

# FOIA MARKER

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|                                                                   |               |             |                |             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| Folder Title:<br>Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [16]            |               |             |                |             |
| Staff Office-Individual:<br>Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard |               |             |                |             |
| Original OA/ID Number:<br>3827                                    |               |             |                |             |
| Row:<br>49                                                        | Section:<br>4 | Shelf:<br>7 | Position:<br>1 | Stack:<br>v |

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                        | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001a. agenda             | NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (1 page)                              | 01/25/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001b. paper              | Deputies Committee: Somalia Review (5 pages)                         | 01/20/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001c. map                | Status of Forces Ground/Air (1 page)                                 | 01/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002a. list               | UN Peacekeeping Operations (1 page)                                  | 10/09/1992 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002b. paper              | Peacekeeping Success Factors (1 page)                                | 07/29/1992 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. cable               | Re: Further P-4 Consultations on SYG's Peacekeeping Report (4 pages) | 01/12/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. report              | Re: [Peacekeeping] (7 pages)                                         | 09/02/1992 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005. report              | Re: [Croatia] (2 pages)                                              | 02/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. briefing<br>paper   | CSG-CT Slides (8 pages)                                              | 09/20/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 3827

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [16]

2012-0659-F  
ke4221

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DARRAGH

DOC DATE: 22 JAN 9  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA  
AGENDA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DC MTG RE SOMALIA

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 02/22/17  
2012-0659-F

ACTION: DARRAGH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 25 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER

CICIO

CLARKE

NSC CHRON

WRIGHT

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL

CLOSED BY: NSJSL

DOC 3 OF 3

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20006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 22, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs  
Office of the Vice President

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD  
Associate Director for National  
Security and International  
Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD  
Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. JOAN WOLFE  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International  
Development

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL  
Executive Secretary  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (S)

Attached is the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia, scheduled for Monday, January 25, 1993, at 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance is limited to principal plus one. (S)

*Sean J. Darragh*

Sean Darragh  
Deputy Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Agenda  
Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By WDE NARA, Date 02/22/17


2012-0659-F

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

A



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001a. agenda             | NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (1 page) | 01/25/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 3827

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [16]

2012-0659-F  
ke4221

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).


RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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**B**



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

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|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001b. paper              | Deputies Committee: Somalia Review (5 pages) | 01/20/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

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2012-0659-F  
ke4221

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

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ATTACHMENT 1



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

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|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001c. map                | Status of Forces Ground/Air (1 page) | 01/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

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
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**ATTACHMENT 2**




Major International Force Contributions in Somalia

| <u>Nation</u>      | <u>UNITAF</u>    | <u>UNOSOM II (Estimates)</u> |
|--------------------|------------------|------------------------------|
| Italy              | 2,500            | 3,900                        |
| France             | 2,600            | Unknown                      |
| Egypt              | 245              | 750                          |
| Canada             | 1300             | Unknown                      |
| Belgium            | 580              | 580                          |
| Pakistan           | 565 (500-UNOSOM) | 4,000                        |
| India              | 7                | 4,000                        |
| Morocco            | 1,300            | Unknown                      |
| Jordan             | 900              | 900                          |
| Australia          | 860              | 900                          |
| Nigeria            | 270              | 550                          |
| Botswana           | 330              | 330                          |
| Zimbabwe           | 150              | 150                          |
| Saudi Arabia       | 650              | 650                          |
| Turkey             | 300              | 500                          |
| Germany            | 50               | 1500 (logistics)             |
| Indonesia          |                  | 900                          |
| Kuwait             | 150              |                              |
| Sweden             | 150              |                              |
| Tunisia            | 130              |                              |
| UK                 | 90               |                              |
| New Zealand        | 60               |                              |
| <hr/>              |                  | <hr/>                        |
| Total UNITAF:      | 12,000           | Total UNOSOM: 18,000         |
| (plus 24,000 U.S.) |                  | (plus several thousand US)   |

Considering: Argentina (750), Greece (350)



**ATTACHMENT 3**



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UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
INFO USLO MOGADISHU 0347-0348 IMMEDIATE  
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TFSO01: DRAFT TEXT OF NEW UNSC SOMALIA  
RESOLUTION

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 007788

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TEXT)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, EAID, UNSC, SO

SUBJECT: TFSO01: DRAFT TEXT OF NEW UNSC SOMALIA  
RESOLUTION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DRAFT TEXT OF FOLLOW-ON SOMALIA RESOLUTION PROVIDED BELOW SHOULD BE VIEWED AND DISCUSSED IN CONJUNCTION WITH TALKING POINTS PROVIDED SEPTTEL.
3. ACTION REQUEST: USUN SHOULD CIRCULATE THIS DRAFT TEXT, PARALLEL TO INSTRUCTIONS SEPTTEL, INITIALLY TO PERM-5 MEMBERS AND JAPAN. FOLLOWING THESE INITIAL CONSULTATIONS, PERMREP MAY CONSULT MORE BROADLY IN THE COUNCIL ONCE A CONSENSUS APPEARS LIKELY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PERM-5 PLUS JAPAN. EMBASSIES IN PERM-5 COUNTRIES, TOKYO, AND ALL UNITAF COUNTRIES ON THE COUNCIL SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVELS OF THE CONSULTATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN NEW YORK.
4. BEGIN DRAFT TEXT:  
--DRAFT RESOLUTION ON EXPANSION OF UNOSOM  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 794 (1992) OF 3 DECEMBER 1992  
775 (1992) OF 28 AUGUST 1992, 767 (1992) OF 27 JULY 1992,  
751 (1992) OF 24 APRIL 1992, 746 (1992) OF 17 MARCH 1992,  
AND 733 (1992) OF 23 JANUARY 1992,  
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF MEMBER STATES ACTING PURSUANT TO  
RESOLUTION 794 (1992) TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT  
FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA,  
ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED FOR A PROMPT TRANSITION FROM THE  
UNIFIED TASK FORCE TO UNOSOM,  
NOTING WITH DEEP REGRET AND CONCERN THE CONTINUING REPORTS  
OF WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  
AND THE GENERAL ABSENCE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOMALIA,

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By KOE NARA, Date 02/22/17  
2012-0659-F

DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA BEAR ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY, CONSIDERING THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN SOMALIA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS, RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND THE REHABILITATION OF SOMALIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, STRESSING THE DESIRE TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA TO PARTICIPATE IN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT, ENCOURAGING THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR WORK AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN REHABILITATING THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, WELCOMING THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE UN-SPONSORED PREPARATORY CONFERENCE ON SOMALI POLITICAL RECONCILIATION HELD IN ADDIS ABABA JANUARY 4-5, 1993. NOTING THE REPORT OF STATES CONCERNED OF 17 DECEMBER 1992 (S/24976) AND OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 19 DECEMBER 1992 (S/24992) ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 794 AND THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT SO AS TO ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISION FOR A PROMPT TRANSITION FROM THE UNIFIED TASK FORCE UNOSOM,

1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/24992);
  2. URGES THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO WORK TOWARD THE DISBANDING OF ALL PARAMILITARY AND IRREGULAR FORCES IN SOMALIA;
  3. DECIDES TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF UNOSOM AND ITS MANDATE TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS TAKING ALL APPROPRIATE ACTIONS AGAINST ELEMENTS THREATENING THAT SECURE ENVIRONMENT, AND TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOMALIA;
  4. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND, THROUGH HIM, THE UNOSOM COMMANDER, TO TAKE ALL ACTIONS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THIS MANDATE;
  5. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DIRECT THE COMMANDER UNOSOM, UPON A DETERMINATION BY THE COMMANDER OF UNITAF SUBMITTED BY THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED THAT A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN A PART OF SOMALIA, TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURED SECTORS AS PART OF A PHASED TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM;
  6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE SOMALI PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION;
  7. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THROUGH HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR SOMALIA AND WITH ASSISTANCE, AS APPROPRIATE FROM UNOSOM AND ALL APPROPRIATE UN OFFICES AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES;
- A) TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIGENOUS POLICE FOR

TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND LAW AND ORDER IN SOMALIA;  
B) TO PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN SOMALIA;  
C) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE REHABILITATION OF THEIR ECONOMY;  
D) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS; AND  
E) TO RECEIVE, COLLECT AND PRESERVE INFORMATION RELATING TO SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SOMALIA;  
8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN 15 DAYS CONTAINING HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXPANSION OF UNOSOM AND FURTHER REPORTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION;  
9. REQUESTS UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, MEMBER STATES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXTEND, IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, FINANCIAL, MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA;  
10. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

KANTER

BT

#7788

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

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7788

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
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**ATTACHMENT 4**



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**Planning Assumptions for US Military Presence  
in Somalia**

|               |                                                                                                                            |
|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| JANUARY 25    | US informs UN SYG of desire to proceed soonest with new resolution and UNITAF/UNOSOM handoff, offers US troops for UNOSOM. |
| FEBRUARY 8    | UNSC passes new resolution on UNOSOM.                                                                                      |
| FEBRUARY      | New UNOSOM commander appointed, arrives Mogadishu.                                                                         |
| MARCH         | UNITAF hands off first sectors to UNOSOM. US forces continue drawdown, UNOSOM builds up.                                   |
| APRIL         | UN sponsored National Reconciliation Talks resume.<br><br>UNOSOM assumes command of final sectors.                         |
| MAY           | US forces drawdown to about 6000, under UNOSOM.                                                                            |
| SUMMER        | Contract services begin to replace some US units assigned to UNOSOM.                                                       |
| FALL          | US withdraws land-based Quick Reaction Force and shifts function to Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG).                  |
| DECEMBER      | On first anniversary of US deployment, US forces in country total 3000 person contingent in UNOSOM.                        |
| DECEMBER 1994 | Following successful creation of a Government of National Unity, UNOSOM withdraws.                                         |

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 02/22/17

2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20006

January 21, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *Let's discuss S.*  
SUBJECT: *→* Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting on Somalia, Monday, January 25, 1993, at 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room.

Tony Lake has reviewed the discussion paper (Tab B), which he asked me to prepare for a January 23 Deputies Committee on Somalia. If you approve, it would be circulated with the meeting notice (Tab I) and Agenda (Tab A).

Decision Track: What I discussed with Tony and is reflected in the discussion paper is a two-step plan for decisions on Somalia. Near-term decisions would be made at the DC meeting, to the extent that there was a consensus. (The vehicle for recording such decisions would be the Summary and Conclusions of the DC, which would be sent to Principals). Mid/long-term issues would be reviewed in a PRD, which the DC would launch.

PRD: We should circulate the PRD tasker after the DC meeting, so that we can incorporate the discussion from that meeting, but I recommend that we not coordinate the text of the PRD tasker with the agencies.

Core Group: Beneath the level of the DC, Somalia policy has been coordinated by the Somalia Core Group chaired by NSC. To preserve some continuity (especially at a time when Assistant Secretaries are not in place), I urge you to continue the Core Group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Sean Darragh to forward the transmittal memo at Tab I to agency counterparts.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies  
Tab A Agenda  
Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 02/22/17

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

2012-0659-F

3/5/93

**ESTIMATED INCREMENTAL U.S.COSTS FOR BOSNIA PEACEKEEPING MISSION**  
**(\$ IN MILLIONS)**

Assumptions:

22,500 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED

-- 17,500 COMBAT PERSONNEL

-- 5000 SUPPORT PERSONNEL

ADDITIONAL 45,000 IN ROTATION BASE IN U.S. AND GERMANY TO PERMIT 6 MONTH ROTATION  
 EQUIPMENT DEPLOYED WILL COME FROM ASSETS STORED IN EUROPE

| <u>RECURRING COSTS:</u>        | <u>MONTH</u> | <u>YEAR</u> | <u>ONE TIME COSTS:</u>    |     |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----|
| TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL 1/ | 6            | 72          | TRANS EQUIP TO BOSNIA 7/  | 21  |
| SPECIAL PAYS 2/                | 6            | 72          | REPAIR EQUIP IN EUROPE 8/ | 350 |
| IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT 3/          | 8            | 96          | BASE CONSTRUCTION 9/      | 400 |
| ARMY OPERATIONS 4/             | 43           | 516         | SUB-TOTAL UP-FRONT COSTS  | 771 |
| AIR FORCE OPERATIONS 5/        | 15           | 180         |                           |     |
| SUSTAINING AIRLIFT/SEALIFT 6/  | 30           | 360         | TRANS EQUIP FR BOSNIA 10/ | 21  |
| TOTAL                          | 108          | 1,296       | TOTAL                     | 792 |

**COST ESTIMATE NOTES:**

1/ TWO UNIT ROTATIONS PER YEAR.

2/ INCLUDES HAZARDOUS DUTY, FOREIGN DUTY, AND SEPARATION PAY.

3/ BASE SUPPORT, REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, AND MEDICAL SUPPORT.

4/ OPERATIONAL TEMPO AT 4 TIMES PEACETIME LEVEL.

5/ SIMILAR MISSION TO THAT PERFORMED FOR "PROVIDE COMFORT" IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

6/ TRANSPORTATION COMMAND ESTIMATE.

7/ TRANSPORTATION OF EQUIPMENT FROM EUROPE TO BOSNIA.

8/ ESTIMATE IS ABOUT 10% OF NEW COST OF EQUIPMENT.

9/ INCLUDES \$150M FOR 10 SMALL BASES AND \$250M FOR ONE MAIN BASE.

10/ TRANSPORTATION OF EQUIPMENT FROM BOSNIA TO EUROPE.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dick -

I think this is  
a key document  
because it has ideas  
for the whole spectrum.  
So, I pass it on  
to you for your use  
as part of the new  
team. — Nancy Dyke

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH/~~  
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Clarke*

20074

January 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RA*

FROM: <sup>NBD</sup> NANCY BEARG DYKE

SUBJECT: Report to be Transmitted to Deputies Committee (U)

Attached at Tab A is a final report of this administration to the Deputies Committee from the Deputies Committee Working Group on Peacekeeping, which is chaired by Dick Clarke. The attached report should be transmitted to the members of the Deputies Committee today through their Executive Secretaries. I discussed this with Admiral Howe. ~~(C)~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Deputies Committee  
Tab A Report to Deputies Committee

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006  
By KOE NARA, Date 08/22/17  
2012-0657 F

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Declassify on: OADR

With the end of the Cold War and increased cooperation among Russia and the Western members of the UN Security Council, nations have come to rely increasingly on the United Nations to resolve international and internal disputes through the use of peacekeeping forces. Regional organizations have also expanded their peacekeeping roles. Despite this growth in peacekeeping, the UN and some regional organizations have not changed their relevant policies or structures significantly. Although the US promulgated a new policy last year and recently shared it with three members of the Security Council, there are many issues that remain to be resolved before the US has a complete policy on peacekeeping.

This PRD is intended to be a zero-based review of the issues involved in the creation of a US policy on peacekeeping and to identify options, leading to Presidential decisions. The scope of the review includes both peacekeeping and the similar function of civilian and military emergency humanitarian relief. The phrase peacekeeping is meant, except where otherwise noted, to include the full range of activities from observers through enforcement.

The study should include, but not be limited to, the questions and issues in the outline below. When options are developed, they should also be analyzed. Each analysis should compare a set of options against a set of evaluative criteria, so that options in the set can be contrasted on the same measures. Two criteria that should be given special attention are the availability of funding sources for new activities and the ease/difficulty in obtaining UN support for change options.

## I. BACKGROUND (IC)

Describe recent and current international peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief operations in terms of their origins, scope, goals, participation, and effectiveness. Identify what has made for successes and what has made for failures, what has worked and what has not.

## II. THE ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING (STATE)

What options are there for the role that international peacekeeping should play in our foreign and security policies? Specifically:

--when are US interests best served by reliance upon international peacekeeping and when are they best served by action that is unilateral or not sanctioned by the UN?

--to what degree does the downsizing of US and allied militaries mean that we may need to rely increasingly upon international organizations and coalitions for intervention capability?

--does the trend toward internationally sanctioned peacekeeping and enforcement undermine in an undesirable manner our ability to act unilaterally?

--should decisions about increasing reliance on UN peacekeeping be tempered by the possibility that Russia and or China may change policies and begin vetoing peacekeeping operations which we support? how likely is such a change? what could we do to continue international peacekeeping if this change did occur?

### III. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A. Describe and evaluate the status of peacekeeping policy, structure, and operations in key regional organizations including the OAS, OAU, CIS, ECOWAS, NATO, CSCE, Arab League, GCC, and ASEAN. (IC)

B. Develop options for US policy toward peacekeeping by key regional organizations, including steps the US might take to strengthen the capabilities of these groupings. US policy toward the NATO/CSCE question should be specifically developed with options and a proposed gameplan. What relationship should these groupings have to the UN system politically and militarily? What criteria should be developed for deciding whether to employ the UN or a regional organization? (STATE)

### IV. THE UNITED NATIONS

The study should identify the shortcomings of the current United Nations peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief system and propose options for improvements. The options should include information about feasibility, resource availability, and plans for achieving UN Secretariat and member support for implementation. Among the issues that should be reviewed are:

A. Structure (roles, missions, organization, and staffing): including the structure of Under Secretaries, the Emergency Coordinator for Humanitarian relief, the Military Staff Committee, the Military Advisor to the Secretary General, and the Field Operations Division. (STATE/JCS)



B. Command control communications: what are the UN's C3 requirements for peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief and what options are there for meeting them? What options are there for what the US could provide, including facilities and hardware, both gratis and as in kind services to create the necessary system? (DOD/JCS)

C. Information support and intelligence interface: what options are there for how the information function can be integrated into the C3 system? how can US intelligence be provided on a regular (not ad hoc) basis to various components of the UN system and its field operations? Do current collection priorities give sufficient attention to UN requirements and, if not, what can be done to improve collection? (IC)

D. Logistics/Transportation: what are the deficiencies of the logistics and lift systems and what are options for improvement, taking into account needs such as speed and interoperability? (DOD/AID)

E. Plans and Training: what options are there for creating a UN system for peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian relief planning, including a permanent staff? what options are there for developing a training system, including use of US facilities for simulations and exercises? (DOD/JCS)

F. Doctrine and Rules of Engagement: should the past practice of somewhat passive peacekeeping be altered and, if so, what are the options? include an examination of the chapter VI and VII dicotomy. (STATE)

G. Emergency Humanitarian Relief: what options are there for the UN's capabilities? what are the options for a new international standing/on-call capability? include non-UN options. (AID)

## V. STANDING FORCES AND US PARTICIPATION (STATE/DOD)

A. Article 43: what are the options for US policy regarding a standing UN force as outlined in Article 43 of the UN charter, including on-call forces, commitments of specific units in specific timeframes, or commitments of specific capabilities in specific timeframes. A limited non-national or "foreign legion" capability should be examined. An explicit differentiation should be made between peacekeeping forces and emergency humanitarian relief forces in this examination.

B. The Command Relationship and US Participation: what options are there for policy regarding the participation of US combat and support forces in international peacekeeping organizations, including consideration of control of US forces by non-American commanders?

## VI. THE UNITED STATES

A. Organization: OSD, JCS, STATE, AID, and the IC should describe how they are structured to support international peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief and examine options for improving their existing structures. They should also propose options for an interagency structure for policy development and implementation in these areas. (ALL)

B. Training: what are options for improving US military and civilian training for international peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian assistance? (JCS/AID)

C. Funding: what options are there for reflecting the US contribution to UN peacekeeping in the US budget, including placement solely in the 050 account, the 150 account, or shared between the accounts on the basis of some formula? other funding related issues that should be addressed include accounting for in-kind services, transfer authority between accounts, the desirability of additional contingency reserve funds similar to ERMA, options for payment of the US assessment and arrearage, and options for the priority that peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief should have in the 050 and 150 budgets relative to other programs. (OMB)

D. Legislation: what options are there for amending the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 and other legislation related to peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief? (STATE)

## VII STUDY PROCESS

Initial drafting responsibilities for the sections of the study are indicated above, however, the options and views of all agencies should be included in the drafts presented . To insure that agency views are reflected in the papers, working groups should be created as indicated below. After review by the Working Groups, the drafts should be presented to an IWG, which for the purposes of managing this study, will be chaired by the NSC Staff. The IWG shall be responsible for integrating the products of the working groups into a single study with decisionable options and agency views for examination by the Deputies Committee. The IWG shall also be responsible for enforcing drafting deadlines, as indicated below.

DRAFT

DRAFT

*MS*  
1. Tony is signing there,  
I think.

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~THE VICE PRESIDENT~~  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
~~THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS~~

A-VP-NSCA

← THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: **Policy on Multilateral Peacekeeping Capabilities**

*Prejudges*  
*See intent*  
*(A)*  
The United States is strongly committed to strengthening multilateral peacekeeping capabilities to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict across the globe and to assist in the delivery of humanitarian relief. I hereby direct an interagency review to determine means by which we can enhance the capacity of the United Nations, other multilateral organizations, and our own government to conduct effectively collective peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and enforcement operations ("multilateral operations").

A special session of the UN Security Council is expected by spring to consider issues of this character. It is important for the U.S. Government to have a well-developed series of recommendations prior to the special session in order to continue formal and informal consultations with UN leadership and the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5).

The success of multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in the past several years has increased the demands on the United Nations more than any time in its 50-year history. Traditional peacekeeping operations among consenting parties were initiated in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, the former Yugoslavia and other countries. In addition, non-permissive enforcement operations such as Desert Storm in Kuwait and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia have established new means of resolving international challenges through the use of multilateral coalitions under United Nations auspices.

*Emergency*

This review will address three types of operations: peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement. Since the lines between these operations are becoming blurred in practice, this review should both distinguish between them and examine their inter-relationships. In addition, this review will address U.S. participation in UN enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

*What can be done to maintain a viable peacekeeping system if Russia and/or China began to veto operations?*

This PRD is a zero-based policy review, but should take into account NSD-74 State cable (8716) to the P-4 known as the US Non-paper on UN Peacekeeping - or just the "non-paper" - is a good reference to the current guidance to the field on U.S. proposals to strengthen the UN system. However, this review is not constrained by any previous decisions or the issues outlined below. Its purpose is to stimulate new thinking to address the enormous challenges to the UN and the U.S. Government. *In those areas where interagency consensus cannot be reached, options should be clearly delineated for higher level decision.*

*and the US "non-paper" to the P-4 partners.*

## *Presidential* I. ASSESSMENT (CIA)

- *description and 2nd recent*  
~~Brief evaluation of current peacekeeping operations worldwide with a summary of U.S. participation and contributions.~~
- ~~What are the problems with these current operations? What are the criteria for successful peacekeeping operations? What are the characteristics of failed peacekeeping operations?~~

*successful and*

## II. GENERAL US POLICY FOR PEACEKEEPING

### A. US Peacekeeping Policy (STATE)

- *When*  
~~Are US national interests better served through the use of peacekeeping operations and other multilateral instrumentalities?~~
- ~~What problems are associated with the increased reliance on multilateral approaches? What are the shortcomings of current peacekeeping operations?~~

*Describe scenarios (including probabilities) in which we lose How dependent on Russian and Chinese acquiescence or support for the UN peacekeeping process?*

- oo Does the trend toward international peacekeeping undermine the ability of the U.S. Government to act unilaterally in its national interest?

- ~~Could the improvements proposed in this study help in these cases or are other factors still going to preclude effectiveness?~~
- ~~How can peacekeeping operations be terminated successfully in a more timely and cost effective manner?~~

- Is the United States prepared to put U.S. troops under UN command in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations?
- Should U.S. troops be deployed for UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations on a volunteer basis? (later)
- What rules of engagement and command and control arrangements should be required before U.S. troops are contributed to UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations?

## B. Regional Peacekeeping Capabilities (STATE)

Regional organizations and arrangements are increasingly being pressured to take on peacekeeping assignments. The UN Secretary-General has encouraged the use of regional bodies for this purpose, such as NATO, WEU, and CSCE.

### Questions and Options

- <sup>Evaluate the main</sup> ~~Which~~ regional organizations (such as NATO, OAS, WEU, ECOWAS, CSCE, etc.) <sup>potential</sup> ~~are most likely to be able to contribute effectively to peacekeeping operations? Of these regional organizations, how can the United States encourage and strengthen their peacekeeping capability. How will they relate to the UN? Should they be represented in the Secretariat?~~
- When, and under what type of command structure, should the United States contribute forces to peacekeeping operations organized and run by a regional organization? (later)
- How can U.S. resources be used to support regional peacekeeping operations? (already included above)

## III. ENHANCING UN CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS

### A. UN Organization and Structure

<sup>US</sup> <sup>presented to the P-4</sup> The "non-paper" recommends the expansion and appropriate reorganization of the UN Secretariat staff for peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs. Current US policy also recommends the creation of a professional peacekeeping headquarters staff supported by U.S. expert personnel. This study should review specific, realistic changes to the structure and organization of the United Nations staff.

### Questions and Options

- What changes in the roles, missions, organization, and staffing requirements within the UN should be made in order to enhance peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and enforcement capabilities? (STATE)

- Should the focus of enhancements be in the Secretariat, specifically the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations? Is there a need to realign the roles and missions of the other under-secretaries? How might the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs be better utilized? (JTAG)
- How can logistical support and fiscal oversight for peacekeeping operations be improved? For example, should the Field Operations Division (FOD) be moved to the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations? How should the communications, planning, and data collection and retrieval capabilities of the Secretariat be improved for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations? (DOD/JCS)
- How should command and control of UN peacekeeping operations, both in New York and in the field, be better organized and staffed? (DOD/JCS)
- What is an appropriate role of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) in connection with non-enforcement operations? Should its size be increased? What should be the relationship with the plans and current operations directorate? (DOD/JCS)
- What is an appropriate role for the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General (SYG)? Should his staff be enlarged? What should be his relationship to the SYG, the Security Council, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, the MSC, the FOD, and the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff? (DOD/JCS)

#### **B. Operations, Planning, Training, Command and Equipment (DOD)**

The "non-paper" recommends the creation of a plans and current operations directorate reporting to the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations. The directorate would provide planning and determine the force, equipment, logistical, and transportation requirements for assigned missions. The current operations directorate would handle crisis management and monitor operations in the field. The training of potential forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief tasks is also important to the success of future missions.

While the U.S. has provided significant logistical support to UN peacekeeping operations, and remains the largest financial contributor, the U.S. has traditionally resisted the assignment of U.S. military forces under foreign command. Recently, an Army M.A.S.H. unit was assigned to UNPROFOR in Croatia, the first U.S. forces under UN command since Korea (which was only nominal). Current policy is that national forces are only made available after the request of the Security Council and with the approval of states providing them. The "non-paper" recommends the U.S. identify capabilities to the United Nations that will be available for peacekeeping operations.

(if so, where),  
equipmentQuestions and Options

- What are the requirements for space, personnel, and communications to field a planning and current operations center? Who should control it? Should the U.S. offer to provide a suitable location, and some personnel to help initiate the process?
- Should the United States push hard for a communications and information center in the Secretariat that would provide immediate access to information about peacekeeping operations? → and intelligence
- Should the UN develop a new peacekeeping doctrine, perhaps with more liberal rules of engagement? Is a humanitarian relief doctrine required that permits the use of military force? Should the UN establish common operating procedures for inter-operability among participants. How should potential peacekeeping and humanitarian relief forces be trained? In combined UN-sponsored exercises or by individual countries in accordance with established UN doctrine?

**C. UN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND ARTICLE 43** ~~(DOD/STATE)~~ (DOD/STATE)

Military deployments authorized or directed under Chapter VII of the Charter (such as the Iraq and Somalia operations) share many of the same concerns yet raise a separate set of issues to consider.

Article 43, Chapter VII, of the UN Charter envisioned that member states (and the P-5 in particular) would commit forces "on-call" to the Security Council for enforcement actions pursuant to negotiated "special agreements." No such agreements or forces have ever or currently exist. If the United Nations is to create a rapid deployment force that can be deployed to enforce Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII, then the United States and other countries may need to negotiate their respective Article 43 special agreements with the Security Council. An Article 43 rapid deployment force -- prepared for combat -- should be distinguished from peacekeeping and non-enforcement humanitarian relief operations, which do not require Chapter VII authority to be deployed and are not intended to engage in combat.

Questions and Options

- Should the U.S. support the creation of an Article 43 on-call force for UN enforcement actions and proceed to negotiate an Article 43 special agreement with the Security Council? What should be our strategy to ensure that other major powers support our position?
- Is the caveat "with national consent" sufficient to protect the prerogative of the President in controlling the deployment of U.S. forces in combat?



- How would command of Article 43 forces be implemented? What would be the proper role of the Military Staff Committee? How would liaison, if any, between the field commanders and the Secretariat be arranged?
- What are the legal or Constitutional implications of Article 43 forces? Is the UN Participation Act of 1945 sufficient authority for the President to negotiate an Article 43 agreement? Should the Administration support certain legislative initiatives on Article 43?
- What options are available for an on-call force?
  - oo A standing, professional, volunteer UN force (A UN "Foreign Legion")?
  - oo A brigade-sized rapid deployment force of contributing nations? Should it be an all-volunteer force?
  - oo Task-organized force for specific missions drawn from a pool of earmarked forces?
  - oo A large contingency force for major military operations?
  - oo A standing headquarters and C3I structure to command on-call forces?
  - oo A combination of some or all of the above?
- Should the UN force develop its own doctrine and training standards for Article 43 forces? Should it conduct joint training and deployment exercises?
- How should Article 43 forces be financed?
- How can the Security Council best transform a peacekeeping force into a humanitarian relief or enforcement contingent?
- Should we establish Chapter VI (peacekeeping) forces that have the inherent capability to conduct Chapter VII (enforcement) operations and vice-versa? What procedures should the Security Council take to implement changes in the rules of engagement or other adjustments to the mission?
- Under what circumstances would general Security Council authorization for the voluntary use of military force (such as was done against Iraq and in Somalia) be preferable to mandatory direction to activate Article 43 forces pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter? Is the command of such a force a prerequisite?

#### **IV. ENHANCING USG CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS**

## A. U.S. Organization and Structure ~~(DOD)~~

The increase in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and enforcement operations may require significant adjustments in U.S. Government bureaucratic structures.

### Questions and Options

- Does the U.S. military need a new, separate organization with specific responsibilities for military contributions to multilateral operations? What would be the size and composition of such an organization and its relationship to the other unified and specified commands? (DOD/JCS)
- Are the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff properly organized for military contributions to multilateral operations? (DOD/JCS)
- Is State properly organized for multilateral operations? What should be the roles of USUN, IO, PM and the regional bureaus? (STATE)
- Is the intelligence community properly organized to support multilateral operations, both within the federal bureaucracy and among relevant multilateral organizations? (IC)
- What is the best interagency structure for coordinating policy on multilateral operations? Should there be a temporary or standing Interagency Working Group? (All)

## B. U.S. Military Doctrine and Training for Peacekeeping (DOD/JCS)

The U.S. has offered to work with the United Nations on how best the U.S. could employ its lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations. The U.S. has offered to promote multilateral peacekeeping training.

### Questions and Options

- What is the current state of U.S. military doctrine for peacekeeping operations? Is a joint doctrine required? What about Service doctrine?
- What are and should be the requirements for training for the services and joint operations?
- How should the U.S. military support U.S. and international peacekeeping training exercises, simulations, and leadership development? What is the UN view on peacekeeping exercises?

## C. Intelligence (IC)

The UN requires improved and expanded intelligence capabilities for multilateral operations.

#### Questions and Options

- How will the intelligence community broaden its support for monitoring, verification, reconnaissance, and other requirements for multilateral operations? ~~(SFA)~~
- What will the intelligence community's role be in the plans and current operations directorate?
- Is there value in separate functional analysis for multilateral operations or are the regional directorates capable of handling the issues?

#### **D. Authorities and Funding for UN Peacekeeping Operations (OMB)**

U.S. authorities for peacekeeping operations are antiquated. For example, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (UNPA) has a 1,000-man ceiling of non-combatant U.S. troops for participation with specific exclusion of participation in Chapter VII activities. The United States is assessed 30.4% for regular peacekeeping operations, a figure higher than the 25% assessment for the regular UN budget. The United States owes \$44 million in arrears for peacekeeping and \$134 million in arrears on the regular budget. In addition, U.S. arrears to UN specialized agencies and others equals \$156 million.

#### Questions and Options

- Which agency should bear the responsibility for peacekeeping funding the State Department budget function (150) or the Defense Department function (050)? If the responsibility is shared between the two functions, along what lines should the division of funding responsibility be drawn? For example, which budget function should fund humanitarian relief operations? Would shifting funding responsibility involve any redistribution of control of policy with regard to these peacekeeping activities? How can funding responsibility be assigned to ensure that total U.S. costs do not increase as a result of collective responsibility? Should a mechanism for transfer authority between 150 and 050 accounts be designed to provide additional flexibility?
- Should direct appropriations be provided to match the existing funding authorities of Defense? Should funding and authorities be provided to support anticipated but undefined peacekeeping activities (e.g., create a contingency reserve in the budget)?
- Should the U.S. develop rules for the handling of Defense in-kind contributions to the UN and other multilateral organizations (e.g., UN reimburse Defense, State reimburse

Defense, Defense provide without reimbursement and UN credit against U.S. assessment)?

- How should peacekeeping authorization and appropriation legislation (including the UN Participation Act) be amended to provide more flexibility for the President to respond to multilateral and unilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking funding requirements?
- What should be the U.S. position on the Secretary-General's financing proposals for peacekeeping outlined in An Agenda for Peace? Some of the financing proposals in the paper include charging interest on assessments not paid to the UN on time, establishing a peacekeeping reserve fund of \$50 million which the UN General Assembly has approved, authorizing commercial borrowing by the UN, and the creating of a UN peacekeeping endowment of \$1 billion.
- Should the Bush Administration's five-year arrearage payback plan be adhered to? For example, should the FY94 budget request include full repayment of peacekeeping arrearage?
- What innovative methods might be explored to repay the arrearage, such as a credit against the arrearage for logistical support provided at no cost by the United States in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations? How would any rules developed for handling of Defense in-kind contributions be applied?
- How do we deal with payments when U.S. forces become part of a UN operation?

## **V. IMPLEMENTATION**

- This review should be completed within six weeks of the date of this directive so that the U.S. will have developed positions on the issues to be addressed in United Nations meetings in March. In order to maintain continuity on this fast track approach, an Interagency Working Group for Peacekeeping should be established, chaired by the NSC, to manage the interagency process.
- A timetable for implementation of specific proposals will be included in the review for those actions that can be accomplished by the U.S. Government.
- The review will also consider the resistance for U.S. proposals within the UN and consider a strategy for implementation. It should identify the forces in the UN that frustrate change and how they might be overcome.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                       | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002a. list               | UN Peacekeeping Operations (1 page) | 10/09/1992 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 3827

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [16]

2012-0659-F  
ke4221

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                         | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002b. paper              | Peacekeeping Success Factors (1 page) | 07/29/1992 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 3827

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [16]

2012-0659-F  
ke4221

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## UNCLASSIFIED

## Comparison of Peacekeeping Operations By Success and Limiting Factors

## Success Factors

|                                               | Namibia | Cyprus | W Sahara | Cambodia | Yugoslavia | Somalia |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------|--------|----------|----------|------------|---------|
| Cooperation of all parties                    | ✓       | ✓      |          |          |            |         |
| Tied to settlement negotiations or agreement  | ✓       |        | ✓        | ✓        |            |         |
| Stable cease-fire                             | ✓       | ✓      | ✓        | ?        |            |         |
| Parties disarmed/ confined to bases/separated | ✓       | ✓      |          |          |            |         |

## Limiting Factors

|                                      |  |  |   |   |   |   |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|---|
| Ambiguous or unclear mandate         |  |  |   |   | ✓ | ✓ |
| Civil war/ lack of central authority |  |  |   | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Lack of clear cease-fire line        |  |  |   | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Poor terrain/ deployment in cities   |  |  | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| UN mismanagement/ admin problems     |  |  | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Availability of weapons              |  |  |   | ✓ | ✓ |   |
| Education/ illiteracy                |  |  | ✓ | ✓ |   | ✓ |
| Combatant chain-of-command problems  |  |  | ? |   | ✓ | ✓ |

UNCLASSIFIED

## Top Ten UN Peacekeeping Financial Assessments

Financing for peacekeeping comes out of a special UN budget, except for the UNFICYP force in Cyprus, which is financed on a separate, voluntary basis. Each UN member is charged a special assessment based on national GNP.

The assessments of the top contributors are as follows:

|                   |        |
|-------------------|--------|
| 1. United States  | 30.38% |
| 2. Japan          | 12.45% |
| 3. Russia         | 11.44% |
| 4. Germany        | 8.93%  |
| 5. France         | 7.29%  |
| 6. United Kingdom | 6.10%  |
| 7. Italy          | 4.29%  |
| 8. Canada         | 3.11%  |
| 9. Australia      | 1.51%  |
| 10. Netherlands   | 1.50%  |
| +                 |        |
| -----             |        |
| Total:            | 87.00% |

### How Peacekeeping Assessments are Calculated

Peacekeeping assessments are similar to regular UN budget assessments in that they are generally based on GNP (as well as a lot of haggling) of member states, but they differ in two ways:

-- The majority of UN members (mostly from the Third World) pay assessments at a rate that is between four and ten times lower than the percentage they are assessed for the regular UN budget. Almost 100 Third World states pay a "bargain basement" rate of .001 percent of the UN's total peacekeeping bill. These special rates are subsidized by wealthier UN members.

-- The five permanent members of the Security Council traditionally pay at a rate higher than they do for their regular assessments. Unlike its assessment for the regular UN budget, the United States peacekeeping assessment is not capped at 25%. (U)



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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                        | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003. cable               | Re: Further P-4 Consultations on SYG's Peacekeeping Report (4 pages) | 01/12/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 3827

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [16]

2012-0659-F  
ke4221

### RESTRICTION CODES

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| 004. report              | Re: [Peacekeeping] (7 pages) | 09/02/1992 | P1/b(1)     |

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National Security Council  
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| 005. report              | Re: [Croatia] (2 pages) | 02/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [16]

2012-0659-F  
ke4221

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20 Sept 93

RAC

CSG-CT Slides

Jan B

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RAE

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not meet our needs



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| 006. briefing<br>paper   | CSG-CT Slides (8 pages) | 09/20/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

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