


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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

June 27, 1997

Copied
Higgins
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: **KITTY HIGGINS** for Kitty

SUBJECT: **Summary of Cabinet Weekly Reports**
June 20 - 27, 1997

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

- **NAFTA:** Treasury and other agencies have been working with USTR to draft a report on NAFTA, which is due to Congress by July 1. Treasury drafted the section dealing with NAFTA's effect on the U.S. economy, which found that the direct effect of NAFTA was to increase U.S. exports to Mexico by up to $12 billion. NAFTA's indirect effects were more important, as Mexico stuck to its economic reform program and abided by the commitments it made during its 1995 economis crisis to liberalize its markets to U.S. exports. Treasury and other agencies are coordinating with NEC on a roll-out strategy.

- **NADBank:** On June 20, the Advisory Committee of the U.S. Community Adjustment and Investment Program met in Washington, D.C., and discussed the implementation of the program. Treasury signed agreements on June 23 with USDA and on June 19 with SBA for program implementation. Within the next two weeks, the program will announce the 30 communities throughout the nation that will initially be eligible for NADBank economic development loans.

- **Budget:** On June 25, the House and Senate approved the spending portion of the balanced budget plan, which will now move to conference. On June 26, the House and Senate took up the tax cut portion. On June 25, Secretary Rubin sent a letter to Speaker Gingrich strongly opposing the House bill and Majority Leader Lott expressing serious concerns over the Senate bill, and on June 26 sent a letter to Senator Daschle in support of the overall structure of his alternative tax plan.

- **IRS Appropriations:** On June 19, the Senate Treasury, General Government and Civil Service Appropriations Subcommittee held a hearing on IRS appropriations for FY98. Senator Kerrey testified first, followed by GAO, and then Deputy Secretary Summers

testified on the third panel, joined by senior IRS officials. Senator Kerrey's testimony was critical of current IRS practices and proposed Treasury solutions, and he expressed his advocacy of an independent board, claiming Treasury oversight was clouding accountability. Deputy Secretary Summers emphasized the seriousness of the Year 2000 issue, stating that the options are few and relatively expensive.

- **VA/HUD Appropriations Bill:** On June 25, the House VA/HUD Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its appropriations bill, which includes full funding for the CDFI program at $125 million to match your request. Secretary Rubin called Chairman Lewis and Ranking Member Stokes in advance of the markup to urge full funding of CDFI.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- **Branch Davidians:** In re Andrade, (June 9, 1997) [5th Cir.; W.D. Tex.]. Plaintiffs, Branch Davidians who survived the fire on April 19, 1993, and the estates of those who died, filed actions arising out of the federal law enforcement operations in February-April, 1993, at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, TX. Judge Walter Smith, who had presided over the criminal actions against the Branch Davidians and over several other civil suits, was assigned the case. Plaintiffs then filed motions to recuse Judge Smith, alleging that he was biased against them based on his statements in the other cases. DOJ's opposition was that Judge Smith's statements were all made in the context of his rulings in the related cases and that plaintiffs' motion to recuse appeared to be based solely on the fear that, based on those past rulings, Judge Smith would rule against them here. The Fifth Circuit denied plaintiffs' petition.

- **White House Chef Case:** On June 9, Bruce Rheinstein sued the EEOC and Administrative Law Judge Jag Jit Singh, challenging an order issued by Judge Singh in Haddon v. Walters. Rheinstein v. Singh (D.D.C.). Judge Singh ordered that the Haddon EEO proceedings would be confidential, which is consistent with the treatment of other EEO proceedings brought by federal employees under Title VII. Mr. Rheinstein claims that he is interested in attending the hearing in Haddon v. Walters and claims that Judge Singh's order violates the First and Fifth Amendments. DOJ intends to allow the EEOC to represent itself and Judge Singh, and DOJ will intervene on behalf of the Executive Residence to defend Judge Singh's order. On June 20, Administrative Law Judge Singh ruled that the First Lady must answer up to 30 interrogatories but will not be deposed.

- **Kimberlin in Custody:** On June 16, Brett Coleman Kimberlin returned to BOP custody as a parole violator.

- **Civil Rights:** DOJ recently initiated an investigation into allegations that Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. and New Hanover Rent-A-Car, Inc. had violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating on the basis of race or color in the rental of vehicles.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

Allegations of discrimination on the basis of religion are also being investigated. The investigation concerns allegations that Avis outlets located at various airports have discriminated against African-Americans and Jews by refusing to rent them cars and/or by subjecting them to other less favorable treatment than similarly situated whites and non-Jews.

- **AZ Water Project Case:** The Central Arizona Project ("CAP") is an aqueduct system that supplies Colorado River water to Phoenix, Tucson, AZ, and adjacent areas. DOI's Bureau of Reclamation is building the CAP and has a contract with the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) to repay the costs of construction. Between 1994 and 1995, DOI and CAWCD tried to settle a number of contract issues. CAWCD filed suit in July 1995, after Secretary Babbitt rejected an agreement in principle. CAWCD noticed Secretary Babbitt's deposition, and DOJ moved to quash the notice of deposition or for a protective order. The AZ district court has now ruled that CAWCD be allowed to take Secretary Babbitt's deposition relating to the 1994-95 negotiations, but not relating to Mr. Babbitt's tenure as Governor of AZ, during which he played a role in CAP issues.

- **Campaign Finance:** The Supreme Court agreed to review the D.C. Circuit's decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, which presents the question whether an organization that spends more than $1,000 on contributions or coordinated expenditures in a calendar year, but is neither controlled by a candidate nor has as its major purpose the nomination or election of candidates, is a "political committee" within the meaning of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Respondents initially filed an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) had violated the FECA. Respondents later filed suit following the FEC's determination that there was no probable cause to believe that AIPAC was a "political committee" within the meaning of the FECA. The district court ruled in favor of the FEC, but the en banc D.C. Circuit reversed.

- **Holder Nomination:** On June 24, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the nomination of Eric Holder to be Deputy Attorney General.

- **Media Inquiries:**
  - *The Chicago Tribune* and the *New York Times Magazine* are developing profile pieces on Director Freeh.
  - On July 6, a profile of Attorney General Reno will appear in the *New York Times Magazine.*

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

- **North Korea Famine:** The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) has recently processed an increased number of humanitarian licenses to support flood and famine relief in North Korea. One approved license permits a donation of $20 million of

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

medicines and pharmaceuticals, and is the largest pharmaceutical donation for North Korea to date. The exporter is required to provide periodic monitoring of the consignment to ensure that no diversion of these supplies occurs. There is ongoing U.S. concern that humanitarian food and medicine shipments may be intercepted and diverted by the North Korean military as conditions worsen.

- **Census Speech:** On July 2, Census Director Riche will present information on "economic security indicators" at a press conference announcing the release of the first Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics report. This report was produced through a cooperative effort of Federal statistical agencies and presents coordinated information on children and family using 25 key national indicators.

- **Census Case:** On June 19, the Southeastern Legal Foundation (SLF), a conservative interest group, announced that it intends to file a suit seeking to block DOC from incorporating sampling in Census 2000. Apparently, the basis of the lawsuit is the anti-sampling language included in the initial disaster relief bill passed by the Congress and vetoed by you, which, according to SLF, demonstrates Congressional intent with respect to sampling in the census. SLF argues that DOC is acting unconstitutionally because the Constitution states that the census must be conducted "in such manner as [Congress] shall by law direct."

- **Information Technology Agreement:** On June 30, the U.S. Court of International Trade will consider a request filed by the Passive Electronics Coalition (five U.S. manufacturers of resistors and capacitors) for a temporary restraining order to block implementation of the Information Technology Agreement, which is scheduled to go into effect July 1. The suit, filed against USTR and Customs, argues that the Administration does not have the proper authority to remove tariffs on resistors and capacitors under ITA.

- **Space Shuttle:** On July 1, National Institute of Standards and Technology engineer Gregory Linteris, whose April space shuttle mission was cut short, is scheduled to return to space to complete work on a series of experiments on fire safety and combustion.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

- **Grants:** On June 30, DOL will make grant announcements to the following programs: Employment Training, Microenterprise, Environmental Technologies and Jobs for Youth. White House staff is reviewing press release options.

- **Out-of-School Grants:** This week, Secretary Herman announced that Boston, MA, and New York, NY, were two of the three 1997 recipients of the Opportunity Areas for Out-of-School Youth Grants (also known as Kulick grants). This initiative focuses on inner-city or rural high-poverty communities; the grant competition was limited to

communities. The funds will be used for employment and training services with the goal of raising the employment rate for 16-24 year old out-of-school youth from the current level of less than 50 percent to over 80 percent within 5 years.

- **Health Care Commission:** On June 26, the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, co-chaired by Secretary Herman and Secretary Shalala, conducted its second meeting. The Commission heard testimony from about 16 members of Congress about pending federal legislation concerning health care issues, such as patient protections and consumer rights.

- **Employment:** On July 3, the Bureau of Labor Statistics will issue the national employment and unemployment figures for the month of June.

- **GE:** Negotiators for General Electric and the 14-union Coordinated Bargaining Committee are intensifying their efforts as they approach the June 29 expiration of contracts covering some 46,000 workers at plants across the country.

- **CA Nurses and Kaiser Permanente:** On June 23, the CA Nurses Association (CNA) announced approximately 7,500 registered nurses will strike every Kaiser Permanente hospital and clinic in northern CA on July 7. This one-day action is being taken to emphasize the nurses' alarm at deteriorating patient care standards and their continuing anger at drastic contract concessions demanded by Kaiser.

- **CA Transit Negotiations:** This week, in Los Angeles, CA, negotiators for the MTA and three unions are continuing efforts to replace contracts covering some 6,300 bus and train operators, mechanics and clerks which expire at midnight, June 30. Union members have authorized a strike, but no date has been set.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

- **Garvey Nomination:** On June 24, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee held a hearing on the nomination of Jane Garvey to be FAA Administrator.

- **Automobile Parts Labeling:** This week, a final rule was sent to the *Federal Register* modifying NHTSA's domestic content labeling requirements. The final rule extends a temporary provision that permitted manufacturers to estimate the domestic content of up to 10 percent of the parts of a carline when the parts suppliers did not provide the information. Some manufacturers have had difficulty in obtaining content certificates from suppliers for a portion of their purchased parts. This rule will result in more accurate statements of the actual domestic content of carlines until the manufacturers can arrange for all vendors to provide certificates of origin.

- **TWA 800:** This week, the NTSB will respond to an FAA letter seeking broad industry and academic comment on TWA 800-related NTSB recommendations. FAA is arranging early July editorial board meetings with *Newsday*, the *NY Times*, the *Washington Post* and *USA Today* to discuss FAA's decision not to have any immediate response to the NTSB's wide-ranging recommendations made in December 1996, and to demonstrate the unprecedented extent of FAA's involvement in the TWA 800 investigation. Senior staffs from FAA and the NTSB held two meetings last week to discuss the technical issues involved in the Safety Board's TWA 800 safety recommendations. Last week, FAA and the NTSB produced agreements which will serve as the basis of the Board's evaluation of FAA's actions in response to the recommendations and which will map out the cooperative efforts of FAA and the NTSB to address the technical issues reflected in the recommendations.

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

- **NAFTA:** USTR has finalized a draft report on the operation and economic effects of NAFTA on the U.S. On July 1, you are required to submit the report to Congress as mandated by the NAFTA Implementation Act.

- **Cherry Exports to China:** On June 23, Ambassador Barshefsky announced the first shipment of U.S. sweet cherry exports from WA to China and welcomed the move as another step forward on the Administration's on-going efforts to open the Chinese market. USDA estimates the sweet cherry market could be worth $8 - 12.5 million over the next three to five years.

- **Hong Kong Accession:** Hong Kong recently acceded to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. Hong Kong's accession will ensure U.S. exporters of goods and services access to Hong Kong's Airport Authority, Mass Transit Railway Corporation, the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation and Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Department. Hong Kong's accession is a significant achievement in U.S. efforts to open government procurement markets around the world by increasing participation in the Government Procurement Agreement.

- **Japan Deregulation:** On June 19, the U.S. and Japan announced a new initiative on deregulation of the Japanese economy, aimed at increasing market access for foreign producers of goods and services and at benefitting Japanese consumers with greater choice and lower costs. The deregulation agreement identifies specific sectoral areas for reform including telecommunications, medical devices and pharmaceutical products, housing and construction products and financial services.

- **WTO Dispute:** This week, USTR expects to receive two confidential reports in disputes that have been taken to the WTO. USTR will receive a panel's draft findings in a case against India involving its failure to implement its obligations under the WTO agreement

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

on intellectual property protection with respect to patent protection for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals. USTR will also receive the WTO Appellate Body's report in the case that USTR brought and won against Canada's discriminatory practices affecting U.S. magazines such as *Sports Illustrated.*

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

- **Lending Programs Conference:** On June 26, Administrator Alvarez hosted a stakeholders meeting on the future of the agency's lending programs. A shortfall in SBA's 7(a) program and a subsequent run on 7(a) resources triggered the Administrator to undertake a top-to-bottom review of all SBA lending programs.

- **Disaster Loan:** Early next week, SBA anticipates publishing a rule change in the *Federal Register* that will allow the agency to provide disaster loans to non-agricultural businesses that are part of an agricultural enterprise.

- **Racial Reconciliation:** On July 10, Administrator Alvarez will address the National Summit on Hispanic Women in Business in Washington, D.C., and on July 21 she will address a meeting of the Council of La Raza in Chicago, IL.

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

- **National Petroleum Reserve:** Beginning July 7, Secretary Babbitt will spend four days studying first hand the National Petroleum Reserve - AK (NPRA). DOI is undertaking an 18-month integrated activity plan analysis of the 4.6 million acre northeastern section of the NPRA. AK and the oil industry are urging DOI to initiate oil and gas development activities in the NPRA, spurred in part by ARCO's recent oil discovery of the 300-million barrel Alpine field, which is on the border of the NPRA. Environmentalists and others are concerned about protecting some or all of the NPRA from surface disturbance because of very high habitat values, particularly for migratory birds, raptors and caribou.

- **NV Wild Horses:** BLM's Las Vegas, NV, District has begun to gather wild horses from the NV Wild Horse Range herd on the Nellis Bombing and Gunnery ~~Range.~~ ~~Over~~ the next 30 days, about 500 wild horses will be removed to bring the herd population down to 600 animals. The horses gathered in this process are then prepared for participation in the adoption program. The removal will ensure that the remaining horses have enough feed and water to survive the summer without threat of starvation or dehydration.

Burns Head Run off

- **Border Closures:** U.S. Customs Service threatens to close several border crossings on the Rio Grande River adjacent to Big Bend National Park on the TX-Mexico border. These crossings are no longer staffed by Customs and are technically illegal. Complete closure of the border in this several-hundred mile-long stretch of the border would create

impossible management problems for park managers, and impose significant hardships upon visitors and local residents. On June 20, DOI and State officials will meet with Customs to seek accommodation. If Customs insists on border closings, DOI will likely elevate the issue, for it appears to conflict with recent statements that you made as well the letter of intent between DOI and its Mexican counterpart agency.

- **OR Water Quality:** This week, Eugene, OR, city council members signed a letter of concern addressed to BLM and the Forest Service to express concerns about the "ramping up of timber harvest under the Northwest Forest Plan" and the "impact of federal forest practices on the quality of our drinking water." The McKenzie River, primarily in federal land ownership, is the main source of drinking water for Eugene. The city council action comes in response to a letter from the OR Natural Resources Council for the city's consideration and signature expressing concern over forest practices and water quality. While the letter from the city council is not unexpected, the mayor of Eugene had assured BLM that the letter would not come out on city letterhead. Several of the city council members who signed the letter have since expressed regret for jumping normal procedures.

- **Rio Grande Project:** The U.S. has filed suit against a number of defendants seeking to quiet title to water rights held by the Bureau of Reclamation as agent for the U.S. At issue are water rights held by the U.S. with a priority right dating back to 1906. The court filing by the U.S. seeks to separate issues under litigation from other aspects of the project water right which is not being litigated. Some of the Federal interests in the Rio Grande Project water which are not being litigated are: storage in Elephant Butte Reservoir and releases from the reservoirs for delivery to water users in TX and Mexico.

- **Escalante Monument:** On June 23, the UT Association of Counties and the State Institutional Trust Lands Administration filed separate lawsuits in U.S. District Court in Salt Lake City, UT, seeking to overturn the designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument by alleging that you exceeded your authority under the 1906 Antiquities Act and failed to comply with other environmental laws. Governor Leavitt refused to join either suit, stating that he prefers to "have everyone at the table trying to work out the problem" and that he has talked to Secretary Babbitt and "feels like we are making progress." The Governor's staff has privately indicated that they believe the legal strategy will lose, and are seeking to look to the future. Even Senator Bennett, who has sharply criticized the Administration, stated his interest in moving forward.

- **American Heritage Rivers:** The public comment period on your American Heritage Rivers initiative has been extended until August 19. This decision was based on a broad consensus from Congress and river stakeholders.

- **Secretary's Schedule:**
  - On June 30, at Incline Village, NV, Secretary Babbitt and Secretary Glickman will co-chair the second of three Lake Tahoe Basin Presidential Forum pre-conferences.
  - On July 1, Secretary Babbitt joined by Governors Romer, Gerringer and Nelson will sign a tri-state comprehensive multi-species conservation plan for the Platte River Basin that will provide for immediate funding for habitat acquisition and cost sharing between CO, WY, NE and the federal government.
  - On July 3, Secretary Babbitt will announce that contributions for restoration of the Washington Monument have reached the goal of $5 million.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

- **Fair Housing Agreement:** On July 11, Secretaries Glickman and Cuomo will sign an agreement that will enable rural Americans whose housing comes through USDA to receive the protection of the Fair Housing Act that HUD enforces.

- **Northeast Dairy Compact:** On June 23, USDA's decision to authorize implementation of the Northeast Dairy Compact was upheld by the Federal District Court for D.C. USDA's decision had been challenged by dairy interests outside of the Compact region, which includes CT, ME, MA, NH, RI and VT. Dairy farmers in the six states will receive higher fluid milk prices as a result of actions taken by the Commission established to implement the Compact.

- **Water 2000 Funding:** On June 27, Secretary Glickman joined the Vice President at the White House to announce $155 million in federal money in the latest round of funding for Water 2000, a program to help rural Americans who lack adequate drinking water. The Vice President announced over 80 projects in 43 states and Puerto Rico as part of the program.

- **Citrus Canker Update:** As of June 20, 327 of 650 FL citrus acres surveyed were found to be infected by citrus canker. Survey teams are inspecting residential properties and commercial groves in a 1.5-square-mile area around positive sites. This week, FL officials began burning infected trees in the quarantined area. Emergency regulatory action is being taken to prevent any additional spread of the disease. The outbreak could have fallout effects for FL citrus in the European market, as the EU lists canker as a key quarantine concern.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

- **Hanford, WA, Plutonium:** On June 20, Hanford's Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility (PUREX), the largest of ten national Cold War plutonium processing plants, was successfully deactivated. The PUREX Deactivation Project, anticipated to be a five-year $225.5 million effort, was completed nearly $78 million under budget and more than a year ahead of schedule.

- **Medical Isotope Shortage:** Molybdenum isotope production facilities at Chalk River, Canada, have been shut down by a five-day strike, potentially creating U.S. supply shortages beginning June 23. Molybdenum is the most important medical isotope in the U.S. because it is used about 36,000 times per day to diagnose cancer, heart disease and other illnesses.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

- **Remedial Instruction:** On June 23, the Supreme Court ruled that it does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for Title I remedial instruction to be provided by public school employees on religious school campuses. The Court reversed the 2nd Circuit decision in Agostini v. Felton and overturned its 1985 decision in this same case. Under the previous decision, New York City was providing instruction in portable classrooms near the school buildings at an additional cost of several million dollars per year. DOJ filed a brief on behalf of DOEd arguing that on-campus instruction should be allowed.

- **Call to Action:** On June 24, the U.S. Conference of Mayors passed a resolution, proposed by Mayor Menino, Mayor Daley and others, in support of your Call to Action for American Education. The resolution mentioned the importance of adopting tough academic standards in schools and encouraged the expansion of Title I and school-to-career programs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

- **Carbofuran:** EPA will make a final decision on whether to raise a national production cap for Carbofuran to allow LA to continue to use the pesticide this year to control the rice water weevil. The pesticide poses risks to birds and can leach to groundwater. In 1990, in an effort to phase out Carbofuran, EPA set a national production cap for the granular pesticide. After this agreement expired in 1996, EPA extended it for two years. LA has used up the amount of the pesticide alloted for this year.

- **Champion Paper Mill:** EPA has circulated a settlement framework that addresses the effects of the Champion pulp and paper mill on water quality in the Pigeon River. This framework will satisfy the public health concerns of the citizens of TN and fulfill NC's

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

economic needs. EPA assessed the economic costs of mill closure and downstream economic benefits, and in May, an overall settlement concept was endorsed by EPA, NC and TN. The framework provides for significant reductions in color discharge, limitations to the NC water quality variance, and continuous improvement in the mill's performance. On July 9, the three parties are scheduled to meet with Champion in Washington, D.C., to discuss the proposed settlement.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES



Infant Mortality: Infant mortality reached a record low and life expectancy returned to a record high level in 1995, according to The 1995 Final Mortality Statistics from the National Center for Health Statistics, CDC. The age-adjusted death rate reached an all-time low due to decreases in mortality from heart disease, cancer, and homicide; however, increases in mortality occurred for diabetes, Alzheimer's disease and stroke.

- **Parkinson's Gene:** On June 26, NIH announced that scientists at the National Human Genome Institute and their collaborators have discovered a Parkinson's disease-related gene. This discovery offers Parkinson's disease patients and their families hope that scientists will be able to unravel the origins of the disease and use that knowledge to develop treatment and prevention strategies.

- **MEDLINE Access:** On June 26, Vice President Gore, Senator Harkin and HHS representatives announced that MEDLINE, the world's most extensive and reliable collection of published medical information, will be available free of charge over the World Wide Web. Prior to this announcement, MEDLINE required registration and payment before searching on line.

- **Tobacco:** HHS continues to work closely with DPC in implementing an effective and timely process for reviewing the proposed tobacco settlement.

- **Behavioral Health Organization (BHO):** On June 30, Premier, one of two BHOs providing mental health and substance abuse services to all TennCare enrollees, is threatening to quit TN's demonstration program on when their contract expires. Premier is dissatisfied with the TN's rate setting. TN has renewed Premier's contract automatically, at its option, for 12 months and is to obtain a restraining order to prevent Premier from terminating its contract.

- **Manley Resignation:** Effective June 31, Audrey Manley, the Acting Surgeon General, will have resigned. Dr. Manley will become the President of Spelman College, in Atlanta, GA.

- **Welfare Fraud:** Beginning in September, seven counties in NC, SC and GA will attack interstate welfare fraud through fingerprinting technology and a joint database. The technology will allow the counties to cross-check each other's public assistance rolls to asure that persons applying for benefits are not already receiving them in other states.

- **FOIA Requests:**
  - *NBC Nightly News* has requested a copy of the HCFA report on an alleged case of patient "dumping" by Kaiser Permanente and any congressional correspondence concerning this report.
  - This is the first year in which states must provide details on their implementation of the Synar amendment -- actions they will take to prevent access to tobacco products by those under 18 years of age -- as a condition for receiving substance abuse prevention and treatment block grant funds. To date, five requestors have asked for information from each State and territory concerning their Synar implementation plans.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

- **Management Awards:** Secretary Cuomo presented 238 communities with awards for outstanding management of housing and community development programs funded by HUD. The new John J. Gunther Blue Ribbon Practices Awards recognize the top performing cities, towns, counties, states and territories among the 1,000 communities around the nation that receive about $7 billion in block grants and competitive awards from HUD's Division of Community Planning and Development each year for housing and community development projects.

- **Fannie Mae:** HUD approved Fannie Mae's controversial proposal to insure mortgages against a homeowner's death, disability or unemployment. Initiatives in both the House and the Senate would eliminate the tax benefit that would help Fannie Mae earn profits from the insurance.

VETERANS AFFAIRS

- **Balanced Budget:** Veterans service organizations (VSOs) continue to express concern over the balanced budget agreement and its impact on VA's discretionary accounts, particularly VA's medical care account. VSO anxiety has increased regarding the Administration's FY98 budget proposal to provide for future increases in VA medical care funding through the retention of health insurance reimbursements.

- **Tobacco:** VA's Office of Public Affairs and General Council have been working with White House Cabinet Affairs and DPC to develop a fact sheet and questions and answers in preparation for additional media inquiries on Administration legislation that seeks to prohibit service-connection of disabilities or deaths based solely on their being

attributable to veterans' use of tobacco products during service. The issue has already been covered by *ABC News, The Washington Post, Army Times, Modern Healthcare* and scores of local television affiliates across the country. Additional interest may be generated by VA's impending release to inquiring media of Under Secretary for Health Dr. Kenneth Kizer's memorandum on nicotine dependence as a disease and General Council Mary Lou Keener's written opinion on VA responsibility under current statutes.

- **Burial Benefits for McVeigh:** Under current law, McVeigh's conviction does not disqualify him for any veterans' benefits for which he is otherwise eligible. Several members of Congress have recently introduced or plan to introduce bills that add the category of crime for which he is convicted to the list of crimes which would prohibit the convicted individual from receiving veterans benefits. On June 18, the Senate passed one such measure. On June 23, the House voted for a measure that would deny a funeral with military honors to veterans who commit serious crimes.

- **Gulf War Ailments:** A draft GAO report has rekindled the assertion that nerve gas and other chemical weapons exposure could have caused delayed symptoms and ailments among members of the military and reserves who served in the Persian Gulf War. The findings are being discussed at two hearings this week.

- **AR Department of Geriatrics:** The University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences will receive a $25.5 million gift from the Donald W. Reynolds Foundation to establish a new Department of Geriatrics, continuing the partnership between the university and VA's Little Rock, AR, VA Medical Center's Geriatrics Research, Education and Clinical Center. It is anticipated that programs developed in this center may serve as a paradigm in developing new strategies to address the needs of an aging society and training health care professionals.

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

- **CA Events:** On July 1, Director McCaffrey will travel to San Diego, CA, to address the World Affairs Council, where he will discuss international counter-narcotics policy. Director McCaffrey will then go to March A.F.B. where he will tour the U.S. Customs office and the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center. On July 2, Director McCaffrey will visit the San Francisco, CA, Jail's S.I.S.T.E.R. (Sisters In Sober Treatment Empowered in Recovery) Project, an innovative in-house treatment program for women, funded by the City of San Francisco and operated by Sheriff Michael Hennessey and address the opening session of the National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors Annual Conference.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

- **Noncitizen Ineligibility:** Six class action cases have been filed challenging the provisions in the Welfare Reform Act that make most noncitizens ineligible for Supplemental Security Income benefits. These cases argue that the provisions violate plaintiffs' rights to equal protection. Some of the cases also challenge SSA's implementation plans.

cc:
The Vice President
Erskine Bowles
Franklin Raines
John Podesta
Sylvia Mathews
Ron Klain
Rahm Emanuel
Maggie Williams
Michael McCurry
Doug Sosnik
Craig Smith
Mickey Ibarra
Don Baer
Maria Echaveste
John Hilley
Janis Kearney
Ann Lewis
Bruce Reed
Gene Sperling
Kathleen McGinty
John H. Gibbons

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6-27-97

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'97 JUN

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June 18, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY SB

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached for your signature are birthday letters for the following Members of Congress:

1) Rep. Carolyn C. Kilpatrick (D-MI)
2) Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI)
3) Sen. Charles S. Robb (D-VA)
4) Rep. Bill Luther (D-MN)
5) Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI)
6) Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ)
7) Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA)
8) Rep. Major R. Owens (D-NY)
9) Rep. Collin C. Peterson (D-MN)
10) Rep. Jim Nussle (R-LA)
11) Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-AZ)
12) Rep. Joe Skeen (R-NM)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Carolyn:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Carolyn C. Kilpatrick
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Neil:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chuck:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Charles S. Robb
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bill:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Bill Luther
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Carl:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Ed:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Ed Pastor
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jane:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Jane Harman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Major:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Major R. Owens
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Collin:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness.

You can be proud of your hard work on behalf of your constituents and our country. Let us continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Collin C. Peterson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Nussle:

Happy Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness, and that we can continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Jim Nussle
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Kolbe:

Happy 55th Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness, and that we can continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Jim Kolbe
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Skeen:

Happy 70th Birthday! Hillary and I join your family and friends in extending warmest wishes. We hope the coming year brings you good health and much happiness, and that we can continue working together to strengthen our nation and build a brighter future for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Joe Skeen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-27-97

Copied
COS
Ann Walker

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1997

'97 JUN 26 PM12:18

Susan Brophy
Speeches

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: **SUSAN BROPHY**

SUBJECT: **CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE**

Attached for your signature are letters to the following Members of Congress, thanking them for accompanying you on the San Diego trip:

1) Sen. Daniel K. Akaka (D-HI)
2) Rep. John Lewis (D-GA)
3) Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA)
4) Rep. Patsy T. Mink (D-HI)
5) Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-SC)
6) Rep. Brian P. Bilbray (R-CA)
7) Rep. Bob Filner (D-CA)
8) Rep. Carlos A. Romero-Barcelo (D-PR)
9) Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dan:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear John:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,



The Honorable John Lewis
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Maxine:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Maxine Waters
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Patsy:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Patsy T. Mink
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jim:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable James E. Clyburn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Bilbray:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Brian P. Bilbray
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Bob Filner
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Carlos:

Thank you for accompanying me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Carlos A. Romero-Barcelo
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Juanita:

Thank you for joining me during my recent visit to San Diego.

I hope that my U.C. San Diego commencement address will help to promote a productive dialogue on race relations. I appreciate your participation in my Administration's initiative, and I ask that you remain actively engaged as we seek to address the problems of race in this country.

I look forward to continuing our work together and hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Juanita Millender-McDonald
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

John Drucker
275 Bryn Mawr Ave.
Bryn Mawr PA 19010
97 JUN 30 AM 9:19

June 24,1997

Dear Mr. Stern:

If President Clinton celebrates ARKANSAS DAY, or a similar state event, please invite my daughter, Mrs.Mary Jane Daly to the event. She was born at the Army and Navy Hospital in Hot Springs,Ark. in March 1946.

Her present address is 7102 Plandome Ct in Springfield, Va 22153.

Sincerely,

John Drucker

6-30-97

Send to ~~Scheduling~~ Dorothy

Yes ____

No ____

C.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: **STEPHANIE STREETT** SS
KAREN FINNEY KF
JANNA SIDLEY JS

RE: **TRIP TO SPAIN, POLAND, ROMANIA AND DENMARK**
JUNE 5 - 12, 1997

DATE: **6/27/97**

CC: **SAMUEL BERGER**
BRUCE LINDSEY
SYLVIA MATHEWS
GENERAL DONALD KERRICK
DON BAER
DAN ROSENTHAL

Copied
Streett
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COS
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Kerrick
Mathews

Please find attached a copy of the proposed schedule for your trip to Palma de Mallorca, Madrid, Granada, Warsaw, Bucharest and Copenhagen.

Palma de Mallorca, Spain

You and the First Lady are currently scheduled to depart on Saturday morning, (July 5th) and arrive in Palma de Mallorca on the evening of July 5th. However, you have the option to depart on the evening of July 4th after the fireworks which would get you in to Palma on the afternoon of the 5th. (For example, if you depart Washington at midnight, you would arrive in Palma at 1:30 pm) We will need to prepare for an earlier arrival as it affects the time the press charter leaves and other arrangements, so this is a decision that must be made by Monday, June 30, 1997.

Would you like to depart on the evening of July 4?

YES ✓ **NO** _____ **DISCUSS** _____

The King and Queen have invited you to stay at their Guest Palace, Almodina. The King and Queen will stay at their private home, Mariavent, approximately 25 minutes away. As the Palace is in downtown Palma and has no pool or beach access, the advance people are currently exploring options at private residences for swimming or sunbathing.

David Stein who is a businessman from Orange County, California and is the head of the Robert F. Kennedy Foundation, has a house in the island and will be in Mallorca during the time you are there. Norman Lear and his wife and Bill Moyers and his wife will be visiting Mr. Stein also during that time. They would like to try and see you at some point during your stay in Palma and have offered to host a small party if you would like.

Would you like to schedule dinner with them?

YES ✓ **NO** _____ **DISCUSS** _____

On Sunday, (July 6) the King and Queen would like to take you out on the royal yacht for a luncheon boat trip in the early afternoon. They would also like to have dinner with you and the First Lady on Sunday evening at their home.

Would you like to do the yacht trip and have dinner with the King and Queen on Sunday ? Or would you prefer to have a private dinner?

YES ✓ **NO** _____ **DISCUSS** ✓

Yacht Trip and Dinner with King and Queen ✓

Yacht Trip only _____

You will travel from Palma de Mallorca to Madrid in the early afternoon on Monday (July 7). Upon arrival in Madrid you will have several pre-NATO summit events, including a small dinner hosted by the Prime Minister and Mrs. Aznar for the NATO leaders and their spouses who are in town that evening. The staff recommends that you and the First Lady attend this dinner. At this point 6 countries have accepted the invitation.

Among the pre- NATO Summit events are a bilateral meeting with Secretary General Solana who has asked to meet with you prior to the start of the Summit. In addition, Prime Minister Aznar has requested a meeting with you prior to the start of the Summit. Sandy Berger recommends that you do both meetings.

Will you do bilateral meetings with Secretary General Solana and Prime Minister Aznar on Monday evening?

YES ✓ **NO** _____ **DISCUSS** _____

Madrid, Spain

As you will see, the NATO Summit meetings on Tuesday (July 8) are somewhat long, you will end the day with a dinner at the Royal Palace hosted by the King and Queen for the NATO leaders and their spouses.

Prior to the start of the Summit meetings on Wednesday (July 9), Sandy Berger recommends that you do a short coffee or meeting with President Chirac. This meeting would serve to illustrate that there are no hard feelings between France and the United States on the NATO enlargement issues.

Will you do a meeting with President Chirac on Wednesday morning?

YES ✓ **NO** _____ **DISCUSS** _____

Following the Summit meetings on Wednesday, you and the First Lady will travel to Granada for the evening to visit the Alhambra Castle. Since it does not get dark until approximately 9:30 pm this time of year in Spain you will have the opportunity to enjoy the sunset during your visit to the Castle. The King and Queen would like to join you for your tour and have a small private dinner with you at a hotel located on the grounds of the gardens adjacent to the Castle.

Would you like to have dinner with the King and Queen in Granada?

YES ✓ **NO** _____ **DISCUSS** _____

Warsaw, Poland

You will depart from Madrid on Thursday morning, (July 10) and arrive in Warsaw early Thursday afternoon. Following a bilateral meeting with President Kwasnieski, you will address the citizens of Warsaw, and attend a dinner hosted by President Kwasnieski to be attended by opposition leaders. Due to technical problems with the communications equipment and limited hotel accommodations in Bucharest, you will overnight in Warsaw and travel to Bucharest on Friday morning. (July 11th)

Because the focus of your visit to Warsaw is the celebration of Poland's induction into NATO, we have not scheduled any events pertaining to other issues, i.e. an event with the Jewish community. At this point, the staff recommends that you do a pull aside with Jewish community leaders who will attend the dinner hosted by President Kwasnieski on Thursday evening (July 10).

Bucharest, Romania

You will arrive in Bucharest late on Friday morning and do a wreath laying at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, have a bilateral meeting with President Constantinescu and attend a reception hosted by the President that will be attended by members of the opposition party. Additionally, it is recommended that you and President Constantinescu do a public address. The Romanians are very enthusiastic about your visit and are eager to hear you speak. For your public event, you and President Constantinescu will do an address to the people of Bucharest at University Square. University Square is the heart of the new Romania. It was there that the 1989 revolution began and the President addressed a large crowd that spontaneously gathered on his election night last year. Following this event you would have time to do an OTR before departing for Copenhagen. You will arrive in Copenhagen on Friday evening. (July 11th)

Copenhagen, Denmark

Your schedule in Copenhagen is comprised of the events that were originally scheduled for your trip that was postponed in March of this year. As you will recall, you were to stay at the Queen's Winter Palace in Copenhagen. The Queen has now moved to her Summer Palace, Fredensborg, located approximately 30 minutes outside of Copenhagen and has again invited you to be her guest. The staff recommends that you accept her invitation. Upon your arrival in Copenhagen on Friday evening, you will go to the Summer Palace and have no events that evening. The Queen would like to host you for a meal prior to your meeting with the Prime Minister, therefore you are scheduled to attend a small private luncheon hosted by the Queen on Saturday (July 12). Following the luncheon you will go into Copenhagen to do a wreath laying ceremony, have a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Rasmussen and do an address to the people of Copenhagen. Following your address, you will have time ~~for sightseeing~~ in Copenhagen prior to your return to Washington on Saturday evening (July 12).


You also have the option to remain in Copenhagen for an additional night on Saturday (July 12) and return to Washington on Sunday (July 13). This would give you more time to sightsee on Saturday evening and Sunday morning and would get you back to the White House on Sunday afternoon.

Would you like to depart Copenhagen on Saturday evening or on Sunday?

Saturday evening _____ **Sunday** _____

The Codel:

The Codel will travel from Washington, DC to Madrid on Sunday July 6, arriving in Madrid on the morning of the 7th. Currently there are 10 members of Congress who will travel. (Please see list below) At this point, only Senator Mikulski has expressed an interest in accompanying you from Madrid to Warsaw. Because Congress will be in session during the time you are in Poland and Romania, and given that there are votes scheduled during that time which will prevent many members from being able to travel, Congressional Affairs, recommends that we not extended invites to members for the time being. If there is further interest, we will re-examine the issue next week.



Traveling To Madrid:

Senator Roth
Senator Biden
Senator Snowe
Senator Mikulski
Senator Smith
Senator Hutchinson

Congressman Gilman
Congressman Gejdenson
Congressman Solomon
Congressman Sisisky

Proposed Schedule for the President's Trip to
Spain, Poland, Romania and Denmark
July 5 - 11, 1997
(As of 6/27/97; 8:00 pm)

Saturday, July 5, 1997

NOTE: SPAIN IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC

9:00 am	Depart WH South Lawn via Marine One en route Andrews flight time: 10 minutes
9:10 am	Arrive Andrews
9:25 am	Wheels up en route Mallorca flight time: 7 hours, 30 minutes; +6 hours time change
11:00 pm	Wheels Down Palma de Mallorca
	Greeted by King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia
11:15 pm (5:15 pm est)	Depart airport en route Almodina Palace drive time: 25 minutes
12:10 pm	Arrive Almodina Palace
RON:	**Almodina Palace** **Palma de Mallorca**

Sunday, July 6, 1997

NOTE: SPAIN IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC

Down for the Day and Evening

TBD	**Dinner with the King and Queen**
RON:	**Almodina Palace** **Palma de Mallorca**

Monday, July 7, 1997

NOTE: SPAIN IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC

Down for the Morning

2:15 pm	**Depart Almodina Palace en route airport** drive time: 25 minutes
2:40 pm	Arrive airport
2:55 pm	Wheels up Mallorca en route Madrid, Spain flight time: 1 hour; no change
3:55 pm	Arrive Torrejon Air Base, Madrid Open Press
4:10 pm	Depart airport en route Palace Hotel drive time: 40 minutes
4:50 pm	Arrive Palace Hotel
5:00 pm - 5:50 pm	**Briefing for Bilateral with PM Aznar and Solana and NATO Summit** Presidential Suite Palace Hotel Closed Press
6:00 pm - 6:50 pm	**Meeting with Members of Congress and National Security Team** Room TBD Palace Hotel Closed Press
7:00 pm - 7:30 pm	**Bilateral Meeting with Secretary General Solana** room tbd Palace Hotel Closed Press ?
7:40 pm	Depart hotel en route Moncloa Palace drive time: 20 minutes

8:00 pm Arrive Moncloa Palace

8:10 pm -
8:45 pm **Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Aznar**
Room TBD
Moncloa Palace
Pool Spray

8:50 pm Proceed to dinner

9:00 pm -
11:15 pm **Private Dinner for NATO leaders and Spouses hosted by Prime Minister Aznar and Mrs. Aznar**
Moncloa Palace
business attire
Closed Press

RON: **The Palace Hotel**
Madrid, Spain

Tuesday, July 8, 1997

NOTE: SPAIN IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC

NOTE: The First Lady has a separate schedule and will join the POTUS for the dinner hosted by the King and Queen.

8:20 am -
8:40 am **Morning Update**
Suite
Palace Hotel

8:50 am Depart hotel en route King Juan Carlos I Conference Center
drive time: 25 minutes

9:15 am Arrive Conference Center

9:30 am -
12:45 pm **NATO Summit Morning Plenary Session**
Conference Hall
King Juan Carlos I Conference Center
Pool Spray for Opening Statements

Format: Secretary General makes opening remarks
Aznar makes remarks

Note: Senator Roth will address the session at approx. 9:50 am - 10:05 am.

12:50 pm **Photo With Leaders**
location tbd
Pool Press

1:00 pm -
2:30 pm **Working Luncheon**
TBD
King Juan Carlos I Conference Center

NOTE: There will be three other luncheons at this time, one for Foreign Ministers/Defense Ministers, one for Delegation members and one for staff.

2:30 pm -
3:30 pm **Afternoon Plenary session**
Conference Hall
King Juan Carlos I Conference Center

3:45 pm Depart Conference Center en route Palace Hotel
drive time: 25 minutes

4:10 pm Arrive Palace Hotel

4:15 pm -
5:50 pm **Down time**
Suite
Palace Hotel

6:00 pm -
7:00 pm **Briefing for press conference**
room tbd
Palace Hotel

7:05 pm Proceed to press conference

7:15 pm -
7:45 pm **Press Conference**
(1:45 pm est) TBD
Palace Hotel

NOTE: Solana will do a press conference at 4:30 pm.

7:50 pm Depart en route suite

8:00 pm -
8:30 pm **Hold/Clothes Change**
Suite
Palace Hotel

Note: the dinner at the Royal Palace is black tie.

8:30 pm Depart Palace Hotel accompanied by the First Lady en route the Royal Palace
drive time: 15 minutes

8:45 pm Arrive Royal Palace

9:00 pm -
11:00 pm **Dinner for NATO Leaders and Spouses hosted by the King and Queen**
Royal Palace
Press TBD

NOTE: There will be a separate dinner for Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Permanent NATO Representatives.

11:00 pm Depart Palace en route hotel

11:20 pm Arrive hotel

RON: **The Palace Hotel**
Madrid, Spain

Wednesday, July 9, 1997

***NOTE: SPAIN IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC**

8:15 am -
8:30 am Morning Update

8:30 am -
8:55 am **Briefing for EAPC Meeting and Meetings with President Chirac and President Kuchma**

8:35 am Depart hotel en route conference center
drive time: 25 minutes

8:50 am Arrive Conference Center

9:00 am -
9:30 am **Coffee with President Jacques Chirac**
room tbd
King Juan Carlos I Conference Center
Pool Spray

9:45 am -
10:10 am **Bilateral Meeting with President Kuchma**
tbd
King Juan Carlos I Conference Center

10:15 am Proceed to tbd

10:20 am -
11:20 am **NATO/Ukraine Signing Ceremony**
(5:20 am est) Tbd
King Juan Carlos I Conference Center
Press tbd

11:25 am Proceed to Auditorium

11:30 am -
1:00 pm **EAPC Meeting**
Auditorium
King Juan Carlos Conference Center
Press TBD

1:15 pm -
2:45 pm **EAPC Luncheon**
King Juan Carlos Center

2:55 pm	Depart conference center en route Ambassador's Residence drive time: 25 minutes
2:35 pm	Arrive Ambassador's residence
2:45 pm - 3:45 pm	**Reception with the CEE/partners** Room tbd King Juan Carlos I Conference Center Closed Press
3:55 pm	Depart for Torrejon Air Base drive time: 20 minutes
4:15 pm	Arrive Torrejon Air Base
4:25 pm - 4:50 pm	**Remarks to Embassy Staff** TBD Torrejon Air Base Closed Press
5:05 pm	Wheels up en route Granada flight time: 1 hour; no change
6:05 pm	Wheels down Granada
6:20 pm	Depart en route Alhambra Castle drive time: 15 minutes
6:35 pm	Arrive Alhambra Castle
6:45 pm - 8:00 pm	**Tour Alhambra Castle with King and Queen**
TBD	**Private Dinner with the King and Queen** Alhambra Castle

NOTE: It gets dark at approximately 9:30 pm this time of year in Spain.

TBD	Return to Madrid

RON: **The Palace Hotel**
Madrid, Spain

Thursday, July 10, 1997

**** NOTE: SPAIN IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC. POLAND IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC.***

9:35 am — Depart hotel en route airport
drive time: 25 minutes

NOTE: The First Lady will depart separately from Madrid.

10:00 am — Arrive airport

10:15 am — Wheels up en route Warsaw, Poland
flight time: 2 hours 50 minutes; no change

1:05 pm — Wheels down Warsaw, Poland

1:10 pm - 1:25 pm — **Arrival Ceremony**
Open Press

1:35pm — Depart Airport en route Presidential Palace
drive time: 20 minutes

1:55 pm — Arrive Palace

2:00 pm - 2:10 pm — **Photo Op with President Kwasnieski**
Presidential Palace
Pool Press

2:15 pm - 2:55 pm — **Bilateral Meeting with President Kwasnieski**
Presidential Palace
Closed Press

3:05 pm — Depart en route hotel
drive time: 20 minutes

3:25 pm — Arrive hotel

3:30 pm -
5:00 pm **Down time**
Presidential Suite
Marriott Hotel

5:00 pm
5:15 pm **Speech Prep**
Presidential Suite
Marriott Hotel

5:20 pm Depart hotel en route TBD
drive time: 15 minutes

5:35 pm Arrive TBD

5:45 pm -
6:40 pm **Remarks to the Citizens of Warsaw**
(12:40 pm est) Location TBD
Open Press

6:50 pm Depart TBD en route Presidential palace
drive time: 15 minutes

7:05 pm Arrive Presidential Palace

7:10 pm -
9:10 pm **Dinner hosted by President Kwasnieski**
Presidential Palace

NOTE: This dinner would include members of the opposition party. The President will need to do a pull aside with the Prime Minister and with former president Lech Walesa. It is also recommended that he do a pull aside with members of the Jewish community.

9:00 pm Depart Palace en route hotel

9:20 pm Arrive hotel

RON: **Marriott Hotel**
Warsaw, Poland

Friday, July 11, 1997

**** NOTE: POLAND IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC. ROMANIA IS 7 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC. DENMARK IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC.***

8:30 am	Depart hotel en route airport drive time: 20 minutes
8:50 am	Arrive airport
9:05 am	Wheels up en route Bucharest, Romania flight time: 1 hour 30 minutes; +1 hour time change
11:35 pm	Wheels down Bucharest, Romania
11:50 pm - 12:05 pm	**Arrival Ceremony** Open Press
12:10 pm	Depart airport en route Tomb of the Unknown Soldier drive time: 20 minutes
12:30 pm	Arrive Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
12:40 pm - 12:50 pm	**Wreath Laying Ceremony** Pool Press
12:55 pm	Depart en route Presidential Palace
1:10 pm	Arrive Presidential Palace
1:15 pm - 1:25 pm	**Photo Opportunity with President Constantinescu** Presidential Palace Pool Press
1:30 pm - 2:10 pm	**Bilateral Meeting with President Constantinescu** Presidential Palace Closed Press

2:15 pm -
3:00 pm **Reception hosted by President Constantinescu with Opposition leaders**
Presidential Palace
Press TBD

NOTE: This reception would include members of the opposition party. The President will need to to do a pull aside with the Prime Minister

3:10 pm Depart en route hotel

3:30 pm Arrive hotel

3:35 pm -
4:30 pm **Down time/Speech Prep**
Presidential Suite

4:35 pm Depart hotel en route TBD

4:50 pm Arrive TBD

4:55 pm -
5:40 pm **Remarks to the Citizens of Bucharest**
(10:40 am est) Location TBD
Open Press

5:50 pm Depart TBD en route OTR

6:00 pm -
6:45 pm **OTR**

6:50 pm Depart OTR en route Ambassador's Residence

7:00 pm Arrive Ambassador's residence

7:10 pm -
7:35 pm **Remarks to the Embassy staff**
Garden
Ambassador's Residence
Closed Press

7:40 pm Depart en route Airport

8:00 pm Arrive airport

8:15 pm	Wheels up en route Copenhagen, Denmark flight time: 2 hours 10 minutes; - 1 hour time change
9:25 pm	Wheels down Copenhagen
9:40 pm - 9:50 pm	**Arrival Ceremony** Open Press
10:05 pm	Wheels Up via Marine One en route LZ flight time: 15 minutes
10:20 pm	Wheels Down LZ
10:30 pm	Depart LZ en route Fredensborg Palace drive time: 15 minutes (T)
10:45 pm	Arrive Fredensborg Palace
RON:	**Fredensborg Palace** **Denmark, Copenhagen**

Saturday, July 12, 1997

**** NOTE: DENMARK IS 6 HOURS AHEAD OF WASHINGTON, DC.***

10:30 am - 10:45 am	**Morning Update**
10:50 am - 11:20 am	**Briefing for meeting with Prime Minister Rasmussen** Presidential Quarters Fredensborg Palace
11:25 am	Proceed do dining room
11:30 am - 1:00 pm	**Luncheon Hosted by the Queen** Fredensborg Palace Closed Press
1:10 pm	Depart Fredensborg en route LZ

Drive time: 15 minutes (T)

1:25 pm Arrive LZ

1:40 pm Wheel up via Marine One en route Copenhagen LZ
flight time: 15 minutes (T)

1:55 pm Wheels down LZ

2:10 pm Depart en route Memorial Park
drive time: 20 minutes (T)

2:30 pm Arrive Memorial park

2:35 pm -
2:45 pm **Wreath Laying Ceremony at Midelund Memorial Park**
Pool Press

2:50 pm Depart en route Prime Minister's Office
drive time: 15 minutes (T)

3:05 pm Arrive Prime Minister's Office

3:15 pm -
3:25 pm **Photo Opportunity with Prime Minster Rasmussen**
Prime Minister's Office

3:30 pm -
4:00 pm **Meeting with Prime Minister Rasmussen**
Prime Minister's office
Closed Press

4:10 pm Depart Prime Minister's Office en route tbd
drive time: 15 minutes (T)

4:25 pm Arrive tbd

4:30 pm -
5:30 pm **Remarks to the Citizens of Copenhagen**
(11:30 am est) Location TBD
Open Press

5:40 pm Depart tbd en route Ambassador's residence

	drive time: 15 minutes
5:55 pm	Arrive Ambassador's residence
6:00 pm - 6:25 pm	**Remarks to American Embassy staff** Location tbd Closed Press
6:30 pm	Depart tbd en route sightseeing or airport
8:00 pm	Wheels up en route Andrews AFB **(T)** flight time: 8 hours, 35 minutes; -6 hours time change
10:00 pm	Wheels Down Andrews AFB
10:15 pm	Depart Andrews via Marine One en route White House
10:25 pm	Wheels down White House
RON:	**White House**

Dear President Clinton

Thank you for remembering my birthday. The frame is beautiful and I have a wonderful picture of Joshua playing the sax - well sort of playing it - so I thank you for a beautiful memory.

Ron and I are looking forward to a ten day vacation in Aspen. The mountains have a special spiritual affect on me, not to mention the most

To Maureen Lewis

for reply ?

Maureen - Y ✓ N —

Check w/ NH to see if reply necessary

Phil

magnificent golf course imaginable. My Dad said it was the most gorgeous course he ever played. I hope you and Hillary will have an opportunity to enjoy a relaxing holiday over the fourth.

As always, it was great to see you.

warmest regards

Beth

To Dorskind for reply?
Y ✓ N ___
Coordinate with NSC?
Y ✓ N ___

Staff file

'97 JUN 27 PM 4:04

Embassy of the Republic of Korea
Political Section I
2450 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
T:(202)939-5619/5620/5486 F:(202)387-0205

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Number of Pages (Including this cover sheet): 3

Date: June 27, 97 Time:

TO: Ms. Janis Kearney Facsimile Number: 456-6703

FROM: Young Jip Ahn Telephone Number: 456-6610

MESSAGE: per our telephone conversation I am sending a copy of condolences message from our president Kim Young Sam to president Clinton. Original letter will be delivered by diplomatic channel (through State Department)

[If there is any difficulty in receiving this transmission, please contact the sender at (202)939-5619 .]

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON, D. C.


KAM 97/146

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and has the honor to convey a message of condolences from President Kim Young Sam to President William Jefferson Clinton upon the passing of President Clinton's great-uncle, Mr. Henry Oren Grisham.

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

Washington, D.C.
June 25, 1997

Enclosure: as stated



Dear President Clinton,

Having learned of the news that your great-uncle, Mr. Henry Oren Grisham, has passed away, I would like to express my deepest sympathy and most profound condolences to you and your family. May God comfort you in your time of grief.

Looking forward to meeting you soon,

/ s / Kim Young-Sam

BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

LEONARD BARRACK
GERALD J. RODOS
DANIEL E. BACINE
SHELDON L. ALBERT
SAMUEL R. SIMON**
STEVEN A. ASHER***
M. RICHARD KOMINS
EDWARD M. GERGOSIAN*
JEFFREY W. GOLAN
ANTHONY J. BOLOGNESE
STEPHEN R. BASSER†
LESLIE BORNSTEIN MOLDER
ROBERT A. HOFFMAN*
DOMENICK KLEIN, JR.*
JEFFREY L. LERNER
NICHOLAS J. GUILIANO
KRISTI A. SHELTON*
BLAIR A. NICHOLAS*
JEFFREY A. BARRACK

* ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA
† ALSO ADMITTED IN NEW JERSEY
** ALSO ADMITTED IN NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
***ALSO ADMITTED IN NEW YORK

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(212) 688-0782
TELECOPIER (212) 688-0783

TELECOPY COVER SHEET

June 24, 1997

TO: ***Name:*** President William J. Clinton

Attention: Ms. Nancy Hernreich

202-456-6703
Telecopy No.:

FROM: ***LEONARD BARRACK***
Direct Telecopy Number: (215) 568-2996

Message: Dear Nancy -
Please bring this letter to the President's attention at his earliest convenience .... Yours Too
Thanks.
Len Barrack

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover sheet): — 1

Original to follow by U.S. Mail, Overn or other (_____)

___X___ ***YES*** _____

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL ... PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNE...

To Dorskind for reply?
Y ___✓___ N ___

Coordinate with NSC?
Y ___✓___ N ___

Staff Sec.

BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

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KRISTI A. SHELTON*
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** ALSO ADMITTED IN NEW JERSEY
*** ALSO ADMITTED IN NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
**** ALSO ADMITTED IN NEW YORK

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June 24, 1997

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.

97 JUN 27 PM 03

Dear President Clinton:

As a member of the Board of Visitors of Temple University School of Law, I have been following with great interest the Law School's initiative in developing a program of legal education in China to complement its existing program in Tokyo.

Dean Robert Reinstein has recently returned from Beijing where he has successfully negotiated a Letter of Intent to create the first American Master of Laws Program in Beijing. Bob is a very capable individual and I have a high regard for his accomplishments, creativity and his perceptions.

This is an exciting and important event in the development of a rule of law in China, and a matter that is, in my opinion, deserving of your attention and whatever follow-up action you may deem appropriate.

Please read the enclosed letter from Dean Reinstein at your earliest convenience which comprehensively describes his efforts.

With warm personal regards and expressions of my highest personal esteem,

Sincerely,

Leonard Barrack

LB:dsk
Enclosure

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
A Commonwealth University

School of Law

1719 N. Broad Street (005-00)
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122-6098
(215) 204-7863
Fax: (215) 204-1185

Office of the Dean

June 19, 1997

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear President Clinton:

At the request of the Chinese Ministry of Justice and the China University of Political Science and Law, Temple University School of Law is developing a program to teach Chinese law graduates about the American legal system and international law. This program has the potential of contributing significantly to the development of the rule of law in China. Because the development of a legal system in China is critical to that country's future, and because this objective is central to your policy towards China, I wanted to advise you of the initiative that Temple Law School is pursuing.

Last year, Temple Law School was approached by officials of the Chinese Ministry of Justice and the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPSL) with a proposal to discuss the possibility of creating a program of legal education in China that would focus on the study of the American legal system and of international and comparative law. These officials emphasized that such an educational program would be beneficial for students and faculty in both of our countries and that it was critical for the development of the rule of law in China. CUPSL is an excellent partner for such a program because it is one of the largest law schools in China, and its graduates not only go into private practice but also enter government service and hold positions in the ministries and courts that would be at the core of a functioning legal system.

The Ministry of Justice and CUPSL officials said that they approached Temple Law School with this proposal because they know that Temple is a leader in international legal education. The CUPSL officials, in particular, were familiar with Temple Law School's unique program in Tokyo which has two components: American law students study full-time and receive a semester's worth of credit toward the Juris Doctor degree, and local law graduates (mostly Japanese) study and receive credits toward the Masters of Law degree. The courses are in English, and the curriculum has a wide variety of offerings in American, Japanese and international law. This program has completed its fourth year, and it is the only program of this kind offered by any American law school in Asia. The Ministry of Justice and CUPSL officials thought that the Tokyo program might provide a model for a similar effort in Beijing.

The Ministry of Justice and CUPSL officials also said that they approached Temple Law School because they were aware of Temple University's historical ties with China. Our university has had exchange programs with Chinese universities for many years, and Temple is the only American university that awarded an honorary degree (in 1979) to Deng Xiaoping.

After many discussions, the Temple Law School faculty decided that this proposal had sufficient merit that it should be pursued seriously. I and other Law School representatives have had several extended discussions with CUPSL and Ministry of Justice officials. These discussions resulted in the signing of letters of intent between our two institutions to create the first American Masters of Law program in Beijing. Both schools hope to start the program in September 1998.

The Masters of Law program will be a two-year program of study in which Chinese law graduates take courses at CUPSL's campus in Beijing and at Temple's campus in Philadelphia. The Masters of Law degree will be a Temple degree, and the faculty will be members of the standing Temple Law faculty as well as the faculties of other American law schools. We have established an academic advisory committee, which includes many of the leading American law scholars on China, to help in the formulation of the curriculum. The curriculum will include American constitutional law, which is the foundation of the American legal system, and will also cover many areas of business and commercial law, such as contracts, international business transactions, intellectual property, international commercial transactions, tax, banking and securities regulation, creditors' and debtors' rights, secured transactions, cross-cultural negotiations, legal ethics, and the enforcement of legal norms through an independent judiciary and other mechanisms.

Although we have made substantial progress, a considerable amount of work remains to make this program operational. The program has been approved in principle by the Chinese Ministry of Justice, but must obtain formal approvals from that Ministry and the State Education Commission. At our end, the program must be approved by the Temple University Board of Trustees and the law school's accrediting agency (the American Bar Association). Each of these approvals is dependent upon a demonstration that the program rests on a sound financial basis.

We are currently looking for some financial support for this pioneering project. First, we are in need of a modest planning grant to fund the program's developmental year. Second, a scholarship fund must be created because many of the Chinese law students will not be able to afford the necessary tuition levels and the expenses of spending at least one semester studying in Philadelphia. Third, CUPSL has a downtown campus which would provide an excellent location for the program, but does not have a modern, first-class building with classrooms, a library, faculty offices and apartments, and computer facilities that are essential for such an important international program. The total cost of this program is nevertheless small in comparison to its

potential benefits, and we are hopeful that we can receive the necessary support from American government, foundation or corporate sources.

In the early stages of this project we met with Robert Suettinger, the Director of Asian Affairs at the White House, whose advice and encouragement were very positive. It would be very helpful for us to receive similar assistance in meeting the financial and other needs of the program.

I would, of course, be greatly honored to provide you with additional information or discuss this project with you at greater length if you so desire.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. Reinstein

Robert J. Reinstein
Vice President and Dean
School of Law, Temple University

cc: Robert Suettinger

To Dorskind for reply?

Y ✓ N —

6/26

Dear Mr. Primdel,

Your speech at the mayor's Conference was great! It went over very well.

They also liked the Stats & the Cities report which received wide coverage.

I'll follow up.

Thanks,

Andrew

ANDREW CUOMO
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

HUD Daily Newsclips

STATE OF THE CITIES

U.S. Conference of Mayors

97 JUN 27 PM 4:04

To Dorskind for reply? Y ✓

Keep Our Post Office
Downtown, Committee
P.O. Box A
1-501-255-3202
Hazen, Arkansas 72064

June 16, 1997

Jan - N
We can't get involved, right?
cc: USPS decisions
Please advise
Phil

Honorable William J. Clinton
White House
Washington, D. C.

Re: New Proposed Postoffice, Hazen, AR.

Dear President Clinton:

While you are working hard to build us a bridge into the next century, it seems to us that one of our government agencies are burning bridges, present and past. We are referring to the United States Postal Service all across our great country.

From the beginning, the Postal Department has been very adamant that the new Post Office should be located at the very Eastern extreme of our City Limits on the busy and dangerous Highway 11.

After our committee was formed and filed an objection with the Postal Department about their proposed site so far from downtown Hazen would be a real handicap for our patrons who walk to the Post Office and for the business community, many, who go the convenient Post Office several times a day to receive mail and also to mail out-going mail.

Our committee spent considerable time trying to obtain an option on a suitable site, downtown, convenient to all of our local patrons.We were successful in our efforts. The Hazen First State Bank offered to give a vacant lot adjacent to their bank and even offered to give up their employee's parking spaces for this Post Office project. The Bank offered this free as a donation to the betterment of the City of Hazen, recognizing that the vast majority of our citizens wanted to keep our village postoffice downtown.

The Postal Department called a special town meeting to discuss the Post Office location with the citizens of Hazen. From the discussions from the floor, it became very apparent that our people did not want the post office near the edge of town.....but wanted it located in the center of the City. It was also very obvious that the Postal Department officials wanted it on the remote Eastern side of Hazen. Near the end of the meeting, Mr. William McMurry, United States Postal Service Real Estate Specialist, told the group that he would ask the Council to pick from the available locations.....their recommendations as to the site that our people desired the new Post Office to be located upon.

The Postal Officials toured our town with a group from our committee looking at the available sites. We were advised that the bank site would be large enough.

On May 15, 1997, the Hazen City Council met and passed Resolution No. 377 which recommended to the Postal Service Site 7 at the southest corner of Adams and Chester Streets. This was the site that the Hazen First State Bank offered as a donation.

Now, today, we have a copy of a letter, dated June 13, 1997 to the Mayor of Hazen advising that the bank site is too small.....it fact he says that building on this site would leave their available parking 40% below their requirements.

We drew this lot to scale, placing a 4,000 square ft. building on the drawing and found that 45 parking spaces could be on the site with the furtherest one only 90 feet from the Post Office building. This would leave 8,500 square feet of additional parking space or driveways, drive-in windows, etc. We are sure that they will require a dedicated driveway for the Postal Trucks to pick up the out-going mail and deliver the Hazen mail. There should be adequate room for this in this 8,500 sq. ft.

We feel that this is more than adequate.....it fact it is much better parking than we have at the Federal Building at 700 West Capitol in Little Rock.

We are still convinced that for the overall good and overall convenience of the vast majority of our Post Office patrons, that the location of the Post Office should be in the down town area.

In the event that the Postal Service cannot approve any site in the downtown area, we respectfully request that the Postal Department place this project on hold for 12 months and perhaps a site might become available that would please the majority of our Citizens and also one that might be acceptable by the Postal Service.

Sincerely,

KEEP OUR POST OFFICE DOWNTOWN, COMMITTEE

Byrum Kelly

Byrum Kelly, Chairman

Joe Kelly, Vice-Chairman

Conley House

Conley House, Secretary

WE THE UNDERSIGNED CITIZENS OF HAZEN, ARKANSAS OPPOSE THE RE-LOCATION OF THE HAZEN UNITED POSTAL SERVICE TO HIGHWAY #11

[illegible]	Box 31 Hazen AR
Billy Aycock	Box 474 Hazen AR
Nancy Pocock	Box 297 Hazen, AR
Kathy E. Gibson	BOX 332 Hazen Ark 72064
Jake Smith	BOX 344 Hazen, AR
Olivia Lemmons	Box 252 Hazen, Ar
Cleo Penn	BOX 881 HAZEN AR
Becky Wheeler	Box-108 Hazen, Ar.
Travis Wheeler	Box 108 Hazen, Ar
Jeff Bell	BOX 948 HAZEN AR.
Billy Hill	Box 696 Hazen Ark
Dana Lewis	PO Box 278 Haze, AR
Carol Gibson	PO Box 175 HAZEN AR
Beverly Wood	P.O. Box 11, Hazen, Ar.
[illegible] Coleman	P.O. Box 848 Hazen, AR
[illegible]	PO Box 523 Hazen
Tammy Scott	P.O. Box 442 Hazen, Ar
[illegible]	P.O. Box 46 Hazen, Ar
[illegible]	P.O. Box 179 Hazen, Ar.
[illegible]	Po Box 703 Hazen, AR 72064
[illegible]	Box 476 Hazen AR 72064
Lisa Hudson	P.O. Box 922 Hazen, AR 72064
[illegible]	[illegible]

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 27, 1997

Copied
Sperling
Lindsey
COS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: **GENE SPERLING**

RE: **NEC Weekly Report**

cc: **ERSKINE BOWLES**

Direct Loans: Bob Shireman, on our staff, joined Mike Smith and others at a presentation by EDS representatives on their readiness for the large volume of loan originations that will be processed in August and September. A few issues came up, and Mike will continue to press hard to make sure that the system is as close to fail-safe as possible. In particular, we pushed to ensure that (1) there is enough knowledgeable technical staff available to address problems immediately if they arise, (2) they maintain the school hotline to senior managers at EDS (this was established in response to the initial problems), and (3) there is enough redundancy and excess computer system capacity to survive a disaster or a delay in the arrival of planned new computers.

Hispanic Education: Following up on a suggestion that I made to the Hispanic Caucus, the NEC held the first of four planned discussions with Caucus members and staff on education issues. David Longanecker (the Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education) discussed some of their thinking as they develop the Department's proposal for reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. The reaction to the meeting was very positive. Also this week, Bob Shireman met with Ana Guzman, the chair of your Advisory Commission on Educational ~~Excellence~~ for Hispanic Americans, to discuss the Commission's recommendations and our efforts on the issue.

Let's call him on this need to discuss

Product Liability: Bruce Lindsey and I held two principals' meetings this week to consider options on product liability reform. The discussion focused on both the larger issue of whether federal legislation in this area was appropriate, and on specific options to deal with the major items in your veto message: several liability for non-economic damages, caps on punitive damages, and the statute of repose. We are drafting a memo to you presenting the options; the memo will be circulated to participating NEC principals next week, with a goal of getting it to you before the July 4 holiday. Bruce and I have also met over the last week with both sides -- CEOs from the Business Roundtable and the American Trial Lawyer's Association.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

Climate Change: Sen. Levin called me to stress he is going to be constructive on this issue, but he has to take into account his part of the country. He emphasized how important it was that developing countries be included in the treaty so that there is no incentive to move auto production offshore to places without the same binding levels.

Katie McGinty, Dan Tarullo and I sent out a letter with your UN speech to various people, including those who opposed us, hoping to engage them. As a possible first event, we are considering either bringing in a group of Nobel Laureates to make the case on the strength of the science or finding a place to give a speech that visually shows the potential impact of climate change.

Medicare Commission: This week, I chaired working group meetings as well as principal-level discussions with the overall budget group. This group will need to consider substantive and process issues for long-term Medicare and long-term Social Security. Our immediate focus is how the Republican insertion of a Medicare commission in the Reconciliation fits with our strategy and whether we should try to delete it or fix it. We will be sending you a memo outlining opinions of the budget team. Erskine and John Hilley spoke with Sen. Lott and they worked out that myself and Chris Jennings would discuss this issue with Lott's people.

NAFTA Report: The NAFTA Implementation Act requires the President to submit to Congress by July 1, 1997 a detailed review of the operation and effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy at the aggregate and sectoral level. We held two meetings this week with USTR, Treasury, Commerce, NSC & CEA to coordinate a strategy on the release of the report. The report references a DRI analysis which should provide some independent validation by showing when the peso crisis is put to the side, NAFTA would have led to an increase in our trade surplus with Mexico and boosted national income modestly.

However, at the sectoral level, it is very hard to isolate the effects of NAFTA from the peso crisis, and there are some sectors (apparel & textiles) where critics could use statistics to support the notion that NAFTA has had a negative impact. Indeed, critics of NAFTA released their own 3-year review of NAFTA this week entitled "The Failed Experiment." To get the report out in the best possible shape, we are releasing it the day Congress returns. Our strategy is to roll it out in a way so that it is strong and credible while educating the media as to NAFTA's ~~contributions~~. On the other hand, we do not want to raise its profile so that it plays into the hands of Fast Track opponents who want to make Fast Track a referendum on NAFTA.

Fast Track: Following the success of China MFN, Charlene Barshefsky, Sandy Berger, Dan Tarullo, Susan Brophy and I all agree we should keep together the same team as much as possible. We will be meeting first thing in the week to sketch out a detailed action plan for building support for Fast Track over the summer.

Securities Litigation: Kathy Wallman and Ellen Seidman are working with a small interagency group to prepare an options memo on Congresswoman Eshoo's bill to establish national uniform standards for private class actions alleging securities fraud. In addition to the yea and nay options on whether to support any legislation and whether to support this bill, the group is ~~developing several intermediate options~~ that would preempt state laws more modestly than would the Eshoo bill.

Electricity Restructuring: Kathy Wallman is coordinating an NEC interagency process to develop an Administration position on proposals to make the electricity industry more competitive. The process is well underway and is now at the stage of refining the consensus among the agencies and framing issues for decision at higher ranks. We expect the process to be finished later this summer. Betsey Moler, one of the country's foremost policy experts in restructuring, has now been sworn in as Deputy Secretary of Energy, and she will be a substantial asset to the Administration and to Secretary Pena in putting forth the Administration's position once it has been shaped.

Kid-friendly Internet: In your response to the Supreme Court decision on the Communications Decency Act, you pledged to convene a meeting of industry leaders and groups representing parents, teachers and Internet users. This meeting is tentatively scheduled for July 16th. We are working with industry to develop a series of commitments that would make Internet filtering technology (similar to the v-chip) widely available and effective.

European Review of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger: Boeing expects to get a green light next week from the FTC on the proposed merger with McDonnell Douglas. However, the European Union (EU) merger officials continue to have major objections -- objections that appear to reflect concerns about the competitiveness of Airbus more than concerns about the welfare of consumers. If the FTC does give Boeing the go ahead, the NEC will meet right away with Boeing officials to discuss a strategy for dealing with the Europeans.

SBA Proposal: The NEC has begun a process to deal with an SBA proposal to raise the federal procurement goal for small businesses from 20 to 25 percent. SBA argues that this will help minority and women-owned small businesses, by creating a bigger pie for them to compete for. Moreover, there is support for similar proposals in Congress, and SBA wants to get on board. However, OMB, NPR and agency procurement executives strongly oppose the proposal because, among other reasons, they believe the benefits of a higher goal would go largely to white male-owned small businesses. Through the NEC process, we are developing a set of options, including some options designed to directly benefit minority and women-owned businesses.

Progress on Restoring Benefits to Legal Immigrants: During Senate debate on the spending reconciliation bill, Sen. Domenici accepted (without a vote) an amendment from Sen. Lautenberg that restored SSI benefits to all legal immigrants in the country as of August 22, 1996 who subsequently become disabled. As a result, the Senate legislation now restores benefits to all current recipients and new disabled applicants. The Senate action increases the likelihood that the conference report will restore benefits to both elderly and disabled legal immigrants -- provided the Administration maintains the pressure. As you know, the House legislation restores benefits only to current recipients, permitting no new applications.

Tobacco settlement: The NEC is participating in Bruce Reed's and DPC's various workgroups of the tobacco settlement task force. We have attended meetings this week on the litigation aspects of the case -- including questions concerning punitive damages, enforcement of various advertising restrictions, and document discovery, and on economic analysis of the tobacco industry and the impact and the impact of the settlement on that industry, related industries (including farmers) and the federal government (including taxes and expenditures).

Electronic Benefits Transfer: Ellen Seidman met with Treasury public affairs staff to discuss Treasury's planned educational campaign to support EBT99. We discussed increased involvement of community groups who have developed relations with the banking sector, as well as timing and thrust of the campaign.

THE PRESI[illegible]EEN
6-30-97

'97 JUN 27 08:44

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

June 27, 1997

COPIED - Pg. 1
McGinty
COS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: KATHLEEN A. McGINTY

CC: ERSKINE BOWLES

RE: CEQ WEEKLY REPORT

PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM TOXICS

Brownfields, Superfund, and the Budget

We worked this week with DPC, OMB, White House Legislative Affairs (WHLA), EPA, and Treasury to respond to several failures by Republican committee chairmen to fulfill commitments made in the budget agreement concerning toxic waste cleanup and community redevelopment. For example, the Archer tax bill that went to the floor this week omitted the broadly-supported brownfields tax incentive you first proposed in your 1996 State of the Union address and then secured in the budget agreement. Separately, a House Appropriations subcommittee omitted the funds, also made possible by the budget agreement, for the initiative you announced at Kalamazoo to accelerate toxic waste cleanup.

We worked with these offices and agencies to develop a letter from the Vice President, sent to 245 members on Wednesday, criticizing the leadership for walking away from these commitments. These members were targeted on the basis of their past support for our brownfields proposals. We expect the letter to be useful in rallying public support on these issues over the July 4 recess.

RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP

Land and Water Conservation Fund

The House Appropriations Committee this week reported the Interior Appropriations bill without including the $700 million in the Land and Water Conservation Fund that was part of the budget agreement. The Administration wants to use $315 million of this funding for land acquisition to complete the Yellowstone and Headwaters agreements. In order to make clear our position on the importance of this issue, the Administration will need to emphasize this funding as an important priority before this bill goes to the floor.

Also during this period, the Administration has been working to put together a proposed project

list for the use of the remaining $385 million in the fund. An outreach process led by the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Interior (DOI) met last week with about 50 outside groups including sportsmen, state and local officials, and environmental groups. Input from that process will be used as USDA and DOI work together next week to develop a consensus list of project. We expect to send that list to Congress by July 15.

INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Climate Change

The general reaction from the various interest groups regarding your speech before the Untied Nations General Assembly Special Session were within the expected range. The industry response was muted. The Global Climate Coalition, an industry led group, said, "He [the President] resisted the temptation to use this highly public event to unveil Draconian measures that would be harmful to our economy and harmful to the American people." Labor released a statement that supports the process described by the President. Richard Trumka, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, stated that "the AFL-CIO applauds President Clinton for his remarks today that invite discussion and dialogue from all quarters on the issue of global climate change."

Overall, the environmental groups were harshly critical of the lack of specific targets and timetables. The Sierra Club warned that "with the whole world watching, the president of the world's biggest polluter needs to do more that warn of the dire consequences." On a more positive note, however, the World Wildlife Fund called the speech "the strongest statement on climate change by any sitting U.S. president, by a wide margin."

I believe overall these reactions show that your speech succeeded in putting this issue squarely on the nation's agenda and moving it forward in a reasonable fashion. To continue forward motion, it will be critical for you at this time to charge your Cabinet to begin to work together actively with the White House on a concerted strategy on this issue.

International Dolphin Conservation Act

The Senate Commerce Committee reported out Administration supported legislation to protect dolphins by a voice vote this week. Unfortunately, this process has been repeatedly delayed as a result of negotiations with Senator Barbara Boxer's (D-CA) in which further concessions are made by our side without movement on hers. I am concerned that the strategy of the opponents of the bill may be to delay this issue into an election year, including using a filibuster by Senator Boxer when the bill comes to the Senate floor.

We are working very hard to secure the necessary votes for cloture, which remains a difficult task because of the split within the Democratic caucus. Furthermore, it would be better to have a fairly sizeable number of Democrats voting for final passage. I am afraid that is unlikely to be the case unless I am able to convince Senator John Kerry (D-MA), who facilitated the negotiations with Senator Boxer, to support the legislation. Nevertheless, my recommendation is

that we push forward and urge Senator Trent Lott (R-MS) to put this matter before the full Senate in the near term.

SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES

Ozone/particulate matter standards

Reaction to your announcement of the new clean air standards from various stakeholders has been predictable -- kudos from the environment/public health communities and criticism from business and local officials. Press reaction so far has been mostly positive, lead by good editorials in The New York Times and The Washington Post. On the congressional side, Representatives Boucher (D-VA) and Klink (D-PA) have introduced legislation to overturn the standards, and John Dingell (D-MI) has promised to lead the charge. On the other hand, Senator John Chafee (R-RI) has announced that he will not support legislation to overturn the standards, and Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) have endorsed the proposal. Also, local official have also expressed appreciation for the implementation flexibility included in the proposal.

American Heritage Rivers initiative

The Conference of Mayors passed a resolution endorsing the American Heritage Rivers initiative.

OTHER

Regulatory reform

Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Fred Thompson (R-TN) have drafted a new regulatory reform bill for introduction into the Senate. Although this new proposal corrects many of the faults of the old approach taken by the Dole bill and the Contract with America on the last Congress, agencies continue to express strong reservations about this bill, and environmentalists and labor have stated their strong opposition. CEQ and WHLA are working on this issue with OMB, who will be coordinating the Administration's response and testifying before the Senate in July.

Advanced Engine Technology

Recently you discussed with Steve Jobs a new technology known as a "hybrid" powertrain. This technology is one of the research priorities for the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles -- the effort with the Big 3 that you mentioned in your United Nations speech this week. The hybrid is considered by the government/industry technical team to be the most promising approach for achieving the partnership's goal of a threefold improvement in fuel efficiency. A newsletter describing the project's work is attached.

Recycled Paper

Resolution No. 51

Submitted By:

The Honorable Wellington E. Webb
Mayor of Denver

AMERICAN HERITAGE RIVERS INITIATIVE

1. **WHEREAS**, President Clinton announced during his State of the Union speech creation of the American Heritage Rivers Initiative; and

2. **WHEREAS**, the American Heritage Rivers Initiative's objective is to enhance our citizens' enjoyment of the historic, cultural, recreational, economic and environmental value of our rivers and to protect the health of our communities; and

3. **WHEREAS**, the American Heritage Rivers Initiative will recognize outstanding stretches of America's rivers by selecting them to be American Heritage Rivers; and

4. **WHEREAS**, the American Heritage Rivers Initiative will be a partnership between the federal government and the people who enjoy the many values of our rivers; and

5. **WHEREAS**, President Clinton has directed federal agencies to take into consideration the effects upon American Heritage Rivers of federal government actions; and

6. **WHEREAS**, President Clinton has directed his Cabinet to refocus programs, grants and technical assistance in a number of departments to provide special support to American Heritage Rivers and each community supporting an American Heritage River will be given resources to catalyze their community's work on behalf of a restored, revitalized river; and

7. **WHEREAS**, communities will be able to nominate outstanding stretches of river for consideration as American Heritage Rivers and include information on the importance of the stretch of river to the nation's culture and history, to

past and future economic development and to public health and environmental quality,

8. **NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED** that The U.S. Conference of Mayors supports the President's new American Heritage Rivers Initiative and will deliver this resolution to the White House and to members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives; and

9. **BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that The U.S. Conference of Mayors applauds the President for bringing national attention and resources to the creation of preserved environments in urban areas as well as in the remote wildernesses of our nation -- and redirect resources to help make American Heritage Rivers a reality.

Projected Cost: Unknown

CHRYSLER CORPORATION · Ford · GM General Motors

USCAR

NEWS FOR AND ABOUT THE UNITED STATES COUNCIL FOR AUTOMOTIVE RESEARCH

MILEPOST

Winter '9

Fairlane Plaza South,
330 Town Center Dri
Dearborn, MI 48126


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NEXT GENERATION POWERTRAINS

There May Be A Hybrid In Your Future

The next generation family sedan just might be some form of hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) since they offer promise for meeting the USCAR/federal government Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles' (PNGV) goals for fuel economy, low emissions, range and performance.

But while Chrysler, Ford and General Motors are in general agreement on the potential of hybrids, there are a number of views on the best approach and combination of technologies to be used, according to Ron York, General Motors' PNGV director.



Next Generation Vehicles might look similar on the outside, but they likely will have radically different technology under the hood. However, alternative technology will be transparent to the consumer.

Chrysler, Ford and GM all have active hybrid programs coordinated with the PNGV, he said, and each is exploring different approaches. The USCAR partners plan to share some of the results from their separate research with each other. "By collaborating, we'll cover more ground than if we each pursued all the options," York explained.

These next generation PNGV hybrid programs at Chrysler and Ford are based on four-stroke compression ignited internal combustion (IC) engines - in various combinations. GM is concentrating most of its PNGV hybrid research on continuous burning engines: i.e., the gas turbine and the Stirling (see related reports).

USCAR and a host of suppliers are cooperating in developing many of the basic technologies. These include high performance batteries, which the United States Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC) is researching.

The hybrid propulsion programs have targets in 1998 and 1999 and therefore focus on the nearer-term technologies of PNGV. Production prototypes aiming for the PNGV 80 mpg goal are due in 2004.

Why Hybrids?

Hybrids offer a number of advantages: unlike purely electric vehicles, their range is not dependent solely on batteries; and emissions can be reduced because smaller heat engines may be used.

An HEV is a hybrid car with a combustion engine or fuel cell-and an electric drive system that can draw power from an energy storage device such as an advanced battery, flywheel or ultracapaitor.

Chrysler PNGV Director Peter Rosenfeld pointed out that while today's mid-sized sedans may have engines of 100 horsepower or more, they actually require less than 30 horsepower to maintain highway

(Continued on Pg. 2)

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

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June 27, 1997

Pgs. 1 & 2
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: MARIA ECHAVESTE

SUBJECT: OPL WEEKLY REPORT - June 21 to June 27

ACTIONS SUPPORTING PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES

BUDGET

- OPL held a briefing with 200 women health care leaders from across the U.S. to highlight the health care budget and other issues. They were briefed by Dr. John Eisenberg, Dr. Vivian Pinn, Bonnie Campbell and Chris Jennings. This group was particularly interested in domestic violence, Medicare, managed care and children's health.

- OPL held a meeting with 45 CEOs/Hospital Administrators. Chris Jennings provided an update on the budget and listened to their concerns regarding how the proposed budget reductions impact the delivery of health care in their own communities. They are particularly concerned about PSOs, PPS Freeze, the Transfer issue and Medicaid disproportionate share payment reductions (DSH).

- OPL held a meeting with 12 Hospital CEOs from the Massachusetts Hospital Association. Chris Jennings provided an update on the budget. They are concerned about the "carve out" of indirect medical education, Medicaid disproportionate share payment reductions and the impact of proposed equity revisions to other AAPPC payments.

- We began outreach to identify a number of individual working women who can share their stories about how they will benefit from the child tax credit and the EITC.

HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CHILDREN

- The children's health groups are pleased after this week's action on the Senate floor where language was accepted to provide hearing and vision aid for children (this also included dental). They are also pleased with the additional prospect of money from the tobacco settlement. The groups are working with Members of Congress to highlight this issue during the 4th of July Congressional recess.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

- OPL is identifying and working with children's and women's groups to educate and gain support for the ozone and environmental initiatives.

RACE/UNITY INITIATIVE

- We met with the leaders of National Voices for an Inclusive 21st Century -- a coalition of civil and human rights groups representing America's diversity who were in town for a symposium on "Best Practices in Promoting Improved Race Relations." The group was founded by Sanford Cloud, Jr. (National Conference of Christian and Jews), Hugh Price (National Urban League), Abraham Foxman (ADL), and Raul Yzaguirre (NCLR). They all voiced praise and encouragement for you and commended you for starting the dialogue on race. They said your speech set the tone, but cautioned that "we have to move beyond the bully pulpit to action." They urged that the initiative focus on problem solving policy formation, coupled with the identification and replication of best practices.

- Several of the Asian American specialty newspapers have carried positive articles regarding the announcement and Angela Oh's appointment to the board. Asian Week, the largest and most widely read specialty paper, carried the President's remarks in their entirety. Reference was made to the initiative in several related articles.

- I met with Anti-Defamation League (ADL) representatives who are excited about the race initiative and the scheduled White House Conference on Hate Crimes. Executive Director Abraham Foxman has pledged to help and actively participate with both.

- While meeting with the National Italian American Foundation and the Arab American Institute on the Hate Crimes conference we discuss the race initiative. They feel strongly that ethnicity is an important part of the race dialogue. While they acknowledge black discrimination as central to this discussion as the most significant form of discrimination experienced in this country, they remind us that many white people have had their own unique and painful experiences with exclusion and discrimination. They also stated that many white people do not see themselves as merely white, but as Americans of various backgrounds and cultures.

EDUCATION

- We met with the National Italian-American Foundation to discuss ways that their organization can get involved with your education initiative. We discussed how to spark the feeling and desire of volunteerism effectively with their group's membership. They would like adopt several school libraries and either donate an international section or an entire library depending on the resources. NAIF will ask there members to bring a book donation to their annual dinner and are looking at the possibility of a monetary donations that could be used for scholarships or computers (to be used for the Urban testing initiative). Their goal is to have this idea in place for their Annual fall dinner.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

Need to make sure local govt, st, understand the implementation aspects of Air Policy

copied (Pg. 1, 2) Ibarra COS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Need to make sure local govts & understand their concerns / implementation aspects of Air Policy

June 27, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Mickey Ibarra

SUBJECT: Office of Intergovernmental Affairs Weekly Report -- June 23 - 27, 1997

I. PRESIDENTIAL PRIORITIES

Budget and Welfare: We continue to work closely with Mayors to generate support for the Administration's Brownfields initiative and the welfare-to-work proposal. The Mayors wholeheartedly believe that the Brownfields initiative is essential to encourage businesses to clean-up and revitalize sites around the country. They are pleased with the level of attention the Administration has given this initiative, through Secretary Rubin's letter to both Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) and the Vice President's letter to Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY). In addition to Mayor Richard M. Daley's (D-Chicago) letter on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) to Speaker Newt Gingrich and Chairman Bill Archer expressing their strong support for Brownfields, Mayors have individually expressed their views to Congress.

The Mayors are encouraged by our consistent commitment to ensure that a substantial share of welfare-to work funds are targeted toward cities and counties with impoverished populations. The Administration and the Mayors agree that the House Ways and Means proposal most accurately reflects this commitment. Many Mayors have communicated this directly to Congress. At their Annual Conference in San Francisco, the U.S. Conference of Mayors passed a resolution supporting the Ways and Means proposal. Both the Ways and Means and the Education and Workforce Development proposals were included in the bill that passed the House, with the differences to be resolved in Conference. It is important that we do all that we can to maintain the Ways and Means language in Conference. In addition, Mayors Paul Helmke (R-Fort Wayne) and Norm Rice (D-Seattle) wrote to Senators William Roth (R-DE) and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) on behalf of the USCM urging the Senate to target funding to localities and to utilize Private Industry Councils (PICS) as the delivery mechanism. The Senate targeted the funding, but without the use of PICS which will be an issue in Conference.

"One America" Race Initiative: We used your June 23 address to the Annual Meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the address of Secretary Cuomo the same day as a vehicle to explain and recruit partners for our initiative on race reconciliation. The response was very

positive.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

We are also considering a meeting between the leadership of the "Big Seven" and the Race Advisory Board members Governors William Winter and Tom Kean following the first Board meeting in July to discuss the initiative and how the bipartisan intergovernmental affairs organizations can become meaningfully involved in our "One America" race reconciliation initiative.

II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONSTITUENCIES

U.S. Conference of Mayors: Your participation on Monday, June 23, at the 65th Annual Meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors in San Francisco was well-received. The Administration's high visibility at the meeting helped signal our substantial commitment to cities. Nine agencies were represented in addition to you, the Vice President and three Cabinet members. Each morning during the conference, we held meetings with all federal government representatives in order to establish a well-coordinated presence. The only negative note came after our departure at a press conference held by Mayors Archer and Daley about the proposed new EPA standards. The follow-up press on your speech was also very positive.

The presence of agency representatives resulted in an improved resolution on education which incorporates both your reading program and a stronger statement on standards. The staff representative from USTR was able to shepherd a new policy resolution on "Fasttrack," and there was a resolution offered on NATO enlargement after a presentation to the Mayors from the State Department.

With the assistance of Cabinet Affairs, we are preparing to establish a "one stop shop" Administration Service Center at future annual conferences of major intergovernmental organizations consistent with your request and the suggestion of Mayor Daley. In partnership with key departments and agencies, we will create a single location to provide information and address the concerns of conference participants.

National Governors' Association: We met with NGA and DGA staff to begin planning our presence at the Annual NGA Meeting in Las Vegas which will be held July 27 - 30, 1997. In addition to your participation, at least two Cabinet members will participate in the meeting.

Indian Country: We are attempting to learn all of the facts of the troublesome situation in the Cherokee Nation. We know that you were given a letter by Wilma Mankiller about this issue. We have requested and will forward a full report from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as any information that the Justice Department may have. This has been an issue for some time -- White House Counsel has advised us in the past to have the agencies handle our response. Initial investigations suggest that this is a severe internal struggle with a great deal of history behind it.

PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PHIL CAPLAN

SUBJECT: Recent Information Items

We are forwarding the following recent information items:

(A) Ruff/Marshall analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions.

(B) Silverman/Reed/Fortuna memo on Service Summit follow-up. Update on the 501(c)(COPIED llow-up efforts. TAB A: RUFF, MARSHALL, COS (COVER + PG. 4)

(C) Echave TAB C: ECHAVESTE, JOHNSON, COS ck to your in TAB F: C. WALKER, COS s has Maxine TAB H: ECHAVESTE, COS ay and lesbian TAB L: MATHEWS, KING, COS icans and Ar Medite thnicity is as im ey can help. S

(D) Ibarra elected official ff and those a ls and their support/opposition and concerns.

(E) Sheldon Hackney letter o a lengthy and thoughtful letter laying out thoroughly bad idea." He advocates that y *letter for details.* *A response is being prepar*

FROM OVAL

C. Walker
Send to ~~Dorskind~~ for reply?

_____ YES

_____ NO

(F) Letter from Sen. Robert discrimination measure moving through says that "Bob [Bennett] called me...Sand mediately. Bennett's a good guy and y this issue." Bennett thanks you for rais ern that the measure might become law *on a reply.*

PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PHIL CAPLAN

SUBJECT: Recent Information Items

We are forwarding the following recent information items:

(A) Ruff/Marshall analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions.

(B) Silverman/Reed/Fortuna memo on Service Summit follow-up. Update on the 501(c)(3) set up by General Powell, Rev. Campolo's "Mission Year," and other follow-up efforts. *Please see memo for details.*

(C) Echaveste/Johnson memo on Race/Reconciliation outreach. Update on feedback to your initiative -- generally very positive. Hugh Price has welcomed the initiative as has Maxine Waters (statement attached). Asian American community is enthusiastic; gay and lesbian community hopes gays and lesbians of color will be included; Italian Americans and Arab Americans have organized a group that includes other European and Mediterranean communities and have discussed ways to get involved -- they feel ethnicity is as important as race in the dialogue. Jews are supportive and have asked how they can help. Support from Hispanic community is positive.

(D) Ibarra/DuVal memo on PM/Ozone outreach. IGA took the lead on outreach to elected officials following your announcement through conference calls with WH/EPA staff and those affected. Mickey/Fred attach a detailed memo specifying who was on the calls and their support/opposition and concerns.

(E) Sheldon Hackney letter on slavery apology. Dr. Hackney has sent you a lengthy and thoughtful letter laying out the reasons why he believes an apology is a "thoroughly bad idea." He advocates that you move quickly to oppose it. *Please see his letter for details. A response is being prepared in coordination with Sylvia.*

(F) Letter from Sen. Robert Bennett and 18 other Senators on religious discrimination measure moving through Russian Duma. Forwarded by Erskine who says that "Bob [Bennett] called me...Sandy spoke with Bob and agreed to follow-up immediately. Bennett's a good guy and you might want to call him since we agree on this issue." Bennett thanks you for raising the issue with Yeltsin and expresses concern that the measure might become law. *We will also send the letter to NSC to work on a reply.*

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

(G) **Gibbons memos on Mir space station.** NASA and the Russian space agency are planning a repair mission, in mid-July after the July 5 resupply mission, to reinstate power to the core module and assess other damage. This will likely involve a spacewalk inside the depressurized module by the two Russians. Jack also forwards a memo explaining the Soyuz "lifeboat" (including diagram) and details how the astronauts would return to Earth if an evacuation would become necessary.

(H) **Echaveste memo on immigration radio ads running in Miami.** The Republican Party of Dade County is running an intensive Spanish radio ad campaign concerning benefits to immigrants and deportations. Maria attaches a translation of the ad and notes that it misstates the reality of the current controversy in Congress -- it is also an attempt to attract Nicaraguan voters. Earlier this week, OPL met with clergy and representatives of the immigrant community who conveyed the urgency thousands are feeling about the situation. Maria will follow-up with Counsel and DPC to explore options.

(I) **NAFTA Environmental Effects Study.** You saw a NYT piece that said the Mexican government has withheld funding for this study. Berger/McGinty/Sperling/Tarullo report that over the last few weeks, USTR and EPA officials have reached agreement with the Mexicans; Mexico has agreed to allow the study to go forward and to provide funding.

(J) **CEA follow-up on Weekly Economic Briefings.** Green Top Ten - you asked for the World Bank's top ten measures that can "exert real impact on improving and protecting the environment." *We sent you a portion of this material last week while you were in Denver.* Earnings of low-wage workers - you asked about the long-term decline in earnings for those at the bottom of the distribution and whether they have been helped by EITC. Answer is yes -- EITC helps mitigate the declines. For example, the annual income of an unmarried full-time full-year worker with two children at the 10th percentile of the earnings distribution has been significantly enhanced by the EITC (see figure 2). Marital status plays a role -- a married couple at the 10th percentile with two children where both parents work full-time, full-year is not helped much (see figure 3).

(K) **Secy Cohen letter on follow-up to families of Croatia plane crash.** You wrote Secy Cohen in April following receipt of Under Secretary Dorn's report to you on assistance for the families in Ron Brown's delegation. You urged Secy Cohen "to continue to support and assist the families in every possible way." Secy Cohen assures that DOD is. He has established an inter-Service task force to document lessons learned and develop an action plan to prepare for any future tragedies of this magnitude. Dorn is leaving at the end of June and Secy Cohen will appoint another senior official to be the main point of contact with the families.

(L) **Mathews/King memo on Cabinet weekly report follow-up.** COPS -- you asked what the total funding of the COPS grants was to date. COPS has awarded $3.1 billion to law enforcement agencies to fund over 57,000 officers and sheriffs' deputies. Mississippi AIDS funds -- in the next two months, the state's AIDS Drug Assistance Program will run out of money. You asked if we could help. HHS explains that, absent a supplemental

appropriation, there are no additional federal funds for the state program this year. The state recently announced it was providing $400,000 in additional funds, $300,000 of which comes from another federal program, but this will not cover everyone who was dropped from the program initially.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-30-97

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 26, 1997

MEMORANDUM TO: **THE CHIEF OF STAFF**

FROM: **RAHM EMANUEL**

SUBJECT: **WEEKLY REPORT**

I believe the time between now and the President's return from Madrid should be used to convey an activist agenda and a determined President. With the Congress out of session, the following weeks will provide the President a unique opportunity to define his goals for the summer. The following is a rough outline of how I believe we should proceed.

CRIME/ DRUGS: On Friday, June 27, the President will sign the Community Anti-Drug Coalition legislation that grants communities $10 million dollars to communities to fight drugs use among young people. The bill provides an important step in curbing the rising numbers of children using drugs and has a bipartisan majority.

At the signing, the President would also announce the White House strategy concerning the tobacco settlement. Secretary Shalala and Bruce Reed will announce the panel, participants and report on the tobacco settlement. (We will also hear from the Supreme Court on Brady Friday morning and are preparing to add a statement into this event.)

BUDGET: The Wall Street Journal poll shows that an emphasis on the per-child and tuition tax cuts are strongly favored by the public. These findings give us leverage to push ahead in the balanced budget negotiations.

On Monday, June 30, the President will introduce his tax plan. The goal of the announcement, beyond any particular component, is to re-shuffle the tax cut debate. We want to convey that we are for tax cuts and for tax cuts that help middle class families. On departure to the baseball game next week, the President could also announce the new deficit numbers. This will be another opportunity to emphasize our balance budget message.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE: The President's radio address this Saturday, June 28, will announce the co-chairs of the President's Commission for Free TV. This will emphasize his commitment to

campaign finance reform.

OTHER EVENTS:
Upcoming scheduled events include a July 3 event focusing on Veterans, an event outlining our guidelines on religious freedom that I think we should consider as the subject of a radio address. The key message events of the President's trip to Madrid will be the signing at NATO and the trip to Warsaw.

(I thought you would find the attached material interesting.)

TO: Rahm Emanuel

FROM: Geoffrey Garin

DATE: June 26, 1997

RE: The President's Latest Poll Ratings

The President has a strong approval rating of 58% today, with just 33% expressing disapproval of the job he is doing. His ratings are built on a foundation of upbeat perceptions about the current economy, and they are buttressed by the President's competitive advantage over the Republicans in favoring tax policies that are good for the country and fair to the middle class.

The President receives a high level of approval for the job he is doing from all quarters of the electorate. Sixty percent of women approve of his performance, as do 57% of men. He does well across the range of age and income groups, and receives majority approval in all regions of the country (including the South, where his score is 52% approve, 38% disapprove). Politically, the President fares well in the crucial middle of the electorate—including both Independents (58% approve, 30% disapprove) and moderates (65% approve, 25% disapprove). Fully 83% of Democrats approve of the job he is doing; among Republicans, 29% approve and 62% disapprove.

The current polling shows that the President comes to the tax debate from a position of strength vis a vis the Republicans—especially when there is a clear focus on the President's emphasis on tax breaks that mainly benefit the middle class.

The public puts top priority on tax credits for college tuition and tax credits for families with young children, and by 2-to-1 prefer a Democratic tax package that puts more emphasis on these kinds of middle class tax cuts over a Republican tax package that gives relatively more emphasis to investors, savers, businesses, and estates worth more than $600,000.

I hope this is helpful to you. Please let me know if you have any questions I can answer.



CMR 405 Box 1626
APO AE 09034
June 20, 1997

Dear President Clinton,

I have written to both you and Mrs. Clinton regarding educational issues and you have shown an interest in my concerns by forwarding them to Dr. Lillian Gonzalez, the director of DoDDS. Unfortunately, the replies from DoDDS and Dr. Gonzalez have all been justifications of current practice and no changes have taken place.

The facts remain:

- **Issue number one**: Even though Wetzel and Smith Elementary Schools have approximately 565 and 465 students respectively, our art, music, physical education, special education, and media specialists must still serve an additional school. This means the students at both schools have *lost contact time with a qualified specialist*. Current brain research indicates that the arts are critical in stimulating learning and brain development. Our students need more time with a specialist, not less!

Dr. Gonzalez maintains the "redirection" (reduction) of staffing at the school level **has not** hurt programs. She insists the staffing document mandates a strict formula of staffing by numbers, not by need. Children can not be thought of as "numbers". This policy must be changed. Staffing must be done by programs and with the unique needs of each school in mind. These same recommendations have been made by ECAPTS and both Teachers' Unions. **Our schools must have adequate staffing to meet the educational and emotional needs of the students.** With your intervention, Congress and DoDDS must change this formula.

Interestingly, the staffing for the Washington headquarters has *increased* since Dr. Gonzalez took office. This is in direct contrast to the recommendations made by the National Commission of Teaching and America's Future which recommended that management be reduced so the classroom teacher can be fully supported. The commission recommends: "flatten hierarchies and reallocate resources to invest more in teachers and technology and less in nonteaching personnel."

How can DoDDS say there is no money for staffing? This past March every administrator in DoDDS was flown to Baltimore, Maryland and housed at the Lord Baltimore Hilton for a week at a cost of $130,383.31 for 229 people. Last year consulting fees were paid by DoDDS at a cost of $1,850,000.00. This combined amount would have paid for **sixty-six** additional teaching positions which would directly benefit the students.

- **Issue number two**: Of the four Baumholder area schools, only Neubruecke Elementary with a population of about 250 students has a Reading Improvement Specialist. Baumholder High School has not had a Reading Improvement Specialist for the **past year**. Wetzel and Smith Elementary Schools have had **no reading specialist for the past *two years* and are not projected to have a reading teacher for the coming year.**

This means *over 1200 students have no access to remedial reading instruction.* Your goal to have all children reading by fourth grade will not be attained without a reading teacher to assist the students. Because seventy-three percent of the students at Wetzel receive free or reduced lunch, our population has special needs, yet we are *ineligible* for any Title I aid and have *no teacher's aides* in grades one through six. Our classrooms average twenty-five students with some classes having as high as twenty-nine students. The classroom teacher is expected to meet the literacy needs of at-risk students as well as cover all the required subjects areas. Your administration has asked for 2.7 billion dollars to fund the "America Reads" program. Our students, the sons and daughters of the American military, will not be able to utilize this program. Our schools are located overseas and do not have access to teaching institutions or trained literacy tutors. Again, we are *ineligible for the funding* because we are part of the Department of Defense System. **Our students are not receiving the support they require and deserve. We must have a *qualified* reading specialist in all four schools.**

- **Issue number three**: It is a goal to put computers in every school to help the students become skilled in technology. Yet, no funding is available for **teachers** to facilitate this skill. Classroom teachers do not have the time to learn and prepare for an additional subject; nor has adequate training been provided to equip us with the necessary technical skills to maintain the computers. We have been told we can have a computer specialist; however, the position will come at the expense of a teaching position! This will either raise class sizes or eliminate a program. **We must have a designated technology specialist to instruct the students in the use of the computers and to maintain the computer lab.**

According to Defense Department auditors, for the 392 employees at the Education Activity headquarters in Washington there were 693 computers--that is two per person! Apparently technology is available to management but not to the students. The money spent on that second administrative computer would have funded **twenty-six** additional computer specialists **in the schools** at no expense to the current budget.

- **Issue number four**: You have expressed a desire to implement *standards and hold students accountable* for their learning. Yet, it is DoDDS policy to pass students to give them time to develop. You can literally **fail** all of elementary school; **fail every subject in seventh grade *and* fail every subject in eighth grade, yet *still pass* to ninth grade!** This makes a mockery of our educational system. Furthermore, under the new DoDDS Discipline Code, a teacher is required to provide work for students

who have been truant or suspended for inappropriate behavior. If you want to start with standards of reform, start in the Department of Defense Dependents Schools. We need your help!

- Finally, **issue number five** concerns all teachers. That is the issue of money. Teachers must be given a decent wage, states must recognize a teacher's experience, certification must be made reciprocal, and retirement monies must be made portable. These recommendations were also made by the National Commission of Teaching and America's Future.

One of the greatest barriers to a teacher's salary is the common practice in every state, county, and district to ***credit teachers minimally for the number of years they have taught in other districts or states***. Virtually every system will give a teacher credit for only **five** years of experience (a few accept ten years). This means that every time a teacher must move, his/her *earning power drops*. Experience is not rewarded. For example, I have twenty-eight years of actual teaching experience. If I returned to the States, I would be placed on step five--the same as a fifth year teacher and would experience a **twenty to thirty thousand dollar drop in pay**. No one can afford to lose that much money! Yet this is accepted practice and happens routinely to teachers. **No other occupation so denigrates the experience of its professionals.** This issue must be addressed at the highest levels with the governors of each state and with Congress.

Thank you for considering these issues. I applaud your efforts to make education a priority of your administration. With your support and leadership, the Department of Defense Dependents Schools can make the necessary changes to help us lead the nation in creating a model school system, one where teachers' ideas are accepted and students'needs are put ahead of statistics. **Children are our future and deserve every resource we can give them.**

Sincerely,

Dorrie Meckes

Dorrie Meckes, first grade teacher and president of the Baumholder Area Education Association

ECAPTS Leads the Way

The 39th Annual ECAPTS Convention (European Congress of American Parents, Teachers, and Students) was held at AFRC Chiemsee 28 April-2 May 1997. The "European PTSA" is a branch of the "National PTA." This was an exciting, as well as rewarding time for everyone. We also helped celebrate the 100th birthday of the PTA.
The PTA advocates a closer relationship between the school and home. By combining PTA leadership with DoDDS resources, we have the opportunity to create local school/home partnerships that will be the envy of the entire nation.

Continue to help your PTA lead the way!!!!

Convention Highlights:
The Special guest speakers were: Sandy Zelno, National PTA Region 2 Director; Alvin Granowsky, renowned speaker and author; and Marvin Terban, renowned speaker and author. The special guests were: Dr. Jerald Bloom, DoDEA Deputy Director; Mr. Le Buhn, DoDDS-Wiesbaden; and other guests from the DoDDS district offices.

Legislative Action:
Two resolutions were passed by the delegates. 1- The staffing of DoDDS schools should be completed by programs and not merely by numbers. (Too many schools are losing essential programs because of severe cuts in staffing for SY 97-98.) 2- A School Psychologist should not be assigned to more than 1000 students. (The current ratio is 1 to 3000 students.)

The 1997 award winners were announced at the banquet.

Educator of the Year
Yvette Billington, Vogelwegh Elementary School, Kaiserslautern, Germany

Advocates for Children Award
Vogelwegh Elementary School, Kaiserslautern, Germany

Volunteer of the Year
Kareen Lawson, PHV Elementary School, Heidelberg, Germany

The winner of the Educator of the Year and the Advocates for Children Awards were forwarded to compete in the National PTA competition.

$18,000 Scholarship Awards
Through the ECAPTS Scholarship program $18,000 was awarded to 13 deserving DoDDS seniors in Europe. This program was only made possible by generous contributions.


10-$1,500 Scholarship Winners

Brandon Green, Lakenheath High School
Anna Stacia Harlan, Baumholder High School
Matt Fahrner, Heidelberg High School
Nicole Sherman, Vilseck High School
Christopher O'Shaughnessy, Lakenheath High School
Renee Prince, Patch High School (Stuttgart)
Heidi M. Jones, Incirlik High School (Turkey)
Kendra Richardson, Vilseck High School
Christian Murray, Heidelberg High School
Megan Van Dyke, Naples High School

3-$1,000 Scholarship Winners

Amber V. Trapp, Ramstein High School
Ryan A. Anderson, Bamberg High School
Morgan Elizabeth Hunter Hammersen, AFCENT International High School

Congratulations to all these top quality winners!



Submitted by: Mary-Jeane Huber, ECAPTS Public Relations Chairperson.

DODDS system that I feel has gone unmentioned for far too long. The issue is accountability of many students and their parents. I am a substitute teacher and have observed unbelievably-childlike behavior, both on the part of students and parents, that invokes shame and anger. Today I had a student "get up in my face" after being told to leave the class for behavioral reasons. Later in the day, I observed the mother of a student give grief to one of the school secretaries because she felt she was being singled out as a result of having to go up the stairs to sign her child out at the student affairs office. Several weeks ago I observed the father of a student in his class "A" uniform make a threateningly provocative statement to one of the school officials in the presence of his son and several school personnel. Now there is a fine example of parental accountability. Then, after failing at his intended purpose of getting his son's well-deserved suspension revoked, he proceeded to the security police station to file assault charges against a teacher. If this sounds like something out of a Ripley's Believe It or Not comic, it isn't.

There are a lot of parents out there who are "enablers." Instead of confronting the school every time little Johnny gets a bad report from school, how about making some attempt to get to the bottom of the matter and support what it is that the schools are trying to do: raise responsible citizens who aren't afraid of making a positive contribution to society.

I used to get angry when I saw a school official or teacher who I felt had become apathetic, but after having had the opportunity to see exactly what they have to do just to try to teach, I wonder why more have not joined the ranks of the apathetic few.

Many of us pick our new cars and where we will do our banking with more attention than we give to the schools where our children will be educated. Those cars will rust, and those banks will be bought out by a larger bank, but our children will always be our children.

Your child's teachers need your support just as they recognize their need of your support to accomplish an already difficult task, made more so by a society characterized by a total lack of morals and questionable values. Teaching is an art form born of a desire to help. America's youth risk educational deficiency and moral bankruptcy without the talents of dedicated educators.

Dan Monceret
Ramstein Air Base, Germany

TO OUR READERS:

Let us know what you think

We encourage our readers — especially those who have never submitted a letter — to write to us.

Letters expressing readers' viewpoints or opinions are published daily on this page.

Send to: Letters to the Editor, The Stars and Stripes, Unit 29480, APO AE 09211; fax (country code: 49) 06155-601-395, DSN 348-8395; e-mail: letters@mail.estripes.osd.mil

All letters must be signed and include address and telephone number. We reserve the right to edit letters for clarity, length and taste.

DODDS leading way?

Recently on AFRTS's *Two Minute Report* during the evening news, I saw and heard President Clinton and Dr. Lillian Gonzalez, director of DODEA, proclaim that beginning in 1999 DODDS will lead the way for national standardized testing of students. Gonzalez assured viewers that schools in DODDS would establish the highest standards of excellence for the nation's public schools to follow.

Unfortunately, DODDS presently is nowhere near being up to the task of leading the nation as a model of academic achievement. For example, one of the highly touted parts of GOALS 2000 states that American students will rank first in the world in math- industrialized nations whose educational systems are presently producing better math and science graduates than our own schools. And DODDS is not in the forefront of this tremendous challenge.

Just take a look at two national measures of academic achievement from the Scholastic Aptitude Test, a widely employed college-entrance exam. In 1995 (the most recent year for which DODDS has published results) the national average scores on the SAT verbal and math sections were 428 and 482, respectively, representing 41 percent of all high school seniors. Systemwide, DODDS students scored 430 and 480, respectively, representing 64 percent of all seniors in DODDS. Thus, rather than leading the nation in verbal and mathematical abilities, DODDS students are somewhere in the middle.

Another measure of mathematical excellence is the nationwide Mathcounts competition results. Mathcounts involves teams of top students in mathematics from grades seven and eight. While I have not been able to obtain national results yet from previous years, I have coached teams in both the States and in DODDS. This year one of my "mathletes" placed second overall in the qualifying tournament to determine the DODDS national team, which will compete the top Mathcounts teams from all the States in Washington, D.C. Many DODDS seventh- and eighth-grade students are behind their peers in the States in mathematics because DODDS does not encourage capable junior high students to enroll in high school algebra classes, as do the better school districts in the States. Those DODDS students who do manage to get into algebra classes (as did two of the students on my Mathcounts team because I recommended to their parents that they be placed in algebra) do not receive high school credit for the course. DODDS would prefer, according to the mathematics coordinator I spoke with, that all eighth-graders take the recently implemented junior high mathematics curriculum and wait until ninth grade for algebra. Too often, DODDS students who would benefit most from algebra as eighth-graders are expected to wait and thus fall behind their stateside peers in schools to which they will be returning.

sound educational objectives. Too often administrators don't seem to care whether the programs actually achieve what they are intended to achieve so long as it appears to parents that something is available. And any one who tries to tell you that students can accomplish through acceleration anything like what they would have achieved had they not had to leave early (especially those who PCS with a month of school remaining) is lying. Students and teachers cannot find the time or the energy to perform the work necessary for meeting all requirements of the curriculum, so the students do a hurry-up job, just skimming the material, and the teachers drastically reduce expectations of what the students can finish. As a colleague of mine once said, "The military should be charged with child abuse for forcing parents to remove their children from schools before the conclusion of the semester."

Before DODDS can act as a leader in education, a Herculean effort at cleaning out the administrative stables, beginning with the current director, must be performed. What we are seeing and hearing, from the newsletters of principals to the sound bites out of Washington, is more of the propaganda DODDS employs to create its Potemkin village of excellence in education. I hope that not the village to which President and Hillary Clinton refer when they say it takes a village to raise a child.

Patrick Ive
Lajes Field, Azor

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 4/29

To: Trey

From: The Staff Secretary

I talked with Nancy and she said POTUS would probably want the golf bag.

The gift would be from the Host Committee. Will you contact Kevin directly or should I? He is in Denver today. Phil

TO Gift Unit
from Phil Cipkins
6/30

'97 APR 24 PM2:13

FASCIMILIE COVER SHEET

DATE 24 April 1997

TO: Phil Caplan

TEL: 202/456-2702

FAX 202/456-2215

974-9637

FROM: K. Varney 303/446-5111 - Denver

TEL:

FAX: Number of pages including cover 3

COMMENTS

Phil,

Here is the request to use the Presidential seal on a golf bag that will be presented to the President As a gift at the Summit.

The contacts for more information are Ed Morrissey, Denver Buffalo Co. 303/831-1299

[illegible] Wolkins Golf 303/465-3854

FAX TRANSMISSION

FRED WOLKING GOLF
6340 W 100TH PL
BROOMFIELD, CO 80020
303-465-3654 / 800-653-2695
FAX: 303-438-6746

marketing

To: Ed Morrissey / Denver Buffalo Co. 831-1299 **Date:** April 22, 1997

Fax #: 303-831-1292 **Pages:** 1, including this cover sheet.

From: Fred Wolking

Subject: Presidential Seal

his boss on Host Committee will McFarland

COMMENTS:

Dear Ed;

I just got off the phone with Jackie at Belding. She has been searching for embroidery info on the Presidential Seal. We set up the logo for a bag in 1991 and there are no records going back that far. As I recall, we had to make the tape send a swatch for approval, once it was signed off we were allowed to make the bag and then were required to return the swatch and the embroidery diskette. It looks like we will be starting from scratch with a very limited time frame.

The logo placement on this sketch is a suggestion based on what Jackie and I think would look good. I have not seen the Summit of 8 logo so this could change depending on how complex that artwork is. Please let me know what you think.

To get started I will need;

1. Copies of the paperwork giving permission to use the Presidential Seal and the Summit of 8 logos.
2. Camera ready artwork for both logos.
3. Your definite approval on the logo placement on the bag.
4. Wording for the brass kick plates on the XL tour series bags.

Please call me ASAP. Thank you.


Sincerely,

Fred Wolking

SHIP

1621 Emerson Avenue
CA 93033
-7000
-6197
97 fax

Beldings
Cor Tapes
Comp-



NOTE: Use these sketches to diagram colors, logo placement or personalization. Please be specific!

OFFICE USE ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sylvia

FYI - Bowman

should review, analyze

& respond

Here are the articles

on race Diane

told you about

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6-30-97

copied

Sylvia Mathews

COS

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PRESIDENT
APR 3 0 1997

*Are Americans Ambivalent Towards Racial Policies?**

R. Michael Alvarez, *California Institute of Technology*
John Brehm, *Duke University*

Theory: The variability in individual respondent's considerations over racial policy may be due to uncertainty or to ambivalence. Ambivalence is distinct from uncertainty in that it stems from incommensurable choices, and cannot be altered with additional information.
Methods: Using a heteroskedastic probit technique, we consider six separate core beliefs potentially relevant towards racial policy choice (modern racism, antiblack stereotyping, authoritarianism, individualism, and anti-Semitism) for four different policy choices. We evaluate two separate models for the source of individual variance: conflicting values and direct effects of values.
Results: Our analysis indicates that modern racism trumps rival explanatory variables in explanations of racial policy choice, and that variability in attitudes toward racial policy is due to uncertainty, and not to ambivalence.

Few contemporary policy debates are as conflictual as the debates over policies intended to redress racial inequality. Elites conflict over the specific terms of policy, over the appropriateness of particular goals, and over the symbols and rhetoric that define the issues. For some individuals, racial policy wears all the signs of a policy debate that yields *internal* conflict, or ambivalence over policy choices. Our specific research question centers on the sources of individual ambivalence, manifested as greater implicit variation in the range of considerations in response to survey questions.

If one thinks of a survey response as a sample from an individual's range of considerations over policy choice (Zaller 1992), then there are two more important attributes of the range of considerations: its central tendency (which we might assume to be the expected survey response) as well as its variance (the diversity of potential answers a respondent might supply). Typically researchers have been concerned with modeling only the

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 6–8, 1995, Chicago, IL. We appreciate the comments of Morgan Kousser, Lynn Sanders, Paul Sniderman, Laura Stoker, and the Duke-UNC Political Psychology Group. We thank Paul Sniderman, Philip E. Tetlock, and Thomas Piazza for use of their 1991 Race and Politics Survey. Alvarez thanks the John M. Olin Foundation for support of his research.
Editor's note: The paper received the John Sprague Award from the Midwest Political Science Association in 1996.

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first component of the survey response—choices about policies. Understanding the factors which determine individual responses to policy choice questions is important. But it also might be important to examine the second component of the survey response—the variation in individual policy choices, or the range of considerations they bring to bear in their survey response. Larger variation in responses from an individual might be due to unreflective response manufactured at the door, or it might be symptomatic of internalized conflict over the specific policy domain.

The first form of response variability is uncertainty, distinguished from other forms of response variability in that additional information helps the respondent to sharpen his or her opinions. Uncertainty about public policies is a function of a lack of information, either stemming from the respondent's own personal information costs or from deficiencies in the transmission of information from elites to citizens (Alvarez 1997; Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Bartels 1986). Uncertainty can always be resolved, however, by additional information.

The second form of response variability is ambivalence, wherein additional information only heightens the internalized conflict (Liberman and Chaiken 1991; Tetlock 1986), making the policy choices more difficult and responses more variable. Ambivalence arises in a choice situation when the choice precludes compromise, such that opting for one alternative precludes the other. Literally, "ambivalence" means "the simultaneous existence of conflicting emotions" (*Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary*, 2nd ed., S.V. "ambivalence"), i.e., that a policy choice is simultaneously good and bad. The role of additional information does not reduce the number of factors relevant in an ambivalent choice situation; instead, additional information makes the simultaneous factors more salient. If two of a respondent's core beliefs conflict over a policy choice, no amount of additional information can narrow the response variance.

The different origins of response instability are consequential—the doorstep opinion suggests that respondents are ill-equipped to participate in the debate, while the internally conflictual opinion means that the debate itself is difficult. Variation due to ill-formed or uncertain responses indicts the respondent or the political process, while variation due to difficult choices and ambivalence identifies the very marrow of politics.

As we have argued elsewhere (Alvarez and Brehm 1995), a source of conflict over policy choices can be conflict between core values. If multiple core values pertain to a policy choice, yet they implicate different answers in the debate, then respondents who heed those values will be conflicted in their answers. Difficult policy choices typically involve such conflicts. Abortion policy is difficult for the respondent who prizes a woman's reproductive choice, but also believes that human life begins well before birth.

Environmental policy choices are tough for the respondent who values clean air and water, yet regrets imposing any costs on industry that might lead towards the loss of jobs. The decision to go to war against a foreign tyrant is conflictual for those who rue committing American troops to battle.

Do conflicting core values undercut racial policy? According to several prominent scholarly treatments, the answer is yes. Rokeach (1973) identifies a significant fraction of respondents torn between two terminal values, freedom and equality, over diverse policy choices, including race. Katz and Hass (1988) attribute whites' conflict over racial policy to two competing value orientations, a Protestant ethic and a humanitarian-egalitarian orientation.

Do these competing core values implicate internalized conflict? Again, the answer in the scholarship appears to be yes. McConahay (1986) argues that the difference between the respondent's reactivity to "old-fashioned" racism scales (racial superiority) and those measuring "modern" racism denotes a zone of ambivalence about race. Katz and Hass (1988) and Katz, Wackenhut, and Hass (1986) argue that white subjects experience psychological tension and discomfort in response to the presence of cues activating conflicted racial attitudes. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) demonstrate a residual core of aversive racism, even among subjects professing generalized support for racial policy.

To even the most cursory student of the scholarship on racial attitudes, it is bluntly obvious that researchers collide over the basic forces that drive racial attitudes. One group (Kinder 1986; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986) contends that "symbolic racism," a combination of antiblack affect with traditional American values, drives white resistance to racial policy. By this argument, whites who oppose such policies as affirmative action or busing on the grounds that blacks are getting more than they deserve, are motivated by a form of racism that has replaced overt expressions of racial superiority. Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) argue that symbolic racism fails because it confounds the policy choice with the attitude, while at the same time ignoring the continuing presence of simple antiblack affect as a source of white opposition to racial policy. We take the level of conflict about the sources and meaning of white opposition to racial programs as one piece of evidence that individual attitudes may be in conflict.

Both groups of partisans in the debate have direct evidence about individual ambivalence toward race. When one alters the question in relatively minor ways, one can elicit entirely different responses, indeed, even different patterns of responses. Among other persistent differences, Kinder and Sanders (1990) demonstrate through a split-form survey design that framing

the debate as a question of "reverse discrimination" caused egalitarian respondents to see affirmative action as undesirable, whereas a frame of "unfair advantages" caused egalitarians to support affirmative action. Sniderman and Piazza (1993, 178) conclude in their book:

> Of the myriad findings we have reported on contemporary American racial attitudes, the one to which we ourselves attach the most importance is the pliability of the policy positions of substantial numbers of whites on specific issues of race. It has long been assumed that whites are dug in on racial issues. In fact, large numbers of whites can be dislodged from the positions they have taken on many issues of race by calling their attention to countervailing considerations.

The deepest irony of the dispute is that both groups of partisans acknowledge that the framing of the debate determines how respondents will answer questions about racial policy, and that both groups of partisans believe that the lability of response echoes the broader policy debate among elites.

The differences between uncertainty and ambivalence over policy choice point to two criteria to distinguish the concepts. Uncertainty reduces with additional information, while ambivalence does not; hence, if one is able to demonstrate that better informed respondents have less variance in their responses, it indicates uncertainty. Ambivalence stems from a choice between incommensurables, and the dominant literature points to the role of competing values; hence, if one is able to demonstrate that as competing values become increasingly important to an individual that individual's response set becomes more variable, then it indicates ambivalence. These criteria establish well-defined conditions to adjudicate between ambivalence and uncertainty.

Our point is not to settle, or hardly to enter, the argument over the existence of symbolic racism as a distinct source of racial attitudes. Our specific interest is to assess how levels of support for these values account for both the policy choices and the variability of those choices. Our paper has three parts. We first develop six scales for pertinent values from the 1991 Race and Politics survey: symbolic racism, antiblack stereotyping, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, egalitarianism, and individualism. We then turn towards an evaluation of the effect of these values upon policy choices in this survey. Using a heteroskedastic probit model, we look at both the probability of support for the policy and the implicit variance in that probability. Finally, we reflect upon the relationship between internalized conflict at the level of individual survey response to the debate among policymakers.

1. Measurement of Racial Values

We construct our core beliefs scales on the basis of the 1991 Race and Politics Survey, a data set collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of California, Berkeley.[1] The unique aspect of the Race and Politics Survey was the profusion of split questionnaires, randomly assigned to respondents, made possible by a Computer Aided Telephone Interview approach. Each of the four dependent variables we consider altered important components of the question. For purposes of scale construction, however, we were stymied by the split samples, and employed only those questions which were asked of all respondents.

We use confirmatory factor analysis to develop six scales, each measuring one of the concepts which assume varying degrees of prominence in scholarly explanations for variation in racial attitudes. The overall fit for our confirmatory factor model is adequate with a Goodness of Fit Index of 0.86.[2] The first scale is a measure of "modern racism." According to the various authors (e.g., Kinder 1986; Kinder and Sanders 1990; Kinder

[1]The data are available through the Survey Research Center. Our recode (SAS), confirmatory factor (SAS), and heteroskedastic probit files (SHAZAM) will be available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research replication archive. The survey was a telephone interview based on random-digit dialing using a stratified two-phase sample selection procedure. The first phase of the procedure sampled from known area codes and prefixes, appending a four-digit random number to generate a complete ten-digit telephone number. The second phase drew disproportionately from sample strata containing at least one known residential number, although drawing also from strata where there was no known residential number. "Known" residential numbers were drawn from a tape created by Donnelly Marketing Services. See Casady and Lepkowski (1991) for further details of the sampling methodology. The target population consisted of all English-speaking adults over 18 years old, residing in households with telephones, within the 48 contiguous states. The total sample size was 2,223, with a response rate of 65.3% (a response rate in excess of typical rates for telephone surveys).

[2]We construct the scales using a confirmatory factor model with the SAS routine PROC CALIS, multiplying the indicator variables by the factor loadings in order to obtain the scales. We free the inter-indicator covariances (δ, in the standard LISREL notation) only for pairs of indicators within a factor (fixing inter-indicator covariances to zero elsewhere). We free the covariances among the factors (ϕ). One factor loading (λ) in each factor is fixed at 1.0 to set the scale. Each scale is coerced to 0–1 bounds, where a 1 denotes the maximum observed level for the scale (e.g., a 1 for authoritarianism denotes a respondent who provides the most authoritarian answers of the sample). We reverse three of the scales (modern racism, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism) to reflect our preference for interpretation of the scales. The reader should note that the maximum and minimum levels for each scale do not reflect absolutes, but only the maximum or minimum observed for the sample. The reliabilities (as measured with a Cronbach alpha) are .58 for modern racism, .63 for antiblack stereotyping, .65 for anti-Semitism, .82 for authoritarianism, .40 for individualism, and .52 for egalitarianism. The Cronbach alpha underestimates reliability for con-generic scales (Bollen 1989, 217). Nonetheless, the reliability for the individualism item in particular is quite low.

and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986) symbolic or modern racism denotes a conjunction of antiblack affect with traditional American values, taking form in the sense that blacks are receiving more attention from government or other advantages than they deserve.[3]

We located three questions which tap into the idea of modern racism. One of these questions is a simple three point Likert scale asking respondents to rate the amount of attention that government has been paying to minorities. The second and third indicators ask how angry the respondent feels about giving "blacks and other minorities special advantages in jobs and schools," and the other about "spokesmen for minorities who are always complaining that blacks are being discriminated against."[4]

This scale probably will not satisfy either group of partisans in the debate over the relevance of "modern racism." One of Sniderman and Tetlock's chief objections to the modern racism concept is that the scales often treat policy choices as independent variables in the same models that purport to explain policy choices as dependent variables.

> . . . [I]t is gratuitous to equate opposition to affirmative action with racial prejudice—gratuitous because it would otherwise be possible to examine the actual relation between the two, and thus establish as a matter of fact, and not of definition, how and to what degree the two are connected. Quite simply, defining opposition to affirmative action as racism precludes falsification of the prediction that the two are indeed related, at the cost of making the relation between them a tautology (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986, 135).

In order to be sensitive to these objections, we replicate all of our models excluding the modern racism scale, and a further replication where we only include the last item ("complaining"). But in defense of the measure, we note that the specific policy referents in the measures are rather oblique.

[3]McConahay (1986) prefers the term "modern" racism, with the explicit idea that the underlying racial attitudes are possible only in the post civil rights movement period, and because "old-fashioned" racism might also be symbolic (i.e., not grounded in realistic group conflict). Kinder (1986) prefers the term "symbolic" racism, since the "traditional" American values invoked by the idea are hardly "modern." Neither label is perfect. We opt for "modern" racism in the context of the specific questions since all refer (obliquely) to policies only in practice since the 1960s.

[4]The "how angry" variables are scaled from 0 (doesn't bother) to 10 (extremely angry), while the first question is scaled oppositely from 1 (too much attention) to 5 (not paying enough attention). Considering the range of the indicators, the indicators load roughly equally on the underlying scale, with estimated factor loadings of −.27 (anger about giving blacks and other minorities special advantages) and −.34 (anger about spokesmen for minorities who are always complaining); the attention to minority problems indicator has been constrained to a coefficient of 1.0.

The "attention" variable asks the respondent to evaluate the amount of "attention" from government to the problems of minorities, hardly in the same level of specificity as the dependent variables we discuss later in this paper. The latter two questions ask about a diffuse "anger" provoked by a policy (special advantages) or "complaining" spokesmen.

The weakness in these indicators as seen from the advocates of the symbolic racism concept would be the absence of specific referents to traditional American values. If symbolic racism is the conjunction of antiblack affect and traditional American values, then these questions are decidedly weak as far as their emphasis on "unearned advantages." The language here emphasizes "too much attention" or "special advantages" which orbits somewhere near the meaning of unearned advantages.

In place of the modern racism scale, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) argue for separate consideration of alternative values: authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, individualism, and antiblack stereotyping. In a series of impressive bivariate analyses, Sniderman and Piazza demonstrate that authoritarianism is more strongly correlated with opposition to racial policy than measures of individualism (which they take to be the core of the modern racism argument).

The authoritarianism scale draws upon six indicators which correspond to three aspects of the classic "F scale" of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950, 228–41)—conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression—albeit to varying degrees of coherence. "Conventionalism" referred to "rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values" and is captured here with "Following God's will" and "Improving standards of politeness in everyday behavior." "Authoritarian submission" meant a "submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group" and is measured here with "Preserving the traditional ideas of right and wrong." "Authoritarian aggression" referred to a "tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values" and is measured by "Respect for authority," "Strengthening law and order," and "Respect for American power."[5] All six of the loadings for the indicators are strong, where "pre-

[5]Each of the indicators is a response on a 10 point scale to a question of the form "How about X? On a scale from 0 to 10, how important is that to you?" where 0 denotes "one of the least important things" and 10 denotes "one of the absolutely most important things." (This scale is *not* reversed.) The confirmatory factor analysis estimates loadings of 1.00 for "Preserving the traditional ideas of right and wrong," .91 for "Respect for authority," .74 for "Following God's will," .71 for "Improving standards of politeness in everyday behavior," .76 for "Strengthening law and order," and .78 for "Respect for American Power." This scale thus omits at least six aspects of the F scale: anti-intraception, superstition, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex. One might consider the

serving the traditional ideas of right and wrong'' and ''respect for authority'' are the strongest pair.

Our scale for individualism is measured by three items: the importance of self-reliance and emphasizing individual achievement, and a Likert scale assessing anger at government interference.[6] This is admittedly a weak scale (with the lowest reliability), and any effect that it has in our subsequent analysis is likely to be attenuated due to the inferior level of measurement.

The next scale that we employ in our analysis measures anti-Semitism. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) find modest (approximately .3) correlations between assessments of negative attributes of blacks and agreement with elements of an anti-Semitic scale. In several analyses in their book, Sniderman and Piazza utilize anti-Semitism as a measure of prejudice because of ''[their] belief that the heart of prejudice is captured by the notion of ethnocentrism'' (1993, 107). We use five Likert scale questions (four point scales which do not include the hedging response of ''neither agree nor disagree''). At face value, one of the five questions does not seem to be anti-Semitic: ''Most Jews are ambitious and work hard to succeed.'' We have two responses. The reader should recall that the purpose of the scale is to measure a religious stereotype in order to denote prejudice and ethnocentrism. The significant part of the apparently anomalous question is ''Most Jews'' in light of construction of a stereotype. Our second answer is data-driven: when we delete this question from the scale, the remaining loadings plunge by nearly 25%.[7]

Fourth, we construct a scale for ''egalitarianism.'' The nominal conflict between egalitarianism and individualism appears prominently in the literature on attitudes toward racial policy. Katz and Hass (1988) find in experimental work that priming subjects to consider one value or the other significantly increased scores on corresponding attitudes, but not on attitudes corresponding to the nonprimed value. In other words, the two scales operate independently, and each has the potential to significantly affect preferences for racial policy. Lipset and Schneider (1978, 43), in a review of a range of survey data, see the dynamic of attitudes towards racial policy as ''between two values that are at the core of the American creed—individualism and egalitarianism.''

As with our scale for individualism, the scale for egalitarianism is somewhat weak. While the first variable is fixed at 1 (more money being spent to reduce unemployment), the next variable loads at only .33. The non-Likert scale question loads at half that (−.13). Again, we expect that the effects of the egalitarianism scale in the estimation will be attenuated.

Last we develop a measure of antiblack stereotyping. The scale performs adequately. All of the negative attributes (aggressive, lazy, boastful, irresponsible, complaining) have positive, large, and statistically significant coefficients.[8]

We take note of the correlations among these six generated scales (see Appendix 1 for the full correlation matrix). None of the scales are strongly correlated. The highest pairs of correlations include antiblack stereotyping and anti-Semitism (.39), and authoritarianism and individualism (.37). Most of the remaining pairs of indicators are correlated at .25 or less. The lack of strong intercorrelations allows us to be more confident that our indicators are indeed tapping into separate dimensions of possible values underlying racial beliefs.

These scales allow us to evaluate the relative weight of the competing explanations for opposition to racial policy, in a mode that is similar to any other analysis of policy choice. But we argue that understanding the choice is only one of the interesting aspects of the problem, and that understanding the *variability* in that choice, for each respondent, also matters. We employ a heteroskedastic probit technique, simultaneously modeling the probability that a respondent might choose a particular racial policy alternative and the amount of variance which is associated with that policy choice for the respondent. The next section summarizes our application of this method.

''respect for American power'' question to tap into the ''power and toughness'' aspect of the F scale.

[6]Two of the questions are of a similar form to those used for the authoritarianism scale (in fact, part of the same battery of questions): ''Self-reliance'' and ''emphasizing individual achievement.'' ''Self-reliance'' is fixed at 1, and ''emphasizing individual achievement and excellence on the job'' scales at only .30. Likewise, ''(How about) Government officials interfering and trying to tell us what we can and can't do with our own lives'' scales at only .15.

[7]The confirmatory factor loadings for the Anti-Semitism scale are 1.00 for ''Most Jews are ambitious and work hard to succeed,'' .85 for ''Most Jews are more willing than other people to use shady practices to get ahead in life,'' .90 for ''Most Jews believe that they are better than other people,'' .76 for ''Most Jews in general are inclined to be more loyal to Israel than to America,'' and .86 for ''Most Jews don't care what happens to people who aren't Jewish.''

[8]Each of the indicators for the antiblack stereotyping scale is a response to a question of the form ''How about X? On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think that it describes most blacks?'' where the scale ranges from 0 (''very inaccurate'') to 10 (''very accurate''). Since this scale is ultimately reversed, each of the factor loadings represents a score in a pro-black direction. The factor loadings for the antiblack stereotyping scale we construct are: Aggressive or violent (1.00), Lazy (.87), Boastful (.63), Irresponsible (.77), and Complaining (.68). We have replicated our analysis with a second scale for antiblack stereotyping, where the measures include both positive and negative stereotypes. This alternative scale has some serious defects in that the positive and negative attributes appear to load better on separate scales than on a single scale.

2. Variability of Racial Policy Choices

The mechanics of the heteroskedastic probit technique are in Appendix B. Briefly, the idea behind the technique is to specify and estimate simultaneously two related equations, one for the probability of a choice, the other for the variance of the error residual. We refer to the first equation as the "Choice Model," and to the second equation as the "Variance Model." Note that the variance modeled by this approach is the individual respondent's variance in choice, not the variance across the sample. Our approach employs inferential statistics in order to model and estimate this variance in choice.

The heteroskedastic probit model can be applied to virtually any type of discrete policy choice. For example, in our previous paper we found substantial support for the hypothesis that many Americans are ambivalent, and not uncertain, about abortion policy choices, and that this ambivalence is determined by the conflict between two core values, the value of human life and respect for women's rights (Alvarez and Brehm 1995).

Here we are interested in examining the same hypothesis, except in the context of racial attitudes. As we discussed earlier, there is substantial discussion in the literature about the role that ambivalence plays in racial politics, even for individual choice. What has been absent is a direct examination of the form of the response variability (i.e., uncertainty or ambivalence). Ambivalence as the form of response variability entails two criteria, that individuals who are better informed exhibit greater response variability, because those individuals display conflict between core beliefs or values. Using the 1991 Race and Politics Survey and our heteroskedastic probit technique, we can examine policy choice variability, and evaluate whether it is ambivalence or uncertainty that characterizes variable opinions about racial policies.

2.1 Choices About Racial Policy

The 1991 Race and Politics Survey data has extensive data about different racial policy alternatives. In this paper, we focus our attention on only four different types of racial policy choices: federal set-aside programs for minorities, preferences for qualified blacks in university admissions, open housing laws, and whether to raise taxes to increase educational opportunities for minorities. We use only these four since they involved simple dichotomous (yes–no) policy choices.[9]

From the 1991 survey data, we recoded four dependent variables for each type of racial policy choice. The four binary variables are each coded so that 1 indicates an affirmative response (the respondent favors federal set-asides for minorities, they believe that there ought to be preferences for qualified blacks in university admissions, there ought to be open housing laws, and that taxes ought to be raised for educational opportunities for minorities) and 0 indicates a negative response. Given this coding, each of the four heteroskedastic probit models are estimating the probability of an affirmative response, and the coefficients we estimate should be interpreted with that in mind.

[9]Many of the remaining racial policy choices in these data involved ordered discrete choices. We reserve the analysis of those questions for future work, since the econometrics of a heteroskedastic ordered probit model is beyond the scope of this present research.

There is one complication we briefly mentioned in the previous section, however. One of the interesting aspects of the 1991 data involved the use of randomized question experiments which posed different varieties of each question to different respondents (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). That different question wordings were employed in this survey, though, greatly complicates the analysis of these data. To deal with the heterogeneity the question wording experiments impose on each dependent variable, we include in the choice function of each heteroskedastic probit model dummy variables which measure which question wording each respondent received.[10]

The first dependent variable is a three-version question about open housing:

1. (Neutral, Dummy 1 = 0, Dummy 2 = 0, 57% yes) Suppose there were a community-wide vote on a general housing issue and that there were two possible laws to vote on. One law says that homeowners can decide for themselves who to sell their houses to, even if they prefer NOT to sell to blacks. The other law says that homeowners cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for?
2. (Property Rights, Dummy 1 = 1, Dummy 2 = 0, 35% yes) Some people believe that homeowners should be free to decide for themselves who to sell their house to, even if they prefer not to sell it to blacks. For example, some people might say it isn't that they don't want to sell to blacks; it's just that they don't want to be told what to do with their own property. In other words, they feel that because it's their property, they should have the right to sell to anyone they want to.
   How do you feel about this? Do you think homeowners should be able to decide for themselves who to sell their houses to, even if

[10]Although there were many variations in question format, we found few statistically significant interaction effects. That is, the effect of the different question wordings (denoted here by dummies) only shifted the base probability, and did not interact with any of the scales to an appreciable degree.

they prefer not to sell to blacks, or do you think homeowners should not be allowed to refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color?

3. (Role of government, Dummy 1 = 0, Dummy 2 = 1, 38% yes) Some people believe that the government should make an active effort to see that blacks can live anywhere they choose, including white neighborhoods. Others believe that this is not the government's business and it should stay out of this. How do you feel? (Is this an area the government should stay out of or should the government make an active effort to see that blacks can live anywhere they can afford to—including white neighborhoods?)

Both the property rights and role of government frames introduce a rationale for opposing rights of equal access to housing for blacks. The property rights frame invokes one of the very "traditional values" embedded in the modern racism concept, and so advocates of this concept might expect the sign on the coefficient to be negative, and sizable (it is). We do not see the same relationship to the role of government frame, although it introduces government intrusion, and a potential reactance effect. The dummy term for the role of government is also negative and sizable. (The coefficient on the role of government dummy is larger than the equivalent for property rights, although the two are statistically indistinguishable).

The second question manipulated a four-version split on set-asides, specifically, federal contracts for black contractors.

1. (Dummy 1 = 0, Dummy 2 = 0, 38% yes) Many people believe . . .
2. (Dummy 1 = 1, Dummy 2 = 0, 35% yes) Many blacks believe . . .
3. (Dummy 1 = 1, Dummy 2 = 0, 39% yes) Many people are demanding . . .
4. (Dummy 1 = 1, Dummy 2 = 1, 38% yes) Many blacks are demanding . . .

   . . . that there should be a law to make sure that a certain number of federal contracts go to black contractors. What do you think about such a law—is it a good idea or a bad idea?

The "people/blacks" frame encourages racists to reject racial policy based on the requester. The "believe/demanding" frame introduces a reactance element. We would have expected that the signs on Dummy 1, Dummy 2, and the interaction of the two would all be negative. Only the coefficient for the "people/blacks" frame is negative, and it is not statistically significant.

The third question is a second four-way split about raising taxes for education, although we opted to fold together responses on one of the splits (not to use the dummy).

1. (Dummy 1 = 0, Dummy 2 = 0, 58% yes) *Some people have said* that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel—would you be willing to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve *education in public schools?*
2. (Dummy 1 = 1, Dummy 2 = 0, 62% yes) *Both the President and Congress, including both Democrats and Republicans, have decided* that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel—would you be willing to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve *education in public schools?*
3. (Dummy 1 = 0, Dummy 2 = 1, 51% yes) *Some people have said* that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel—would you be willing to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve *educational opportunities for minorities?*
4. (Dummy 1 = 1, Dummy 2 = 1, 64% yes) *Both the President and Congress, including both Democrats and Republicans, have decided* that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel—would you be willing to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve *educational opportunities for minorities?*

The first variation (Some people/Both the President and Congress) manipulates the status of the advocate. One might expect that the higher status of the President and Congress would induce higher levels of support for policy. Since we saw no direct relevance of the status of the advocate to the racial nature of the question, we neglected to include a dummy. The second question would encourage racists to reject educational opportunities for minorities, since the only significant variation in the question specifies "minorities." The coefficient for Dummy 1 was negative, and sizable.

The final question that we explore in this paper presented two versions of questions related to preference for qualified blacks in university admission.

1. (Preference, Dummy 1 = 0, 31% yes) Some people say that because of past discrimination, qualified blacks should be given preference in university admissions. Others say that this is wrong because it discriminates against whites. How do you feel—are you in favor of or opposed to giving qualified blacks preference in admission to colleges and universities?
2. (Extra effort, Dummy 1 = 1, 64% yes) Some people say that because of past discrimination, an extra effort should be made to make sure that qualified blacks are considered for university admission. Others say that this extra effort is wrong because it discriminates against whites. How do you feel—are you in favor of or opposed

to making an extra effort to make sure qualified blacks are considered for admission to colleges and universities?

The "preference" frame reflects a stronger policy than simple "extra effort." Hence, we expected the sign on Dummy 1 to be positive, and it was both positive and statistically significant.

2.2 *Specification of the Choice Function*

Other than the dummy variables in the choice function, our specification of this component of the model was driven largely by the existing literature. One group argues that modern racism structures attitudes towards racial policy. Another suggests that the effect of other prejudices should be included, including antiblack attitudes, generalized out-group antipathy (in the form of anti-Semitism), and authoritarianism. A third group contends that the conflict of two core values—egalitarianism and individualism—determine racial attitudes.

We allow for six different scales, as discussed in the previous section: modern racism, individualism, antiblack stereotyping, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and egalitarianism. Each is a scale constructed on the basis of confirmatory factor analysis of various survey items, and each has been recoded to range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the maximum observed level of the scale. Our prior beliefs about the signs on each of the scales are that they should all be negative, with the exception of egalitarianism. Higher levels of modern racism, individualism, antiblack stereotyping, authoritarianism, and anti-Semitism, and lower levels of egalitarianism, should all be associated with lesser support for racial policy. We additionally include the respondent's self-placement on a liberal-conservative scale as a control in the choice model. We limit the estimates to nonblack respondents.

2.3 *Specification of the Variance Function*

The specification of the variance function reflects our desire to test two competing explanations for differences across Americans in the variation of their racial policy beliefs. As we argued above, variation in policy beliefs may reflect fundamental uncertainty about the policy choice under discussion. In other words, people may simply lack information about the policy choices and what they might imply, and that uncertainty will be reflected in the variance function of the heteroskedastic probit model (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Franklin 1991).

To control for the effect of uncertainty, we include in the specification of the variance function a variable which measures what we call "chronic information." This is a simple political information measure, based on the

earlier measures advocated by Zaller (1992). We use an additive scale which measures whether the respondent correctly knew the number of Supreme Court members and the maximum number of presidential terms. This variable is coded to range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates correct answers to both factual political information questions. We expect the estimated coefficient to be negative, which implies that with increased political information the amount of variance in policy choices diminishes.

The 1991 survey data also includes three factual items which are race-related: the percentage of poor who are black, the percent arrested who are black, and the percentage of black males who are unemployed. We used responses to these three questions to develop a domain-specific racial information measure. Although the mechanics of the difference are far from clear, chronic information measures regularly outperform domain-specific information measures (Zaller 1992).

The rival explanation for variability in attitudes toward racial policy is ambivalence induced by core beliefs underlying racial attitudes. We set two criteria in order to identify ambivalence. The first is that additional information should not reduce, and may in fact heighten, the response variability. The second criteria is that response variability should increase as core beliefs and values conflict. Prior research instructs us to attend to one particular source of conflict, between egalitarianism and individualism. To the extent that racial policies achieve egalitarianism by rejecting individualism, we should expect to see greater response variability among individuals who prize both egalitarianism and individualism.

To test for the core belief conflict, we include the absolute values of the differences of levels of egalitarianism and individualism.[11] To get an intuition for what this operationalization means, recall that each of these core value scales is coded so that the minimum score is 0 and the maximum is 1. Thus, when we use the absolute value of the differences, when a respondent's level of egalitarianism and individualism are in conflict (i.e., both are highly prized values), then we get a measure of zero. When the respondent's level of egalitarianism differs from the level of individualism then the values are not in conflict, and we get a positive value for the conflict term. In this particular case, we expect that if the conflict of the two values structures response variability, then this can only occur when both values

[11]It is conceivable that conflict among the other scales might also lead to greater response variability. An earlier version of this paper, in fact, included all possible combinations of scales in a similar test. None of the results to follow vary significantly with the results of the fully saturated test. We prefer the simpler test of conflict between egalitarianism and individualism as it is one based upon the standing literature. We can think of no similarly motivated reason to expect conflict among any other pair of values.

are in agreement. Hence, if ambivalence is the appropriate characterization, we expect that the coefficient on this measure to be negative and significant.

A second way in which these scales might influence variability in racial attitudes is via a kind of measurement effect. Sniderman and colleagues (Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) have argued that researchers should not hold that opposition to racial policy is an indication of racism, since opposition to racial policy might be grounded in nonracial objections. This is tantamount to holding that racists are relatively fixed in their opposition to racial policy; but that nonracists might be quite variable in attitudes about racial policy. We estimate a second set of heteroskedastic probit models which include the two primary racial core values, modern racism and antiblack stereotyping, in the variance function. Our expectation is that people who are more racist on these scales will have lower variance, hence that the sign of the direct effects of modern racism and antiblack stereotyping should be negative.[12]

2.4 *Results of the Heteroskedastic Probit Models*

We present our results organized by the specification of the variance function: the "conflict" specification is in Table 1, and the "linear" specification is in Table 2. Each table gives estimates for model coefficients, standard errors, and χ^2 tests both for the general fit of the model and for the presence of heteroskedasticity.

Estimation of the choice function yields results which shed light on the current debates about which core beliefs structure choices about racial policies. Across all of the models we estimated, only one of the six scales significantly affected support for racial policy: modern racism. Despite the weaknesses of the particular measure, in every specification of the variance model, for each of the four dependent variables, the modern racism scale is far and away the largest coefficient in the model. In every specification, the modern racism variable is statistically significant at $p < .05$ or better. Furthermore, the coefficient on modern racism is one of only two of the coefficients on the six variables that is always correctly signed (negative). We find this to be somewhat ironic, that the modern racism measure performs best, despite significant efforts to measure rival hypotheses. Egalitarianism is also a significant predictor of racial policy choice, such that those

[12]We also include ideology in the variance function, in order to control for a similar effect such that liberals may be more variable in their opinions about racial policy than conservatives. As the reader will note below, this effect did not materialize. We explored another variation of this model wherein we scaled ideological self-placement to reflect extremism (i.e., extreme liberals and extreme conservatives score at the maximum, moderates at the minimum), and there was again no effect of ideology on variance.

Table 1. Heteroskedastic Probit Estimates, 1991 Race and Politics Survey: Conflict Specification of Values

Variable	Housing	Set-Asides	Taxes	University
Choice Model				
Constant	1.235*	0.350	0.019	0.246
	(0.337)	(0.250)	(0.713)	(0.258)
Dummy 1	−0.536*	−0.138	−0.003	1.022*
	(0.153)	(0.100)	(0.707)	(0.160)
Dummy 2	−0.591*	0.063	.019	
	(0.167)	(0.089)	(.073)	
Dummy 1 × Dummy 2		−0.036	−.003	
		(0.126)	(.707)	
Modern Racism	−1.006*	−1.292*	−0.866*	−1.841*
	(0.297)	(0.284)	(0.374)	(0.316)
Individualism	0.129	−0.741*	0.309	−0.608*
	(0.271)	(0.298)	(0.203)	(0.277)
Antiblack Stereotypes	−0.229	0.088	0.002	0.271
	(0.240)	(0.207)	(0.164)	(0.220)
Authoritarianism	−0.450	0.148	0.053	0.154
	(0.258)	(0.193)	(0.156)	(0.230)
Anti-Semitism	−0.428*	0.626*	−0.257	0.416*
	(0.232)	(0.234)	(0.177)	(0.201)
Egalitarianism	0.362	0.566*	0.402	0.617*
	(0.255)	(0.281)	(0.218)	(0.214)
Ideology	−0.040	−0.059	−0.006	−0.058
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Variance Model				
Domain Specific Information	0.490	−0.102	−0.165	0.199
	(0.338)	(0.227)	(0.445)	(0.232)
Chronic Information	−0.715*	−0.758*	−1.046*	−0.217*
	(0.295)	(0.215)	(0.414)	(0.201)
$\lvert EG - IN \rvert$	0.012	−0.075	−0.185	0.234
	(0.404)	(0.403)	(0.565)	(0.320)
Ideology	0.069	0.056	−0.029	0.009
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.031)
N	1363	1396	1359	1494
χ^2	182*	207*	101*	399*
Het. Test	10.5*	13.8*	9.8	2.4

"Dummy1" and "Dummy2" are question-specific variations in wording, see the main text for details. *$p < .05$.

Table 2. Heteroskedastic Probit Estimates, 1991 Race and Politics Survey: Linear Specification of Values

Variable	Housing	Set-Asides	Taxes	University
Choice Model				
Constant	1.450*	0.313	0.340	0.665
	(0.490)	(0.292)	(0.215)	(0.424)
Dummy 1	−0.608*	−0.185	0.142	1.826*
	(0.201)	(0.112)	(0.085)	(0.451)
Dummy 2	−0.663*	0.059	−0.266	
	(0.225)	(0.095)	(0.106)	
Dummy 1 × Dummy 2		−0.038	−0.126	
		(0.143)	(0.103)	
Modern Racism	−1.135*	−1.674*	−0.905*	−3.016*
	(0.394)	(0.533)	(0.293)	(0.780)
Individualism	0.096	−0.837*	0.105	−1.007*
	(0.282)	(0.347)	(0.175)	(0.481)
Antiblack Stereotypes	−0.243	−0.378	−0.061	0.259
	(0.250)	(0.305)	(0.153)	(0.389)
Authoritarianism	−0.538	0.071	0.321	−0.050
	(0.299)	(0.225)	(0.213)	(0.405)
Anti-Semitism	−0.488	0.728*	−0.247	0.194
	(0.265)	(0.287)	(0.169)	(0.292)
Egalitarianism	0.407	1.007*	0.475*	0.943*
	(0.255)	(0.364)	(0.216)	(0.327)
Ideology	−0.043	0.000	−0.031	−0.062
	(0.027)	(0.000)	(0.017)	(0.039)
Variance Model				
Domain Specific Information	0.436	−0.120	−0.040	0.390
	(0.339)	(0.211)	(0.259)	(0.235)
Chronic Information	−0.679*	−0.769*	−0.724*	−0.203
	(0.302)	(0.209)	(0.274)	(0.199)
Modern Racism	−0.171	−0.320	−1.273*	0.515
	(0.330)	(0.334)	(0.368)	(0.264)
Antiblack Stereotypes	0.449	1.268*	0.719	0.459
	(0.429)	(0.424)	(0.412)	(0.328)
Ideology	0.065	0.000	0.105	0.009
	(0.045)	(0.000)	(0.048)	(0.032)
N	1363	1396	1359	1494
χ^2	182*	207*	101*	399*
Het. Test	12.5*	39.6*	19.1*	9.4

"Dummy1" and "Dummy2" are question-specific variations in wording, see the main text for details. *$p < .05$.

respondents who are more egalitarian are more likely to support the racial policy. The coefficients for egalitarianism in the choice models are almost always significant, although also substantially smaller than the corresponding coefficients for modern racism.[13]

Turning to the remaining four variables, we found that antiblack stereotyping was not a consistent predictor of opposition to racial policy. Under the conflict specification, the coefficient on antiblack stereotyping was of the correct sign only once. Under the linear specification, the coefficient on antiblack stereotyping was negative in three of the four cases, but never statistically significant. Furthermore, we have evaluated the possibility that the collinearity of antiblack stereotyping and modern racism undermined the coefficient for antiblack stereotyping. When we exclude modern racism from the choice model, antiblack stereotyping does not appreciably improve as an explanatory variable.

None of the remaining three scales (individualism, authoritarianism, and anti-Semitism) achieves any degree of consistency across the four dependent variables. The coefficients on the three variables are often incorrectly signed, although rarely statistically distinguishable from zero.[14]

[13]We replicated the analysis in two ways. First, we ran the analysis without the modern racism measures, and there were a few substantive changes. Authoritarianism and antiblack stereotyping became negative, statistically significant variables for each of the four dependent variables under each of the three variance model specifications. To the extent that the modern racism measure "works" because it includes policy choices as evidence of attitudes toward race (i.e., the modern racism measure is endogenous), then one might prefer the specification without modern racism. The substantive results with respect to the variance model were unchanged. Second, we replicated the analysis using only a one-item measure of modern racism, where modern racism is measured by the amount of "anger about spokesmen for minorities who are always complaining." With the one-item measure of modern racism only three changes occur to the results. The estimated effect of modern racism across all models is diminished by roughly half (but remains quite statistically significant) while the estimated effects of egalitarianism and ideology in the choice function increase. Substantively, this means that the effects of modern racism and egalitarianism are almost of the same magnitude on the four racial policy choices we examine, when we use this measure of modern racism. Little changes in our estimates of the variance function, with only the estimated effect of chronic information in the housing models (in both specifications of the variance function) diminishing slightly, although the standard error for this coefficient increases enough to render the parameter statistically insignificant. Our substantive conclusions are not influenced by this measure of modern racism either.

[14]Of the race belief scales we construct, four (modern racism, antiblack stereotypes, authoritarianism and anti-Semitism) were relatively strong measures in our confirmatory factor analysis. Two (egalitarianism and individualism) were admittedly weaker measures, however, which may suggest the presence of measurement error in these two scales. We do not believe that this measurement error influences our results in an appreciable manner. First, egalitarianism performs relatively well in the models presented in Table 1 and 2. As discussed

Our primary interest is in the variance model. We turn first to the heteroskedasticity likelihood ratio test, printed at the bottom of each table. With 4 degrees of freedom, the critical value for the heteroskedasticity likelihood ratio test in the conflict specification is 9,5 (at $p < .05$). The first three models exceed the cutoff, implying that responses are heterogenous. The last model (university admissions) does not exceed the critical value, and we cannot reject the assumption of homogeneous response. The linear specification has five degrees of freedom, and the relevant critical value is 11.07 (at $p < .05$). Again, we can reject the assumption of homogeneity in the first three models, but not the fourth.

Next, consider the estimated parameters of the variance models. Better (chronically) informed respondents are less ambivalent about racial policy than less informed respondents. The effect of chronic information in the variance model is always negative, and statistically significant at $p < .05$ or better for every variation of the housing and set-asides questions. (The coefficient on information is negative for the latter two questions, although only slightly larger than the standard error.) The effect of domain specific information, however, is never distinguishable from zero to a statistically significant degree.

The distinction between "ambivalence" and "uncertainty" is that additional information reduces uncertainty, but does not necessarily reduce ambivalence. If the respondent is in a state of internalized conflict, then additional information only heightens the state of conflict. With attitudes toward abortion policy, we demonstrated that better informed respondents were more ambivalent under "hard" policy choices (where core values were in conflict), and less ambivalent under "easy" policy choices (where one core value dominates).

The consistent negative sign on chronic information implies that variance in attitudes toward racial policy is best characterized by "uncertainty," and not by "ambivalence." Does this finding suggest that the debate on racial policy might actually become consensual, i.e., that variance in attitudes might be reduced? We hold on further interpretation of the effects of chronic information until the conclusion.

in the text, it is always correctly signed and statistically significant, although with a weaker effect than modern racism. Second, individualism is significant in four of eight models (and is correctly signed in three); in the other four models, the estimated effect of individualism on racial policy choice cannot be distinguished from zero. Also, these are highly nonlinear models, so if measurement error was present in one variable that ought to bias the remaining coefficients in unpredictable manners. Notice that when we use egalitarianism and individualism to specify value conflict in Table 1 that the addition of these terms, while poorly measured, do not change the estimated results for the choice function in an appreciable manner (compare to Table 2). This strongly suggests that measurement error in these two scales is not influencing our estimated results.

The first of our specifications of the variance model (Table 1) posited that individual variance in attitudes toward racial policy was due to conflict between core values of egalitarianism and individualism. For instance, we expected that a respondent who had high, roughly equal levels of esteem for both egalitarianism and individualism would have greater implicit variance in his or her policy choices. The "conflict" model incorporates the absolute value of the difference in two scales. Our expectation was that the signs on the coefficients for these "conflict" terms would be negative.

Instead, only two of the four terms are negative, and none are statistically significant. (We obtain a similar pattern from a fully saturated set of conflict terms among the six scales.) Overall, one would have to conclude that conflict between core values does not account for variance in attitudes, with conflict measured in this way.

We set two criteria to distinguish ambivalence from uncertainty: that the effect of information is to increase ambivalence, because dissonance in core beliefs should be irresolvable. With respect to the four measures of attitudes toward racial policy in this essay, we found exactly the opposite: information reduces individual variance, and there was no evidence of conflict in core values as a source of variance.

An alternative conception of the variance in attitudes toward racial policy is that the "fit" of attitudes toward racial policy as a function of racial attitudes varies by the level of racial attitudes. In other words, racists might have little variance in opposition to racial policy, but nonracists might be quite variable in support for racial policy, since opposition to that policy might be grounded in nonracial foundations. In order to evaluate this conception, we include direct effects of modern racism and antiblack stereotyping (the two strongest predictors of opposition to racial policy) in the variance model (Table 2). If this alternative conception holds, we would expect that the signs on the variance coefficients for modern racism and antiblack stereotyping should be negative, i.e., that higher levels of each lead to less variance.

Overall, this argument for the source of individual variation fails. Of the eight coefficients on the direct effects, three are negative, and only one of these to a statistically significant degree. None of the measures of antiblack stereotyping are negative, and one is statistically significant. But there is some indication that the argument might hold for modern racism. Three of the four terms on modern racism are negative, one to a statistically significant degree. The fourth model is also not heterogeneous, by the likelihood ratio test. An implication of this frankly provisional result is that it is touchy to infer from opposition or support for racial policy back to racial attitudes. With at least two of the four policy choices (set-asides and taxes), those who were lowest on the modern racism scale were of widest variance

in their choices, meaning that those who were, by this measure, not racist might still be in opposition to policy.

2.5 Magnitude of Estimated Effects

The estimated effects of racial values and different specifications of heterogeneous responses allow only for rough tests of the hypotheses we have presented earlier. Just as with more common binary choice models, the heteroskedastic probit parameters are difficult to interpret on their own. Here we turn to another way of presenting the estimated effects of racial values and ideology upon policy choice, by examining the "first differences" for each of the important right-hand side variables.

The "first difference" methodology is relatively simple (King 1989). Here we set each right-hand side variable to the sample mean value; with these values and the estimated coefficients, we can determine the probability that a hypothetical respondent would give a particular answer to a survey question. Then, for a particular independent variable (say modern racism in the housing model), we increase the value of that variable by two sample standard deviations, and then calculate the probability that this hypothetical respondent gave an affirmative answer to the housing question. The difference between these two probability estimates provides our "first difference" which can also be thought of as an estimate of the impact of a two standard deviation change in one independent variable, holding all other effects in the model constant.

These "first differences" are presented for both of the specifications (given on the left) in Table 3. Recall that with the coding of the racial value scales, we expect to see positive "first differences" (indicating that the probability of affirmative response is greater for the first calculation [the mean] than the second [the mean plus two standard deviations]) for all of the core belief measures.

The probability differences in Table 3 do shed additional light on the debates surrounding which core beliefs impact racial policy choices. Here is strong evidence that modern racism is the predominant variable which structures racial policy choices, specifically policies dealing with housing, set-asides, taxation, and university admissions. Modern racism's weakest effects are in the housing models, where a two standard deviation increase in the modern racism scale leads to a .11 to .15 drop in the probability that the respondent would support open housing laws. But an identical change in the modern racism scale leads to almost doubling on the drop in probability that the same hypothetical respondent would support affirmative action university admissions (.17 changes in probability). No other variable comes close to having this impact on racial policy choices.

Table 3. Effects of Values and Ideology from Heteroskedastic Probit Models

Variable	Housing	Set-Asides	Taxes	University
Conflict Specification				
Modern Racism	−0.15	−0.23	−0.17	−0.34
Individualism	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.04
Antiblack Stereotypes	0.01	0.08	0.04	−0.07
Authoritarianism	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Anti-Semitism	−0.05	0.09	−0.04	0.07
Egalitarianism	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.10
Ideology	−0.05	−0.08	−0.01	−0.09
Linear Specification				
Modern Racism	−0.11	−0.28	−0.17	−0.52
Individuals	−0.02	−0.05	−0.01	0.04
Antiblack Stereotypes	0.01	−0.09	0.01	−0.12
Authoritarianism	−0.04	0.01	0.04	−0.01
Anti-Semitism	−0.04	0.10	−0.04	0.03
Egalitarianism	0.03	0.15	0.07	0.15
Ideology	−0.03	0.00	−0.04	−0.09

Note: From heteroskedastic probit estimates in Tables 1–2.

The estimated parameters in the variance function are also difficult to interpret. In Table 4 we present calculations which will allow us to discuss the magnitude of the estimated effects on the variation in respondent policy choices. Here we again employ the "first difference" approach by estimating the underlying error variance for the same hypothetical respondent

Table 4. Effects of Variables on Error Variance

Variable	Housing	Set-Asides	Taxes	University
Conflict Specification				
Domain Sp. Info.	0.24	−0.04	−0.04	0.10
Chronic Info.	−0.41	−0.35	−0.30	−0.13
$\|EG - IN\|$	0.00	−0.02	−0.03	0.09
Ideology	0.25	0.16	−0.05	0.03
Linear Specification				
Domain Sp. Info.	0.25	−0.06	−0.01	0.34
Chronic Info.	−0.44	−0.48	−0.29	−0.20
Modern Racism	−0.09	−0.16	−0.43	0.43
Antiblack Stereotypes	0.18	0.49	0.18	0.29
Ideology	0.27	0.00	0.27	0.06

Note: From heteroskedastic probit estimates in Tables 1–2.

(mean values of all right-hand side variables), with one of the error variance terms set to the mean minus its standard deviation. We then estimate the error variance again, after changing that same variable to its mean plus its standard deviation, while holding the other variables constant. In Table 4 we give the difference between these two calculations. Again, we are interested in determining what impact a significant change in each independent variable has on the magnitude of the error variance.

Among the two information variables, the inconsistent effects of domain specific information can again be seen. In three of the models race specific information has an effect opposite that we posited—higher race specific information leads to higher levels of error variance. In only the set-asides model do we see race specific information with the correctly signed effect, but it appears to have a relatively small magnitude.

But chronic political information consistently has the correct effect, with more chronic information leading to lesser error variance. The estimated effects are consistent across the different dependent variables and the different error variance specifications. And compared to most of the other error variance effects, chronic information has a consistently large effect.

What can these calculations tell us about the different specifications of racial core beliefs? The first specification we presented we called the "conflict specification," which estimated the effects of the conflict between egalitarianism and individualism and posited that individuals with greater conflict ought to lead respondents to have higher error variances (recall that with the coding of these two scales, the absolute value of their differences leads to a variable in which conflict is coded 0 and agreement is coded 1). In Table 4 we see that the estimated effects on the error variance of this specification are often incorrectly signed, and that they are relatively tiny.

The second specification was the linear specification of modern racism and antiblack stereotypes. Increases in both of these variables ought to decrease error variance. Only three of the estimates (modern racism in the housing, set-asides and taxes models) conform to this expectation. None of the antiblack stereotype effects are correctly signed, and again one is of considerable magnitude relative to chronic information (set-asides).

In general, several conclusions can be taken from these empirical results. First, as far as choices about these four racial policies are concerned, they are largely a function of modern racism. Second, we have shown that three of these four racial policy alternatives provoke heterogeneous responses (housing, set-asides, and taxes). And last, our results indicate that the variability in respondent choices about racial policies is due more to uncertainty than to conflicting core beliefs.

3. Conclusion

In short, we find evidence to rile both sides of the debate on racial attitudes. The principal disagreement is over the importance of modern racism, where one camp holds that the modern racism measure neglects the effects of rival hypotheses: antiblack stereotyping, individualism, generic out-group dislike (proxied here with anti-Semitism), and authoritarianism. The modern racism measure is substantively the most important predictor of attitudes toward racial policy. Yet we also found that it may be difficult to infer back from opposition to the policy to the attitudes, since those who were least racist by the modern racism measure were more likely to be "accidentally" in opposition to the policy.

We also found evidence that the one point of agreement between the two sides might be in error. Both camps agree that attitudes toward racial policy are highly sensitive to question wording, and that ambivalence characterizes much of American attitudes toward racial policy. Yet if we distinguish ambivalence from other forms of individual variability in attitudes by the role of information and the underlying conflict in core beliefs, "ambivalence" is probably the wrong term. Additional information reduced individual variance, and there was scant evidence that conflict in racially relevant attitudes led to greater variability. "Uncertainty" seems like the better word to us.

That the individual variability in attitudes toward racial policy stems from uncertainty, and not ambivalence, has significant political implications. If we had found that ambivalence towards racial policies in the minds of Americans was tied directly to their core beliefs, then the only way to resolve this ambivalence politically would be to change the underlying core beliefs. This would certainly seem a difficult task.

On the other hand, we found that the variability in attitudes toward racial policy grew largely out of uncertainty. This is consistent with past research:

> The most important thing to appreciate about the thinking of whites on race, we now believe, is that many of them do not very often think about it at all. . . . But there are good reasons why whites might not make the issue of race central to their concerns. They neither suffer directly from the problem of racial inequality, nor see themselves as directly responsible for it. The problem of race is, like many other problems of public policy, a secondary concern in the daily lives of whites and of only occasional interest to them (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, 154).

The political implications, then, are that to change the minds of many Americans about racial policies it is necessary to reduce their uncertainty about the policies.

This does not mean that the reduction of variability in racial attitudes will lead to consensus in public opinion about the "correct" direction of racial politics. While Americans would become more rooted in their opinions about public policy, roughly equal numbers could be rooted on opposite ends of any racial issue, which would be difficult to resolve politically.

So there are no easy answers to the dilemma of race in American politics. In previous work we found that opinions about abortion policies were ambivalent due to conflicting core beliefs. But we have shown here that ambivalence about racial policies is not the result of conflicting core values, but rather is the consequence of a lack of political information. That does not make the resolution of debates about either issue any easier to resolve, nor does it make the search for general models of public opinion any more tractable.

Why is it that ambivalence toward abortion policies results from conflicting beliefs while those toward racial policy appear to be better characterized as uncertain? We can offer only speculations at this point. Perhaps problems of ambivalence arise when there are incommensurable choices. In the case of abortion policy, the choices are clear and stark. One can either permit the abortion of the fetus, or require the mother to carry the fetus to term. Racial policy, perhaps, permits compromises. Setting aside some contracts for black-owned businesses, making some allowances for higher taxes for minority schools, admitting some black students under affirmative action guidelines may not do grievous damage to principles of individualism, while perhaps accommodating a more egalitarian policy.

Or it might be that Americans are ill-informed about issues of race and racial policy. Nadeau, Niemi, and Levine (1993, 334) found that "only 15 percent of all Americans have a proper understanding of the size of the black population." For white Americans in their study, estimates of the size of the black population were related to the respondent's political informedness and to contextual effects (the size of the local minority population). In light of the basic lack of information about the size of the black population in the United States, perhaps it should come as little surprise that variability in responses about racial policies are also due to a lack of political information. What is surprising in our results is that the most pertinent source of information is not the domain-specific information about racial conditions, but the extent to which the respondent is stocked with chronic political information.

Last, perhaps we have uncovered in two cross-sectional samples the evolution of public opinion about controversial social issues. Abortion has only recently become a hotly contested social issue in American politics, and it was not thrust onto the political stage by organized interests (Craig

and O'Brien 1993). Rather, it became an important social issue in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1973 *Roe* v. *Wade* ruling. Our abortion study documented the effect of core belief conflict on abortion policy ambivalence in data from the early 1980s, which could imply that many Americans simply had not resolved their core belief conflict in the decade since abortion became a hot issue. But race has long been a conflictual issue in American politics. With the many racial equality and affirmative action policies put into action during the 1950s and early 1960s, perhaps by 1991 core belief conflict in the minds of many Americans about racial politics had been resolved, and any remaining ambivalence about affirmative action was the result of uncertainty about those policies. With the recent rise in the amount of affirmative action rhetoric in American politics, perhaps incompatible core beliefs will be evoked by political elites—giving us the opportunity to witness the impact of public discussion, political rhetoric, and possibly electoral politics, on American ambivalence about controversial social issues.

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APPENDIX A
Correlations Among Scales

Table 5. Correlation Matrix of Generated Scales, 1991 Race and Politics Survey

	M. Racism	Antiblack	Indg.	Egalm.	Authm.
Antiblack Stereotypes	.240				
Individualism	.240	.157			
Egalitarianism	.218	.018	−.025		
Authoritarianism	.252	.249	.368	−.101	
Anti-Semitism	.120	.390	.114	.032	.196

N = 1880

APPENDIX B
Heteroskedastic Probit as a Tool for Understanding Conflictual Attitudes

A more thorough review of the mechanics of heteroskedastic probit may be found in our paper (Alvarez and Brehm 1995), as well as in one prominent econometrics text (Greene 1993). Each of the dependent variables we consider in the next section of this paper is dichotomous, leading towards the usual probit or logit likelihood:

$$\log L(\pi|y) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} y_i \log \pi_i + (1 - y_i)\log(1 - \pi). \quad [1]$$

Where π is reparameterized as a function, $f(\,)$,(usually a probit or logit function) of a set of explanatory variables (X):

$$\pi_i = f(X_i\beta) \quad [2]$$

We refer to this function [2] as the "choice model." The standard probit or logit assumes that the variance of the choice function is constant, and can be standardized to 1.

Our innovation is to notice that choice is sometimes heterogeneous, that the underlying variance of the choice function is not constant. Borrowing from Harvey's "multiplicative heteroskedasticity" approach (1976), we reparameterize the variance for an individual's choice ($\text{var}(\varepsilon_i)$) as a function of an additional set of explanatory variables (Z):

$$\text{var}(\varepsilon_i) = \exp(Z_i\gamma)^2. \quad [3]$$

(Exponentiation is required in order to keep variance greater than zero.) We refer to this second function [3] as the "variance model."

This leads to a variation on the usual probit log-likelihood:

$$\log L = \sum_i \left(y_i \log \Phi\left(\frac{X_i\beta}{\exp^{Z_i\gamma}}\right) + (1 - y_i)\log\left[1 - \Phi\left(\frac{X_i\beta}{\exp^{Z_i\gamma}}\right)\right]\right). \quad [4]$$

We have successfully estimated this function using Gauss and Shazam, two popular econometrics packages.

There is an implicit test for the presence of heterogeneity with the addition of the variables in the denominator to the likelihood. If the variables in the variance function in the denominator add no new information, then the likelihood for the heteroskedastic probit [4] will not be appreciably different from the likelihood for the standard probit [1]. The test is then

$$LR = 2 \times (L_H - L_S) \quad [5]$$

where L_H is the log-likelihood for the heteroskedastic probit [4], and L_S is the log-likelihood for the standard probit [1]. The LR is distributed as a χ^2 with as many degrees of freedom as there are Z variables.

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*Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes**

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Theory: Social psychological theories of social stereotyping are used to generate a series of predictions about the conditions under which whites' stereotypes of African-Americans are likely to bias their evaluations of blacks in the context of crime.
Hypotheses: Stereotypes of African-Americans should influence attitudes on crime policy primarily when criminals are black, crimes are violent, policies are punitive, and no individuating information seriously undercuts the stereotype.
Methods: Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) procedures are used to administer a series of survey experiments where the race and other characteristics of the target (e.g., criminal suspects, furlough programs, etc.) are manipulated in interviews with Lexington, Kentucky residents in a 1994 probability survey.
Results: Consistent with our expectations, we find a strong relationship between whites' images of African-Americans and judgments of crime and punishment, but only for black criminals who commit violent crimes, and only for punitive (vs. preventive) policies. Because these are the circumstances which typically surround the crime issue, we conclude that much of public opinion in this domain is influenced by racial concerns.

We know two things about public opinion on crime—it is salient and it matters. The salience of the issue is documented by numerous recent surveys which list crime at the very top of the list of public concerns and by the increasing temptation for individuals to resort to punitive, "get-tough" policies (Pettinico 1994).[1] Moreover, as much as opinion in any other policy domain, public attitudes on crime are consequential. Throughout the 1990s, political rhetoric escalated, culminating in the 1994 campaigns featuring crime as a central campaign theme. While we cannot prove

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[1]As documented by various national surveys reviewed in Petinico (1994), for example, by 1993 support for the death penalty had increased to 72% (compared to 43% in 1965) and 61% had come to the position that "punishment" rather than "rehabilitation" should be the primary purpose of prisons (compared to 15% in 1971).

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that increasingly punitive anticrime measures are driven by public outcry, such a scenario is supported by studies documenting a relationship between public opinion and state crime policy (e.g., Bowers and Waltman 1993).

Ironically, the salience of the issue has not encouraged analysts to focus on public opinion toward crime. In an effort to remedy this inattention, we explore the antecedents of public attitudes toward crime and punishment in this paper. More specifically, we focus on one potential source of such attitudes which is both plausible and undeniable—viz., race. Accordingly, the question we take up in this paper, is: to what extent, and under what circumstances, do racial attitudes influence whites' political thinking about crime and punishment?

We have several reasons for presupposing a linkage between race and crime, one of which stems from plentiful evidence that racial attitudes (including stereotypes) impact policy attitudes on other ostensibly "race-neutral" issues such as welfare (Gilens N.d.; Peffley and Hurwitz N.d.), as whites with more negative images of blacks tend to be less supportive of welfare programs, particularly if the recipients are described as being black. If the race-policy linkage exists in this domain, there is every reason to believe it exists in the realm of crime.

Second, we must acknowledge the regrettable but objective association in the "real world" between race and crime. While African-Americans make up between 12 and 13% of the general population in the United States, blacks accounted for more than half of all arrests for robbery and murder, and just under half of all inmates in state and federal correctional facilities in 1990. Without delving into the reasons behind these statistics (Hacker 1995; Meier 1994), it is a safe bet that these tragic associations have permeated the public consciousness in some way. Thus, if individuals conflate criminal activity with race, their views of crime are likely to be based, in some part, on their judgments of blacks.

This conflation is doubtless exacerbated by the critical role of the mass media. In his study of local news broadcasts, Entman (1992) found that violent crimes committed by blacks comprised a substantial portion of coverage of news stories centrally featuring blacks. Just as important, in video presentation black criminals were portrayed quite differently from white criminals. The former were more likely to remain unnamed, to be seen in handcuffs, in physical custody, and were less likely to speak for themselves. Thus, not only are African-Americans more likely than whites to be portrayed as criminal suspects in news stories about violent crime, but they are also more likely to be depicted as physically threatening, a pattern also noted by Jamieson (1992) in national network portrayals. These findings strongly suggest that the media contribution is one of both linking blacks to the issue of crime and, moreover, rendering stereotypes of blacks more negative.

The media are not alone in helping to forge this linkage. Political communications of all types are replete with messages in which crime is tinged with racial overtones, exemplified most perfectly in the infamous 1988 television ad run in opposition to the Democratic presidential candidate, in which Michael Dukakis was criticized for consenting to the furlough of prisoner Willie Horton. Defenders held the ad to be legitimate in focusing on the issue of Dukakis' "softness" on crime; critics charged that such a point could have been made without displaying a menacing looking picture of Horton, an African-American, during the spot (Jamieson 1992). Others have made the more general argument that issues like crime and welfare are "racially coded," allowing politicians to play upon racial animosities without explicitly playing the "race card" (Edsall and Edsall 1992).

Our belief, in sum, is that the conflation of race and crime—in reality, in the media, and in political communication; together with evidence from other policy areas that racial views shape attitudes on issues such as welfare—should be manifest in public attitudes on crime and punishment. Specifically, whites' attitudes toward crime are likely to be tied to their global stereotypes of African-Americans, with whites who see blacks as characteristically violent displaying more punitive views on issues such as rehabilitation, prison furloughs, and sentencing terms, at least when such policies are targeted for African-Americans.

We begin by reviewing the concept of stereotypes; that yields a series of hypotheses concerning how and when stereotypes of African-Americans are likely to influence whites' attitudes toward crime. Not only should images of blacks bias whites' views on crime and criminal suspects, but racial stereotypes should be more important, we argue, for certain types of crime, policies, and criminals. We then test these expectations using a variety of survey experiments that provide us with an appropriate blend of internal and external validity for our analysis. After discussing the survey results, we conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for the intersection of race and crime and public policy.

The Nature of Stereotypes

Social stereotypes are commonly defined as "cognitive structures that contain the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about human groups" (Hamilton and Trolier 1986, 133). As such, they are, in Walter Lippmann's (1922) classic phrase, "pictures in the head" which, like any other kind of cognitive generalization, allow cognitive misers with limited motivation and mental capacities to process ambiguous information more efficiently. The social cognition literature uses the term theory-driven processing to refer to this strategy, based on the assumption that stereotypes bias all stages of information processing (e.g., attention, retrieval, infer-

ence), such that they become strongly determinative of relevant judgments (e.g., Hamilton and Sherman 1994). In the context of race and crime, for example, those who stereotype blacks as "violent" or "hostile" may expect blacks to engage in criminal behavior, may attend to and recall more instances in which crimes are committed by African-Americans, and may interpret the behavior of blacks as being somehow "violent" or "criminal."

Individuals, however, often engage in more data-driven processing strategies by relying more on the information of the specific case than on their global stereotypes when rendering a judgment. To account for the reality that stereotypes both are (when processing is theory-driven), and are not (when data-driven) associated with relevant judgments, continuum or dual process models have been developed (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). While cognitive misers generally prefer theory-driven strategies, they rely less on stereotypes, and more on information about the specific case, when stereotypes do not fit the particular stimulus, thereby predicting that stereotype and political judgment will be more closely linked when the case at hand seems to "fit" the individual's stereotype (e.g., Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Rahn 1993).

The conditional importance of stereotypes in dual-process models is supported by recent studies: in a variety of settings, researchers (e.g., Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Carmines and Sniderman 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Terkildsen 1993, and others) have found that the relationship between racial stereotypes and political judgments depends on a variety of limiting conditions, such as the way the policy is framed, the way blacks are described, and so on. Bobo and Kluegel (1993), for example, found racial stereotypes to be far stronger predictors of government programs when framed as designed to improve the standard of living for blacks (rather than poor people) and as "government assistance" (rather than "opportunity-enhancing") programs. In another context, Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) found that racial stereotypes were more likely to shape political judgments of blacks who "fit" the pejorative stereotype. Stereotypical black welfare recipients (e.g., described as having trouble hanging onto a job) were judged more harshly than similarly described white welfare recipients—a discrimination that vanished when individuating information (e.g., being highly motivated) was offered to inhibit the stereotype.

Expectations

A large and eclectic literature has shown convincingly that whites respond more punitively to blacks than to those of their own race. Experimental studies from social psychology, for example, show consistently that the same behaviors acted out by black and white targets are interpreted very

differently by white subjects, with the black target often seen as more guilty and more aggressive than the white (e.g., Duncan 1976; Rector, Bagby, and Nicholson 1993). More to the point, in "mock jury" trials, defendants who are African-American or Hispanic receive harsher judgments of guilt and punishment than white defendants, and are also seen as more likely to commit violent crimes in the future (e.g., Bodenhausen 1988). Outside the laboratory, blacks are disproportionately seen as guilty and deserving of punishment by whites. Even as children, blacks are treated more punitively than whites in schools (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989). As adults, the bias of the criminal justice system tilts against African-Americans, with blacks receiving stiffer sentences than whites and historically being more likely to receive the death penalty than whites, at least in rural areas.[2]

The tendency to judge and punish blacks more harshly is particularly prominent among whites who perceive African-Americans most pejoratively: Sweeney and Haney's (1992) meta-analysis of experimental studies investigating racial bias in sentencing decisions concludes that whites with negative racial stereotypes consistently distribute harsher sentences to blacks, relative to those with more generous images of African-Americans. If such experimental evidence generalizes to the outside world, racial stereotypes should play a crucial role in shaping whites' judgments in the criminal justice realm. Our baseline expectation, then, is that racial stereotypes are likely to drive whites' attitudes toward crime, criminal suspects, and criminals, at least when blacks become the focus of the question. Dual process models demand, however, that we formulate this expectation more conditionally.

When Stereotypes Affect Attitudes Toward Crime

Individuals do not, in our view, display indiscriminate prejudice by responding more negatively to all blacks under all circumstances; rather, their judgments are linked to the stereotypes when, and only when, the case at hand fits the image. If stereotypes serve as functional heuristics in generating political judgments, we expect images of African-Americans to be more closely linked to attitudes on crime and punishment for certain types of crime, certain types of policies, and certain types of criminals. Identifying these conditions, we emphasize, is not merely an exercise of

[2]Evidence of racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty indicates that the racial bias is attenuated somewhat after controlling for the severity of the crime, and, at least in the era post-*Furman* v. *Georgia* (1972), some authors argue that the antiblack discrimination in rural areas is balanced somewhat by an alleged antiwhite discrimination in urban areas (e.g., White 1991, chap. 7). One unequivocal finding, however, is that killers of white victims are substantially more likely to receive the death penalty relative to killers of black victims.

interest to cognitive psychologists. To the contrary, such findings will tell us a great deal about when stereotypes matter politically.

The Nature of the Crime. First, we expect racial stereotypes to become more determinative of whites' attitudes toward crime when the crimes, themselves, are viewed as being a stereotypically "black crime." As Andrew Hacker (1995, 188) has remarked, "Quite clearly, 'black crime' does not make people think about tax evasion or embezzling from brokerage firms. Rather, the offenses generally associated with blacks are those . . . involving violence. . . ." Accordingly, we anticipate that stereotypes of African-Americans will be particularly important in biasing whites' judgments of blacks when the crime in question is a violent rather than a nonviolent crime. Given the aforementioned tendency of the media to portray blacks as menacing criminal suspects when covering violent crime, it is not surprising that recent national surveys suggest that the image of blacks as a violent underclass has become a central component of contemporary white stereotypes of African-Americans: one of the most popular negative beliefs expressed about "most" blacks is that they are "violent and aggressive" (Peffley and Hurwitz 1993). Sunnafrank and Fontes (1983) have found violent crimes (e.g., assault), but not nonviolent crimes, to be associated more frequently with blacks than with whites, while "mock jurors" are more likely to judge individuals accused of race stereotypic crimes as guilty and deserving of stiffer sentences (e.g., Bodenhausen and Wyer 1985; Gordon et al. 1988). Accordingly, our first experiment is designed to examine this proposition (that racial stereotypes are more important in whites' evaluations of violent, than nonviolent, crime) outside the laboratory setting.

The Nature of the Policy. Second, we expect race to play a more important role in shaping attitudes toward punitive policies, and a much smaller role in determining policies which are essentially preventive. By their very nature, punitive policies (e.g., "three strikes and you're out," building more prisons, eliminating prison furloughs) are targeted for individuals already in the criminal justice system—i.e., those who have already been stigmatized as violent and disobedient. Given the historic associations between race and punitiveness documented above (e.g., Bodenhausen 1988; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989), in such a context, racial stereotypes are all the more likely to be activated. Punitive policies targeted for black (but not white) prisoners, consequently, should be linked to respondents' racial stereotypes in the sense that those who see blacks as characteristically violent and disobedient should be substantially more likely to support programs designed to punish the perpetrator harshly.

Preventive policies, however, are designed to keep people out of the criminal justice system. Drug rehabilitation and job training programs, for example, are intended to reduce the risk that individuals will turn to a life of crime by providing options (e.g., freedom from chemical dependency or employment skills) which are essential to the "straight" lifestyle (Gaubatz 1995). Because the targets of these programs are not yet stigmatized as hardened criminals, racial stereotypes should be substantially less relevant in predicting attitudes toward such policies—even when intended primarily for African-American neighborhoods.

The Nature of the Criminal. Third, racial stereotypes should be more important in whites' evaluations of certain types of criminals—viz., violent African-American criminals who fit negative impressions of blacks as a violent underclass. Dual process models of social stereotyping, for example, postulate that when the attributes of the individual target easily fit the global category, stereotypes are convenient and powerful heuristics. When individuating information clearly contradicts the stereotype, however (such as when an African-American criminal is described as making a serious effort to reform himself), the group image becomes less relevant (e.g., Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Rahn 1993), thereby temporarily "disconnecting" the stereotype from the policy judgment.

We have, in sum, attempted to specify a set of conditions under which racial stereotypes should be linked to policy attitudes in the crime domain, arguing that this should be substantially more probable when crimes are violent, policies are punitive, and perpetrators most closely resemble the underclass stereotype. If our expectations are confirmed, the fact that these also happen to be the most salient categories of crime, remedy, and criminal, we shall argue in the conclusions, renders stereotypes extraordinarily important in the debate on crime.

Methods, Data, and Instrumentation

Methods

In exploring the questions of how and when whites' judgments of crime are affected by race, we conducted a series of survey experiments in which the race (and other characteristics) of the target in various questions about crime were systematically varied. One important advantage of this method is the ability to contrast the impact of racial stereotypes on policy judgments when the target in the question (e.g., prison inmates) is black to the impact of such stereotypes when the target is white. If images of blacks are found to shape judgments of white, as well as black, criminal suspects, there is reason to suspect that the relationship is spurious, due perhaps to the often-

noted tendency for social conservatives to express both racial prejudice and a desire to get tough on crime.

We could, of course, ask the same respondent about black and white criminal suspects, but this would raise obvious problems of response bias. To avoid this problem, we rely on Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) technology to randomly assign respondents to one of several question wording conditions. We then determine through a series of regression-based models the degree to which: 1) stereotypes of African-Americans are more influential in shaping responses to black than to white targets; and, just as important, 2) the conditions under which stereotypes are, and are not, influential in shaping whites' attitudes toward crime. Thus, our design, made possible with computer assisted interviewing, benefits from both the control and internal validity gained from experiments and the generalizability and external validity gained from probability surveys (Piazza, Sniderman, and Tetlock 1989).

Data

The data for the analysis are drawn from a probability telephone survey (N = 501) of adults in the Lexington, Kentucky area, conducted by the University of Kentucky Survey Research Center (UKSRC). White respondents were selected through a variant of random digit dialing procedures and interviewed by the professional staff for approximately 15 to 20 minutes between June 22 and July 5, 1994 (see Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 for further details).

Measures

To assess the importance of racial stereotypes as determinants of crime policy attitudes, we included on the Lexington crime survey a generous number of policy experiments (used as dependent variables, and described in the course of the analysis below). Presently, we describe both the independent and control variables employed in the regression models.

Black Racial Stereotypes. While analysts have used an array of descriptors to assess stereotypes of African-Americans, we focus on two central attributes—laziness and violence—which both: (1) capture contemporary white resentment toward blacks; and (2) are particularly relevant to whites' political judgments of crime. "Old-fashioned" racism was founded on beliefs about the genetic inferiority of blacks. Current white stereotypes—fueled by media portrayals and political rhetoric—are more likely to characterize blacks pejoratively as a violent underclass of "welfare blacks," "streetwise blacks," and "ghetto blacks" (Devine and Baker 1991; Edsall and Edsall 1992). Moreover, it is this picture of blacks as a violent, urban underclass which should influence whites' views on crime.

Accordingly, respondents were asked to rate "most blacks" on five semantic differential scales, each arrayed on a bipolar metric ranging from 1 to 7 (see Appendix items I.A. for the precise wording and sample means): "prone to violence" (vs. "not prone to violence"), "short-tempered" (vs. "even-tempered"), "hostile" (vs. "friendly"), "hardworking" (vs. "lazy") and "prefer to be self-supporting" (vs. "prefer to live off welfare").

Control Variables. To minimize the prospects for estimating spurious relationships, we include several control variables that are potentially associated with both African-American stereotypes and attitudes toward crime. For example, to control for the possibility that punitive attitudes toward crime are linked to black stereotypes because people with a more jaundiced view of human nature rate everyone (not just blacks) poorly, we included a White Stereotype Index (see Appendix items I.B.), which consists of the same adjective pairs used in the Black Stereotype Index (but asked in reference to "most whites").

In addition to the rather standard battery of political (partisan and ideological identifications) and demographic (education, age, gender, and income) variables, we include two other control variables with a special relevance to crime attitudes: punitiveness and civil liberties. The Punitiveness Index (see Appendix items II.A.) was designed to assess general support for using punishment as a way to deal with crime and misbehavior. The Civil Liberties Index (see Appendix items II.B.) measures support for due process in the criminal justice realm, particularly the right of the accused to a fair trial. In the forthcoming analyses, variables have been coded so that lower values correspond to more conservative, racially intolerant, and punitive responses so that expected relationships yield positive coefficients.[3]

Analysis

As noted, we expect the impact of racial stereotypes on crime policy attitudes to be conditioned by three sources of variability—the crime, the policy, and the criminal.

[3]The correlation between black stereotypes and white stereotypes, Punitiveness, and Civil Liberties is .31, .17, and .25, respectively. The correlation between Punitiveness and Civil Liberties is .45. It should be noted that routine diagnostic tests found no obvious signs of multicollinearity in the estimated regression equations reported below.

The Nature of the Crime: The Race and Crime Experiment

To test the proposition that whites' stereotypes of blacks are a stronger determinant of attitudes toward crime in the context of violent crimes, we designed the Race and Crime Experiment in which both the race and the crime (assault vs. embezzlement) of the target are independently varied in the following pair of survey questions (see Appendix item III.A):

1. Consider a case in another city where a 21 year old [black/white] man was arrested for [beating a motorist before stealing his car/ embezzling thousands of dollars from the telephone company where he worked]. In your opinion, how likely is it that the man is guilty of the crime?
2. How likely is it that the man will commit a similar crime again in the near future?

Thus, a random one-quarter of the respondents is asked about a black assault case, and so on. If "black crimes" tend to be equated with violent crimes in the minds of whites, racial stereotypes are more likely to be activated in the context of the assault crime condition, where we would expect stereotypes to bias judgments against the black, but not the white, suspect.

To examine these expectations, judgments of the targets (in each of the four experimental conditions) were regressed on the two racial stereotype variables (black stereotypes and white stereotypes), and a variety of control variables, including political predispositions (punitiveness, civil liberties, party ID, and ideology), and sociodemographic variables (education, gender, age, and income).

Table 1 reports the OLS results for the four targets for each of the two survey questions. The findings lend considerable support to the crime stereotypicality hypothesis for, not only are black stereotypes important in shaping judgments of black, though not white, criminal suspects but, more germane to our present concern, they only affect judgments of the black accused of a violent crime (i.e., the black assault condition). Stereotypes are essentially irrelevant when judging blacks accused of the race-astereotypic crime of embezzlement. Presumably because whites do not envision the white-collar crime as a part of the underclass racial stereotype, the stereotype does not influence the judgment—of either present (Table 1.A) or future (Table 1.B) criminality. Yet, when whites are confronted with a crime that accords with the racial "picture in their head," then black stereotypes are strongly determinative of judgments: whites who view African-Americans as violent (and lazy) are far more likely to believe them to be guilty of assault, and also view them as likely to commit a similar (violent) crime again in the future.

Table 1. Race and Crime Experiment

Table 1.A. Predicting Assessments of Guilt across Race and Crime of Suspect
Likely the [white, black] man is guilty of the crime [assault, embezzling]?

	DESCRIPTION OF SUSPECT AND CRIME							
	Black Assault				**White Assault**			
	Black Embezzle		**White Embezzle**					
	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)
Black Stereotype	.377	.039** (.008)	.177	.017 (.010)	−.083	−.011 (.014)	.164	.023 (.015)
Constant		−1.15* (.389)		1.15* (.45)		.41 (.661)		1.23* (.015)
R^2	.565		.273		.198		.223	
Adj R^2	.509		.188		.101		.132	
N	98		105		101		115	

Table 1.B. Predicting Judgments of Future Crime across Race and Crime of Suspect
Likely the [white, black] man will commit a similar crime [assault, embezzling] in the future?

	DESCRIPTION OF SUSPECT AND CRIME							
	Black Assault				**White Assault**			
	Black Embezzle		**White Embezzle**					
	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)
Black Stereotype	.303	.028** (.009)	−.014	−.002 (.012)	.185	.022 (.012)	−.168	−.024 (.013)
Constant		−.31 (.439)		1.13 (.576)		−.866 (.614)		1.45* (.55)
R^2	.301		.357		.328		.375	
Adj R^2	.210		.281		.250		.304	
N	99		104		105		106	

Source: 1994 Lexington Race and Crime Survey.
Note: Entries are standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Lower values on the above variables indicate: judgments of greater likelihood of the black stereotype scale. Coefficients are also controlled for white stereotypes, political predispositions (punitiveness, civil liberties, ideology, party ID), and sociodemographic characteristics (education, gender, age, and income).
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

The Nature of the Policy

To test the second proposition, that racial stereotypes play a larger role in shaping assessments of blacks when they are the targets of punitive versus preventive policies, the Lexington survey included several experiments of each type of policy where the race of the target in the question is randomly varied. Punitive policies are represented by questions on prison furloughs, prisoner rehabilitation, and prison terms for committing a carjacking; and preventive policies are gauged with questions on drug rehabilitation and job training programs.

Prisoner Furlough Experiment. No policy has been as politically-charged as the prison furlough program, which assumed center stage in the 1988 Bush campaign (via the focus given to Willie Horton, mentioned previously) and a number of 1994 congressional and gubernatorial races. To examine the degree to which attitudes on this policy are fueled by racial considerations, we designed the Furlough Experiment, in which respondents were randomly assigned into either the black or white treatment group and asked, first, the extent to which they approved of "programs to help prisoners—many of whom are [black/white]—adjust to life outside prison by granting them weekend furloughs near the end of their prison terms" (see Appendix item III.B). Subsequently, in an additional question, they were asked to gauge the likelihood that such prisoners would "commit more crimes while on weekend furlough."

These assessments were regressed on the same set of predictors used in earlier models. The OLS results in Table 2.A.1 clearly show that while perceptions of African-Americans are unrelated to support for furloughs for white prisoners, negative stereotypers are far more likely to oppose furloughs for black prisoners, relative to those with less pejorative images.

Further analysis suggests that one important reason why negative stereotypers reject such furlough programs for blacks is because African-American prisoners are regarded as incorrigible and beyond rehabilitation. Evidence for this explanation can be found in Table 2.A.2, which displays the regression results for the next question in the furlough experiment. In the black (but, importantly, not the white) condition, whites with pejorative images of blacks are substantially more likely to believe that the prisoner will commit more crimes while out on furlough. Such pessimism for black prisoners, doubtless, underlies the strong tendency of these white respondents to reject the ideas of furloughs in the first place.[4]

[4]The impact of Black Stereotypes on furlough approval does appear to be indirect, mediated by judgments of whether such prisoners are likely to commit similar crimes on furlough. When responses to the second furlough question on committing crimes are inserted into the furlough approval equations (along with the other predictors in Table 2.A), judgments about committing crimes are substantial (unstandardized b = .60 and .65 in the black and white equations, respectively), while the impact of the Black Stereotype variable on furlough approval for black prisoners essentially vanishes. We would not want to press this causal interpretation too far, however, in light of the close proximity of the two furlough items in the survey, especially since the approval item was actually asked *before* the committing crimes question in the interview.

Rehabilitation Experiment. To underscore the power of racial stereotypes to affect evaluations of punitive policies by shaping assessments of the likely criminal behavior of blacks, we turn to the rehabilitation experiment in Table 2.B, in which randomly assigned respondents were asked to "Consider a case where a 25 year-old [black/white] prisoner in the Kentucky State Penitentiary recently had a parole hearing, hoping to be released early from his sentence for manslaughter" (item III.C in Appendix). Quite clearly, perceptions of blacks as violent (and lazy) generate assumptions that black prisoners are incorrigible. Not only are negative stereotypers far more likely to believe black (but not white) prisoners are incapable of being rehabilitated (Table 2.B.1), but, when asked about black prisoners, are also more likely to believe they would engage in violent crimes in the future (Table 2.B.2).

Carjack Experiment. Punitive policies are most-directly exemplified by tough sentencing decisions. Our expectation in the Carjack Experiment, consequently, is that racial stereotypes should strongly affect judgments of punishment (and expectations for future criminality) for black felons convicted of carjacking, but not for white felons. Respondents were asked about three [black/white] teenagers arrested for a series of carjackings (see Appendix item III.D). Table 4 reports the regression results obtained from regressing whites' judgments of the black and white suspects. As before, when blacks are stigmatized as prisoners or criminal suspects, whites with strongly negative images of African-Americans are far more likely to believe that black (but not white) suspects will commit comparable crimes in the future (Table 2.C.1). More to the point, as shown in Table 2.C.2, such whites are also significantly more likely to believe a 10 year prison term to be too lenient for black carjackers (or, at least, to advocate relatively harsher sentences for felons of color).

Preventive Policies: The Drug Rehabilitation and Job Training Experiments. In Table 2, then, we have consistently demonstrated a pronounced tendency for racial stereotypes to condition assessments of punitive policies. Questions about furloughs, rehabilitation, and prison terms appear to activate racial stereotypes, which, in turn, bias judgments on such issues, but only for treatment conditions in which the target is black. The important

Table 2. Punitive Policy Experiments

Table 2.A. Prison Furlough Experiment

1. Predicting Approval of Prison Furlough Programs across Race of Prisoners

	Black Prisoners			White Prisoners		
	Stand.	Unst.	(se)	Stand.	Unst.	(se)
Black Stereotype	.227	.039**	(.015)	−.072	−.013	(.018)
Constant		.214	(.727)		.789	(.826)
R^2	.329			.248		
Adj R^2	.262			.161		
N	119			106		

2. Predicting Likelihood of [Black/White] Prisoners Committing Crimes on Furlough

	Black Prisoners			White Prisoners		
	Stand.	Unst.	(se)	Stand.	Unst.	(se)
Black Stereotype	.237	.035*	(.012)	−.182	−.028	(.015)
Constant		.135	(.593)		.835	(.706)
R^2	.255			.271		
Adj R^2	.178			.184		
N	119			115		

Table 2.B. Rehabilitation Experiment

1. Predicting Likelihood of Rehabilitating [Black/White] Prisoner

	Black Prisoner			White Prisoner		
	Stand.	Unst.	(se)	Stand.	Unst.	(se)
Black Stereotype	.272	.044**	(.011)	−.106	−.016	(.011)
Constant		1.35*	(.528)		1.32*	(.505)
R^2	.155			.161		
Adj R^2	.112			.115		
N	225			211		

2. Predicting Likelihood of [Black/White] Prisoner Committing Future Crime

	Black Prisoner			White Prisoner		
	Stand.	Unst.	(se)	Stand.	Unst.	(se)
Black Stereotype	.211	.026**	(.001)	.061	.007	(.008)
Constant		1.18*	(.411)		.089	(.359)
R^2	.145			.165		
Adj R^2	.101			.120		
N	224			215		

Table 2. (*continued*)

Table 2.C. Carjacking Experiment

1. Predicting Judgments of Punishment of Suspected Carjackers across Race of Suspects

If suspects found guilty, would a 10 year term be too lenient, about right, or too severe?

	Black Suspects			White Suspects		
	Stand.	Unst.	(se)	Stand.	Unst.	(se)
Black Stereotype	.214	.019**	(.006)	−.027	−.003	(.006)
Constant		1.11**	(.294)		1.39**	(.321)
R^2	.157			.217		
Adj R^2	.115			.177		
N	228			225		

2. Predicting Likelihood of Committing Similar Crime in Future across Race of Suspects

How likely commit a crime like this in the future?

	Black Suspects			White Suspects		
	Stand.	Unst.	(se)	Stand.	Unst.	(se)
Black Stereotype	.252	.032**	(.008)	.0179	.002	(.009)
Constant		1.38**	(.412)		.966*	(.462)
R^2	.202			.089		
Adj R^2	.159			.041		
N	216			217		

Source: 1994 Lexington Race and Crime Survey.

Note: Entries are standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Lower values on the above variables indicate: more negative ratings on the Black Stereotype scale, greater disapproval of furlough program, greater likelihood of prisoners committing crimes while on furlough, prisoners less likely to be rehabilitated, likely to commit violent crimes again, 10 year prison term for carjacking suspects too lenient, carjacking suspects likely to commit similar crime in the future. Coefficients are also controlled for white stereotypes, political predispositions (punitiveness, civil liberties, ideology, party ID), and sociodemographic characteristics (education, gender, age, and income).

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

contrast, according to our hypothesis that some policies are more susceptible to racially-based decision making than others, is between the policies just examined and what might be considered preventive policies.

Such policies are the focus of survey experiments analyzed in Table 3, where we asked respondents about their support for "spending more money on social programs to help people get jobs" and "creating drug rehabilitation programs" (see items III.E in Appendix). In each experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to respond to programs in either black or white neighborhoods as ways of dealing with crime.

Table 3. Preventative Policy Experiments

Table 3.A. Predicting Approval of Spending on Social Programs to Help People Get Jobs
Approve of things law enforcement might do to deal with crime in mostly [black, white] inner city neighborhoods?

	Black Neighborhoods		White Neighborhoods	
	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)
Black Stereotype	.035	.005 (.010)	.044	.007 (.010)
Constant		2.01** (.529)		2.21 (.539)
R^2	.171		.203	
Adj R^2	.128		.163	
N	247		232	

Table 3.B. Predicting Approval of Creating More Drug Rehabilitation Programs?

	Black Neighborhoods		White Neighborhoods	
	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)
Black Stereotype	−.011	−.002 (.010)	.052	.007 (.009)
Constant		1.63* (.531)		2.92** (.511)
R^2	.148		.132	
Adj R^2	.102		.089	
N	217		232	

Source: 1994 Lexington Race and Crime Survey.
Note: Entries are standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Lower values on the above variables indicate: greater disapproval of creating more social (jobs) programs and drug rehabilitation programs, and more negative ratings on the black stereotype scale. Coefficients are also controlled for white stereotypes, political predispositions (punitiveness, civil liberties, ideology, party ID), and sociodemographic characteristics (education, gender, age, and income).
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

The stereotype coefficients indicate that this is, indeed, the case. Not only are the racial stereotype variables statistically insignificant, but the unstandardized coefficients (appropriate for purposes of comparison with the comparable entries in Table 2) are close to zero. Quite clearly, assessments of preventive programs—even when targeted to African-Americans, failed to activate whites' racial stereotypes. In fact, the only significant predictor of such policies is punitiveness (not shown), which doubtless prompts individuals to reject preventive programs, in general, in favor of more punitive strategies for dealing with crime.

In summary, we find that in the context of punitive policies, negative racial stereotypes condition bleak predictions of future criminal behavior, which prompt a more punitive orientation to "get-tough" with black (but not white) criminals. In the context of preventive policies, however, stereotypes are much less consequential, presumably because such programs are intended for individuals not yet stigmatized as violent.

The Nature of the Criminal

To explore the third proposition that stereotypes of blacks as a violent underclass are particularly relevant when the target is a violent black criminal, we return to the Prison Furlough Experiment (displayed in part in Table 1). In our prior discussion of these data, we presented only half of the cases—i.e., those in which subjects responded to either black or white violent criminals—to demonstrate that black stereotypes determine furlough support for black, but not white, prisoners. For present purposes, we note that the experiment makes use of not just one, but two, variations in question wording. The full question stem (item III.B in Appendix) is as follows:

> Some states have programs to help prisoners—many of whom are [black/white] adjust to life outside prison by granting them weekend furloughs near the end of their prison terms. Many of the prisoners eligible for these programs are [model prisoners/prisoners who have committed violent crimes].

Because the two subject assignments are independent of each other, one-quarter of the sample is placed in the black-model condition, one-quarter into the black-violent condition, and so on. Our expectation is that the importance of racial stereotypes will be far less important to respondents assigned to the black-model condition than to those assigned to the black-violent condition (i.e., those who are exposed to individuating information which is consistent with the negative stereotype).

Consistent with our expectations, racial stereotypes drive evaluations of the furlough programs when black prisoners are described as having committed violent crimes. Presumably because such inmates closely match the images held by negative stereotypers, these respondents are substantially more inclined to reject furlough programs for such prisoners (Table 4.A) and to expect them to commit additional crimes while on furlough (Table 4.B), relative to whites with less pejorative stereotypes. Racial stereotypes are rendered irrelevant, however, when whites are responding to "model (black) prisoners" who fit less well with the pejorative image of African-Americans as a violent underclass.

Conclusions

As social scientists more fully realize the importance of group perceptions, they have naturally turned their attention to the study of social stereo-

Table 4. Prison Furlough Experiment: Type of Criminal

Table 4.A. Predicting Approval of Prison Furlough Programs across Prisoner Descriptions

	DESCRIPTION OF PRISONERS							
	Black Violent Prisoners		**Black Model Prisoners**		**White Violent Prisoners**		**White Model Prisoners**	
	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)
Black Stereotype	.227**	.039 (.015)	.090	.014 (.016)	−.072	−.013 (.018)	−.150	−.024 (.016)
Constant		.214 (.727)		2.3** (.766)		.789 (.826)		.195 (.797)
R^2	.329		.238		.248		.165	
Adj R^2	.261		.141		.161		.078	
N	119		101		106		117	

Table 4.B. Predicting Likelihood of Prisoners Committing Crimes on Furlough across Prisoner Descriptions

	DESCRIPTION PRISONERS							
	Black Violent Prisoners		**Black Model Prisoners**		**White Violent Prisoners**		**White Model Prisoners**	
	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)	Stand.	Unst. (se)
Black Stereotype	.237*	.035 (.013)	.079	.010 (.014)	−.182	−.028 (.015)	−.002	−.001 (.014)
Constant		−.135 (.593)		1.47* (.665)		.835 (.706)		.866 (.663)
R^2	.255		.255		.270		.197	
Adj R^2	.178		.160		.184		.112	
N	119		101		115		117	

Source: 1994 Lexington Race and Crime Survey.

Note: Entries are standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients. with standard errors in parentheses. Lower values on the above variables indicate: greater disapproval of furlough program, greater likelihood of prisoners committing crimes while on furlough. and more negative ratings on the black stereotype scale. Coefficients are also controlled for white stereotypes, political predispositions (punitiveness. civil liberties, ideology. party ID). and sociodemographic characteristics (education, gender, age, and income).

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

types, focusing particularly on the political and social consequences of racial perceptions. Indeed, there is an excellent extant literature exploring the ways in which stereotypes of African-Americans shape views of government assistance programs (see Hobo and Kluegel 1993, and Sniderman and Piazza 1993, for examples). These studies have underscored the point that stereotypes are more than mere cognitive heuristics; while the theoretical work of those in the field of social cognition is invaluable for the purpose of exploring the cognitive properties of stereotypes, it is also useful to be reminded that stereotypes can be profoundly consequential, serving to shape debate concerning public policy and electoral politics.

While scholars have concentrated on the link between racial stereotypes and welfare, there is another important component to contemporary white images of African-Americans—viz., violence. Quite clearly, by the late 1960s a new set of traits began to creep into the black stereotype shared by many whites (Stephan and Rosenfield 1982)—traits often described as "aggressive," "violent," or "hostile." To be sure, these characteristics are presently among the most often-mentioned traits by whites when asked about African-Americans, along, of course, with those dispositions associated with the work ethic (e.g., lazy). If, as Reeves and Campbell (1994) have suggested, the black female has come to represent the welfare queen to many whites, the black male increasingly has come to represent the criminal.

But this prevalent view of African-Americans as a violent black underclass has gone largely unexplored, despite the high probability that this image is politically consequential. To what degree is public opinion on this topic driven by racial perceptions? As we shall argue below, the answer to this question is important for it sheds light on the rationality of political discourse.

In what ways are racial stereotypes linked to views of crime? Given the documented disproportionate involvement of African-Americans in crime, of media accounts which often portray blacks as criminals and not much more, and of political rhetoricians who may "play the race card" in the course of campaign treatments of crime, we were not surprised to find a substantial and recurrent overlap between negative African-American stereotypes and more punitive views of crime policy among our white respondents over a variety of survey experiments. We are confident that this linkage is not spurious inasmuch as negative stereotypes affect judgments of black targets, but not similarly-described white targets, under a variety of relevant control variables. We are therefore quite confident in concluding that, for many whites, crime policy attitudes are fueled by their racial beliefs.

This link between race and crime is neither inevitable nor universal,

however, for as we have learned, it occurs only when the specific case fits the more general stereotype. Only when crimes are violent and when policies are punitive are negative stereotypes substantially more likely to see blacks as guilty of crimes (in the Race and Crime Experiment), to envision more crimes in the future (in the Race and Crime, Carjack, Furlough, and Rehabilitation Experiments), and to favor harsher punishments (in the Carjack and Furlough Experiments). But these tendencies can also be short-circuited in the presence of individuating information. As demonstrated in the Prison Furlough Experiment of Table 4, black criminals are not treated more harshly if the respondent is given the information which is inconsistent with the pejorative stereotype (i.e., that the target is a "model prisoner"). In short, specific information which diverges from the stereotype in important ways—whether pertaining to the crime, the policy, or the criminal—will serve to render the racial stereotype irrelevant as a determinant of the crime policy attitude.

What does this analysis tell us about crime as a potential wedge issue in American politics? How easy is it for political elites to "play the race card" and thereby encourage citizens to think about crime in essentially racially-coded ways? Most broadly, is public concern with crime largely a function of racial beliefs?

Quite clearly, the heightened and intensified public preoccupation with crime is not proportionate to any real changes in the violent crime rate of the recent past (Gaubatz 1995). Federal statistics document that such crimes are becoming more, not less, rare. If the hypersalience of the crime issue is not a response to real-world events, then, it must necessarily be based on some less rational foundations—foundations, quite possibly, such as the racial fears and animosities of the American public.

Obviously—and we emphasize this caveat—not all thinking about crime is rooted in racism. At the same time, however, several facts are inescapable. Regrettably, African-Americans comprise a disproportionate share of those arrested for crimes. Numerous high profile cases (e.g., Michael Jackson, Mike Tyson, and, of course, O. J. Simpson), furthermore, reinforce this link in a dramatic fashion. And, as studies increasingly make clear, the media are more likely to contribute to, than detract from, the conflation of race and crime. When audiences see African-Americans in televised news stories, it is usually in the context of crime. Law-abiding blacks (who, of course, comprise the overwhelming majority of African-Americans) are less likely to be portrayed than blacks who have broken the law. As Entman (1992) and Jamieson (1992) have shown, network news portrayals of blacks are, indeed, menacing portraits. Blacks are often shown in handcuffs, in mug shots, in physical custody, and to be unnamed and unspoken. In short, they are demonized rather than humanized—a tendency

which is not counterbalanced because whites so rarely get to see blacks portrayed in the news as lawful, contributing members of society. Experimental evidence suggests, moreover, that even a brief visual image of a black male in a typical nightly news story on crime is powerful and familiar enough to activate viewers' negative stereotypes of blacks, producing racially biased evaluations of black criminal suspects (Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996). Thus, because media treatments of blacks reinforce rather than individuate racial stereotypes, it would indeed be surprising to find whites' racial beliefs to be unconnected to their views of crime.

Recent studies of the "war on drugs" in the 1980s provide an excellent example of how zealous anticrime policies and sympathetic media coverage can conspire to create violent images of a black underclass. Based on an exhaustive study of drug enforcement policies, for example, Meier (1994) concludes that the brunt of the war on drugs clearly fell on urban blacks: although the use of illicit drugs is roughly equal among blacks and whites, blacks (who constitute only 12.4% of the population) accounted for approximately 40% of all persons arrested for drug offenses. The dramatically higher arrest rates of blacks are, according to Meier, traceable to a series of state and federal laws which provided stiffer punishments for violations involving crack versus powder cocaine (the former is consumed more by blacks, the latter by whites), despite the fact that the two drugs are chemically equivalent.

Once the mass media were enlisted into the war on drugs, racial differences emerged in the way drug offenders were portrayed. One study of network coverage of the drug war from 1981 to 1988 found that as the focus of drug enforcement efforts shifted from powder to crack cocaine, the media frame shifted dramatically from white, suburban drug users in need of therapy to riveting images of violent black drug offenders in the inner city who were beyond the point of rehabilitation (Reeves and Campbell 1994). The vivid and stigmatizing images from the battlefront—"customers cruising the crack houses, trembling crack babies, cops going in for the bust as the hand-held camera shakes along behind" (Gitlin 1989, 17)—portrayed black drug offenders as the "enemy within." The correspondence between these media images and the "pictures in the head" of many of our white respondents—of blacks as a violent underclass beyond rehabilitation and requiring stiffer punishment—is striking.

We began this work open to the possibility that race would be omnipresent in the debate about crime—i.e., that virtually all crime-related issues would be approached, at least by many individuals, as a decision influenced by racial judgments. But we found racial stereotypes to be only modestly correlated with attitudes toward generic crime issues (e.g., the death penalty), our punitiveness and civil liberties scales, and so on (see

Note 4). As well, we found them to be unimportant as determinants of responses toward nonviolent crimes and preventive policies.

The conditional impact of race, however, in no way minimizes its importance. Violent crimes committed by blacks, and the policies designed to punish them, are the very images which drive public fears. When many citizens respond to questions about crime, they are thinking about precisely such scenarios, not the prevention of white-collar malfeasance. Thus, the finding that many crime-related concerns are conceptualized race-neutrally should not obscure the likelihood that race and crime can be, and often are, conflated. They are conflated by the media, by individuals like Charles Stewart and Susan Smith (both of whom blamed African-American males for crimes they, themselves, committed), and by cynical political messengers who "Willie Hortonize" campaigns.

A debate on crime policy which is fundamentally designed to elicit visceral and angry images of race is both irrational and divisive. We should, therefore, very closely scrutinize public policy debates on crime. To the degree that political discourse is based on the unnecessary infusion of race, public anticrime policy will turn more on passion than on reason.

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APPENDIX
Survey Measures and Sample Characteristics

I. Racial Stereotypes
   A. The Black Stereotype Index (Cronbach's α = .76) items were selected because they appropriately reflect the two prominent domains of the violent underclass stereotype (i.e., violence and laziness). The items were based on the following question: Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to describe a 7-point scale that I'd like you to use to describe the characteristics of most blacks. . . . Where would you rate most blacks on this scale where 1 means _____ and 7 means _____ [and 4 means you think most blacks don't lean one way or the other]? The five semantic differentials were: hardworking—lazy, prone to violence—not prone to violence, short-tempered—even-tempered, prefer to be self-supporting—prefer to live off welfare, and hostile—friendly. Responses to the 7-point scales are coded such that lower values indicate more negative assessments of most blacks.
   B. The White Stereotypes Index (Cronbach's α = .67) was assessed by asking respondents to use the same five scales to describe some characteristics of most white people.

Due to our theoretical interest in uncovering the impact of black stereotypes, as cognitive expectancies, on political judgments about blacks, we enter the Black and White Stereotype scales as separate variables in the equations below. Others analysts, such as Bobo and Kluegel (1993), have used stereotype items to compute difference scores (by subtracting ratings of "whites in general" from ratings of "blacks in general") to measure "prejudice," a concept which the authors argue involves attributing less positive characteristics to blacks than whites. Because our theoretical interest lies in stereotypes as cognitions (i.e., cognitive expectancies about the traits and behaviors of social groups) rather than as prejudice (which has traditionally been defined as a more global, affective predisposition toward a group, similar to social distance), subtracting ratings of other groups would, for our purposes, only muddy the conceptual and empirical waters. We note, however, that the basic pattern of our results would be unaffected by substituting difference scores for separate Black and White Stereotype scales in the equations below, since difference scores are statistically significant in exactly the same equations as the Black Stereotype measure.

II. Political Predispositions
   A. Punitiveness (Cronbach's α = .53) was measured with several Likert items, including "There would be less trouble in our society if parents and teachers used more good old-fashioned physical punishment to make people behave properly,"[a] "To really reduce crime in this country we need to focus more on reducing poverty instead of just cracking down on criminals,"[a] "The best way to deal with violent crime is to dramatically increase prison terms for people who commit violent crimes,"[a] "I strongly favor the death penalty for anyone convicted of murder,"[a] "In dealing with criminals, it is more important to rehabilitate them than to punish them."[a]
   B. Civil Liberties (Cronbach's α = .59) was measured with the following Likert items: "Accused rapists and child molesters have every right to a fair trial,"[a] "Far too many guilty people are set free because of some legal technicality,"[a] "If someone is caught red-handed beating and robbing an elderly person on the street, it is just a waste of taxpayers's money to bother with the usual expensive trial,"[a] and "Taxpayers should not have to pay for lawyers to defend poor people who are obviously guilty of committing a crime."[a]

III. Survey Experiments
   A. Race and Crime Experiment: Consider a case in another city where a 21 year old [black/white] man was arrested for [beating a motorist before stealing his car/embezzling 1000's of dollars from the telephone company where he worked]. Despite the evidence against him, the man pleaded not guilty. (1) In your opinion, how likely is it that the man is guilty of the crime?[b] (2) How likely is it that the man will commit a similar crime again in the near future?[b]
   B. Prison Furlough Experiment (Punitive Policy): Some states have programs

to help prisoners—many of whom are [black/white]—adjust to life outside prison by granting them weekend furloughs near the end of their prison terms. Many of the prisoners eligible for these programs are [model prisoners/prisoners who have committed violent crimes]. (1) Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of such programs? (2) In your opinion, how likely is it that prisoners in programs like this will commit more crimes while they're on a weekend furlough?[b]

C. Rehabilitation Experiment (Punitive Policy): Consider a case where a 25 year old [black/white] male prisoner in the Kentucky State Penitentiary recently had a parole hearing, hoping to be released early from his sentence for manslaughter. Even though he was described as a model prisoner, many people believe that it is impossible to rehabilitate criminals like him. (1) In your opinion, how likely is it that prisoners like him can be rehabilitated?[b] (2) How likely is it that prisoners like him will commit a violent crime in the future?[b]

D. Carjacking Experiment: Consider a case in another city where three [black/white] teenagers (about 18 years old) were arrested for a series of "carjackings," where cars are stolen from their owners by forcing the owner off the road and ordering them out of the car. Lawyers for the three suspects maintain that their clients were arrested only because they were [black/driving an old car and had long hair]. (1) If the suspects were found guilty of the crime, do you think a minimum 10 year prison term would be too lenient, about right, or too severe? (2) How likely do you think it is that the suspects will commit a crime like this in the future?[b]

E. Preventive Anticrime Policy Experiments: Here are some things that law enforcement might do to deal with the problems of drugs and crime in mostly [black/white] neighborhoods in the inner city. For each one, please tell me whether you strongly approve, somewhat approve, or somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove. (1) Spending more on social programs to help people in these neighborhoods get jobs? (2) Creating more drug rehabilitation programs for people in these neighborhoods?

[a]Response options were "strongly agree, not so strongly agree, not so strongly disagree, strongly disagree."

[b]Response options were "very likely, likely, unlikely, very unlikely."

Table A.1. Lexington Population and Sample Characteristics

	Lexington Population	Lexington Sample
Gender		
Male	48%	43.6%
Female	52	56.4
Median Income	$17,941	$20,000 to $30,000
Education		
Less than high school	19.8%	7.6%
High school graduate	23.4%	24.9%
Some college	26.2	24.7
Four-year college degree	18.6	23.9
College graduate work	12.0	18.1

Note: Lexington-Fayette County population characteristics are from the 1990 U.S. Census. The Median Income for the Lexington sample refers to the median income category used in the interview. Because the sample overrepresents more educated (and affluent) individuals, it was weighted to reflect education levels in the Lexington population. The sample does not include African-Americans, who comprise 13% of the Lexington population because the cost of oversampling blacks to gain a representative black subsample was prohibitive.

Table A.2. Whites' Ratings of "Most" Blacks

Black Stereotype Item	Mean Rating	% Negative Rating
Hardworking—lazy	3.809	24.7%
Prone to violence—not prone to violence	4.104	30.7
Short-tempered—even-tempered	4.439	20.1
Prefer to be self-supporting—prefer to live off welfare	4.155	41.3
Hostile—friendly	4.491	20.8

Note: Means are based on 7-point scales (see above for question wording). "Negative ratings" on the 7-point scales are those that fall below 4 (or above 4 for the hardworking and self-supporting items) on the 7-point scale. The ratings of "most blacks" here are slightly less negative than those obtained in national surveys where, for example, 31% of whites rates "most blacks" as "lazy" and 36.5% rated "blacks in general" as "lazy" (versus hardworking) (see Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman n.d., Table 1 and Note 2).

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*Racial Prejudice and Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action**

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Theory: We examine the relationship between blatant racial prejudice and anger toward affirmative action.
Hypotheses: (1) Blatantly prejudiced attitudes continue to pervade the white population in the United States. (2) Resistance to affirmative action is more than an extension of this prejudice. (3) White resistance to affirmative action is not unyielding and unalterably fixed.
Methods: Analysis of experiments embedded in a national survey of racial attitudes. Some of these experiments are designed to measure racial prejudice unobtrusively.
Results: Racial prejudice remains a major problem in the United States, but this prejudice alone cannot explain all of the anger toward affirmative action among whites. Although many whites strongly resist affirmative action, they express support for making extra efforts to help African-Americans.

At the level of public policy, the politics of race has undergone a transformation. A generation ago, the struggle centered on efforts to dismantle public policies mandating segregation and Jim Crow and to assure African-Americans their right as citizens to use public accommodations in the same way and on the same terms as white Americans. Historic legislation and government decrees mandated that black Americans are free to vote, sit at the front of a school bus, and eat a sandwich at a luncheon counter without restrictions based on skin color. Now, a generation later, rhetoric and lawmaking center on efforts to combat discrimination through policies mandating the affirmative use of race as one of a permissible set of considerations in making educational and employment decisions. Whereas a large majority of white Americans now say they endorse the extension and protection of basic civil liberties to African-Americans, an equally large majority oppose affirmative action. The question is what to make of this opposition.

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Broadly, two lines of argument have emerged. Some scholars (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Glazer 1988; Kluegel and Smith 1983; Sears 1988) see the politics of affirmative action as continuous with traditional racial politics. They attribute the clamor over affirmative action and related policies to the persistent fears and prejudices of white Americans. Others, most notably Edsall and Edsall (1991) and Sniderman and Piazza (1993), argue that the politics of affirmative action significantly departs from racial politics of the past. In their view, the current upheaval over affirmative action arises from the nature of the policy itself; many whites, otherwise unprejudiced and indeed quite willing to make special efforts to help blacks, deem the particular policy as unfair and exclusionary.

Quite obviously, the prejudice-centered and the policy-centered lines of argument need not be mutually exclusive. To believe that prejudice has nothing to do with white people's reactions toward affirmative action would be naive. But just how much does the one underlie the other? Does deep-rooted prejudice motivate most of the strongly-held opposition to affirmative action? Or, does racial animosity, by itself, account for only the fringes of resistance?

Finding answers to these questions is a matter of considerable consequence. Suppose that racial prejudice remains far more pervasive and more politically potent than traditional surveys document. Then to back away from affirmative action would allow a social cancer to triumph over good intentions. But suppose that racial prejudice alone cannot explain a good part of the resentment among whites, and that while many whites oppose affirmative action, they also feel a genuine commitment to furthering opportunities for African-Americans. Then well-intended policymakers might back alternative programs or at least employ alternative rhetoric, of potentially equal or greater benefit to black Americans, as a means to reduce resentment or resistance among white Americans.

In the following pages, we address three questions: (1) Do blatantly prejudiced attitudes still pervade the white population? (2) Is resistance to affirmative action merely an extension of this prejudice? (3) Is white resistance to affirmative action unyielding and unalterably fixed? Our answers are, respectively, yes, probably not, and no. We arrive at them through a series of experiments, some of them designed to measure racial attitudes unobtrusively, incorporated into a national survey of American adults' racial attitudes taken in 1991 (see Sniderman, Tetlock, and Piazza 1991 for a detailed description of the sample and data collection methodology).

Since much of the debate centers on the attitudes of whites, we have limited our analyses to white respondents only.[1]

Racial Prejudice as Blatant Animosity

The more pervasive the animosity toward people on the basis of their skin color, the more serious and difficult the problem of prejudice. But how pervasive prejudice is depends on how one defines it, and defining it has become increasingly difficult over time. At earlier periods in our history, researchers generally agreed on its meaning—what Kinder and Sears (1981) call "old fashioned" prejudice. Today scholars construe prejudice in a multitude of ways; the result has been to render the very concept of racial prejudice nearly intractable (contrast Sniderman and Tetlock 1986 with Kinder 1986). Social desirability effects long have plagued traditional surveys, moreover, leaving authors vulnerable to the criticism that white Americans have represented their feelings towards black Americans as more positive than they are in order to avoid giving the impression they are prejudiced (Jackman 1978; Jackman and Muha 1984). Social desirability, if operative, can quickly become a self-reinforcing process. Some people are truly unprejudiced; others feel a need to look as though they are; then still others succumb to the social pressure; and so forth, until survey responses begin to convey a distorted picture of reality (Noelle-Neumann 1984).

For purposes of analysis, we construe racial prejudice as a strong, openly expressed, negative evaluation of African-Americans. To be sure, not everyone will accept this construction (an issue to which we will return); but especially given the dangers of academic politicization, it is best to define and measure prejudice in a way that is both valid on its face and consistent with classical conceptions (Allport 1954; Myrdal 1944).

How do we afford people the opportunity to tell strangers what they really think in a telephone interview? We developed the following technique to do just that. By no means perfect, it represents, we believe, an advance over existing techniques that researchers use to measure sensitive attitudes (Kuklinski and Cobb 1995b provide a detailed narrative of the psychometrics of the technique).

Methodology[2]

Imagine a representative sample of the general population divided randomly into two. One half is presented with a list of three items, and asked

[1]In any event, the small number of African-Americans in the sample precludes a systematic analysis of their attitudes. Nor did we ask blacks all of the questions in the survey; some would sound nonsensical to them.

[2]All data and documentation necessary to replicate this analysis can be obtained from the authors.

to say how many of the three make them angry—*not which items, just how many.* The other half is presented with the same list with one item added—a race item—and is also asked to say how many of the items make them angry—*not which ones, just how many.* Suppose, for the sake of argument, some respondents in the second half take exception to two of the items, and one of the two that angers them is the race item. Asked how many items make them angry, they respond "two." It will seem to these respondents quite impossible for the interviewer to figure out that one of the items upsetting them is racial in content. In fact, as we shall show, although the interviewer cannot tell in the course of the interview if the race item has angered a particular respondent, the analyst can determine afterwards the level of anger in the population as a whole and in strategic subsets of it.

The list experiment we employed begins as follows:

> "Now I'm going to read you three things that sometimes make people angry or upset. After I read all three, just tell me HOW MANY of them upset you. I don't want to know which ones, just HOW MANY."

With the ground rules established, the interviewer then read a list of three items:[3]

(1) "the federal government increasing the tax on gasoline;"
(2) "professional athletes getting million-dollar salaries;"
(3) "large corporations polluting the environment."

To assess the level of prejudice, the three items of the baseline list were repeated with a fourth item added; it takes the form, "a black family moving in next door." Any person who gets angry at the mere thought of a black family moving in next door is revealing a strong, negative reaction based on no more than skin color, in short, prejudice. To ensure that this item serves its intended purpose, we undertook companion validity studies as an indicator of racial prejudice that take angry responses to interracial dating. See Kuklinski and Cobb (1995b) for a discussion of these results, which resemble those reported below.

The list experiment thus consists at a minimum of two lists (there are three in our design, as we will see shortly)—one containing three items (the baseline condition) and the other (the test condition), four items. Re-

[3]When choosing the three nonracial items, we made every effort to avoid contrast effects. Suppose, for example, one of the items had read, "someone raped your best female friend." This thought is so repugnant and anger-provoking to most people that any other item would sound tame in comparison. Pilot studies show the three items to be comparable in their propensities to provoke anger.

Table 1. Mean Level of Anger Toward A Black Family Moving in Next Door, by Region (Whites Only)

Region	Experimental Condition		Estimated Percent Angry
	Baseline	Black Family	
Non-South	2.28[a]	2.24	0
	(.07)	(.05)	
	425[b]	461	
South	1.95	2.37	42
	(.06)	(.08)	
	139	136	

[a]Standard error of the estimate.
[b]Number of cases.

spondents are of course randomly assigned to the conditions, and in each respondents are asked only to report the number of things on the list that make them angry—*not which ones make them angry, only how many.* Thus they can freely express prejudiced attitudes without exposing themselves to censure.[4]

Results

Deriving an estimate of racial prejudice, in this instance the percentage of respondents angry over the thought of a black family moving in next door, entails subtracting the average number of items in the baseline condition from the average number in the test condition and multiplying by 100. Throughout, we use analysis of variance to ascertain levels of statistical significance.

Table 1 reports, by region, the mean number of angry responses in the two conditions. Among non-Southern respondents in the baseline condition, the mean is 2.28, contrasted to 2.24 in the test condition;[5] in other words, no significant number of non-Southern whites expresses anger over

[4]That the list includes only four items in the two experimental conditions raises the possibility of ceiling effects. Although the possibility cannot be absolutely rejected, we feel confident that the results reported below are not an artifact of such effects. In some of our pilot studies, we presented respondents with lists of six items to read, including several that were innocuous. In four of the five studies, the results mirror those reported below, with the results in the one exception being ambiguous. Moreover, we developed a modeling strategy to identify ceiling effects in the list experiment. It identified only one, which we note later.

[5]Because the baseline and test conditions are independent samples, the test condition mean can be smaller than the baseline mean when the test item evokes no or little anger.

a black family moving in next door—a finding which, on its face, is a warning flag of ceiling effects; and, indeed, here, and only here, ceiling effects undermine our estimation procedure. Consequently we developed a more elaborate methodology (see Appendix)[6], and taking advantage of it, we estimate that about one in every 10 whites in the non-South gets angry over the mere thought of a black family moving in next door—a figure that reaches statistical significance at the .05 level.[7] This figure may seem low even so, but far from suggesting that the number of prejudiced whites is low, it demonstrates that, even now, there are at least as many undeniably prejudiced whites outside the South as there are African-Americans.

Whether or not our method underestimates the level of prejudice (a matter to which we will turn later), the estimated percentage of prejudiced respondents living in the South is truly remarkable. Some 42% of Southern whites—four times as many outside the South—express anger at the idea of a black family moving in next door. The only other region that approaches this level of anger, not coincidentally, consists of those states bordering on the South. These results (also see Kuklinski and Cobb 1995a) demonstrate that racial attitudes have by no means changed as much, in one significant part of American society, as commentators often suppose. Indeed, what we have uncovered warrants strong emphasis. Contrary to the idea now in common circulation that white Southerners have, if anything, a more sensitive appreciation of how to live and work along with African-Americans as equals, our unobtrusive measure indicates that something approaching one in two Southerners is angered by the thought of a black family moving into the neighborhood.[8]

All in all, then, we conclude that white America has not freed itself of the racial animosity that has so scarred this country's history. Blatant racial prejudice remains a sad reality of American life, and more so in some regions than others.

Anger Toward Affirmative Action

This out-and-out prejudice could motivate all of the anger toward affirmative action, a good part of it, or only some of it. The answer depends on how widespread the intense hostility toward affirmative action actually

[6]The credit for developing this iterative procedure goes to Barbara Mellers.

[7]Essentially, the algorithm compensates for the relatively low movements from two items in the baseline condition to three in the test condition and from three items in the baseline to four in the test condition.

[8]We must emphasize the obvious: to find a high (and statistically significant) level of prejudice in the South is not to indict everyone who lives there. More than half of the respondents living in the region do *not* express racial animosity as we have measured it.

is. If about 10% of non-Southerners express strong resentment toward the policy, for example, we would attribute it all to out-and-out prejudice. But if, say, 25% do, that conclusion would not hold.

Method

To estimate the level of anger over the policy itself, we replaced the black family item with "black leaders asking for affirmative action" and administered this second test condition to the final third of our sample. Intentionally two-dimensional, the statement refers to both black leaders and affirmative action. Although analytically distinguishable, the two are inextricably combined in the hurly-burly of real politics, and it is the reactions of citizens to the issue as they actually confront it that interests us.

Note that the "black family" and "affirmative action" conditions are identically worded with the exception of the race item. This facilitates a direct comparison of the responses in the two conditions.

Results

Table 2 presents estimates of the level of anger toward affirmative action by region. More than 40% of the total sample of non-Southern whites, or nearly one in every two, expresses anger toward affirmative action.[9] This is a sizeable proportion, considerably greater than the percentage we estimated to hold blatantly prejudiced attitudes. By no means, in other words, is the one completely a function of the other. Moreover, anger toward the policy is fairly consistent across partisanship, ideology, and education, factors that have traditionally predicted racial prejudice (Table 2).

Some 98% of Southerners—nearly all—are resentful toward affirmative action. This figure is a story unto itself. But the critical point to note here is that, just as we found in the non-South, the level of prejudice by itself cannot explain the widespread hostility toward the policy.

The percentages do not fully convey the meaning of what we have found thus far; actual numbers do. The numbers are these. On the one hand, when allowed to say what they really feel about black people, some 36 million white adults express undeniable animosity, a number that should make anyone who cares about race relations shudder. However, another 163 million do not voice such animosity even when given the opportunity, but do strongly resent affirmative action.

What should we make of this latter group? More precisely, does their anger toward affirmative action reflect a cold harshness toward African-

[9]The analysis of variance consists of the mean number of items as the dependent variable and region (South versus non-South), condition (baseline versus affirmative action) and the region by condition interaction as independent variables. All three independent variables are significant at $p < .001$.

Table 2. Mean Level of Anger Toward Affirmative Action Policy, by Region (Whites Only)

Region	Experimental Condition: Baseline	Experimental Condition: Affirmative Action	Estimated Percent Angry
Non-South	2.28	2.69	41
	(.04)[a]	(.05)	
	450[b]	450	
Education Level			
High School or Less	2.46	2.88	42
	(.05)	(.07)	
	195	196	
Some College	2.21	2.58	37
	(.07)	(.10)	
	110	119	
College Degree or More	1.84	2.20	36
	(.07)	(.09)	
	141	134	
Partisan Identification			
Democrats	2.34	2.66	32
	(.07)	(.09)	
	140	131	
Independents	2.22	2.81	59
	(.06)	(.08)	
	149	157	
Republicans	2.27	2.59	32
	(.07)	(.08)	
	137	143	
Political Ideology			
Strong Liberals	1.92	2.26	34
	(.15)	(.18)	
	26	30	
Weak Liberals	2.13	2.44	31
	(.08)	(.11)	
	103	107	
Moderates	2.41	2.89	48
	(.06)	(.08)	
	139	147	
Weak Conservatives	2.27	2.60	33
	(.08)	(.09)	
	119	105	
Strong Conservatives	2.21	2.89	68
	(.13)	(.16)	
	40	41	
South[c]	1.95	2.93	98
	(.07)	(.09)	
	148	146	

[a]Standard error of the estimate.
[b]Number of cases.
[c]The small number of Southerners precludes estimating the level of anger within demographic groups.

Americans, a "let black Americans fend for themselves posture," or is this anger so singularly focused on the policy that it does not preclude a genuine concern for the plight of many black Americans?

Making An Extra Effort

We look to two experiments to help us reach the right conclusion. The first is the "making an extra effort" experiment.

Method

In this experiment, one randomly selected half of the national sample was asked:

> "Some people say that because of past discrimination, qualified blacks should be given *preference* in university admissions. Others say that this is wrong because it discriminates against whites. How do you feel—are you in favor or opposed to giving qualified blacks preference in admission to colleges and universities?"

The other half received a strategically differently worded version:

> "Some people say that because of past discrimination, an *extra effort* should be made to make sure that qualified blacks are considered for university admission. Others say that this extra effort is wrong because it discriminates against whites. How do you feel—are you in favor or opposed to making an extra effort to make sure qualified blacks are considered for admission to colleges and universities?"

Note that the first item explicitly mentions preferential treatment, the second, extra effort. Note also what is no less important: in both, blacks get special attention even if they only get special treatment in one. If a lack of concern for blacks (even in the absence of prejudice) underlies whites' objections to affirmative action, then we should find little difference in responses to the two items. On the other hand, if the crucial element is preferential treatment, then respondents should respond differently to the two versions of assistance for blacks.

Results

This is exactly the case (Table 3). Only one out of four Southerners or non-Southerners expresses support for preferential treatment, while nearly 60% in both regions endorse extra effort.[10] Given the findings on

[10]The difference is significant at $p < .001$ among both Southerners and non-Southerners.

Table 3. Percentage of Respondents Favoring Preferential Treatment of Blacks and Extra Efforts to Aid Blacks, by Region (Whites Only)

	Experimental Condition	
Region	Preferential Treatment	Extra Effort
Non-South		
Favor	26%	61%
Oppose	74%	39%
	n = 674	n = 696
South		
Favor	23%	59%
Oppose	77%	41%
	n = 215	n = 215

prejudice we uncovered earlier using the unobtrusive measure, both of these figures undoubtedly reflect social desirability effects. The difference across the two conditions is what interests us. Since there is no reason why respondents should be more inclined to hide their true feelings on one version rather than the other, we take this difference to be real. In short, although whites overwhelmingly reject affirmative action if it involves preferential treatment, a clear majority favor going the extra mile to assure that all blacks meriting assistance receive it.

Support for Compensation in the Face of Discrimination

Our second experiment pushes even further. It is designed to determine if whites will respond positively to affirmative action—even to affirmative action with explicit racial quotas—provided it is presented as a response to the unfairness with which African-Americans have been treated.

Method

The experiment takes three conditions. In the "baseline" condition, one-third of the sample, randomly selected, was asked the following question.

> "Do you think that large companies should be required to give a certain number of jobs to blacks, or should the government stay out of this?"

In the other two conditions, respondents were presented with a reason potentially justifying racial quotas, but—deliberately—the reason varied.

Table 4. Percentage of Respondents Favoring Government Intervention on Behalf of Blacks, by Experimental Condition and Region (Whites Only)

Region	Experimental Condition		
	Control Group	Blacks Underrepresented	Companies Discriminate
Non-South			
Government to Intervene	26%	20%	43%
Government to Refrain	74%	80%	57%
	n = 422	n = 463	n = 480
South			
Government to Intervene	18%	18%	36%
Government to Refrain	82%	82%	64%
	n = 137	n = 164	n = 126

Thus, in one condition, they were told that "There are some large companies where blacks are underrepresented," and then asked whether a certain number of jobs should be given to blacks in this case; in the other, they were told that "There are some large companies with employment policies that discriminate against blacks," and then asked if these companies should be required to give a certain number of jobs to blacks. If the hostility toward affirmative action stems from a rejection of or indifference to the claims of blacks to fair treatment, then the distributions across the three conditions should look much the same.

Results

They do not (Table 4). Three-fourths or more of Southern and non-Southern whites oppose government action in the first two versions. On the other hand, some 36% of Southerners and 43% of non-Southerners *support* affirmative action in the face of overt discrimination. The change among non-Southerners, especially, is substantial.[11] As important, there is no difference whatever between responses in the "baseline" condition and in the "statistically underrepresented" condition. This is as important because it means that respondents in the "discrimination" condition are responding to the *particular* reason given—that blacks have been treated unfairly—rather than merely responding to the fact that a reason for supporting affirmative action had been given.

[11]The mean of the third version is significantly different from the means of the first and second conditions at $p < .01$ among both groups.

Even in the "discrimination" condition, a majority of whites do not support affirmative action. Although this distribution unquestionably reflects some *underlying prejudice*, it does not follow logically, let alone ideologically, that people must support racial quotas and preferential treatment at a company if it has been found guilty of discrimination. It is perfectly possible to believe that the appropriate remedies are to compensate the specific individuals who have been discriminated against and to ensure that the company does not engage in discrimination thereafter without going on to favor racial quotas. Indeed, just because people are not compelled to favor affirmative action generally, it is impressive that so large a number of whites, their general aversion to affirmative action notwithstanding, regard it as fair to impose it on a company if they have reason to believe that it has treated blacks unfairly.

Alternative Explanations

To summarize: blatant prejudice continues to be a major problem in the United States; but attributing all the anger toward affirmative action to it would be a mistake. Many whites dislike the policy even though they harbor no ill feelings toward African-Americans. To the contrary, many of these whites express a willingness to support extra efforts by government on behalf of African-Americans.

In the next few pages, we briefly entertain several rival hypotheses. Each represents a potentially viable alternative to what we have argued. Some are more viable than others; none, we believe, undermines the validity of our analysis.

Differences in Thresholds

The list experiment, which we used to ascertain the level of prejudice, asked people to indicate how many items make them angry. An alternative would have been to ask how many items they *oppose*. To oppose the idea of a black family moving in next door is surely a sign of prejudice, and presumably more respondents will oppose it than actually become angry over it. In other words, in focusing on reactions of anger, we have selected a test-criterion that sets a high threshold and thus underestimates the prevalence of prejudice among whites.

We intentionally selected the term "makes you angry or upset" for two reasons. First, while the dominance of the cognitive perspective in social psychology during the 1970s and 1980s strongly influenced the study of racial attitudes and perceptions (Hamilton 1979; Hamilton and Gifford 1976; Tajfel 1970), psychologists are returning to original constructions of prejudice as largely affective (see the chapters in Mackie and Hamilton 1993, for example); our measure comports with the latter conception. Obvi-

ously, anger is not the only form of affect. But, (and second), anger implies salience. If the thought of a black family moving in next door angers people, there can be no doubt about its meaningfulness to them (Krosnick 1988a, 1988b). Anger and fear probably motivate behavior more than any other negative emotion (Marcus et al. 1995; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988).

Ultimately, the effect of our choice of terms is an empirical question. Therefore we conducted additional studies in which we compared responses to the two terms. The results indicate that substituting the term "oppose" for "make you angry" increases estimates by another 12% (Kuklinski and Cobb 1995b). Assuming the figure to hold for a national sample, this means that more than 50% of Southerners and slightly more than 20% of non-Southerners oppose a black family moving in, disheartening figures, needless to say. But it must also be noted that some 75% of American whites nationwide indicate they oppose affirmative action. Even if prejudice is more widespread than we have reported, it still falls far short of explaining all of the turmoil over affirmative action.

Yet additional evidence comes from comparing the reactions to affirmative action of the most and least racially tolerant whites, as determined by a classical measure of prejudice, i.e., negative stereotyping. Employing this procedure[12], we have compared levels of anger over affirmative action among the most racially tolerant third of the white population and the least tolerant third. The result is clear-cut. Levels of anger are just as great among the former as the latter.

The Problem of Censoring

Devine's creative experiments (1989; Devine and Monteith 1993) suggest that whites must regulate their attitudes to overcome negative images of African-Americans, images that are imbedded in the very fabric of (white) American society. This censoring process entails whites recognizing their initial, negative reactions and then consciously working to overcome them.

Perhaps, one might argue, a majority of white Americans now censor their negative feelings on something as blatantly prejudiced as opposing a black family moving in, but consciously or unconsciously consider it legitimate to target their animosity on affirmative action, especially since many elites have opened the door by challenging the program.

If taken to its extreme, the assertion categorizes anyone who opposes

[12]The survey asked respondents whether a variety of negative adjectives—"aggressive or violent," "lazy," "boastful," "irresponsible," and "complaining"—accurately describe blacks. Given the strong intercorrelations among responses to the five items (from .38 to .58), we constructed an index.

affirmative action as prejudiced. This translates into 75% or more of the white population, a figure that most students of public opinion will find hard to believe. Moreover, testing the hypothesis with survey data (and possibly experimental data) borders on the impossible. Mental processes such as censoring are not readily amenable to observation. So construed, prejudice becomes unmeasurable.

But suppose that we discovered an unconscious link, such that some people unknowingly transfer society-based negative images to affirmative action. Other than as an indicator of how far American white society has yet to go to eliminate stereotypes, how would we interpret the finding? Would we, in short, label the phenomenon "prejudice?"[13] Presumably one would first want to determine how individuals respond when made aware of the unconscious process, not an easy task. Moreover, there still would be a question of causal direction. On the one hand, negative images of African-Americans could lead whites consciously or unconsciously to resent affirmative action. On the other, it is at least conceivable that rhetoric surrounding affirmative action primes negative stereotypes, which in turn then generates the hostility toward the program (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). At this point, research into racial attitudes threatens to be intractable.

A Contaminated Measure?

We noted earlier our use of the term "black leaders pushing for affirmative action" to identify the level of anger over the program. We also offered our rationale, i.e., the statement portrays part of the context within which debates over affirmative action have been taking place. Nonetheless, a nagging question—does reference to black leaders cause an overestimation of anger toward the program itself?—warrants an answer.

Several follow-up studies suggest not. In them, we compared responses to our original item with those generated by alternatives such as "affirmative action programs for African-Americans," "affirmative action programs," and "university scholarships earmarked for black students." What stands out is the consistency of responses across the whole set of differently worded statements.

Implications

Let us underline what we have not claimed. Nowhere do we claim that the anger toward affirmative action we have uncovered is "right." Perhaps whites believe that prejudice and discrimination do not exist when in fact they do. If many whites respond viscerally to the words "affirmative action" without knowing precisely what the program is intended to do, their

[13]We certainly would interpret it as an indicator of society-wide racism.

anger will often be misguided (although, in fairness, the policy's purpose has itself become muddled over time). Our sole purpose has been to establish the sources and frequency of anger at affirmative action, not to pass normative judgments.

Nor do we mean to imply that public opinion should dictate the direction of public policy. Had that been the case earlier in this nation's history, we never would have seen the historic civil rights legislation of the 1960s. Elected officials inherit a responsibility to lead as well as follow.

But public opinion does have implications for strategic politics. Our results underline the risks that liberals and the Democratic party face among the general citizenry. On the one hand, to abandon a policy that has benefited thousands of deserving African-Americans can only exacerbate the perception among them that they are being left behind. On the other, to continue to associate issues of race with affirmative action can only provoke yet more anger among the majority of whites in this country. And this risk is likely to grow, not shrink, over the medium run. As more time passes, as memories of legalized segregation and overt exploitation fade, we can expect a growth in the number of whites who believe African-Americans share at least partial responsibility for their circumstances and, going a step further, who believe that continuing problems African-Americans face are a consequence not merely of their circumstances but of their own motivations and desires. If so, anger and resentment over affirmative action will increase, not decrease.

In principle, resolving the dilemma may not be as difficult as we have portrayed. Many white Americans say they are committed to government programs to give African-Americans special assistance. If we are willing to take their word, the support and sympathy are in place. What elected officials and other key players in the continuing civil rights movement must do is play to this sentiment. This might entail moving away from explicitly racialist politics, and especially the categorical and exclusionary language that has come to be associated with affirmative action, without losing sight of the special needs and claims of African-Americans, including those that affirmative action programs currently address.

Unfortunately, what sounds right in principle often becomes perilous in practice. This peril takes the form of prejudice. There is a fine but crucial line between reshaping affirmative action programs as a strategy to broaden support and dismantling them out of a cold lack of concern for African-Americans. And there is always the risk that even well-intended policy changes will play into the hands of the prejudiced.

Although the politics of race has changed, one challenge has not: how to ensure that good will and benevolence reign over malice and hatred. How to maximize that goal within the context of (white) public opinion warrants public debate and deliberation.

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APPENDIX
Iterative Estimates

To generate the most accurate estimates for the probabilities of anger for the non-South population, we wrote a computer program that used the observed frequencies from all three conditions. In the baseline condition, there were four possible responses (i.e., people could say they were angered by 0, 1, 2, or 3 items). To predict observed frequencies we formulated a model that was represented as a set of equations, one for each possible response. For example, in either of the test conditions, a person could be angered by "*1*" item if and only if one of the three baseline items (and *not* the test item) was upsetting, or the test item (and *none* of the baseline items) was upsetting. The prediction equation for "*1*" item specified each of these outcomes and all possible ways they could occur. To generate predictions or expected frequencies, the model required a set of predicted probabilities. To predict the probability that a person would be angered by "*1*" item, the model needed: (1) an estimate of the probability of being angered by 1 baseline item and not the test item, and (2) the probability of being angered by the test item and not the baseline item. By iteratively adjusting these unknown probability estimates, the program solved for a set of predicted probabilities that generated better and better expected frequencies. To be more precise, the program made numerous iterations with the help of a Fortran subroutine, STEPIT, to minimize a **X** statistic. The **X** statistic was simply the sum of the squared deviations between observed and estimated frequencies, each relative to the estimated frequency. Output from the program included a set of parameters that, when put in the prediction equations, came closest to predicting the observed frequencies. These parameters are minimum chi-square estimates based on data from all three conditions.

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