the first, we have a Korea with one, perhaps two, nuclear weapons, and no real delivery system. Such a North Korea is a threat as a terrorist is a threat: dangerous stuff, but never cataclysmic. The other threat is North Korea as an exporter of nuclear technology and refined uranium to other countries, with therefore the muscle and the capacity to sponsor true nuclear proliferation. That is a threat we cannot "tolerate."

Mr. Aspin is persuasive. But even though he is only a few weeks out as defense secretary, what are the policies he bequeathed us in respect of that second threat? Are we to assume that he made recommendations to the president, which recommendations are (a) being acted upon, (b) not being acted upon, (c) being considered?

The impatience being felt is not a call to action. Sometimes in thorny world situations it pays to do nothing, because it is the passage of time that precisely one wants as a matter of policy.

What gives us the eerie sense of emptiness at this moment is that there is no suggestion of a mind at work. We do not feel the humming of brain power, informed by moral priorities — strategic intelligence. It is altogether stupefying, as though Mr. Clinton had discovered a brand-new constitutional right, the right not to think.

William F. Buckley Jr. is president and editor at large of National Review and a nationally syndicated columnist.

CORD MEYER

Macedonia's sea of troubles

The democratically elected and intelligently moderate president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, has maintained an island of stability for his 2.2 million people in a sea of Balkan trouble. But he is under increasing pressure from four different directions and will need more effective help from the United States than he has received in the past if Macedonian democracy is to survive.

First and most immediately, Mr. Gligorov is under the gun of a Greek economic blockade, imposed by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou two months ago in order to compel the Macedonian government to change its name and to modify constitutional language and symbols.

By buying more expensive oil shipped by circuitous routes from Albania and Bulgaria, the Macedonians have been able to keep their declining economy going, but the combination of U.N. sanctions on Serbia and the Greek blockade are closing factories and forcing widespread unemployment. On this issue, the European Union has reacted by taking the Greek government to the European Court of Justice and demanding fines.

In contrast, the Clinton administration has backed down under pressure from the well-organized Greek lobby in the U.S. Congress. The administration has retreated from its intention to establish a fully staffed embassy and to appoint an American ambassador.

The Greek government has demanded a change in Macedonia's name, flag and constitutional language as the price of allowing an American ambassador in Skopje, the Macedonian capital.

A second source of serious trouble for Mr. Gligorov is the growing demand of the large Albanian minority in Macedonia for a bigger share of the pie. Albanians now account for only 3 percent of government employees, and they have reason to complain that only a comparatively few secondary school classes are conducted in Albanian.

These resentments came to a head recently in the main Albanian political organization, the Party for Democratic Prosperity. At its recent meeting in Tetovo, the PDP replaced the older leaders with a 29-year-old, Menduh Thaqi, who warned of radical demands "if we do not receive full constitutional parity after the elections."

To deal with this increasingly assertive and growing minority, Mr. Gligorov has made two commitments. He has agreed to a country-wide census to be held in June to provide an accurate count of the actual size of the different ethnic grouops. And he remains committed to a national election to be held no later than November.

He will need all his persuasive powers to keep the peace between the radical Macedonian nationalists and the growing Albanian Muslim minority. The recent burning of a Muslim mosque in a provincial town shows that the forces that wrecked Bosnia lie just beneath the surface in Macedonia.

A third danger that looms larger with the growing success of Serbian aggression in Bosnia is the threat of Serbia on the Macedonian border. Although Kosovo is valued by the Serbs as the historical sight of a famous battle, it is now inhabited by a 9-to-1 Albanian-Muslim majority, who have been denied all democratic rights by a heavily armed and oppressive Serbian occupying army. There is justified fear in Macedonia that the recent Bosnian Serb victory may be trigger an attempt by the Serbian army to drive large numbers of unarmed Albanian Muslims across the border into Macedonia.

By adding 180 soldiers to the 320 U.S. troops already stationed as U.N. peacekeepers on the Macedonian border, an attempt has been made to replace Swedish troops and to strengthen the trip wire. However, there are no illusions that this force can prevent a massive flow of refugees across the Macedonian border if extensive ethnic cleansing begins in Kosovo.

Finally, although Albanian President Sali Berisha and Mr. Gligorov maintain good and cooperative relations, Mr. Gligorov has to worry about the deteriorating relations between Greece and Albania, which could endanger his whole southern border. The killing of two Albanian soldiers by an armed Greek band on April 10 is only the most recent incident.

On balance, Mr. Gligorov has done a remarkable job of holding his new country together in a period of mounting troubles. Mr. Clinton needs to make it very clear to Mr. Papandreou that now is the time to lift his damaging and counterproductive blockade.

Cord Meyer is a nationally syndicated columnist.

R.EMMETT TYRRELL JR. **KEN ADELMAN**

Confronting yet another cruel crisis

And so a stroke felled former President Richard Nixon the other day. His old body has taken a lot of abuse. He has been a fixture in American life during six decades. His presidency was not my cup of tea, and I had occasion in the late 1960s and early 1970s to deride it. Alas, once he was out of power he inveigled me into friendship. Had the friendship begun when he was in power, I might have flown in Air Force One with him to China and served a stretch in public housing.


How we became friends is very simple. He deceived me. He was in exile in San Clemente. One of his aides who happened to write for the magazine I edited then (and now), the American Spectator, invited me down from Los Angeles for dinner. That meant I had to spend the night. After dinner, my friend said, "The boss will see you in the morning." I was reluctant but reminded that a gentleman does not kick a guy when he is down. Mr. Nixon was down and nearly out. The next day, I was ushered into the former president's library for coffee: There the infamous pol sat, slouched in a reading chair that appeared to be floating on a circular pond of books and papers discarded beneath it. With a pipe at his side and reading glasses, he looked like a fellow editor. Was this a set-up?

I shall never know. I do know that we discussed politics, history and sports. He was interested in biography, and was reading voraciously. He assumed that I would stick around and have coffee with him the next day. I did, and not reluctantly. The character of an interesting man is often like a crystal, sometimes like a diamond. Different facets are drawn out by different conditions — a change of lighting, a shifted position, the colors nearby. The Richard Nixon I saw that first morning and for years to come, usually over coffee, sometimes over dinner, always in private, was bookish, reflective, fleetingly religious. As with his friend Henry Kissinger, different aspects of his personality entered and exited abruptly, occasionally without warning.

I never really saw a squirrely side to Mr. Nixon or a conspiratorial side. Doubtless both were there. History attests to it. Yet with me he talked books, history, philosophy, current events, sports. When President Carter had been in office but a few months, Mr. Nixon solomonically pronounced him a one-term president. "He does not learn from his mistakes," Mr. Nixon asseverated. He kept an eye on geopolitics and on all national races. When almost everyone else was wrong, he correctly predicted the 1980 presidential results and every Senate race save one or two. Back in 1977, when so many people believed we had seen the last of Ronald Reagan, Mr. Nixon said: "Don't count him out. He's a lot tougher than people think."

When I first met Mr. Nixon, he looked like hell. Viewing his deeply lined face, I thought the cartoonists had been too charitable. As the years rolled by, and he produced books and articles more capably executed than those of any president since Woodrow Wilson, his face steadily returned to the health of the face that once filled our TV screens from the Oval Office. Obviously, the tortured face that I first saw in San Clemente was the face of unconcealable suffering. As Watergate receded into the past, the therapy of writing books proved to be cosmetic surgery for Mr. Nixon. He finished another just before the stroke hit.

Obviously, I came to like the Nixon I knew. He has been a piece of Americana and a chunk of history. In talking with him one, hears the concerns of a generation that passed through Depression, World War and prosperity into television-land and 24-hour entertainment from flickering noise boxes, live concerts, and various pills and potions. He has been uneasy about



Richard Nixon

television-land and contemptuous of the 24-hour entertainment. Whenever I have been with Mr. Nixon, I have had the impression that he was not all that different from the best Democrats of his generation, say Hubert Humphrey — though more interesting.

And so what will historians record as his last words? He knew many of the great political figures of the century and had read the lives of the rest. Last lines have been important to him. Answering his niece's query, "What is the matter, Uncle James?" Madison's last words were "Nothing more than a change of mind, my dear." Oscar Wilde's were "I am dying, as I have lived, beyond my means." Heinrich Heine said, "God will forgive me; that's his job." And Italy's exiled King Umberto II expired after saying "Italia." One of Mr. Nixon's favorite lines from Churchill has Churchill saying of Asquith, "His children are his best monuments." Having seen the fine family that gathered at Mr. Nixon's sickbed the other day, it occurred to me that Mr. Nixon could have lifted that line and said, "My children are my best monuments." He has other monuments, of course, but a great man's work starts with his family.

R.Emmett Tyrrell, Jr. is editor-in-chief of the American Spectator.

Champion rebounder

Initially it was "Six Crises" that Richard M. Nixon endured, as the title of his first book told. Since then there have been many more personal and professional crises. The stroke he suffered this week now could become the last crisis of this unique and tortured individual.

Most probably, it will end the public life of a man whose public life was deemed ended countless times before. There's never been a public life like his, or a rebounder like him.

Bill Clinton is kid stuff as the Comeback Kid compared to this fellow.

Mr. Nixon's essence takes high drama or epic poetry to capture. Mere description fails. The closest anyone has come, though, is Mr. Nixon's White House sidekick, rival, co-conspirator, colleague and competitor, Henry Kissinger.

Richard Nixon "had set himself a goal beyond human capacity: to make himself over entirely. But the gods exacted a fearful price for this presumption," Mr. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs on the White House years.

"Nixon paid, first, the price of congenital insecurity. And ultimately he learned what the Greeks had known: that the worst punishment can be having one's wishes filled too completely."

Mr. Kissinger caught the "titanic struggle" that ensued within Mr. Nixon's being: "Most men mature around a central core; Nixon had several. That is why he was never at peace with himself."

That lack of inner peace drove Mr. Nixon toward controversy, as if the turmoil he could create on the outside matched the turmoil he constantly felt within.

Since leaving the presidency in disgrace 20 years ago, he has waged a well-planned campaign for rehabilitation. Mr. Nixon has been running hard to become ex-President of the United States.

Yet whenever he gained acceptance, he would create another controversy. Just weeks ago, Mr. Nixon couldn't help himself when infuriating Russian President Boris Yeltsin, whom he had previously praised. Even at the age of 81, Mr. Nixon had to create controversy.

And even when praising others, Nixon could not help but be Nixon. After meeting Dan Quayle — who, like Mr. Nixon nearly 20 years before, had gotten hammered when nominated as a young vice-presidential candidate — Mr. Nixon had to say he did not find Mr. Quayle as dense as people said. As Mr. Quayle recalled the moment recently, it may have been better than nothing but wasn't exactly what he wanted out of the session.

Even with Henry Kissinger, his partner on so many endeavors, Nixon had to be Nixon. In the 1980s, Mr. Nixon said on "Meet the Press" that President Reagan needed a "heavy-weight negotiator" on the Middle East. He went on: "Now Henry is devious. Henry is difficul — some people think he's obnoxious — but he's a terrific negotiator." No exactly what Mr. Kissinger would have deemed ideal.

But then again, that relationship was one of history's weirdest. Mr Kissinger's biographer Walter Isaacson wrote, "As each of them acquired the power he had long sought, they retained the persona insecurities that they found reflected in each other."

They fawned over each other when together and bad-mouthed the other when apart. After leaving the White House, Mr. Kissinger liked to tell of Pat Nixon's question to Mr. Kissinger when he told her how brilliant her husband was. "You haven't seen through him yet?" she reportedly replied.

While Mr. Nixon ribbed Mr Kissinger's professorial ways, Mr Nixon himself has written some 10 books, some first-rate. He read extensively and relished intellectual conversation — some of which I was lucky enough to experience Yet, characteristically, Mr. Nixon abhorred intellectuals.

Though an artist in his own fields of domestic politics and foreign policy, Mr. Nixon abhorred the arts The White House tapes, which Mr Nixon realized were being recorded at the time, have him telling his daughter Tricia: "The arts, you know — they're Jews, they're left-wing. In other words, stay away."

Mr. Nixon's essence is best revealed by newsreel footage of the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket at the 1952 Republican Convention. The crowd roared as the two took their traditional hand-clasp at the podium. Mr. Nixon, a surprise selection, grinned boyishly from ear to ear.

Then, wondrously, the magic moment happened. Mr. Nixon raised his free hand to point up repeatedly at the raised clasped hands — as if to remind himself (and to show everyone else) that it really *was* him as running mate of the great wartime hero Eisenhower.

That's the real Nixon, looking at himself — searching for himself — even at a moment of great triumph

The United States has become awash with former presidents. Each has his essence. Gerald Ford enjoys a care-free golfing retirement. Jimmy Carter looks for redemption in good works and prayers. Ronald Reagan accompanies Nancy in glamorous living. George Bush is in the grandfather and book-writing business.

All seem set. Each seems comfortable, however static and uninteresting.

Only Richard Nixon still intrigues — month after month. year after year. He continues a never-ending quest for respectability and comeback, which now must be physical as well as personal and political.

Ken Adelman is a nationally syndicated columnist.

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

The U.N. as Scapegoat

The carving up of Bosnia—in particular, the strangling of Gorazde—is now widely cited as an ultimate humiliation for the United Nations. But this, while true, is too narrow a judgment. Again the United Nations has proved its great value. Not, alas, in problem-solving but in providing a scapegoat for the hesitations of its masters, starting with the United States. The ignominy of this role does not diminish its utility to those who so exploit it.

The permanent members of the Security Council assigned the United Nations the ambitious task of somehow making things come out all right in broken Bosnia. Then they provided resources, guidance and authority wholly insufficient to allow the United Nations to do the job. When, fulfilling many grim prophecies, the fallible men and women of the United Nations failed, its critics fell to blaming the world body itself. They concluded that if a tough job is actually going to get done, the United States or this or that other interested country will have to do it on its own.

But it is late in the day for pseudo-toughness. If an interested country were serious in the first instance, it would not farm out the mission to an organization vulnerable to the limitations and misgivings that typically shackle the United Nations. First-order problems, such as a threat to vital oil supplies, are dealt with by affected nations. Second- or third-order problems, such as unrest in a place that can be set apart, are handed off to the United Nations. This is the hard logic of the international division of political labor.

I learned something about this logic from recent talks with well-placed Europeans. As always, they pine for American "leadership." But by leadership they don't mean zeroing in on Bosnia, a matter they believe requires only lesser, tactical decisions to contain the damage and the fallout. Rather, they mean demonstrating a capacity not to be overly distracted by Bosnia, not to be kept from presumably more important things. Things like—this is the source of Europe's enduring neuralgia—staying engaged in Europe and tending to Russia.

It is wrong to say that people here and governments there are disenchanted and disillusioned with the United Nations. Not very many of them were enchanted in the first place. At least the more realistic among them knew instinctively that the United Nations was only going to be assigned problems where failure was a live option. Not that anyone wanted failure. But no one wanted to pay much for success. This, of course, is what has afforded an edge to those in any given place who are most responsible for the disorder the United Nations is asked to treat.

It takes the blame for the hesitations of its masters, starting with the United States.

It also helps explain the downsizing of the very definition of failure. In Haiti, for instance, the mere appearance of some gesticulating thugs on the dock was used to undermine the whole American mission of preparing a transition back to democracy. In Somalia, the death of 18 American soldiers was allowed to pull the plug on another American presence and mission. In Bosnia, President Clinton has chosen up to this point not to match our allies' readiness to supply ground troops to deliver relief, and not to stand up to a smaller and weaker but more assertive Bosnian Serb army. All these matters involved American decisions, yet by the dubious bookkeeping of politicians under pressure they are debited to the United Nations' account.

In Bosnia, U.N. bureaucrats and military commanders have taken the several, often contradictory parts that the United States and others wrote for them in U.N. resolutions—wrote for them, mind, without giving them the tools to do the job. When, predictably, the United Nations does not perform adequately either as a military enforcer or as an honest broker or as an aid provider, the hit squad issues passionate analyses of the world body's mortal shortcomings.

Let it be noted that the man at the eye of the hurricane, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, anticipated these difficulties a couple of years ago and offered a solution. Tune up the United Nations in advance for the new turmoil of the post-Cold War era, he said. It was a U.N. bureaucrat's solution. It was stiffed by the best people. Their alternative solution was to cooperate up to a point with the United Nations but otherwise to reserve to each member-nation flexible powers to deal with the crisis of its choice.

We have had almost two years of testing that alternative solution. Looking at Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, are you pleased with the results? These three leading exhibits are disaster areas, basket cases. True, we Americans have preserved much of our autonomy in policy-making. A disinterested doctor might say that in that sense the operation has been a success. But the patients are nearly dead.

Inept to Disgraceful

Charles Krauthammer

With the debacle in Gorazde, President Clinton's conduct of foreign policy passes from inept to disgraceful. No administration since World War II can match this one for incompetence. If we had parliamentary government, parliament would introduce a motion of non-confidence in Clinton's foreign policy and the government would fall. Unfortunately, ours is a presidential system. We shall have to suffer this crew until at least 1996.

If the high administration officials responsible for foreign policy had any self-respect, they would have long since resigned. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright and NSC Director Anthony Lake are the architects of a spectacularly disastrous U.N.-subordinated foreign policy that has brought us needless death in Somalia, abject humiliation in Haiti and monthly slaps in the face from North Korea.

And now Gorazde. At first, Albright hails it as a "picture perfect" operation. Lake grandiloquently declares "Europe's stability," "NATO's credibility" and "our very vision of a post-Cold War Europe" at stake. With Clint Eastwood swagger, Christopher's spokesman dares the Serbs to shoot down a NATO plane: "Let them try."

Well, they do—and we do nothing. We mount two air strikes that cause risible damage—and they overrun the town that we had said we would protect. Our first reaction (characteristically, since reversed) to Serb defiance is to signal a readiness to begin lifting the economic sanctions *against Serbia* if they cease fire. What policy there is can be described as confusion in the service of cravenness.

Lord Carrington resigned when the Falklands were invaded, even though he was not directly responsible. "There has been a British humiliation," he said. "I think I ought to take responsibility for it." Men of principle have a sense of ministerial responsibility. And responsibility means paying a price for failure.

This crew seems not even to recognize failure. The president, asked about the rout at Gorazde, offers the fatuous "this has not been a great weekend for the peace effort in Bosnia." In one week of fecklessness over Gorazde, Clinton manages to fritter away 50 years of hard-earned NATO credibility. Yet his advisers show not the slightest recognition of the depths to which they have, in less than a year and a half, reduced America's standing in the world.

My position on Bosnia has long been non-interventionist. I do not believe that we can possibly do what needs to be done at any cost remotely commensurate with our interest in the conflict. The interventionists, on the other hand, see significant American interests at stake and are willing to advocate taking significant risks to secure them. I disagree with this view but I can respect it. What is impossible to respect is the administration's position of adopting interventionist rhetoric while eschewing any serious means to back up it up.

The Clinton policy of constantly changing objectives—holding Gorazde, sending a message of resolve, getting the Serbs to the bargaining table, supporting U.N. personnel on the ground—backed by unserious means elicits only contempt. And not just in Washington but where it counts—from the Serbs in Bosnia.

The secretary of state whines that the Serbs have not kept their word. (Surprise!) He complains bitterly about their "tangle of lies." He declares petulantly that the Serbs have shown "contempt for the international community." No. They have shown contempt for the United States, for this administration, for the competence of its foreign policy team and its capacity to stand up to anyone.

Why not he? The Serbs are acting perfectly rationally. It is highly rational to defy the United States and dare this sorry team in Washington to do anything about it. After all, look at the people who defied us in Haiti, Somalia and North Korea. They are all sitting prettier than they were a year ago.

Robert Kaplan, author of "Balkan Ghosts," last Sunday in The Post made an impassioned argument for deep American involvement in Bosnia. Yet even he is willing to concede that the non-interventionists have "one compelling argument," namely that "this White House, with its muddled performance on national security issues, may not be up to the task."

A kindly understatement. The president, stung by universal criticism of his comic show of force in Gorazde, now seeks to redeem himself by pushing for a more extensive NATO air campaign over Bosnia. Yet even those not sobered by the disastrous consequences of the Gorazde air strikes—even those still undaunted by the prospect of an air campaign in mountainous terrain and chronic bad weather against nimble forces with concealable arms—have trepidation about an escalated air war run by the Clinton team.

Like Kaplan, even those not impressed by Serb abilities are impressed by American incompetence. Are you willing to risk an air campaign directed by this administration?

Which is why there is a growing chorus to do one and only one thing in Bosnia: lift the arms embargo against the Bosnians. Let them fight their own war against the Serbs. At least that way you would not have to wake up every morning worrying about what General Clinton and his armchair improvisers have done overnight to the brave American airmen they have so aimlessly deployed in the Balkan nightmare.

JUDY MANN

In the Privacy of Your Own Home

Has the thought ever crossed your mind that you might be infected with the HIV virus that causes AIDS?

Has that thought ever led you to take the next step, which is to go to a clinic or doctor's office and be tested?

Chances are that the answer to the second question is no. According to a survey by the National Center for Health Statistics, only 8 percent of adult Americans intend to get tested for the virus using the testing options that are currently available. Less than 15 percent of the adult population has been tested for the HIV infection. These findings are fueling an effort by some of the most respected researchers in the AIDS field to secure approval from the Food and Drug Administration for a test that people can administer to themselves at home.

The test, which has been developed by Direct Access Diagnostics, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, has the backing of such prominent people as former surgeon general C. Everett Koop, who has written a pre-test counseling and information booklet that is included in the test kit.

The kit has a lancet that allows a person to draw a few drops of blood from a finger and then place the blood on a special piece of paper. Using a mailer that comes with the kit, the person then sends the dried blood sample to a laboratory that screens it. A positive sample is then retested to make sure the result is accurate.

The person gets the result by calling a toll-free number that also provides post-test counseling and referral to HIV resources provided by the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The entire transaction is anonymous, and people purchasing the tests use only a code number that is unique to each kit.

Proponents of the home AIDS test argue that it will provide wider access to HIV testing and counseling, particularly to people living in rural areas, to single mothers and to others who might have difficulty getting time off from work and from family obligations to get tested. The National Center for Health Statistics, which is part of the CDC, found that 24 percent of adults would use a home test if it were available—or triple the number of people who would get tested through current resources. Nearly half of the people with a high chance of having HIV said they would use the home test.

A research team led by Thomas J. Coates analyzed data from the 1991 National AIDS Behavioral Surveys and concluded that private testing options might encourage more than 40 million people to be tested, identifying as many as 100,000 people with the virus.

And many of these will be women. AIDS is now the leading cause of death in women ages 25 to 44, according to the CDC. The Harvard AIDS center estimated that in 1992, 40 percent of the HIV-positive people in the world were women. Heterosexual sex is now the leading cause of AIDS transmission among women.

The Health Policy and Research Foundation, based in Los Angeles, argues that home testing helps educate people who are at risk, reduces the likelihood that those who test positive will infect others, and can promote early intervention and monitoring for those who are infected.

The National Alliance of Lesbian and Gay Health Clinics wrote this month to the Food and Drug Administration to oppose FDA approval of the kit. While it acknowledged that the kits could increase testing, it argued that there was a potentially "catastrophic impact" on individuals who do not receive face-to-face counseling that "far outweighs the intended advantages" the kits offer. The letter cites the danger of suicide among people who learn that they have the virus without trained counselors present to help them. The clinics were especially concerned about teenagers using the kits.

But a joint statement by doctors and leading AIDS advocates makes the point that 56 percent of the people who are tested now say they get no pre-test counseling and that a whopping 68 percent get no post-test counseling. "As long as we require a face-to-face confrontation as a condition of getting tested, a significant number of Americans will continue to avoid being tested or will not return for the results," they argued in a statement issued last week. And they cited CDC data that suggested that in the first year a home test becomes available, "we could test more Americans for the HIV than have been cumulatively tested in the last six years."

That's about as good an argument as you can make for giving people more access to what well could be the toughest news they'll ever get.

THE FEDERAL DIARY

Bagging a Buyout

By Mike Causey
Washington Post Staff Writer

Operation De-Layer Redundant Management—the unofficial name of the very official White House program to lure thousands of senior civil servants off the payroll—is on track but moving slowly. Most of the buyouts that have been or will be offered this year are for Grade 13 through senior executive workers making $49,947 to just more than $100,000 a year.

The slow pace of the buyouts has irked many workers who had hoped Uncle Sam would make them an offer by now. Most will be disappointed unless they are in the right place (an operation or agency being trimmed), in the right job (considered expendable) or at the right salary level (middle to high) at the right time.

Congress approved the government-wide buyouts last month. That was too late in the fiscal year that started Oct. 1 for most agencies to show a profit or to break even by offering workers as much as $25,000 to quit or retire. But when the new fiscal year begins, agencies are expected to offer thousands of people buyouts and the chance to retire early—at age 50 with 20 years' service or any age with 25 years' service.

The few buyouts offered since P.L. 103-226 took effect have gone to higher-paid workers in budget, procurement and personnel jobs. They are considered "overhead" by the reinventors of government, who believe much of Uncle Sam's red tape problems result from overpopulation in those occupations. The reinventors also want jobs in agency headquarters (here and in the regions) thinned, and payroll, personnel and computer services in many agencies consolidated.

Nearly every agency is looking at who might be offered buyouts in the fall. The purpose of buyouts is to cut the payroll without having to fire hundreds of thousands of younger, less senior non-veterans. Congress made clear that the purpose is not simply to give people who would retire a $25,000 going-away gift.

The Office of Personnel Management—which also is laying off several hundred workers—was the first to take advantage of the new buyout law. It offered virtually all of its 1,200 workers at GS 13 and above the chance at buyouts. About 500 were eligible to retire. Seventy-seven employees—58 men and 19 women—took the buyout.

Portions of the Commerce, Interior and Agriculture departments and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have offered some workers buyouts. Just over 2,000 NASA employees applied for the 825 buyouts. The General Services Administration made its buyout offers Monday. Health and Human Services may announce its plans this Monday. The departments of Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, Justice and Energy are studying buyouts.

Most agencies would prefer that buyout-takers be high-grade workers eligible for regular (not early) retirement. Getting a high-paid worker off the payroll for $25,000 saves salary and is cheaper than firing that worker because severance pay can amount to a year's salary.

Agencies (not the employee) must pay the pension fund an additional 9 percent of salary for anyone getting a buyout and early retirement. Anyone taking a buyout who comes back to government within five years—even under a personal service contract—must repay the full amount of the buyout including deductions and taxes.

Q&A on Buyouts, Retirement

At 9 a.m. tomorrow on WUST radio (1120 AM), **Ed McHugh**, director of OPM's office of federal work force restructuring; **Tom Glennon**; **Susan Shelton**; and **Tina Gonzales** will answer questions about buyouts, early retirement and discontinued service retirements. At 10 a.m., **Curt Smith**, director of the federal retirement and insurance system, and **Ginger Graber**, of Defense's personnel policy office, will talk about the status of the vice president's national performance review program in agencies.

The Reformers' Tragedy

By Jeffrey Sachs

1/23/94

CAMBRIDGE, Mass. The Communist old guard has reasserted political dominance in Russia. The resignations of two key reformers, Yegor T. Gaidar and Boris G. Fyodorov, from Boris Yeltsin's Cabinet last week were not just a failure for the Clinton Administration, which has blithely accepted President Yeltsin's commitment to reform, but a serious setback for Russia's move toward democracy. Western governments are now likely to spend much more on their military budgets than they would have on direct aid to Russia.

Most Westerners never understood the bald facts of political life in Russia. While pundits debated the relative merits of shock therapy versus gradualism, the real issue was far simpler. Would reformers have the political strength and Western financial backing to pursue a sensible and consistent financial policy, or would they be done in by a bitter and corrupt Communist opposition?


For two years, reformers in Moscow struggled for power while Western governments promised them large-scale aid. The reformers could not win without our help, but help never arrived, and they paid the price, losing badly in the December elections.

The U.S. and its allies had turned over the task of bailing out Russia to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, principally because these institutions could make loans that did not require Congressional and parliamentary authorization. While the I.M.F. and the World Bank proudly took the limelight as leaders of Western aid, like private bankers they made sure no significant amount of their money would be risked in unstable Russia.

Of the roughly $17 billion that the I.M.F. and World Bank were to lend to Russia in 1993, only $2 billion was handed over. This might have been prudent banking practice, but it was disastrous foreign-assistance policy — and worse foreign policy.

What is even more troubling is that these institutions blundered in their technical assessment of the situation in Russia. It wasn't just excessive caution that stopped the flow of support; it was their lack of understanding about what to do.

Jeffrey Sachs, professor of international trade at Harvard University, resigned Friday as economic adviser to President Boris Yeltsin.



Eugene Mihaesco

The urgent tasks of financial reconstruction were admittedly complex, but the broad outlines should have been clear. Mikhail Gorbachev and the Communist regime had left Russia in a financial shambles, with a budget deficit of more than 20 percent of the gross national product, which was paid for by printing money; a rampant and corrupt flow of subsidized loans from the central bank to state enterprises; an unpayable foreign debt, and depleted hard currency reserves.

The main goals of financial policy should have been to reduce the deficit; to float new Government debt on the domestic market, in order to cover the deficit without printing new money; to stanch the flow of cheap Government loans to state-owned industries, and to establish a separate Russian currency so that Russia could pursue a monetary policy independent of its neighbors. At the same time, international grants and loans should have been provided to help the Government pay its bills.

All of these tasks were urgent, and needed to be carried out in a comprehensive way. Each piece of the package was needed to support the others. Critics might derisively call the package shock therapy, but these measures are the essential remedies for a financial collapse and have a pedigree stretching back to Alexander Hamilton's rescue of American finances in 1790, Hjalmar Schacht's solution for Weimar Germany's hyperinflation in 1923 and Ludwig Erhard's creation of a democratic market economy in Germany after World War II. In all these cases, outside help was crucial.

The I.M.F. failed miserably in advising the Group of 7 countries and the Yeltsin administration on Russia's financial reconstruction. It discouraged Russia from rapidly introducing a separate national currency. For two years, it downplayed Russia's need and ability to issue domestic treasury bonds, focusing nearly all its efforts on pressuring the Russians to make politically impossible cuts in the budget deficit.

It advised Russia against the stabilization of the ruble exchange rate and held back a ruble stabilization fund designed to support such a policy. Most remarkably, it never acknowledged the urgency of mobilizing international assistance to help Russia finance its deficit.

The I.M.F.'s relentless advice was to cut the deficit, not to find acceptable and noninflationary ways to finance part of it. The World Bank also failed in its most important task: to help finance badly needed social services.

How the I.M.F. pushed Russia to the brink.

Why was the I.M.F. so inept? Fo simple reason. For 50 years, has been nearly as secretive a monopolistic as the Central Comm tee of the Communist Party. I.M.F. loan documents concerni Russia are secret. The only inform tion the I.M.F. publishes is gene economic data, not specific policy a vice. The I.M.F. is cut off from inc pendent professional scrutiny a from competition. It alone det mines whether Western aid will flo Like any longstanding monopoly, has grown arrogant, self-protecti and sloppy.

And yet whenever anything go wrong with an I.M.F. program, t United States Treasury and the oth Group of 7 governments draw t wagons around the I.M.F. The We ern governments have to understa that it is one thing to defend the ba and sound principles espoused by t I.M.F. — budget discipline, respon ble monetary policy, open markets and another to cover up the sho comings of the organization's tech cal work and its reluctance to ma loans in urgent circumstances.

The reformers may or may not another chance in Russia. Now th they are no longer heading the k ministries, there is little the U.S. c do. We will have to watch how t policies of the new Government c velop, but it makes little sense for t Clinton Administration to commit large-scale economic assistance t less reformers regain power. (In a case, our credibility on aid is alrea at a low ebb.)

If reforms somehow continue, t worst response on our part would to send an unreformed I.M.F. ba into the fray. The I.M.F.'s managi director, Michel Camdessus, shou accept responsibility for this deba and step down. The I.M.F. needs n management at the top and a n direction, based on the best practic in financial stabilization, risk-taki in lending money and openness professional scrutiny.

The best we can do now is to p pare for another chance to supp reforms before Russia poses a newed threat to itself and the rest the world.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Bosnia

THE SINGLE, presumably Serb-fired mortar shell that killed 68 Bosnian civilians in a Sarajevo market changes really nothing. But in the universe of CNN that we all now inhabit, it has sparked a new round of international shock and indignation. The question is whether the embers of emotion will burn down before the bestirred governments act.

As always, there are powerful reasons to evade a change. Air strikes, in their several modes, offer undeniable tactical uncertainties and tempt Serb retaliation against peace-keepers and aid workers. Even to keep on the old sanctions, let alone to add new ones, aggravates the mounting fatigue of nearby states crucial to enforcement. Lifting the arms embargo to permit Muslims something closer to parity with Serbs and Croats threatens to escalate the war and derail international diplomacy.

But none of these considerations is overwhelming; all are judgment matters. On air strikes, the gulf war showed the possibilities of precision bombing; political and military responses to Serb retaliation are available; credibility has its continuing uses in the post-Cold War world. As for sanctions, they may be a wasting asset, but while they last they hurt. To lift the arms embargo is to allow the Muslim-led Bosnian government, otherwise without effective international aid, an expanded self-defense. It fights, after all, for its own towns and to reverse the "ethnic cleansing" that others profess to deplore.

But who at this late date can believe that policy turns on position-paper analysis of options? Certainly standards of reasonable sense must be met. But as the Sarajevo blast reminds us, the real issue is whether the United Nations and especially NATO can act in a situation which has its contrary aspects but which remains in essence a case of rampant Serb brutality. The American government occasionally grasps parts of the point but in general tends to conduct a rambling and endless seminar with itself, rather than make timely decisions consistent with the obligations of American leadership.

How many times can the United States go up and down the hill on air strikes, for instance? How long can Bill Clinton talk of lifting the arms embargo without making it a forceful priority at the United Nations? How could he move over the weekend, suddenly and without explanation, from rejecting to accepting an unfair international deal resisted by the Muslims? How could he allow himself to muse, in a way comforting Serbs, on the authorship of the latest mortar attack? The challenge before President Clinton is very clear.

The Budget: Restraint

PRESIDENT CLINTON yesterday moved to take possession of still another Republican issue. To crime and welfare reform you can now add spending restraint. He submitted a budget under which spending next fiscal year would rise only 2.3 percent, or $34 billion. That's less than the likely inflation rate and slightly less

Security, Medicare and Medicaid and interest on the debt. Together they are expected to cost about $50 billion more in 1995. Defense is slated to cost $7 billion less. There will also be some savings from the economic recovery—unemployment insurance costs will decline—and the government will make more next year than this from the sale of assets acquired in the takeover of

THE WHITE HOUSE *BULLETIN*

BULLETIN BROADFAXING NETWORK, 625 KING STREET, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 (703) 684-2020

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN PODESA
STAFF SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: **TODAY'S BRIEFING**

DATE: **THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1993**

SINCE THE MORNING PAPERS:

- **Thousands of Croat civilians, fearing reprisals by Muslim-led government soldiers, sought refuge** in the forests around an isolated Croat area in central Bosnia. Government soldiers stormed the town after taking a string of Croat villages to the north. UN officials said fighting diminished in the area today, and government soldiers appeared to consolidate their control. About 15,000 Croat civilians fled the fighting.

- **Pakistani police arrested Murtaza Bhutto, the brother of the Prime Minister**, moments after his plane landed before dawn today, ending his 16 years in exile. The Prime Minister and her brother are bitter political rivals. Murtaza Bhutto allegedly plotted a 1981 plane hijacking to Afghanistan in an attempt to undermine the military regime that overthrew and executed their father, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto faces charges that include hijacking, murder and terrorism.

- **Economic News:**
  - -- **Orders to U.S. factories rose 0.7 percent in September,** pulled higher by gains in automobiles and communications equipment. The advance followed a strong 1.2 percent increase in August and was the third in four months.
  - -- **The productivity of American workers rose at a 3.9 percent annual rate** from July to the end of September, the first improvement since the final three months of 1992. The Labor Department said the seasonally adjusted increase in nonfarm productivity -- defined as output per hours worked -- followed declines of 1.8 percent in the first quarter and a revised 0.4 percent in the second.
  - -- **The number of Americans filing first-time claims for jobless benefits fell by 10,000 last week** to the lowest level in a month. The Labor Department said new applications for unemployment insurance totaled 338,000.

IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND AROUND TOWN:

- **Today, Secretary of State Warren Christopher laid out the "strategic priorities of American foreign policy."** In an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Christopher said: "The world is moving away from one of the most dangerous confrontations in history, and in that fact lies tremendous opportunity for the United States. In the Cold War world, stability was based upon confrontation. In the new world, stability will be based upon common interests and shared values."

  Christopher then explained the Clinton Administration's priorities, saying:

Paul Roellig, Publisher and Editor | William Armistead, Managing Editor | Richard Reed, Political Editor
Bruce Kirschenbaum, Senior Editor | Dan Carol, Contributing Editor | Heather Fleming, Assistant Editor
Stephen Saunders, Circulation Manager | Robert Katz, Assistant Publisher | Willa Mae Powers, Circulation Assistant

"**First: economic security.** Security in the post-Cold War era will depend as much on strong economies as on strong arsenals. This Administration understands that America's strength at home and the strength abroad are interlocking and are mutually reinforcing. That is why President Clinton and I have placed economic policy at the heart of our foreign policy. And I believe that this new emphasis is already yielding important results. Three events, all occurring within the next 40 days, will help determine the strength of our economy and the standard of living for our people as we enter the 21st century. These events are the NAFTA vote, the decision on the Uruguay Round in GATT, and the APEC meeting in Seattle." After explaining the importance of these three, Christopher added: "These 40 days can shape the economic world and shape America's future as we look forward to a new role in Asia. With NAFTA, GATT and APEC, there is an extraordinary convergence of opportunities for the United States."

"**Our second priority: support for reform in Russia and the newly independent states.** We're placing special emphasis on our support for political and economic reform in Russia, in Ukraine, in the other states of the former Soviet Union and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. President Clinton is seeking to build a strategic alliance with post-communist reformers throughout this area. ..."

"**A third priority: Europe and NATO.** The trip I completed last week was also designed to renew the NATO alliance at a time of new and different security challenges in Europe. The alliance must embrace innovation or risk irrelevance. The United States is proposing to transform NATO's relationship with the new democracies of the East. The January summit should formally open the door to an evolutionary process of NATO expansion. The process should be non-discriminatory and inclusive and should not be tied to a specific timetable or criteria for membership. The summit should also initiate practical military cooperation between NATO forces and those of the East. To that end, we proposed a partnership for peace open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as well as others."

"**A fourth priority, Asia and the Pacific.** The Asia-Pacific region contains the world's most dynamic economies, and it is the most lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs. It is thus crucial to the President's domestic agenda. The upcoming APEC meeting will elaborate the President's vision of a new Pacific community. The basic outlines of this community are already clear – a more prosperous community through open markets and open societies; a more secure community through the maintenance of our alliances and forward military presence; nonproliferation policies and engagement in regional dialogues; a freer community through advocacy of open societies and regional cooperation on global issues. The cornerstone of our Asia-Pacific policy remains our relationship with Japan. ... We are establishing a comprehensive relationship with China, a relationship that permits resolution of differences in a broad strategic context. We're working to make strides in all areas of continuing concern with China, including human rights, non- proliferation, and market access. We share with the Congress the need to make measurable progress. The clock is ticking. Unless there is overall significant progress on human rights, the president will not be in a position to recommend extension of MFN next spring."

"**A fifth priority, the Middle East.** The Middle East is a region where the United States has both vital interests and the influence to protect those interests. The recent breakthrough between the Israelis and the Palestinians has fundamentally changed the landscape of Arab-Israeli conflict. There is much work to be done to transform the Declaration of Principles into an enduring agreement and changed realities on the ground. It is absolutely essential that the Israelis and the Palestinians implement their declaration in a timely manner. ... It is also essential that we continue our efforts to move toward a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. This means ensuring that there is progress on the other tracks and that progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track will facilitate rather than impede movement, progress on the other tracks."

"**A sixth priority, non-proliferation.** The peace process must be accompanied by efforts to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as well as in other regions. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most serious security threat in the post-Cold War era. This Administration is working for global enforcement of non-proliferation standards. We're pursuing specific strategies in each region where there are real risks of proliferation – the Middle East, the Korean peninsula, the Persian Gulf, south Asia, Russia, and the new independent states."

After finishing the list of priorities, Christopher said: "Let me say a few words about regional conflicts," before addressing Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia. "These are difficult situations and some setbacks are inevitable. We should learn from them, but we should not overreact for they may -- that might mean losing possible opportunities for progress or damaging our interests elsewhere." After describing the Administration's positions, Christopher added: "I want to assure the members of this committee that our policy toward any regional conflict will undergo constant and rigorous evaluation. And any situation in which American men and women may be put in harm's way will always hold the highest priority for me and for every member of our Administration."

- **Christopher also downplayed reports of a shift in Russia's first-strike nuclear strategy and use of its troops abroad.** According to Christopher: "The Russian Federation has jettisoned the old doctrine of 'no first use.' Frankly, the United States and its allies never took the old Soviet doctrine as a serious indication as to what the USSR might actually do with its massive arsenal of nuclear weapons. In the new doctrine, Russia has said essentially that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states who are parties to the NPT. In fact, the nuclear doctrine announced in this statement is not very different from our own." Christopher added: "Let me comment on the aspect of it relating to the deployment of Russian troops outside of Russia itself. The new doctrine states that the basic objective is to complete the withdrawal of Russian forces to the Russian territory, in other words, to complete their withdrawal from outside of Russia. We welcome this. The doctrine also makes provisions for Russian troops to operate in certain situations, presumably in terms of peacekeeping along the periphery of the old Soviet Union. Our preliminary understanding is that this new doctrine has a very important proviso, and that is that such operations -- that is, operations by the military along the borders of Russia -- will be only in cooperation with the other states involved. ... In short, Russia must be part of the solution and not part of the problem with respect to the regional conflicts."

- **Heading into Secretary Christopher's testimony today, those involved were preparing for tough questioning following weeks of criticism over Clinton's foreign policy decision-making process.** Notes an agency source: "We expect it to be a stormy session." A Senate Foreign Relations Committee source bears out this analysis: "The world is boiling over and we want to know how the [Administration's foreign policy] decisions are made...and who makes the decisions...we can't figure out who's running the show. It's a zoo." The agenda for the hearing is wide open. Notes a source: "I think he's going to try and cover the world...we will just ask him questions...it will be Haiti, Bosnia, Russia and China." Somalia is also expected to be a major topic, especially in light of reports this morning that US troops have left their barracks and are now once again patrolling the streets. Hints one Republican committee staffer on questions facing Christopher: "We don't have any national interest in that stinking place...who's in charge on this?" Tomorrow, Christopher heads to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen will discuss the NAFTA agreement.

- **Meanwhile, rumors of a major shake-up in the Clinton foreign policy apparatus persist.** Explains one senior Administration advisor: "At the most senior levels of the Administration, there's a desire for the flight to safety that brought in [David] Gergen. In other words, 'Give us a big name so that the press will shut up.' The problem is that this strategy is blocked by Gergen himself. ... He thinks he's the Jim Baker of this Administration, thank you very much...and it will be hard to find such a person. It's not like you're going to get a Henry Kissinger to take the number three slot behind the likes of Gergen and Christopher." Echoing this approach, one foreign policy source is hearing this scenario: "Les Aspin is going to go...CIA Director Woolsey comes over [to Defense]...Dave McCurdy would be at CIA and State would get a really tough but confirmable deputy to help Christopher." Adds this source: "Nothing happens before Christmas." Sources continue to suggest that Clifford Wharton's departure at State is imminent and that the key is finding the right replacement for the number two slot at State. Explains one source: "The plan for saving Christopher is with the deputy. ... It's not going to be [Stephen] Solarz...they're having a hard time getting him confirmed as Ambassador to India. They probably ought

FOREIGN POLICY: RE-AFFIRMING AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP

"The United States occupies a unique position in world affairs today. Yet with the Cold War over, many people ask whether the United States plans to retreat or remain active in the world; and if active, to what end. Let me answer that question as clearly and plainly as I can. The United States intends to remain engaged and to lead. We cannot solve every problem, but we must and will serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace." (United Nations General Assembly, September 27, 1993)

EXPANDING WORLD TRADE, JOBS AND EXPORTS

- Served interests of American workers and businesses by **making economic issues a foreign policy priority**; passed the North American Free Trade Agreement, co-ordinated G-7 growth policies at Tokyo Summit, agreed with Japan on framework for trade talks, convened first-ever Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting and made efforts to reach a successful GATT agreement.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, MARKET REFORM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

- Led support for democracy and market reform in **Russia and other former Soviet states** through bilateral/multilateral aid and firm support for reformers. Created Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to cooperate in space, energy, defense conversion and other areas. Secured repeal of many outdated Cold War laws.

- Restored U.S. consensus on **China** policy for the first time since Tiananmen Square, setting the basis for dialogue to secure improved Chinese behavior on human rights, non-proliferation and trade

- Supported **South Africa's** transition from apartheid to democracy, including non-racial elections in April 1994, through diplomacy, aid and lifting of sanctions.

- Promoted efforts to restore democracy and President Aristide to **Haiti** through helping to negotiate the Governor's Island agreement; adopted tough international sanctions when the military in Haiti reneged on its commitments.

- Proposed summit meeting of democratic leaders from this hemisphere for 1994.

- Introduced reorganization of **international broadcasting**, continuing support for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and creation of new Asian Democracy Radio service, while achieving substantial budgetary savings.

- Led efforts to resist the "auto-coup" in **Guatemala**, resulting in the safeguarding of democracy and the naming of human rights activist de Leon as President.

- Stood up for **human rights** through actions at U.N. Conference on Human Rights, insisting on a single standard for human rights world-wide. Condemned repression in Burma. Met with **Dalai Lama, Desmond Tutu and Salman Rushdie.** Achieved creation of a U.N. High Commission for Human Rights.

- Achieved increase in funding for **National Endowment for Democracy** to support essential efforts to promote democracy and human rights worldwide.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE

- Reinvigorated **Middle East** peace process, leading to historic White House signing between Israel and the PLO. Enlisted international support for process, including $2 billion pledged at the Washington Conference.

RELIEVING HUMAN SUFFERING

- Provided relief to **Bosnia** through longest humanitarian airlift in our history; promoted peace talks, enforced the "no-fly zone" and sanctions against Serbia, and secured NATO's commitment to airstrikes if needed to ensure relief flows and prevent Sarajevo's strangulation.

- Resisted calls for precipitous pull-out from **Somalia**, allowing Somalia the opportunity to prevent a return to the chaos which caused 350,000 deaths before our entry. Attacks on US/UN forces have declined and a commission of inquiry has been established to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on U.N. forces. Praised the Army Rangers heroic actions in this humanitarian effort.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

- Attacked **Iraqi** intelligence headquarters in response to Iraqi sponsored plot to assassinate President Bush; imposed new US/UN sanctions on **Libya** to press for those implicated in Pan Am 103 bombing to be brought to justice; adopted policy of "double containment" of **Iran and Iraq**.

TOUGH STAND ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

- Adopted new policies to combat **illegal immigration** through cooperation with foreign governments and new enforcement, while facilitating legal immigration.

ENHANCED ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS

- Devised policies to more effectively combat international **drug trafficking**, moving away from interdiction strategy to a more balanced approach targeting drug cartels and cooperating with democratic governments in the hemisphere.

STREAMLINING AND REFORM OF AID

- Proposed the most comprehensive **restructuring of foreign aid** since the Kennedy Administration, leaving behind Cold War baggage and promoting economic growth, democracy, peace, sustainable development and humanitarian relief. Committed to maintain assistance at current levels to Israel and Egypt.

PROTECTING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

- Signed the **Biodiversity Convention** and sent it to the Senate for ratification; prepared a national action plan on **global climate change**; agreed to meet the goals of sustainable **forest management** by the year 2000; proposed new structure for the **Global Environmental Facility**, which funds effort by developing countries on global climate, biodiversity and oceans issues, to make it more environmentally responsive and democratic; negotiated replenishment of multilateral fund for **ozone** protection.

COMMITMENT TO A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE

"The changes of recent years allow us to be hopeful. But common sense reminds us to be prepared. One way we must be prepared is by ensuring that our Forces have what they need to get the job done, the equipment and the quality people needed to ensure that we can achieve decisive victory should we be called to battle once again." (West Point, May 29, 1993)

ENSURING STRONG ARMED FORCES

- Completed the **"Bottom Up Review,"** the first comprehensive strategic review of defense needs for the post-Cold War world. The process provides a road-map to maintaining strong national security while identifying substantial defense savings.

- Ensured **adequate funding** for national security by resisting precipitous cuts in defense spending proposed by some members of Congress.

- Initiated the first **review of nuclear posture** since the end of the Cold War, including policy doctrine, force structure, operations and safety.

- Visited military installations of every service branch and selected Army General John **Shalikashvili** as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

STRENGTHENING SECURITY TIES

- Proposed a **"Partnership for Peace"** -- embraced by allies, Russia and others -- to adapt NATO to our new European security requirements by offering former Soviet republics and Central/East European nations closer ties with NATO. Called for NATO Summit, to take place in January 1994.

- Reaffirmed our commitment in East Asia and laid out a vision of future **Asian security** during visit to Tokyo, Seoul and DMZ.

DETERMINED EFFORTS TO STOP WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

- Adopted a comprehensive **non-proliferation** and export control policy, and acted firmly to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, Iran, Iraq, China and others. Announced counter proliferation initiative to combat emerging missile, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons threats.

- Signed framework with Russia for military partnership and accelerated **destruction of further nuclear weapons**. Worked with other former Soviet states on securing their commitment to control and deactivate nuclear weapons.

- Suspended nuclear testing and began serious work with other governments to achieve a **Comprehensive Test Ban treaty** by 1996. Obtained Senate approval for Open Skies Treaty and sent to Senate the Chemical Weapons Convention, which would ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

POW/MIA's

- Pursued aggressively the fullest possible accounting of our **POW/MIA's** with Vietnam, including return of remains, release of documents, and cooperation on discrepancy cases and with Laos. Sent two Presidential missions to Vietnam to pursue this issue.

Russia

Background

Over the past few days, press attention has focussed on the U.S. government reaction to the strong showing of Zhirinovskiy and other anti-reformers in the December 12 election. Some are interpreting comments by Vice President Gore and Ambassador Talbott are suggesting that the United States, other Western donors and the international financial institutions should relax their requirements for economic reform in Russia. The shorthand phrase some are using is that Russia has had too much shock and not enough therapy.

Points

-- We need to consider how remarkable the elections of December 12 were. The Russian people held free and fair elections in which they approved a democratic constitution that wipes out the last vestiges of the Soviet system. This becomes even more remarkable given that the elections took place just two months after the uprising in Moscow.

-- The voting for Parliament has resulted in the reformers having the largest bloc. It's clear, however, that Mr. Zhirinovskiy [ZHEER-IN-OFF-SKI], the Communists and other anti-reformers did better than expected. This protest vote is a reminder that change is always difficult, and underscores the reasons why we have worked so hard to support the process of democratic reform.

-- The lesson we draw from this is that we and other international donors have to redouble our support. If in fact the Parliament will be dominated by three major groups -- reformers, Communists and Zhirinovskiy supporters -- it's not hard to know where American interests lie.

Questions

Q. Are we reassessing assistance programs for Russian reforms?

-- We remain firmly committed to supporting the reform process and the reformers themselves in Russia. As I've indicated, the election results remind us that economic change can be painful and that the average Russian citizen has felt the harsh impact of disruption and dislocation.

-- Working with President Yeltsin and the reformers, we want to ensure that our assistance is implemented as effectively as possible. In so doing, we can help minimize the hardship of change and maintain political support for democratization and reform process.

Q. Are we urging the IMF and World Bank to loosen their requirements on their assistance to Russia?

-- All the international donors have been aware of the need to maintain political support for the reform process by minimizing the hardships that may result.

-- This isn't an either/or question, however. For example, in our large privatization package adopted last July in Tokyo, we included assistance to help the reformers cushion the social and political costs of breaking up and privatizing large, inefficient state enterprises.

-- We will be looking at means of deepening and expanding that kind of activity, both in our bilateral programs and through the multilateral institutions.

Q: What are your views of Zhirinovskiy?

-- On the basis of his past record and public statements, his policies and point of view seem to be completely at odds with the principles that we support -- including on human rights or foreign policy. I reject these views, and believe that most Russians do, too.

Q. Will you meet with him during your visit to Russia?

-- I haven't taken a decision on this question.

January Trip to Europe, Russia and Belarus

Points

-- My trip to Europe in January comes at an historic moment of opportunity. The trip will reaffirm the integrity and importance of the transatlantic relationship to global stability and prosperity; reintegrate the states of Central and Eastern Europe into the community of market democracies; reassure Russia that this process of reintegration extends to them; and renew the political, economic and security ties among the Western nations.

-- These are historic challenges:

- o To ensure that Russia continues down the path toward democracy and market reform, and does not seek an authoritarian and internationally aggressive future.
- o To secure the place of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe as independent states in a community of European democracies.
- o To adapt the Cold War's most important alliance -- NATO -- to the post-Cold War challenges.
- o To build on GATT's success and further enhance our economic ties with the EU and other European economies.
- o To reduce the threat of nuclear catastrophe by reducing nuclear arsenals among the former Soviet states.

Brussels/NATO Summit - January 10

-- I called the Summit to help adapt NATO to the post Cold-War security needs of Europe.

-- I expect that NATO will adopt our proposal for a "Partnership for Peace" that establishes new forms of cooperation between NATO and the nations of Europe.

Brussels/Summit with European Union - January 11

-- We will discuss ways to deepen our economic relationship after our effective cooperation to achieve the historic GATT agreement.

-- The GATT agreement, the G-7 Tokyo Economic Summit, NAFTA, APEC, and our Japan Framework Agreement represent the most successful year in our lifetimes in opening up world markets.

Prague - January 11-12

-- I will meet with the leaders of Czech Republic (Havel), Poland (Walesa), Hungary and Slovakia -- nations that have taken courageous actions to move towards democracy and economic reform.

-- We will discuss ways we can support their reform programs and reassure them of our commitment to their independence and security.

Russia - January 12-14

-- I will meet with Yeltsin and other political leaders (no decision yet on Zhirinovskiy) to reaffirm our support for the process of democratic and market reform, to enhance our bilateral cooperation and to discuss denuclearization and non-proliferation issues.

Minsk - January 14-15

-- I will reaffirm the importance we attach to Belarus' national development and to its program of denuclearization.

NOTE: We have announced that you will meet with President Assad in Geneva in mid-January -- although we have not announced (for security reasons) the date, every one is aware it will take place followin the Minsk stop.

NATO Enlargement - Partnership for Peace

Background

We are proposing a Partnership for Peace to foster concrete military cooperation between NATO and eastern militaries. The Partnership will transform the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) from a body limited to conferences and exchanges to one in which eastern and western militaries plan, train, and exercise together. The Partnership will be open to all NACC members and neutral and non-aligned countries. This proposal is an inclusive approach to deepening NATO's engagement in the east and drawing the new democracies into the west. The Partnership for Peace represents an important step forward in an evolutionary process of NATO expansion.

Points

-- We are proposing that the NATO Summit launch a new initiative to transform NATO's relations with the militaries of Europe's east, including Russia, Ukraine and central Europe. This "Partnership for Peace" is an important step in an evolutionary process of NATO expansion.

-- The Partnership will provide a means for eastern and western militaries to plan, train, exercise and if necessary operate together. It would be open to all former members of the Warsaw Pact, and neutral and non-aligned nations. It is an inclusive approach to deepening NATO's engagement in the east and embracing Europe's new democracies in the West.

-- We are proposing that the Summit declare that NATO wants and expects to expand. Through participation in the Partnership, the new democracies will develop standard operating procedures, the habits of cooperation and the routines of consultation. This will prepare them for membership down the road.

Q. Is the Partnership for Peace just a way to appease Russian concerns about the expansion of NATO to include central European nations?

-- The Partnership avoids drawing new and hostile dividing lines in Europe. Rather than face off across a new line, the Partnership is designed to support an evolutionary process that will build a community of democracies throughout Europe.

North Korea

Points

-- I take this issue very seriously. Throughout the year, I have been working on behalf of the international community to ensure that North Korea meet its obligations for:

  o Full international inspections by the IAEA

  o Denuclearization talks with South Korea.

-- Last summer in Korea, I reaffirmed our steadfast commitment to South Korea's security, including during my visit to the DMZ. I made clear that there would be very serious consequences should North Korea threaten its neighbors with nuclear arms.

  o U.S. forces have been committed to the defense of our South Korean allies for more than 40 years; this commitment remains strong.

-- North Korea responded to our latest proposal in a meeting in New York yesterday. We are reviewing their response, and will be consulting with our allies and other concerned parties. I do not want to characterize their response at this time.

-- We seek a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and a robust global regime against proliferation. We've worked with South Korea, Japan, China and other countries to make clear to North Korea that the entire world community demands that it abide by its nonproliferation obligations.

-- Time is not unlimited for a resolution of this matter. If we are not satisfied that North Korea has abandoned the nuclear weapons option, we will consult with our allies on other appropriate actions.

Questions

Q: Are you preparing for war on the Korean peninsula?

-- Our forces have been committed to the defense of our South Korea for more than 40 years, and remain steadfast in our commitment. We continue to plan and exercise with our South Korean allies to deter and, if necessary, to defend against any possible aggression from the North.

Q. Do we think North Korea has the bomb?

-- It is no secret that North Korea has pursued a nuclear program which appears to have been clearly designed to give it a nuclear weapons option.

-- By now, North Korea could have acquired enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon. This is why we have dealt with this as a matter of greatest consequence and urgency.

Haiti

Background

The "Four Friends" (United States, France, Canada and Venezuela) sent a delegation of high-level officials to meet with Aristide on Monday and of flag officers to meet with General Cedras in Haiti on Wednesday. The flag officers will present a detailed aide-memoire to the Haitian military leaders which calls for their participation in a national conference for political reconciliation. The aide-memoire also lists steps the military must take to bring about the end of sanctions, and warns that additional sanctions will be considered if they do not comply by mid-January.

A separate aide-memoire will be sent to Aristide on Wednesday asking him to support a national conference. It stresses the need to bring all democratic sectors in Haiti into the process of creating conditions which will permit the restoration of democracy and the eventual return of President Aristide. On Tuesday, Aristide issued a statement rejecting any such conference until after his return to Haiti.

Points

-- We have important national interests in Haiti. We must ensure the safety of American citizens in Haiti; promote democracy, respect for human rights and stability on our doorstep in the Caribbean; and limit potential for a new flow of illegal immigration, which risks a disastrous humanitarian situation from the loss of life at sea.

-- Anti-democratic forces in Haiti must understand that the international community is firmly united in this effort, and that tough sanctions will remain in place until they fulfill commitments under the Governor's Island accord. The impact of these and possible new sanctions will be severe.

-- We are committed to the restoration of democracy and the return of President Aristide to Haiti. Our immediate tasks is to create the conditions in Haiti that will enable us to achieve that goal.

Questions

Q: President Aristide has announced that he favors holding a series of conferences and gatherings in Haiti after his return there, since the security situation in Haiti precludes a national conference now. Reaction?

-- Representatives of the Four Friends (US, Canada, France and Venezuela) discussed on Monday with President Aristide our support for a national conference. We appreciate President Aristide's recognition of the value of such a conference.

-- Such a conference is needed to work out the political arrangements to bring about compliance by both sides with the Governor's Island Agreement, and to promote the broader national reconciliation it envisions. The conference

would have to occur before President Aristide's return to Haiti. It could be held either in or outside of Haiti.

-- All the Haitian parties must engage in creating conditions which will allow the restoration of democracy and return of President Aristide.

-- A delegation of high-ranking military officers will meet on today (Wednesday) in Haiti with the military leadership to urge them to participate as appropriate in a national conference. They will inform the military leadership of the steps they must take to bring about the end of sanctions, and will warn them that failure to comply will result in possible intensification of sanctions.

-- We urge both sides to contribute to efforts to resolve the Haitian crisis.

Q. Are you considering the imposition of comprehensive sanctions, which President Aristide and many members of Congress have advocated?

-- Our current approach to sanctions -- of enforcing the UN sanctions and imposing assets and visa sanctions on targeted individuals -- is appropriate and effective in bringing pressure on the military.

-- These sanctions and the naval enforcement of them are the strictest measures ever adopted in this hemisphere. It is clear that the sanctions currently in force are bringing strong pressure on Haiti. Fuel supplies are dwindling and will soon be exhausted.

-- At present, 90 percent of the goods which continue to flow are food.

-- We also are continuing our humanitarian aid program -- which feeds up to 700,000 Haitians and provides health services for two million -- and we are prepared to expand it if necessary.

-- However, as the Four Friends will warn the military leaders in Haiti, we will consider tightening sanctions if they do not comply with their Governor's Island commitments.

Haitian Immigration Issues

Q: Are you considering changes to your policy on direct return of Haitian boat people?

-- The policy is not under review. We remain committed to giving Haitians the full opportunity to apply for refugee status without leaving Haiti, thus preventing risks to their lives.

-- We have great sympathy for individuals involved in these cases. In March, after careful review, we decided to maintain the practice of direct return of Haitian migrants interdicted on the high seas. We took this action to avert humanitarian tragedy that would result from a potential large-scale boat exodus.

-- The only way to relieve the pressures which lead to such migration is to address Haiti's pressing social and economic problems. This is one reason I have given such a high priority to restoring democracy to Haiti and returning President Aristide to office.

-- At the same time, we have taken a number of steps to address concerns about possibly turning away individuals who may have a legitimate claim to refugee status. We have procedures to identify possible legitimate claimants on-board Coast Guard cutters before they are returned so they can be placed into refugee processing.

-- In addition, we have acted to enhance our ability to process requests from potential refugees in Haiti. These include increased numbers of personnel working on these issues, streamlining the procedures for high priority cases, and expanded links with human rights groups to maximize access to vulnerable individuals.

Pentagon Budget Shortfall

Background

Media reports over the past two weeks highlighted an alleged disagreement between the Pentagon and OMB over how, or whether, the Administration will try to pay for a $31 billion shortfall in the Defense budget over the next five years, in line with the "Bottom Up Review". In fact, the Defense Department and OMB have been working closely together to address this problem and a process has been followed to identify options to resolve the issue in an appropriate manner.

Points

-- I believe the "Bottom Up Review" provides an indispensable road-map to our security needs over the next decade or so. I am committed to full funding of the strategy and force posture outlined in that document while maintaining the readiness of our armed forces.

-- I am currently reviewing the proposed budgets of all government departments and agencies, and no final decisions have been made about the size of the Defense budget that the Administration will submit to Congress.

Q: Is it true that there is a $31 billion shortfall in the Defense budget due to the pay increase that Congress added to last year's budget and a miscalculation in inflation estimates?

-- The Congress approved military and civilian pay raises that the Administration did not request. Inflation estimates initially used for the 1994 budget were overly optimistic. Based on recent data, we've determined that about $30 billion is associated with pay and inflation changes.

-- It is important to remember that this amount is less than 3 per cent of the total of $1.3 trillion over the next five years.

Lockerbie Bombing -- New Evidence

Background

There have been reports this week in the foreign press about "new evidence" implicating Syria in the bombing of Pan Am 103. A principal of the Zurich firm that manufactured the timing devices used the Pan Am bombing is reported to claim he now recalls taking two of the devices to the East German Army in 1985. A New York Times article speculates that these devices could have found their way to Syrian terrorists. In contrast to the speculation of these press reports, the indictment is based on fact, including evidence that the suitcase containing the bomb was placed into the airline baggage system by the two Libyan defendants, who were function as operatives of the Libyan intelligence service.

Points

-- I met yesterday with some of the families who suffered tragic losses because of this heinous action and I had the honor to dedicate a portion of Arlington National Cemetery to the memory of the victims of this tragedy.

-- This moving ceremony made me only more determined to ensure that the perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing are brought to justice. The families of the victims in the murderous bombing and other acts of Libyan terrorism deserve nothing less.

-- At our urging, the United Nations recently enhanced its sanctions against Libya in an effort to signal that Libya cannot continue to defy justice and flout the will of the international community with impunity.

Question

Q. Can you comment on new information linking Syria to the bombing of Pan Am 103?

-- We continue to investigate all reports of new information. However, the evidence we have supports the existing indictment relating to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 which indicates that operatives of the Libyan government were, in fact, responsible for the bombing.

-- It is our hope that the UN sanctions will result in the surrender of the defendants for trial in the U.S. or Scotland in the near future.

Bosnia

Background

The parties to the Bosnian conflict continue to meet in Geneva under EU auspices to discuss humanitarian aid for the winter and proposals to resolve the conflict. The Europeans are considering a proposal whereby the U.N. would consider easing sanctions on Serbia if they the Bosnian Serbs to agree to territorial concessions to the Bosnian government leading to a peace settlement.

Points

-- We welcome efforts to persuade the parties to the Bosnia conflict to continue their discussions in Geneva to provide new impetus to winter humanitarian relief efforts and to peace talks. However, any talk of lifting sanctions on Serbia is premature. The Serbs know what they must do in order to comply with U.N. resolutions and achieve the lifting of sanctions.

-- This tragic conflict can be resolved only at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield. With Bosnia enduring a second winter of war, the international community must see that assistance reaches those in need. We have been the largest single contributor to the effort, having contributed or pledged more than half a billion dollars since 1991.

-- Our airlift and airdrop operations have delivered more than 40,000 tons of food and assistance -- on average, 20 pounds per person in Bosnia. The airlift operation is now the longest sustained operation of its kind in our history, having now surpassed the Berlin airlift. We recently announced a doubling of these efforts.

-- This is an extraordinarily difficult problem that two Administrations have struggled with. We have interests in what happens in Bosnia, including humanitarian and concern over a wider conflict, but we must act in concert with the Europeans on this issue. We have encouraged a fair settlement, provided humanitarian aid, enforced sanctions against Serbia, and threatened NATO airstrikes to prevent strangulation of Sarajevo.

-- NATO maintains its commitment to possible air strikes to ensure that humanitarian aid flows unimpeded and to prevent strangulation of Sarajevo and other population centers. We are watching events in Sarajevo closely.

-- If the U.S. is to become involved in implementing an agreement, we must be sure that any agreement is entered into in good faith by all the parties. Enforcement should be through NATO, which has command structures able to launch a significant mission of this kind. Congress will be consulted fully with respect to U.S. involvement in an implementation mission.

Ukrainian Nuclear Deactivation

Q: What do you make of reports that Ukraine will dismantle 20 SS-24 missiles by the end of December and the remaining 26 missiles in 1994?

-- I have for some time urged Ukraine to include SS-24s in the deactivation process, the first step toward dismantling these weapons under the terms of START I and the Lisbon Protocol. Thus, I welcome reports that the Ukrainian government is in the process of deactivating SS-24 strategic missiles.

Q: Were there talks between the U.S., Russia and Ukraine last week? Did you reach any final agreements?

-- We are continuing the process of trilateral consultation and discussion begun last summer. We intend to work closely with Ukraine and Russia to help Ukraine to meet its declared commitments under the Lisbon Protocol, to implement START I and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state at the earliest possible time.

Middle East Peace Process

Points

-- Promoting peace in the Middle East has been one of our highest priorities from the very start. In January, the negotiations had been put on hold because in part by the Israeli deportation of hundreds of Palestinians. Secretary Christopher's first travel was to the Middle East, where he moved rapidly to re-establish our role as full partner in the process by helping to resolve this issue.

-- Through these and other efforts, we helped create an environment where the parties themselves could take their courageous actions. This allowed us all to celebrate the signing of the Israeli-PLO peace agreement here on the South Lawn. We then moved rapidly to mobilize the international community to contribute more than $2 billion to support the agreement.

-- We will do everything possible to assist the parties to resume negotiations on all tracks in January or early February and to ensure that all parties are committed to not only making progress but also reaching agreements.

-- We will continue to work for the full implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement and for the expansion of contacts between Israel and Arab countries. In this regard, we will continue to work for the dropping of all boycotts of Israel and elimination of anti-Israel portion of U.N. resolutions.

Question

Q: Are you concerned about the failure of Rabin and Arafat to reach agreement on the implementation of the Declaration of Principles?

-- No. We are in constant touch with Israel and the PLO as well as with other parties who are facilitating the negotiations. Both sides are working hard to reach agreement and both sides seem to be committed to closing the gaps.

-- We believe it is very important to reach prompt agreement and proceed with effective implementation so that Israelis and Palestinians can see the tangible benefits of the agreement.

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ruption of minors. They even hauled out Captain Kangaroo to defend their court. But the Atari Generation has grown up. There's a whole new world of technology out there. We don't even consider Digital Pictures to be a video game company; we make films that are interactive. We're the first concrete expression of why Bell Atlantic is willing to spend billions of dollars to buy TCI: interactive television. Some of it is for kids; some of it, like "Night Trap," is for grownups. I'd hate to have the government tell me that the only thing I can watch is "Barney": then I might condone violence.

Much of the reaction to "Night Trap" is the shock of the new. When Thomas Edison started making short films around the turn of the century, patrons ran from theaters in horror when they saw a steam engine barreling directly toward the front-row seats. If you're unfamiliar with what's happening in technology, the realization that you can press a button—and I don't mean the remote control—and affect what happens on your TV screen is overwhelmingly profound. It has ramifications [illegible]

Charles Krauthammer

Russian Earthquake

The meaning of Zhirinovsky.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Russia's answer to Hitler, staggered the West by winning the popular vote in Russia's parliamentary elections. The West is staggered not because he will directly influence Russia's government. He will not. Boris Yeltsin's new constitution provides for a very strong presidency that can practically ignore parliament.

The West is staggered because of what Zhirinovsky's victory tells us about the Russian people. And if what it tells us is true, then the entire post-Cold War strategy of the West—gradually bringing Russia into the Western security system—is built on sand.

It is important to be clear who Zhirinovsky is. He is called far-right, ultranationalist, fascist. He is more a Nazi. He openly proclaims his ties with German neo-Nazis. He is frankly, crudely racist. He calls, for example, for Russian television to use only blond-haired, blue-eyed announcers.

He plays the same Nazi themes: virulent xenophobia, ethnic hatred and a contempt for democratic norms. He offers the same geopolitical cure: war for empire. He promises an *Anschluss*, forced union with neighboring lands where Russians live; and *Lebensraum*, expansion onto the Indian Ocean. In a burst of moderation, he is not now pressing his claim to Alaska.

Zhirinovsky lacks a militant party of brown-shirted thugs. But he may not need one. In the convulsed Russia of today, such elements already exist. On Oct. 3, Alexander Rutskoi mobilized them to storm Moscow city hall and the TV complex at Ostankino. They are still there, awaiting new orders.

Zhirinovsky may not have Hitler's intelligence or single-mindedness. Then again, in 1930 nobody thought Hitler did either. And Hitler did not have 27,000 nuclear warheads. Zhirinovsky has spoken openly of using Russia's. "If a German looks at Russia the wrong way when I'm in the Kremlin . . . ," he has warned, "we will create new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis. I will not hesitate to deploy atomic weapons."

Consider, then, the message this election sends the world. The Russian people are offered their first free election since 1917, and they choose Zhirinovsky. He gets 24 percent of the popular vote in the nationwide party voting, almost twice that of his nearest rival. The communists and their allies total another 30 percent.

True, the democrats were cosmically inept—squabbling, feuding, dividing their vote among four parties. True, Zhirinovsky is great on TV. True, Zhirinovsky's may have been a protest vote. But there were plenty of other places to park a protest. Instead it went to a Nazi.

Will Zhirinovsky come to power? Presidential elections are due in 1996, and Zhirinovsky is already running. It is possible that this time the democrats will get their act together and unite behind an attractive candidate. It is possible that the economy will pick up. It is possible that this election revealed not an ugly Russian mind, just an ugly Russian mood. Possible.

But even if the democrats manage to hang on to power now and through another presidential term, the message is clear. If in a free vote half of Russia chooses totalitarians, then over time, with the inevitable ebb and flow of political fortunes, democratic government cannot be secure. Russia will ever be only one economic downturn, one shift in popular mood, one badly managed election away from the abyss.

Which has grave implications for the West. The key to global pacification, to eliminating the threat of major war, is bringing Russia into the West. Russia's democratization would mean that every great power save China had entered into quasi-alliance. It would guarantee a generation or two of relative peace.

The administration's "Partnership for Peace," offering NATO cooperation to Eastern Europe and Russia on equal terms, is based entirely on this assumption. But with a Russia half inclined to totalitarianism, such a partnership cannot endure. If Russia proves to be fundamentally non-Western, then the grand strategy comes to nothing.

What to do? Firmly support Yeltsin's Russia and firmly prepare for the possibility of another kind of Russia:

(1) Halt the wholesale dismantling of our military establishment undertaken in the euphoria of the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

(2) Halt the mindless dismantling of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The Czechs have offered them a home. Accept.

(3) Offer eventual but definite NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic now while the political costs are relatively low. Yeltsin will protest. We should explain: We are not protecting against you but against Zhirinovsky. Can you guarantee that the likes of him will not succeed you?

(4) Stop badgering Russia's neighbors to disarm. In particular, we can stop hectoring Ukraine to dismantle its nukes. The Ukrainians would be defenseless against a revanchist Russia. Certainly, we will not defend them. We ought not be stripping them of their one deterrent and bargaining chip.

(5) Redouble our economic support for Yeltsin. President Clinton called for that in his Wednesday press conference. Aides then told reporters that there is no money. Find it. And more important than aid is trade. Russia's private economy is being strangled in the crib by Western trade barriers. Eliminate them.

(6) Make our support for Russian reform unequivocal but pointed. Make clear that so long as Russia follows a democratic path and pursues friendly relations with the West, we shall reciprocate. Make equally clear that we can reciprocate ill will too. We've had 40 years of practice.

William Raspberry

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 12/2

The Washington Post WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 199

Henry Kissinger

Not This Partnership

In the most significant foreign policy initiative of the Clinton administration, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Defense Secretary Les Aspin have put forward ideas for the reform of NATO that would revolutionize what has been aptly called the most successful alliance in history. They would also, unfortunately, risk dissolving it in a vague new concept called Partnership for Peace.

NATO, as it has operated for four decades, is clearly in transition. An alliance formed when Soviet armies bestrode Central Europe cannot have the same significance under present conditions. Nevertheless, the Alliance remains America's sole institutional link to Europe and the most natural way for the United States to influence the political evolution of Europe. It also possesses a nearly irreplaceable command and logistics system.

Threats to peace have become far less immediate and overwhelming; they have also become more frequent and festering as nationalist, fundamentalist and ethnic conflicts have become more widespread. Despite the discouraging experience of Bosnia, the challenge before the Alliance is to translate common interests into common policies and to create an Atlantic zone of stability in a turbulent world.

Ironically, the American initiative was elicited by countries applying for membership in NATO, and which like it as it stands: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The timing of the request was premature, before the administration had had an opportunity to develop its Atlantic policy. And consideration of it could have been postponed for some time without much damage.

Instead, the administration used the occasion to merge its Atlantic and East European policies by putting forward the Partnership for Peace. Affirming its rejection of "blocs" and its desire to erase Europe's dividing lines, it invited all the components of the former Soviet Empire—the 15 republics that have declared their independence, together with Russia and the former East European satellite states—to form such a partnership. This is to have four missions: peace-keeping, crisis management, search-and-rescue missions and disaster relief.

When Secretary Aspin was asked whether what was meant was "peace-keeping" (preserving an established agreement) or "peacemaking" (imposing a settlement), he replied that it could be either because "the words were not drawn with care." All partners are to be eligible for NATO membership on a "non-discriminatory" and "inclusive" basis for which, however, Christopher has rejected any specific timetable.

Refused a security guarantee and offered the placebo of nebulous joint missions, which have not been defined and do not respond to their concerns, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary must have noted the absence of any distinction between Russia, the cause of their anxiety, and themselves, the historical victims of Russian aggression. The leaders of those three countries clearly prefer Russian President Boris Yeltsin to any alternative, but obviously are not prepared to base their nation's security on this preference. They seek some reassurance, if not vis-á-vis the incumbent Russian government then against an unforeseeable government in the future.

According to Aspin, Eastern Europe would be given a "sense of stability" and some "comfort" by its right to consult within the Partnership for Peace. The opposite is the case. The Partnership would force the concerned countries to consult with the very country that is causing their discomfort.

I agree with Christopher's statement that "helping democracy prevail in Russia remains the wisest—and least expensive—investment that we can make in American security." I strongly support the administration's program of economic assistance to Moscow.

Where I draw the line is when the administration declares every partner in the new Partnership to be eligible for membership in NATO—though it was not indicated how or by what procedure. A political process like Russia's, which has led to two attempted coups in two years, should not be given a veto over NATO membership or be declared eligible for NATO membership itself.

If the purpose is to avoid "blocs" and "discrimination," there will never be a good time for East European membership without Russia; and if it is made dependent on Russia, Moscow will have been given a veto or the option of watering down the existing institutions to the point of irrelevance. And if, later on, Eastern Europe is taken into NATO because Russia has turned out badly, the crisis will surely be exacerbated. We resisted blackmail when Russia was strong. Does it make sense to permit Moscow to blackmail us now with its domestic weakness?

The European Security Conference seems the ideal instrument for enabling Russia to cooperate with the other nations of the Atlantic area on political, economic and cultural subjects. And it could be expanded for that purpose. But when even the Russian reform leadership continues to maintain armies in nearly all the successor states of the former Soviet Union, and when these armies participate in civil conflicts in Georgia, Moldava and Azerbaijan—all members of the United Nations—it is surely not the moment to hold out the prospect of NATO membership to Russia.

The concerns of both Russia and Eastern Europe could be met by a qualified NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary that enables them to be in NATO, as Spain and France are, without joining the integrated military structure. In that scheme, no non-national forces would be deployed east of the Cold War demarcation line. That plan would turn NATO into a defensive guarantee without adding to its offensive capabilities. I would even argue that by drawing an unambiguous security line, historical Russian temptations would be discouraged. This would provide the soundest basis for East-West cooperation.

The Partnership for Peace, on the other hand, would create a vacuum in Eastern Europe. If things turned out badly in Russia, it would lead to the emergence of a no-man's-land between Germany and Russia, a condition that has caused many European wars. And Poland would once again be defined as a potential victim.

The Atlantic Alliance has united nations with substantially common objectives, though at times major tactical disagreements have occurred. Nevertheless, the goals outlined for the Partnership for Peace are unlikely to be perceived in the same way in the former Soviet Union. For example, "peacekeeping" has a special meaning there, often indistinguishable from restoring the former Russian empire.

The Partnership for Peace would dilute what is left of the Atlantic Alliance into a vague multilateralism. When Russia is as eligible for NATO membership as Poland, what is left of any common purpose? If Uzbekistan is eligible, why not India? If everybody between Vladivostok and Vancouver is eligible—if everybody is allied with everybody—why even have an Atlantic Alliance? What difference remains between NATO and the new Partnership for Peace? Either NATO has in fact become vestigial or, alternatively, Asia will see the new grouping as ranging the white races against the peoples of the Far East. Though the administration implies that the core NATO group of 16 would be held together, it has been silent as to what their specific functions would be other than to participate in the Partnership for Peace.

For more than 40 years, the domestic debate in each country of the North Atlantic Alliance has been polarized between the advocates of a cohesive alliance and proponents of a vague multilateralism extending east. For 40 years, American policy has supported the advocates of cohesion. With the Partnership for Peace, America is shifting its considerable weight to the multilateral option, and is making Russia its principal partner. This will have the profoundest impact on European politics. The Partnership for Peace would accelerate the trend toward European nationalism and, once Russia regains strength, toward European neutralism. It would align us in Western Europe with many of the forces that have opposed all the measures that brought the Atlantic Alliance its successes.

NATO needs to strengthen its political role, and the West European part of it should be given more autonomy in the military field. Perhaps it is impossible to achieve this reform. But we owe it to a history of common effort and to the needs of a turbulent world to make the attempt. The administration deserves credit for its efforts to relate Russia to the mainstream of international politics. But the new East-West relationship must not begin by submerging the Atlantic Alliance in a morass of ill-defined multilateralism. A new international order always involves something of a high-wire act as the old and the new interact. Let us not begin it by destroying the safety net.

The writer, former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm with business interests in many countries abroad.

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Bruce
What's our answer
to this?

60

September 24, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a memo from Bob and Tony covering a decision memo from Ron Brown on tied aid (capital projects financing tied to U.S. capital goods exports). Commerce, Treasury and the Exim Bank strongly support creation of a small tied aid fund. State and AID oppose. The joint cover memo is written with neutrality although Bob Rubin favors Ron's recommendation of option 1, creating the small tied aid fund.

John Podesta

037204

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1993 23 P5:59

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
ROBERT E. RUBIN

SUBJECT: Tied Aid and Export Controls

Purpose

To decide whether to create a $150 million capital projects fund to counter other countries' use of tied aid.

Background

At Tab A is a memorandum from Ron Brown on the status of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee's (TPCC) work. The first part contains a summary of the TPCC's recommendations for a National Export Strategy.

At this point, the important sections to focus on are Part III on Export Controls and Part IV, which asks you to decide between two options on tied aid.

We are pushing hard on significant export decontrol, particularly computers, and believe we will succeed. There is a separate question of how to present the new export control level in the TPCC report. Since we must negotiate with COCOM, it may be better not to publish the precise new levels, but to brief the industry informally at the same time (where we could be more specific). We will soon have an update to you on the export control decisions.

As for tied aid, all the TPCC agencies except State and AID support the creation of a $150 million capital projects fund to counter the use of tied aid by other countries. This fund would be comprised of $50 million of Eximbank's "war chest" and $100 million taken proportionally from the export promotion budgets of all the TPCC agencies.

Although the economic impact of this fund would be relatively small ($150 million of tied aid would support $450-600 million in U.S. exports), it would demonstrate U.S. Government support for U.S. companies seeking to compete for major telecommunications, power and transportation projects, particularly in Asia. It also might give a greater incentive to other countries to negotiate further reductions in the use of tied aid. State and AID are concerned, however, that the resources devoted to tied aid could be more effectively spent on other export promotion programs and that increasing U.S. tied aid would undermine our "clean hands" position in tied aid negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve either Option 1 (the creation of a $150 million tied aid fund) or Option 2 (the State/AID option).

Approve Option 1 _____ Approve Option 2 _____

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Brown

TAB A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Ronald Brown to POTUS re: The TPCC Report: A National Export Strategy (7 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Staff Secretary
Todd Stern
OA/Box Number: 14129

FOLDER TITLE:
Foreign Policy [2]

2019-0774-S
rs3430

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Washington, D. C.

93 JUL 22 P1:54

FAX TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET

DATE: 22-Jul-93

TO: TODD STERN

SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION GROUP: AGENDA

FROM: CHRISTIAN L. MARSH (202) 456-2372
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

If there are any problems receiving this transmission,
please call the sender, or (202) 395-7370.

93 JUL 22 P1:54

July 22, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION GROUP

FROM: Katie McGinty

SUBJECT: Announcement and Agenda for July 27 Meeting

A meeting of the Climate Change Mitigation Group will be held on Tuesday, July 27, at 4:00PM in Room 472 OEOB. The first item on the agenda will be a presentation of the DOE results of the projected emissions reductions from the options currently under consideration. This will enable us to assess our progress and provide context for discussing the two remaining issues from the last meeting: Sinks Options and Additional Options. Materials on the DOE analysis will be provided at the July 27th meeting. Please contact Lisa McNeilly (456-6224) in my office to confirm your attendence.

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PHILLIP D. MOSELEY, MINORITY CHIEF OF STAFF

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6348

March 10, 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Rubin

FROM: Dan Rostenkowski

RE: Policy on most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China

As a follow-up to our phone conversation last week, this memorandum briefly describes the political climate in the House on the China MFN issue and suggests steps that the President can take to address Members' concerns.

As you know, the House, led by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, made failed attempts in the last Congress to condition China's future MFN status on progress by the Chinese Government in the areas of human rights, weapons proliferation, and trade. It appears that Mrs. Pelosi intends to introduce similar, but not identical legislation, again this year. She has had overwhelming support for such legislation in the past, particularly among Democrats, and she and many other Members continue to feel strongly that China needs to show significant improvement, particularly in the human rights area, if China is to maintain its MFN status in the future. I firmly believe, however, that Mrs. Pelosi and her supporters' objective is not to bring about the revocation of China's MFN status but to obtain meaningful improvements in human rights conditions in China.

I believe most Democrats would prefer for the President to take the lead on this issue. However, many, including Mrs. Pelosi, feel a strong commitment to the issue and do not want to appear to be backing down simply because a Democrat is in the White House. I therefore believe it is essential that the Administration immediately begin quiet, high-level discussions with the Chinese Government with the objective of having tangible, concrete steps to improve human rights conditions in China announced by the Chinese Government before June 3.

It is my belief that the Chinese Government is sufficiently apprehensive about whether the Clinton Administration will be recommending renewal of China's MFN status on June 3, that they would be willing to take significant steps to insure continued MFN status. This is evidenced by the unilateral steps they have taken in recent months. I believe it is essential for such discussions to take place quietly, however, because I think the Chinese will not, or cannot, respond favorably when they are publicly embarrassed, such as by publicly stating the conditions which they must achieve in order to maintain MFN status. This is why I believe it is essential that your discussions with the Chinese be discreet.

If such quiet discussions are unsuccessful before June 3, the President must decide whether to recommend continued MFN status for China, which I believe he should, and if so, whether to publicly state conditions which must be satisfied before he recommends any further extensions. Unless he does the latter, conditions will be ripe for enactment of the Pelosi legislation.

Based on discussions my staff has had with relevant interest groups such as Chinese students, and Members offices, I have set out below some examples of concrete steps that the Chinese Government can take to address Congressional concerns. Hopefully, some of these can be accomplished before June 3; others may take longer. I hope these ideas will be helpful to you and the President. I want to make it clear, however, that these are suggestions, and that I intend to work with the President to carry out his policy, whatever that may be, on this important issue.

<u>Human Rights</u>

(1) Release those convicted and imprisoned or under criminal or administrative detention for offenses of counterrevolution, or analogous offenses, due to their non-violent, political or religious activities. (If met, this condition would result in the release of the lion's share of political prisoners in China both in and outside of Beijing. I think it is necessary to insist on a substantial number of releases without expressly asking for the release of *all* who fall into this category. I would indicate that recent releases of two or three prisoners in Beijing, while a step in the right direction, fall far short of meeting this condition.)

(2) Provide the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with confidential access to political prisoners in China for purposes of administering humanitarian services. (This condition would create a deterrent to the use of torture and ill treatment in Chinese jails, prison camps, and detention centers.)

(3) Furnish a *real* accounting of political prisoners in China. China would be directed to give this accounting to either the United States or to an international group such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission or the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions. (Unlike accountings the Chinese Government has provided in the past, information solicited under this condition should include the following: precise locations where named prisoners are being held; their current legal status; description of charges, if any, that have been brought against prisoners; if convicted, what prisoners' sentences were; and if released, when, and with what restrictions on subsequent re-arrest.)

(4) Open Tibet to regular access by foreign journalists and independent human rights monitors. (This would not fully satisfy those who lobby on behalf of the Tibetan cause; however, it would represent a modest step toward encouraging the Chinese to change repressive practices, especially in areas outside of Lhasa.)

Trade

(1) Take effective, verifiable action to prevent export to the United States of products manufactured through forced labor and allow U.S. customs officials to visit places suspected of producing such goods. [This language gets at the problem of implementation of the prison labor Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that China signed with the United States in August 1992.]

(2) Demonstrate greater compliance with the market access MOU that China signed with the United States in October 1992. (Under this MOU, China pledged to reduce or eliminate over the next five years a wide variety of trade barriers including tariffs, quotas, import licenses, and import substitution laws. China also committed to making its trade regime more transparent and to establishing a joint working group on eliminating standards and testing barriers to agricultural imports. Since China's GATT-accession protocol is likely to incorporate the terms of the U.S.-China MOU on market access, China will have a dual reason for meeting this condition.)

(3) Provide adequate protection for U.S. intellectual property rights. (This implies better compliance with the intellectual property MOU that China signed with the United States in January 1992.)

(4) Cease use of unfair practices in trading with the United States, particularly transshipment of textile and apparel products.

Weapons Proliferation

(1) Cease activities inconsistent with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and with the standards and guidelines set by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group on chemical and biological arms proliferation.

(2) Refrain from testing of nuclear devices. (In May 1992, the Chinese conducted a 150-kiloton, underground nuclear test that substantially exceeded a nuclear testing limit observed by the former Soviet Union and the United States since 1976. The United States was not observing a strict moratorium at the time of this incident; however, we have committed to a moratorium since, along with Russia and France, and would therefore like to see China refrain from testing of any kind, especially that which is violative of the U.S.-Soviet recognized limit.)

(3) Cease transfers of M-9 and M-11 missiles to Syria, Iran, and Pakistan. (China developed for export the mobile, solid-fuel M-9 and M-11 short-range ballistic missiles that violate the MTCR, allegedly with Pakistan, Syria, and Iran as interested buyers.)

(4) Stop transfers of nuclear material and technology to non-nuclear states. (China has reportedly provided assistance to countries, including Algeria, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran, engaged in building nuclear capability.)

1480

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
1800 K STREET, N. W., SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

(202) 833-2408

To Toby
pls dismiss to
Pres + draft
reply for
signature

March 10, 1993

Dear Tony:

Many thanks for your good note. I hope it works out for you could hardly do better than that particular candidate.

At the same time, I hope you do not mind passing through to the President the enclosed letter -- even if you disagree with some of its thrust. Perhaps it will give him a perspective that at least should be considered.

With best regards -- and keep up the good work,

Sincerely,

Zbig

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
1800 K STREET, N. W., SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 833-2408

March 11, 1993

Dear Mr. President

I am writing as one who for years has been advocating increased western engagement in the constructive transformation of the formerly Communist states. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the need for that engagement has become even more acute. Your recent statement -- as well as your campaign speeches -- indicate that you are prepared to lead the West in a truly enhanced effort.

The present, and deepening, crisis in Russia makes this issue especially timely. In the short run, Yeltsin needs -- and deserves -- our help. But in the longer run, the issue is bigger than the question of aid to Russia alone, and the West should face the fact that only a comprehensive response will do justice to the challenge. More specifically, we cannot lose sight of the fact that of the former Soviet Union's 300-odd million people, no less than 150 million now live in separate states. All of these states are in as bad a shape as Russia, or even worse. All of them need help.

The perception that our aid is meant primarily for Russia is likely to produce two negative results: It will maximize the sense of isolation and the fears of the non-Russian states, including the very important Ukraine (inhabited by more than 50 million people), perhaps unintentionally contributing to the emergence of a power vacuum in a considerable portion of the former Soviet Union; it will revive the Russian temptation to reconstruct in some form the old empire, an inclination already manifest even in Yeltsin's recent statements (notably that of February 28) and in the efforts to create some sort of a Moscow-dominated special security system throughout the space of the former Soviet Union.

The cumulative effect of the above is likely to be harmful to the prospects of a peaceful transformation of the former Soviet Union into a genuinely pluralistic community of independent states. Particularly important here is the fate of Ukraine, which President Bush in the past so slighted. If Ukraine succeeds in overcoming its massive domestic problems and sustains itself as an independent state, Russia will automatically cease to be an imperial state. The map of Eastern Europe will be permanently transformed. If Ukraine fails, Russia will have no choice but to become again an empire, thus forfeiting the historical chance of becoming a post-imperial and increasingly democratic state (much the way Turkey evolved after the end of the Ottoman empire).

None of the foregoing is an argument against aid to Russia. But it is an argument for casting our approach in a deliberately comprehensive fashion, emphasizing from the outset that it is meant for Russia, Ukraine (which should always be mentioned by name), and the other newly independent states. In all of our statements and actions we should also be sensitive to the danger that the notion of a special partnership with Russia will be interpreted by the non-Russians as legitimating a special imperial role for Moscow. To most Americans, the notion of such a partnership is benign; to most non-Russians -- and, unfortunately, also to some Russians -- it implies a green light for the assertion of a special role by the Kremlin throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union.

I cannot help but wonder what the European reaction would have been in the late 1940's if the Marshall Plan had been presented primarily as an initiative designed to put Germany on its feet on the grounds that Germany is West Europe's largest state, with only passing references to the inclusion also of "other European states." Such an approach would have certainly generated fear and resentment among the latter, much as is already the case in Ukraine, in some of the other new states, and even in post-communist Central Europe.

Our predecessors had rightly a wider vision of Europe. The great challenge that you now face is to formulate a program of constructive aid that will be welcomed

not only by the Russians, but also by the Ukrainians and the other non-Russian nations of the former Soviet Union. A comprehensive approach -- one designed to sustain the independence and to help all of the former Communist states, engaging them in a community of cooperative countries -- would elicit a truly enthusiastic response. Even more important, it would help to consolidate the new geopolitical pluralism which it is so much in the long-term interest of the West to nurture. That geopolitical pluralism is ultimately the best guarantee of Russia's emerging democracy and the strongest bulwark against the reemergence of American-Russian hostility.

Last but not least, a major Presidential speech on these themes could help to give all of the parties concerned --both in the West and in the East -- the badly needed sense of historical direction.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



The Honorable William J. Clinton
The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500