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
ARTICLE

Improving Medicare Managed Care

Opportunities for substantial Medicare savings from managed care are limited by small enrollments and a flawed approach to paying HMOs for Medicare beneficiaries.

Background. The private sector has shifted dramatically toward managed care and away from fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement of medical expenses. In 1995, for example, 69 percent of workers in large companies (those with more than 200 employees) received their insurance coverage from some type of managed care provider—up from 29 percent in 1988. By contrast, less than 10 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in HMOs or other kinds of managed care plans. HMOs with Medicare enrollees receive a payment equal to 95 percent of the per capita Medicare spending in FFS plans in the same county, adjusted for a limited number of risk factors. This formula provides few incentives for cost savings and may actually increase Medicare expenditures.

Selection bias. HMOs tend to enroll relatively healthy people with low risk of requiring expensive care (see chart). The per capita payment to HMOs for Medicare patients should reflect the lower costs associated with serving this relatively healthy



population. To the extent it does not, Medicare payments may be higher than if the patients were in FFS plans. One study indicates that the medical expenses of seniors shifting into HMOs were 25 to 30 percent lower than those of the average Medicare FFS enrollee in the year or so immediately prior to their enrollment in the plan. Another analysis estimates that the introduction of managed care has increased Medicare costs by 7 percent per HMO beneficiary.

The selection problem is exacerbated by three additional factors:

- Migration of healthier individuals into managed care leads to higher average costs in the FFS sector, which drives up the HMO per capita payment.
- HMOs have an incentive to offer coverage in counties with high payment rates and to avoid counties in which the per capita payment is low.
- Individuals are allowed to switch between plan types as often as monthly. Hence they have an incentive to move from a managed care to an FFS plan if their health deteriorates. (Evidence on the significance of this is weak. Only 12 percent of those newly enrolled in HMOs in 1990 returned to FFS plans within a year and the percentage of switches has been falling over time.)

Weak incentives for cost savings. HMOs are not allowed to earn higher profit margins on their Medicare enrollees than they earn on their private sector enrollees. In cases where the allowed per capita payment would generate too high a rate of profit, HMOs have the option of covering some or all of enrollees' mandatory Medicare premiums or providing coverage not normally included in Medicare (like prescription drugs). But unless HMOs are allowed to keep some of the profit resulting from increased efficiency, they have little incentive to develop more cost-effective methods of providing care.

Scope for improvement. The Administration has a number of proposals that would address some of these selection bias and cost-incentive issues. The use of more uniform payment rates, for example, should help to remove the incentive for HMOs to locate mainly in high-cost areas. The Administration has also proposed testing new risk-adjustment methodologies. But the likelihood of classifying medical risks accurately enough to eliminate the remaining selection bias is poor. The best currently available risk-adjustment mechanisms, which use information on prior claims as well as on observable characteristics, only account for about one-eighth of the individual variation in annual health care spending. Furthermore, using information on previous claims to set the payment rate could give providers an incentive to increase medical expenses in one period in order to receive more generous payments subsequently.

Comprehensive changes in the FFS program may well be needed to achieve the full benefits of Medicare managed care. Currently, beneficiaries enrolled in the traditional program have limited incentives to switch into managed care and, particularly for those with Medigap policies, little reason to economize on medical spending. Moreover, FFS providers have strong incentives to increase expenditures beyond what would be cost-effective.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET • NEW YORK • NEW YORK 10021

Tel 212 434 9400 Fax 212 861 1916

Michael Mandelbaum
Director, Project on East-West Relations

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Tony Sauer

These articles may be of interest.

Sincerely,

Michael Mandelbaum

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MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

*THE DAWN
OF PEACE
IN EUROPE*

A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND BOOK

1996 ♦ The Twentieth Century Fund Press ♦ New York

INTRODUCTION

This is a book about peace in Europe after the Cold War. During the four and one-half decades of East-West rivalry, the question at the heart of the book's subject was whether the military balance between the two opposing European military coalitions, one led by the United States, the other by the Soviet Union, was stable. In the wake of the Cold War, the central question is broader: How can and should Europe be organized politically and militarily to assure that the countries of the continent remain secure and at peace? The nine chapters that follow, which address that question, are divided into three parts, with three chapters in each part.

The first part concerns the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the Cold War the Atlantic Alliance consisted of a roster of members with a common and clearly defined mission. It could retain both. The perpetuation of the status quo in NATO is the subject of chapter 1. Another possible future for the alliance, to which chapter 2 is devoted, is to retain its Cold War membership but change its mission to the assumption of responsibility for political and military problems outside its original geographic sphere of concern, as in Bosnia. A third possibility,

the subject of chapter 3, is to retain the Cold War mission—deterring aggression from the East—but to expand the membership to include some of the countries of Central Europe that overthrew communism in 1989. In 1994, the current members of NATO committed themselves in principle to expansion of this kind.

Each chapter returns a verdict on the proposal in question. The status quo is both desirable and feasible. (Its feasibility is also discussed in chapter 9.) Out-of-area missions are desirable but not feasible. Expansion is feasible but not desirable.

The most desirable future, which is not part of the ongoing discussion about the future of European security, includes, but goes well beyond, perpetuating NATO in its Cold War form. This “common security order” replaces the grim imperatives of power politics with a system of international relations involving more extensive, explicit cooperation than the sovereign states of Europe have ever practiced. It is the subject of the book’s second part.

Chapter 4 is a detour from the close consideration of current politics and policies to a more abstract level of analysis. It surveys some of the assumptions and findings of the academic study of international politics in order to put the measures that comprise common security into a perspective in which their significance can be appreciated—as a dramatic departure from past security arrangements in Europe that promises a more peaceful continent, at lower cost, than ever before.

A security order of this kind is plainly desirable. It is also feasible: A common security order has come into existence in post-Cold War Europe. Its core is the series of arms control accords signed between December 1987 and January 1993. Although similar in form to postwar arms treaties, they are different in content.

They have two distinguishing features. One, the subject of chapter 5, is “defense dominance.” The treaties have

reshaped the military balance in Europe to make armed forces more suitable for defending national territory but less so for seizing the territory of others. The other feature, discussed in chapter 6, is "transparency." Each country is obliged to make publicly available information about the size and the operations of its forces. Thus all countries can be confident that each is observing the agreements that all have signed and can know what every country is doing with the forces it is entitled, under the treaties, to have.

Because adherence is voluntary, the common security order is fragile. The two countries the participation of which is most in doubt are the subjects of the book's third part. They are the two that dominated the security affairs of the continent during the Cold War: Russia and the United States.

Chapter 7 addresses the future of domestic politics in Russia, exploring how the end of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Communist political and economic systems, and the slow, unsteady beginnings of democratic politics and free markets are likely to affect Russia's commitment to the new security order. Chapter 8 discusses Russia's relations with its neighbors: those to the west, which are part of the European security order, and those to the south and east, where Russian policies are relevant to common security insofar as they affect what kind of country Russia becomes and how it conducts its policies toward its Western neighbors.

The conclusion of these two chapters is that the reasons to fear that Russia will overturn the institutions and practices of common security are no more powerful or compelling than the reasons to hope that, in the end, the new Russia will remain a good citizen of the new Europe.

The United States is integral to the common security order, as it is to each of the three different versions of NATO's future. Chapter 9 therefore returns to the subject of the first part of the book, assessing the durability of the American commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and therefore to a role in European security.

The three parts of *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* concern three different subjects, indeed three different *kinds* of subjects. The first addresses a series of current issues of public policy; the second has to do with concepts and ideas of interest to professional students of international politics; the third speculates about the future of the world's two greatest military powers. The three fit together as a single argument in the following way: NATO, the subject of part I, is necessary for a secure Europe in the post-Cold War era, but the two ambitious expansions of its Cold War role that have been proposed are unnecessary, because of the existence of a new common security order, which is described in part II. The durability of this new order depends on the continuing participation of Russia and the United States, the issues that part III considers.

Russia, the United States, and Germany are the countries that receive the most attention because they are the countries most important for the future of European security. The roles of two other historic great powers, Britain and France, remain important, but not as important. Because they will influence the international politics of Europe, domestic issues in Russia and the United States are the subjects of chapters 7 and 9. But these chapters do not examine in detail the ebb and flow of party politics or the details of particular elections in either country. What matters in Russia is the character of the regime, in the United States the structure of public opinion, although both factors will surely be influenced by the day-to-day politics of each country.

The Dawn of Peace in Europe describes and assesses five distinct, although not in each case mutually exclusive, futures for European security: three versions of NATO and two attempts to escape the traditional power politics of Europe—common security by reforming those politics and American isolation by removing from European politics the one country that is part of Europe as a matter of choice rather than geography.

Why are these, and not others, the options available? The array of choices is neither random nor accidental. None of the five is entirely new. Each is a late-twentieth-century version of policies that were proposed or tried during one of the three periods of modern European history comparable to the present: the aftermaths of the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars I and II.

After 1991, as after 1815, 1918, and 1945, a long, costly, dangerous European conflict has come to a decisive conclusion. Like Napoleonic France and Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union was defeated and reduced in size, and a government similar to those of the winners was installed on its territory. As in the other three conflicts, the conclusion of the Cold War brought to an end not simply a war but also an entire system of international relations in Europe, creating the need to construct a new one. Although less vividly than on previous occasions, the shadow of the recent past hangs over the deliberations about how to do so. Each of the five scenarios for European security provides an answer to the inevitable question: How can a recurrence of the conflict just concluded be avoided?

The withdrawal of the United States from Europe is not a plan for peace so much as a way for one country to avoid quarrels in which it believes it has no direct stake. American isolation would repeat the policy followed by Britain after 1815 and the United States after 1918. The two countries had involved themselves in Europe's wars temporarily, in a departure from their normal practice. They had intervened for the limited purpose of ensuring that a single, aggressive, imperial power did not subdue the entire continent, which it could then use as a base to threaten them directly. Once the would-be hegemonic power was defeated and a rough military equilibrium on the continent restored, the "offshore balancer," as the British thought of themselves, could bring its forces home.

As for common security, the search for some set of arrangements promising more durable peace than could be provided by the power politics that had dominated Europe's international relations, and had produced the four major wars, was a natural postwar development. The aspiration to transform international politics in order to prevent the terrible bloodshed to which it periodically gives rise was at its purest and most powerful after World War I. This was the brief, shining moment when the American president, Woodrow Wilson, lifted the spirits of a shattered continent with a vision of a peaceful world over which a new international organization—the League of Nations—would preside.

Ironically, these recurrent hopes were, if anything, more modest in the wake of the Cold War than after the two world wars, while the prospects for a more peaceful Europe were and are far brighter. Common security does not transform Europe in the way that Wilson had envisioned, however. It is closer in form to an earlier precedent: the Concert of Europe that followed the Napoleonic Wars.

The proposal to expand NATO eastward is in the tradition of recurrent postwar efforts to confine the defeated power within its new borders. The victors' strategy after the Napoleonic wars and World War I was to surround the defeated power, France and Germany respectively, with newly created buffer states, which were to serve as barriers to expansion and shock absorbers between the victors and the vanquished. In one sense this has already happened in the wake of the Cold War: The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were freed from Soviet-imposed Communist rule, and the former Soviet republics, having been liberated from the Soviet Union itself, are now independent countries. They are the buffer between Russia and the easternmost member of the winning coalition, Germany. The purpose of bringing some of them into NATO is to strengthen that buffer.

The enthusiasm for out-of-area missions for NATO represents the revival of another characteristic project of post-war periods: the organization by the winning coalition of a kind of standing police force. The proposals for a Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic Wars, for a strong Council of the League of Nations to which the great powers would belong after World War I, for Franklin Roosevelt's four policemen—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—during World War II and the designation of a United Nations Security Council afterward, were all intended to deal with smaller conflicts that could, if unchecked, lead to larger wars such as the one just concluded. The combined efforts of the strongest powers would, it was hoped, stamp out brush fires before they turned into all-consuming conflagrations.*

The Europe-wide interest in sustaining NATO in its Cold War form echoes efforts after the three previous conflicts, especially after World War I, to keep the winning coalition together. The purpose was to hedge against the possibility that the power just defeated—France in the first case, Germany in the second and third—would rise again to threaten Europe. The reason for perpetuating NATO is to provide insurance against a neoimperial Russian foreign policy to the west.

The parallels with comparable historical moments make clear how much has changed in Europe in a few years and how much more fluid the international relations of the continent became with the ending of the Cold War. The range of possibilities for European security has abruptly and dramatically broadened. During the Cold War, when the politics of Europe were frozen, security questions were military

*The post-Cold War motives were as much humanitarian as strategic. The purpose was to save lives in countries where fighting was taking place rather than to protect the interests of the nations contributing to the police force. That is one of the reasons that the idea attracted little support. See chapter 2.

in character. In the wake of the conflict, as after the previous great wars, the most important considerations are political.

The comparisons with the previous postwar eras demonstrate as well, however, that while the range of possibilities is wider, it is not infinitely wide. Certain issues, and certain responses to them, recur. That is the reason the historical parallels are so striking.

For European security, therefore, the past is relevant to the future. It is not an infallible guide: History does not faithfully repeat itself. What happened to the historical antecedents of the five futures for European security described in the pages that follow does, however, help to illuminate the advantages, disadvantages, and obstacles associated with the late-twentieth-century avatars of these patterns of the past.

Although the problem of European security is dramatically different in the post-Cold War era than it was during the Cold War, the two periods share one principal feature: the central importance of the Atlantic Alliance. The status and the future of NATO, therefore, is the starting point of *The Dawn of Peace in Europe*.

CONCLUSION

In January 1991, President George Bush proclaimed that the American-led effort to drive Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait heralded the dawn of "a new world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law."¹

It proved to be a false dawn. The world became less rather than more orderly in the wake of the Cold War, but outbreaks of instability beyond the Middle East did not attract the attention that Iraq's occupation of Kuwait received. The powerful multinational firefighting squad that put out the blaze in the Persian Gulf proved to be unavailable elsewhere. There was, and is, no new world order of the kind that Bush foresaw.

There was, and is, however, a new security order in Europe. To be sure, it does not abolish all organized violence there. It neither prevented nor quickly stopped the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. But it does reduce to historically low levels the chances of a major war, involving all the major powers, like the two world wars of the twentieth century. The establishment of that order represents the dawn of peace in Europe.

The new common security order is the product of the interaction of three great changes in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One is a change in the political map of the continent. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Central Europe liberated nominally independent sovereign states that had been under Moscow's effective control; the collapse of the Soviet Union itself led to the independence, in most cases for the first time in modern history, of countries that had been republics-provinces-of the Soviet Union.

The dissolution of the last great multinational empire on the planet eliminated a standing cause of war in Europe. The nations that Moscow dominated were perpetually willing, although only occasionally able, to rise up against Communist rule. The control that Moscow exercised was regarded in the West, as well as in the Soviet-dominated countries themselves, as an act of aggression and therefore as clear evidence of a Soviet intention to subdue Western Europe unless prevented from doing so by countervailing force.

The second great change, related to and made possible by the first, is in the way the European countries to the east of Germany are governed. Virtually all have sought, with varying degrees of success, to install democratic political systems with governments popularly chosen in regular, free, fair elections that respect the rights of those they govern. Democracy reduces the chance of war because democracies are less susceptible than countries with other forms of government to the ambitions and drives that have for millennia produced international conflict. In Russia, while democracy is not firmly established, orthodox communism, which was highly susceptible to bellicose motives, has been damaged beyond repair.

The third change is in the military balance in Europe. A series of treaties has reshaped national military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less so for attack. The voluntary acceptance of treaty-imposed restraints on their own forces by each European country reassures all the

others that none harbors aggressive designs. The restrictions themselves provide insurance in the event of the reappearance of such designs by making it difficult to carry them out. Any effort by a European country to escape the treaty-imposed limits on arms, moreover, would serve as a warning to others that the post-Cold War common security order was in jeopardy.

Common security reduces the insecurity that arises from the anarchy of the international system and historically has motivated the competitive amassing of military forces, making peace dependent on a balance of military power. The new order achieves peace without sharp political divisions among the major powers, at lower cost, lower risk, and lower levels of fear and uncertainty than ever before in Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, one of the mainstays of the balance of power arrangement of the Cold War, also plays an integral part in this new security order. Post-Communist Europe is marked by transitions—from centrally planned to market economies and from Communist to democratic, or at least non-Communist, political systems. NATO, too, has undergone a transition in its principal mission, from deterrence to reassurance. The American commitment to Europe, for which NATO is the vehicle, reassures all the countries of the continent that sudden, sharp changes in the distribution of military might are not imminent. It reassures Germany's neighbors that the Germans will not feel the need to conduct an independent military policy, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons; at the same time, it reassures NATO's members, and others to the east, that if Russia should opt for the aggressive foreign policies of its imperial and Communist predecessors, the United States will remain the spine of a military coalition to oppose this, even as it was during the Cold War.

The common security order depends on the continuation of NATO's basic political arrangements; it would be

jeopardized by either the contraction or the expansion of its membership, which would bring about dramatic changes in the role played in the new order by its two flanking powers, the United States and Russia.

As during the Cold War, the security of Europe depends in large measure on the policies of these two continental-sized, partly European countries, both of them heavily armed with nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the commitment of each to offsetting the other's military power and political ambitions was unwavering—until the late 1980s and early 1990s when the Soviet side first voluntarily retreated and then involuntarily collapsed. In the wake of the Cold War, the participation of each in the new European common security order is in doubt.

What is in question in the American case is the country's commitment not to the norms of common security but rather to ongoing engagement in Europe's political and military affairs. The circumstance that drew the United States to Europe three times in the twentieth century, the threat of a single power dominating the continent, has vanished.

Still, in the second half of this century an American military presence of some kind in Europe has become normal and there is no evidence of powerful public sentiment in the United States to withdraw completely.

The doubts in the Russian case involve not the country's role in Europe—which is, after all, a fact of geography—but the durability of its commitment to the tenets of common security. If subtracting the United States from the alliance would undercut the sense of confidence that the common security order promotes, expanding its formal membership eastward would risk destroying the legitimacy that the post-Cold War settlement has in Russian eyes.

Even without the expansion of NATO, Russia may withdraw from the new order. Nothing like the Western consensus in favor of the precepts of common security exists

in the new Russia. But if there is reason for confidence that the United States will continue to be a European power, there is also reason for hope that Russia will continue to be a good citizen of Europe. Over the long term, it is possible that Russians will adhere to the norms of common security because they cannot conceive of breaking them; in the short term, it is likely that they will refrain from violating those norms because they are not strong enough to do so.

These post-Cold War security arrangements, which depend so heavily on the United States and Russia, do not represent the best of all imaginable ways of organizing the international relations of Europe. A Europe-wide government with an effective military force would offer a firmer guarantee against a major war and, unlike the common security order, could prevent lesser conflicts such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia. But the nation-states of Europe, old and new, will not surrender their sovereign prerogatives to a continental Leviathan. Europe would also be more secure if the common security order itself were more solidly established and deeply rooted. This, however, requires what by definition cannot be supplied quickly: the passage of time.

Therefore, in the crucial matter of the security of Europe—the heart of the international system and the scene of many of the bloodiest episodes in human history—a set of arrangements has emerged from the Cold War that embodies the best of all *possible* worlds. The policy wisdom that follows is a variation on Benjamin Franklin's reply to an onlooker who asked him, as he was leaving a meeting of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, what the drafters had given the people of the world's newest independent country. "A republic," Franklin replied, "if you can keep it."²

Without benefit of a single grand meeting, but rather through dozens of separate negotiations each lasting thou-

sands of hours, combined with unexpected, revolutionary political developments from Berlin to Vladivostok, by dint, that is, of hard work and good fortune, through both design and inadvertence, the governments of Europe and North America have provided the people of the European continent with a common security order. Their common task now is to keep it.

Future Roles Series Paper #4

Nuclear Weapons and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World

by Professor Michael Mandelbaum
Johns Hopkins University

sponsored by
Defense Programs at Sandia National Laboratories

Robert L. Rinne
Project Director and Senior Advisor on National Security Issues
and
Karinne W. Gordon
Project Administrator

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This paper is part of a series being conducted for "The Role of American Nuclear Weapons in the First Quarter of the 21st Century" project. The project's objectives are to provide a foundation for projecting the role of nuclear weapons in potential future international security environments, and increasing awareness of the rationale for the programs within the DOE Nuclear Weapon Complex. The series supports contributions from the intellectual community outside the Laboratories to foster communications about issues relevant to the future of the United States' national security. Prof. Michael Mandelbaum presented this paper at a colloquium held May 14, 1996, at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. This paper reflects the views of the author. It does not necessarily express the opinions of Karinne Gordon and Robert Rinne, nor does it necessarily reflect the views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy.

INTRODUCTION

"Fear and I were born twins" begins the introduction to Thomas Hobbes' classic of political philosophy, *Leviathan*. The phrase refers to the coincidence of the author's birth and the British naval battle against the Spanish Armada in 1588, which created, Hobbes came to believe, an atmosphere of tension and conflict that shaped his vision of political life and the principles he postulated to govern it.

Similarly, the nuclear age and the Cold War were born twins. The global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union shaped the role of nuclear weapons in international politics for four decades. In retrospect, the Cold War was a great ordering principle for the nuclear age and the end of that conflict has thrown the role of these armaments into doubt. The Cold War provided answers to the central questions nuclear weapons raised: what political purposes were they to serve? Where were these purposes salient? And what array of nuclear weapons was necessary to serve those purposes?

Together, the answers to those three questions made up what can be called classical deterrence. With the end of the Cold War, those answers are no longer valid. The set of policies, assumptions and expectations that made up classical deterrence has collapsed. The United States still has nuclear weapons, and they remain relevant to the international politics of the post-Cold War world. But they are no longer relevant in the clear, coherent fashion of the Cold War era.

It was common during that era to use the metaphor of a game to describe the Soviet-American rivalry, specifically the game of chess. The superpower competition did incorporate three features of chess that, in turn, lent clarity to the policies governing nuclear weapons.

As in a chess game, where nuclear weapons were concerned there were, effectively, two and only two rivals. Third countries had nuclear weapons, of course, but for purposes of Soviet and American nuclear deployments and doctrine the others were of marginal significance.

Second, the two sides were symmetrical. As with the two opponents in chess, the United States and the Soviet Union had roughly the same capabilities and operated under the same rules. In neither case was the equality absolute. In chess, the player with the white pieces has an advantage because he or she moves first. In the Cold War nuclear rivalry, the United States maintained a technological advantage, consistently being the first to introduce new technologies, but the Soviet Union had a political advantage—the absence of democratic political constraints on its arms programs. Moscow could deploy whatever weapons it was capable of making. Nonetheless, the two were equal in the sense that each could aspire to match the other; and each therefore had to assume that the other would match what it did.

A third, related common feature is that the nuclear rivalry, like chess, involved strategic interaction. In both cases, each player responded to the other; each had to calibrate its policies on the basis of how it anticipated the other would react.

Together, these three features, in combination with the technical features of nuclear weaponry, supplied the answers to the three questions nuclear weapons raised: what political purpose? where? and which weapons?

The purpose of American nuclear weapons was, of course, deterrence: the prevention of aggression by the threat of retaliation. This defensive goal served a larger political purpose, which was also defensive: "containing" the Soviet Union. In the two-player global rivalry the United States was the defender of the *status quo*, the Soviet Union the would-be disturber. The United States therefore required a defensive military strategy, to which the physical properties of nuclear weapons lent themselves.

In the age-old contest in military technology between offense and defense the Soviet-American rivalry in nuclear weaponry gave a decisive advantage to the defense, ironically through the superiority of the offense. Each side could be confident of inflicting a devastating blow on the other even after absorbing a full-scale attack. Because neither could attack with impunity, neither dared attack at all. The result was the functional equivalent of an impregnable defense on both sides. Nuclear deterrence came to be used as a single term, signifying that the United States had no other legitimate political purpose and that nuclear weapons could have no other feasible military use.

The fact that there were two and only two principal rivals provided an answer to the question of where the political purposes they served were relevant. Deterrence, like a radio signal, seems to become fainter the farther it travels from its point of origin. It was, on the whole, strongest in the regions nearest the two great nuclear powers, in what might be called the global "red zone," and weakest in regions farthest from them, the "green" zone. In between was a yellow, or "grey" zone.

In the red zone, the predominance of one or the other was unchallenged; neither tried to change the *status quo* by force. Europe was such a zone. The United States was dominant in the west, the Soviet Union held sway in the east. Deterrence was entirely effective; in the whole history of the Cold War neither side fired a shot in anger against the other.

In the green zone, the competition spilled over into the use of force by one side or the other, but in no case directly against the other. The United States fought major wars in Korea and Vietnam in which the Soviet Union supported America's adversary. The Soviet Union fought in Afghanistan against forces with American support.

In the grey zone, the rules were less certain. Each side had considerable stakes there, but neither had an unchallenged claim to primacy. A prominent part of this zone was the Middle East, and so was the Western hemisphere for a brief moment in 1962, when the Soviet Union attempted to install missiles in Cuba. The presence of important interests combined with the absence of clear rules made the possibility of a big war greater in this zone than elsewhere.

The red zone was demarcated by geography—it was close to the rivals' homelands—by international treaties—the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty committed the United States and the Soviet Union to the defense of the other signatories—and by military deployments—the two countries put large powerful armies in this zone of Europe.

The green zone lacked any of these; the grey zone lacked some. There were no troops or formal treaties, but the Middle East bordered on the Soviet Union and its oil gave the United States a huge economic and therefore military stake there.

The chess-like features of the US-Soviet rivalry also determined the array of nuclear weapons the two powers acquired. They competed to develop new technologies of nuclear weaponry: there was a qualitative arms race, driven not simply by the scientific impulse to explore the frontiers of technology but also by the symmetry of the rivalry. The two sides raced to acquire fission and fusion explosives, then delivery vehicles of ever-greater range and accuracy, because each knew the other was capable of developing them and had to assume that it would develop them.

The two arsenals were also shaped by the strategic doctrine adopted explicitly by the United States and implicitly by the Soviet Union, in turn the product of the chess-like features of the rivalry—duopoly and symmetry—combined with the physical properties of nuclear explosives. That doctrine was known as assured destruction. Each sought to assure itself of the capacity to make a devastating counterattack on the other even after absorbing an all-out attack. To this end, each acquired a nuclear striking force that was versatile—composed of nuclear charges based on land, at sea, and in the air, that was protected—by being based deep underground or made mobile on airplanes and submarines, and that was large—each accumulated thousands of nuclear explosives.

The two nuclear arsenals were large, as well, because, like chess, the Cold War rivalry was a symmetrical two-player contest, with each seeking to match the size of the other's force.¹ Neither was willing to concede to the other a significant advantage in any aspect of nuclear weaponry, at least not a numerical advantage. The question of which nuclear weapons to have was answered for each side in a final way, which also stemmed from the fact that they were roughly equal opponents: they negotiated equal limits, which served as ceilings, on weapons of some types.

Under conditions of classical deterrence the political rivalry did not erupt into open warfare and the competition in amassing nuclear weaponry, although it never ended, was conducted in the second half of the Cold War in a quasi-regulated fashion, at manageable expense (at least for the United States) and, on the whole, without the danger of technical surprises. Classical deterrence brought, if not peace, then stability. The Cold War rivalry steadily lost the sense of danger with which it had begun and seemed decreasingly likely ever to lead to World War III, although it was never guaranteed not to do so.

The Cold War was not, of course, quite as tranquil as this retrospective summary makes it seem. There were moments of peril. War between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the real prospect of a nuclear exchange, seemed uncomfortably close over the status of the divided city of Berlin on several occasions in the late 1950s and early 1960s and when the United States discovered Soviet preparations to install intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba in October,

¹ China and France also acquired nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterring one (or both) of the two superpowers, but the nuclear strategies they adopted did not require them to match the two largest nuclear arsenals.

1962. Nor, as noted, did classical deterrence prevent the two great nuclear powers from fighting large, costly wars: the United States in Korea and Vietnam; the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Nor was each side always fully confident that the other would not be able to gain a decisive advantage through technological innovation: the launch of the first Earth-orbiting satellite "Sputnik" in 1958 produced anxiety in American society and the American government; the American Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s worried Soviet leaders.

The United States had another recurrent concern: that Soviet advantages in some categories of weaponry, or the geographic differences between the two opposing military and political coalitions, or both, would translate into a political advantage for the Communists. They worried about the presumed superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in non-nuclear weaponry from the 1950s onward; and in the 1980s managed, with difficulty, to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe to offset those the other side had already deployed.²

Because the United States was separated from its European allies by the Atlantic Ocean, moreover, and because in the second half of the Cold War defending them against an attack from the east risked triggering a Soviet nuclear assault on the continental United States, American and European officials feared that Soviet leaders would conclude that they could attack westward with impunity because resisting would create a risk for the United States that no American government would run. Western governments sought to demonstrate American resolve to fulfill its commitment to Europe under all circumstances, to show that the United States and its transatlantic allies were "coupled" together.

Finally, for all the effort devoted to building, deploying and analyzing nuclear weapons and to envisaging and planning for armed conflict with the Soviet Union, the American government and military establishment never devised a persuasive scenario for using nuclear arms in a sensible, politically useful fashion—in a way, that is, that fell short of a holocaust. This would presumably have been true of the Soviet side as well. Classical deterrence involved clarity about how nuclear weapons could be used for deterrence. Nuclear war-fighting was another matter. As Fred C. Iklé put it, "When the [simulated] exercises progressed to the point of first use [of nuclear weapons] they were invariably terminated instantly. At the edge of the nuclear abyss, the war vanished like a bad dream."³

Still, the Cold War did provide some—although not total—clarity about nuclear weapons, clarity that has disappeared with the end of that conflict. Nuclear weapons have not, of course, been dismantled. The United States retains a large nuclear arsenal, which is relevant to American political purposes—although relevant in a less clear-cut way—in three major post-Cold War issues: relations with Russia and China; relations with Germany and Japan; and relations with lesser countries the political goals of which run contrary to American interests and that seek nuclear weapons in pursuit of those goals.

² The difficulties involved public resistance to the deployment of these missiles, especially in Germany, which was part of a wave of popular opposition to nuclear weapons throughout the Western world, including the United States.

³ Fred C. Iklé, "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, 75:1 (January/February 1996), p. 121.

II

Russia and China were the principal objects of American nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Russia's imperial predecessor, the Soviet Union, was, of course, America's opponent in the two-player nuclear contest, the adversary against which classical deterrence evolved. China never approached the United States in nuclear might but the American government did make implicit nuclear threats against Beijing. The purpose of those threats was not deterrence but rather "compellence": not, that is, to dissuade China from doing something it was thought to be contemplating doing, but rather to compel it to stop an activity in which it was already engaged: fighting in Korea and shelling several small islands in the Taiwan Strait.⁴ The threats that helped persuade the Soviet Union to remove the missiles it had begun to deploy in Cuba also count as instances of compellence.

With the end of the Cold War neither country is any longer the object of classical deterrence, let alone compellence. China has long since ceased to fit either description. In 1972, Beijing and Washington reversed what the Korean War had accomplished. That conflict had made them adversaries. Richard Nixon's journey to China signaled the formation of a common front against the Soviet Union. The internal changes in China that began in 1979 turned out to be just as important for Sino-American relations. The economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping started the undoing of orthodox Communism in China. The government relaxed its grip on Chinese economy, and Chinese society was opened to the outside world. Having been more or less isolated for three decades of Maoist rule, China rejoined the international community. The United States gained a growing economic stake in the country. All these changes made it difficult for Washington, despite sharp ongoing differences with the government in Beijing, to regard China as an adversary to be deterred and contained.

American relations with the Soviet Union changed later and even more suddenly and dramatically than those with China. In 1991 the Cold War adversary of the United States embarked on three revolutionary transformations: from an empire to a nation-state; from a centrally-planned to a market economy; and from a totalitarian political system with a monopoly of power in the hands of the Communist Party to a democratic government. These, in turn, transformed Russian-American relations from a global rivalry to what the two countries initially proclaimed to be a "strategic partnership." Still, post-Cold War Russia and China pose potential difficulties, to which American nuclear weapons are relevant.

Neither is as resolutely peace-loving, conflict-averse, satisfied with its status in the international order and determined never to make war except in self-defense as are the great democracies of Western Europe, North America, and East Asia. Political democracy serves, in a variety of ways, as a barrier to aggressive international conduct.⁵ Neither Russia nor China is a full-fledged democracy. Democratic norms in Russia are new and weakly grounded. China is not democratic at all and never has been, and its Communist rulers intend that it never will be.

Moreover, in both countries the most powerful ideology of the modern era, nationalism, remains relevant. Nationalism is the source of conflict when combined with irredentist claims, and both

⁴ See Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 206.

⁵ See Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, forthcoming 1996), Chapter 7.

post-Cold War Russia and post-Cold War China have, actually or potentially, such claims. There is strong, vocal sentiment in the Russian political class in favor of reconstituting the Soviet Union; but the people and the leaders of almost all of the former Soviet republics that are now independent countries would regard forcible attempts to do this as acts of aggression.

The government of China is committed to the proposition that the island of Taiwan should be governed from Beijing, a view it underscored in March, 1996, with menacing military exercises conducted by the Chinese military in the Taiwan Strait. The government and people of Taiwan, while not unanimously opposed in principle to "reunification" with the mainland, certainly do not wish to be reunified with a Communist-ruled country, something they would fight to resist.

The United States, with its array of diplomatic instruments including nuclear weapons, is relevant to potential conflicts involving Russia and China for several reasons. First, should either of the two pursue its irredentist claims by force, the consequences would be adverse for American interests. War between Russia and Ukraine, or between China and Taiwan, would probably be violent, bloody, and dangerous. While those most directly threatened would be their immediate neighbors, the United States has an interest in both regions and is the only country with the military power to intervene in such conflicts and to provide reassurance and even formal security guarantees to the countries to which Russia or China would suddenly appear far more threatening.

Moreover, the United States has obligations to Ukraine and Taiwan themselves. The Taiwan Relations Act, while lacking the force of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Japanese-American Security Treaty, does firmly commit the United States to an active interest in Taiwan's fate. Similarly, as part of the tripartite accord among the United States, Russia and Ukraine to remove Ukraine's nuclear weapons to Russia, Washington offered a security guarantee to Kiev. As in the case of Taiwan, it does not have the binding character of the commitments to Western Europe and Japan. It was a restatement of the guarantee all non-nuclear weapon states receive in return for signing the Nonproliferation Treaty. Still, it establishes a connection, no matter how loose and ill-defined.

The tripartite accord is part of a more specific, although tacit, obligation the United States has undertaken. Nuclear weapons would be useful to Taiwan and Ukraine for defending their independence against their large, nuclear-armed neighbors. Both have forsworn their own nuclear arsenals, in conformity with the wishes of the United States. A tacit bargain can be construed from this, and perhaps has been construed by the governments of Taiwan and Ukraine: renunciation of a national nuclear arsenal in exchange for American assistance in addressing the problem to which nuclear weapons might well be an effective response.

Yet Taiwan's and Ukraine's geopolitical circumstances do not repeat those of the Cold War, when classical deterrence was the favored, appropriate, successful American policy toward menacing countries. The United States has no formal treaty with either. Ukraine is not a member of NATO; Taiwan is not even recognized as an independent country.⁶

Nor does the chief threat to the independence of either necessarily come from the kind of direct military assault that the United States was prepared to repel in the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s and

⁶ A comparison between the two yields an irony. Taiwan has been effectively independent of the mainland for far more of its modern history than Ukraine has been independent of Russia. Yet Ukrainian independence is firmly established in international law, whereas Taiwan's is not.

in the middle of Europe throughout the Cold War. It is unlikely that China or Russia is militarily capable at present of conquering Taiwan or Ukraine even in the absence of American intervention. However, a potentially more effective strategy is available to both, to which American military power is not directly relevant. Russia could deny Ukraine energy, of which it is the main supplier. Moscow could also try to incite the large ethnic Russian minority in Ukraine against the government in Kiev. For its part, China could impose a *de facto* blockade on Taiwan with military exercises of the kind it conducted in March, 1996, which would be aimed at closing the island's ports to non-military shipping.

There are other reasons that the resumption of Cold War deterrence toward Russia and China is not necessarily practical. Hopeful as well as dangerous political currents are in circulation in both countries. Neither is now ruled by an orthodox Communist regime. Both are increasingly free, increasingly engaged with the outside world, and therefore increasingly open to political arguments against using force against their neighbors. This creates a danger in the post-Cold War era, which did not exist during the Cold War, the danger that a policy of classical deterrence will backfire. It is possible that, rather than deterring Russia and China, a policy of explicit military guarantees to Taiwan and Ukraine would provoke them, fueling the fires of nationalism and irredentism and stifling political trends toward economic interdependence and political engagement that can form the basis for peaceful relations between China and Taiwan and between Russia and Ukraine.

Nor, even if the American government were to decide to treat Taiwan and Ukraine in the 1990s the way it treated Taiwan and Berlin in the mid-1950s, could it rely on Cold War levels of support for classical deterrence from other countries and from the American public. Then, international Communism was believed to be embarked on a crusade without geographic limits to promote its ideology and Soviet power. For this reason, defending remote places of no intrinsic importance such as Korea and Vietnam was seen as a way of defending places of greater importance closer to home, indeed of defending home itself. The Chinese threat to Taiwan in the 1950s was seen as part of a Chinese campaign to dominate Asia; it would not be seen that way now. The Russian threat to Ukraine would not be interpreted, as was the Soviet threat to West Berlin, as part of a threat to the West itself.

The potential irredentist claims of Russia and China and the prospect that these two huge countries will use force in pursuit of them cannot be matters of indifference to the United States. Should either country try, there would be damage to American interests whether or not either succeeded. The United States thus has a strong interest in their not trying. Persuading them not to try is a policy of deterrence.

So deterrence continues to be relevant, and thus the military forces at the disposal of the American government, including nuclear weapons, are relevant as well. But the deterrence that is appropriate is not the classical deterrence of the Cold War. It is a policy of deterrence that is tacit, not explicit, one that involves conveying to the governments in Beijing and Moscow the understanding that the United States takes a set of issues seriously, that a particular course would provoke a reaction and lead to adverse consequences. But post-Cold War deterrence also involves not spelling this out with the rhetoric, the treaties, and the military deployments and strategies of

the Cold War era, in order not to subvert the two additional barriers to conflict besides American military power: diplomatic persuasion and internal change in the two countries.

In the best case, this form of deterrence will work as well as the classical deterrence of the Cold War did. The Russian and Chinese governments will be dissuaded from military adventures, buying time for domestic political trends within each country that can dissolve the political goals on behalf of which force would be used.

There is, however, a worst case, the failure of tacit deterrence, for which there are Cold War precedents. In Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990 aggression occurred in the absence of a clear American commitment to prevent it, a commitment that was not politically possible to give in advance of the North Korean attack on the South in June, 1950, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. The United States felt obliged in each case to wage a major war to reverse the aggression. Reversing a Russian absorption of Ukraine or a Chinese annexation of Taiwan—or, what is more likely, an active, expensive, perhaps controversial and probably dangerous policy of containing a Russia or a China that has abruptly come to seem far more dangerous—is not a happy prospect.

III

While American protection for Ukraine and Taiwan in exchange for their forgoing nuclear weapons is, at best, implicit, such a bargain was explicit with Germany and Japan during the Cold War. Indeed, the attention the American government lavished on reinforcing the credibility of “extended deterrence”—that is the protection of countries on the other side of the Atlantic, with all the risks involved by convincing Moscow that the United States was “coupled” to Western Europe—can be seen as a substitute for, and thus a way of avoiding, the German acquisition of nuclear weapons. While the commitment to defend Germany with American nuclear weapons might be subject to doubt, the commitment to do so with German nuclear arms would not be. Americans and Germans believed, however, that it was important that the German Federal Republic not have nuclear weapons of its own, for that would have been regarded as a provocation by the Soviet Union, which deployed a large army on German territory.

With the end of the Cold War, the need for either German or Japanese nuclear weapons, but also anxieties that the prospect that they would get them generates, are in decline. Yet neither is entirely extinct. To be sure, neither country wants nuclear weapons. Both much prefer to retain the status of non-nuclear weapon state if at all possible. Indeed, in no other country is the public allergy to such arms as strong as it is in Germany and Japan. This is the legacy of their experiences in World War II—Germany as an aggressor, Japan as the victim of history’s only two nuclear attacks on cities.

Yet for all their aversion to them, either or both countries might feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons if they found themselves without the nuclear protection of the United States. In such circumstances they would be at a disadvantage in dealing with their large, nuclear-armed neighbors, Russia and China. For purely defensive reasons they could come to regard the possession of their own nuclear weapons to be necessary for their safety.

A nuclear-armed Germany or Japan would not threaten the United States. Nuclear weapons would not make either country undemocratic at home or belligerent abroad. The United States tolerated, even assisted, the nuclear weapons programs of other friendly countries—Israel and France. Still, preventing Germany and Japan from joining the “club” of nuclear weapon states is an important objective for the United States (and for Germany and Japan as well) for two reasons.

The first is the shadow of the past, although it is by now a distant past, that still hangs over the two countries. In the 1930s and 1940s Germany and Japan practiced a particularly brutal form of imperialism in Eastern Europe and East and Southeast Asia. Memories of these rampages make other countries of these regions sensitive to the possibility of the resumption by either country of an entirely independent foreign policy, a possibility that their alliances with, and the nuclear protection of, the United States had precluded during the Cold War.

The other reason has to do not with history or the present politics of either country but rather with numbers. A nuclear-armed Germany or Japan would complicate international politics in a potentially destabilizing way. Either or both could become major nuclear powers as Britain, France, and China have not, especially because they would no longer be closely allied, as Britain and France were during the Cold War, with the United States.

The world would move from nuclear bipolarity to multipolarity. This is undesirable. Two is a more stable number than three or four. With the lower number, there is less chance for misunderstanding and surprise. With two powers, no one is in any doubt about who is on which side. The emergence of a third creates the possibility of a sudden shift in the international alignment, a reversal of alliances that has occurred from time to time in European history, a possibility that in turn lends an air of uncertainty and anxiety to relations among the major powers.⁷ The United States therefore has an interest, in the post-Cold War era as during the Cold War, in relieving Germany and Japan of any incentives to equip themselves with nuclear arms.

But the measures necessary to suppress these incentives, above all the perpetuation, in some form, of the American nuclear guarantee, cannot properly be called deterrence. A better term is “reassurance,” which the British historian and strategist Michael Howard defines as the task of instilling confidence in allies so that they can go about their business without feeling threatened or intimidated.⁸ The American commitment reassures Germany and Japan that neither will find itself at an acute disadvantage in dealing with Russia and China, and thereby also reassures the neighbors of each that Germany and Japan will not become nuclear weapon states.

The policy of reassurance brings with it three problems. The first is the problem of force sizing and composition. Unlike deterrence, reassurance supplies no guidelines for military planning, no basis for answering the question which nuclear weapons are necessary to carry it out. There is no

⁷ See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Relations* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chapter 7.

⁸ Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s,” *Foreign Affairs*, 61:2 (Winter 1983). See also Michael Mandelbaum, “The United States and the Strategic Quadrangle,” in Mandelbaum, ed., *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia* (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), p. 161.

opposing force against which to measure the adequacy of the American arsenal; reassurance is a method of building confidence, not a way of preparing to fight a war.

Still, this problem is not a pressing one. If the task of reassurance requires no particular complement of nuclear weapons, this means that some nuclear weapons, indeed an arsenal of almost any shape and size, may well suffice to carry it out. Moreover, there are standards that the American nuclear force has to meet, which are set by the series of arms limitation treaties negotiated between 1987 and 1993: the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) accord and START I and II. It is these accords that now provide the answer, for American nuclear weapons, to the inescapable question "how much is enough?"

✓ The second problem reassurance raises is that of public support within the United States. The mission is an unfamiliar, indeed a counterintuitive one. It involves protecting countries that are not visibly threatened and in any event are wealthy enough to defend themselves. The American public paid, over four decades, to support the clear and urgent military task of deterrence. Whether it will be willing to pay for reassurance is not certain. But public skepticism, like the lack of clear force sizing criteria, does not necessarily pose an insuperable obstacle to a successful policy of reassurance. Reassurance is bound to get less support than deterrence, but it requires less support because it requires a smaller and less expensive arsenal than that of the Cold War.

Reassurance requires some nuclear weapons, but the United States will certainly continue to have some. It will not choose to have none. Because the United States already has a great many, the maintenance and gradual modernization of which will consume only a minor proportion of the defense budget, it should not be impossible to muster political support for nuclear forces adequate to the new task.

Political pressure to have no nuclear weapons at all is likely to come not from within but from outside the borders of the United States. Members of the international community are committed to the proposition, enshrined in Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty (to which the United States is, of course, a signatory), that ultimately nuclear weapons should be abolished entirely. The world would not be a safer place in that case. The knowledge of how to make the weapons, not to mention the knowledge that they can be made, would remain. In a world in which the official, authorized total of nuclear weapons was zero, the possession of a few bombs, even one, could give the possessor enormous political power. The incentive to get one secretly would thus be huge, as would the anxiety that some country or countries were trying to do so. Some American nuclear weapons are therefore necessary for international stability, not only for the purpose of reassurance but to address a third post-Cold War issue.

IV

The third new issue to which American nuclear weapons are relevant also involves preventing the spread of nuclear arms, but to a different category of countries than America's Cold War allies. Germany and Japan prefer not to have nuclear weapons; the countries in this other category actively seek them. Where this second group is concerned, nonproliferation requires not satisfying but rather thwarting their wishes. Thus, while the goal of American policy toward Russia and China is deterrence of a non-classical kind, and toward Germany and Japan is reassurance, toward this group of "rogue" countries the goal is the denial of nuclear weapons.

Rogues are countries that seek nuclear arms for political purposes that run counter to American interests. The list includes Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and also perhaps Libya, Syria, and Cuba.⁹ As with deterrence and reassurance, the post-Cold War period has made the problem of "rogue" proliferation more acute. During the Cold War the Soviet Union could restrain their nuclear aspirations. The leverage it could then use is gone with the Soviet Union itself.

At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union has lifted the tight controls on the far-flung Soviet nuclear complex, making scientific and technical skills, fissionable material, and perhaps even explosives themselves available in a way that was inconceivable during the Soviet period.

Here, as with Russia and China, the American nuclear arsenal provides a modicum of deterrence by its very existence. But the fact of American nuclear weapons is not in and of itself sufficient to dissuade rogues from pursuing their nuclear ambitions.

For this third problem the United States has adopted more active policies, which do not, however, involve the use of nuclear weapons.

A set of treaties, rules, procedures and institutions has been created to deny to rogue countries the means to get nuclear weapons: the Nonproliferation Treaty, which also established the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor peaceful nuclear facilities for any illegal diversion of material to military purposes; the London Suppliers Group, which tries to control the distribution of the technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that could be put to bomb-making purposes; and the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is concerned with restricting the spread of the most advanced type of delivery system.

The United States plays a major role in all three. It is, with the Soviet Union, one of the two principal architects of the Nonproliferation Treaty and a prime mover in organizing the NSG and the MTCR. With its vast intelligence infrastructure, the United States takes the lead in monitoring compliance. And what sanctions there are for violating the various rules and norms are enforced by the United States, which, for example, denied Pakistan economic assistance on the grounds that it was actually seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and confronted North Korea over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program.

⁹ See Michael Mandelbaum, "Lessons of the Next Nuclear War," *Foreign Affairs*, 74:2 (March/April 1995), pp. 33-36.

Because denial is not guaranteed to be always and everywhere successful, a second approach to the rogues is likely to gain in prominence in the future: defense. In 1983 President Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative, the purpose of which was to give the United States the capacity to protect itself against a Soviet nuclear attack. It is a formidable challenge, one that has thus far proven impossible to meet. But defending North America against one or two missiles from a rogue state, or defending the rogue's neighbors against such a threat, is a more modest and thus a technically less daunting task.

The third, most direct, and potentially most effective way to deal with a rogue nuclear weapons program is also the riskiest and costliest: destroying it in a military operation. For this there are recent precedents. Twice Iraq's nuclear program was set back by the use of force, once by an Israeli raid on the Osiraq reactor in 1981 and again a decade later in Operation Desert Storm.

But there is no established international convention for preemption of this kind. Moreover, preemption involves a tradeoff between technical feasibility and political plausibility. The smaller and less advanced the nuclear weapons program, the easier it will be to destroy; but the harder it will be to persuade the world that it poses a threat. The larger and more fully developed it is, the easier will be the task of persuasion but the harder that of destruction.

If preemption were an established international practice, the prospect of preemptive attack might deter rogues from acquiring nuclear weapons; but even in that case, the American nuclear arsenal would probably not be directly relevant. Preemption would likely be undertaken by non-nuclear forces.

V

The three issues discussed above—potential irredentist policies by Russia and China, the need for ongoing nuclear protection for Germany and Japan, and the nuclear aspirations of anti-American rogue states—have several features in common.

Each originated in the Cold War period but each was made more acute by the conditions of the post-Cold War era. Ukraine became independent only with the end of the Cold War—and of the Soviet Union. Taiwan was emboldened to seek greater external recognition and internal democracy by the great events of 1989 and 1991. As for Germany and Japan, the end of the Cold War actually decreased their need for nuclear protection, but it also called into question the political basis in the United States for continuing to provide it. Rogue states grew more interested in nuclear weapons with the loss of their Soviet patron, which had, during the Cold War, been able to exercise a restraining influence on them.

Moreover, the United States has an interest in each issue. In each case, the United States favors the *status quo*. It is change that threatens American interests. In each case the American policy is broadly one of deterrence, its goal to prevent the unwanted changes from taking place. But in no case is American policy the classical deterrence of the Cold War. In each it lacks one of classical deterrence's defining characteristics: none involves strategic interaction.

During the Cold War, the nuclear weapons that the United States had, and what it said about them and did with them, were all decided for the purpose of dissuading the Soviet Union from committing aggression. In the post-Cold War era, the fact of American nuclear weapons surely goes some way toward discouraging the changes in the international *status quo* that the United States opposes. But the details of the deployments and the doctrines are not, and cannot easily be, tailored to those purposes. Having some nuclear weapons, perhaps having a great many, serves American interests; but the pursuit of those interests does not give detailed guidance for the design and deployment of the nuclear forces of the United States. Post-Cold War American foreign policy provides answers, for nuclear weapons, to the questions what and where, but not which.

This is so because the problems to which these arms are relevant are not problems of wartime, when military methods come to the fore. Now political, or at least non-military, methods are available, and plausible, for preventing Russian and Chinese revisionism, for providing reassurance to Germany and Japan, and for blocking rogue nuclearization.

In the first case, the evolution of internal politics, institutions, and attitudes may weaken irredentist impulses. In the second, American deployments are crucial. In the third, the web of controls created to restrict access to bomb-relevant material, while not leak-proof, does serve as a check on the nuclear ambitions of the rogues.

In each case the American nuclear arsenal hovers in the background. Russia and China understand, it is to be hoped, that measures the United States opposes would bring that arsenal more directly to bear on their policies. It thus serves as a backstop to the diplomacy surrounding these issues. It is analogous in this way to reserves that back up national currencies. Individuals and firms will accept pieces of paper as payment for real goods and services because the paper can be exchanged for gold or dollars. Because all know this, no one seeks to make this exchange.

What would change the post-Cold War role of American nuclear weapons? At least three developments could alter their "reserve" role.

One of them could bring back the classical deterrence of the Cold War. If China did attack Taiwan, or Russia did attempt to reincorporate what was once the western part of the Soviet Union, pressure would mount for the United States to draw an explicit line against further aggression and back it up with specific military threats, including, at least implicitly, nuclear weapons. In that case the American commitment to Germany and Japan would become more important. For these two former great powers would regard their neighborhoods as suddenly more dangerous, because their large, nuclear-armed neighbors had abruptly come to seem more threatening. The need for nuclear protection would consequently seem more pressing, and if American protection was not seen as reliable, the two would be more likely to seek the means to protect themselves.

Yet even in this case, post-Cold War deterrence would not correspond precisely to the deterrence of the Cold War. Several conditions would be different. First, the United States would remain constrained by the negotiated limits on its nuclear arsenal. Unless Washington or Moscow chose to violate them, or the United States decided that the restraints to which it had agreed first

with the Soviet Union and then with Russia were not compatible with the task of deterring China, there would be no Cold War-style arms race.

Second, neither a China in armed conflict with Taiwan nor a Russia seeking to annex Ukraine or the Baltic states would necessarily seem to pose the kind of world-wide threat that Stalin, and then Mao, embodied for the West in the early years of the Cold War. Local aggression might not be taken as the harbinger of a global threat. In that case, it would be more difficult for the American government to maintain support, both at home and abroad, for the policy of containment of which classical deterrence was, during the Cold War, the military component.

Similarly, the acquisition of an actual nuclear arsenal by one of the rogues might well trigger a policy of explicit American deterrence. Had the United States chosen in 1990 and 1991 simply to defend Saudi Arabia rather than oust Iraq from Kuwait, it would in 1996 be pursuing such a policy vis-à-vis Baghdad. But this would not be the deterrence of the Cold War because the symmetry of the Soviet-American competition would be missing. None of the rogues could match the American nuclear arsenal, nor is it likely that any could mount a credible threat to the continental United States. The Cold War problem of the credibility of deterrence and the need to demonstrate that the protector and the protected were tightly "coupled" would thus not arise.

There are two other potential sources of change in the post-Cold War role of American nuclear weapons: one is an ongoing trend, the other a discrete, dramatic event. The trend is the ongoing changes in the methods available for conducting warfare brought about by the new technologies of information-gathering and processing. So dramatic are the results that this is sometimes called a military "revolution." Lasers, satellites, and data-processing have led to remarkable advances in detection and accuracy. The American military can spot, and therefore hit, and therefore destroy, a much wider array of targets, over a much greater part of the planet, with far greater confidence, than ever before.¹⁰ The phrase "like shooting fish in a barrel" is relevant to a far wider range of American military operations than was previously imagined, let alone possible.

The consequences of these changes are not fully apparent, and will not be apparent unless and until the new technologies are used in an actual war. They may prove to be helpful in dealing with all three post-Cold War issues to which nuclear weapons are relevant. They may, for example, make it easier to thwart Beijing's designs on Taiwan and Russia's on its western neighbors without resort to nuclear arms. To the extent that this is so and the United States retains a decisive advantage over China and Russia in the new military technologies, this will be a source of confidence for Germany and Japan, an extra layer of protection against their large, nuclear-armed, potentially revisionist neighbors.

Finally, the information revolution in warfare may make it more feasible to pursue the severest strategy of denial against the rogues: military attacks on their nuclear weapons facilities. The changes under way make it possible to target such facilities ever more accurately, to strike them from longer range and with more devastating effects. The new technologies of warfare may thus give the United States another set of tools for achieving the goals for which nuclear weapons are

¹⁰ See Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, 75:2 (March/April 1996), pp. ##.

relevant in the post-Cold War era, tools more useful than nuclear weapons themselves, which remain blunt instruments. This, however, is not certain.

What is certain is that the next nuclear war, which would be the second in all of history, the next nuclear shot fired in anger, will have wide repercussions. While it may not, in Fred Iklé's words, "unleash forces that would transform the international system far more profoundly than did the collapse of the Soviet empire,"¹¹ it will surely have profound psychological and political effects. Those effects, like the consequences of the ongoing revolution in military technology, are unpredictable. The lessons the United States draws from this development will depend heavily on where the attack takes place, who launches it, and under what circumstances. Indeed, it is plausible to envision two opposed American responses.

It could propel the United States into deeper international engagement. It could make axiomatic military action against rogue states that seek nuclear weapons. It could legitimate preemption, which will be seen in retrospect as something that could, if undertaken, have averted the nuclear disaster that has occurred. The crippling of Iraq's nuclear weapons program in 1991 was the byproduct of a war conducted to reverse international aggression—the occupation of the internationally recognized sovereign state of Kuwait. After the next nuclear war the world might consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons as clearly an act of aggression as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. This event might also produce more extensive international cooperation to stifle the spread of nuclear weapons, perhaps even the kind of international organization for effective international control that was proposed at the outset of the nuclear age but never created.

Alternatively, the shock of a nuclear explosion might propel the United States toward radical disengagement from international affairs. The next nuclear war might create a climate of opinion in the United States strongly opposed to policies that could draw the United States into conflicts in which nuclear weapons figured. It could be a spur to the kind of American isolationism not seen since before World War II, perhaps before the twentieth century. Whatever the impact, it is bound to affect the policies governing American nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era, well into the next century.

¹¹ Iklé, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

Where Have All the Heroes Gone?

'Buyer's remorse' is the quadrennial regret that no Washington or Lincoln is available to serve in the White House.

THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL election has reached the stage known as "buyer's remorse." Many voters seem to be concluding that President Bill Clinton and Bob Dole do not measure up to what Americans are entitled to expect in a chief executive. Polls show that nearly half the electorate would like another candidate to enter the race. Before declaring himself to be that candidate, Ross Perot had expressed the public mood, announcing that his new Reform Party would seek as its nominee "George Washington the Second."

Perot might have added, "or Abraham Lincoln the Second." For it is the first and the 16th presidents who define presidential greatness. Their presidencies, or rather the nation's memory of their presidencies, have established the standard against which all subsequent contenders for the office are measured. Buyer's remorse is the quadrennial regret that no Washington or Lincoln is available to serve in the White House.

Obvious differences aside, the real Washington and the real Lincoln actually had a good deal in common with current politicians. A closer look at how the historical Washington and Lincoln match up to our national memory of them offers some useful reminders of what we can expect from a president and what is and is not at stake in the presidential election of 1996.

Washington and Lincoln were both well endowed with a quality that the American public today finds increasingly unattractive: ambition. In keeping with the political etiquette of his day, neither man put himself forward or actively campaigned for the presidency. But each worked hard to be in a position to be summoned by others. Each yearned, throughout his life, for public distinction. Lincoln's law partner William H. Herndon famously remarked of the future president that "his ambition was a little engine, never at rest."

Moreover, each was acutely conscious of his public reputation and his public image. Both were enthusiastic patrons of the theater and used what they learned from the stage in their political careers. Neither, it may be speculated, would have been altogether surprised that one of their successors, Ronald Reagan, spent much of his adult life as a professional actor.

Furthermore, both Washington and Lincoln were what the public increasingly distrusts: professional politicians. Before leading the victorious Colonial Army, Washington served for 15 years in colonial Virginia's House of Burgesses, the rough equivalent of a modern state legislature. Lincoln served four two-year terms in the Illinois state legislature, one term in the House of Representatives in Washington, and twice ran unsuccessfully for the Senate.

Neither spent uninterrupted decades in public office. But neither man's career in the private sector would commend him to the modern electorate. Washington engaged in what today would be called land speculation and development. He lobbied for public funding for a canal that would enhance the value of property that he owned in Pennsylvania by connecting it to Virginia. Lincoln was by profession a lawyer



Michael Mandelbaum, a professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, directs the East-West Project of the Council on Foreign Relations.

who counted among his clients the most powerful of all 19th-Century "special interests" — the railroads.

While the two were spared the contemporary media's microscopic inspection of personal foibles — Washington's fierce temper, Lincoln's bouts of depression — both came in for severe criticism, and neither enjoyed the experience. An early draft of Washington's Farewell Address included a complaint about what was said about him in print. Two historians of the period note that this was tantamount to saying the press "would not have George Washington to kick around anymore."

Washington and Lincoln also drew another criticism frequently leveled at the 1996 candidates — the charge of waffling. Washington was caught between two factions, both represented in his own cabinet. The Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, sought to build a bustling commercial country and favored proper relations with Britain. The opponents of Hamilton and the Federalists were led by Thomas Jefferson and known as the Democratic-Republicans. They were advocates of a decentralized agrarian republic, passionate supporters of the French Revolution and critics of the Revolution's chief adversary, Britain. The first president tried to avoid choosing between the two factions, but his efforts to reconcile them failed.

Similarly, Lincoln also presided over a fractious coalition throughout his term of office, which coincided with the Civil War. He tacked back and forth between Congress' radical Republicans for whom the conflict was a war to eradicate the curse of slavery, and moderates, for whom it was strictly a war to restore the union. Each side regarded Lincoln as dangerously sympathetic to the other.

China's Mostly Getting Better

— Continued from Page A49

visible. They are captured in pictures. Trends, by contrast, are continuing, mundane and largely invisible. They are expressed in statistics. What is distinctive about China is that, as with the differences between generations and between politics and economics, events and trends tell contrasting stories about the country.

While in the 1970s the most dramatic events — President Richard Nixon sitting with Mao Zedong in the Chinese leader's study in Beijing in 1972, Deng Xiaoping trying on a cowboy hat in Texas during his 1979 American visit — conveyed the image of Sino-American friendship, the pictures of more recent events — students demonstrating for democracy, a solitary Chinese figure stopping a column of tanks in China's capital, both in Beijing in the spring of 1989 — portray a harsh, brutal, totalitarian country.

The trends tell a different story: double-digit annual economic growth for a decade; the private sector producing 70 percent of China's output; a floating population, moving from place to place, of 40 million to 80 million. These statistics depict a freer, more dynamic and far less tightly controlled country.

Indeed, in each of these three pairs of contrasts, the second — the attitudes of the young, the state of the economy, the most important trends — is better, from the American point of view, than the first. But the first has, in each case, made a stronger impression on Americans. Because senior officials are more prominent than their younger counterparts, because political matters tend to be higher on the Sino-American agenda than economic issues and because events are spread around the world on television while trends are familiar mainly to specialists on China, the American picture of China is, on the whole, a negative one.

That picture is not wholly incorrect, but is too negative. The young will have more future influence than the old. Freer economics means freer politics. And trends have greater impact than events.

China is not a democracy, and is all too prone to disturbing events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. The next such event may come a year from now when Hong Kong passes from British to Chinese control. But China is changing rapidly, and on the whole for the better. While opposing the objectionable features of Chinese political life, American policy ought also to recognize those changes and do whatever is possible to support and encourage them.

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Michael Mandelbaum, a professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, directs the East-West Project of the Council on Foreign Relations.

These similarities between past and present suggest two lessons for the current campaign. One is that public life attracts a particular kind of person, one who enjoys being in the public eye. Those who gain the office will be skilled in ingratiating themselves with the public.

The examples of Washington and Lincoln also teach us that compromising, temporizing and balancing come with the office. The president leads the national government of a country much larger and more diverse than the one over which Washington and Lincoln presided. He or she is thus inevitably subject to competing claims and pressures. The job will always involve navigating among these contending forces. Anyone who lacks the inclination or the talent for this undertaking is unlikely either to seek or win the office and probably should not hold it.

None of this is to say that either Washington or Lincoln was a run-of-the-mill political figure with a vastly inflated posthumous reputation. To the contrary: For one thing, each was, by all accounts, a person of unusual personal integrity. Moreover, the personal character of each man gave rise to a policy that had a profound impact on the subsequent course of American history.

A man of principled self-restraint, Washington voluntarily gave up supreme power twice, first when he resigned his commission after leading the colonial army to victory over the British in 1783, and again at the end of his second presidential term, in 1796. He thus ensured that there would be no American dictator. As for Lincoln, at the end of the Civil War he was magnanimous toward the defeated South, promising a peace "with malice toward none." He did not live to preside over Reconstruction, but his spirit of conciliation has marked American dealings

with defeated adversaries in the 20th Century, contributing to the creation of peaceful, prosperous democracies in Germany and Japan after World War II.

Each man's greatest achievement was to shepherd the country through the crucible of war. In battle, the two pursued opposite strategies: Washington spent most of the American War of Independence avoiding a decisive battle; Lincoln spent most of the Civil War searching for a Union general who would fight one. In each war, the existence of the United States of America, in the form in which it exists today, was at stake. Washington was determined to secure American independence from Great Britain; Lincoln was determined to keep the union together. Both succeeded, and each was indispensable to the victory. The two men are elevated above all other presidents in the nation's collective memory because they are symbols of the country itself. Without them, it would not exist.

The stature of Washington and Lincoln thus issues as much from the historical predicaments they faced as from their individual talents. Whoever is elected president in November will almost certainly not face crises remotely comparable to those through which Washington and Lincoln led the country. Thus the next president will not have the opportunity for posthumous renown that history thrust upon them. That is the most important reason that Clinton and Dole do not and cannot measure up to Washington and Lincoln.

To be sure, there are significant tasks on the national agenda, mainly the task of deciding the scope, the functions and the cost of the federal government, which has expanded far beyond what Washington or Lincoln could have imagined.

Yet no matter how Clinton or Dole addresses this task, it will not give either man the opportunity to achieve the stature that Washington and Lincoln enjoy. This may be unhappy news for the candidates — all that effort for only a modest place in history! — but it is cause for celebration for the rest of us. For the circumstances that elevated Washington and Lincoln — and their greatest 20th-Century successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt — to the pantheon of the American presidency brought danger and suffering to the American people.

The last presidency of the 20th Century will not be a heroic one — a fact for which Americans should be grateful. "Unhappy the land that has no heroes," remarks one of the characters in Bertolt Brecht's "Mother Courage." To which another replies: "Unhappy the land that needs them."



Bob Nash

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11-12-96

on your young
supporter - founder
of the contest
he —

Bob

MR. President

11-12-96

Dear Mr. President,

I am planning to
move to Washington DC
in January.

Enclosed is my resume,
please consider me for a
job.

Thank you,

Suai Thomas

SUNILA J. THOMAS

83 Rockrimmon Road
Belchertown, MA 01007
(413) 323-4789

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11.12.96

BAR ADMISSION

Member of the Massachusetts Bar.

EDUCATION

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND COLLEGE SCHOOL OF LAW, Springfield, MA

Juris Doctor, May 1995

Honors: Distinction in Oral Advocacy, Lawyering Process - 1st year Moot Court

Activities: 1993 Phillip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Intramural
Competition: Vice-President, Multi-Cultural Law Student Association;
BAR/BRI Bar Review Head Representative; Indian Bar Association.

WHEATON COLLEGE, Norton, MA

Bachelor of Arts, May 1991

Activities: Student Body Association; Asian Students Association: Intramural Softball

LEGAL EXPERIENCE

5/96-10/96 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LEGAL DIVISION, Springfield, MA

Attorney:

Draft and argue motions, findings and stipulations in Probate and District Courts.
Represent the Department in status conferences, pre-trial conferences, and temporary
custody hearings. Litigation involving custody, guardianships and parental rights.

1/96-5/96 HARRIS, ELLIOTT & RIVERA -SCOZZAFAVA, P.C., Worcester, MA

Associate Attorney:

Researched and wrote on motions and memorandum of law on criminal defense issues.
Interviewed clients, negotiated pleas, investigated cases and argued motions.

1/95-5/95 MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, Springfield, MA

Legal Advocate:

Interviewed and represented clients in discrimination cases. Investigated claims, drafted
motions and prepared and answered interrogatories. Also, obtained discovery, deposed
witnesses, conferenced cases, negotiated settlements and researched legal issues.

5/94-12/94 HAMPDEN COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Springfield, MA

Student Prosecutor:

Argued bench trials and arraignment hearings under Massachusetts Rule 3.03(a) and
conferenced cases. Made factual submissions to the Court, prepared witnesses for trial,
wrote briefs and memoranda of law and argued motions.

COMPUTER SKILLS

Proficient with Wordperfect 6.0, Microsoft Word; Lexis/Nexis, and Westlaw.

References and writing samples available upon request.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1996

Mr. John M. Doe
Title
Organization
Business Adr1
Business Adr2
Business City, BState BZip-BZip9

Dear John:

Thank you for sharing your views regarding the establishment of a nuclear waste dump at Ward Valley.

Thus far, the state of California has been unwilling to make a binding commitment to follow through on the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences that there be additional testing and monitoring, instead pursuing a legislative override of existing environmental and land management laws in order to force an unconditional transfer. As you may know, the Department of the Interior has asked for a supplemental analysis of new environmental issues that have been raised.

Congressional shortcuts on a matter of this importance are wrong. If the Ward Valley site is transferred and used to store low-level radioactive waste, all Californians must be assured that the site will be safe and that their interests -- and the interests of their children and grandchildren -- will be protected.

I appreciate your interest in this important issue.

Sincerely,

(10/31/96)


1-17-96


J. S. Kird

11-12-96

OK/press

'Babies having babies' trend on decline

By Cheryl Wetzstein
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The teen birthrate has dropped for most of the country for the fourth year in a row, signaling a societal trend, a Washington research group says in a report released today.

Recent state-by-state data "strongly suggest that the changes that are contributing to the decline in teen birthrates are happening on a broad societal level," said Kristin A. Moore, executive director of Child Trends Inc., a nonprofit group that tracks data on children and families.

"Between 1986 and 1991, the teen birthrate increased in every state; since then, it has decreased in almost every state," she said.

Of the 46 states that saw their birthrates decline since 1991, 12 states saw drops of about 10 percent or more, Child Trends said in its new Facts at a Glance report, which uses data from the federal National Center for Health Statistics, states and major cities.

The District, which has had the nation's highest teen birthrate for years and in 1993 had an unprecedented rate of 129 births per 1,000 teens, saw a drop to 115 births per 1,000 teens in 1994, the organization said.

New York and Connecticut saw no change in their teen birthrates, and Nebraska and Rhode Island saw their birthrates increase.

Births to teen mothers reached a historical peak in 1957, with 96.3 births per 1,000 girls aged 15 to 19.

The rate fell to a low point in 1986, with 50.2 births per 1,000 teens, but then climbed to its most recent peak of 62.1 births per 1,000 teens in 1991.

Since 1991, the birthrate has dipped each year, and preliminary data for 1995 show that the downward trend for teen births is continuing — the 1995 rate is 56.9 per 1,000 teens.

Researchers have not determined why the birthrates are dropping. Activists, however, are eager to point to many causes: Some say teens use contraceptives more regularly and effectively; others say teens are responding to the myriad school- and church-related abstinence programs.

Child Trends said forthcoming data on teen sexual activity will likely help answer questions about why teen birthrates are declining.

Child Trends cautioned that though overall teen birthrates are dropping, the percent of births oc-

TEEN BIRTHRATES FALL AGAIN

Teen birthrates were lower in 1994 than they were in 1991 in 46 states and the District of Columbia, according to the nonprofit research group Child Trends.

Births per 1,000 teen mothers, ages 15-19 in:

State	1991	1994	% change
Alabama	74	72	- 2.7
Alaska	65	55	-15.3
Arizona	80	79	- 1.2
Arkansas	80	76	- 5.0
California	74	71	- 4.0
Colorado	58	54	- 6.8
Connecticut	40	40	0
Delaware	61	60	- 1.6
District of Columbia	116	115	- 0.8
Florida	68	64	- 5.8
Georgia	78	72	- 7.7
Hawaii	59	54	- 8.5
Idaho	54	47	-12.9
Illinois	65	63	- 3.0
Indiana	61	58	- 4.9
Iowa	43	40	- 6.9
Kansas	55	54	- 1.8
Kentucky	69	65	- 5.7
Louisiana	76	75	- 1.3
Maine	44	36	-18.1
Maryland	54	50	- 7.4
Massachusetts	38	37	- 2.6
Michigan	59	52	-11.8
Minnesota	37	34	- 8.1
Mississippi	86	83	- 3.4
Missouri	65	59	- 9.2
Montana	47	41	-12.7
Nebraska	42	43	+ 2.3
Nevada	75	74	- 1.3
New Hampshire	33	30	- 9.0
New Jersey	41	39	- 4.8
New Mexico	80	77	- 3.7
New York	46	46	0
North Carolina	70	66	- 5.7
North Dakota	36	35	- 2.7
Ohio	61	55	- 9.8
Oklahoma	72	66	- 8.3
Oregon	55	51	- 7.2
Pennsylvania	47	44	- 6.3
Rhode Island	45	48	+ 6.6
South Carolina	73	67	- 8.2
South Dakota	48	43	-10.4
Tennessee	75	71	- 5.3
Texas	79	76	- 3.8
Utah	48	43	-10.4
Vermont	39	33	-15.3
Virginia	53	51	- 3.7
Washington	54	48	-11.1
West Virginia	58	54	- 6.8
Wisconsin	44	39	-11.3
Wyoming	54	48	-11.1
National average	62.1	58.9	- 5.1

The Washington Times

curing to unmarried teens is still climbing — as is the unwed-birth rate of women in their 20s.

In 1960, 15 percent of births to teens were outside of wedlock. Since then, the percentage of unwed teen births has steadily increased, reaching 76 percent in 1994.

The rate of births to unwed women aged 20 to 24 has also sky-

rocketed, from 5 percent in 1960 to 45 percent in 1994.

Compared to children raised by two parents, children raised by single parents are at risk for school and health problems, poverty, involvement in crime and drugs, and teen childbearing.

More than 50 percent of all new welfare cases are due to births to unmarried women.

The Washington Times

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1996

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11-8-96



Address on
Back of
Photo

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11-8-96

Dear Bill Clinton
You are my favorite
President.

From
Sarah Nichols

11/8/96

Phil

Should these go to Dorland
for a reply or maybe to send
her some enclosures?

S

Sarah Nichols
P.O. Box 184
Levant - ME
04456

11/11/96

politicians and to avoid anything that could be branded as soft or a puff piece. She suggests this bias leads reporters to shy away from giving politicians credit even where the credit is well deserved. Mike describes the article as "another indication that the press itself sees shortcomings in its approach to political leaders."

Brownstein December 1992 article in L.A. Times on lack of Republicans on your team. Via Sosnik. Brownstein notes that FDR was the master of reaching into ranks of the other party, with three Republicans, including Harold Ickes, in his initial Cabinet. JFK, Nixon and Reagan all did so as well. Ike tried, though his one Democratic appointee (Martin Durkin at Labor) left unhappy after a few months.

"Women Succeed in Business: A Success Guide for Women Entrepreneurs. Via Harold. The booklet was prepared by the Interagency Committee on Women's Business Enterprise and the White House Office for Women's Initiatives and Outreach.

Letter to Gen. McCaffrey from Paula Mercuri. Via Kitty Higgins. The young woman refers to her 36-year-old sister who is addicted to crack, a manic depressive, on and off welfare, and unable to get good medical help. "My point is, my sister is not a criminal. She is not even a bad person. She is just sick!" Ms. Mercuri believes you are right about prevention and treatment, and plans to vote for you.

Sanford Sol
we prepared
Mr. Solarz
Steve forward

11-11-96

to Doriskind

ve Solarz's request, via Nancy,
; Sanford Solarz. Unfortunately,
eve mentioned the letter to him.
neral.

Letters. See
working with
Hillary and
but you speak

for reply?

— yes

action, and looks forward to
n in sending best wishes to you,
t only do you carry the big stick,
ok."

We have also received

Alan Sullivan
Military Office

We had these 47 promotions executed on your behalf.

— NO

chief of staff to Sullivan in the
minations to brigadier general.

Executive Order. On November 7, we had an Executive Order executed making technical changes to allow agencies more flexibility in hiring students who have completed career-related work-study programs. The EO was drafted by OPM, and permits agencies to hire these students for term appointments for up to four years, rather than only for career status appointments or for career-conditional appointments. Agencies concerned about downsizing wanted the ability to hire these students for term appointments in order to avoid expectations of permanent employment and potential conflict when RIFs occur.

11/11/96

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(F)

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(G)

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(H)

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(I)

Sanford Solarz Eulogy. Via Nancy Soderberg. At Steve Solarz's request, via Nancy, we prepared a 90th birthday letter from you to his father, Sanford Solarz. Unfortunately, Mr. Solarz passed away before his 90th birthday, but Steve mentioned the letter to him. Steve forwards the eulogy he delivered at his father's funeral.

(J)

Letters. *Sen. Byrd* -- he congratulates you on your reelection, and looks forward to working with you in the new Congress. Emma joins him in sending best wishes to you, Hillary and Chelsea. *Kathleen Kennedy Townsend* -- "not only do you carry the big stick, but you speak softly and elegantly. Thanks for your book."

We have also received the following items:

Alan Sullivan note on Col. Jim Hawkins. Hawkins, chief of staff to Sullivan in the Military Office, was on the most recent list of USAF nominations to brigadier general. We had these 47 promotions executed on your behalf.

Executive Order. On November 7, we had an Executive Order executed making technical changes to allow agencies more flexibility in hiring students who have completed career-related work-study programs. The EO was drafted by OPM, and permits agencies to hire these students for term appointments for up to four years, rather than only for career status appointments or for career-conditional appointments. Agencies concerned about downsizing wanted the ability to hire these students for term appointments in order to avoid expectations of permanent employment and potential conflict when RIFs occur.

rec'd 11-7-96
1:55pm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 7, 1996

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11/11/96

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: KITTY HIGGINS *KK*

SUBJECT: Letter Forwarded from Director McCaffrey

General McCaffrey wanted you to see the attached letter from Paula Mercuri in Floyds Knobs, Indiana.

cc: Rahm Emanuel

25 OCT

1905 Plum Hill Way
Floyds Knobs, IN 47119
October 18, 1996

General Barry McCaffrey
Office of Nat'l. Drug Control Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear General McCaffrey:

I just read the article about you in the October 21 issue of Newsweek.

My 36-year-old sister has been on crack for the last year. She was a beautiful girl who has had a very difficult life - a manic depressive, on and off welfare, unable to get good medical help. Now she has lost her three children.

My point is, my sister is not a criminal. She is not even a bad person. She is just so sick!

I don't think people can understand unless they get really close to someone with a drug problem. My own husband has no compassion or tolerance for her.

She hates the drug. She hates what it has done to her - how it has stolen everything from her and caused her to do so many bad things to the people she loves. She sobs and cries all the time about all of this and how she just wants a normal life so desperately.

She has gone downhill so fast - we pray that she'll live to see Christmas. I have nine brothers and sisters and a 78-year-old mother. We are all on pins and needles constantly waiting for the next phone call to go rescue her from jail or the hospital or some sleazy hotel room. (We try tough love but that's a whole different topic.) This affects all of us and our families. It is so far-reaching and devastating.

She does not belong in jail. She is waiting (again) to get into a treatment center. (There are not enough.) You are so right about prevention and treatment. I support you wholeheartedly. I feel so helpless but you give me hope. I wish you the very best in what I know will be an extremely arduous task. And I will pray for you.

Because of you, I am voting for President Clinton.

Sincerely,

Paula A. Mercuri
Paula A. Mercuri

cc: President Clinton



October 22, 1996

President William J. Clinton
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

Reference: Senate Oversight Hearing on the National Indian Gaming Commission

It is significantly troubling that Commission Chairman Harold Monteau has been unfairly attacked at the recent Hearings by Senator Harry Reid. In his opening statements October 2nd, Senator Reid made a number of personal and disparaging statements against Chairman Monteau which are viewed as harmful to the Commission. Senator Reid went so far as to call for Chairman Monteau's resignation.

Indian Country has generally approved of the Chairman's performance and the National Indian Gaming Association (NIGA) testified in support of the Commission and Chairman Monteau.

Senator Reid's comments indicate he prefers a Chairman who will not provide Tribes the access now provided to the Commission. Senator Reid has consistently been a critic of Indian gaming and, while asserting to be exclusively interested in improved regulations, has consistently sought to impose state regulation and authority on Indian Nations and has consistently sought to limit the expansion of gaming to all eligible tribes.

He is now pushing to establish standards for a future Commission Chairman, including standards designed to close down Indian gaming in locations where litigation is still unsettled. He wants the Chairman to shut down the "illegal" casinos in California, Florida, and other states.

Senator Reid's attack on Chairman Monteau is unprecedented in its personal nature and unfairness. It is harmful because it is being done to an Indian person



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11/8/96 Phil,
From Ovalote
To Desk/Kind for reply?
✓ yes — no

who has paid attention to real needs in Indian Country and has performed his job effectively and efficiently.

Chairman Monteau took the high road in his testimony and did not respond in a negative manner to Senator Reid. He offered testimony regarding the re-organization of the Commission to be more effective and responsive to Indian gaming needs. The NIGH, Department of Justice and NIGA all spoke in favor of increased regulation of Indian gaming in the form of the establishment of Federal Minimum Internal Control Standards. The standards would be promulgated by the NIGC in consultation with the Tribes, with the Tribes as the primary regulator. We also need to expand NIGC authority to include Class III gaming.

The Committee was presented with a manual of the National Indian Gaming Minimum Internal Control Standards (MICS); however, Senator Reid commented that having standards on paper was one thing, having standards implemented another. He referred to NIGA as an "Indian Gaming Chamber of Commerce" whose purpose was to only spread good news about Indian gaming.

It is our understanding that there would be oversight hearings on Indian gaming early in the 105th Congress.

I encourage you to continue to show your support for Chairman Monteau and the outstanding strides he has made to address the numerous issues before this Commission. Your support is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "John A. James".

John A. James,
Tribal Chairman

JJ:MN:bc

cc: Senator Diane Feinstein
Senator Barbara Boxer

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I'd rather be golfing.

Do try to support
what I believe
in. — PR

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JIM DORSKIND:

please coordinate
the reply.

November 7, 1996

MEMORANDUM

To: The President

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11-12-96

From: Nancy Hernreich
Rebecca Cameron

Re: Congratulations

The following called with their congratulations:

Sam Kitadai

Howard Gelt

Christine Varney

Felicia & Chuck Gervais - "Bravo, Congrats and Mazel Tov too!"

Burt Roberts, Chairman, MCI

↳ Doty - Be

JIM DORSKIND:

Please coordinate
the reply.

11-12-96

Todd -

After you have reviewed,
I will forward to Jim
Dorskind -

C,

Christy Burton

September 2 1996

2952 N.W. 13th St

Ft. Lauderdale, Fl.
33311

Dear Mr. President,

my name is Christy Burton.

I am 8 years old. I heard you
speak on Thursday, September 5, 1996
at the Sunrise Musical Theater,
Sunrise Florida.

I like your speech, especially
when you said all 8 year old
children should be able to read.

I like to read and write and
I like school. Thanks for letting
me come back stage to shake your
hand and give a picture to you.

I wish I could vote for you. Please
send two copies of the picture and some
thing for my classroom.

Some day I want to be the first black
Woman president. You said I can be any-
thing I want to be, because I live in
America.

P.S. Mr. President
Write Back.

11-12-96


From Oval
Send to Denmark for
reply -

Yes ☒

No ☐

Response?





DoTy-I'll sign

Hoa Nguyen
5909 S Oak Dr.
Marrero, LA 70072
October 24, 1996


JIM DORSKIND:

Please coordinate
the reply.

Dear President Clinton,

Hi, I'm Hoa Nguyen, a senior from
S. W. Higgins. I am so honored to
see you in person. I was very shocked
to hear you come to Marrero. My principal,
Mr. ~~Sevridy~~, gave me a pass to come
hear you, and I was so excited. I
just wish you the best of luck in
the elections, and I hope you continue
your hard work and dedication as
president. I know you must have a busy
schedule, so I just want you to do your
best to continue being the best president you
can be! Good luck! I have faith that
you will remain our president!

P.S. Keep this coin as a
good luck charm! Don't
forget me when you win
the elections.

Sincerely,
