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NATIONAL SERVICE AND ITS ENEMIES

Charles C. Moskos

National service proposals have traditionally failed to attract sustained policy attention for two seemingly contradictory reasons. Many proposals come across as vague and incomplete, omitting any serious discussion of such crucial matters as administration and costs. Other proposals are too formal and detailed, tending to ignore the social and historical experiences of actual service programs. All this changed, however, in the late 1980s with an outpouring of legislative proposals on Capitol Hill and editorial commentary across the country.

The catalyst for these developments was the Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989 introduced by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Congressman Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.), and other congressional Democrats. Shaped by the Democratic Leadership Council, this legislation was both concrete in form and philosophical in content.¹ Although the bill did not move forward, its rationale and proposals coupled with the stature of its sponsors made it the focal point of much contemporary debate on national service.

This essay hypothesizes that this debate can be illuminated by looking at the opposition to the national service act. The opposition's distinguishing feature is that it comes from two directions: libertarian conservatives and conventional liberals. Another source of opposition is the human resources establishment within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Although that office's opposition to national service parallels

the support of the marketplace military favored by the libertarian conservatives, the specific focus of the military requires separate treatment. I will address the main arguments raised by opponents and offer rejoinders. My intention is not to defend all types of national service, but rather to keep the argument focused on the program envisioned by the Democratic Leadership Council and specified in the Citizenship and National Service Act.

The Nunn-McCurdy bill presented a nonmandatory program of comprehensive national service, embracing both civilian service and a citizen-soldiery. The bill would thus create a Citizens Corps of young people to perform such service for one or two years. The military side would include a new lower-paid citizen-soldier track for short enlistments coexisting with a professional soldier track, basically the present system. The civilian side would consist of expanded versions of the Peace Corps, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and conservation corps plus a new component of social services overseen by a corporation for national service and a local network of councils. Such social services would be administered through existing voluntary associations and state and local government agencies.

Both citizen-soldiers and civilian servers would receive subsistence pay during the time of service, followed by generous vouchers for federal student aid or job training on completion of service. Students who perform some form of national service would become the main, though not sole, recipients of federal student aid. (Exemptions are made for those over age 26, for hardship cases, and for persons for whom no service position can be found.) This moves away from the present program under which the government gives \$9 billion each year in loan subsidies and grants to college students without asking anything in return—a GI Bill without the GI.

The Nunn-McCurdy bill is based on three core principles. The first is that civilian and military service in peacetime have equivalent value. The second is that national service starts with the value of the service performed, not with the presumed good it does for the server. The third is that citizenship entails duties as well as rights. Each of these principles has in some way offended the interests and convictions of the libertarian right and the conventional left.

The notion that civilian and military service are antinomies can be traced to William James, often described as the progenitor of national service. James's 1910 essay "The Moral Equivalent of War" set the tone of the discussion for decades to come when he called for the same heroic and noble qualities in civilian service that he associated with warfare.² But by opposing what he termed the *peace-party* with the *war-*

party, James set up a contradiction that handicaps national service to the present day. Contrary to James, the virtue of military service rests not in its martial values, but in its character as one of the deepest forms of citizenship obligation in a democratic society—a quality true of civilian service as well. Military and civilian service, if not quite a seamless web, are, to the degree they contain civic content, cut out of the same cloth.

There has been some confusion among national service supporters about who is supposed to benefit—the server or the society—from the work performed. We have a military to meet a pressing national need, not to mature young people or improve their character. The same standard must be applied to civilian service. Focusing on the service invokes civic sentiments; focusing on the server invites negative stereotypes of the qualities of the server. Indeed, only when national service is cast in terms of meeting a genuine need can its positive, but necessarily derivative benefits for the server be achieved.³

In modern times both libertarian conservatives and conventional liberals de-emphasize the role of the citizen duties in favor of a highly individualistic rights-based ethic.⁴ Whether political theorists favor an activist state handing out benefits, as liberals do, or a state that needs to be curbed, as conservatives do, the view of citizenship remains the same: individuals exist apart from one another bound by no meaningful obligations.⁵ The Nunn-McCurdy bill points to a more balanced and nuanced formulation of citizenship duties and rights. To the degree practical, recipients of taxpayers' money should earn that money, especially when it is being used to increase the lifetime earnings of its recipients. The linchpin of the Nunn-McCurdy bill is to extend the principle of the GI Bill—an education or job training benefit for military service—to civilian service.

THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE

The conservative critique of the national service act centers on three core issues and one facade argument. The facade argument is that any program along the lines of the Nunn-McCurdy bill is somehow un-American, akin to the Hitler *Jugend* or the Russian *Komsomol*. Any reading of U.S. history, however, that ignores the recurring connection between citizen duties and rights is intellectually dishonest. How can one dismiss the militia system of the colonial and early republican era, the common defense and general welfare provisions of the Constitution, the mandatory public schools of the Northwest ordinances, the partial conscription of the Civil War, the mandatory officer-training require-

ments of the early land grant colleges, the twentieth-century drafts in both peace and war, the Civilian Conservation Corps of the New Deal, the alternative service provisions for conscientious objectors, or the Peace Corps and VISTA? The history of the United States shows that notions of civic obligation periodically expand and contract. At certain times national service is held out as a civic ideal; at other times it is dismissed as misguided or utopian. Let us now turn to the more salient conservative criticisms of national service.

A Compulsory Scheme That Could Reinstate the Draft

This is a warranted fear. The system being proposed offers to national servers strong inducements—postservice educational and job-training benefits—that are much less available to those youth who do not serve. But the transition from the comprehensive (but nonmandatory) system proposed here to a compulsory program would be a momentous step that could not come about without widespread support. Such support would exist only if the comprehensive program were widely viewed as a great success. It seems perverse, then, to argue against a voluntary national scheme on the grounds that it might prove too successful.

More to the point is the objection that a comprehensive national service program could serve as a cover for reinstating a military draft. Indeed it might. But it is virtually unimaginable that a compulsory civilian program would be legislated (even presuming constitutional obstacles could somehow be overcome) before enactment of military conscription. If the draft were to come back, however, the prior existence of a voluntary national service program would surely create strong pressures to make that program compulsory for men, certainly, for women, probably. But why argue that any form of national service should be avoided because it might make a draft more palatable? Surely a palatable draft is better than a nonpalatable one. Again, the success of a program ought not be used as an argument against it.

Exorbitant Costs and a Massive Bureaucracy

A mandatory program involving millions of young people could certainly become a bureaucratic and financial nightmare. But the Nunn-McCurdy bill envisions a highly streamlined administration building on historical precedents and successful programs. Citizen-soldiers—approximately 100,000 annually, or one-fourth of the total annual military intake—would be absorbed into the existing armed forces with a minimum of organizational adjustment. Most of the envisioned 600,000 or

so civilian servers would also be assigned to existing institutions—nonprofit organizations, schools, and hospitals. Of the remainder, nearly all would serve in conservation corps, for which there is already extensive organizational experience at state and federal levels. Any scheme that seeks to impose a uniform system on a country as large and diverse as the United States would collapse of its own weight.

Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that comprehensive national service will not come cheap. Every 100,000 civilian servers would cost about \$1 billion in public funds—and this does not take into account the portion of the present federal student budget that would be redirected toward civilian servers. About one-quarter of the outlay would come from matching funds from state and local governments and sponsoring agencies. Still, the federal expenditures would be substantial.

Yet there are some weighty items on the other side of the ledger. The introduction of a citizen-soldier track to the all-volunteer military would produce substantial savings in military personnel costs while strengthening our reserve forces. Anything that gets people out of the American underclass will lead to long-term reductions in costs associated with welfare, unemployment, and crime—though admittedly there is no sure way to quantify those savings. But the ways in which military service and the GI Bill salvaged otherwise dead-end youth offer some guidelines. National service also means savings in the impending costs of meeting the needs of an increasingly older and infirm population, costs that otherwise would decimate family savings and stagger the federal budget.

Market More Efficient than National Service

This view grows out of the conviction that even the most well-intentioned intervention in the marketplace produces negative results. This is not a frivolous argument, but it ignores the purpose of national service, which is to perform work that the market does not deliver, that is too expensive to be done by standard government bureaucracies, and that can be done by nonspecialized workers. Indeed, to the degree that many human services—care for the infirm, aged, and mentally ill comes to mind—require menial labor combined with compassion, short-term servers are best suited for these tasks, too often not performed at all.

During World War II, U.S. conscientious objectors performed alternative service in mental asylums, bringing an unprecedented humane-ness to the handling of the mentally ill in this country. Today in the Federal Republic of Germany some 70,000 conscientious objectors are assigned to civilian service in lieu of military service. These young men

are assigned to social services in hospitals and sanatoriums, day-care facilities for the mentally and physically incapacitated, the ambulance corps, and, especially, nursing homes for the aged. They operate with a minimum of extra overhead because they are supervised by existing welfare and church agencies. Persons across the political spectrum recognize the usefulness of such *Zivildienst* (civilian service)—none of which displaces regular workers. In the United States a program of proportionate magnitude would involve close to 300,000 civilian positions in social services.

Any defense of national service must answer two questions. Are the means employed more likely to achieve the purpose than other means? Are the means more likely to achieve the purpose at lower cost than other means? If the answer is no to either one, then the activity is not suitable for national service. If it is yes to both, then national service is the practical means to meet societal needs that would otherwise go unmet.⁶

THE LIBERAL ASSAULT

The conservative opposition to the Nunn-McCurdy bill was predictable because of the right's general apathy toward citizen obligation and its outright hostility toward interference in the market. More surprising was the vociferous opposition of the higher-education establishment and its liberal allies on Capitol Hill. Underlying the education establishment's attack was a visceral antipathy to a service-based criterion for federal student aid eligibility. Indeed, when the GI Bill lapsed after the Vietnam War and was reintroduced in 1985, the education establishment did not visibly lament its end or support its resurrection.

The nature of the higher-education establishment's opposition to the Nunn-McCurdy bill is revealing. For instance, that the proposal affected only able-bodied, unencumbered young students was lost in a welter of stacked congressional hearings and outlandish cost estimates.⁷ At a time when students are protesting tuition increases in public universities and when the student default rate on federal loans is a scandalous \$1.8 billion annually, the American Education Association and the College Board nevertheless stubbornly defended the present so-called needs-based system. Even more telling is that the higher-education establishment ignored the millions of middle-class families who need aid.

Opponents of the Nunn-McCurdy bill argued that linkage of federal aid to service would force only poor students to enter national service.

The proponents of the status quo, however, disingenuously overlook the regressive nature of the present system. In point of fact, the Nunn-McCurdy bill is infinitely fairer than the status quo. Here is why.

Negative Trends in Student Aid and Enrollment Will Be Reversed

The percentage of students receiving federal grants dropped from 31 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 1984. Of that number, the proportion of black students receiving aid declined from 25 to 17 percent over the same period. This parallels a sharp decline in the percentage of poor, predominantly male, black and Hispanic high school graduates entering college over the same time and is accounted for mainly by the shift from student grants to loans during the 1980s. By putting a GI Bill-type grant in place of student loan programs, youth service widens access to higher education.

New Avenues for Underclass Youth

All student aid is regressive by definition inasmuch as it bypasses the bottom half of the youth population that does not attend college. Experience with existing local and state youth corps shows overwhelming enrollment—because of the steady stipend feature—by poor and minority youth. By expanding such youth corps, national service offers large numbers of youth, otherwise trapped in poverty, opportunities for college or vocational training. A civilian youth corps, like the original GI Bill, would become a way up for many poor young men and women.

Another important consideration is that infusing a middle-class element into civilian youth corps would preclude the debilitating and self-reinforcing stigma of programs targeted only on poor youth. A comprehensive program of national service would call on all our country's races and classes to take part in a common civic enterprise. If this possibility is ignored and time is allowed to slide by, the richest country in the world will enter the twenty-first century crippled by an unemployed, unassimilated, and embittered underclass.

More Student Benefits

The proposed ten-thousand-dollar educational voucher for each year of civilian service far exceeds the average federal grant (fourteen hundred dollars annually). Most important, linking national service to student aid would strengthen the constituency for student aid across the board. Moreover, the only public opinion survey on the issue shows

better than three-to-one support for the proposition that students who receive financial aid for college should be "required to repay that support through some type of public service."⁸ Consider this: in 1949 our country gladly spent 1 percent of its gross national product on the GI Bill—more than \$45 billion in today's dollars.

Youths Act for Themselves

Determining eligibility for federal student aid under the present system is not only complex, but unfair because such aid does not necessarily go to the most needy, even among the college-attending population. Families that have not saved money have an advantage over same-income families that have. By basing eligibility on actions taken by the youth themselves, national service gives young people control over their educational future.

Gross Societal Inequities Addressed

The bill is designed to ensure that most servers would work in local agencies and voluntary associations. Thus national service would strengthen precisely those institutions in deprived communities where the need is greatest. The special energies of the organizations that achieved prominence in the struggle for civil rights could now confront the difficulties of the black underclass.⁹ The preferential treatment on the basis of income of day care for children, of primary and secondary education, and in the handling of the aged and sick is one of the shames of our society. Youth participation in national service would reduce such inequities more than any other feasible program.

One other point must be made on service-based student aid. An amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 1983, sponsored by Congressman Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.), denies federal student aid to men between the ages of 18 and 26 who fail to register for the draft. The passage of this bill marked a signpost in the effort to restore civic obligations to those receiving student aid. Opposition to the Solomon Amendment, as the new law was called, was immediate. Opponents included pacifists, university presidents, and civil libertarians. The Supreme Court upheld the Solomon Amendment among other reasons because no student is required to seek student aid. The Solomon Amendment was a reaction, if not a full turn of the tide, against the notion that student entitlements were unconnected with civic duty.¹⁰

Latent union opposition. Although organized labor has not yet taken an official position on national service, the issue of job displacement is a

serious one. The only acceptable answer is that national service must be restricted to work that otherwise would not be performed. The whole rationale for national service is that it meets needs not being filled by either the marketplace or the government. An extensive Ford Foundation study calculated that 3.5 million useful jobs could be performed by nonspecialized one-year servers without displacement.¹¹ Even if this figure is high, surely a program involving 600,000 civilian slots could be managed so as to have minimal effect on the regular work force.

At bottom, the labor substitution issue is more a political problem than anything else; thus it is essential that organized labor be represented on administrative boards at all levels, much as Franklin D. Roosevelt defused labor opposition to the Civilian Conservation Corps by appointing a union leader to head it. Labor must be allotted a policy-making role in a national service program. In an important sense, a national service system could even help labor, for reducing unemployment would tighten the labor market, thereby enhancing union bargaining power in the long term.¹²

Volunteerism One other source of opposition to the Nunn-McCurdy bill originates from proponents of volunteerism. These groups and proposals—represented by such diverse initiatives as Campus Outreach Opportunity League, Campus Compact, Senator Edward Kennedy's Serve-America bill, and, most significantly, President George Bush's proposal for Youth Engaged in Service (YES)—differ from genuine national service. The hallmark of volunteerism is to favor part-time service and uncompensated work over full-time and compensated service. I find singularly unpersuasive the view that only those who serve without reward are worthy of being called national servers. Only the extraordinarily idealistic (or perhaps neurotic) would serve without any recompense whatsoever. Volunteerism proponents also eschew any connection of civilian service with military service; the citizen-soldier concept especially runs contrary to the values of most supporters of volunteer service. Yet another distinction between national service and volunteerism is that the former typically stresses the importance of the service delivered whereas the latter emphasizes the good done to the server. Finally, volunteerists oppose linking service to student aid as such linkage makes use of an element of coercion. That the Nunn-McCurdy bill unabashedly rewards those who serve their country or community more than those who do not places the volunteerism establishment in opposition to the bill.

In congressional testimony in 1989, Energy Secretary James Watkins, a former chief of naval operations, supported both President

Bush's YES program and Senator Kennedy's bill. Opposing Nunn-McCurdy, Watkins states, "We believe service should not be financially compensated by the federal government. We feel that it is inimical to the very objectives we're trying to instill in young people."¹³ Apparently Watkins did not see any contradiction between his testimony and his support of the all-volunteer force (AVF), the highest-paid military in our country's history.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONFUSION

Ever since the inception of the AVF, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has been hostile to any concept of a citizen-soldier. During the difficult recruiting times of the 1970s, OSD gamely insisted that high-quality recruits were entering the military—long after everyone else knew otherwise. OSD then shifted to claiming that no solid measures linking recruit quality and soldierly performance existed.¹⁴ In the 1980s, OSD opposed two of the most successful recruiting initiatives in the turnaround of the AVF—the Montgomery GI Bill and the two-year army enlistment program. It was no surprise, then, that OSD has also come out strongly against the Nunn-McCurdy bill and its citizen-soldier option. The main OSD arguments and rebuttals follow.

GI Bill-Type Benefits for Civilian Servers Will Make Military Recruiting Difficult

It is foolish to argue that requiring service from college youth who now receive educational benefits with no service requirement will handicap military recruiting. A survey of youth who were offered the options proposed in the Nunn-McCurdy bill indicated that half of all male youth would choose a military option; one in ten, a civilian option; and the remainder choosing not to serve in any capacity. For women, about a quarter chose the military option; the same number, the civilian option, and about half elected not to serve.¹⁵ In brief, the Nunn-McCurdy bill would create a new reservoir of potential military recruits. Indeed, the relevant OSD report contradicts itself by stating that military could not effectively handle larger numbers of recruits.¹⁶ OSD to the contrary, nothing in Nunn-McCurdy can be construed as affecting the military's control over entering numbers and standards.

Citizen-Soldiers Would Create Large Training Costs

The citizen-soldiers would be a new stream of soldiers set by the army's need for two-year enlistments. When reserve components are

included in the analyses (something OSD studies on national service have failed to do), savings occur in training costs.¹⁷ In point of fact, reserve recruitment is best met by soldiers with prior service in the active force. In 1989 Army chief of staff Carl E. Vuono supported an enlistment option of two years in the active force, two years in the ready reserve, and four years in the standby reserve.¹⁸ That military personnel trends, for both budgetary and personnel reasons, are moving toward great reliance on reserve components makes the case for the Nunn-McCurdy bill all the more persuasive.

*Introducing a Lower-Paid Soldier into the Army
Would Cause Discontent in the Enlisted Force*

Invidious comparisons, some claim, would be made between those receiving less pay and those performing the same work and holding the same rank for more pay. Yet if the lower-paid citizen-soldier does feel put out, he can join the professional corps. Almost every army in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization except the United States has a two-track system much like the one described here. Our peacetime draft experience shows that many young men accepted short tours in combat arms over the technical-training advantages of a long enlistment and even accepted short tours as enlisted men over the compensation and privileges of longer-term officers.

Why Lose Soldiers Once They Have Been Trained?

This article of faith for OSD human resources analysts does not stand up to scrutiny. Long-term enlistees are less likely to complete their enlistments than short-term servers. Even during the best AVF years about three in ten of those who entered the army failed to complete a three-year enlistment. Certainly the military is more technical than it was a generation ago, but it is hard to argue that military readiness would suffer by having somewhat fewer career soldiers whose work could be done by an equivalent proportion of citizen-soldiers. In a citizen-soldier system, those leaving active duty would automatically enter reserve duty, thus building on the Total Force concept. Resultant personnel cost savings could then be directed toward the career force, precisely where technicians must be retained.

Underlying the whole OSD approach and its contract apparatus has been the myth that the AVF is less expensive than conscription. A look at some dollar figures (in constant 1986 values) gives us a sense of the changes in military compensation since the peacetime draft years (see

the appendix for a detailed breakdown). In 1964 the average personnel costs for each active soldier were approximately \$17,300, compared with \$28,700 in 1986. The contrast in overall personnel costs is enormous. In 1964 the total bill was \$79 billion (excluding retirement outlays); in 1986 the total was \$100 billion. In other words, we are spending some \$20 billion more for half a million fewer soldiers on active duty! Whatever the arguments against the draft, cost savings is not one. Indeed, it will be economics more than sociology that will bring the AVF into question.

The philosophy that underpinned the shift to an AVF tended to define military service in occupational terms rather than in institutional terms.¹⁹ Such a redefinition of the military is based on a set of core assumptions. First, there is no analytic distinction between military systems and other systems, especially no difference between cost-effectiveness analyses of civilian enterprises and military services. Second, military compensation should be in cash (rather than in kind or deferred) and be linked to skill differences rather than to seniority. Finally, if end-strength targets are met in the AVF, concepts of citizenship are incidental concerns. If we are going to have armed forces based on cost-effective grounds—ignoring moral sentiments and civic dimensions—then we should hire Third World nationals and be done with it.

EMERGING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL SERVICE

The national service act seems to have incurred the opposition of just about every interest group in the country.²⁰ Yet, even though the obstacles are considerable, I see three scenarios, not exclusive of one another, by which national service could be established. One is through the return of a military draft—a development that would surely create pressure for some form of alternative civilian service. A second scenario is for an energetic president to come forward and make the cause of national service his own. Just as the Civilian Conservation Corps was inaugurated by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Peace Corps by John F. Kennedy, so national service awaits a president who is convinced that such a program is both good politics and good for the country.

The third scenario is the most problematic, but also the most desirable because it would foster public sensibilities to meet societal needs in national service terms. The public—already accustomed to thinking in such terms when it comes to military manpower, as is clear from the resilience of the citizen-soldier concept—is becoming more inclined toward such an approach with regard to civilian service, especially the conservation corps. The debate over the delivery of human

services that pits those who favor a market approach against those who support the expansion of government agencies to deliver such services is becoming increasingly sterile. National service means thinking of how national needs might be met in a different way and apart from either market arrangements or conventional government delivery of services.

To break out of this conservative versus liberal mind-set means no less than a paradigmatic shift in American thinking about policy. Yet such a shift is essential if we are to meet the challenges that currently confront our society.

For example, national service could help families cope with Alzheimer's disease, which afflicts about 5 percent of Americans over 65 and 20 percent of those over 80 and whose direct costs are estimated at \$20 billion annually. The indirect costs are greater: the need for constant care places severe emotional burdens on relatives. Just to give family members a temporary break from caring for an Alzheimer's victim—either through home visits or adult day-care centers—would be a major help.

In recent years U.S. cities have been inundated with the deinstitutionalized mentally ill. Many of these would be better off back in institutions, but staff costs makes this financially infeasible. National service, which would provide low-level personnel for work in mental hospitals, offers a way out. The alternative is to allow cities to become increasingly crowded with people incapable of taking care of themselves and to make Americans increasingly callous toward the plight of the mentally ill on their doorstep.

Efforts to make standard public transportation available to the handicapped not only will lead to huge costs for the public at large, but also will leave untouched the many areas where public transportation is not readily available. With the introduction of national service, a paratransit system based on successful local models could become a nationwide reality. A cheap, alternative transportation system would not only be much less costly than where we are heading, but also offer a much more convenient mode of travel to those who need it the most.

Thanks to acidic paper, every year some 70,000 books in the Library of Congress crumble between their covers and at least 40 percent of the books in major research collections will soon be too fragile to handle. All films made before 1950 are in danger of turning to dust. Preserving these collections is tedious and extremely labor-intensive. Unless a national service program comes to the rescue, we are destined to lose a large portion of our cultural heritage.

The list goes on almost indefinitely, but the point is that we, the citizenry, must think about how national needs might be met through

youths' serving their country and community. Political theorists as well as ordinary citizens are showing a growing appreciation of citizens' obligations and the importance of shared values. The new interest in the duties of citizens results from both the inadequacies of Marxism, with its materialist analysis and collectivist prescriptions, and the inadequacies of libertarianism, which offers a similar materialist analysis but with an insistent stress on the individual. Advocacy of national service is the political center reasserting itself against the right and the left.

Charles C. Maskos

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APPENDIX.

COMPARISON OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL COSTS, 1964 VERSUS 1986
(IN 1986 CONSTANT DOLLARS)

	1964	1986
Direct Active Duty Personnel	\$43.1 billion	\$47.8 billion
Family Housing	1.8	2.8
Support*	6.0	11.8
Reserve Components	2.5	6.4
Retired Military Pay	4.2	17.3
Civilian Pay	26.3	31.3
Total	\$83.9	\$117.4
Number of Personnel		
Active Duty Military	2,687,000	2,169,000
Reserve Units	953,000	1,130,000
Civilian	1,175,000	1,112,000
Total	4,815,000	4,411,000

*Medical, recruitment, schools

NOTE: Inflation factor: 1964 = 1.0; 1986 = 3.5

SOURCE: Department of Defense, *Manpower Requirements Report FY1988* (February 1987), pp. (VIII 3-4.)

NOTES

1. In its broad contours the Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989 followed the line of reasoning given in Charles C. Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service* (New York: The Free Press, 1988). The main difference between what I proposed and the Nunn-McCurdy bill was my inclusion of high school dropouts in the purview of youth corps. In the text pertaining to the national service proposal, I have held to my original formulation.

I wish to acknowledge Will Marshall, a member the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) and president of the Progressive Policy Institute, for his ongoing generosity with ideas and practicalities concerning national service. Marshall was the primary author of the DLC's *Citizenship and National Service* (Washington, D.C.: DLC, May 1988), which foreshadowed the Nunn-McCurdy bill. I am also grateful to Joel Berg of the Progressive Policy Institute for bringing new thought to an old subject. Although he does not always agree with everything I advocate, my debt is deep to Donald J. Eberly, who has been my longtime mentor in the area of national service. See Donald J. Eberly, *National Service: A Promise to Keep* (Rochester N.Y.: John Alden Books, 1988).

2. William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in *Essays on Faith and Morals* (New York: Longman, Greens, 1942), pp. 311-28. Originally published in 1910.

3. The insight that rehabilitation can best be served when the agency involved is not defined as rehabilitative was originally developed with regard to the latent functions of the armed forces. See Bernard Beck, "The Military as a Welfare Institution," in Charles C. Moskos, ed., *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 137-48.

4. On the connection between citizenship and national service, see especially Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) and Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

5. A paradigm-making book that melds the economics of moral commitments with the prevailing utilitarian model of modern economics is Amitai Etzioni, *The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics* (New York: The Free Press, 1988).

6. I agree with conservative critics who find unpersuasive studies that compare the value of work performed by youth servers with what that work would have cost if done on the market. The question must always be, is the work important enough to warrant national service in the first place?

7. Perhaps the most irresponsible statement was the assertion of the research staff of the American Council of Education (ACE) that the Nunn-McCurdy bill would cost the federal government more than \$50 billion a year to serve the same number of people now receiving federal student aid. See William D. Ford, "Bill in Congress on Public Service for Young People Shows Confusion

About Student Aid and Patriotism," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, March 15, 1989, p. A40. Although the ACE has backed away from this assertion in private correspondence, it has not publicly withdrawn its earlier statement.

The libertarian right faces a conundrum with service-based student aid. Opposed to federal student aid in principle, it nevertheless dislikes the "something for nothing" feature of the present system. Conservative elder statesman William Buckley has long proposed that the country's top colleges require students to spend a year in national service before they enroll.

8. 1983 Gordon Black poll. This New York state survey was conducted to test public sentiment toward a program like the Reserve Officer Training Corps for noncareer police officers.

9. A 1989 Urban League conference "lamented the shortage of black men in youth programs." "Urban League Parley Focuses on Help for Young Black Men," *New York Times*, May 4, 1989, p. 11. The connection between such a need and national service, however, has yet to be made by leading black organizations. Caring for the infirm elderly is a task that falls almost entirely on women, yet feminist organizations have never rallied behind national service.

10. By 1987 four states—Massachusetts, Mississippi, Illinois, and Virginia—had enacted laws linking state college aid to draft registration. A Tennessee law went so far as to prohibit enrollment of nonregistrants in state colleges and universities.

11. Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton, *National Service: What Would it Mean?* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986).

12. No serious proposal exists to make national service an element of rebuilding the national infrastructure. Yet the Federal Highway Administration figures that bringing roads up to minimum engineering standards would cost \$565 to \$655 billion over the next twenty years. *Wall Street Journal*, August 30, 1989, p. 1.

13. "Bush Official Rejects Linking Aid, Volunteer Work," *Chicago Tribune*, April 22, 1989, p. 4.

14. A valuable summary of the literature dealing with quality/performance in the military is Juri Toomepuu, *Soldier Capability—Army Combat Effectiveness—SCACE* (Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.: U.S. Army Soldier Support Center, 1981). An insightful account of soldiers in the all-volunteer army of the 1980s is George C. Wilson, *Mud Soldiers* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989); for the navy, see Wilson, *Super Carrier* (New York: MacMillan, 1986). An impressive treatment of military recruitment in historical perspective is Sue E. Berryman, *Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988).

15. These and other pertinent data on the positive effects of the Nunn-McCurdy bill on recruitment are given in Juri Toomepuu, *Effects of a National Service Program on Army Recruiting* (Fort Sheridan, Ill.: Research and Studies Division, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, February 1989). Because the Toomepuu analysis ran afoul of official policy, his report was initially suppressed. Even more troubling, high-level studies emanating from the Pentagon do not acknowledge, much less refute, Toomepuu's research findings.

16. See report attached to letter to Sam Nunn, chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, dated July 11, 1989, signed by L. Niederlehner, deputy general counsel, Department of Defense. The report itself is unsigned with no letterhead.

17. Toomepuu, *Effects of a National Service Program on Army Recruiting*.

18. The so-called two plus two plus four enlistment has elements of the citizen-soldier track contained in the original Nunn-McCurdy bill. This enlistment was introduced on a trial basis in late 1989. Early reports indicated that the program was hugely successful in attracting young people into the army who would not have considered enlisting in the army for longer terms.

The concept of a lower-paid citizen-soldier track coexisting with a professional soldier track has also been proposed by the Heritage Foundation. See Stuart M. Butler, Michael Sanera, and W. Bruce Weinrod, eds., *Mandate for Leadership II* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984), p. 253, and Charles L. Heatherly and Burton Yale Pines, eds., *Mandate for Leadership II* (Washington, D.C.: 1989), p. 738.

19. A comprehensive treatment of the tendency to view armed forces in occupational rather than institutional terms is presented in Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., *The Military—More Than Just a Job?* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). In addition to the United States, eight Western nations are comparatively examined.

20. In the strange bedfellows department, conscientious objector groups have joined with the Pentagon in opposing the Nunn-McCurdy bill. See the newsletters of the National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors and the Central Committee for Conscientious Objection.

Reaction to the Nunn-McCurdy bill has not been one of unrelieved opposition, however. The concept received editorial support in the *New York Times* and strong endorsement from columnists Mark Shields and David Broder in the *Washington Post*, as well as in much of the regional press.

Another philosophical strain that resonates with national service as a concept, if not in all the particulars given here, is neoconservatism. The first major publication of the ideas embodied in the Nunn-McCurdy bill appeared in Charles C. Moskos, "How to Save the All-Volunteer Force," *Public Interest* (Fall 1981): 74–89. At the Hoover-Rochester Conference on the All-Volunteer Force held at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in December 1979, Sidney Hook came to this writer to express his strong endorsement of the concept of national service. For neoconservative support of conscription, see Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985) and Philip Gold, *Evasions: The American Way of Military Service* (New York: Paragon House, 1985).