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4-7-99

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As get in Lamm's article

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Podesta

David S. Broder

Health Care: The Cold Truth

When Congress returns next week, it will face a debate on health care that has started on a partisan note and may well end in frustration. For anything useful to be salvaged, politicians will have to recognize a truth few of them are willing to face.

It is defined succinctly in the headline of an article in the April issue of the monthly magazine of the National Conference of State Legislatures: "Government Does, Indeed, Ration Health Care."

The author is a man known for disgorging uncomfortable truths, former Colorado governor Richard Lamm. Speaking of American medicine, Lamm says, "We are inventing the unaffordable and spending the unsustainable. We need to focus limited resources where they will buy the most health for society."

He cites some of the evidence. In this age of medical breakthroughs, health care has overtaken housing as the most expensive item in the family budget—and health care spending is growing faster than anything else in state and federal budgets as well. The trillion-dollar annual medical bill represents one-seventh of the nation's economy.

And yet, the United States has by far the largest share of uninsured citizens of any advanced nation, with 43 million having no coverage now. Of 29 industrial countries, we rank 21st in infant mortality, 17th in life expectancy for women and 21st for men.

Lamm is far from alone in arguing that the current health care system is unsustainable. Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala says the same thing. So do many other experts.

The question, as Lamm writes, is not if we ration—but how. So far, we have chosen to ration by leaving one-sixth of our population uninsured and, increasingly, by trying to let medical organizations "manage" the health care of those with insurance. Since the failure of the Clinton administration's bill for universal health insurance in 1994, efforts to expand coverage have been sporadic, and the number of uninsured has grown by roughly a million a year.

What is almost as worrisome is the fact that the major health care reforms being considered in Washington ignore the fact that society must make hard choices about what it can afford—and how those dollars can best be used. Indeed, they threaten to exacerbate the problem by promising that the privileged will be even better protected.

Consider Medicare. Those over 65 are the only large class of Americans with guaranteed health benefits. A bipartisan commission's effort to slow the cost spiral that threatens bankruptcy of that program foundered on insistence by the White House and most congressional Democrats that every existing benefit be guaranteed. President Clinton even endorsed a politically popular move to add prescription drug benefits to the menu. No one, least of all the president, has proposed a way of financing that level of services—without new cost-sharing measures—for the growing ranks of senior citizens, whose voting power intimidates politicians of both parties.

Or take the "patient's bill of rights" legislation tabbed as a high priority by the White House and Republican congressional leaders. The basic provision would guarantee every patient in managed care all "medically necessary" treatments, determined by his or her physician or, on appeal, by an independent arbiter.

The legislation is being propelled by a flood of emotional anecdotes about individual patients whose lives were jeopardized—or even lost—by the cost-conscious regulations of a managed care company or insurer. The individual stories are so compelling that the social costs are ignored. If every patient is guaranteed every service that could provide even a marginal benefit in someone's judgment, then what will the economic consequences be? The answer, Lamm writes, is that "the dollars we spend on marginal and futile care are no longer available to spend on needed care for someone else in the system or some other equally important social need."

He adds: "The health care system can no more afford to do everything 'beneficial' for every patient than the education system can do everything 'beneficial' for every student ... or the police department for every citizen. ... We are funding health care by an unsustainable yardstick."

Writing in this vein sounds coldhearted. But the real cruelty is ignoring these truths. Until we insist that all Americans of all ages—including the retired—contribute to the costs of their health care as far as they are able, until we acknowledge that additional benefits for those with insurance are less vital than providing access to basic care for the uninsured, the political finagling over health care in Washington is likely to do more harm than good.

The Washington Post
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1999

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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Military experts see bombing mistakes

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Clinton administration lost a chance for a quick victory in Kosovo through a series of miscalculations on what it would take to break the will of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, military analysts said yesterday.

President Clinton's primary goals were to protect Kosovar Albanians and force Mr. Milosevic to accept Western peace demands. Neither has been accomplished as NATO bombing enters its third week.

But Mr. Milosevic's offer yesterday to make peace could be the first of many trial balloons that eventually leads to peace.

Analysts say Gen. Wesley Clark, NATO's supreme commander, had too few strike planes in place to deliver the quick, punishing blows that could have undercut Mr. Milosevic's political support. NATO, which is now adding about 100 new warplanes and attack helicopters, had at the start about one-fifth the 1,000 strike jets used in Desert Storm.

"The attacks were really relatively limited," said retired Air Force Col. John Warden, an architect of the 1991 air war. "Then you brought more airplanes and more ships, and what that means is you increase pressure in a measured way that allows the Serbians to get accustomed to the new level and to be able to continue doing what they

MISTAKES

From page A1
wanted."

The air attacks themselves, especially in the first week, were so focused on Serbian air defenses they left thousands of Serbian troops and paramilitary police in Kosovo free to run wild and attack ethnic Albanians.

And by taking ground troops off the table as an option, Mr. Clinton gave Mr. Milosevic an added sense of security, analysts said. A sizable NATO armored force on the Kosovo border might have forced the Serbian dictator to back off or divert some elements from the Kosovo "killing fields."

"There were two parallel wars," said Arnold Kanter, a national security adviser to President Bush. "We devoted our assets to trying to take down their air defenses, which had no effect on Milosevic's ability to prosecute his war, atrocities against the Kosovars. They were just disconnected."

"The problem is he didn't take the bait. He didn't use his air defense against our aircraft. He didn't turn on his radar, and we couldn't get them. So Phase One didn't go as planned, to be blunt."

Col. Warden said that in the Gulf war the air strikes from Day One attacked Iraq's "multiple centers of gravity" — its leadership, electrical power, oil refineries and communications — to "impose a kind of paralysis."

In the Balkans, he said, "we hit targets that when hit didn't have an impact on Serbia as a system. The Serbians were able to ignore those particular attacks because they didn't prevent [Milosevic] from doing the things important to him, such as the operation in Kosovo and to rally the people in Belgrade."

A Pentagon planner, who asked not to be named, said: "The Air Force convinced the administration that the administration's objections could be achieved without the use of ground forces. But even the Army underestimated the speed by which Milosevic would sweep through Kosovo and depopulate it of ethnic Albanians."

NATO blames the air campaign's slow start on poor weather that dropped a thick cloud mass that stymies lasers used to guide 2,000-pound bombs to the target. Aviators would have to drop below a 15,000-foot ceiling to see the quarry, putting them in closer range of anti-aircraft missiles. It was a chance NATO commanders refused to take.

Col. Warden said the allies

"We devoted our assets to trying to take down their air defenses." — Arnold Kanter, Bush security adviser

should have waited for clear skies.

"If the environment precludes you from doing the things you expected to do, you are better off holding off, gritting your teeth and waiting until you have a high probability of being able to conduct good operations. It's very, very bad to conduct operations that don't appear to be quickly successful."

But weather cannot explain NATO's short target list for the first phase of a three-phase operation. Gen. Clark is working for political leaders — in this case the group of 19 NATO ambassadors known as the North Atlantic Council — who must approve specific targets in some cases, as well as an overall escalation in bombing.

When the bombing's first three days failed to stop Serbian marauding in Kosovo, the council met and approved a broader target list. The United States sent in B-1B bombers, which could have been used from the outset to carpet-bomb large military installations and troop concentrations on the ninth day.

"It's hard to quarrel with the view the campaign has been designed to minimize to the great extent possible any [NATO] casualties," Mr. Kanter said.

A Senate aide said, "If you're going to get serious about firing at tanks, you need to go low to find them. In other words, you need to risk pilots."

The problem now, as NATO executes what will be a 30-day-plus operation, is that Mr. Milosevic is achieving his two main goals, U.S. officials say. He has smashed the only viable separatist group, the Kosovo Liberation Army. He is also close to evicting or displacing 1 million ethnic Albanians.

But the Pentagon says his advances are temporary and will be rolled back.

Sen. Charles S. Robb, Virginia Democrat, criticized the war strategy.

"We've spent so much time preparing to take down their air defenses, and what have you, that we have not been concentrating on our initially announced objective, and that's to protect the Kosovars," said Mr. Robb, a former Marine Corps officer and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

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4-7-99

In the Balkans, No Wars Are 'Local'

By Robert D. Kaplan

STOCKBRIDGE, Mass. The humanitarian nightmare in Kosovo may be reason enough for NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia, but for the United States there are vital strategic stakes involved as well. These stakes justify the use of any NATO measures needed to defeat Serbia, including the use of ground troops, because nothing less than the future contours of Europe are now being decided.

When the East-West division of Europe was erased in 1989 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new division immediately began forming: that between Central Europe and the Balkans. Even before the outbreak of fighting in Yugoslavia in 1991, the Central European states of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were pulling dramatically ahead of Balkan countries like Romania and Bulgaria in terms of progress toward stable, democratic rule.

These northerly states of the former Warsaw Pact had several advantages: they were heirs to the traditions of the Hapsburg Empire, and they had sizable middle classes prior to World War II and Communist rule. The Balkan states were burdened by centuries of Byzantine and Turkish absolutism, and even before the Communist takeovers their middle classes had been mere specks amid vast seas of peasantry.

The admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has formalized this dangerous historical and religious redivision of Europe: between a Roman Catholic and Protestant West and an Orthodox Christian and Muslim East.

However, Slobodan Milosevic's campaign in Kosovo has now given the West a chance to reverse this process. A real NATO victory, one that not only gives the Kosovars protection but also knocks Serbia off its perch as the region's military threat,

would go a long way toward stabilizing the continent.

This is because the immediate impact of the current fighting is being felt well beyond the states of the former Yugoslavia, which all told

Defeat Serbia, or the West may lose Bulgaria, Romania and Greece.

constitute only a third of the Balkan peninsula. Three major Balkan countries — Romania, Bulgaria and Greece — though not directly threatened by the flood of refugees roiling Albania and Macedonia, are nevertheless at a pivotal point of political destiny.

In Romania, the largest and most populous Balkan state, there is a tenuous peace between the Orthodox Christian majority and the ethnic Hungarian minority, which is mixed Catholic and Protestant and lives in the northwestern region of Transylvania. This relative calm is a significant achievement given that in the course of this century each group has occupied the other's territory.

Yet social peace is threatened by the lack of modernization in the countryside and Cabinet chaos in Bucharest, where economic reform is in slow motion and investor confidence is eroding. In Romania only the military is well run. Though Romanians are Eastern Orthodox, the horrible memory of dark Stalinist decades makes them desperate for NATO membership, which would keep the military out of politics, stifle ethnic nationalist politicians and energize the elite in the direction of good government.

The same goes for Bulgaria, where the democratically elected Cabinet is valiantly working toward economic reform but is besieged by criminal groups with links to Russian businesses and mafias. These groups operate as a state within a state and control large parts of the economy,

including banks, car insurance and energy companies, tourist businesses and agricultural exporting. They put tremendous pressure on the Government and effectively push the country into Russia's fold.

The Bulgarian elite is fighting back but is legitimately afraid of being stranded at the far end of the Balkans, spurned by NATO and severed from Central Europe by instability in Kosovo and Macedonia. If the West cannot pacify the region, Bulgarian politicians will have to survive through deals with Russophile criminals.

Greece is the most misunderstood Balkan country. The West demands that Greece behave exactly like the other members of the alliance because it is middle class and a member of NATO. But it can't, because it is in the Balkans and must adjust its foreign policy relative to its geographical position. Greeks know that they are fated to live next door to the Serbs long after any NATO troops leave.

Moreover, throughout the long centuries of Turkish occupation, Greeks were supported by their Orthodox co-religionists in Serbia and Russia — a fact of history with effects that run deep. And, having never experienced Soviet occupation or Communism, Greeks have a romantic attachment to Russia that doesn't exist in Romania or even Bulgaria.

The Greek Government is supporting the United States as best it can, given the pressures upon it from both the political left and right. But if the Serbs humiliate NATO, Greeks will act in self-interest: their NATO ties will be reduced to an official trapping, even as they deny this very fact and quietly intensify links with their fellow Orthodox in Moscow and Belgrade. After 47 years of NATO membership, Greece could be lost.

Appeals to conscience will not keep Greece a de facto as well as a de jure member of NATO, nor will they keep Romania and Bulgaria from slipping into the sway of Russia. What is required is nothing less than a complete NATO military victory. Indeed, while the Greeks and the Macedonian Slavs despise each other, as Orthodox Christians they equally despise the Muslim Kosovars. Few in the region can be expected to feel sympathy for

the Islamic refugees, who disrupt the fragile religious and ethnic balance in neighboring countries, already burdened by weak governments and high unemployment.

Thus, if the bombing campaign fails and NATO gives up at the negotiating table, it would seal Europe off according to medieval lines, with the newly expanded NATO a mere variation of the old Holy Roman Empire — the old Christian West, that is — and with the Near East beginning where the old Ottoman Turkish Empire once did, roughly on the border between Croatia and Serbia and somewhere in Transylvania where ethnic Hungarians meet Romanians.

In 1834, entering the autonomous Ottoman principality of Serbia from the Hapsburg Empire, the English travel writer Alexander Kinglake wrote, "I had come, as it were, to the end of this wheel-going Europe, and now my eyes would see the Splendour and Havoc of the East." That same demarcation between East and West will re-emerge unless Mr. Milosevic is crushed with air and ground troops and a NATO protectorate is established in Kosovo and Macedonia. Only Western imperialism — though few will like calling it that — can now unite the European continent and save the Balkans from chaos. □

The New York Times

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1999

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
DELAWARE



299782

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 2, 1999

President William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President

All too often we only hear the negative about people working for us. This time, however, I wanted to ensure that you knew about the positive. While I have enjoyed working with all of your excellent staff during the past few years, I must say that Janet Murgia has served both you and the American people exceptionally well. She has always been attentive to the needs of Members and has provided me and my staff with superior service and advice. Furthermore, her enthusiastic attitude and keen political judgment have been invaluable to me. Having worked with thousands of staff in Washington, I can honestly say that Janet is among the very best.

Very truly yours,

Joseph R. Biden
United States Senator

TO PRESIDENT HAD BEEN

4-7-99

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to J Podesta
and in her
personal file

Box

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Podesta
~~Personal~~

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Teeling Street, Tubbercurry, Co. Sligo.
Tel. (071) 85007 Fax. (071) 86210



TUBBERCURRY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

'99 APR 7 AM9:11

President W.J. Clinton,
Washington DC,

1st April 1999

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to you on behalf of the people of Tubbercurry, Co. Sligo to offer an invitation to you to visit our area.

We are a border county and are aware of your tremendous involvement with the Peace Process and feel that a visit from you would encourage US investment in the locality. Like all border counties due to the war in Northern Ireland we have suffered immensely both from a tourist and business point of view.

Our county is located on the main Derry to Galway route (N17) and we feel we have a lot of exciting attractions which would be of personal interest to you and your family e.g. Golf, Horse-riding, Walking, Hill-climbing etc. Our scenery is exquisite.

Mr. President! We would be tremendously grateful if you would consider a visit. We have ample accommodation to offer your entourage. I cannot express to you how much it would mean to the people of this area.

May I take this opportunity to thank you for all of your hard work in the Peace Process and wish to a happy and healthy life.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

Helen Rochford-Brennan
Helen Rochford-Brennan
PRESIDENT

will send 4-7
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President W.J. Clinton,
White House,
Washington DC.

FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

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Secretary

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PHONE: (202) 835-8096

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Ms. Nancy V. Hemreich

(202) 456-6703

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THOMAS R. DEVINE
(202) 835-8096
Direct FAX: (202) 835-8238
E-Mail: TDevine@hopsul.com

April 6, 1999

Ms. Nancy V. Hernreich
Deputy Assistant to the President
And Director of Oval Office Operations
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

VIA TELEFAX 456-6703

Re: Assistance in pursuing claim against the German government by families of U.S. victims of a mid-air collision caused by the negligence of a German Luftwaffe crew off the coast of Africa in 1997.

Dear Ms. Hernreich:

Enclosed, per the suggestion of your assistant, Mary Morrison, is a summary of an incident in which a German Luftwaffe TU-154 collided with a U.S. Air Force C-141 off the coast of Namibia, Africa on September 13, 1997. Our firm represents the families of five (5) of the nine (9) Air Force crewmembers who perished in the accident. I have also enclosed brief bios of the five victims whose families we represent.

Both the German government and the U.S. government investigations determined that the cause of the accident was the fact that the German aircraft, in violation of basic international flight rules, was operated at an improper altitude for the direction it was headed.

We have recently filed a claim with the German government under a process they have established to handle this matter. The strong support of the United States government - particularly the President and the Departments of State and Defense - will be critical to ensuring that our families' claims are handled expeditiously and the families receive appropriate compensation.

Ms. Nancy V. Hernreich
The White House
April 6, 1999
Page 2

Senator Thurmond and Senator Helms have written to the Secretaries of State and Defense urging their support. Secretary Cohen has pledged his assistance. We are meeting on Thursday, April 8 with the Acting Secretary of the Air Force and his Chief of Staff to discuss this matter.

Given that the German Chancellor has pressed the President to provide compensation by the U.S. for the German families who lost loved ones in the Cavalese accident that occurred 5 months after the C-141 accident, we would hope that the President would similarly press the Chancellor to compensate the American families who lost loved ones due to the negligence of the German Luftwaffe pilots.

I would be happy to provide you with a copy of the claim we filed with the German government or any other information you might find useful. Please call me at 835-8096 to discuss this matter. If I am not available, my partner David Ralston could be reached at 835-8131.

The families we represent would deeply appreciate any assistance you or the President can provide us.

Sincerely,



Thomas R. Devine

TRD:trd
Enclosure

**CLAIMS AGAINST THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT BY DECEDENTS'
FAMILIES FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 1997 MID-AIR COLLISION**

- Hopkins & Sutter represents the families of five (5) of the nine (9) U.S. Air Force crew aboard a C-141 Starlifter that a German military plane ran into, in mid-air, off the coast of Namibia, Africa. All of the U.S. crewmembers died as a result of the September 13, 1997 collision.
- The C-141 was on a humanitarian mission. It was returning to Ascension Island after transporting an American mine-clearing team in support of anti-land mine projects in Africa.
- The U.S. and German governments each investigated the head-on collision and found that:
 - The accident occurred because the German plane was flying at an improper altitude, under international flight rules, for the direction it was heading at the point of collision.
 - The U.S. aircraft was where it was supposed to be, and the U.S. crew had acted properly and was in no way responsible for the collision.
 - The German flight crew had filed an incorrect flight plan. While prepared by an outside company, the flight plan was accepted by the Luftwaffe, and transferred by hand to the appropriate form by the flight crew.
 - The German report states that ultimate responsibility for complete and correct flight planning lies with the aircraft commander for the mission. In any event, the crew did not even follow that flight plan, which would have placed the German aircraft 4,000 feet above the U.S. aircraft.
- The C-141's flight recorder indicates that, seconds after the collision, the USAF crew sought to don oxygen masks and looked for flashlights. They were thus aware that they had been struck and would die a horrible death. It is believed that the U.S. plane exploded in mid-air.
- The bodies of the USAF crew were not recovered. On April 2, 1998, there was a group burial of this crew at Arlington National Cemetery. The deaths of these men have caused great anguish, pain and suffering for their families.
- The families of the victims have filed a claim with the German government for compensation for the loss of their loved ones. The U.S. government has paid similar awards to foreign nationals accidentally killed by the U.S. armed forces.
- The families have hired vocational and economic experts to determine the lost income from the projected careers of the victims.

- Two of the victims were Air Force pilots, who planned on pursuing careers as commercial airline pilots, one in 1999, and the other in 2000.
- Two others planned on retiring from the military when eligible and pursuing similar careers in the civil transportation sector.
- The fifth was a young man who would have remained in the service until 2000, and pursued a career in computer or automotive repair.
- The families also seek compensation for pain and suffering, mental anguish and loss of companionship caused by the deaths of their loved ones.
- Based on these factors, the total claims for each of the five crewmembers we represent range from \$1.9 million to \$3.9 million. The differences in the amounts sought relate primarily to the variation in projected earnings and the number of children left behind.
- The families seek the assistance of the President, as well as the Departments of State and Defense, in urging the German government to provide fair compensation promptly to the families for their loss.
- The German government has pressed the United States to pay compensation to the German citizens who lost family members in the Cavalese accident, which occurred five months after the C-141 accident. It is only fair that the German government practice what it preaches and compensate the families of the victims of the C-141 accident.

**BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF THE VICTIMS WHOSE FAMILIES SEEK
COMPENSATION FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT**

- Our clients are the families of the pilots, Captain Gregory Cindrich and Captain Peter Vallejo and three other crewmembers, Staff Sergeant Stacy Bryant, Staff Sergeant Robert Evans, and Airman 1st Class Justin Drager.
- Captain Gregory Cindrich was a 1991 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He was married, and he and his wife Monica had a son, Christopher, who was 3 years old at the time of Capt. Cindrich's death. Capt. Cindrich received many commendations during his military career. He also attended graduate school, and received his Master's in Business Administration in 1994. Capt. Cindrich led an active lifestyle, and was a devoted family man.
- Captain Peter Vallejo entered the U.S. Air Force in January 1990 at the age of 27 years. After receiving a college degree in Business Administration, Capt. Vallejo worked in banking prior to joining the USAF. He was interested in pursuing a career as a writer, and had, prior to his death, finished writing a novel.
- Staff Sergeant Stacy Bryant entered the U.S. Air Force when he was 18 years old. He intended to be in the service until his retirement. Sgt. Bryant was regularly promoted and in good health. He was family oriented and financially assisted his sister in going to college. After his death, his sister was so distraught that was unable to complete her final college semester.
- Staff Sergeant Robert Evans entered the U.S. Air Force after he finished high school in 1985. He intended to retire from the service. Married in 1994, he and his wife Sheila had a daughter, Lauren, who was 4 years old when he died. SSG Evans also helped raise Mrs. Evans' daughter, Jamie, as his own.
- Airman Justin Drager enlisted into the U.S. Air Force after his high school graduation in the spring of 1997. His constant dream was to fly, and he joined the USAF to fulfill that dream. He was only 19 years old when he died, leaving a father, who had raised him as a single parent, and a younger brother.

4-7-99

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Bergen
PodestaSandy
This is very good
Be

David Ignatius

Outstaying the Regional Bullies

One of the most poignant—and potentially dangerous—dynamics in the modern world is the way that weak ethnic groups come to believe that a superpower can save them from a regional bully.

We're seeing that explosive process unfold now in the Balkans. For the moment, clearly, we have no choice but to fight on behalf of the weak Kosovars who depended on our promises of protection. But we need to understand the underlying forces at work here to avoid potentially disastrous mistakes in the future.

The problem, in essence, is what I would call "the law of disproportionate interest." This holds that a regional power like Yugoslavia, whose interests are engaged in a visceral way, will almost always have greater patience and resolve than a distant superpower, which is intervening for reasons that are morally sound but pragmatically weak.

I watched this dynamic play out in Lebanon, where the Maronite Christians dreamed that a great power would rescue them from their geographical fate of living next door to a brutal Muslim-led Syria. The Lebanese Christians imagined at various points that the French could save them, or the United States, or Israel or the Vatican.

Two potential deliverers—Israel and the United States—actually went to war on their behalf. But the regional bully, Syria, had a staying power we lacked. Lebanon regained stability only with the Taif agreement of 1989, which implicitly recognized Syria's hegemony.

A similar process has been at work in other regions where the United States has intervened in recent years. A particularly sad example is the Kurds of northern Iraq, who dreamed that the United States would save them from the tyrannical rule of Baghdad. They fought a bloody guerrilla war with CIA encouragement in the 1970s, then suffered brutal repression in the 1980s. They mounted a new uprising after the Gulf War in 1991, again with American encouragement, and once more were brutally repressed.

Properly ashamed of our role in encouraging these

disastrous Kurdish revolts, the United States began Operation Provide Comfort in late 1991 to provide relief for the desperate Kurdish refugees, and it continues today.

The Palestinians, too, looked in every direction for salvation. Using the moral blackmail of the weak, Yasser

"Desperate Kosovo refugees fleeing their homes are a reminder of the moral obligations that great powers assume when they make threats and promises on behalf of weaker groups."

Arafat turned first to the Arab states, then the Soviet Union and finally the United States—hoping that they could spare him the necessity of dealing directly with Israel. Peace came only when Arafat abandoned that hope.

The Balkans in the 1990s have provided a stark example of the power of the weak—through their very suffering and powerlessness—to gain international support. The Bosnian Muslims turned their victimhood in Sarajevo into a kind of weapon—really their only weapon—against the regional bully, the Serbs. The great powers finally sent in troops to enforce a shaky peace agreement. But the fact remains that a stable Bosnia can

exist over the long run only if it reaches an accommodation with a Serb-led Yugoslavia, which will remain the dominant force in the Balkans.

Now in Kosovo, NATO has embarked on what may prove the most dangerous test yet of this regional power dynamic. In the weeks leading up to the conflict, all the problems of weak-power, great-power relations were obvious. With our support, the Kosovo Albanians came to believe that they were a potent force—to the point that they actually balked at signing the Rambouillet peace deal we had negotiated on their behalf.

This week, the images of desperate Kosovo refugees fleeing their homes are a reminder of the moral obligations that great powers assume when they make threats and promises on behalf of weaker groups.

We have no choice now but to wage war to protect the people whose lives are at risk—in part because of our hastily considered diplomatic and military strategy. To leave them to die, after they trusted in us, would be unforgivable.

President Clinton is so far showing admirable resolve in trying to finish what he started. With his military and intelligence advisers competing to avoid blame for policy blunders and the armchair generals in the media closing in for the kill, Clinton is right to insist that this isn't the time for post-mortems. They can come later.

But as we begin to think about the future of the Balkans, we should bear in mind the lesson that was learned, at great cost, by a generation of would-be peacemakers in the Middle East: Great powers cannot impose peace when the parties on the ground are not ready to make peace themselves. We cannot override their intransigence with our goodwill. History also teaches that when we rashly promise military intervention, we risk harming most the very people we want to help.

The Washington Post
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1999

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Shawley
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Worth reading
R

Jim Hoagland

Shades of LBJ

Horror suddenly drives the public debate over NATO strategy in the Balkans. Revulsion and anguish eclipse the logic, patience and calculation of national interest that President Clinton and his European allies hoped would underpin their air campaign against Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic.

This is a grave development. NATO's leaders are being dragged toward a gradual escalation they promised to avoid. They become increasingly uncertain of the relationship between their aims, their battlefield methods and the mood of their publics. They cede a bit at a time to the pressures to do more but still run behind the horrors Milosevic has created to confound them.

NATO's leaders have grudgingly begun to admit they miscalculated Milosevic's willingness to turn his corner of southern Europe into a modern heart of darkness. This miscalculation has left their strategy vulnerable to pressures they must now find ways to contain—but not ignore.

Viscerally and emotionally sickened by the televised scenes of unending lines of cold, hungry and ill Kosovars herded like so many sheep into the wilds of neighboring lands, Americans and Europeans reach out for the certainty that this cannot, will not, must not be allowed to continue.

But each day it does continue. And each day the cry for a NATO ground war against the Serbs rises, even as Clinton and other alliance leaders insist it is not an option. To counter the pressure, they lapse into explanations of the goals of the air war that are increasingly vague and increasingly ambitious, a dangerous combination.

On Monday the president—echoing the words George Bush used in announcing he would not permit Iraq's Saddam Hussein to erase Kuwait from the map—said: "The ethnic cleansing of Kosovo cannot stand as a permanent event." Clinton clearly anticipated, and rejected in ad-

vance, Belgrade's offer yesterday of a cease-fire that would leave Milosevic's marauding forces in control in Kosovo.

But the president also acknowledged that the air campaign had been chosen out of "a bunch of bad options." Bombing was "the best available option to

Clinton needs to insulate his commanders from political pressures, not leave them with a sense of being second-guessed.

show aggressive action, to keep NATO's word, to keep our NATO allies together and to give us a chance to preserve our objectives," he explained defensively to reporters.

This is a lawyer going to war, constructing an argument for all eventualities—including the possible need to argue failure as victory. Milosevic has raised the stakes by attacking Macedonia and Albania with refugee armies. Clinton and his aides have trouble explaining how they will stay in this bloody game.

Worse: By describing the military choices given him as "a bunch of bad options," the president inadvertently points up the significant doubts the generals and admirals at the Pentagon have about the strategy they have been asked to carry out.

A Clinton aide told the New York Times that the president is personally giving clearance to the Pentagon on buildings hit in Belgrade to make sure

the targets are chosen with political sensitivity. The aide, evidently showcasing the president's skills as a warrior-diplomat, seems never to have heard of Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson came to grief constantly reviewing target lists and making them conform to his political goals during the Vietnam War. Bush made a point of leaving targeting and other military decisions to the Pentagon during Desert Storm.

Clinton should immediately revert to the Desert Storm practice. He needs to insulate his commanders from political pressures, not leave them with a sense of being second-guessed.

And Clinton should adopt a much more straightforward, less defensive explanation to the public of not only what he intends to accomplish on the ground in Kosovo but also how and when he will achieve it.

Clinton's desire not to be nailed down to a deadline and to precise courses of action is understandable. But the vague way in which he and his aides wave off questions about their assessments of what they have achieved and how long the remaining tasks will take is self-defeating. That approach forces the media to be ever more inquisitorial, to hammer every day on the question of ground troops and thus feed public questioning of the current strategy and public hunger for a quick solution.

Johnson pretended that the Vietnam War could be pursued without great cost to Americans. He compounded that error by hiding his true intentions and assessments from the public.

These were huge mistakes that no president should ever risk duplicating. It is time for Clinton to tell the nation in concrete, believable terms where he is taking us in this Balkan war. If he still knows.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1999

Sue Myers
10300 Harper
Little Rock, Arkansas 72206

Dear Sue:

Thank you for your letter.

I was so sorry to learn about you and Bert. I know this must be a very difficult time for you, but I'll be keeping you in my prayers.

We're not hiring yet for the Presidential Library, and it may be a while, but I'll make sure your name goes on file for consideration. I am also forwarding your letter to Bob Nash, the Director of Presidential Personnel, for his review. I'm sure you have a lot to offer.

Hang in there! And thanks for your support and friendship over the years.

Sincerely,

Bill

*Return letter to
Myers letter to
Nash
don't send to OPM*

cc: Nash

w/ incoming

cc: Bob Nash
Sue Myers

*Copied
Lindsey
Nash*

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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cc
Ann McCloy
Nancy Pelosi
I like to send
\$100 to Scholarship Fund
Be

Copied
McCloy
Kincaid

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1999

Katherine Hantz
1923 East Joyce Boulevard
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72703

Dear Katie:

I was so sorry to learn of Harold's death and wanted you to know I'm thinking about you and your family during this difficult time.

Hillary and I send our heartfelt condolences. We are keeping you all in our prayers.

Sincerely,

Bill

What a wonderful
man he was, and what
friends you were to see in
the early days when I
was starting out. I'll never
forget it —

Katherine Hantz
1923 East Joyce Boulevard
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72703

CB

DIANE D. BLAIR

Phone: 501-521-1066

Fax: 501-521-8373

To: Varey HerreichNumber of pages including this page 2

I'm sure the President would
want to send a note to
"Katie" Hantz, 1923 E. Joyce Blvd.,
Fayetteville, AR 72703

Diane

Harold D. Hantz

FAYETTEVILLE — Harold Donovan Hantz, 87, of Fayetteville died April 2, 1999, at Washington Regional Medical Center in Fayetteville. He was born June 17, 1911, in Thermopolis, Wyo., to Hosea Marsh and Margaret Kirby Hantz. He received his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Colorado in 1933 and attended Columbia University in New York. He worked as a legislative research assistant for the U.S. Senate Library for three years, then returned to Columbia and received his Ph. D. in philosophy in 1939. He began his teaching career at the University of Mississippi in 1939 and was chairman of the philosophy department. He entered the Army, served three years in the Pacific during World War II and was discharged as a first lieutenant. He returned to teaching at Oklahoma State University and came to the University of Arkansas in 1949 as chairman of the philosophy/psychology department. He was a founder of the Honors Program and served as its coordinator until retiring in 1977. He was visiting professor at Columbia University and the University of Colorado and conducted research at Oxford University and the University of Athens. He co-authored the text "Science, Folklore and Philosophy." He was a member of the National Collegiate Honors Council, Phi Beta Kappa, America Philosophical Society and American Association of University Professors.

Survivors include his wife, Katharine Hantz, to whom he was married in 1941; two sons, Edwin Hantz of Rochester, N.Y., and David Hantz of Berkeley, Calif.; one sister, Maryal Hunt of Pierce City, Mo.; three grandchildren, Matthew, Sarah and Giuliana Hantz.

Services will be at 2 p.m. Tuesday at Moore's Chapel in Fayetteville, with burial in National Cemetery.

Visitation will be from 6 to 8 p.m. Monday at the funeral home.

Memorials may be made to the Harold D. and Katharine C. Hantz Scholarship Fund, University of Arkansas Foundation Inc., 405 Administration Building, Fayetteville 72701, or to the Single Parent Scholarship Fund of Washington County.