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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: April 29, 1999

NOTE FOR: **Honorable Brian Atwood**
Agency for International Development

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☐

Action ☒

4-29

ok to dispatch?

yes B

have ASE
message it.

Thank you.

cc:

cc NSC

ed Rice on

already sent to [unclear]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1999

Jana Carter
1926 16th Street, NW, #2-1
Washington, DC 20009

Dear Jana:

Thank you for sharing with me your and Benjamin's suggestions for reuniting children and their parents who have been separated in Kosovo. I agree that this might be a good solution to help alleviate some of the heartbreak and suffering that families there are experiencing. I have directed a copy of your memo to members of my staff for review.

All the best to you and Benjamin.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

This is a really good idea - Tell Ben hello from -

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4-29-99

cc Brian Atwood
too —

Let's see we need to seriously explore this

Bc

Jana Carter
1926 16th Street, NW, #2-1
Washington, DC 20009



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
UNCLASSIFIED
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

Date: 4/16/99

Number of Pages to Follow: 1

To: Nancy Herrnreich
c/o Mary Morrison

ADDRESSE'S FAX NUMBER 456-6703

FROM: Jana Carter

SENDER'S FAX NUMBER: (202) 622-0265

SENDER'S CONFIRMATION NUMBER 622-2955

COMMENTS/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

This is the plan that I mentioned to
Mary. I also mentioned this to Jack
Quinn this morning & he thought
that you might be interested.
For what it's worth, here it is.

Best

Jana

Mom — Thanks. —

*See
Gina
Sanguy*

(Jana Carter sends suggestion for reuniting families separated in Kosovo. Use digital cameras, disks and computers to identify missing children and/or parents. (Copy sent to NSC - Ed Rice or Glyn Davies))

*cc: NSC
Ed Rice or
Glyn Davies
1/12/0
Muller dist
(mention
that it was
sent to NSC)*

MEMORANDUM FOR: NANCY HERNREICH
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF OVAL OFFICE OPERATIONS

FROM: Jana Carter

DATE: April 16, 1999

SUBJECT: Reuniting Kosovo Families

After watching and reading news accounts of children separated from their parents, my husband, Benjamin Carter-Whillock, and I thought that there must be a better more efficient and effective way to reunite missing children with their parents. The following plan should not replace handing out flyers, rather it should augment that strategy. This memorandum outlines our plan in its simplest form.

This plan proposes providing military personnel and or relief camp workers with the capability of taking digital images of the lost children and sharing it with other relief camps. At least one digital camera and computer should be sent to each relief camp enabling military personnel at those camps to take the photographs of the children who have been separated from their parents or, for that matter, allow pictures to be taken of the parents who have been separated from their children. These digital images then can be down loaded, copied on disks, and sent to the other relief camps. The free standing or lap top computer should be set aside for the exclusive use of those parents who have been separated from their children (or for those children who have been separated from their parents). Once a parent identifies his or her child, military personnel or relief camp workers could contact the appropriate officials at the camp where the child is located and verify the child's location and make transportation arrangements to reunite the family. These digital images can also be shown to the lost children for possible identification of a parent by the child.

This effort shows the Administration's concern and compassionate involvement at even the meekest of levels—that of the lost, bewildered, and scared children and their equally lost, bewildered, and scared parents. Furthermore, this evidences the Administration's commitment to help the Kosovo people.

The basic tools necessary for this plan are digital cameras, disks, and computers with their own source of power. An American company which manufactures digital cameras and computers should be more than willing to donate the equipment. This plan could serve as a prime example of the Administration and the private sector uniting to help the plight of the Kosovo people.

'99 APR 30 AM 11:23

The Honorable Massimo D'Alema
Prime Minister
Republic of Italy
Rome, Italy

The Honorable William J. Clinton
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

4 - 30 - 99
Send to WSC
Yes ☒
No ☐

Dear Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. President:

During Prime Minister D'Alema's visit to
agreed that the Italian Minister of Defense and the
Defense would review the operational and safety
wake of the ski gondola incident at Cavalese. The stated goal was to ensure the
highest levels of safety for U.S. aircraft operations in Italy.

In response to your direction, Admiral Joseph Prueher, United States Navy,
and his counterpart, Lieutenant General Leonardo Tricarico, Italian Air Force, led
a commission to assess the adequacy of the operational and safety measures taken
by U.S. aircraft conducting flight training missions from Italian air bases. They
also examined whether any additional measures might be appropriate.

We have received and been briefed on the report of the Tricarico - Prueher
Bilateral Safety Review Commission and are confident that the review was
comprehensive and thorough. We accept the conclusions of the report and have
agreed to implement all of the report's recommendations, including new
procedures that will provide for maximum safety in the conduct of military flight
training.

Cooperation of Italian and U.S. authorities in the conduct of this review
was outstanding, and we particularly want to express our gratitude to Lieutenant
General Tricarico and Admiral Prueher for their leadership. The ongoing NATO
military operations in Operation Allied Force highlight the critical importance of
close Italian and U.S. cooperation in ensuring the security of our countries and the

Alliance. We believe the recommendations of the Commission will enhance even further the level of cooperation between our countries and our Armed Forces.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Carlo Scognamiglio', written in a cursive style.

Carlo Scognamiglio
Minister of Defense

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'William S. Cohen', written in a cursive style.

William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense

**REPORT OF THE
TRICARICO - PRUEHER
BILATERAL COMMISSION**

13 APRIL 1999

INTRODUCTION


On February 3, 1998, a US Marine Corps jet flying a low-level training mission from Aviano Air Base, Italy, hit and severed two cables supporting a ski gondola near Cavalese, Italy. The ski gondola fell over 300 feet to the ground, resulting in the deaths of 20 civilians of various nationalities. Immediately after the accident, the US and Italian governments established several new measures to improve safety of military flights in Italy. These measures include new minimum altitude restrictions, radio contact with Italian air traffic controllers, briefings from Italian air traffic control, and use of Italian charts for flight planning.

One year later, US President Clinton and Italian Prime Minister D'Alema appointed a Bilateral Italian-US Commission to conduct a safety review. The Commission was tasked to examine all the rules and procedures for low-level flights in Italy, as well as the new measures introduced after the accident, to ensure that the best conditions possible are in place for safe US training flights in Italy. The Commission approves of the new measures and has recommended additional actions, to include first of all, the further restriction of low-level flight activity in Italy. Furthermore, given the complexity of the Italian operational environment and the need to safeguard numerous legitimate Italian national interests, as well as the safety of the civilian population, the decision has been made to limit low-level flights to squadrons permanently deployed in Italy, except in special cases. Other additional recommendations include a US-Italian Safety Review Board and a Designated US Authority responsible for certifying that US military units are prepared to safely conduct training flights.

With the submission of this report, the Commission has concluded its work. The Commission's recommendations, which include the strengthened implementation of and adherence to established procedures, are consistent with safety requirements and our common NATO obligations. Adoption of these recommendations will have a positive effect on the safety of flight over Italy and will enhance our mutual support to NATO.

The Commission benefited from the full support and cooperation of the Italian Ministry of Defense, the United States Department of Defense, and military authorities of both countries, and worked in close coordination with the United States Embassy in Rome and the Italian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

This work has been conducted and concluded in the spirit of close cooperation and friendship which has defined the Italian-American relationship for decades. The adversity our nations have weathered together during this tragic incident will hopefully result in continued expansion of the breadth and depth of our friendship. The Commission expresses our deepest sympathy for the deaths that occurred at Cavalese, and hopes this work will be a significant step in preventing another such tragedy.


Leonardo Tricarico
Lieutenant General, IAF


Joseph W. Prueher
Admiral, USN

Done at Washington, D.C.
This 13th day of April, 1999

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On February 3, 1998, an EA-6B aircraft attached to the Marine Attack Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 (VMAQ-2), and operating from Aviano Air Base, Italy, struck and severed aerial gondola cables near Cavalese, Italy. The severed cables caused a suspended gondola to fall, resulting in the deaths of 20 civilians of various nationalities. The aircraft was flying a low-level navigation training mission.

Subsequent to this tragic event, the US and Italian governments implemented a number of operational and safety measures. These measures include new minimum altitude restrictions, radio contact with Italian air traffic controllers, briefings from Italian air traffic control, and use of Italian charts for flight planning. See Annex E for a complete listing of measures implemented.

At a summit meeting in March 1999, US President Bill Clinton and Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema agreed to undertake a bilateral review of these measures and the rules and procedures for low-level flights in Italy with a view to achieving maximum conditions for safety of US training flights. On March 9, Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, US Navy (USN), and Lieutenant General Leonardo Tricarico, Italian Air Force (IAF), were appointed to head a Bilateral Commission to conduct this review. They were tasked to conduct a thorough review of the corrective operational and safety measures implemented, to assess the adequacy of these measures, and to determine whether additional measures should be taken to ensure that US operations are consistent with safety requirements and our common NATO obligations and commitments. They also examined the rules and procedures for low-level flights to verify that they provide the best conditions possible for safe execution of such flights by US aircraft in Italian airspace. The Bilateral Commission was directed to present the results of the review to the Italian Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense within 30 days.

PREMISES

This report provides the results of the Commission's review which was based on the following major premises:

- 1. That the Republic of Italy, like all independent nations, exercises sovereignty over her territory, airspace and territorial waters.**
- 2. That the US Government accepts responsibility and obligation under the NATO SOFA for the Cavalese accident.**

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission's most significant finding is that: **The primary guarantor of flight safety is unit/command leadership that demands thoughtful, disciplined adherence to established procedures.** The Commission emphasizes that **safe flight results from professionally conducted flight operations.** The Commission concluded, as did the US Marine Corps' Command Investigation Board, that the **accident was caused by air crew error, and that supervisory error occurred within the air crew's chain of command.** Accordingly, the Bilateral Commission provides seven recommendations, briefly summarized below. See Section III for a full explanation of the recommendations.

1. **New Procedures for US Low-level Flight Training.** Apply the following new procedures to low-level flight training in Italian airspace (low-level flight training in this report is defined as 2000' above ground level (AGL) and below, and is referred to in the Italian Low Flying Manual (Manuale BOAT) as Bassissima Quota (BBQ)):

a. When certified by the Designated US Authority and with the concurrence of the Italian Base Commander, US units permanently based in Italy (forward stationed units) will be authorized to fly low-level flights, up to the maximum limit of 25% of weekly authorized flight activity.

b. Non-permanently based units (forward deployed and rotational units) will be authorized to carry out low-level flight activity only:

- (i) Within the context of exercises authorized by the Italian Defense Staff (IDS) and where such flight activity is in keeping with the objectives and procedures of the exercise itself; or
- (ii) When necessary for training aimed at carrying out air operations for which the units in Italy are based, and when certified by the Designated US Authority and authorized by the IDS.

c. Units based on carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) will be authorized to fly low-level flights only when certified and approved in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 1.c. of Section III.

2. **Designated US Authority.** Appoint a US Commander at each Italian air base as the Designated US Authority. US units will be permitted to conduct flight operations only after they have been certified by the Designated US Authority.

- a. US unit commanders will be responsible for certifying to their Designated US Authority that unit air crews are qualified for their assigned operational and training missions.
 - b. The Designated US Authority will review and submit the daily flight schedule to the Italian Air Base Commander, certifying that the mission has been planned consistent with Italian flight regulations.
 - c. The Designated US Authority will coordinate with the Italian Base Commander to ensure the local procedures are consistent with Italian regulations for safety of flight.
 - d. The Designated US Authority will provide comprehensive information regarding US and Italian flight regulations to all local US units.
 - e. The Designated US Authority will certify to the Italian Base Commander those units that are qualified to perform low-level training.
3. **Liaison and/or Exchange Officers.** Assign US and Italian Liaison and/or Exchange Officers to selected US and Italian units to optimize the flow of information and facilitate communications.
 4. **Flight Safety Board.** Appoint US Flight Safety Representatives to receive indoctrination briefings from Italian Flight Safety Officers, and then to meet periodically with the Italian Flight Safety Central Board Representative.
 5. **Flight Information Web Site.** Pursue development of an Internet-based flight information file to provide near real-time access to the most current theater-specific information to air crews prior to deployment.
 6. **Review of New Procedures.** Review, if necessary, these new procedures, in order to ensure that all relevant factors are considered.
 7. **Institutionalizing the New Procedures.** Incorporate these new procedures into the on-going review of bilateral arrangements under the existing Shell Agreement.

II. CONCLUSIONS

The US and Italian teams recognize that policies and procedures governing low-level training in Italy must ensure safe operations foremost and sustain unit combat readiness, support individual pilot currency and proficiency requirements, and achieve our common NATO obligations and other bilateral commitments. The Commission provides the following conclusions:

1. The primary guarantor of flight safety is unit/command leadership that demands thoughtful, disciplined adherence to proven procedures.

2. In response to the specific tasking from the US Secretary of Defense, **the corrective operational and safety measures implemented since the accident are fully adequate to ensure safe flight operations by US forces in Italy.** When coupled with this Commission's recommendations (see Section III) the measures will be institutionalized, will be standardized throughout Italy, and will further ensure that US operations are consistent with safety requirements and our common NATO obligations and commitments.

3. Operational training – including the safe conduct of low-level training – in the environment in which forces will be operating is necessary to maintain unit readiness and air crew currency in support of potential bilateral and NATO missions. Although US units do not deploy to Italy for the purpose of acquiring low-level flying proficiency, they must be able to maintain proficiency while deployed to Italy. Consequently, the Italian Defense Staff (IDS) will take into consideration, on a case-by-case basis, the training requirements of such US units to be carried out in special training cycles, or within the context of exercises where low-level flying activity is in keeping with the objectives and procedures of the exercise itself.

4. Operational and safety procedures were in place and were sufficient at the time of the accident, but knowledge of and adherence to those procedures were incomplete. Of primary significance is that there was no established system to verify that deployed squadrons received and read all relevant flight-related information. Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR) and US Forces have reviewed procedures that were in place and have instituted a number of operational measures to provide an additional margin of safety. These measures include new minimum altitude restrictions, radio contact with Italian air traffic controllers, briefings from Italian air traffic control, and use of Italian charts for planning.

5. US and Italian command and control relationships are governed by various bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the North Atlantic Treaty, the NATO SOFA, and the 1993 MOU on Aviano and its complementary Technical Agreement of 1994. These agreements establish basic command and control arrangements and affirm Italy's sovereignty over its airfields and air

space. Modified procedures for coordination of respective US and Italian duties and responsibilities have clarified national responsibilities for safety of flight in Italy.

6. Pre-accident US command and control relationships were complicated and somewhat unclear, and may have contributed to an environment in which insufficient emphasis was placed on familiarity with and adherence to established flight procedures. The US has since reviewed and modified command and control relationships of US squadrons deployed to Italy, clarifying host-tenant relationships. Among these modifications are the 20 August 98 Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPORD 4247 (US Participation in NATO Stabilization Force, Operation Joint Forge) and the 2 December 1998 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between USAREUR and USAFE. See Annex G for a discussion of these modifications.

7. The Commission observed excellent attitudes and conduct of those implementing the measures instituted since the accident. Involved personnel – both US and Italian – are aware of their responsibility to enhance safety of air operations over Italy and are committed to compliance with all procedures designed to attain that end.

8. It is imperative that US personnel understand that they operate at Italian facilities and in Italian airspace, under regulations mutually agreed upon by the US and Italian governments that recognize Italian sovereignty. This relationship is the foundation for US forces operating in Italy. US personnel recognize the responsibilities of the Italian authorities for operations in and over the sovereign territory of Italy. Italian and US authorities are committed to enhancing our mutual relationship in support of NATO and the NATO mission.

9. An important purpose of post-accident measures is to ensure clear lines of accountability and responsibility for quality control of flight planning. The concept of a Designated US Authority responsible for providing comprehensive information to local US units, for continuous liaison with the Italian Base Commander, for receiving unit commanders' certifications that their air crews are mission ready, and for certifying that units know local area requirements, accomplishes this objective.

In addition to the measures instituted since the accident by USCINCEUR and US Forces, this Commission provides a number of additional recommendations. The new measures recommended by this Commission are designed to ensure air crew adherence to established procedures when operating within the sovereign airspace of Italy. These new measures provide for standardization of procedures and emphasize Italian approval of all operations within its sovereign airspace. A complete listing of the Commission's recommendations follows in section III.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **New Procedures for US Low-level Flight Training.** Apply the following new procedures to low-level flight training in Italian airspace (low-level flight training in this report is defined as 2000' above ground level (AGL) and below, and is referred to in the Italian Low Flying Manual (Manuale BOAT) as Bassissima Quota (BBQ)):

a. When certified by the Designated US Authority (see #2 below) and with the concurrence of the Italian Base Commander, US units permanently based in Italy (forward stationed units) will be authorized to fly low-level flights, as existing bilateral and NATO agreements provide, within the maximum limit of 25% of the weekly authorized flight activity.

b. Non-permanently based units (forward deployed and rotational units) will be authorized to carry out low-level flight activity only:

- (i) Within the context of exercises authorized by the Italian Defense Staff (IDS) and where such flight activity is in keeping with the objectives and procedures of the exercise itself; or
- (ii) When necessary for training aimed at carrying out air operations for which the units in Italy are based and when certified by the Designated US Authority and authorized by the IDS.

c. Units based on carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) will be authorized to fly low-level flights only when certified and approved in accordance with the following procedures:

- (i) Air wings will submit low-level training plan requests for approval and scheduling no later than 30 days in advance. Emergency-specific needs should be dealt with and specifically authorized on a case-by-case basis by the IDS.
- (ii) An Italian Officer, assisted by a US Naval Officer, will provide low-level flight briefings when the carrier/ARG enters the area of operations.
- (iii) An Italian Liaison Officer is assigned to assist in planning for air training operations over Italy during the early phases of the deployment.
- (iv) Low-level training flights are conducted on a limited number of routes that will be reviewed to vary the low-level traffic pattern annually.
- (v) Requests for specific low-level flights must be submitted 48-hours in advance by the Designated US Authority.
- (vi) The Designated US Authority certifies that the flight was planned consistent with all Italian regulations, and that all relevant charts and directives have been reviewed.

2. **Designated US Authority.** Appoint a US Commander at each Italian air base, (e.g., Commander, 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano; Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Sigonella) as the Designated US Authority responsible for implementing and monitoring compliance with US and Italian safety of flight regulations (along the lines of the 1995 Shell Agreement and the 2 December 1998 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between US Army Europe (USAREUR) and US Air Forces Europe (USAFE)). US units will be permitted to conduct flight operations only after they have been certified by the Designated US Authority.

a. US unit commanders will be responsible for certifying to the Designated US Authority that unit air crews are qualified for their assigned operational and training missions, i.e. that they are mission ready, and have reviewed all applicable local flying charts and directives.

b. The Designated US Authority will be responsible for the planning and scheduling phase of US air operations. This Authority will review and submit the daily flight schedule to the Italian Air Base Commander, certifying that the mission has been planned consistent with Italian flight regulations, taking into account all applicable charts and directives.

c. The Designated US Authority will coordinate with the Italian Base Commander to ensure the local administrative procedures are consistent with Italian regulations for safety of flight. All US units will follow the Designated US Authority's procedures when those procedures are more restrictive than service procedures.

d. The Designated US Authority will provide comprehensive information regarding US and Italian flight regulations to all local US units – rotational and permanently assigned to include, but not limited to safety, local area, host nation, and service specific-regulations and procedures. Such information will include a library of all relevant US and Italian publications, references, directives, maps/charts and other documentation. The Designated US Authority will establish official channels for the dissemination of this information.

e. The Designated US Authority will certify to the Italian Base Commander those units that are qualified to perform low-level training.

3. **Liaison and/or Exchange Officers.** Assign US and Italian Liaison and/or Exchange Officers to selected US and Italian units to optimize the flow of information and facilitate communications. The Italian Liaison and/or Exchange Officers are to assist US units in understanding Italian flight procedures, assure the complete and efficient flow of information and ensure that pertinent national publications and materials are received and distributed to the unit.

4. **Flight Safety Board.** Appoint US Flight Safety Representatives (6th Fleet,

16th Air Force, US Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF), Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR)) who will receive indoctrination briefings from Italian Flight Safety Officers and will then meet periodically as a Flight Safety Review Group with the Italian Flight Safety Central Board Representative to discuss issues related to regulations, special circumstances, and sensitivities inherent to the Italian flight environment. The US Flight Safety Representatives will review annually the findings and recommendations of the Flight Safety Central Board with US units located in Italy.

5. **Flight Information Web Site.** Pursue mechanisms to increase the timely procedural and situational awareness of deploying air crews by exploiting new technologies. Pursue development of an Internet-based flight information file. These technologies, if practicable, will provide near real-time access to the most current theater-specific information to air crews prior to deployment.

6. **Review of New Procedures.** Review, if necessary, these new procedures in order to ensure that all relevant factors are considered, to include: safety of air operations; training routes and all other factors affecting the operational capacity of the units; and that the low-level characteristics and missions of helicopters are not negatively impacted by the restrictions in place for fixed-wing operations.

7. **Institutionalizing the New Procedures.** Incorporate these recommendations into the on-going review of bilateral arrangements in accordance with the existing 1995 Shell Agreement and its Model Technical Arrangement. Sections VI, XVI and XVII of the Model Technical Arrangement are an excellent vehicle through which these specific procedures may be formalized and institutionalized. For those Italian bases where there is no permanent US contingent, and where US Forces are temporarily deployed, Sections VI, XVI, and XVII of the Model Technical Arrangement provide a useful guideline for an operational agreement covering command and control, flight safety and conduct of training/operational activities.

ANNEX A US AND ITALIAN COMMISSION CHARTERS

Italian Charter

TRANSLATION

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL DELEGATION WITHIN THE US-ITALIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE REVISION OF THE RULES PERTAINING TO THE FLIGHT ACTIVITIES OF THE US AIRCRAFT IN ITALY

1. Based on the evaluations aimed at preventing other accidents similar to the one that occurred in February 1998 in the Cavalese valleys and to guarantee the conditions of maximum safety for the population, the mandate given to the Chairman of the National Delegation is the following:
 - a. to review all the Italian rules and procedures that apply to the training and operational activities of the US air forces in Italy, additionally proposing, if necessary, the introduction of new rules;
 - b. to verify the adequacy and the compliance, to current Italian standards, of the US directives, rules and procedures for the accomplishment of the training and operational activities of the US air forces in Italy, additionally proposing, if necessary, the introduction of new rules;
 - c. identify those agreements, or portions of them, pertaining to the flight activities, that need to be renegotiated in order to be adequate to the revised Italian standards.
2. Similar directives have been given by the US Secretary of Defense to Admiral Prucher, Chairman of the US Delegation within the US-Italian Committee.

United States Charter



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 9 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER

SUBJECT: Review of Aviation Operational and Safety Measures

On February 3, 1998, an EA-6B aircraft attached to the Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 (VMAQ-2), operating from Aviano Air Base, Italy, struck and severed an aerial cable near Cavalese, Italy, causing a gondola to fall, resulting in the deaths of 20 multinational civilians. The aircraft was performing a low-level flight training mission at the time of the tragedy. Immediately after the incident, the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic directed an investigation be conducted into circumstances surrounding the mishap. Representatives from the Italian Air Force fully participated in this investigation. The Command Investigation Board completed its investigation and report on March 11, 1998.

As directed by the President, it is appropriate at this time to conduct, in conjunction with our counterparts in the Italian Ministry of Defense, a thorough review of the corrective operational and safety measures implemented since the incident. A review of these operational and safety measures is appropriate to assess their adequacy and to determine whether additional measures should be taken to ensure the highest levels of safety. To accomplish these objectives, on my behalf you should invite the full participation of our Italian military counterparts to ensure that such measures are consistent with safety requirements and our common NATO obligations and commitments.

The assessment should be conducted and a report provided to me and the Italian Minister of Defense within 30 days. You may obtain support for this review through the Joint Staff, J-3.

William A. J. [Signature]

cc: Secretary of the Navy
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

ANNEX B

BILATERAL COMMISSION MEMBERS

ITALIAN TEAM MEMBERS:

Lieutenant General Leonardo Tricarico, IAF
Brigadier General Marani, IAF
Colonel Piero Valente, IAF
Colonel Paolo Dolfini, IAF
Colonel Claudio Salerno, IAF
Colonel Giuseppe Favero, IAF
Colonel Pierluigi Galvani, Italian Army
LtCol Giuseppeantonio Cappucci, IAF
LtCol Luigi Ricciardi, IAF
C.F. Vincenzo Izzi, Italian Navy

US TEAM MEMBERS:

Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN
CAPT Howard A. Petrea, USN
BrigGen(Sel) Kenneth M. DeCuir, USAF
COL Robert S. Nasby, USMC
COL James L. Mowery, USA
CAPT Jane G. Dalton, JAGC, USN
CDR Brian P. Cullin, USN
CDR David C. Dykhoff, USN
Mr. Gary R. Biggs
SFC Paula E. Davis, USA

US LIAISON PERSONNEL

COL Harry F. Davis, USAF
CAPT John R. Sanders, USN
Maj Neil J. Truscello, USAF
Mr. Larry Chiarotti, GM-15

ANNEX C

METHODOLOGY

The Bilateral Commission began meeting the week of 15 March 1999. Team members for the US and Italian Teams were identified and initial fact-gathering began. The US and Italian teams began coordinating a strategy for the Commission's work in Italy. An initial press conference was held on 15 March in Washington, D.C. to announce the formation of the Bilateral Commission and to review its mission.

The Italian Team began by conducting a three part review of: (1) Italian regulations affecting US military flight operations over Italian territory; (2) the adequacy of US military flight regulations with respect to safe conduct of low-level flights and ensuring their agreement with Italian flight regulations; and (3) current Memorandums of Understanding and Technical Agreements to improve the safety of flight operations. The Italian Team was tasked to identify new regulations and procedures that would enhance safety of flight over Italy.

The Italian Team met for the first time in Rome, in the offices of the Air Staff, on March 17, in order to define the work methodology most suitable for achieving the goal indicated in the governmental mandate and within the stipulated time limit of thirty days.

In particular, the complexity of the Italian operational environment was considered in all its aspects and not just in the light of technical considerations.

A determining factor that played a primary role in the decisions reached was the safeguarding of multiple vulnerable interests from the incorrect conduct of low-level flight; not only the safety of the local inhabitants and their right not to be burdened by undue concern, but also the protection of Italy's environmental and architectural heritage which are, moreover, essential for a country that has tourism as a fundamental resource.

Furthermore, all the indications of possible danger that have been recorded in recent years as a result of low-level military flights, by both Italian and foreign aircraft, were taken into consideration. This examination confirmed that the complex natural, meteorological, social and cultural environment in which such flight activity takes place can be safeguarded only by a thorough acquaintance with the Italian operational theater as well as strict adherence to clear and precise regulations.

Due to the situation in Kosovo, as well as to the positions held by many of the members of the Italian and US Teams, the subsequent meetings were held in Vicenza, seat of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) Command. In that location, in order to arrive at concerted results, on March 24, two additional

officers from Commander, US Air Forces Europe and one from the US Navy were added to the Commission, as well as one civilian official.

The Italian Team also had frequent and positive contacts with US counterparts.

The US Tactical Air (TACAIR) Team traveled to Whidbey Island, WA and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, NC during the week of 15 March and reviewed USN and USMC EA-6B procedural changes implemented since the accident. The Public Affairs Officer developed a Public Affairs Strategy to support the goals of the Bilateral Commission. The Legal Advisor began fact-finding and conducted reviews of the various related international agreements. Members of the US Team met with representatives of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Coordination with LtGen Tricarico and his Team was ongoing throughout this week.

On Saturday, 20 March the US Team departed Andrews AFB, arriving in Rome on 21 March. First official calls began on Monday, 22 March, with a breakfast meeting between Admiral Prueher and LtGen Tricarico. Mutual goals of the Commission were addressed and a strategy to achieve those goals was developed. Admiral Prueher and various US Team members then met with The Honorable Thomas Foglietta, US Ambassador to the Republic of Italy; His Excellency Carlo Scognamiglio, Minister of Defense; Under Secretary of Defense Massimo Brutti; General Mario Arpino, Chief of Defense; LtGen Fornasiero, Chief of Staff Italian Air Force, and Mr. James Cunningham, Deputy Chief of the US Mission. A press conference that afternoon introduced the Bilateral Commission to the European community, and projected a solid working relationship between the two senior members. The US TACAIR Team traveled to Naples, and the rest of the US Team followed on Tuesday.

Tuesday, 23 March, consisted of substantive discussions with CINCSOUTH in Naples and then with the Commander, 31st Fighter Wing; COM5ATAF, and the CAOC in Vicenza, IT. Meanwhile, the US TACAIR Team continued its discussions with the operational and air cells at AFSOUTH, AIRSOUTH, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, VMAQ-2, 31st Fighter Wing, COM5ATAF, 16th Air Force, and the CAOC. Feedback from the press conference and media coverage that resulted were uniformly positive. The messages of Italian sovereignty over operations at its bases and US and Italian mutual commitment to enhanced air safety in support of the NATO mission were well received and understood in the media and the public.

A US Team visit to Cavalese and the site of the accident on Wednesday, 24 March, accompanied by Lt Gen Tricarico and the American Consul General, was essential to the success of this review. The Team surveyed first-hand the nature of the terrain, the low-level route, and the operating environment. The visit reinforced the tentative conclusion that the primary benefit of this review was

to better ensure that squadron commanders and their air crews adhere to established procedures and operate consistently within established safety standards. In light of imminent NATO operations in Kosovo, the Team elected to shorten its stay in Aviano and Vicenza and returned to Rome on Wednesday evening. The truncated visit did not adversely affect the Team's work, as essential consultations between ADM Prueher and LtGen Tricarico and other substantive discussions by the Team members were successfully completed.

On Thursday, 25 March, US Team members individually followed up on earlier taskings and completed the fact-gathering process. LtGen Tricarico being otherwise engaged with the NATO operation in Kosovo, ADM Prueher provided de-briefs and discussed the Team's progress with the Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy, Mr. James Cunningham; Under Secretary of Defense Brutti; the Chief of Naval Operations; and ADM Venturoni. The discussions were fruitful and provided valuable insights to the US Team.

For their final day in Europe, the US Team traveled to Stuttgart on Friday, 26 March, for discussions with USCINCEUR and MARFOREUR counterparts and a meeting between Admiral Prueher and Deputy USCINCEUR Admiral Abbot, and then to Brussels to meet with General Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

ANNEX D

MAPS/CHARTS

The Chart used for the mishap flight was a Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC) of designation TPC F-2B, produced by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). It did not show the gondola cable. The chart carries two warnings. The first states "All vertical obstructions 200 feet above ground level (AGL) and higher cannot be portrayed due to chart scale and feature density." The second states "vertical obstructions, including power lines, have been extracted from the most reliable sources available; however, there is no assurance that all are shown or that their locations or heights are correct."

The chart labels the area of the mishap as "special use airspace," the restrictions for which must be referenced in Flight Information Publication (FLIP) Area Planning Publication AP/2A. At the time of the mishap, the AP/2A publication established the minimum flight altitude in the area of the mishap as 1,000 feet. Routine US military procedures require pilots to refer to the applicable planning documents to prepare for a mission.

When deciding which obstructions should be shown on a TPC, cartographers follow "capture criteria." The accepted US and NATO criteria for TPCs directs depiction of vertical obstructions with heights greater than or equal to 200 feet AGL. None of the towers supporting the cable exceeded that height, and thus none were shown on the TPC. Also of note is that this standard directs inclusion of such obstructions to serve as aids to visual navigation, not for the purpose of hazard avoidance.

The cable itself would have been characterized as a horizontal, not vertical, obstruction, specifically a cableway. NATO cartography standards do not address cableways, but US standards direct their inclusion when they span valleys. Neither the obstruction data which NIMA obtained from the Italian Low Flying Manual (Manuale BOAT) nor the Italian chart which did portray the cableway (Carta di Navigazione BBQ) showed the towers in positions which would cause the cable to span the valley. Having no source information which indicated that a cable spanned the valley at the mishap location, NIMA cartographers made no depiction on the TPC. The cable was also not shown on the Italian Joint Operations Graphic or TPC charts.

After the accident, the minimum altitude reflected in the AP/2A publication was raised from 1,000 to 2,000 feet to reflect the change made to host nation restrictions. The cableway was not added to the TPC F-2B chart; as reconstructed and repositioned after the mishap it is well below the depiction criteria thresholds.

NIMA has subsequently investigated the feasibility of a program which would supply users with a digital obstruction database. The database would enable the local creation of charts which would portray vertical obstructions according to whatever height criteria the user specified. This program may have the potential to provide the desired level of vertical resolution without making the chart unusable due to excessive detail. Implementation details are not yet finalized, however, and field experience with this program is not yet available.

ANNEX E

Aviation Procedures

Following is a list of the operational and safety measures established since the accident. The Italian and US Commission members have reviewed these procedures and conclude that they are fully adequate to ensure safe flight operations in Italy. When coupled with this Commission's recommendations, the measures will be institutionalized, standardized throughout Italy, and will further ensure that military flight operations are consistent with safety requirements and our common NATO obligations and commitments.

1. To limit the combination of factors which led to the Cavalese accident, two **control measures** have been adopted:
 - Italy has raised the minimum altitude restrictions.
 - Aircraft on low-level routes are, whenever possible, in radar/radio contact with Italian air traffic controllers during the flight.
2. Subsequent to the accident, the following procedural changes were effected to ensure that air crews are fully aware of current altitude restrictions:
 - Distribution of flight information on-site is guaranteed by the following:
 - Deployed commanders must sign for all Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) and "Read File" items.
 - Deployed unit commanders are responsible for keeping FCIF libraries current. The operations group of the USAF 31st Wing performs and documents spot checks on unit FCIF libraries quarterly to ensure they are being properly maintained.
 - At the weekly Deliberate Forge stand-up meeting, the most current Read File/FCIF/pilot aid information is briefed to unit Commanding Officers/Officers in Charge.
 - Unit commanders must provide a monthly written verification that all air crews have read the Special Instructions / ROE.
 - Aircrew "Read and Initial" procedures have been formalized. Pilots of all units are not permitted to fly unless critical items have been reviewed.
 - All deploying aircrew receive lectures on low-level flying as part of formal, standardized area familiarization briefs regardless of whether or not the unit commander intends to execute such missions during the deployment.
 - Deployment "Standard Operating Procedures" (SOPs) have been formalized and clarified by 2nd Marine Amphibious Wing. The greater level of detail now incorporated in SOPs helps to ensure that deploying unit

commanders and their air crews understand local area flight procedures and regulations.

3. Better aircrew familiarity with the intended route and associated flight hazards might have prevented the accident. Accordingly, the following measures have been implemented to ensure familiarity of routes and flight hazards by aircrews:

- Low-level training for fixed-wing units is authorized only for 31FW units which are permanently stationed at Aviano. Deployed units must request permission to schedule and fly low-level training sorties through Italian Authorities.
- US pilots receive special low-level flight rules briefings from Italian air traffic controllers. They must also certify that they have reviewed all briefing materials and are aware of all flight restrictions and applicable aviation notices (NOTAMS) before each low-level flight.
- Aircrew are required to use Italian 1:500,000 charts for planning and as an information source.
- New low-level flight planning and execution criteria have been established by 31FW.

4. To improve oversight of flight operations by the relevant commanders, the following measures have been adopted:

- Pre-deployment briefings to the Wing are now required to ensure the wing commander is fully informed on the type and frequency of planned deployment training events.
- USMC has formalized Operational Risk Management (ORM) procedures, bringing USMC in line with the other US services. A written ORM assessment is required for every flight, and each is forwarded for approval up the chain of command to the level that is considered commensurate with the degree of risk.
- After each low-level flight, a third party (i.e., a 31FW member) reviews flight tapes to ensure compliance with rules and restrictions.

5. Strict aircraft equipment and maintenance procedures remain in place, with no relaxation of the rules and procedures or lessening of the commitment to safety.

ANNEX F

US-Italian Military Command Relationships

Although eight agreements pertain to the US presence at Aviano, three are particularly relevant to the command relationships between US military personnel based in Italy and the Italian military authorities at those bases. The overriding document is the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, in which the US and Italy, two of the original signatories, agree in Article 3 "to maintain and develop their individual and collective defense capability." This provision is the reason and basis for stationing US forces in NATO countries. The basing of US forces in Italy is an integral part of mutual commitments under Article 5, which is the *raison de etre* of NATO – that an attack against one will be considered an attack against all. The document which delineates the status of US forces in Italy pursuant to our NATO alliance with Italy is the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces of 1951 (NATO SOFA).

The third pertinent agreement is the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Defense of Italy and the Department of Defense of the United States Concerning the Use of Installations/Infrastructure by US forces in Italy (Shell Agreement). This agreement establishes a structure for consolidation into a single document all pertinent bilateral agreements for a particular installation or area, using a standard format and standard provisions in the form of a Model Technical Arrangement (TA). The current Aviano TA has yet to incorporate the Model format. Nevertheless, all bilateral agreements concerning Aviano and other bases in Italy are undergoing a review for this purpose. Accordingly, the Commission recommends proceeding with the draft revision of the Aviano TA which incorporates the 1995 Shell Agreement's Model TA, including a number of provisions relevant to the command and control issues.

Section VI (Command) of the Model TA deals with command relationships, and notes that the installation is under Italian command. The US Commander has full military command over US personnel, equipment and operations. In addition, the US Commander will notify the Italian Commander in advance of all significant US activities "with specific reference to operational and training activity" and to movements of material, weapons, and personnel. The Model TA specifies that the Italian Commander will advise the US Commander if he believes US activities are not respecting applicable Italian law. Differences of opinion that cannot be resolved locally will be referred to the respective chains of command, but a disputed activity may not begin until the controversy is resolved. The Italian Commander "will intervene" to have the US Commander immediately interrupt US activities which clearly endanger life or public health. Upon notification of the danger, the US Commander will promptly investigate and consult with the Italian Commander. Any matter not susceptible to local resolution will be referred to higher authority for resolution. The Italian Commander is the formal representative of the installation and serves as the

liaison with national and local authorities. He will coordinate, as agreed, all matters of common interest and, to this end, will be kept constantly informed on all US activities and initiatives.

Section XV (Security and Police Responsibilities) of the Model TA states that, to accomplish his tasks, and as guarantor for Italian sovereignty, the Italian Commander has access to all areas and facilities on the installation. Procedures for access to US classified areas are to be developed and included in an annex to the Technical Arrangement. The Italian Commander is responsible for security of the installation. The US Commander bears independent authority for the safety and security of his own personnel and equipment. The Italian Commander, in coordination with the US Commander, issues appropriate directives for the security of the entire installation.

Section XVI (Air/Surface Transportation and Related Activities) of the Model TA requires that the US Commander notify the Italian Commander in advance of any aircraft deployment, including temporary deployments.

Section XVII (Training/Operational Activities) of the Model TA establishes that planning and execution of all training and operational activities will be with respect to Italian civil and military regulations. Appropriate national authorities will be notified beforehand of training/operational activities of units assigned to the installation, through the Italian Commander, for required coordination and approval according to existing procedures. The US Commander will provide the Italian Commander with the annual schedule of exercises. Detailed procedures for coordination and approval may be developed and included in an Annex to the Technical Arrangement. Air traffic control is the direct responsibility of Italy, and in accordance with the agreements providing for mutual cooperation in this area.

Sections XIX (Local Committees) and XX (Procedures for Mutual Cooperation) of the Model TA notes that the Italian and US Commanders may establish a Joint Committee charged with examining local issues. They will assure effective cooperation to preserve good relations and avoid local frictions and misunderstandings as much as possible.

ANNEX G

US Military Command Relationships

1. Chain of Command

Prior to the accident – in the NATO, not US, chain of command - US VMAQ squadrons deploying to Aviano reported through the NATO operational chain of command to COMSTRIKFORSOUTH (CSFS). CSFS had oversight for NATO tasking, but US responsibility (including training flights) apparently resided at the CINCEUR level. This US command relationship is sub-optimal to provide adequate oversight.

After the accident, EUCOM decided (in consultation with COMMARFOREUR) that units such as the Aviano-based VMAQ squadrons should be operationally assigned to their respective EUCOM components, in this case MARFOREUR. (Also underpinning this decision was the fact that any units deploying to the theater are assigned to their respective components during transit, then may or may not be retained by that component at their deployment destination depending on the mission they are assigned.) Additionally, on 20 August 1998 Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPORD 4247 (US Participation in NATO Stabilization Force, Operation Joint Forge) was promulgated. The change to Appendix 8 (Air Operations) to Annex C (Operations) made clear that:

- Host units will provide all deployed units with comprehensive information regarding all flight procedures and regulations, to include, but not limited to safety, local area, host nation, and service specific regulations and procedures.
- All deployed units will follow host unit procedures when these procedures are more restrictive than Host Nation or service procedures, except as modified by written agreements.
- Host units and deployed units will establish written agreements for procedures for both training and operational missions.

As it now stands, NATO OPCON and TACON authorities are roughly equivalent to the US concept of TACON. For Operations Deny Flight and Noble Anvil proficiency and rehearsal flights, Aviano VMAQ squadrons are issued a Transfer of Authority (TOA) which designates COM5ATAF as their NATO OPCON and TACON authority.

2. Host-tenant Relationships

The relationship between VMAQ-2 and 31FW at the time of the accident was akin to a "host-tenant" relationship, but without formal guidance as to the obligations and responsibilities of each unit. Since the accident, 31FW has

taken a greater and more visible leadership role. Indeed, this more robust role is illustrated by the responsibility assumed by the 31FW/CC in the post-accident 2 December 1998 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between USAREUR and USAFE. Specifically, in paragraph 5 (Host Tenant Command Relationships) of that MOA the following language appears:

5. Host Tenant Command Relationships:

a. The 31FW/CC . . . will act as the liaison between the Italian Installation Commander and US Army Southern Europe Task Force, B Company, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (B/5-158) for any and all matters concerning the presence of B/5-158 on Aviano AB, and operations of B/5-158 to/from/and around Aviano AB.

b. All flying activity will be overseen by the 31FW Deputy Commander of Operations who will be the single point of contact to the Italian Air Force for Aviano AB operational issues.

c. The 31FW will provide B/5-158 with comprehensive information regarding all Aviano AB installation flight procedures and regulations, to include but not limited to, safety, local area, Host Nation, and service-specific regulations and procedures. The B/5-158 commander will ensure that this information is properly distributed in a timely manner to all B/5-158 personnel, and maintain the appropriate records to confirm compliance with this paragraph.

d. B/5-158 will follow 31FW procedures and regulations when these procedures or regulations are more restrictive than Host Nation or Service procedures.

e. In flight operational matters, if 31FW/CC determines there has been a lack of compliance by the B/5-158th with applicable flight procedures and regulations as mandated by this MOU after notification to the Commander, 12th Aviation Brigade, he may suspend B/5-158th flight operations at Aviano until such time as he is satisfied that the B/5-158th is in compliance with the applicable flight operations and regulations. B/5-158th will adhere solely to Army regulations and policies in personnel, logistics, maintenance, and other non-operational areas, unless otherwise specified in the local Support Agreement (DD Form 1144).

Although assigning full US OPCON to the 31FW is not recommended, limited, but well-defined restructuring along the lines of the 2 December 1998 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between USAREUR and USAFE and the Commission's recommendations for a Designated US Authority will create proper oversight for deployed units without confusing the operational chain of command.

From Oson Porter
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To Arlene Baluyut

(Dentist to the Kentucky State
Party Chair)

4-30-99

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
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1998

50¢

ily takes in sights, dines on Main St.

To be sure
with appreciation
Bin Clinton



■ Clintons celebrate
Chelsea's birthday during
weekend in Deer Valley

by Jay Hamburger
OF THE RECORD STAFF

Like a whirlwind, the first family blew into Park City for a private ski vacation last week, leaving the city full of rumors, presidential sightings and for a select few, an event to tell their grandchildren about.

President Clinton, wife Hillary and daughter Chelsea spent the first daughter's birthday in a private residence in Deer Valley, with the White House indicating the Clintons would not make any public appearances: spin control at its best.

In fact, the president apparently caught a bit of cabin fever and wanted to explore Main Street. So, with Secret Service agents in tow, the president went to Main Street Saturday, stopping in at several businesses and the Park City Museum and Territorial Jail and attracting the attention of those on Main Street.

"I was waving and yelling 'Hi Mr. President,'" said Tara Jamesson of the Main Street Deli, as she recalled how she got Clinton's attention. "And then he started coming in."

Clinton headed into the restaurant and started talking to Jamesson, who said she was impressed that Clinton seemed like a normal person.

"He was very down to earth," Jamesson

POOL PHOTO BY THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE

President Clinton greets a crowd as he walks along Main Street in Park City on Saturday. Clinton, who was said to be staying away from the public during his vacation, stopped in for a cup of coffee at the Main Street Deli and toured

The snowstorms of the past several weeks acted as somewhat of a wake-up call for the Park City Public Works Department, as this winter can hardly be described as severe.

But, still, the department has been working vigorously to make

67926
ARLENE
BALUYUT

Dentist
at State Party
Chair

4-30-99

1999 APR 29 04:17:35

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Joe Lockhart

SUBJECT: Update on NATO Communications Operation

This memo is to update you on the efforts of our NATO media strategy group. As you know, twice a day, Alistair Campbell and I chair a conference call with NATO spokesman Jamie Shea, our counterparts from Germany and France, Jamie Rubin, Ken Bacon, and the coordinators of the new media operations team at NATO Headquarters. This group is working very well together to anticipate the direction of the Kosovo storyline and to develop a common line on the leading stories of the day.

The U.S. team at NATO headquarters – P.J. Crowley (NSC), Jonathan Prince, and Lee McClenny (State) – has been on the ground since the beginning of last week. They are leading the effort in Brussels, along with Campbell's representatives, to define the right message for the air campaign and improve NATO's ability to get it out – by improving the daily briefing, searching out good message opportunities, anticipating problems, and enhancing the flow of information, both between SHAPE and NATO, and from NATO to our key allies. They have already developed a very good rapport with Shea; they are basically running the key elements of the new operation – Prince handling message development, Crowley handling briefing preparation, and McClenny handling the expanded press operation. They have met with SACEUR, and regularly meet with the Secretary General as well.

Long
I have already seen major results. The coverage of the collateral damage in Surdulica is a good example. I used an emergency version of the conference call to impose a common line that neither conceded the possible truth of the exaggerated claims of the Serb media, nor suggested anything that we would have to back away from later. NATO put out the line immediately, and bought us the time to get the facts. The team on the ground pushed SHAPE to get the straight, complete facts, as fast as possible. By 9:30am Brussels time, Shea confirmed that a bomb has gone astray, and by the time we were waking up in Washington, the story was dying. Reporters noted, on air and in print, that this was a sharp departure from the way NATO handled the convoy story, and Surdulica became a one-day story.

The HARM missile incident was handled similarly well today. The team in Brussels has instituted a quick morning press availability by Shea, much like my morning gaggle. This enables NATO to provide an early characterization of the previous evening's

Good - This is what we need to handle
LT

copied
Lockhart
Podesta

4-30-99

operation, and to refute the propaganda coming out of Belgrade. Before this, we were giving Milosevic a seven-hour head start on the day's message. Today, they recognized growing press interest in the notion that the U.S. might negotiate a settlement that included some sort of compromise. To counter that, they arranged to have Strobe Talbott brief the NATO press corps on his activities immediately after he met with the NAC, and worked with him to produce a very strong message on the non-negotiability of NATO's five conditions. And they are working closely with SHAPE to improve the military briefing as well: from the quality of the script to the quality of the graphics.

good!

They are also spearheading a revised planning process that includes efforts to highlight important messages apart from the daily storyline and to transmit better messages to other countries as well. Tomorrow, three ~~Kosovar Albanians who speak good English~~ will meet with the Secretary General and then appear in the NATO briefing room. The team is ~~implementing a plan to use certain European leaders in the Greek media to explain that NATO is fighting for the future of the Serbian people, and our quarrel is with Milosevic who has destroyed the Yugoslav economy while enriching himself and his cronies.~~

✓ Finally, I intend to send Anne Edwards to Belgium to organize field trips for the press corps, beginning with a trip to the refugee camps in Albania.

Please let me know if you have any thoughts on this effort.

4-30-99

'99 APR 30 PM 5:48

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1999

Mr. President:

Obuchi comes to town this weekend seeking above all else to demonstrate that you and he have a close personal relationship.

He has by all accounts kept close book on how Hashimoto was treated while in Washington and of course how you received first Jiang, then Zhu. We understand the Japanese now expect you will pay some similar personal attention to the Prime Minister.

We think the best way to do this is for you to invite Obuchi to Saturday night's White House Correspondents' Association dinner as your special guest.

Our Asia experts think Obuchi would appreciate being included in such a quintessentially "American" event and Joe Lockhart does not see why we could not do it. John also thinks it could work and Stephanie has signed off.

If you agree, we will pitch it to the Japanese and work with the Correspondents' Association.

☒ OK to Proceed ☐ Not OK ☐ Discuss

Thanks,

Sandy Davis for
Sandy

cc: John Podesta
Joe Lockhart
Stephanie Streett

*Copied
Berger
Davis
Podesta
Lockhart
Streett*