

3/25

from OVAI Ofc

TOOD - send to Jocelyn

Jolley to handle?

— yes — ☒ no

S.

Handwritten notes:
 Pres has not
 signed properly
 Ash H

96 MAR 25 P 5 OFFICE OF
 CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON
 240 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 2051
 (202) 225-1988 / FAX
 (202) 225-6636 / OFFICE

3. 25.96

ASAP to
 K. HANCOX

from
 Todd Stern

TO: Nancy Hern
 FAX NO.: 456-676

FROM:

Handwritten notes:
 Original fax to
 Karen H

LIONEL COLLINS, JR.
 CHIEF OF STAFF
 THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON
 MEMBER OF CONGRESS
 SECOND DISTRICT, STATE OF LOUISIANA

TIME: _____

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER): 3

COMMENTS: Nancy, Cong Jefferson

would like you to show
this letter to the President--
a follow-up to their
discussion on Air Force ONE.
Thank you.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS TRANSMITTAL, CALL (202) 225-6636



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON
SECOND DISTRICT
LOUISIANA

March 22, 1996

*The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500*

Dear Mr. President:

This news report shows another example of the Landrieu campaign's attempt to tie you to her campaign.

I do not know whether Jim Carville agreed to "join" Landrieu at her fundraiser before Ieyoub announced, but it contributes to the misimpression that you have a hand in Mary's campaign.

Perhaps Jim should not attend now, both because Richard has announced and because I have not unannounced my candidacy for the Senate. Jim is in New Orleans for a roast on the date of Landrieu's event, and I am a roaster for him. Please do what you can to make clear that you are not involved with the Landrieu campaign.

With Respect,



William J. Jefferson

Enclosure:

4 AP 03-22-96 08:22 AET

42 LINES

PM-LA--Landrieu-Senate, 1st ld-writethru, 375

Former State Treasurer Makes It Official

EDS: CORRECTS former lieutenant governor to former state treasurer.

DELETES extraneous phrases in next-to-last graf.

jm713n

NEW ORLEANS (AP) The frontrunner finally made her intentions known: Mary Landrieu is a candidate for the U.S. Senate.

Landrieu, defeated in her 1995 bid for governor, announced her candidacy for the U.S. Senate on Thursday in a letter inviting potential contributors to attend a \$1,000 a couple reception March 31.

The former state treasurer and state representative from New Orleans becomes the seventh candidate and second Democrat to announce a campaign for the seat being vacated by Sen. J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., who said last year he would not seek a fifth term next fall.

Until Thursday, Landrieu, a Democrat, had delayed any sort of official announcement, saying most recently she was "about 95 percent" certain she would run.

"After careful consideration, I have decided to run for this open seat and need your help in this election to get a strong start," Landrieu said in her letter. "The polls indicate that I have an excellent chance to win."

Landrieu said she would be joined by James Carville, one of President Clinton's key campaign advisers, at the reception held at the home of New Orleans friends.

Her announcement Thursday coincided with the release of a new poll which showed 22.8 percent of 800 registered voters surveyed would vote for Landrieu if the election were held now. Another 21.3

percent of those polled were undecided. The poll, conducted March

2-8, had a 3.5 percent margin of error.

She joins a field that includes Republicans David Duke, U.S. Rep. Jimmy Hayes, state Rep. Woody Jenkins, petroleum industry consultant Bill Linder and New Orleans city councilwoman Peggy Wilson. Attorney General Richard Ieyoub was previously the only announced Democratic candidate.

The new poll, conducted by Southern Media & Opinion Research of Baton Rouge for a consortium of television stations, showed Ieyoub with 17.3 percent, New Orleans congressman William Jefferson with 10 percent, Mrs. Wilson with 8.3 percent, Jenkins with 7.5, Hayes with 6.4 and Duke with 5.4.

THE
CARTER
PRESIDENTIAL
CENTER

original given
to NSC

322

Todd

OK to send to NSC for
reply -- (came from
OCS/CF/C)

✓ yes — no

S. 3/25/92



JIMMY CARTER

96 MAR 22 P4:31

March 20, 1996

To President Bill Clinton

Enclosed is a brief trip report and a copy of the final communique' from our Tunis conference. It is still not possible to induce the heads of state to agree to a future international conference, although that is our goal. In the meantime, we will continue to monitor all their commitments and to encourage them to consult closely on all the problems that still exist in the area.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500-2000

cc: Tony Lake



JIMMY CARTER

Trip report, Tunis, 3/16-19/96

During the past 30 months, 100,000 people have been killed in Burundi as violence continues between Hutu factions and the Tutsi-controlled military. The government is quite unstable, with the Hutu president having little real authority.

In Rwanda, where more than 500,000 Tutsis were victims of genocide in 1994, serious problems persist. About 65,000 prisoners have been incarcerated, with an almost totally destroyed judicial system unable to separate the guilty from the innocent. Of the 800 magistrates serving before the 1994 massacre, less than 200 survived, and some of these participated in the genocide. There are still almost 2 million Rwandan refugees in camps in Tanzania (650,000) and Zaire (1,300,000).

Cross border raids continue into both Rwanda and Burundi, mostly from Zaire, and arms are still flowing to the guerrilla forces. Large pledges of financial assistance to the region have not been honored by the donors, with almost all available funds from UN agencies being used to support refugees in the camps.

It has not been possible for either the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity to induce the regional leaders to participate in an international conference. Instead, the heads of state of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire, and Uganda are willing to meet with each other only under the auspices of The Carter Center.

Because of the severity of the continuing crisis in this Great Lakes region, we have responded to appeals from these leaders and continued the effort commenced last November in Cairo, Egypt, to help them resolve some of the problems. In preparing for the Tunis conference, we sought information and advice from many sources within the UN, the OAU, the European Community and the U.S. government. Former presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Toure' of Mali and Archbishop Tutu of South Africa have provided crucial assistance as facilitators.

What has been done so far to honor the commitments made in Cairo and to continue efforts in the future?

For the first time, even among former antagonists, there have been a constant series of consultations with each other. In addition to visits between top political leaders, President M'Kapa has encouraged the prime minister and other top Rwandan officials to go into the Tanzanian camps to reassure the refugees about their safety. In Tunis, a similar agreement was concluded between President Mobutu and President Bizimungu. Since November, a total of 46,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees have returned to their homes from the camps in Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire, with no reports of abuse or intimidation. They have been guaranteed priority in reclaiming their former homes and land, even when the same property is claimed by Tutsis who went into exile in 1959.

Some military equipment taken by the Hutus into Zaire in 1994 has been returned to Rwanda, and President Mobutu has pledged to continue this effort. Along the Tanzanian border, 400 armed infiltrators have been captured and detained. About 100 Hutu leaders in the camps who are intimidating other refugees against returning are identified and will soon be moved to other camps. Many of these intimidators are known to have been guilty of planning and executing the genocide. About a dozen intimidators have been arrested in the Zairian camps, and more are being identified.

In Rwanda, 300 magistrates and 200 prosecutors have been trained, a new supreme court has been established, and it is expected that trials of detainees will commence in May. A few legal experts from American universities have assisted Rwanda in this effort to reconstitute a legal system (described in a recent Newsweek article).

Despite their former relationships with the pre-1994 Hutu government in Rwanda, all heads of state have pledged to arrest and deliver for trial anyone who is indicted by the International Tribunal. All of us will use our influence to induce other governments to take similar action.

Although the mandate for UN armed forces in Rwanda expired this month, there are a large number of NGOs still active, and Rwandan officials have requested that 300 UN human rights monitors be stationed in the country to guarantee the safety of returning refugees. Burundi has approved the stationing of 50 human rights monitors.

The basic problem in Burundi is that the Hutu majority (85%) feel excluded from equal political, military, and economic authority, and the Tutsis (15%) are fearful of massive reprisals if the Hutus gain power. Although serious problems remain in Burundi, some progress has been made. About 20,000

Hutus have returned to their homes in the suburbs of Bujumbura, from which they had been expelled. Leaders of the military and both major political parties (FRODEBU and UP-RONA) in Burundi participated in our conferences, and have agreed that former president Nyerere would act as a mediator among them. One major goal will be to schedule an early national debate, the main purpose of which will be to devise a new constitution, leading to elections in 1998.

We facilitators received a mandate in Tunis to contact opposition leaders now in exile to ascertain under what conditions they will agree to achieve their legitimate goals through peaceful means.

In order to publicize our agreements and especially to reassure refugees about their safety after repatriation, the heads of state and facilitators participated in the preparation of a documentary, which will be broadcast on television and radio, especially to the refugee camps. In addition, all of us agreed to accept an invitation from CNN International to participate in a program on the Great Lakes, which will be a major focus of the CNN annual meeting in Atlanta in May. This will help us to sustain worldwide attention on this stricken area and will be an incentive for the heads of state to report good progress on their Cairo and Tunis commitments.

Following the Tunis conference, ambassadors Marion Creekmore, Vince Farley, and Gordon Streeb made personal reports to the European community, the United Nations, and the U.S. government.

Since our pilots couldn't fly all the way home without rest, we spent one night in Casablanca. The new Grand Mosque is 200 meters long and 100 meters wide, exceeded in size only by the one in Mecca. It is breathtakingly beautiful, one of the wonders of the world. We also enjoyed going to Casablanca Bar, where we heard "Sam" play "As Time Goes By" while a 100-pound Rick imitated Humphrey Bogart.

We returned home today, pleased with the results of our trip.

TUNIS DECLARATION ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION
March 18, 1996

Presidents Mobutu of Zaire, Museveni of Uganda, Bizimungu of Rwanda, Ntibantunganya of Burundi, and Mkapa of Tanzania met in Tunis, Tunisia from March 16-18, 1996 to carry forward their African initiative to promote peace, justice, reconciliation, stability, and development in the Great Lakes region. Former Presidents Carter of the United States, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Toure of Mali served as facilitators. The Heads of State reviewed the progress made toward the achievement of their commitments undertaken in Cairo, Egypt on November 29, 1995, decided on additional measures that must be taken to meet fully these commitments, and pledged themselves and their countries to undertake further actions to achieve their common goals for the region.

The Heads of State agreed that, while useful steps had been taken since Cairo, serious problems persist. These include intimidation in the refugee camps, concerns of some of the refugees about their security, cross-border raids into Rwanda and Burundi, inadequate judicial systems in Rwanda and Burundi, and continued violence in Burundi with little progress toward constructing a long-term government structure that will ensure protection of the rights and interests of all groups, including minority groups.

The Heads of State expressed their conviction that these problems can be addressed with the steps described below, which have been taken or will be taken. Together they will significantly reduce tension, hostility, insecurity, and distrust in the area, encourage the return of refugees, stimulate economic rehabilitation and development, and advance efforts to fashion long-term government structures acceptable to their citizens.

They also urged Rwanda and Burundi to enhance and strengthen further the process of confidence building through broad national consultative mechanisms to achieve long-term solutions and national reconciliation.

On a regional level:

1. The Heads of State reaffirmed their rejection of the ideology of genocide.
2. The Heads of State and their ministers have initiated a dynamic and sustained dialogue, involving frequent meetings with each other, to plan and undertake concerted endeavors in the region. This productive consultative relationship will continue at the Heads of State level.
3. The Heads of State expressed approval that, consistent with the Cairo Declaration, the Governments of Zaire and Rwanda had agreed in January

44 on the return to Rwanda of heavy military equipment taken into Zaire by
45 ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda. Zaire, on February 13, 1996, returned the
46 military equipment which it had been able to identify and possess and
47 agreed to continue its search efforts as promised to find the other
48 equipment and to return it as found to the Rwandan government.
49

50 4. Cross border incursions continue, and increasingly, the perpetrators kill
51 civilians, particularly local officials, and lay land mines as they retreat. But
52 some significant actions have been taken. There is now greater
53 cooperation and information sharing among governments of the region.
54 Tanzania has rounded up and confined 400 persons known to be involved
55 in such activities. President Mkapa stressed that refugees in Tanzania
56 received neither arms deliveries nor military training. Because of fighting
57 in Burundi spilling across its border, Tanzania has increased its level of
58 troops in the area as a deterrent.
59

60 --Additionally, the Heads of State pledge to:

61
62 --take more rigorous efforts to shut down arms flow and military
63 training to rebel groups engaged in cross-border incursions,
64 including urging the UN to station monitors at airports and border
65 points.
66

67 --Heads of State will restrict the travel of leaders associated with
68 cross border incursions and urge other countries to take similar
69 action and freeze the financial assets these persons hold abroad; and
70

71 --Heads of State will permit the Commission of Inquiry established
72 by UN Resolution 1013 to investigate reports of military training
73 and arms transfer to former Rwanda government forces.
74

75 5. The Heads of State reiterated their hope that most of the refugees will
76 return home in a relatively short period of time. They recognized,
77 however, that many refugees would not likely repatriate in the near future
78 because of their real or perceived association with the genocide in Rwanda.
79 In the camps themselves, intimidation is continuing. They also note that
80 some bureaucratic procedures pertaining to logistics and registration are
81 playing into the hands of intimidators and endanger refugees intending to
82 repatriate.
83

84 --It should be noted that Zaire has arrested a few intimidators who have
85 been removed from the refugee camps. In addition, Zaire has banned
86 political activities of the RDR in camps.

87
88 --Tanzania and Burundi have banned RDR political activity, and has
89 tightened security control within the camps. Tanzania has identified the
90 key intimidators in the camps and intends to separate them from the other
91 refugees and house them in a camp in the interior. It is seeking financial
92 assistance to carry through these plans.
93

94 --More needs to be done to separate the intimidators, including armed
95 factions, from the other refugees in order to enable them to make a free
96 choice about repatriation. Conscious of the need to avoid forced
97 repatriation, the Heads of State challenge the international community to
98 work with them and finance a major effort that would permit this choice.
99 This effort would consist of the following components:
100

101 --preparing the home communes to receive the refugees, including
102 the placement in the communes of an adequate number of human
103 rights and other monitors to ensure security;
104

105 --taking measures involving camp administration and management
106 that will guard against cases of insecurity in the border areas.
107

108 6. The Heads of State pledged full support to the International Criminal
109 Tribunal for Rwanda and other jurisdictions in accordance with UN
110 security resolution 955 (1994) of November 8, 1994. They promised to
111 turn over to these jurisdictions indicted persons located in their countries
112 and urged all other countries to do the same. President Mkapa said that
113 the genocide suspects located in Tanzania are under surveillance and will
114 be picked up if indicted by the Jurisdictions. The Heads of State further
115 affirmed that they will cooperate fully in the investigations of the
116 competent jurisdictions. They will similarly support the work of the
117 International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi. The Heads of State of
118 Rwanda and Burundi pledged to guarantee the security for personnel and
119 witnesses relevant to the work of the International Tribunal and the
120 Commission of Inquiry.
121

122 7. The Heads of States expressed continuing concern about the use of
123 radio broadcasts and the print media to spread hate and fear in the region.
124 The participants pledged to take action to curtail the illegal and
125 inflammatory radio broadcasts from one country to another, and reaffirmed
126 their requests for assistance. President Mkapa stressed that Tanzania
127 would not permit hostile propaganda to be broadcast into neighboring
128 countries. President Mobutu said he had asked for assistance to locate and
129 halt inflammatory radio broadcasts despite questions of sovereignty.

President Carter agreed to continue his discussions with experts to ascertain how and whether technical assistance can be provided to locate and prevent such broadcasts.

Within Rwanda:

8. President Bizimungu expressed deep concern about the slow rate of refugee repatriation. Whereas 26,000 refugees from Burundi returned to Rwanda between December 1995 and February 1996, perceived insecurity within Burundi may have motivated some to repatriate. The refugee flows from Tanzania and Zaire during the same period amounted to 2000 and 20,000, respectively. President Bizimungu attributed these small flows to intimidation in the refugee camps.

9. Consistent with the principle of justice with reconciliation and to demonstrate to the refugees its strong desire for them to return, the Government of Rwanda reaffirms its obligation to ensure the safety of returnees, protect their legal rights, and recover their property. To this end, the Rwandan Government has:

--announced a decision to establish special procedures to expedite legal proceedings for the large number of persons held on charges relating to genocide. These mechanisms, which include specialized chambers within ordinary courts, will enable the judicial system to carry out an expeditious and systematic categorization of genocide perpetrators; release those for whom adequate evidence is lacking; permit plea agreements when appropriate; and conduct early trials of those charged. It has trained personnel in arrest procedures and is appointing prosecutors to authorize all arrests.

--in recognition that many refugees fear they will be arrested when they return, agreed to activate the review mechanism (Commission de Triage) to investigate cases (subject to judicial oversight) prior to arrests. It also accepts that defendants should have the opportunity to have the advice of legal counselors. It called upon the international community, particularly African states, to provide support for a mechanism to assist those who cannot afford legal counsel. The Government of Rwanda expects its genocide trials to begin in May 1996.

--trained 300 new magistrates, 90 new prosecutors, 250 new investigators, and has prepared files on thousands of individuals now ready for trial. The Government of Rwanda expressed

173 appreciation to other countries who have provided technical and
174 other assistance for this training and hopes that future assistance,
175 particularly in the legal area, will be extended when requested.
176

177 --attached special importance to the UN High Commissioner for
178 Human Rights in Rwanda and declared that it would welcome the
179 strengthening of this office and the deployment of an expanded
180 number of human rights monitors throughout the country. It is
181 prepared to permit the number of such monitors to increase to an
182 authorized level of 300, and called on the international community
183 to provide the resources to finance the critical work of the human
184 rights monitors.
185

186 --continue with programs to promote greater professionalism and
187 discipline within the armed forces, gendarmerie, and the police
188 force, including training in non-lethal riot control. It plans to build
189 more barracks for the soldiers and move forward in collaboration
190 with the World Bank to establish a commission on demobilization
191 and reintegration and initiate its work as soon as possible. The
192 government promotes, within the framework of demobilization,
193 integration into the military of those members of the ex-FAR who
194 were not involved in the genocide.
195

196 --pledged to encourage initiatives undertaken by indigenous NGOs
197 to rebuild civil society; urged NGOs operating in camps to transfer
198 progressively their services and personnel from countries of asylum
199 to countries of origin; and emphasized the need for these
200 organizations to focus more on rehabilitation and development and
201 less on relief.
202

203 --pledged to work out quickly the modalities with international
204 financial institutions and the donor community to permit the early
205 allocation of existing and future pledges of assistance toward
206 critical rehabilitation and development projects. At present only 40
207 percent of funds pledged have been disbursed.
208

209 --reiterated its determination to strengthen administrative
210 procedures that ensure respect of property rights, including land, as
211 well as enable expeditious return of properties to their legitimate
212 owners immediately on demand. In accordance with the Arusha
213 agreement, new sites have been identified to develop for resettling
214 old refugees, and the Government of Rwanda requested
215 international technical and financial assistance in preparing these

216 lands for settlement. The government will endeavor to provide
217 special assistance for widows (including land owning rights), for
218 orphans, and for communities that receive large numbers of
219 returning refugees.
220

221 --encouraged refugee repatriation by actively promoting "look and
222 see" cross-border visits by refugees, sent senior government
223 officials into camps in Tanzania and Burundi to explain conditions
224 inside Rwanda and urged refugees to come home, plans to make
225 similar visits to camps in Zaire, and is encouraging international
226 organizations and NGOs to intensify the campaign to provide
227 objective information to the refugee camps on events and
228 developments inside Rwanda. President Mobutu and President
229 Bizimungu agreed that a high level Rwandan team would visit
230 refugee camps in Zaire very soon.
231

232 --collaborated closely with UNHCR and the countries of Tanzania,
233 Zaire, and Burundi in preparing for the refugee return and
234 encouraging them to do so. Through this continuing collaboration,
235 and with technical support and equipment, these governments and
236 UNHCR should be able to ensure that processing and other re-entry
237 requirements can be met with minimum delay to the returning
238 refugees.
239

240 --agreed to take concrete steps to encourage dialogue, social
241 healing, and integration among all Rwandese, including those
242 refugees who were not involved in the genocide and who seek to
243 rebuild Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda requested the
244 facilitators of the Great Lakes Summit to make contact with
245 influential personalities among the refugees to encourage them to
246 come home and to assist in promoting repatriation of other
247 refugees.
248

249 --demonstrating its commitment to transparency, agreed to make
250 public a report on implementation of the recommendation of the
251 Commission established to investigate the Kibeho incident, as well
252 as the outcome of the Commission on Inquiry into the Kanama
253 incident.
254

255 **Within Burundi:**
256

257 10. The Head of State of Burundi and his delegation emphasized their
258 commitment to bring to an end the climate of insecurity and impunity that

has paralyzed the country. They will move with speed and determination to launch a process leading to new institutional structures agreed upon and supported by all citizens that will ensure protection of the rights of all Burundians, and their participation within the political and economic life of the nation. To that end the Head of State and his delegation:

--welcomed that former Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere accepted the mandate given to him by the international community, and endorsed by the Heads of State of the region, to assist the people of Burundi in finding means to achieve peace, stability, and reconciliation within Burundi as a basis for a lasting political settlement. This settlement must include the resolution of fundamental problems relating to the access, control, and management of power, so that either the ethnic or political minority is reassured. The Government of Burundi is committed to take concrete steps to fight exclusion, extermination and genocide which have been used by some to achieve and monopolize power. For the success of any such dialogue, there should be an end to killings within Burundi. All parties, internal and external, should take all possible steps to create the necessary environment for successful progress.

--declared that the National Debate on the major problems facing the country will be launched urgently. The debate will seek a consensus for constitutional structures as described above, which will promote peaceful coexistence among all Burundians. All parties and groups that seek these goals and renounce violence as a means to reach political ends could participate. These principles will be incorporated into the constitution.

--reported positively on the dialogue and growing collaboration among the government, different socio-political partners, and the security forces. They reaffirmed their intention and determination to continue their collaboration. The representatives of the political parties, Frodebu and Uprona, who participated in the Tunis summit, made it clear that they appreciate and support the efforts of the government to restore peace and security to the country.

--reaffirmed its commitment to repatriate the refugees and reintegrate the displaced and dispersed elements of the population, premised on reconciliation at the community level. Adequate security will be essential. International assistance will be required

301 initially for communities heavily impacted by returnees, and to
302 promote self-sufficiency of all returnees.
303
304 --agreed to create the necessary conditions of security to facilitate
305 the reintegration on campus and in hostels those students who have
306 left them.
307
308 --reiterated their commitment to guarantee the security of personnel
309 of the UN, OAU, and humanitarian agencies in order that they can
310 fulfill their mandate, particularly concerning affected populations.
311
312 --reaffirmed their commitment to continue to intensify their
313 comprehensive dialogue aimed at ensuring the security of all and
314 restoring mutual confidence among all Burundian citizens. This
315 debate should lead to the establishment of a National Pact of
316 Peaceful Coexistence between the different components of the
317 country and of a constitution adapted to universal democratic
318 principles and to the specificities of Burundi in order to put in place
319 the indispensable instrument for the organization of free and fair
320 elections in 1998.
321
322 --declared their support for the deployment of UN Human Rights
323 monitors based on the needs expressed by the government, stated
324 strong hopes to see the current number substantially increased, and
325 pledged to deploy these monitors to all sections of the country and
326 ensure that they can safely carry out their functions.
327
328 --reaffirmed their determination to guarantee security for personnel
329 and witnesses relevant to the work of the International Commission
330 of Inquiry for Burundi.
331
332 --in order to begin the process by which the population will regain
333 confidence in the security forces (as pledged in Cairo,) committed
334 to undertake a comprehensive training program to enhance
335 professionalism and discipline within the security forces. Such
336 training would include how to uphold international human rights
337 conventions while carrying out military responsibilities. The
338 Government of Burundi also intends to redefine the respective
339 structures and mission of the security and defense forces so that
340 they will assume responsibility for the security of all elements of the
341 population. The international community should be prepared to
342 provide the necessary technical assistance.
343

344 --once again called upon the international community in general and
345 neighboring countries in particular to prevent armed external
346 attacks on Burundi and to dismantle the networks of arms flow
347 across borders.

348
349 --condemned the ideology of exclusion and genocide and expressed
350 a strong desire for the expeditious establishment by the countries of
351 the region of an early warning mechanism to prevent destabilization
352 and human rights violations, as well as dissemination of the
353 ideology of ethnic hatred, exclusion, and genocide.

354
355 --agreed to develop a democratic media policy, including provisions
356 for independent and autonomous media; guarantee wider access to
357 information to journalists on all sides; and support initiatives that
358 promote responsibility of the media. As expressed in Cairo, they
359 reaffirmed their deep concern over the use of radio broadcasts to
360 spread hate and fear in the region. The participants pledged to take
361 all possible action to terminate the illegal and inflammatory radio
362 broadcasts from one country into another. They called upon the
363 international community to assist by providing technology to
364 identify and demobilize mobile transmitters.

365
366 --pledged to guarantee neutrality and independence of the courts,
367 and take concrete steps to improve the system of justice, including
368 accelerating the trials of those accused of crimes against humanity;
369 the training of lawyers, judges, and magistrates; and judicial
370 assistance to defendants. They reiterated their request to the
371 international community for assistance, including the use of foreign
372 lawyers, to achieve these goals.

373
374 --pledged their commitment to organize democratic elections in
375 1998.

376
377 **Appeal to the International Community:**

378
379 To enable the governments to fulfill the commitments made above, the Heads of
380 State call upon the international community to assist in arranging and disbursing the
381 necessary funding to achieve them. In Rwanda and Burundi, in addition to funding for
382 rehabilitation, resettlement, and development, international assistance will be required for
383 improving the systems of justice, development of democratic media policy, deployment of
384 human rights monitors, and professionalization of the security forces. Member states of
385 the UN are requested to respond generously to the appeals from UNHCR and UNHCHR.
386 A greater proportion of funding should go to projects within the countries of origin.

387 Funding must also be obtained in order to conduct the National Debate in Burundi, restore
388 the environment in countries of asylum, and continue the work of the International
389 Tribunal for Rwanda and the Commission of Inquiry for Burundi. Zaire and Tanzania
390 require financial, and in some cases technical, assistance for their efforts to separate
391 intimidators from bonafide refugees. The facilitators agreed to work to obtain and
392 expedite funding for these efforts.

393

394 In recognition of the close collaboration between governments in the region and
395 the international and regional governmental organizations and donor governments, as well
396 as local and international NGOs, the Heads of State declared their willingness to work
397 closely with these groups, and particularly with the UN, OAU, and World Bank, in the
398 future. The focus of this collaboration should be the accomplishment of concrete
399 programs and projects on the ground that will promote justice, reconciliation, peace,
400 stability, and development.

401

402 The Heads of State requested that former Presidents Carter, Nyerere, and Toure
403 and Archbishop Tutu continue their efforts to facilitate contact and actions by their five
404 governments, track comprehensively the achievements made at this meeting and in Cairo,
405 and prepare recommendations for consideration by these governments at their next
406 meeting. General Touré, who consulted extensively in the region since the Cairo Summit,
407 suggested the following for future consideration: greater regional collaboration and
408 economic and security matters; cooperation among African states in the areas of health,
409 agriculture, and education; and a mechanism to accomplish these purposes. They also
410 accepted the invitation by CNN to arrange for participation in person or by satellite of the
411 five Heads of State and the facilitators at the internationally broadcast CNN World Report
412 in early May at which time they will be able to share worldwide their assessment of the
413 situation in the Great Lakes region and the efforts being undertaken to deal with the
414 complex, interrelated problems of the area.

415

416 The Heads of State were pleased by the frank, open, and constructive discussions
417 that characterized the Summit. They commended The Carter Center for arranging the
418 meeting.

419

420 The Heads of State and their delegations expressed their profound appreciation to
421 President Ben Ali and the Tunisian people for their support and hospitality for this historic
422 meeting.

423

424

425

426

427

428

429 Signed:

430

431

432

433

Mobutu Sese Soko

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni

Pasteur Bizimungu

434

435

436

437

438

Sylvestre Ntibantunganya

Benjamin William Mkapa

439

440

441

442

Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere (witness)

Amadou T. Toure (witness)

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Jimmy Carter (witness)

Mr. Todd D. Stern, Special Asst. and Staff Sec.
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Office of the Staff Secretary
Ground Floor, West Wing
Washington, DC 20500

96 MAR 23 11:37

Dear Mr. Stern,

I hope you are the correct person to send this request to.


My grandmother, Mrs. Josephine Modzelewski is turning 80 this April 23rd. She is a huge Clinton supporter and even volunteered for the 1992 campaign in Connecticut. She is a frequent caller to talk radio, and has vehemently defended the President, the First Lady, and the Administration's policies, against conservative talk show hosts and callers. I was wondering if it would be possible to have a birthday greeting sent to her by the President and/or the First Lady. It would mean the world to her (and to me as well).

If this is possible, my grandmother can be reached at the following address:

Mrs. Josephine Modzelewski (04/23/96)
20 Crown Street
Naugatuck, CT. 06770

Again, I would deeply appreciate any greeting that you could have sent her way. Thank you.

Sincerely,


F. Mark Modzelewski

ps-If it helps noting this at all, I am a former Clinton campaign worker myself. I about starting a new Schedule C position this week at HUD. It was my grandmother who got me started in Democratic politics many campaigns ago.

3/23/96

TODD:

To Dorskind for reply?

☒ YES ☐ NO

Tom - please
take care of this.



3/23/96

20 March 1996


06 MAR 25 18:30

Dear Mr. President,

I am aware that your staff is processing an invitation for you to receive the 1996 Intrepid Freedom Award in New York this summer. It has been my distinct honor to attend several of these presentations, most recently that for the former Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin. I respectfully add the encouragement of your Commandant, to that of many others, for you to accept.

Zack Fisher is a great American and a wonderful supporter of your men and women in uniform. The Freedom Award is truly worthy of you and your high office.

Very respectfully,


C. C. KRULAK

General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

original to scheduling

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

3/20/96

From the Oval.

Send to Scheduling

Yes ☒

No ☐

cc: military office? yes

send *+ NSC + Evelyn*

Carl

March 22, 1996

FROM: TODD STERN
HELEN HOWELL *HLH*

General notes
on p. 1+2
Rk

cc: UP (A)
We need to
do more with

- Thick (B)
great - need
copy
2: Ann Lewis
Sally

- ~~agles~~ (E)

- (D)
Roger - Leher
Sing she'll do it
the better
Amen

- (D) **Cisneros memo to HRC on the Washington Interfaith Network (WIN).** The Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), founded in 1940 by Saul Alinsky, represents about 2000 congregations and 2.5 million people in 20 states, with a mission to assist communities in creating broad-based, multi-racial, and economically diverse organizations. The IAF Washington, D.C. affiliate, WIN, is comprised of 50



3.26.96

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

96 MAR 20 48:22

March 11, 1996

MEMORANDUM TO: The President

FROM: Federico Peña *Federico Peña*

SUBJECT: U.S. Major Passenger Airlines' Financial Recovery in 1995

The airline industry in 1995 achieved a remarkable turnaround in its financial condition. The major passenger airlines have just reported net profits of \$1.7 billion and operating profits of \$5 billion. You and the Administration should take a significant part of the credit for this turnaround. Below are several talking points that can be used to explain this remarkable recovery to the American public.

- o When the Administration took office in January of 1993, the airlines had just completed 3 years of record-breaking losses. For 1990, 1991, and 1992 the airlines had lost a total of \$10 billion.
- o Within the first month of taking office, you and I met at Boeing's Seattle Headquarters with all of the major airline and aerospace CEOs to discuss how to revive these industries.
- o As a result of that meeting and other discussions, the Administration proposed legislation to create a National Airline Commission to recommend within 90 days ways to help the airline industry. The Commission reported its results in August of 1993 and presented 61 recommendations.
- o The Administration has reacted favorably to the Commission's report and has acted on 80 percent of the Commission's recommendations.
- o Based on preliminary results from 1995, it is clear that the industry has achieved a significant turnaround. The major passenger airlines reported combined net profits of \$1.7 billion and operating profits of \$5 billion. Every major passenger airline achieved an operating profit and all but one have reported net profits for CY 1995.
- o The industry has overcome many of its earlier problems. Airline expenses have remained flat, revenues are up, the industry has avoided destructive price wars, and carriers are repaying debt. Unlike 1993 when three major airlines were in bankruptcy, no major airlines are bankrupt today.
- o Some carriers have announced plans to recall some furloughed employees and/or to hire new employees and to order new equipment to replace old, inefficient aircraft. Aircraft utilization and load factors are up, while capacity growth remains restrained.

3-26-96

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TODD STERN
HELEN HOWELL *HH*

SUBJECT: Recent Information Items

We are forwarding the following recent information items:

JIM DORSKIND:

PLEASE COORDINATE
THE REPLY.

memo on financial recovery of airlines. Remarkable turnaround -- the major airlines reported net profits of \$1.7 billion and operating profits of \$5 billion in 1995. Every major passenger airline achieved an operating profit, and all reported net profits. "You and the Administration should take a significant credit...." When you took office, the airlines had just completed 3 years of record-breaking losses (\$10 billion over 3 years). You proposed legislation to reauthorize the National Airline Commission, and now 80% of their 61 recommendations have been acted upon.

(B) Cisneros memo on your HUD-related achievements. Homeownership -- highest level in 15 years, and the last year's increase in the homeownership rate is the fastest in 30 years. This increase was made possible by your economic policies, lower interest rates, 8 million new jobs, streamlining of the FHA, and HUD's partnerships with the private sector. Empowerment zones and enterprise communities -- over 70 urban communities have been designated as EZs or ECs using billions of Federal dollars to create jobs and businesses, and leverage private sector investment. Transformation of public housing -- we have implemented the most far-reaching changes since its inception. Dozens of "blighted high-rise projects" are now being demolished and replaced with "garden-style, economically-integrated developments." Sec. Cisneros also provides charts describing achievements city-by-city.

(C) Cisneros memo on Habitat for Humanity legislation. Henry thinks a signing ceremony would be a good idea for the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act, which would fund Habitat for Humanity, Cities in Schools, and other non-profits committed to housing and community development. A ceremony has been tentatively scheduled for March 28.

(D) Cisneros memo to HRC on the Washington Interfaith Network (WIN). The Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), founded in 1940 by Saul Alinsky, represents about 2000 congregations and 2.5 million people in 20 states, with a mission to assist communities in creating broad-based, multi-racial, and economically diverse organizations. The IAF Washington, D.C. affiliate, WIN, is comprised of 50

See memo on p. 1-2
RK

*Will
great - need
to reply
to Alinsky*

agrees

*agrees - let's
say we'll do it
the better
Alinsky*



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5-26-96

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20410-0001

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Honorable William J. Clinton
Vice President Al Gore

FROM: Henry G. Cisneros *Henry Cisneros*

DATE: March 20, 1996

SUBJ: Your Administration's Most Visible Achievements in Community Development and Homeownership

96 MAR 20 PM 6:00

Over the last three years, the HUD team has worked on a wide array of activities. We have tried to be creative and innovative in working with mayors and community development officials. Now as we focus on the areas of greatest success and undeniable achievement for 1996, I would like to provide you with a planning tool for taking advantage of the Administration's clearest and highest profile accomplishments in the areas of community development and homeownership.

We are ready to have you show the nation what your policies have made possible. This is not about future plans or policy pronouncements. It is about visual evidences which you can visit and show the nation. It is time to burnish your specific, demonstrable achievements in three selected areas:

- A. Expanding Homeownership -- The Administration has helped increase the nation's homeownership to the highest level in 15 years. The last year's increase in the homeownership rate is the fastest annual increase in 30 years. That impressive rate has been made possible by the Administration's economic policies, lower interest rates, creation of 8 million new jobs, streamlining of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and HUD's partnership with 56 private sector national partners to change the way the housing sector works and to seek an all-time high number of American homeowners by the turn of the century.
- B. Empowering Communities -- Over 70 urban communities have been designated as empowerment zones and enterprise communities, using billions in federal resources to create jobs and businesses and leverage private sector investment. HUD has also empowered the nonprofit movement to revive neighborhoods and communities by a commitment to building affordable housing.
- C. Transforming Public Housing -- We have implemented the most far-reaching transformation of public housing since its inception. With massive reconstruction now underway, this is the most visible of HUD's priorities.

Dozens of blighted high-rise projects are now being demolished and replaced by garden-style, economically-integrated developments. A national crackdown on gangs and violence has resulted in thousands of arrests and confiscation of weapons and gangs.

Attached is a chart that describes the on-the-ground achievements in each of these areas and suggestions for "visuals" that you and the Vice President can use to "own" these achievements.

Attachments

The attached charts describe major visible achievements city-by-city that you can use on your visits to cities — there will be good "visuals" in groundbreakings and new construction everywhere you go this summer. These are big, tangible deals in every city!

A. Expanding Homeownership Opportunities

Objective: Homeownership remains one of the most important vehicles to create wealth in our society. For many Americans, home equity is the principal way they borrow for college educations and medical bills. For many communities, homeownership is the bulwark to healthy, thriving neighborhoods. HUD is enhancing homeownership opportunities for all Americans by driving a 56-partner Homeownership Strategy, by revamping the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), by helping public housing residents and Section 8 recipients buy their own homes, and by using the fair housing laws to ensure that homeownership is accessible to record numbers of families.

Key Administration Initiatives	City/Time	Suggested Visible Accomplishments to Visit
National Homeownership Strategy - Homeownership rate grew to 65.1% in the close of 1995, the highest rate since 1981. This marks the sharpest one-year rise in the rate in 30 years. 3.6 million Americans have become homeowners under the Clinton Administration. - We have forged an unprecedented partnership with 56 leadership organizations in the housing industry to increase the national homeownership rate to an all-time high by the year 2000. - Strategy partners are producing more affordable homes, making it easier for consumers to acquire mortgages, and spurring local homeownership efforts.	Washington, D.C. June 5, 1995	Celebrate One-Year Anniversary of the National Homeownership Strategy: June 5, 1996 marks the first anniversary of the National Homeownership Strategy. That week, HUD will sponsor a two-day summit to celebrate the Partnership's efforts, increase momentum and strengthen local homeownership efforts. 500-700 national and local representatives from all facets of the housing industry are expected to participate. A Presidential workday, such as at the recent session on Youth, Drugs, and Violence, could focus on accomplishments and challenges for homeowners.
	Cleveland, OH June 21, 1996	Build Homes with Mayors and Habitat for Humanity Volunteers: In an effort to get local elected officials more engaged in promoting homeownership, HUD is working with U.S. Conference of Mayors and Habitat for Humanity to build homes in Cleveland during USCM's annual conference. Several big city mayors, Administration officials, and various national partners are expected to participate. Freddie Mac is also sponsoring the homebuilding event.
	Houston, TX Spring/Summer 1996 (or Los Angeles, Buffalo, Cleveland, or Detroit)	Kick-Off "Homes for Houston Campaign" with Mayor Bob Lanier. HUD has launched a nation- wide campaign to bring the National Homeownership Strategy to life at the local level. As part of that effort, the City of Houston has created "Homes For Houston," an aggressive, visible campaign to build 25,000 homes by the year 2000. "Homes For Houston" is one of the earliest and most dramatic local partnerships that HUD will feature this spring and summer.

Homeownership Zones Builds on the successes of the Empowerment Zone program by using challenge grants to develop local partnerships to develop large tracts of homeownership, create visible, large-scale changes and drive economic growth in targeted areas.	Atlanta, GA Detroit, MI New York City, NY Pittsburgh, PA Anytime	Visit Any of the Following Model Large Tract Homeownership and Neighborhood Revitalization Efforts: Summerhill (Atlanta). The Summerhill Neighborhood, a distressed community located in both the Olympic Ring and the City's Empowerment Zone, is undergoing a wholesale revitalization including the construction of nearly 300 units of new housing and the development of a full-scale grocery store. Victoria Park (Detroit). Victoria Park is a renewed suburban-style neighborhood in Detroit's east side that has attracted middle-class families back into the City. The revitalization of Victoria Park has spawned the development of 86 new homes, with 71 additional homes to be built, and an expansion of a local shopping center. East Brooklyn Nehemiah Homes (New York). The East Brooklyn Nehemiah Homes project, located in one of the City's most distressed neighborhoods, is one of the largest single family affordable home developments in the nation. The effort, started by East Brooklyn Churches (IAF), built 2,300 homes for low-income families to purchase at the affordable price of \$49,000. South Bronx Nehemiah Homes (New York). South Bronx Churches, in partnership with I.D. Robbins and the state housing finance agency, completed the construction of 512 affordable homes for working families. The \$1 million in revenue generated from the sales of the homes will be reinvested in future homeownership and neighborhood revitalization projects. Crawford Square (Pittsburgh). The City is embarking on its largest residential redevelopment effort in 30 years. Crawford Square, located in the Hill District overlooking downtown Pittsburgh, will provide nearly 500 units of affordable new apartments and homes when completed.
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B. Empowering America's Communities

Objective: HUD aims to provide communities greater flexibility to administer federal programs and greater incentive to form inclusive partnerships and comprehensive strategies at the local level and to give communities the tools they need to leverage private investment in affordable housing and job-generating activities.

Key Administration Initiatives	City/Time	Suggested Visible Achievements to Visit
Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities Initiative 72 urban empowerment zones and enterprise communities have received \$3 billion in federal grant and tax benefits, hundreds of millions of dollars in loan guarantees, preference in competitions for additional grants across the federal government, and unprecedented federal cooperation in waiving regulations and cutting red tape. - Program demonstrates the importance of revitalizing communities from the "ground up," forging local collaborations, meeting performance benchmarks to ensure responsible decentralization, and using challenge grants to attract private sector investment.	Atlanta, GA May 1996 (In conjunction with the Olympics)	Help Open a Recycling Plant with New Employees in Atlanta EZ: Renewal Atlanta, a recycling plant, will open this May. The plant will create 65 permanent jobs for Zone residents and 200 temporary jobs for high school and college students. Renewal Atlanta will place these young people in companies which do business with the plant and award them \$4,000 scholarships and career counseling. Construction is underway.
	Baltimore, MD July 1996	Participate in Opening of Job Training Site in Baltimore EZ: An abandoned building is being renovated with the help of student apprenticeships (funded by DOL) and will be converted into a job training and placement facility for Zone residents.
	Chicago, IL Anytime (in conjunction with the Democratic Convention)	Visit with Companies Opening in Former Brownfields Site in Chicago EZ: Several companies have opened or are opening facilities on a restored brownfield site. Two of them -- Madison Equipment and Scott Peterson Meats -- have created more than 100 jobs for Chicago residents.
	Detroit, MI Anytime (in conjunction with the Empowerment Zone conference)	Visit Renovated Historic Building with Church Officials in Detroit EZ: The historic Garfield Building, owned by the Cathedral Church of St. Paul, will house a new Rite-AID drugstore, employing 45 Zone residents, and provide rental housing for 80 families, a third of which will be low-income. Construction is underway.
	Los Angeles, CA April/May, 1996	Join Bank in Issuing Loans to Small Businesses in L.A. EZ: The L.A. Community Development Bank will begin making loans to small business owners and others in the Zone soon, possibly as early as April. The Bank received more than \$450 million from HUD and \$550 million from private sector contribution for its loan portfolio.
	Cleveland, OH Anytime	Visit Fortune 1000 Company Headquarters in Cleveland EZ. Bearings, Inc., a Fortune 1000 industrial corporation, will build a new \$28 million world headquarters in the Zone, employing 300 people. Construction is underway.

New Wave of Building Affordable Housing • <i>Supporting capable nonprofits:</i> HUD will forge new relationships with nonprofits like Habitat for Humanity to help them continue to build affordable, single-family homes for low-income families. • <i>Supporting community development corporations:</i> HUD will continue to partner with the National Community Development Initiative (NCDI), a consortium of ten foundations and corporations to assist nearly 200 CDCs in turning around America's poorest neighborhoods. • <i>Partnering with pension funds:</i> HUD has encouraged pension funds to invest in the production and rehabilitation of affordable multifamily housing.	Philadelphia, PA July 1996 San Francisco, CA Boston, MA Anytime	Participate in Grand Opening of New Apartments and Grocery Store. Next July, the Association of Puerto Ricans in March (APM) is going to have a grand-opening of a 45-unit apartment complex and groundbreaking on a 40,000 square foot supermarket (\$50,000 in NCDI funds) Visit Affordable Homes Financed By AFL-CIO Pension Fund. The following are model affordable housing projects financed by the AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust: • <u>Market Heights Apartments in Bernal Heights</u> -- This will be a 46-unit apartment complex located in the Bernal Heights neighborhood in San Francisco. In a city that has one of the most expensive rental markets in the country, the development will provide needed affordable housing for 24 working families (with incomes of \$28,800-\$34,560) and for 22 low-income families receiving federal rental assistance. Market Heights Apartments is currently under construction. • <u>Lowell Square in Boston</u> -- Lowell Square Apartments, located in a prime residential and commercial development area in the City's West End, will be a mixed-income, 183-unit complex providing affordable homes for working and middle-class families and low-income families receiving federal rental assistance.
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C. Transforming Public Housing

Objective: HUD is changing the dynamic of public housing by tearing down the worst projects and replacing them with smaller-scale developments that anchor neighborhood revitalization efforts; changing rules to reward people who work and promote self-sufficiency and responsibility; and cracking down on poor management and violent crime in public housing.

Key Administration Initiatives	City/Time	Suggested Visible Achievements to Visit
Physical Remake of Public Housing - The Clinton Administration will tear down an unprecedented 24,000 units of bad public housing and rebuild them as attractive, low-rise apartments. That four year pace betters the 20,000 units demolished in all of the last ten years combined. - Awarded a total of \$1.44 billion in grants to spur economic development and change the shape of 85 public housing developments nationwide.	Baltimore, MD July 20, 1996	Participate in Full Transformation of Baltimore Public Housing -- Demolition, Groundbreaking, and Opening of Learning Center: On July 20, 1996, Mayor Schmoke plans to showcase all of the following activities to highlight the City's plans to replace <u>all</u> high-rise developments in Baltimore: (1) <u>Groundbreaking for Lafayette Courts</u> -- all six high-rise buildings and 17 low-rise developments of Lafayette Courts have come down; groundbreaking for the new townhomes, low-rise family apartments and senior buildings will be ready in July. (2) <u>Demolition of Lexington Terrace</u> -- located within the city's Empowerment Zone, Lexington Terrace will be demolished (700 units) and replaced with a combination of townhouse apartments, townhomes, and rental housing for the elderly. (3) <u>Opening of Computer-Based Learning Center</u> -- Mayor intends to have a computer-based learning and training center operational in Lexington Terrace by the July event.
	Cleveland, OH June 7, 1996	Help Dedicate Carl B. Stokes Social Service Mall Adjacent to Public Housing: The Social Service Mall, adjacent to the King Kennedy Renaissance Village, will house a wide variety of educational, social, and health services to residents, such as: MetroHealth, Youth Enhancement Service, a child care center, and a training room for the GED program.
	St. Louis May 17, 1996	Participate in Groundbreaking for Vaughn (St. Louis): All 656 units of public housing have been demolished. Construction on new garden-style apartments for low and moderate-income families will begin this spring. Vaughn is the model of tomorrow's public housing: leveraging federal funds with private and public resources, creating market-rate housing for mixed-income families, and seeking private management. (Attached is a list of additional, high-profile public housing reconstructions that can be considered for upcoming travel.)

CHANGING THE FACE OF PUBLIC HOUSING
Status of HUD's Major Reconstructions of Public Housing
March 1996

Development City	Amount (Type of Grant)	Demolition Start Date (% Completed) Replacement Start Date	Basic Description
Techwood/Clark Howell Atlanta, GA	\$42,412,635 (93 HOPE VI) \$19,400,000 (95 Development)	May 1995 (100%) March 1996 (1st round groundbreaking)	• 1081 total units, all to be demolished • 390 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 489 Section 8 certificates
John Hope Homes Atlanta, GA	Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Projects (MROP) (details TBD)	March 1996 1997	• 581 units to be demolished • part of Olympic Legacy Program
John Eagan Homes Atlanta, GA	Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Projects (MROP) (details TBD)	April 1996 (1st phase only) 1997	• 542 units to be demolished • about 150 units will come down in 1st phase • part of Olympic Legacy Program
East Lake Meadows Atlanta, GA	Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Projects (MROP) (details TBD)	May 1996 1998	• 650 units to be demolished • part of Olympic Legacy Program
Jonathan Pitney Village Atlantic City, NJ	Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Projects (MROP) (details TBD)	FY 1997 FY 1997	• 330 units to be demolished
Lafayette Courts Baltimore, MD	\$49,663,600 (94 HOPE VI)	August 1995 (100%) July 1996	• 807 total units • 771 units demolished • 18 units renovated • 338 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 385 Section 8 certificates
Lexington Terrace Baltimore, MD	\$22,700,000 (95 HOPE VI)	June 1996 Fall 1996	• 677 units to be demolished • 203 replacement units of PH rental townhouses • 113 townhouses for home ownership • 100 elderly units (35 set aside for PH residents) • 108 Section 8 certificates
Mission Main * Boston, MA	\$49,992,350 (93 HOPE VI)	June 1996 Fall 1996	• 822 total units • 500 units to be demolished • 322 units to be reconfigured • 500 replacement units on site • 346 Section 8 certificates
Orchard Park* Boston, MA	\$30,400,000 (95 HOPE VI)	October 1996	• 711 total units • 330 units on-site replacement • 305 units off-site replacement • 74 Section 8 certificates
McGuire Gardens* Camden, NJ	\$42,177,229 (94 HOPE VI)	November 1996 FY 1997	• 367 total units • all will be renovated w/HOPE VI funds

Development City	Amount (Type of Grant)	Demolition Start Date (% Completed) Replacement Start Date	Basic Description
Earle Village Charlotte, NC	\$34,685,155 (93 HOPE VI) \$7,055,000 (95 Implementation)	July 1995 (95%) March 14, 1996 (1st Phase Ground breaking)	• 409 total units • 300 units to be demolished • 109 units to be renovated • 265 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 75 Section 8 certificates
Cabrini Green Chicago, IL	\$50,000,000 (94 HOPE VI)	September 1995 (60%) August 1996	• 1,921 total units • 660 units to be demolished • 60 units to be renovated • 303 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 167 Section 8 certificates
King Kennedy/Outhwaite Homes* Cleveland, OH	\$50,000,000 (93 HOPE VI)	Demolition completed prior to HOPE VI Grant Renovation began October 1995	• 2,208 total units • 500 units are being renovated
Windsor Terrace Columbus, OH	\$41,053,408 (94 HOPE VI)	December 1995 (45%) August 1996	• 442 total units, all to be demolished • 372 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 70 Section 8 certificates
Lakewest Dallas, TX	\$26,600,000 (94 HOPE VI)	July 1994 (100%) October 1996	• 3,500 total units • 2,512 units demolished • 335 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 165 Section 8 certificates
Quigg Newton Homes* Denver, CO	\$20,198,288 (94 HOPE VI) \$6,300,000 (95 HOPE VI)	June 1996 August 1996	• 400 total units • 400 units to be renovated/reconfigured
North Lincoln Park Denver, CO	Development (details TBD)	December 1994 (100%) April 96	• 422 units demolished • 206 2 story mod-victorian townhouses • 75 units reserved for elderly
Jeffries Homes* Detroit, MI	\$39,807,342 (94 HOPE VI)	August 1996	• 2,170 total units • approx. 500 units to be demolished • 250 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 250 Section 8 certificates
Parkside Homes * Detroit, MI	\$499,922 (95 HOPE VI) \$47,620,227 (95 HOPE VI)	May 1996 August 1996	• 737 total units • 350 units to be demolished • 387 units to be reconfigured • 113 replacement units (HOPE VI)
Kennedy Brothers Memorial Apartments El Paso, TX	\$500,000 (94 HOPE VI) \$35,224,644 (95 HOPE VI)	October 1995 (48%) July 1996	• 364 total units • 124 units to be demolished • 240 units to be renovated • 124 replacement units (HOPE VI)

Development City	Amount (Type of Grant)	Demolition Start Date (% Completed) Replacement Start Date	Basic Description
Allen Parkway Village Houston, TX	\$36,602,761 (93 HOPE VI)	June 1996 August 1996	• 1,000 total units • 677 units to be demolished • 205 units to be reconfigured • 500 replacement units (HOPE VI)
Concord Village* Eagle Creek Indianapolis, IN	\$500,000 (94 HOPE VI) \$30,499,010 (95 HOPE VI)	April 1996 November 1996	• 310 total units, all to be demolished • 150 units to be reconfigured • 240 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 70 Section 8 certificates
Guinotte Manor* Kansas City, MO	\$47,579,800 (93 HOPE VI)	June 1996 August 1996	• 418 total units • 246 units to be demolished • 172 units to be renovated • 246 replacement units (HOPE VI)
Highland Park Little Rock, AR	FY 1995 Development (amount TBD)	May 1996 Summer 1996	• 307 units to be demolished
Cotter and Lang Homes Louisville, KY	FY 1995 Development (amount TBD)	May 1996 Fall 1996	• 1,116 units to be demolished
Pico Gardens* Aliso South/Aliso North Los Angeles, CA	50,000,000 (93 HOPE VI)	November 1996 Spring 1997	• 577 total units • 481 units to be demolished • 481 replacement units (HOPE VI)
LeMoyne Gardens* Memphis, TN	\$481,000 (94 HOPE VI) \$47,281,182 (95 HOPE VI)	November 1996 Spring 1997	• 842 total units, all to be demolished • 500 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 342 Section 8 certificates
Hillside Terrace Milwaukee, WI	\$40,003,646 (93 HOPE VI) \$4,685,800 (95 HOPE VI)	May 1995 (100%) September 1995	• 596 total units • 119 units demolished in FY 1995 • 259 units will be renovated • 79 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 39 Section 8 certificates • reconstruction complete 12/97
Scutter Homes Newark, NJ	Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Buildings (MROP) (details TBD)	1996 1998	• 612 units to be demolished • low-rise garden style townhouses planned
Walsh Homes Newark, NJ	\$49,996,000 (94 HOPE VI)	June 1996 1998	• 630 total units, all to be demolished • 358 replacement units (HOPE VI)
Christopher Columbus Newark, NJ	Development (details TBD)	April 1995 (75%) Ongoing (45%)	• 1,556 units to be demolished • 1,777 new units to be built
Elm Haven * New Haven, CT	\$45,331,583 (93 HOPE VI)	September 1996 Fall 1996	• 482 units to be demolished • 352 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 110 Section 8 Certificates

Development City	Amount (Type of Grant)	Demolition Start Date (% Completed) Replacement Start Date	Basic Description
Desire New Orleans, LA	\$44,255,908 (94 HOPE VI)	August 1995 (15%) October 1995	• 1,832 total units • 1,160 total units to be demolished • 333 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 167 Section 8 certificates
Hilltop Homes Omaha, NE	Development (details TBD)	April 1996 (2nd phase) April 1996	• 225 units to be demolished • all units in 1st phase demolished
Richard Allen Homes Philadelphia, PA	\$50,000,000 (93 HOPE VI)	March 1996 August 1996	• 1,324 total units • 129 units to be demolished • 876 units to be reconfigured
Raymond Rosen Philadelphia, PA	Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Buildings (MROP) (details TBD)	July 1995 (100%) September 1996	• 814 units demolished • 191 row-house units on-site replacement • 319 garden-townhouse units off-site replacement
Aliquappa Terrace* Pittsburgh, PA	\$31,564,190 (93 HOPE V)	April 1996 Summer 1996	• revitalization plan w/ replacement proposal pending
Darst Webbe * St. Louis, MO	\$500,000 (94 HOPE VI) \$46,771,000 (95 HOPE VI)	April 1996 Summer 1996	• 1,000 total units • 758 replacement units (HOPE VI)
Vaughn St. Louis, MO	\$17,400,000 (95 Development)	May 1995 (100%) Spring 1996	• all 432 units currently demolished • 1st phase construction will consist of 160 new multifamily rental housing units of which 93 units will be maintained for PH eligible residents
Mirasol Homes* San Antonio, TX	\$244,550 (94 HOPE VI) \$48,285,500 (95 HOPE VI)	April 1996 August 1996	• 500 total units, all to be demolished • 500 replacement units (HOPE VI)
Springview Apartments San Antonio, TX	\$48,810,294 (94 HOPE VI)	April 1996 June 1996	• 421 total units, all to be demolished • 421 replacement units (HOPE VI)
Bernal Dwellings* Yerba Buena Homes San Francisco, CA	\$49,992,377 (93 HOPE VI)	November 1996	• 484 total units, all to be demolished • 353 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 131 Section 8 certificates
Hayes Valley San Francisco, CA	\$22,050,000 (95 HOPE VI)	N/A	• 294 units to be demolished • 117 PH replacement units • 177 Section 8 certificates
Holly Park Apartments Seattle, WA	\$500,000 (93 HOPE VI) \$47,116,503 (95 HOPE VI)	May 1996 Summer 1996	• 893 total units • 871 units to be demolished • 500 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 393 Section 8 certificates

Development City	Amount (Type of Grant)	Demolition Start Date (% Completed) Replacement Start Date	Basic Description
John Hay Homes * Springfield, IL	\$19,775,000 (94 HOPE VI)	April 1996 August 1996	• 731 total units • 599 units will be demolished • 299 replacement units (HOPE VI) • 300 Section 8 certificates
Ellen Wilson Dwellings Washington, D.C.	\$15,671,911 (93 HOPE VI) \$9,404,045 (95 HOPE VI)	April 2, 1996 Summer 1996	• 134 total units, all to be demolished • 134 replacement units (HOPE VI)

* demolition application not yet approved for HOPE VI Grant or demolition application not yet received

3-26-96

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 22, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TODD STERN
HELEN HOWELL *HH*

SUBJECT: Recent Information Items

We are forwarding the following recent information items:

*cc: VP (Lies)
We need to
do more with this*

(A) **Pena memo on financial recovery of airlines.** Remarkable turnaround -- the major passenger airlines reported net profits of \$1.7 billion and operating profits of \$5 billion in 1995. Every major passenger airline achieved an operating profit, and all but one reported net profits. "You and the Administration should take a significant part of the credit...." When you took office, the airlines had just completed 3 years of record-breaking losses (\$10 billion over 3 years). You proposed legislation to create the National Airline Commission, and now 80% of their 61 recommendations have been acted upon.

*Michelle
great - need
reply
to: Ann Lewis
Doh*

(B) **Cisneros memo on your HUD-related achievements.** *Homeownership* -- highest level in 15 years, and the last year's increase in the homeownership rate is the fastest in 30 years. This increase was made possible by your economic policies, lower interest rates, 8 million new jobs, streamlining of the FHA, and HUD's partnerships with the private sector. *Empowerment zones and enterprise communities* -- over 70 urban communities have been designated as EZs or ECs using billions of Federal dollars to create jobs and businesses, and leverage private sector investment. *Transformation of public housing* -- we have implemented the most far-reaching changes since its inception. Dozens of "blighted high-rise projects" are now being demolished and replaced with "garden-style, economically-integrated developments." Sec. Cisneros also provides charts describing achievements city-by-city.

agrees

(C) **Cisneros memo on Habitat for Humanity legislation.** Henry thinks a signing ceremony would be a good idea for the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act, which would fund Habitat for Humanity, Cities in Schools, and other non-profits committed to housing and community development. A ceremony has been tentatively scheduled for March 28.

*agrees - let's
send this out
the house
Hurry*

(D) **Cisneros memo to HRC on the Washington Interfaith Network (WIN).** The Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), founded in 1940 by Saul Alinsky, represents about 2000 congregations and 2.5 million people in 20 states, with a mission to assist communities in creating broad-based, multi-racial, and economically diverse organizations. The IAF Washington, D.C. affiliate, WIN, is comprised of 50

3.26.96

X/ congregations from throughout the District. WIN's primary goal is to create a fund to: 1) generate low income housing, and 2) keep D.C. public schools open from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. to provide a safe environment for academic, recreational and cultural activities for the District's young people. WIN's founding convention will be held on May 28 at the Metropolitan A.M.E. Church and 2000 WIN members are expected to attend. Henry hopes the First Lady can participate in their kick-off event.

We also have received the following items:

✓ **Ann Lewis memo on Doris Kearns Goodwin.** Ann spoke with Doris about her comments on the Charlie Rose show. Apparently, it was an old show, taped last fall. Doris was surprised that it was re-run and says she would not speak in the same way today. She believes that your fighting the budget and choosing to become involved in Bosnia are major events in your Presidency -- experiences comparable to Lyndon Johnson's support for the 1964 Civil Rights Act and FDR's New Deal -- actions where the President used the power of the Presidency to do what is right and found himself strengthened/transformed. About Whitewater -- she hadn't thought about the difficulty of finding and compiling the records, and said after reading the excerpts of Blood Sport in Time Magazine, "It is clear there was no wrongdoing..... There is nothing to this." Ann adds that Doris is a friend who wants to stay well informed about you and your leadership. Ann wants to send Doris one or two of your speeches. Do you have a preference?

no - Ann
get REC report
+ Ann's memo
+ good speech
+ all balls

✓ **Ickes/O'Connor update on Stanton Glantz tobacco study.** Dr. Glantz is studying the extent and nature of tobacco industry influence on state tobacco policymaking. Congress had expressed concern about the portion of the study analyzing the relationship between tobacco industry contributions and state legislative voting patterns. Because of this concern, Dr. Glantz applied to the American Cancer Society to fund this portion of his research, and last month they agreed to provide the \$75,000 he needed. The balance of the funds needed for Dr. Glantz' research, \$200,000, will be awarded to him by the National Cancer Institute in July 1996.

good

✓ **Emerson memo on first meeting of ratings working group.** Tony Podesta reports that the meeting of representatives from the studios, cable and the four broadcast networks on March 13 went well. The next meeting is scheduled for May 6 in L.A. Working groups were formed to address thorny issues such as how to define news, cartoons, etc. Tony thinks they may beat the January 1 deadline. John says he urged doing at least prime time shows for the new season, though he doesn't think you should bank on it.

great

✓ **Thank you note from Dan Rather.** He thanks you for your letter of congratulations for the "15 years-as-anchor" celebration. "You were most generous, and I am very appreciative. I have not earned such praise. But your words inspire renewed effort to try harder to deserve at least some of them, sometime."

Ben. fr

✓ **Follow-up from Leon on Arkansas water projects.** Sens. Bumpers and Pryor, Rep. Blanche Lincoln-Lambert and Marion Barry have all been informed that your FY 97 budget request will include funding for the Grand Prairie Corps of Engineers project.

3-26-96



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20410-0001

96 MAR 20 P4:32

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton
FROM: Henry G. Cisneros
DATE: March 19, 1996
SUBJ: The Industrial Areas Foundation and the
Washington Interfaith Network

In our recent conversation we discussed the formation of the Washington Interfaith Network (W.I.N) by the Industrial Areas Foundation (I.A.F). In particular, I described their plan to create after-hours programs in the D.C. public schools and their request for your participation as First Lady in the kick-off of their efforts on May 28, 1996. I promised to provide you with background information on the I.A.F. and the W.I.N. initiative.

BACKGROUND

The I.A.F was founded in 1940 by Saul Alinsky. In 1972, Alinsky died and the Board of Directors named Ed Chambers as the Executive Director. Today, the I.A.F is staffed by Mr. Chambers and seven national staff. The national staff have regional responsibilities to oversee local I.A.F. chapters and to organize new efforts in communities that invite the I.A.F. to assist them in creating broad-based, multi-racial economically diverse organizations.

There are fifty organizations in twenty states and Washington D.C., that are affiliated with the I.A.F. These organizations represent approximately 2,000 congregations and two and a half million people. The I.A.F is also affiliated with five organizations in Great Britain as well as experimental efforts in South Africa.

WASHINGTON INTERFAITH NETWORK

W.I.N is the I.A.F affiliate in Washington, D.C. comprised of 50 congregations from every neighborhood and ward. The major thrust of W.I.N's work is to create a Youth and Neighborhood Development Fund. This fund's purpose is two-fold; to create a critical mass of new homeowners, and to keep the D.C. public schools open from 3:00 - 6:00 P.M. It is during this time of day that young people experience the most assaults and the highest rates of teen pregnancy. Through an intensive extended day

program, W.I.N seeks to provide a safe environment in which to conduct academic, recreational and cultural enrichment activities for the District's young people. Further, it is a way to involve parents, church members and community residents in the public schools.

To support this fund, W.I.N is seeking the assistance of church leaders, the legal community, university presidents, banks and large corporate foundations. On May 28, 1996, at Metropolitan A.M.E. Church, 1518 "M" Street, N.W., W.I.N will hold its founding convention. Two Thousand W.I.N members and numerous community leaders are expected to attend.

HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Over the years I.A.F affiliated organizations have created 4,500 homes for low and moderate income people for homeownership. Over 4,000 homes have been built or are currently under construction. Additionally, there are commitments to begin construction in the next year of another 2,000 plus units. Most of these homes have been built under the "NEHEMIAH" concept, i.e., creating a critical mass of new homes in order to recreate "whole" neighborhoods in economically distressed areas. I.A.F has done this in Brooklyn, the Bronx, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Prince George's County, Maryland, Los Angeles and Memphis, I.A.F has also been instrumental in creating hundreds of new homes in cities throughout Texas, including San Antonio.

I.A.F. organizations have been successful in getting local and state governments to invest major funding in infrastructure development in many of the cities in which I.A.F operates. The most notable of these has been in San Antonio and throughout South Texas where I.A.F has been instrumental in bringing water and sewerage to the "colonias".

YOUTH AND SCHOOLS

Two I.A.F organizations in cooperation with the New York City School System have founded and are operating three new public high schools -- two in Brooklyn, and one in the Bronx.

In Texas, I.A.F. organizations have created the "Alliance School Project" to change the culture of the public schools through a partnership initiated by I.A.F with school principals, teachers, parents and students. As a result of intensive extended day programs and other efforts there have been some remarkable results in schools that had previously been performing poorly.

In Baltimore, I.A.F created the College Bound Foundation. Funded by corporate donors and local foundations, the Foundation encourages and offers financial support to public school students to go to college. The Foundation has become a model.

I.A.F in Los Angeles has one of the most extensive efforts in gang prevention in the country. It is known as "HOPE AND YOUTH". It involves I.A.F organizations, churches, the legal community, the City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County.

In Baltimore, I.A.F is attempting to create a "child first authority". The legislation to create the authority is now before the Maryland State Legislature. It has the support of both Mayor Schmoke and Governor Glendenning. If passed, it will be the first government entity with bonding capacity to be established for the exclusive benefit of children. The goal of this authority is to finance the effort to keep the schools open from 3:00 - 6:00 P.M. for academic, recreational and cultural enrichment programming.

JOBS

In Texas, I.A.F has organized QUEST. QUEST is a very large partnership of I.A.F, government and local corporations. QUEST trains low wage workers for better jobs. Last year it was recognized by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Through the Ford Foundation the Kennedy School gave I.A.F in San Antonio the Innovations in Government Award. In San Antonio, QUEST has already trained and placed 500 people in decent paying jobs.

In Memphis, I.A.F has organized the "BETTER JOBS" Program. This is somewhat similar to "QUEST". This program has placed large numbers of people in the allied health field and in truck driving jobs.

In Baltimore, I.A.F in partnership with a large public service employees union has created a low wage workers association. This partnership initiated and worked to pass the first "Living-Wage" Bill through the Baltimore City Council. This bill ensures that thousands of low wage service workers will earn a living wage. (Currently, \$6.60 per hour, the wage will rise to \$7.70 per hour by 1998). This effort has received major national media attention from CNN, ABC, Chicago Tribune, N.P.R., and others.

CONCLUSION

I am very supportive of W.I.N.'s efforts and I am enthusiastic about their May 28, 1996 event. I think W.I.N., if properly supported and funded can help improve the quality of life in this community. We have helped W.I.N. make contact with Mr. James A. Johnson, Chairman and CEO of the Fannie Mae Association and have tried to facilitate a local connection between W.I.N. and the Cities and Schools organization (funded, at \$10 million in the HUD Extender Bill to help at-risk youth stay in school). Roberta Achtenberg, Senior Advisor at HUD, has been working as liaison to W.I.N. and can provide your staff with more detailed information concerning the May 28, 1996, event, with whatever information or assistance you may require.

cc: Honorable William J. Clinton
Vice President Al Gore
James A. Johnson, Chairman and CEO, Fannie Mae Association

3 26-96

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We also have received the following items:

✓ **Ann Lewis memo on Doris Kearns Goodwin.** Ann spoke with Doris about her comments on the Charlie Rose show. Apparently, it was an old show, taped last fall. Doris was surprised that it was re-run and says she would not speak in the same way today. She believes that your fighting the budget and choosing to become involved in Bosnia are major events in your Presidency -- experiences comparable to Lyndon Johnson's support for the 1964 Civil Rights Act and FDR's New Deal -- actions where the President used the power of the Presidency to do what is right and found himself strengthened/transformed. About Whitewater -- she hadn't thought about the difficulty of finding and compiling the records, and said after reading the excerpts of Blood Sport in Time Magazine, "It is clear there was no wrongdoing..... There is nothing to this." Ann adds that Doris is a friend who wants to stay well informed about you and your leadership. Ann wants to send Doris one or two of your speeches. Do you have a preference?

*no - added
get it to report
+ on museum
+ good speech
all Bales*

Ickes/O'Connor update on Stanton Glantz tobacco study. Dr. Glantz is studying the extent and nature of tobacco industry influence on state tobacco policymaking. Congress had expressed concern about the portion of the study analyzing the relationship between tobacco industry contributions and state legislative voting patterns. Because of this concern, Dr. Glantz applied to the American Cancer Society to fund this portion of his research, and last month they agreed to provide the \$75,000 he needed. The balance of the funds needed for Dr. Glantz' research, \$200,000, will be awarded to him by the National Cancer Institute in July 1996.

Good

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Deep

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

96 MAR 18 P5:23

4 March 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

CC: LEON PANETTA
EVELYN LIEBERMAN

FROM HAROLD ICKES *HI*
JENNIFER O'CONNOR

SUBJECT STANTON GLANTZ TOBACCO STUDY

Last fall, you expressed an interest in Congress' attempt to stop funding for the National Cancer Institute (NCI) research grant to Dr. Stanton Glantz. Dr. Glantz' project is designed to determine the extent and nature of tobacco industry influence on state tobacco policy making. The Congressional concern with the project focussed on a portion of the study which analyzed the relationship between tobacco industry contributions and state legislative voting patterns. Due to Congress' concern, Dr. Glantz applied to the American Cancer Society for funding for this portion of his study. Last month, the American Cancer Society agreed to provide the approximately \$75,000 needed.

The balance of the funds needed for Dr. Glantz' study, approximately \$200,000, will be awarded to him by the National Cancer Institute in July 1996. He will thus have the funds needed to complete his study.

3 26-96

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Thank you note from Dan Rather. He thanks you for your letter of congratulations for the "15 years-as-anchor" celebration. "You were most generous, and I am very appreciative. I have not earned such praise. But your words inspire renewed effort to try harder to deserve at least some of them, sometime."

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

14-Mar-1996 06:45pm

TO: (See Below)

FROM: John B. Emerson
Intergovernmental Affairs

SUBJECT: Media Update

FYI, Tony Podesta called to report that the first meeting of the ratings working group (with people representing studios, cable, and each of the 4 broadcast nets) took place yesterday and went well. The next meeting is set for May 6, in LA. In the meantime, working groups have been formed to address thorny issues such as what is news; cartoons; etc. Given their progress, he believes they may beat the Jan. 1 deadline. I pushed on prime time (at least) for the new season, and he thought that was a "real possibility." I wouldn't take any of that to the bank, however.

Distribution:

TO: Jennifer Palmieri
TO: Evelyn S. Lieberman
TO: Donald A. Baer
TO: Ron Klain
TO: Gregory C. Simon
TO: Skila S. Harris
TO: Lorraine A. Voles

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 25, 1996

96 MAR 25 P2:00

MEMORANDUM FOR TODD STERN

FROM: G. TIMOTHY SAUNDERS *JS*
Executive Clerk

SUBJECT: **DETAILEES: White House Staff Commissions and
Certificates**

- I. Shall we prepare a White House Staff commission for the following new staffer listed in the latest version of White House Management's Staff list (**attached**).

Peter C. Erichsen (Detailee)
Associate Counsel to the President (effective 1/8/96)

Discussion:

Thus far, no detailees to the White House have received **commissions**. In a previous instance, no commission was issued to Doug Letter, Associate Counsel to the President. (See my memo of 7/14/95, to you, **attached**. I had recommended a year's service for detailees to receive commissions -- Letter served for less than 6 months.)

OK
agree
As it would seem that Erichsen's case is similar to Letter's, I **would not recommend issuing a commission to Erichsen at this time**. If he were to remain here at the White House for an extended period, this question could be revisited.

- 3/25/96*
II. Shall we prepare White House Staff **certificates** for the following new Special Assistants to the President? They are listed in White House Management's Staff list, and have worked at the White House for over 6 months. (I had recommended a minimum of 6 months' service for a detailee to receive a certificate.)

Kris M. Balderson (Detailee)
Special Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs
(effective 6/22/95)

Lucy Wyman (Detailee)
Special Assistant to the President for Legislative
Affairs (effective 6/10/95)

Discussion:

A number of detailee staffers have received certificates as Special Assistants. Among them are Charles Duncan, PPO, and members of the NSC staff.

DECISIONS:

I. That we hold off on preparing a commission for Erichsen.

APPROVED: _____ ✓

DISAPPROVED: _____

DISCUSS: _____

II. That we prepare certificates for Balderson and Wyman.

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

DISCUSS: _____

✓ - Should we make
it a year? What do
you think?

3/25/90

July 14, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR TODD STERN

FROM: TIM SAUNDERS
Executive Clerk

SUBJECT: White House Staff Commissions and Certificates:
Doug Letter's Case

You asked for my recommendation concerning a commission for Doug Letter, a detailee who recently left the White House. Letter's title was Associate Counsel to the President. Briefly, yes, I recommend against granting Letter a commission.

While this is a policy/judgement call, perhaps the following might prove helpful in your decision process (I realize this may be more than you want so please excuse the drawn out nature of this, but as always, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Executive Clerk's perspective to you).

BACKGROUND

At their most basic, the "commissions" presented to White House staff are themselves simply appointment certificates, which
1) convey a nice expression of the President's confidence and
2) grant a "commissioned" appointee the title "the Honorable." These, of course, include the following: Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Counsellors, Assistants, Counsel, Deputy Assistants, Deputy Counsels, Associate Counsels, **but not Special Assistants to the President. As Specials do not receive "commissions," but receive White House Office Certificates, they are not addressed as "the Honorable."** As you know, in previous administrations Special Assistants to the President were "commissioned officers." As an aside, per White House Management, all "titled" White House Officers do not earn annual leave, which is consistent with past practice.

As White House Staff "Commissions" do not convey an "office" in the Constitutional sense, I see absolutely no impropriety in the President presenting Letter a commission.

Indeed, as far as historical precedent, detailees have on occasion received commissions for their White House service. Among the more notable, General Colin Powell received commissions when designated as Deputy Assistant and later as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Thus, while I do not hold the strong conviction that detailees should never receive commissions or certificates as a general rule (as there is some precedent for them receiving them in the past), I would, however, recommend imposing a "higher bar" than that which is applied to regular White House Staff. On that score, I would recommend a minimum of a year's White House service to warrant the granting of a commission and a six-month standard for the granting of a certificate for detailees.

Obviously, these time frames may appear arbitrary, so they are merely a suggestion. However, time in service has in the past been used as a criterion for receiving a White House Office Certificate.

As of now, at least one certificate has been previously approved for a detailee (for Mark Paris, NSC) and you recently approved one for Charles Duncan. (As I have previously mentioned, getting this information from Management has been a bit of a struggle -- see my next memo!)

However, you may want to consider denying commissions to detailees as a general rule, with limited exceptions (say, for the most senior detailees). The Executive Clerk would support that conclusion.

I am advised by Management that Letter served at the White House as an Associate Counsel from December 12, 1994, through June 9, 1995.

Thus, I recommend denial of a commission or certificate in this case. I base this recommendation on the facts as I know them: Letter was a detailee who served for less than 6 months.

DECISIONS

- 1) PREPARE NOTHING FOR LETTER: _____
(Clerk's recommendation)
- 2) PREPARE CERTIFICATE FOR LETTER: _____
- 3) PREPARE COMMISSION FOR LETTER: _____
- 4) NO COMMISSIONS FOR DETAILEES, WITH
LIMITED EXCEPTIONS _____
(Clerk's recommendation)
- DISCUSS _____

ASSISTANTS TO THE PRESIDENT

CURRENT LISTING

1. Leon Panetta
Chief of Staff
2. Harold Ickes
Assistant to the President and
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Political Affairs
3. Evelyn Lieberman
Assistant to the President and
Deputy Chief of Staff for White House Operations
4. Don Baer
Assistant to the President and
Coordinator for Strategic Planning
and Communications
5. Rahm I. Emanuel
Assistant to the President and
Director of Special Projects
6. John (Jack) H. Gibbons
Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology and Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy
7. Marcia L. Hale
Assistant to the President and
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs
8. Alexis M. Herman
Assistant to the President and
Director of Public Liaison
9. Kitty Higgins
Assistant to the President and
Cabinet Secretary
10. John Hilley
Assistant to the President and
Director of Legislative Affairs

11. Ron Klain
Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff
and Counselor to the Vice President
12. Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
13. Bruce Lindsey
Assistant to the President and
Deputy Counsel to the President
14. Michael McCurry
Assistant to the President and
Press Secretary
15. Thomas (Mack) F. McLarty
Counselor to the President
16. Bobby Nash
Assistant to the President and
Director of Presidential Personnel
17. John M. Quinn
Counsel to the President
18. Carol H. Rasco
Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy
19. Bruce N. Reed
Assistant to the President for
Domestic Policy Planning
20. Douglas Sosnik
Assistant to the President and
Director of Political Affairs
21. George R. Stephanopoulos
Advisor to the President for Policy and Strategy and
Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff

22. Todd Stern
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary
23. Jodie Torkelson
Assistant to the President for Management
and Administration
24. Laura D. Tyson
Assistant to the President and Director
of the National Economic Council
25. Margaret (Maggie) A. Williams
Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff
to the First Lady

DEPUTY ASSISTANTS TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Jeremy Ben-Ami
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy
2. Samuel (Sandy) R. Berger
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
3. Susan A. Brophy
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director of Legislative Affairs
4. Lisa M. Caputo
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Press Secretary to the First Lady
5. James Costello
Deputy Counsel to the President
6. W. Bowman Cutter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy
7. John B. Emerson
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Deputy Director of Intergovernmental Affairs
8. Ira Fishman
Deputy Assistant to the President [in Legislative Affairs]
9. Karen L. Hancox
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director for Political Affairs
10. John P. Hart
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director of Intergovernmental Affairs

11. Nancy Hernreich
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Scheduling and Appointments and
Director of Oval Office Operations
12. Alphonso Maldon
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
13. Doris O. Matsui
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Deputy Director for Public Liaison
14. Janet Murguia
Deputy Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs -- House
15. Betsy Myers
Deputy Assistant to the President for
Women's Initiatives and Outreach
16. Kevin M. O'Keefe
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director of Intergovernmental Affairs
17. Victoria Radd
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director of Communications
18. Paige Reffe
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Advance
19. Marsha Scott
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Political Affairs
20. Stephen B. Silverman
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Cabinet Secretary

21. Nancy E. Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and Staff
Director of the National Security Council
22. Gene Sperling
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy
23. Stephanie Streett
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Scheduling
24. Alan Sullivan
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of the White House Military Office
25. Patsy L. Thomasson
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director for Presidential Personnel
26. Melanne Verveer
Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy
Chief of Staff to the First Lady
27. Michael A. Waldman
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Speechwriting
28. Anne Walley
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Scheduling
29. Kathleen M. Wallman
Deputy Counsel to the President
30. Lorraine McHugh Wytkind
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Press Secretary for Media Affairs
and Operations
31. Marilyn Yager
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director of Public Liaison

SPECIAL ASSISTANTS TO THE PRESIDENT

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Special Associate Counsel to the President

TO: TODD STERN
EVELYN LIEBERMAN

FROM:

JIM DORSKIND *JD*

DATE: March 25, 1996

96 MAR 25 P 5 : 06

COMMEMORATIVE PROCLAMATION REQUEST

Commemoration Title: National Organ Donor Awareness Week

Commemoration Date(s): April 21-27, 1996

Requestor Name(s): Senator Carl Levin (and the wife of an organ recipient)

Organization: U.S. Senate

Request Date: March 1996

Congressional Support: Only Senator Levin, as of this writing

Contact Telephone

Number: 202-224-6221

History:

President Reagan issued a proclamation in 1984 , at the request of Congress, to commemorate National Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Week. In 1993 and 1994, President Clinton issued proclamations, again at the request of Congress, to commemorate Nancy Moore Thurmond National Organ Donor Awareness Week. (The name was changed and text included in these proclamations to honor the memory of Senator Strom Thurmond's daughter, whose organs were donated after she was killed in an automobile accident.

NOTES:

Senator Levin is pushing this very hard, and *he wants a (small) White House signing ceremony, as well.* I recommend we do the **proclamation**, and I believe that we can return the proclamation back to its more generic title. If either of you disagree, we can continue to name it after Ms. Thurmond.

Please indicate approval or disapproval of a PROCLAMATION, or another recommendation:

EL _____

TDS

*OK to proc. -
signing is up to scheduling.
3-25-96*

*original taken to
EL's ofc*

CARL LEVIN
MICHIGAN

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2202

March 6, 1996

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President

I am requesting that you issue an Executive Proclamation declaring the week of April 22-26, 1996, Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Week. According to statistics maintained by the United Network for Organ Sharing, in August of 1995 there were 41,385 Americans, representing the entire national spectrum of age, race, sex, and geographic distribution, waiting for the miracle of an organ transplant. Sadly, eight of these individuals die every day, largely because of inadequate awareness and family reluctance. The requisite transplant centers and procurement organizations are in place. They are poised and desperate, knowing that transplantation works, but only if there are organs and tissue to be transplanted!

Timeliness and understanding are absolutely essential to the success of this program. Positive publicity is needed to raise this issue in the American conscience so that people will talk about the gift of life, inform themselves of its merits and buy into the program. Many families never discuss their personal wishes in this regard, so when tragedy results in a loved one being declared brain dead, their decision-making is clouded by grief and uneasiness with the donor process. In far too many cases families of potential donors are never even approached, or, if asked, refuse to consent because they were not informed of their loved one's wishes.

I firmly believe that declaring an Organ Donor and Tissue Awareness Week, including a brief White House ceremony, will heighten public appreciation and strengthen convictions for this humane and compassionate program.

Your recognition of this need would be a signal which reaches all Americans and it will entice them to fully embrace this worthy cause. It will raise their level of confidence on the issue of equity for all beneficiaries and, most of all, give them a genuine sense of the national urgency of this program.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Carl Levin

CL/jp

and other facilities abroad, including all military facilities and naval vessels and stations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eighteenth.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

Editorial note: For the President's remarks on this tragedy, see the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 30, pp. 809 and 815).

Proclamation 6672 of April 15, 1994

Nancy Moore Thurmond National Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Week, 1994

By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation

Perhaps the most precious legacy that one human being can bestow upon another is the gift of life. The unselfish decision to donate one's organs after death is an act of generosity that can mean the beginning of new life for others. Advanced medical knowledge and techniques have allowed bone marrow transplants to bring hope and healing to children with leukemia; the gift of a new heart, lung, or liver has enabled many terminally ill Americans who would otherwise have died, to live longer, fuller lives. A new kidney has provided improved health, and the donation of a cornea has restored the miracle of sight. Unfortunately, however, many people still wait, and many people still die waiting for a suitable organ to become available.

Today there are more than 34,000 patients on the national transplant waiting list, and a new patient is added to the list every 20 minutes. The gap between the number of patients on the waiting list and the number of donors continues to widen, and many more will needlessly die. The United States has the potential to maintain an adequate supply of donor organs. To fulfill that potential we must increase public awareness of the urgent need for donation. All Americans need to know that by completing a donor card and carrying it, and by discussing with their families their wishes to donate, they may give the blessing of life to other Americans in need of organs for transplantation.

One year ago, on April 14, 1993, a tragic auto accident claimed the life of Nancy Moore Thurmond, the beautiful, gifted, and caring young daughter of Senator Strom Thurmond and his wife, Nancy. Their courageous decision to donate her organs so that others might live was in accordance with Nancy's wishes and, even in death, has enabled the promise of her young life to continue. The Thurmond family, along with others who have made the same magnanimous gesture for their loved ones, can find some measure of comfort in knowing that they have, indeed, bequeathed the gift of life.

The Congress, by Public Law 103-30, has designated the week beginning April 17, 1994, as "Nancy Moore Thurmond National Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Week" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week of April 17 through April 23, 1994, as Nancy Moore Thurmond National Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Week. I urge all health care professionals, educators, the media, public and private organizations concerned with organ donation and transplantation, and all Americans to join me in promoting greater and more widespread awareness and acceptance of this humanitarian cause.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eighteenth.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

Proclamation 6673 of April 15, 1994

National Volunteer Week, 1994

*By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation*

Since the founding of our democracy, the ideal of community service has been an integral part of our national character. As the words of Thomas Jefferson remind us, "A debt of service is due from every man to his country proportioned to the bounties which nature and fortune have measured to him." Throughout our history, Americans have been called upon to meet his challenge a thousandfold. For our Nation is a place of tremendous blessings—a noble purpose, a wealth of resources, a diverse and determined people. We are rich in the gifts of freedom. During this week especially, we realize anew that shared responsibility is freedom's price.

That our vibrant spirit of community has made our country strong reflects our understanding of this enduring truth. Every day, countless volunteers across America work to address the fundamental necessities of our people—educating our youth, protecting our environment, caring for those in need. From children who help older Americans after school to volunteer firemen who guard our neighborhoods while we sleep, these dedicated individuals bring a sense of hope and security to everyone whose lives they touch. Their service makes us stronger as a Nation, setting a powerful example of leadership and compassion to which we all can aspire.

This past year has marked the beginning of a new era for America, an era in which those of us who have benefited from this great land are acting on our instincts to help others in return. Though government has an important role to play in meeting the many challenges that remain before us, we are coming to understand that no organization, including government, will fully succeed without the active participation of each of us. Working family

DATE: 3-24

TO:

✓ Larry (Lake)

FROM: Staff Secretary

This package showed
up from Mandelbaum.
I guess he's trying to
build upchutzpah points.
You want to do anything
with it other than pitch
it? Truly

(sent on 3/25)

**COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS**

Pres has not seen
96 MAR 14 48:56

March 4, 1996

These articles may be of interest.

-Michael Mandelbaum

Will France 'Tell Europe to 'Eat Cake'?

By Michael Mandelbaum

ON BASTILLE DAY — tomorrow — the French commemorate the fall of the royal prison in Paris during the French Revolution more than two centuries ago. Not surprisingly, they also celebrate their own historic greatness as a European power. That status continues: This Bastille Day, France's forceful new president, Jacques Chirac, elected last May, finds himself the West's most dynamic leader.

Yet within the next year, Chirac may, for domestic political reasons, make decisions that will undercut the basis on which France hopes to play a leading international role in the 21st Century: the movement toward an economically and politically united Europe. That scenario would be a momentous development not only for France and Europe but for the United States as well.

France has been at the forefront of the movement toward European unity since the end of World War II. Chirac's predecessor, Francois Mitterrand, regarded membership in a united Europe as a way to play the major world role France could not achieve acting alone. A united Europe could



exercise a degree of international influence comparable to that of the United States, Russia or Japan.

The next move toward European unity is the Maastricht Treaty, calling for the creation of a single European currency. France signed the document in 1991, with others in the European Union.

To prepare for the merger of their individual currencies, each EU member agreed to keep its monetary exchange rate in a stable relationship with other member countries' rates. And during Mitterrand's term, France scrupulously complied, although the result was much higher interest rates, deliberately increased to keep up with Germany's, which in turn had sharply risen to help pay for

unification. In France, however, the increases have been accompanied by — and frequently considered the cause of — high unemployment, now a painful 12.5 percent. Unemployment was a major campaign issue, and Chirac promised to reduce it.

Ultimately, keeping that pledge may necessitate more public spending, a higher deficit and other policies that conflict with the single EU currency requirements. Italy and Britain have already abandoned those requirements. If Chirac follows them in order to fulfill his campaign promise, the plan for European economic union will collapse.

For the French, European economic union is not only worthwhile in itself, it is a precondition for a cohesive, all-European foreign policy. But Chirac could also put an end to the single most important example of a European foreign policy: peacekeeping in Bosnia. When war broke out in the former Yugoslavia in 1992, the Europeans told the American government it was a local problem they could resolve. As it turns out, Europe has neither resolved the problem nor prevented the United States and Russia from becoming involved; both are part of the multinational diplomacy "Contact Group."

Still, Britain and France are the major contributors to the UN peacekeeping force, in which the United States is not represented. Bosnia is thus the closest thing to an independent Western European foreign policy initiative.

Chirac has vowed to maintain French participation in the UN peacekeeping effort. Yet with no end to the war in sight, the prospect of a continuing, thankless, dangerous mission for their soldiers is hardly appealing to the French. Moreover, it could blight Chirac's presidency. The fall of the "safe haven," Srebrenica, only increases his incentives to withdraw France's peacekeepers, thereby triggering the end of the UN effort.

These setbacks to a united Europe that Chirac is on the brink of administering have important implications for the United States. Washington has consistently supported the movement toward European unity in public, but has privately felt ambivalent. A united Europe could be a powerful global partner for the United States, easing some of the burdens America has borne since 1945; but it could also become a rival.

A united Europe would inevitably dilute American power around the world. Of all the countries of Western Europe, France has been the most consistently in favor of expanding Europe's influence at the expense of that of the United States. Yet by Bastille Day, 1996, Chirac may well have made decisions that ensure Europe will be a loose association of wealthy, important, medium-sized nation-states rather than a budding transatlantic superpower.

The Nuclear Taboo Is Stronger Than Ever

By Michael Mandelbaum

THE SUGGESTION by a Japanese government official that the United States take the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima to apologize for the American attack of Aug. 6, 1945, illustrates the curious dual fate of the bomb over the past half-century.


Nuclear history has followed two tracks, which have intersected in unexpected and politically significant ways.

The bomb is, of course, a weapon of war. But it also has come to occupy a singular niche in global psychology as a symbol of both horror and evil. Over the past five decades, scientists and engineers have made bigger (and also smaller) nuclear weapons, even as soldiers and statesmen have considered how to use them — and how to prevent

them from being used. At the same time, the feeling has grown throughout the world that nuclear weapons are so devastating and repugnant that they should never be used under any circumstances — indeed, that they should be abolished.

Unlike the bow and arrow, the rifle, or the tank, the bomb is the subject of a widely held taboo. Its use has come to be regarded, like slavery, cannibalism or incest, as a violation of civilized norms. The mushroom cloud, such as the one that formed over Hiroshima, is universally recognized as a symbol of horror. It is on this basis that some Japanese consider its use against them — in a war that Japan started and in which its soldiers committed terrible atrocities — to be a crime.

Oddly, the taboo against the bomb was weakest — certainly it was least evident publicly — when the chances that it would actually be used seem, in retrospect, to have been greatest. During the first



two decades of the nuclear age, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was intense and dangerous: The two closest brushes with open warfare between them, which could have resulted in nuclear combat, came during the early 1960s, over Berlin and Cuba. This was the era, in the United States, of air raid drills conducted in public schools and bomb shelters built in the basements of family homes. Yet public protest against the bomb was rare and on a small scale.

The taboo was more forcefully expressed in the 1980s. During that decade, the rivalry between the two military giants, however strained it became, never seemed on the verge of triggering World War III; yet protests against the bomb were larger, louder and better organized than in the earliest part of the Cold War.

Although the Cold War has ended, the nuclear taboo remains. To be sure, the Japanese interest in an American apology for Hiroshima is more than an expression of that taboo. It involves, as well, Japan's inability to come to terms with its own role in World War II. Many Japanese prefer to see their nation as a victim rather than an aggressor in World War II. They emphasize the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki while downplaying the

— Continued on Next Page



Michael Mandelbaum, a professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, directs the East-West Project of the Council on Foreign Relations.

— Continued from Preceding Page

surprise attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, and the crimes the Japanese army committed in China. But there are other signs that the nuclear taboo remains robust. President Jacques Chirac of France was greeted with hisses and jeers by members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg recently for having authorized the resumption of French nuclear tests, to be conducted in the South Pacific.

During the final stages of the Cold War, the nuclear taboo was a minor handicap for the West. In the early 1980s, NATO members encountered stiff public resistance to their plan to deploy intermediate-range nuclear-armed missiles in Western Europe to counterbalance Soviet missiles of the same range. Millions of Western Europeans were flatly opposed to the stationing of any more nuclear weapons within their borders. At the same time, millions of Americans called for a "freeze" on the nuclear arsenals of both sides. The Communist governments were unmoved by the nuclear taboo because they were unaffected by public opinion.

Now, however, the broad public revulsion at nuclear weapons works to the advantage of the West and the United States. It helps to inhibit what is perhaps the chief danger the West and the world

face: nuclear proliferation. One obstacle to proliferation is the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), whose signatories recently agreed to extend it indefinitely.

The NPT is an explicitly unequal treaty: five of its signatories — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — are allowed to keep the nuclear weapons they already have, while all the others are required to pledge never to acquire them. The treaty testifies to the power of the nuclear taboo. For the conviction that nuclear weapons, even if strategically useful, are morally unacceptable, is one reason that more than 170 countries have been willing to accept a self-denying ordinance that discriminates against them.

Most of the world's countries have made the kind of commitment that is ordinarily unnatural and unwelcome because of the nuclear taboo. They have agreed to forswear a potentially useful armament and embrace in practice what they reject in principle — international inequality — because of the stigma attached to nuclear weapons. In that sense, the memory of Hiroshima, with the feelings of horror and revulsion that it arouses, helps to stem nuclear proliferation. And it is nuclear proliferation that is most likely to lead to future Hiroshimas.

India Prefers Slow Lane To U.S. Idea of Progress

By Michael Mandelbaum

ONE OF THE oddities of American foreign policy over the past half-century is how small a role India has played in it.

Although it is the world's second largest country after China — with a population of 900 million, 100 million of them educated and many speaking English — India has commanded relatively little American attention since winning its independence from Britain in 1947. The recent decision by the government of an Indian state to cancel construction of an American-sponsored power plant in western India illustrates one reason for India's unimportance to the United States in the past and shows why this may well continue into the next century.

Since 1947, India has been largely cut off from the western economies. This was a legacy of the drive for independence. Mohandas Gandhi, the principal independence leader, preached economic self-sufficiency, which he combined with skepticism of the value of heavy industry. He traveled with a spinning wheel, with which he made the cotton for his own clothes. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, endorsed the building of dams, steel mills and cement factories. As a socialist, however, Nehru was critical of private enterprise and, as a nationalist, he was hostile to foreign business.

Much of the Indian economy is owned by the government. The private sector came to be both heavily regulated and protected from foreign competition, and hostility to foreign companies became part of India's political culture.

American firms, especially major ones, found it hard to resist entering the Indian market but harder still to stay there. In the 1970s, Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter and his successor as prime minister, forced Coca-Cola, IBM and other companies to close their Indian operations.

In the early 1990s, however, three developments produced a sharp change in India's official economic thinking. The most tightly controlled and formidably protected economies in the world — those of the Communist countries of Europe — collapsed. Economic growth soared in Asian countries more committed to free market practices, while the Indian economy lagged. And India experienced a fiscal crisis, with its foreign currency reserves dwindling to almost nothing.

In response, the national government, still controlled by the Congress Party of Nehru

and Indira Gandhi, adopted a new set of economic policies calling for deregulation, privatization, the shrinking of the public sector and the encouragement of foreign investment. There seemed no reason that India, with its huge market, millions of skilled workers and nationwide system of roads and railways, could not increase its economic output as quickly as China has. If it could, it would become as important for America's economic future as is China — a magnet for investment and a major trading partner.

Faster growth requires more electric power, which has chronically been in short supply in India. A \$2.8-billion power plant, to be built by a consortium of American firms headed by the Enron Energy Corp. of Houston, and to be situated 100 miles south of Bombay, India's largest and most dynamic city, was to be the first of eight foreign-sponsored showcase energy projects. But earlier this month, the government of the western state of Maharashtra, in which the U.S.-sponsored project in Dobhal was being built, announced its cancellation.

The state government claimed that the power the plant would generate would be too expensive for consumers, although the announced price schedule was in line with the rates elsewhere in India. It also criticized the lack of competitive bidding for the project, although this procedure had been deliberately avoided in order to speed completion of the project.

In fact, the cancellation was partly the result of two admirable features of Indian public life: federalism and democracy. Although the national government in New Delhi had initiated the project, the state government in Bombay had the power to stop it. When the contract with the American consortium was signed, the Congress Party controlled not only the federal government in New Delhi but the state government as well. In an election earlier this year, however, the Congress Party was defeated by a coalition of two Hin-

du nationalist parties. It is the new government that halted the project, demonstrating that elections in India are meaningful events.

At the root of the cancellation, however, is an old, unfortunate and potentially costly feature of Indian politics: the popularity of strident opposition to foreign business. In the election campaign, the winning coalition found it politically profitable to object to Dobhal; once elected, it carried through its threat of cancellation.

The politics of Dobhal illustrate the extent to which India is out of step with the rest of the world. While even Communist countries such as China and Vietnam welcome foreign investment, in India politicians can still win elections by opposing it. In the short term, the losers from the Maharashtra government's decision are the American firms involved. In the longer term, however, because the Dobhal decision will discourage all foreign investment, the price will be paid by the people of India, who will be poorer than they would have been otherwise.

Secular Turkey Needs a Nod From Europe

By Michael Mandelbaum

WE ARE A western democracy," Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey told a group of visiting Americans last month.

"We belong in the West." Ciller's proposition faces an important test. Turkey has negotiated a customs union with the European Union (EU), which Turks see as a step toward full membership in the EU itself. The customs union must be approved by the European Parliament, the legislative arm of the EU. The parliament is hesitating, for reasons that partly echo the American debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The stakes are high not only for Ciller's government and for Turkey and Europe but for the United States as well. Though it has a stake in the issue, the United States, of course, has no EU vote. But it is urging Turkey to comply with European human-rights standards and urging the Europeans to ratify the customs union.

Of all the world's predominantly Islamic countries, Turkey is the one most committed to secular, democratic politics. It thus has the potential to

serve as a beacon for the others, an exemplary antidote to the Islamic fundamentalist movements that threaten American interests around the world.

Turkey is both eastern and western. Its dual identity is exemplified by the city of Istanbul, where business executives talk with their counterparts in Germany and Italy on mobile telephones and women, who have come from villages far to the east that lack running water, wear traditional Islamic dress, their faces hidden by veils.

Since the Turkish republic was established in 1923 on the ruins of the Ottoman empire, which had been defeated and destroyed in World War I, Turkey's leaders have aspired to be part of the West. The founding father, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, decreed that the country would be secular and replaced the Arabic with the Latin alphabet. Democratic governance has alternated with periods of military rule. The country is a member of NATO and fought on the side of the United States in both Korea and the Persian Gulf.

Despite this record, the western Europeans remain hesitant to admit Turkey fully to their ranks. One reservation has to do with the country's 10 million to 15 million Kurds, who are, like the Turks, Sunni Muslims but have a distinct language. Some of them are waging a bloody rebellion against the government in southeastern Turkey.

The Kurdish question is a complicated one. Most Kurds do not live in the southeast, do not assert a separate identity, and are comfortably assimilated into the Turkish population. Indeed, several of the country's presidents have been all or part Kurdish.

Moreover, leading the rebellion is the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist organization that has received aid from Iraq and Syria. Still, in fighting the PKK, the Turkish army has engaged in violations of human rights on a scale that concerns

the Europeans and jeopardizes their approval of the customs union.

The European Parliament's misgivings about the customs union involve, as well, the larger question of whether a country of 63 million Muslims, many of them poor, that is historically and culturally part of the Mideast, can fit comfortably into European institutions.

The dilemma that this poses for Western Europe is similar to the one that the United States faced with the free trade agreement with Mexico: whether to embrace a neighboring country that is not yet fully western, thereby risking importing some of its problems; or try to keep it at arm's length, which could discourage ongoing trends toward democracy, free markets and the

protection of human rights. The decision is sufficiently difficult that, although the European Parliament is scheduled to act by the end of the year, the customs union decision may be postponed.

The importance of Turkey results from what it is and where it is. In addition to being the world's most democratic, westernized Muslim country, Turkey is located near three of the world's most troubled regions: the former Yugoslavia, the Mideast and the Caucasus peninsula, south of Russia. In the post-Cold War era, the first two are places where the United States has used military force and the third involves Russian troops, oil and a conflict between Christians and Muslims.

A prosperous, secular, democratic, western-oriented Turkey could add much-needed stability to those regions. And Turkish democracy and prosperity and the country's continued alignment with the West, according to its prime minister, all depend heavily on membership in Europe's political and economic institutions, beginning with the customs union.

'The stakes are high for Turkey, Europe — and for the United States.'



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SUNDAY FOCUS

Michael Mandelbaum

Path to Bosnia Is Still Risky

THE CLINTON administration's intention to dispatch up to 25,000 American troops to Bosnia as part of a settlement of the war there raises three fundamental questions: Why are they going? What will they be doing? And with whom will they be doing it? The answers will determine whether the troop deployment turns out to be a contribution to peace in the Balkans or another American misadventure in the post-Cold War world.

The dispatch of troops is not a certainty. First there must be a peace agreement in Bosnia. The presidents of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia will gather at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton on Oct. 31 to try to reach one. If they succeed, it will be ratified at a formal conference, probably in Paris. Only then would western troops go to Bosnia.

But the prospects that they will go are good enough, and this could happen soon enough, that both the House and the Senate conducted hearings on the subject last week. The skepticism expressed by members of both bodies, from both political parties, made it clear that the first question the administration must answer is why the United States should send troops to an obscure part of southeastern Europe at all.

President Bill Clinton's foreign policy team put Bosnia at the top of its agenda in 1993 because it believed that important principles were at stake there. But the settlement in prospect will violate those principles: It will ratify Serb territorial gains made, in the administration's view, through aggression. It will accept the results of the barbarous practice of ethnic cleansing. It will involve close cooperation with President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, whom the administration initially branded an international criminal.

All this may be the price of ending the war, but such a settlement makes it impossible to portray the dispatch of American forces as a way of upholding principles important to Americans; indeed, the administration does not appear to be trying to do so.

Instead, the president and his advisers are asserting that contributing troops to a NATO force that will go to Bosnia is part of the American obligation to the Atlantic Alliance. This, however, is dubious: Under the North Atlantic treaty, all signatories are obliged to come to the aid of any of the others under attack, but not to police areas such as Bosnia that lie beyond the borders of any of them.

In the absence of a persuasive rationale for it, the administration will have to mount a military mission in Bosnia without political support at home. In that case, the mission will resemble the current occupation of Haiti. Just as in Haiti, the capacity to accomplish anything on the ground will be severely limited by the



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need, rooted in domestic politics, for the troops to leave as soon as possible without incurring casualties.

Secretary of Defense William Perry's recent proposal that a time limit of one year be placed on the Bosnian operation suggests that this is what will happen.

Whether a military force operating under such constraints can serve a useful purpose in Bosnia depends on what the force is asked to do.

The term most often used to describe what American troops will be doing is "peacekeeping." Peacekeeping involves monitoring a settlement to which all the parties to a conflict have agreed, with which all are satisfied, but that each party suspects the others may violate. Under those circumstances, the job of peacekeepers is simply to monitor the settlement to assure each side that the others are in compliance.

Peacekeepers such as those dispatched by the United Nations are often lightly armed, since theirs is not a military task. But they should be impartial. American forces in Bosnia will be neither. Reports indicate the Pentagon plans to send a heavy armored division, complete with powerful tanks. And the United States has already taken sides in the Bosnian war, bombing Bosnian Serb positions to protect Bosnian Muslim civilians.

The American history of taking sides may not matter if all three parties to the conflict — Serbs, Croats, and Muslims — abide faithfully by all the terms of the settlement negotiated. If the three sides are weary enough of war to stop fighting, if they are persuaded they can gain more from the western economic aid that will come only with peace than from continuing the conflict, if they are intimidated by the NATO firepower in Bosnia and convinced that it will be used against any side that violates the settlement, then peacekeeping may go smoothly.

But none of this is guaranteed. The parties to the war have, after all, fought bitterly for nearly four years. The central issue has been Bosnia's territory. The Muslim-dominated government in Sarajevo claims all of it; the settlement, however, will leave Serbs and Croats in control of much of it.

Even if all three sides accept the distribution of territory, the constitutional provisions for Bosnia may well prove controversial. The Muslims want a strong central government; the Serbs and the Croats fought to resist this, to secure considerable autonomy for themselves, and to gain the right to federate with what they consider their mother countries — neighboring Serbia and Croatia.

It is therefore entirely possible that the party most dissatisfied with the conflict will be the one — the Muslims — with whose cause the Clinton administration has strongly identified. In that case, the Muslims

will try — just as they tried with some success during the fighting — to enlist the United States in their quest to stretch, modify or overturn the settlement.

The Croats and the Serbs will resist any Muslim effort to do so, in which case the American force might well repeat the experience of American troops in Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993: Having entered a country intending to be neutral, they could find themselves allied with one of the parties in a bloody civil war that, in fact, has not ended. When this led to American casualties in Beirut and Mogadishu, the public outcry in the United States forced the withdrawal of the Americans.

If that should happen, it would do greater damage to NATO than if the United States had declined to participate in a western peacekeeping operation in the first place.

Still, it would not be the worst possible result of the dispatch of American forces to Bosnia. That would arise from what seems to be the answer to the question raised by the

presence of American troops in Bosnia: With whom will they serve?

They will apparently be serving with, among others, Russians. The Russian government, which does not belong to NATO, has thus far refused to place its forces under NATO's command. If the Russians are deployed separately and if the terms of the settlement are disputed, given the Russian sympathy for the Serbs the United States might find itself at odds with Moscow in a country where both have stationed troops.

The Clinton administration has declared, for example, that it may supply arms and provide training to the Bosnian army after peace has been established. The Russians might respond by giving similar assistance to the Serbs. In the worst case of all, Russian and American armies could well find themselves staring at each other across a contested border in Bosnia, as they did in Germany during the Cold War. While conflict with the Soviet Union over Germany during the Cold War was an unavoidable consequence of the defense of vital American interests, conflict with Russia over Bosnia would be a mistake, which could poison American dealings with the Russians on more important issues.

A NATO military mission in Bosnia need not end in failure or disaster. But to avoid a repetition of the recent American experiences in Haiti, in Somalia and in Germany, the Clinton administration must rally support in the Congress and the country for such a mission, make certain that none of the parties to a settlement tries to overturn it and work out a mutually acceptable relationship on the ground with Russia. And it must do all this before sending armed Americans to Bosnia.

*'The capacity to accomplish
anything on the ground
will be severely limited.'*

Russian Vote Certainty: Uncertainty

NEWSDAY, TUES, JAN 30, 1996

By Michael Mandelbaum

FIVE YEARS ago, Boris Yeltsin stood astride a tank in Moscow and confronted the powerful forces of communism. As a result of his victory, the Soviet Union collapsed and he merged as the president of a new Russia.

In the Russian presidential election scheduled for June, the confrontation will be repeated. Yeltsin is poised to run for re-election. Among his opponents will be a candidate from Russia's Communist Party, which is now the largest political force in the country. Conversations earlier this month in Moscow suggested that this time the confrontation between Russia's president and its Communists may have a different outcome.

In order to gain re-election, Yeltsin has devised a two-pronged political strategy. First, he is distancing himself from the economic reforms over which he presided for four years. The results of this past December's elections for the Russian parliament, the Duma, in which most of the successful candidates criticized the economic measures, demonstrated that they are deeply unpopular. In response, Yeltsin this month dismissed the last pro-free market official in his cabinet, Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais. Second, he will try to unite behind his candidacy all anti-Communist voters, including even those who have supported extreme nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

Yeltsin suffers from serious political weaknesses, however, all apart from public discontent with the cost of the transition to a market economy and widespread doubts about whether his health will permit him to serve another full five-year term. His erratic personal behavior and the corruption that is widely believed to flourish in the upper ranks of the Russian government have made him personally unpopular.

He will not be helped by the most recent episodes in the ongoing conflict with Muslim rebels from Chechnya: the bloody shoot-out in which Russian hostages were killed and some of the Chechen hostage-takers escaped, and the hijacking by Chechens




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of a Turkish ferry in the Black Sea carrying dozens of Russians. Russian liberals are angry at Yeltsin for the brutal tactics he has employed in the conflict; Russian nationalists are furious at the way the military's poor performance has humiliated the country, and Russians who are neither liberals nor nationalists are nonetheless troubled by the prospect that Yeltsin's war against the Chechens will bring terrorism to the rest of Russia.

The presidential election is likely to consist of two rounds. If no candidate receives 50 percent of the votes on June 16, a runoff between the two top vote-getters will take place. Yeltsin's anti-Communist strategy is designed for the second round; his problem is attracting enough support in the first ballot, when several other candidates opposed to the Communists will also be running. The Communists face the opposite problem. Their likely candidate, party leader Gennady Zyuganov, will almost certainly lead the first-round balloting. They and affiliated parties together received 30 percent of the December vote, three times that of any other single party. It is unclear, however, how a Communist can attract 50 percent of the electorate in a second-round vote.

That is because it is unclear just what the post-Soviet Communist Party of Russia stands for. Zyuganov has said that his political role model is Willy Brandt, the late German Social Democratic chancellor. But he also has called for reversing the economic political changes of the last five years. Whether he would try to do so as president, and whether he could do so if he tried, are questions of



Newsday / Bob Newman

enormous importance — and not only for Russia.

The Communists say that the Russian government should keep workers employed at all costs and increase old-age pensions. Attempting to carry out these promises would, however, fan the flames of inflation, the control of which has been one of the principal achievements of the Yeltsin government. The Communists also have said that, if they gain control of the Russian government, they will reassemble the Soviet Union, which is now divided into 15 separate sovereign countries. A serious

— Continued on Next Page

Michael Mandelbaum

Our Outdated Russia Policy

Why is the U.S. still boosting Yeltsin and giving Moscow unwanted economic advice?

SINCE 1993, AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA HAS rested on two pillars: enthusiastic support for a series of economic measures designed to create a market economy in Russia—a revolutionary transformation often misleadingly called “reform”; and public identification with the political fortunes of President Boris Yeltsin. Those policies were right for '93. They are wrong for '96. It is time for a change.

A recent expression of the policy came earlier this month when U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns, commenting on Yeltsin's dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais—the sole surviving pro-market official in the Cabinet—asserted that it was “absolutely essential” for Yeltsin to “reaffirm the reform basis of the Russian government.”

By firing Chubais, Yeltsin was looking to his own political future, in particular the Russian presidential election scheduled for June. He was responding to the results of December's vote for the Russian parliament, the Duma, in which most successful candidates had campaigned as opponents of the measures with which Chubais was associated. The American government was thus, in effect, urging Yeltsin to commit political suicide.

Washington's message, moreover, reinforced growing resentment among Russians at what they regard as demeaning and condescending American treatment. Historically, the State Department has not made a habit of commenting on Cabinet changes or giving directions on economic policy in other countries. Making an exception in the case of Russia reinforces the specious but widely believed claims of nationalist politicians that the aim of American policy is to humiliate and weaken Russia.

This does not mean that the policies with which Chubais was linked were wrong. To the contrary, controlling the supply of money, withholding subsidies from inefficient enterprises and continuing the transfer of government-owned property to private hands are essential for Russia's economic well-being. If the Russian government abandons these policies, the result will not be the Western-style prosperity of which Russians dream or the Soviet-style security that their memories have exaggerated. It will, instead, be rampant inflation and perhaps economic collapse.

But that message is most appropriately and effectively conveyed not by the American State Department but by the International Monetary Fund, which is lending Russia billions of dollars and is therefore in a position to tell the Russians that if they do not follow sensible economic policies,

they will not receive Western loans. Moreover, it is better that Russian anger at that message be directed at an international financial institution than at the U.S.

The second pillar of America's Russia policy, the embrace of President Yeltsin, reflects the understandable preference for the familiar. The June election may well produce a worse Russian President from the American point of view. But singling Yeltsin out for U.S. support will not improve his electoral chances, and, like gratuitous economic advice, gives offense to the Russian public, which has, after all, the right to choose its own leaders.

As Yeltsin's Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, visits Washington this week, it is appropriate, indeed essential, for the American government to make its views known on an

area of Russian policy in which the U.S. and other countries have a legitimate interest as well as some influence: foreign policy. It is essential to insist on Russian compliance with treaties limiting nuclear and non-nuclear armaments and also vital to insist on Russian respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors that were once republics of the Soviet Union and are now independent countries—especially the Baltic states and Ukraine.

If Russians choose to violate the rules of economic good sense, they will harm themselves; but that is their business. If they violate the rules of international good conduct, they will harm others, and that is the concern of all countries.

The proper goal of American policy toward its former cold-war rival remains in 1996 what it was in '93: a peaceful, democratic, prosperous Russia fully integrated into the international community. The appropriate tactics, however, are different. In '93, with Yeltsin politically strong and communist economic institutions and practices still intact, it was right for the U.S. to give active support to the creation of a market economy in Russia. Now, with Yeltsin politically weak, much of the work of destroying the communist economic system accomplished and a backlash against its inevitable costs cresting, the American activism of three years ago is out of place. In October 1993, when Yeltsin's opponents challenged his presidency by force, it was an act of principle as well as prudence for the U.S. to stand beside him. In '96, when they are challenging him at the ballot box, it is neither principled nor prudent to enter the fray.

In foreign policy, as elsewhere, consistency is generally a virtue, but, as Emerson noted, a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. The consistency of America's Russia policy has become foolish and even harmful to the national interests of the U.S. ■



Election countdown: The President looks to his future

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Foreign Policy as Social Work

Michael Mandelbaum

THE CLINTON RECORD

THE SEMINAL events of the foreign policy of the Clinton administration were three failed military interventions in its first nine months in office: the announced intention, then failure, to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia's Muslims and bomb the Bosnian Serbs in May 1993; the deaths of 18 U.S. Army rangers at the hands of a mob in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3; and the turning back of a ship carrying military trainers in response to demonstrations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on October 12. Together they set the tone and established much of the agenda of the foreign policy of the United States from 1993 through 1995.

These failed interventions expressed the view of the worldwide role of the United States that the members of the Clinton foreign policy team brought to office. Their distinctive vision of post-Cold War American foreign policy failed because it did not command public support. Much of the administration's first year was given over to making that painful discovery. Much of the next two years was devoted to coping with the consequences of the failures of that first year.

Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti were not, as the administration claimed, problems it had inherited. The Bush administration had sent troops to Somalia for the limited purpose of distributing food

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the spread of democracy, so has every other president since the founding of the republic. While Wilson sought to promote democracy in Europe to prevent a repetition of World War I, the absence of democracy in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti was not going to lead to World War III. And while Wilson had a formula for spreading democracy—the establishment of sovereign states on the basis of national self-determination—that principle was precisely what the Clinton administration was determined to prevent the Serbs from applying in the Balkans.

Lake himself supplied a better analogy. "I think Mother Teresa and Ronald Reagan were both trying to do the same thing," he said in suggesting that the Clinton foreign policy encompassed both, "one helping the helpless, one fighting the Evil Empire."² In fact, they

Applying the standards of Mother Teresa to U.S. foreign policy is an expensive proposition.

were trying to do different things. Reagan conducted a traditional foreign policy with a strong ideological overlay. He was in the business of pursuing the national interest of the United States as he understood it. Mother Teresa, by contrast, is in the business of saving lives, which is what Lake and his colleagues tried in 1993 to make the cornerstone of American foreign policy. They tried, and failed, to turn American foreign policy into a branch of social work.

While Mother Teresa is an admirable person and social work a noble profession, conducting American foreign policy by her example is an expensive proposition. The world is a big place filled with distressed people, all of whom, by these lights, have a claim to American attention. Putting an end to the suffering in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti would have involved addressing its causes, which would have meant deep, protracted, and costly engagement in the tangled political life of each country.

When the time came to carry out the commitment to do so at the risk of American lives, the president balked. He refused to bomb in Bosnia, withdrew U.S. troops from Somalia, and recalled the ship from Haiti, thereby earning a reputation for inconstancy that haunts his presidency. In each case, however, he did not have, nor was he

² Jason DeParle, "The Man Inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy," *The New York Times Magazine*, August 20, 1995, p. 35.

Haiti could not. It was the conflict with the Soviet Union that connected the international periphery to American interests.

In the wake of their initial failures, administration officials lamented that the conduct of foreign policy had been easier for their predecessors. This is not true. There has never been a formula for deciding on military intervention, and Cold War presidents had to make that decision with the specter of nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union hovering in the background, an experience the Clinton administration was spared.

But if the decision to intervene was not easier during the Cold War, it was simpler: U.S. presidents did not necessarily know when to use force, but they always knew why—to combat the Soviet Union, its allies, and its clients, and thus defend American interests. The argument for intervention was not always universally persuasive, but it was always plausible. In Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti in 1993 it was not even plausible.

Lake provided an epitaph for the foreign policy of Mother Teresa, one that captured the motive for its rise and the reason for its demise: "When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict, I want to work to save every child out there," he said. "But neither we nor the international community have the resources nor the mandate to do so."³

COMEDY, TRAGEDY, AND HAITI

WHILE THE administration withdrew from Somalia, the problems of Haiti and Bosnia lingered on, pieces of unfinished business, reminders of the humiliations of 1993.

In both, the administration followed the same pattern. First it adopted policies that made things worse. Then, in 1994 in Haiti and in 1995 in Bosnia, it finally used force. But the motivation was not, as in 1993, to "help the helpless," in Lake's words. Rather it was to bolster the administration's political standing, which was suffering from the failure

³ Elaine Sciolino, "New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Deemphasizes Role of the U.N.," *The New York Times*, May 6, 1994, p. A1.

approval of the operation because he would not have received it. Economic assistance to the country was unpopular with the Republican congressional majority.

The weakness of the administration's political position was demonstrated by the unusual role accorded former President Jimmy Carter. Along with retired General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), he negotiated an agreement with the Haitian junta for U.S. troops to enter the country peacefully and for the junta to leave. Carter's function was to negotiate terms and make concessions that the Clinton administration, because of its political weakness, found it impolitic to make publicly.

The Clinton administration tried to make a case for invading Haiti, falling back on the kinds of arguments that had justified the use of force during the Cold War. J. Brian Atwood, the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, attempted to connect autocratic rule in Haiti with American interests by asserting that it was "an assault on the progress toward democracy that has been made throughout the hemisphere."⁴

The argument was inappropriate in a way that was both comic and tragic: comic because it was ludicrous to contend that the fate of a small, impoverished half of a Caribbean island would affect Mexico, Argentina, or Brazil, tragic in that it was precisely because Haiti was so isolated that its political and economic conditions had become—had been allowed to become—so miserable.

That appeal to national interest failed because the United States had no interest in Haiti. Haiti was, however, one place where an appeal to values might have generated support. Because it was nearby, poor, weak, had once been occupied by the United States, and was populated by descendants of African slaves, the United States had reason to be concerned about its fate. A serious effort to put Haiti on a path toward decent politics and rational economics could have been presented as a good deed in the neighborhood at manageable cost and justified by the fact that America is a rich, powerful, and generous country. The Clinton administration, however, did not try to make that case.

⁴ J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," *The Washington Post*, October 14, 1994, p. A27.

icans and the Europeans. With their peacekeepers no longer at risk, the Europeans consented to a vigorous campaign of bombardment against the Bosnian Serbs in late August and early September of 1995. At the same time, the United States accepted the European preferences on the division of territory between the three contending groups in Bosnia—ethnic cleansing had made different parts of the country more homo-

The Dayton peace settlement all but abandoned principles Clinton had touted.

geneous ethnically—and agreed to the Bosnian Serbs' demand that they be permitted to federate with Serbia, just as the Bosnian Croats had been allowed to federate with Croatia under the terms of the American-brokered Croat-Muslim alliance of the year before. Perhaps because of the American bombing, certainly because of the American

concessions, a cease-fire was achieved, and a conference convened in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 that produced a peace settlement.

Where flimsy political support had forced the Clinton administration to compromise on the implementation of its goals in Haiti in 1994, in Bosnia in 1995 political weakness compelled compromise on the goals themselves. Indeed, the principles that the administration had said were at stake in Bosnia were all but abandoned: the settlement rewarded what the administration had termed Serb aggression and ratified the results of ethnic cleansing. The United States negotiated directly with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, whom the administration had initially considered a war criminal. Bosnia was partitioned along ethnic lines, subverting the principles of undiluted sovereignty and ethnic pluralism that members of the Clinton administration had insisted, in 1993 and 1994, were inviolable.

The single indisputable American accomplishment in the Balkans between 1993 and 1995 was to assist Croatia in gaining control of some additional territory in Bosnia and all the territory it had included as a Yugoslav republic. This, however, was hardly a victory for American values. The Croats had practiced ethnic cleansing on a scale comparable to the Bosnian Serbs and were just as ardent about ethnic homogeneity and intolerance of Muslims. The federation between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia that the United States had brokered in 1994 was a partition between the two groups in all but name.

WARD POLITICS, WORLD STAKES

BOSNIA AND Haiti were the centerpieces of American foreign policy in 1994 and 1995, but there were other issues to be addressed. With the rejection in 1993 of the vision it had brought to office, the administration needed some basis for dealing with them. It found such a basis in domestic politics. Clinton administration policy toward much of the world beyond Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti was made by responding to the concerns and wishes of particular groups in American society.

The pattern is a familiar one for American politicians. With its close attention to Ireland and Israel (Italy was unaccountably omitted), the Clinton administration was pursuing the foreign policy of many a big-city mayor. With its emphasis on securing contracts abroad for American firms, it was conducting the international economic policy common to governors. Such an approach to foreign policy is normal: all presidents have catered to important domestic constituencies. It is natural: foreign policy is a branch of politics, and the president is a professional politician. In the post-Cold War era, without an overarching principle to guide the nation's foreign relations, it is all but inevitable: the promotion of domestic interests is the default strategy of American foreign policy.

Nor is the primacy of domestic considerations in foreign policy necessarily a mistake. Profits for American corporations, jobs for American workers, and a settlement of the long-running conflict in Northern Ireland are all desirable. In its immersion in the Middle East peace process, moreover, the administration was pursuing a goal that transcends the preferences of particular segments of American society and that has thus been central to American diplomacy for two decades.

Making American foreign policy by attending to the wishes of American interest groups did, however, interfere with the pursuit of larger American interests in the cases of Japan, North Korea, and Russia.

The administration placed the reduction of Japan's trade surplus at the center of its policy toward America's most important Asian ally, for a time seeking to establish quotas for Japanese-American trade. Opening Japanese markets is important, and not only for the United States. But the way the administration went about it had unfortunate side effects. It ran counter to the principles of free trade, of which the

with American voters of Central European descent.⁶

The sudden announcement annoyed the Western European members of NATO, who had just agreed to a more modest change known as the Partnership for Peace. It infuriated the Russians, especially Russian democrats, who believed that it was based on the assumption—which was indeed widely shared among its proponents in Central Europe and the West—that its democratic experiment would inevitably fail and Russia would revert to threatening its neighbors. The Clinton administration, however, had adopted policies based on the opposite view, committing itself to the success of Russian democracy. NATO expansion, therefore, not only jeopardized the American interest in the peaceful integration of Russia into Europe and the international community, it also contradicted Clinton's own Russia policy.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

IN JAPAN, Korea, and Russia, the American stakes were larger than, and different from, the preferences of particular American interest groups. The United States continues to have national interests, although they can no longer be expressed simply as opposition to the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most important task the Clinton administration faced as it entered office was to state these interests in a way that would guide the foreign policy bureaucracy, inform the international community, and persuade the American public. Although senior officials gave occasional speeches, and some of the policies the administration carried out were compatible with the nation's central purposes in the post-Cold War world, it never offered a clear, persuasive account of just what those purposes are, sometimes even denying that such an account is possible.

It is possible, and it begins with the maintenance of an American military presence in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region. The goal has changed. During the Cold War the mission of American forces abroad was to deter the Soviet Union. Today it is to reassure all countries in both regions that there will be no sudden change in the military balance. This is especially important for Germany and Japan.

⁶ See, for example, Rick Atkinson and John Pomfret, "East Looks to NATO to Forge Links to West," *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1995, p. A1.

market reforms there, but not with Iran or Iraq, whose governments continue to threaten American interests.

THE FOREIGN POLICY PRESIDENT

AFTER THREE years the Clinton administration had not articulated a clear foreign policy doctrine for the post-Cold War world, but it had compiled a foreign policy record. How good was it?

During the Cold War, the yardstick was straightforward: how well the nation was doing in the worldwide struggle against the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Cold War, three different criteria for judgment are available: the one important to the Clinton foreign policy team, the one important to the country, and the one of most immediate importance to President Clinton himself.

By the standards of Mother Teresa, the Clinton foreign policy could claim modest success. At the end of 1995 Haitians and Bosnians were better off, or at least less likely to be killed, than had been the case 15 months earlier. (Of the administration's three abortive interventions in 1993, the one in which the United States may have accomplished the most was Somalia, where, by some estimates, American intervention saved half a million lives. That had been the aim and was thus partly the achievement of the Bush administration.)

On the other hand, the Clinton team did not succeed in establishing Lake's commitment to "helping the helpless" as the dominant principle of American foreign policy. Meanwhile, political support for the organization it had hoped would be an instrument of its new foreign policy, the United Nations, fell sharply, in part because the administration sought to deflect responsibility for its own failures in Bosnia and Somalia onto the international organization.

The more traditional standard by which the foreign policy of a great power is evaluated is its relations with the most important members of the international system. Here the Clinton performance could not be judged a success. The real legacy of the Bush administration was not Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. It was, instead, unprecedentedly good American relations with all the other major centers of power: Western Europe, Japan, China, and Russia. Three years later, those relations were worse in every case.

that settlement central to Russian foreign policy, even as the infamous Clause 231 of the Versailles Treaty, assigning guilt for World War I to Germany, helped set the Germans on the course that led to World War II. In that worst case, the Clinton policy would rank with America's two greatest twentieth-century foreign policy blunders: the failure to remain politically engaged in Europe after World War I and the Vietnam war.

Still, at the end of 1995, while relations with the major centers of power were worse than they had been when the Clinton administration took office, they were not catastrophically or irretrievably worse. That meant that in 1996, for the president and the country, the immediate test of the Clinton foreign policy would be its impact on his prospects for reelection.

Polls consistently showed that the administration's foreign policy performance was held in low esteem by the American public. The same polls showed that, in the public's ranking of issues important to the country, those having to do with foreign policy were consistently at the bottom. Nonetheless, foreign policy was likely to be part of the 1996 election in a way unhelpful to the president.

Clinton's political difficulties, as he entered the election season, could be divided into two parts. On the ideological spectrum he had drifted too far to the left for many voters during his first two years. A gifted, energetic politician, he subsequently devoted himself to moving nearer to the center. But another problem afflicted him: doubt about whether he measured up to the job of chief executive and commander in chief. The conduct of foreign policy was only one part of this problem, but it was likely to prove more convenient as a metaphor for issues of character and leadership than the details of his personal life.

In this sector of the political battlefield, therefore, his early vacillation on military intervention, his dispatch of troops abroad without political support at home, his failure to spell out a clear set of priorities for post-Cold War American foreign policy, his visible discomfort in dealing with international issues, and his choice of senior foreign policy officials who proved unable to establish their authority either at home or abroad, were likely to come back to haunt him. As election day approached, his political opponents would have every reason to portray Bill Clinton as what he had never wanted to be and had gone to great lengths to avoid becoming: a foreign policy president. ②



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Turbulent Peace:

The United States Role in a Dynamic World

by Michael Mandelbaum

Conclusions

- Global conflicts are unlikely in the near future because rivalries among the great powers have been reduced and the great powers have less need to become involved in peripheral states.
- The current, if uneasy, harmony that exists among the great powers was fostered by the collapse of communism as a militant ideology, by the emergence of economics as a primary emphasis of governments, by nuclear weapons, which made war exceedingly dangerous, and by the spread of democracy.
- Democratic great powers favor the tranquility of the post-Cold War era and they are unlikely to seek dramatic change. One development that could

change the *status quo* is European political unity, which would almost inevitably exclude Russia; however, such unity is unlikely in the near term.

- Russia and China, the great powers that are not fully or irrevocably democracies, are the great post-Cold War question marks. Political uncertainty and the continuing vibrancy of nationalism, combined with irredentist claims, mean that the need to rally political support at home can lead to assertive international rhetoric and action.
- Conflicts within and between peripheral states are the source of most turbulence in today's world. Most of these conflicts have little real importance to the great powers. However, nuclear proliferation among peripheral states is a source of instability the great powers cannot overlook.

A Time of Comparative Peace

The post-Cold War era, although scarcely free of violence, is freer of the danger of a world war than any other time in modern history. For this there are two reasons.

First, at present the traditional great power rivalries that have given rise to great wars do not exist. The international system is more peaceful than ever before at its core, centering on the five great powers: the United States, Western Europe, Japan, China, and Russia.

A second reason for this unprecedented peace is an historically unusual disjunction between the core—the major powers—on the one hand, and the periphery—everyone and every place else—on the other.

The reasons for the unusual harmony among the major powers are familiar, but bear repeating. First is

the collapse of communism as a militant ideology stressing the inevitability of international struggle.

A second reason is the primacy of economics—virtually all core governments emphasize domestic economic growth. Moreover, the rise of the market as the principal method for organizing economic activity within, between, and among most countries has promoted international harmony. According to market principles, the control of territory is not the key to wealth, which comes instead from participation in the international division of labor. Insofar as this principle is accepted by sovereign states, one of the major incentives for war disappears.

Yet a third reason for post-Cold War tranquility, carried over from the Cold War period, is the presence of nuclear weapons. They make war exceedingly dangerous, and thus dampen the incentives for conflict.

Fourth, two principles espoused by Woodrow

Indeed, Japan is too small, too dependent on the outside world economically, and too insular culturally, to play the role of an independent great power on the nineteenth century model. Japan does seek some modification in its international status, notably a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. But it will not press for a change in its geopolitical status in East Asia.

Non-Democratic Powers and Stability

If the democracies will not disturb the peace at the core of the post-Cold War international system, the same cannot be said with comparable confidence of the two great powers that are not fully or irrevocably democratic. Russia and China are the great question marks of the post-Cold War era and the potential disturbers of the peace.

There are, of course, major differences between these two countries, but they have important features in common that illustrate the roles that Russia and China are likely to play in the international system.

Both countries are large, and size matters. The larger a country is, the more independent it can be and therefore the less predictable it is likely to be. It is reasonably certain that lesser formerly Communist countries in Asia and Europe—Vietnam and Poland, for example—will fit themselves into the international orders that surround them. They will conform, broadly, to the political and economic patterns of their regions, Vietnam in Southeast Asia, Poland in Europe. But this cannot be predicted with the same confidence for Russia and China, which are big enough to resist the influences of their surrounding environment.

Neither Russia nor China is wholly or reliably stable in political terms. Both are no longer orthodox Communist countries, but neither is a well-established democracy—or even a stable authoritarian regime. Their political evolutions have not ended.

Although the primacy of economics is a factor in the internal politics of each, economic considerations are not all-powerful. Nationalism is not extinct in Russia and China. Each country's place on the world stage, its power and its prestige, still matter to the governments and peoples of both states.

Moreover, history still matters. For China, the humiliations inflicted by western imperialism remain vivid enough to be invoked by the regime in Beijing to justify the policies it has chosen. For Russia, the humiliation of the recent fall from the pinnacle of world power is similarly evocative. The combination of these two factors—political uncertainty and the continuing vibrancy of nationalism—mean that the need to rally political support at home can lead to assertive

international rhetoric and action. Both have insisted on special treatment by international organizations. The Chinese have sought special terms for joining the World Trade Organization; Russia has negotiated with the International Monetary Fund for credit on terms unavailable to others.

Neither government recoils from the kind of internal repression that is entirely unacceptable to the other great powers. The glaring example in the Chinese case is Tibet; for Russia it is Chechnya.

Last, and perhaps most important for the post-Cold War era, China and Russia have actual or potential irredentist claims: China on Taiwan; Russia, potentially, in the so-called Near Abroad, the former Soviet republics that became independent countries after 1991. Potentially the most explosive relationship between Russia and one of its new neighbors is the one with Ukraine. Thus the Russian-Ukrainian border and the Taiwan Straits are the most dangerous spots on the planet. They are the places where large and dangerous wars could erupt. Global peace depends heavily on what happens in those places, and what happens more broadly to and in Russia and China.

Turbulence in Peripheral Countries

If the core is calm in the post-Cold War era, the periphery is turbulent. The most common and familiar source of turbulence however, is of little importance to the core.

The instability on display every day in the newspapers and on television involves conflicts caused by the end of the Cold War. Either a Communist empire dissolves, leaving nations and groups to squabble over the spoils, as in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or a state collapses because it cannot get the resources to which it has become accustomed from the superpowers. It cannot get these resources because the superpowers are no longer willing (or in the case of Russia no longer able) to pay. Examples of conflicts of this kind are to be found in Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and other parts of the Third World.

These conflicts are now of little importance to the major powers. In the past, the periphery was related to the core through great power rivalry. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union intervened widely in the Third World, they competed for influence and propped up regimes, frequently there as part of their global rivalry. Without great power competition, the five great powers can afford to ignore the turbulence on the periphery.

Bosnia is the exception that proves the rule. It was difficult to ignore entirely because it is situated on the

NIXON

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EDITED BY ERIC HAMBURG

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 **HYPERION**
NEW YORK

Nixon's Policies Didn't End Communism

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

Foreign policy was Richard Nixon's passion, and foreign policy was the source of both his considerable successes and his devastating failures as president.

He entered office in 1969 proclaiming a transition from "an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation." He launched three sets of negotiation that made the world more stable and the United States more secure. They led to policies that lasted decades beyond his term of office.

One set of negotiations was with the Soviet Union. Nixon's policy of détente never became the broad and enduring engagement with America's chief adversary that he initially sought. But it did give rise to several agreements on nuclear arms. While the agreements stopped a potentially costly competition in missile defenses, they had little overall impact on the Soviet-U.S. military balance.

Rather, their chief significance was political: They demonstrated a recognition of the need to keep the superpower rivalry from erupting into a catastrophic war. Moreover, the two decades of arms control talks produced a cadre of Soviet officials with whom the West could talk seriously. Some contributed to the revolution in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev.

The second set of talks was with the People's Republic of China. He saw that the increasingly acrimonious Sino-Soviet conflict of the late 1960s presented a diplomatic opportunity for Washington. His dramatic trip to Beijing in February 1972 shifted the balance of power in East Asia. By bringing the United States into alignment with China he offset the damage done to U.S. power and prestige in the region by the Communist victory in Vietnam.

The third crucial negotiations involved Israel and its Arab neighbors. At the end of their two-week war of October 1973, the U.S. position in the region was perilous. The warring armies were poised to resume fighting. This could have drawn the United States into direct conflict with the Soviet Union: During the war a veiled Soviet threat to send forces to the Mideast had triggered a decision to put U.S. military forces worldwide on a heightened state

the Soviet Union was both permanent and manageable. This meant that it could be put on a businesslike basis, free from the crusading spirit that had so often marked American foreign policy.

His two immediate elected successors reverted to the previous pattern. Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan were crusaders—for human rights in the first case, for the overthrow of the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union in the second. In office, neither was as deft or successful as Nixon at foreign policy. But in the long run they were right and he was wrong: The Soviet empire did collapse, in no small part because of the political power of the idea of individual rights and liberties, an idea that Nixon had relegated to the periphery of his foreign policy.

The 37th president's true political heir was George Bush. Of all his successors, Bush was the one whose definition of the office, with its emphasis on international rather than domestic concerns, and whose approach to the conduct of foreign policy, featuring power politics and high-level diplomacy, most closely corresponded to Nixon's. And it was Bush who presided over U.S. policy when communism collapsed in Europe, thereby ending the world in which Nixon had operated with such skill.

Postcommunism

Four Perspectives

EDITED BY

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM



A COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BOOK

Introduction

Michael Mandelbaum

The term “postcommunism” is backward-looking. It implies a world defined by what it used to be but no longer is. In fact, the 27 sovereign states that emerged from communist rule as a result of the upheavals of 1989 and 1991, which stretch from the center of Germany to the Pacific coast of Russia and, in Churchill’s phrase, from Stettin in the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, share both a particular historical experience and a common set of hopes and plans. “Postcommunism” refers to both the past *and* the future.

The common experience of communism began with the Bolshevik seizure of power in St. Petersburg in 1917 and ended with the collapse of the communist regimes of central Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the state the Bolsheviks built—the Soviet Union—in 1991.

It is clear enough in retrospect—indeed, it was clear during communism’s heyday—just what communism was. It was a political system that was “totalitarian” in aspiration, aiming to control every aspect of social life. The instrument of control was the all-powerful, hierarchically organized, self-selected, and self-perpetuating Communist Party. The party claimed to be equipped for this ambitious task by its unique understanding of the laws of history, to which it had gained access through communism’s sacred texts, the writings of Marx, Lenin, and, for a time, Stalin.

The Communist Party enjoyed a monopoly of power, which it maintained by force.

It was responsible for, among other things, managing the country's economy, which was "planned" in the sense that important decisions were made by administrative fiat. Party officials, not the ebb and flow of supply and demand, determined what would be produced and grown, in what quantities, and the prices at which what was produced would be sold.

The party sought to prevent any collective activity outside its control. All important social ties and transactions were supposed to be vertical, between the party and the society, rather than horizontal, among members of society independent of the regime. Private economic activity, organized religion, interest groups, clubs, associations of all kinds—all the elements of what has come to be called civil society—were suppressed.

That was communism. Or, at least, that was the ideal type of the communist system. The countries and provinces between Berlin and Vladivostok differed from one another in significant ways. In Poland the Catholic church achieved considerable autonomy. Hungary introduced market reforms in agriculture in the late 1960s. In the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union effective power often resided with local clans. In the Caucasus, black market economic activity enjoyed wide tolerance. In Romania a nominally communist dictator tried to establish dynastic rule.

Still, all 27 countries are "postcommunist" in the sense that they left behind a political, economic, and social experience with recognizably distinct and common features.

As it is commonly used, the term "postcommunism" is forward-looking as well. It connotes both a clear direction and a fixed destination. It presumes a goal toward which the 27 countries are moving. That goal is, figuratively, the West: they are presumed to have embarked on a journey from totalitarianism to democratic politics and free market economics.

The presumption of a common destination is captured in another term that is often used in discussions of postcommunism: the transition. The term signifies the belief that the upheaval that is under way where communism once stood has a shape, a pur-

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pose, a theme. It is a transition westward. The idea of the transition is a common point of departure for the four chapters in this volume.

Used in the democratic, capitalist West, the idea of the transition is susceptible to the charge of "mirror-imaging," the reflexive assumption that others are like us—or at least that they *wish* to be like us. The idea of the postcommunist transition rests, however, on firmer foundations than that. It is grounded in recent history. The global conflict between communism and the West that dominated the four decades after World War II was an ideological struggle. It was a conflict of creeds, of political and economic systems. What Stalin said about World War II to Milovan Djilas and other Yugoslav communists was true as well of the Cold War: "This war is not as in the past. . . . Everybody imposes his own system as far as his army can reach."¹

Like World War II, the Cold War had clear winners and losers. The armies of the winners did not, it is true, occupy the territory of the losers. Still, given the nature of the conflict and the way it ended, it was logical for the losers to adopt the institutions and beliefs of the winners.² It was logical in particular because the outcome represented a victory of the West's methods of political and economic organization rather than a triumph of its arms.

The West prevailed because its system was more durable and successful. Democracy secured popular allegiance, something the dictatorship of the Communist Party, for all its claims to represent the real interests of those it governed, failed to do. Market economics achieved prosperity in a way that the planned economies, despite their claim to being a more scientific method of channeling resources and producing goods, did not.³

Imitation is not only the sincerest form of flattery; where intense competition is the rule, it is the best formula for survival. This has always been true of military technology. It is true as well in market economies, where money-losing firms adopt the techniques of profitable ones. In the last part of the twentieth century, rivalry among sovereign states came to involve not only contests of arms but also competition in political cohesion and economic productivity; as with armaments, the most successful techniques for achieving these ends were bound to spread.

The most persuasive evidence for the relevance to postcommunist Eurasia of the idea of a "westward" transition, however, comes not from the academic vocabulary of the West or the logic of recent history, but from the 27 postcommunist states themselves. They have embraced the idea. Their governments profess their goals to be the construction of political democracy and the establishment of a market economy. They seek to become part of the Western-dominated international organizations, which require for membership the establishment of Western-style institutions and fidelity to Western norms: the Council of Europe, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank.

After World War II Stalin refused to allow any of the countries under his control to participate in the American-sponsored Marshall Plan, which helped to underwrite the economic reconstruction of Europe. The Soviet dictator no doubt calculated, rightly, that participation would enmesh the communist-ruled countries in the coils of international capitalism. It is a sign of the revolutionary consequences of 1989 and 1991, as well as a mark of the Western orientation of the regimes that succeeded the communist ones, that in the wake of the Cold War the same countries, including Russia, clamored for a new Marshall Plan. They have received none, but since 1989 and 1991, the postcommunist governments have formed political parties, held elections, established stock markets, and turned previously communist-controlled economic assets over to private owners.

Still, while the end of communism is a matter of fact, the transition to democracy and free markets remains a work in progress. Each of the four chapters in this volume comments on both the idea and the fact of the transition, but each approaches it from a different perspective and arrives at different conclusions about its prospects for success.

THE CHAPTERS

The four essays divide into two groups of two. For Stephen Holmes and Robert Skidelsky, a successful transition—that is, safe passage to democracy and free markets in postcommunist

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Eurasia—is contingent on the adoption of a particular set of policies. By contrast, both Charles Gati and John Mueller are ready to pronounce a verdict on the transition; but theirs are opposite verdicts.

For Stephen Holmes, the key to a successful transition throughout the postcommunist world is effective state-building. The troubles that plague the transition, he argues, are not what either local participants or foreign observers initially expected them to be. Postcommunist countries are not being paralyzed by divisive efforts to come to terms with the past. Nor are they weighed down by the heavy cultural burdens that the past imposes: the absence of the attitudes and values necessary for decent politics and efficient economics.

Instead, the postcommunist countries suffer from governments that are too weak to provide the elementary “public goods” on which tolerable social life depends, chief among which are law and order. The social pathologies that most trouble the inhabitants of postcommunist Eurasia—crime, corruption, and inflation—are the products of a state too weak to enact and enforce laws and control the government’s budget. The epigraph for this chapter might be a quotation from an earlier Holmes, Oliver Wendell, who said that he paid his taxes happily, knowing that the check he sent to the government was purchasing “civilization.” Civilization, in this sense, is something that most postcommunist governments have had difficulty putting in place.

An irony emerges from Holmes’s argument: in the communist era the state was far too strong for the good of those it governed, so strong that it imposed a dismal kind of equality by stifling liberty, fraternity, and prosperity. Now, in the successor states of the Soviet Union and their neighbors, it is too weak. Where once it suppressed what in any normal society would be considered lawful behavior, now it cannot suppress what in every society qualifies as illegal conduct. Instead of enforcing the rules that are necessary for productive economic activity, postcommunist officials use their positions to enrich themselves. The postcommunist countries suffer not from oppressive but from unaccountable government. The chief problem they face is not

tyranny but larceny, not autocracy but kleptocracy. The key to the success of the transition, by this analysis, is an honest, effective system of laws, courts, and police.

For Robert Skidelsky, a successful transition depends on solving a related but distinct problem: excessive government interference in the economy. Success requires reducing the proportion of economic output appropriated by the state. A state that is too large in Skidelsky's terms is not necessarily one that is too strong in the communist fashion: to the contrary, it is likelier to be too weak in the ways that Holmes describes. It is the toxic combination of the government's excessive economic and social aspirations with its administrative weakness that produces one of the most widespread and dangerous pathologies in the postcommunist world: inflation.

Inflation arises when a state's obligations exceed its revenues. Because it lacks the strength either to reduce the demands it tries to satisfy or to collect sufficient taxes to satisfy them, it must pay out more than it takes in. It fills the gap by printing money. The result is a rise in the level of prices: the larger the gap, the steeper the rise.⁴

Skidelsky is writing specifically about postcommunist Russia, but his argument extends across both time and space. He sees the "fiscal crisis of the state" as a chief cause of the implosion of the Soviet Union. The gap between income and obligations became so great that the Soviet machinery of government simply disintegrated: essentially, the central government in Moscow lost most of its revenue to the newly independent republics, the 89 autonomous republics and provinces that make up the Russian federation, and the informal economy, while retaining responsibility for the upkeep of the military-agrarian sector—the part of the economy that it still "owned." That is what is meant by the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁵ The same problem that caused the collapse of the Soviet state has been responsible for the rampant inflation of the post-Soviet era in Russia.

Moreover, the collapse of communism is, in Skidelsky's view, merely the most extreme version of the contemporary worldwide fiscal crisis of the state, the crisis of collectivism. Communism

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was “a distorting mirror of ourselves.”⁶ Skidelsky sees the struggle to correct the chronic and virtually universal imbalance between the state and the private sector—the consequence of excessive obligations undertaken by the state—as perhaps the most important global trend of the last quarter of the twentieth century, a trend common to Margaret Thatcher’s Britain, Ronald Reagan’s United States, Deng Xiaoping’s revolutionary market reforms in China that began in the late 1970s, and the more modest economic liberalization begun in India in the early 1990s. Each involved an effort to “restore profitability.”

Holmes and Skidelsky enter the lists on one side of an ongoing debate about postcommunism, the debate about the feasibility of a successful transition to Western political and economic forms. They are in the camp of the optimists. What distinguishes this camp from the pessimists is a difference in emphasis in the interpretation of political and social life.⁷

The optimists emphasize the role of institutions. Institutions shape behavior by creating incentives. Establishing new institutions that change the structure of incentives that individuals confront thus will cause a shift in behavior. Once the institutions of a market economy are established—and this can be done in a few years, in some cases even months—people will master its rules and operate it successfully in short order.

The pessimists, by contrast, stress the role of culture in human affairs. For them it is habits, attitudes, and skills that determine the shape of social and political life. Because these must be learned, they can only accumulate very slowly, over decades. Thus, the changes in behavior that the shift from communist to Western politics and especially economics involves cannot take place immediately. Western rules of accounting, for example, can be promulgated overnight; but training an accountant takes years, and a generation, at the least, is required to produce the number of trained accountants necessary to constitute a full-fledged accounting profession.

These different assessments of the prospects for the transition are associated with different academic disciplines. Economists, whose professional worldview puts incentives and institutions at its core, tend to be optimists; historians and so-

ciologists, who study long-term trends, gravitate toward pessimism.

Holmes and Skidelsky are unorthodox optimists in that they stress political rather than economic institutions. The institution that matters most is the properly designed state, which is one with a well-functioning government. It is not easy to establish such a state, however, particularly under the conditions of post-communism. Each author's analysis reveals an obstacle to doing so in the form of a circular problem. Holmes argues that in order to be legitimate, a government must be effective; but it is also the case that in order to be effective, it must be legitimate. People will not pay taxes unless they believe that what they pay will purchase services they deem important; but a government cannot provide these services if it cannot collect taxes.

A comparable circularity, involving the postcommunist relationship between politics and economics, emerges from Skidelsky's analysis: policies that are economically necessary may be politically impossible. Economic stability, meaning the taming of inflation, is a necessary condition for prosperity, and policies to promote stability require political support. But implementing policies of stabilization causes economic hardship—notably through unemployment—which is likely to undercut the political basis on which these policies must rest.

To break the vicious circle of ineffectiveness and illegitimacy, and of inflation and unemployment, the two authors prescribe political will and leadership; but these are, after all, easier to prescribe than to achieve.

Of the four authors, the one most optimistic about the transition in postcommunist Eurasia is John Mueller. In his view, it has already taken place. By the proper definition of democracy, according to Mueller—a political system in which the government can be overthrown nonviolently—the countries of post-communist Eurasia are already democracies. By the proper definition of capitalism—an economic system in which it is possible to make a profit legally—they are already capitalist. Democracies and market economies are not all alike in every particular, of course, and precisely what kinds of democratic political systems and capitalist economies these 27 countries will turn

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out to have remains to be seen; but democracies and market economies of *some* kind they will all, or almost all, turn out to be—indeed already *have* turned out to be.

The successful completion of the transition, Mueller further argues, demonstrates a broader truth: the establishment of both democracy and free markets is simple and straightforward, if not always easy. Both are natural in the sense that each will take root unless forcibly prevented from doing so. Neither requires elaborate cultural preconditions. Both spring from what is basic, almost biological, in human nature. Democracy is, in Mueller's view, a logical consequence of the universal tendency to complain. A capitalist economic system arises from another deep-rooted human impulse: the urge to acquire.

Societies will adopt democratic politics unless "thugs with guns" keep them from doing so. With the collapse of communism the thugs—that is, the security organs of the party—disappeared, or at least went into retreat.

The newly established political and economic systems of postcommunist Eurasia are not without problems; but these problems stem from the potential for popular misunderstanding of the character of democracy and free markets where they have recently arrived. Political expectations may be too high. The public may take to be pathological what are in fact part of the normal workings of democratic political systems. Apathetic, cynical, demagogic, money-riddled politics are not departures from the democratic norm: they *are* the norm in the practice if not the theory (or the mythology) of the West.

If democracy risks being discredited in the eyes of the citizens of postcommunist countries who are experiencing it for the first time because it is worse than they have (unrealistically) imagined, capitalism courts unpopularity because, in the form in which they will initially encounter it, it is shabbier and less efficient than what is normal in the West. If democracy is worse than they believe, capitalism is better.

In the minds of the citizens of the postcommunist world, capitalism is becoming associated not simply with greed but also with rampant dishonesty. In the long run, however, it is normal, Mueller argues, for capitalism to promote *honest* conduct. For

the purpose of becoming rich, it is better to have a reputation for honesty than for dishonesty; to earn the desired reputation, it is better actually to *be* honest than dishonest.⁸

Mueller's chapter is similar to Skidelsky's in that the scope of its analysis is extremely broad, reaching far beyond the world of postcommunism. It is similar to that of Charles Gati in delivering a verdict on the transition. But Mueller's optimism stands in contrast with Gati's conclusion, which is bleaker than that of any of the other three authors.

Although the postcommunist countries may succeed in installing economies that partly incorporate market principles, Gati argues, many will not be democracies. In most of them it may be possible—although not easy, absent a position in or connections to the ruling oligarchy—to make a profit legally; but it will not be possible to overthrow the government nonviolently.

The differences between Mueller and Gati are partly matters of interpretation: what Gati sees as evidence of the failure to make the transition Mueller interprets as the inevitable costs of a transition already made. The opposed verdicts also stem from different perspectives. Mueller's is the bird's-eye view, a report of how things look from a distance, under the eyes of eternity—or the contemporary equivalent of eternity: the academic analyst. Gati's is what might be called the view from the trenches, an account of how the transition is being experienced at close range by those who are involved personally.

Still, Gati's chapter goes beyond the other three in challenging directly the premises implicit in the idea of the postcommunist transition: that all 27 postcommunist states are proceeding, albeit at varying speeds, in the same direction and will arrive, some sooner than others, at the same happy destination. Gati presents data that he believes suggest, to the contrary, that the various processions toward democracy and free markets may not all reach this destination.

While the first three chapters concern themselves with the requirements for (or the fact of) success in the transition, a scenario for failure can be deduced from each: for Holmes, it involves the failure to construct an effective state; for Skidelsky, the failure to reduce the state's role in the economy; for Mueller,

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the failure of the people of postcommunist Eurasia to appreciate what democracy and free markets do and do not involve. Gati is more pessimistic than any of them, and from his analysis a different theory of failure emerges.

The idea of the postcommunist transition, with its tacit presumption of a royal road to democracy and free markets, has a distinctly mixed pedigree. It is squarely in the tradition of the interpretation of history that considers the spread of liberty to be the principal political trend of the modern era. The idea of the transition also harbors, however, a Marxist component: the assumption that economics drives politics. Democracy will flourish, the idea of transition implies, because it will be accompanied by capitalism, which will produce prosperity, which will endow democracy with legitimacy and thus permanence. Democracy will take hold because it will, in Gati's phrase, "deliver the goods."

But Gati raises the possibility that the new states will *not* deliver the goods, at least not quickly or abundantly enough to anchor democratic government in popular approval. This failure, if it occurs, will stem from the uncommonly difficult economic and political legacies of the communist past. While the problems the postcommunist states face in building a market economy may in important ways resemble the pathologies of the noncommunist world, as Robert Skidelsky asserts, the damage that communism inflicted was far more severe than anything found in the West or the Third World. Communist damage will be harder, and take longer, to undo.

Communist economies were not, strictly speaking, *underdeveloped*; they were *misdeveloped*. The transition from communism therefore involves not only building new structures but also destroying existing ones. This is bound to be a painful, protracted process. In its early stages it will produce more losers than winners. Unemployment will rise as old factories that produced what communist planners decreed but that consumers do not want to buy close down. Ultimately, as entrepreneurs respond to market demands, the workers cast loose will be reabsorbed into the workforce. But "ultimately" may turn out to be a painfully long time, and some workers may never be reemployed. For some period of

time more people will have been made worse than better off by the collapse of communism. The result is the discontent registered by the poll data that Gati presents, which will lead to disillusionment not only with the sitting government, as would be true in the West, but also with the regime itself, with democracy.⁹

The failure of the transition, according to this scenario, stems from the deadly combination of discontent arising from economic hardship with the poisonous political legacy of the communist era. As Aurel Braun has put it: "The Marxist-Leninist baggage includes: an illiberalism that in key respects is more virulent than the pre-communist authoritarianism; a tendency against factionalism inherited from Lenin which makes it more difficult to form 'big tent' democratic parties; the absence or the dearth of the art of political compromise, which results in a kind of political autism; a cultural mistrust of authority yet a craving for statist economic security; a lack of (and enormous difficulty in constructing) a meaningful legal structure . . . and societies equating wealth with theft."¹⁰ While the depth of what economists call the "transition recession" erodes the principal basis of support for democracy in postcommunist Eurasia—economic benefits with which it is associated—political legacy of communism inhibits the growth of democratic values: tolerance, fairness, belief in the importance of popular sovereignty, and the protection of individual rights.

The result could be the subversion of democracy through what is known as the "Pinochet solution," after Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean general who seized power in the 1970s and suppressed democracy while carrying out free market policies. The parallel between failed transitions in postcommunist Eurasia and military rule in Latin America is hardly exact. The military is not a likely candidate to seize power in most of the postcommunist countries. More plausible would be a dictatorship of parts of the old communist elite—the *nomenklatura*—and the security apparatus. (In some of the 27 countries such a combination does in fact hold power.) One feature common to both Pinochet's Chile and postcommunist autocracies, however, is likely to be a market economy of some sort. The communist economic system almost certainly cannot be restored, for this would require the restora-

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tion of the entire communist political apparatus, with its ideological underpinnings, which is simply not feasible. Thus, even in the scenario of transition failure, it will be possible, although not necessarily easy, to make a profit legally; but it will not be possible to overthrow the government peacefully.

If the results of the opinion polls in central and southeastern Europe that Gati cites suggest a way in which the transition could fail, the figures he supplies that rank all 27 postcommunist countries on several political and economic scales suggest, by the variations in the scores, that some countries will succeed and others will not—or at least that some are better placed than others to establish stable democracies and working free markets.¹¹

The scores are, of course, estimates—crude, imprecise, and based on subjective judgments. Still, they are in keeping with what seems intuitively plausible. They correspond roughly to the conclusion to which observers of the trends in postcommunist Eurasia have generally come: that progress toward Western institutions is uneven across the region and varies, again very roughly and with exceptions and overlaps, according to geography.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

The 27 countries may be usefully divided into three broad categories: the postcommunist West, which includes central and eastern Europe reaching into the northern part of the Balkans; the East, consisting of the two great Slavic states, Russia and Ukraine, and Belarus, effectively an adjunct of Russia; and the South—the central and southern Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. (See table 1.)

What accounts for these regional variations? One obvious source is what Holmes calls “preconditions”: specifically, three distinct but closely related forces—geography itself, history, and culture.

The most successful postcommunist countries are those closest to the part of the world from which the definition of success comes. Central and eastern Europe is the most promising sector of postcommunism because it is closest, both culturally

TABLE 1—PROGRESS IN TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

West	Score	South	Score	East	Score
Bulgaria	21	Albania	19	Belarus	13
Czech Rep.	27	Armenia	15	Russian Fed.	20
Estonia	25	Azerbaijan	NA	Ukraine	12
Hungary	26	Georgia	10		
Latvia	NA	Kazakhstan	12		
Lithuania	24	Kyrgyzstan	21		
Poland	26	Moldova	16		
Romania	20	Tajikistan	10		
Slovakia	25	Turkmenistan	7		
		Uzbekistan	12		
AVERAGE	24	AVERAGE	14	AVERAGE	15

Source: The number for each country comes from combining the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores (cited in Charles Gati's chapter, pp. 687 with the economic scores of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report. Nations in Transit: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States* (New York: Freedom House, 1995). *Transition Report* (Washington, D.C.: EBRD, 1994).

The EBRD scores include large-scale and small-scale enterprise privatization, restructuring, price liberalization and competition, trade and foreign exchange system reform, and banking reform. The Freedom House scores cover political rights and civil liberties. A higher number here signifies greater progress toward democracy and free markets, and a lower number means lesser progress in the transition process.

The countries have been grouped into three general categories—West (central and east Europe and the north Balkans), South (central and south Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia), and East (the Slavic nations)—and the average score for each group has been supplied. The former Yugoslav republics are not included because of lack of data. As noted, these scores are rough estimates and not precise measurements.

and geographically, to western Europe. This should not be surprising: cultural diffusion, after all, is among the oldest of all social patterns. Ideas and institutions are invariably carried beyond their points of origin. They tend to take root earliest where the distance they have to travel is shortest.

Ideas and institutions, like democracy and capitalism, spread by example, as well. The example of Western freedom and prosperity was most potent for the people who could observe it at closest range, the people of the postcommunist West. Ideas and institutions can spread not only through this "demonstration effect" but also by what might be called the "membership effect."

The postcommunist countries aspire to belong to Western-dominated international organizations. Membership requires adopting Western institutions and procedures. The closer a country is to the West, the likelier it is to be admitted to these Western associations, and thus the greater its incentives to remake its political and economic structures according to Western standards. With a fully functioning market economy, the Czech Republic can expect to gain admission to the European Union. No matter how pristine its capitalism, this will not be possible, at least not in the near future, for Kyrgyzstan.

The three regions, as it happens, have distinctive histories. For most of the early modern period, each was under the control of a particular dynasty: the "West" was Habsburg, the "East" Romanov, and the "South" Ottoman. All were multinational empires ruled autocratically; but the impact of political and economic liberalism, and of their historical precursors, the Enlightenment and the Reformation, varied among the three. The impact was more pronounced in the West—the Habsburg Empire was part of the Western Christian world—than in the East, a stronghold of Eastern Christianity. And although the influence of the liberal tradition was faint in the Romanov world, it was fainter still where the Ottoman Turks ruled.¹²

While these 27 countries may share a recent past, their precommunist legacies vary in ways that may account for, by contributing to, their varying degrees of success at making the changes the transition involves, which Gati's scales illustrate.

A different source of regional variation within postcommunist Eurasia has to do with what Holmes and Skidelsky place at the center of their respective analyses: the state. It is arguable that what distinguishes successful from failed transitions is not the *effectiveness* of the state but rather its *legitimacy*, meaning the broad acceptance not of the regime's ideological character but of its geographic scope. Legitimacy here involves not who governs but who *is* governed.

The absence of legitimacy of this kind and the resulting disputes about where the borders of the state should be drawn and which groups should be included in it are responsible for what is perhaps the most glaring, and is certainly the most troubling,

feature of postcommunism: large-scale violence between ethnic groups. Economics aside, some inhabitants of postcommunist Eurasia are worse off than they were under communism (at least during its final three decades), in that they are now more likely to be killed. The wars of postcommunism have been waged over the issue of legitimacy; and they have been waged in the "South": in the Balkans in Bosnia, in the Caucasus over Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Central Asia in Tajikistan.

It is these wars that most sharply distinguish the postcommunist South from the West; and they also distinguish the South, although less sharply, from the East. War is not raging everywhere along the southern tier of postcommunist Eurasia. But even where there is peace, order often is maintained, in the absence of a consensus on legitimacy, by autocratic rule. Dictatorship is one alternative to civil war, a way of preventing fundamental disputes about sovereignty from bursting violently into the open.

What accounts for the presence or absence of a consensus about legitimacy? The most obvious factor, although one that has limited explanatory and predictive force, is nationalism. The most powerful modern political sentiment, nationalism is the conviction that the national unit and the political unit should be congruent, that each nation should have its own sovereign state.¹³ The lack of consensus about the legitimate borders of a state often stems from the absence of such congruence.

What, then, defines a nation? The only foolproof definition is tautological: a nation is a group that considers itself a nation and is willing and able to act as one; the best evidence that a group can act as a nation is that it is trying to secure its own state. Self-conscious nations tend to be groups that speak the same language or that are ethnically homogeneous or both; but there are exceptions to the first condition, and the second is not at all clear-cut.

Moreover, it is now accepted that nations are not primordial entities, born in the mists of time, straining at the leash of imperial rule and ready, once the leash is snapped, to emerge as full-fledged nation-states. To the contrary, they are communities that are imagined, constructed, devised—called into being by po-

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litical and cultural entrepreneurs, although on the basis of some preexisting sense of collective identity.¹⁴

One instrument by which nations are created is the state. To the question of where coherent nations are to be found, the answer often is: where a state has forged one. The modern state can impose a common language through its bureaucracy and system of mass education. The state machinery also can create ethnic homogeneity by evicting those who do not belong to the core group. Ethnic cleansing in Europe did not begin in 1992 in the former Yugoslavia. It is an all-too-familiar feature of the modern era. Ironically, the ethnic cleansing of the past seems to have contributed to stability in the postcommunist present precisely by producing, by gruesome means, ethnic homogeneity, thus eliminating one potential cause of strife. Poland is predominantly Catholic and Polish because its sizable Jewish population was killed by the Germans during the war and the many Germans living in what became Poland after the war were evicted. Similar annihilations and evictions took place in the Czech Republic and the Baltic states.

The most peaceful part of postcommunist Eurasia—the West—is, on the whole, more ethnically homogeneous than the least peaceful part—the South. Not coincidentally, the states of the West have, on the whole, histories of sovereignty stretching back to the end of World War I; their counterparts in the South have been sovereign only since the end of the Cold War. E. J. Hobsbawm has referred to the aftermath of 1989 and 1991 as the unfinished business of 1919: “The eggs of Versailles and Brest-Litovsk are still hatching.”¹⁵ The South is in some ways repeating the history of the West, struggling to form viable states and in some cases seeking to make them ethnically homogeneous by the familiar, terrible, but proven methods. The pattern is familiar, not confined to the Balkans. Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in forcible exchanges of population. Russians are being encouraged to leave Central Asia.¹⁶

The presence of an ethnically heterogeneous population has not led to conflict or repression in every postcommunist state. Bulgaria’s treatment of its Turkish minority actually improved after 1989. The long rivalry between Poles and Lithuanians now

seems extinct. Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, was historically a Polish (and Jewish) city; but Warsaw has made no claims on it. These happy outcomes, provisional though they are, may be due to what Mueller identifies as one of the basic features of democracy, properly practiced: the protection of minorities.¹⁷ The absence of both war and repression may be the result of the existence of an ethnic majority that is credibly committed to observing the rules of democratic politics and a minority that recognizes that this provides enough political space to safeguard its interests.

The largest postcommunist minority consists of the 25 million Russians who, with the breakup of the Soviet Union, suddenly found themselves living as minorities in independent Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet republics. All things considered, the Russian minorities have thus far engendered remarkably little strife.¹⁸ The reason may lie in the size and proximity of their historic homeland and protector. If a commitment to democratic norms is one basis for the fair treatment of national and ethnic minorities, the fear of a powerful neighbor where the minority is a majority may well be another. The military and political power of the Russian Federation is perhaps at least as effective a guarantor of the rights of Russians outside the federation as the moral power of democratic ideas.

In the political geography of postcommunist Eurasia, therefore, the countries of the West are struggling to establish effective states while those of the South face the task of creating legitimate ones. The pathology that besets the first group is crime and corruption; the second is plagued by civil war.

The three large post-Soviet Slavic states, the postcommunist "East," are situated, in cultural and political terms, between the West and the South. Russia and Ukraine confront both rampant crime and corruption and the threat of secession: the first is more acute than in the West, the second less pressing than in the South. Russia and Ukraine are less ethnically homogeneous than the countries of central and eastern Europe, but more so than the newly independent states of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Both Slavic states contain numerically large minorities, but because the states themselves are so populous—numbering 150 million and 52 million people, respectively—

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minorities form smaller proportions of their total populations than they do in the postcommunist South. The Slavic countries have less experience of independent statehood than the countries of the postcommunist West: Ukraine was never an independent state in the modern era and Russia was always a multinational empire rather than a nation-state within its present borders. But they emerged from the communist period with more relevant experience than the new states of the South: there was always a Russian-dominated state, in the management of which the Ukrainians were junior partners.

From a geopolitical point of view, the fate of the Slavic East is of monumental importance. Russia is the largest and most heavily armed state in Europe. Together Russia and Ukraine contain 200 million of the 325 million people in the 27 postcommunist states. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship will have a decisive impact on the security policies of all the countries to the west, including the United States. The political and economic futures of Russia and Ukraine are uncertain. They may move in the direction of the West, or the South, or they may chart a separate course.

If they are drawn in the direction of either the West or the South, and if the two flanking regions continue the trajectories that the data cited by Gati imply, the ultimate result will be a new global political and economic configuration. What was known, during the Cold War, as the Second World will have been partitioned between, and absorbed by, the First and the Third.

The international system will have been divided between states for which the central issue is the one on which Skidelsky concentrates—striking the proper balance between the public and private domain in economic affairs—and those for which the overriding preoccupation is the question of the legitimate borders of the state. The problem with which the first group will have to cope is inflation (or in the case of the United States, debt). The problem for the second will be civil war or its suppression by dictatorship.

Whether or when such a clear global line of division will become apparent cannot, of course, be known in advance. What is clear, however, is that if and when it comes into being, the world will have crossed a threshold into a new historical epoch. It will have entered the *post-postcommunist* era.

NOTES

1. Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 114.
2. Among the losers was not only orthodox communism but also the idea on which Mikhail Gorbachev staked his career—the idea of reform communism, of a “third way” between Stalin (or Brezhnev) on the one hand and John Locke and Adam Smith on the other.
3. The familiar phrase “goods and services” does not apply. Communist economics did not allow for services, which was one (but only one) of the reasons that it failed.
4. Skidelsky notes that inflation is actually a tax—hidden and unacknowledged, perhaps, but a tax all the same in that it gives the state control over resources it would not otherwise have.
5. See Skidelsky's chapter in this book, p. 91–92. 77–101
6. Ibid. p. 82.
7. For Skidelsky's version of this debate see p. 78–79.
8. Here Mueller implicitly disagrees with Holmes, who argues that an effective state must actively promote honesty because in the absence of the apparatus for doing so—an effective legal and judicial system—people will find it rational and profitable to be dishonest. Mueller argues the contrary position. Over time, he says, like Gresham's Law in reverse, good conduct will drive out bad.
9. See Gati's chapter in this book. Here Gati disagrees with Mueller, who argues that the polls express attitudes that are normal for democratic capitalism, since they are common in the West. Gati, however, implies that the same responses have different implications in the East, where the political consequences are likely to be more dire.
10. Aurel Braun, personal communication.
11. See Gati's chapter in this book, ~~pp. 90 and pp. 90~~. The data in the *Eurobarometer* polls, it should be noted, come from the western-most post-communist countries, the ones *most* likely in Gati's view to make a successful transition to democracy and free markets.
12. The Ottomans ruled directly in two of the three areas that comprise the “South” of postcommunism: the Balkans and the Caucasus. The third area, Central Asia, although not formally part of the Ottoman Empire, resembles it in that its people are ethnically Turkic and the primary faith is Islam.
13. Ronald G. Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 14.
14. The best-known statement of this point of view is Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
15. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Canto Edition, 1992), p. 64.

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16. Ronald Suny has noted that the nationalisms of the Caucasus and Central Asia, such as they are, were created largely during the Soviet period: the Soviet Union was a hothouse as well as a prison house of nations. The Soviet experience may have left these new states with the worst of both worlds: a sufficient concentration of the population of the titular nationality in what was designated its "home" republic to give that group a proprietary sense there, leading to the desire to accomplish what it proceeded to attempt upon independence—the expulsion of minorities—without a strong enough commitment to democratic norms to forgo "ethnic cleansing." See Suny, *The Revenge of the Past*, ch. 3.
17. See Mueller's chapter in this book, ~~p. 100~~: 102-107
18. There has been some strife. The civic status of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states is an ongoing subject of dispute; but in none of the three states has that dispute turned violent.