

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

3827

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	4	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. note	Handwritten notes (3 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Deputies Committee Discussion Paper on PRD-13: Peacekeeping (6 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Susan Rice to Samuel Berger, re: Deputies Committee Meeting on PRD-13 Peacekeeping (2 pages)	07/12/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	PRD 13 Peacekeeping (7 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	PRD-13 Peacekeeping (34 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Susan Rice to Samuel Berger, Deputies Committee Meeting on PRD-13 (6 pages)	07/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

2012-0659-F

ke4219

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

PRD-13 Deputies Committee Meeting
Friday, July 16, 1993, 11:00 a.m.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. note	Handwritten notes (3 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

2012-0659-F
ke4219

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM, Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. paper	Deputies Committee Discussion Paper on PRD-13: Peacekeeping (6 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

2012-0659-F
ke4219

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Susan Rice to Samuel Berger, re: Deputies Committee Meeting on PRD-13 Peacekeeping (2 pages)	07/12/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

2012-0659-F
ke4219

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20737

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By LOE NARA, Date 06/21/17
0612-0659-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BG MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. DAVID MEIN
Acting Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Notification of Deputies Committee Meeting on PRD-13,
Peacekeeping (S)

A meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee will be held on July 14,
1993 at _____ in the White House Situation Room. The agenda is
attached at Tab A. Attendance is limited to principal plus one.
(S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B PRD-13 Agreed Recommendations
Tab C Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: July 14, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME:

PRD-13 -- PEACEKEEPING

Agenda

- I. Introduction Sandy Berger
- II. Approval of Interagency Agreed Draft PRD
- III. Discussion of Additional Issues
 - Peacekeeping Funding
 - Rapid Reaction Capability
 - Paying for the US Initiative
 - Issues for Further Study
- IV. Summary Sandy Berger

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By DOE NARA, Date 02/22/17

2012-0654-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	PRD 13 Peacekeeping (7 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

2012-0659-F
kc4219

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping

- A. There is a threat to international peace and security, defined as one or a combination of the following:
- international aggression;
 - a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with violence;
 - sudden and unexpected interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights, coupled with violence or the threat thereof.
- B. There is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- C. There are clear objectives, including an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- D. For Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties to the conflict obtained before the UN Security Council votes to deploy the peacekeeping mission.
- E. The means to accomplish the mission are available, including forces, financing and a mandate (regional or UN) appropriate to the mission.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/28/17

2012 0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 08/22/17
2012-0659-F

Guidelines for US Participation

- A. Funds, personnel and other resources are available for US participation and the risks are acceptable.
- B. US participation is necessary for the success of the mission or to persuade other nations or organizations to participate.
- C. An end point for US participation can be identified.
- D. Participation advances US interests.
- E. There is domestic political and Congressional support for US participation, or such support can be marshalled.
- F. Command and control arrangements, including the assignment of specific personnel, are acceptable to the US.

In addition, when the peacekeeping mission will involve significant use of force, the US will bear in mind its own informal guidelines for the use of force:

- it is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies;
- we do so with the clear intention of winning;
- we have clearly defined political and military objectives and commit sufficient forces to achieve those objectives;
- the relationship between the size, composition, and disposition of forces we have committed and our objectives is continually reassessed and adjusted, if necessary;
- the commitment of US forces to combat is a last resort.
- we have first obtained the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 02/21/17
2012-0659-F

Emergency Humanitarian Relief

The UN SYG should take a number of early steps to improve coordination between its peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts:

1. Designate a lead UN agency for coordinating relief for a given crisis or country. Propose clear modalities for coordination in the field between UN Resident Coordinators, SRSGs, and NGOs.
2. Consider the creation of a Donors' Oversight Committee to improve monitoring of humanitarian programs.
3. Implement a system to be designed by US experts that enables the UN to quantify and track needs as they arise in the field as well as international responses to those needs (from the emergency site, donor capitals, and UN HQ). USAID has already financed the initiation of this activity for use by the UN relief agencies.
4. Request as needed the rapid dispatch of full-time US and other member state military or civilian experts to DHA and the ad hoc detailing of experienced personnel for surge capacity/task force membership in times of crisis.
5. Utilize a data bank to be designed by the US of American personnel and technical resources, including government and private individuals or organizations with expertise in various facets of humanitarian assistance. Request other member states to augment this database.

In addition, USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, with representatives from State, Defense, and Agriculture should formulate detailed proposals for enhancing the humanitarian relief capabilities of the USG and UN in the context of peacekeeping operations. Recommendations should be made to the Peacekeeping IWG no later than September 30, 1993. Specifically the IWG would examine the implications of consolidating the UN's humanitarian relief activities in either New York or Geneva; and improve information exchange and operational coordination; consider ways to augment the Plans and Current Operations Directorate to provide more responsive, specialized support to DHA as well as whether DHA needs its own contingency planning capacity; and ultimately present the SYG with a non-paper recommending ways to enhance DHA's management and operational effectiveness.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Finance and Budget Management ReformsFinancing Reforms

- Enable countries to reduce their assessed peacekeeping costs by receiving credit for in-kind contributions of goods and services over and above those associated with troops they have provided to a particular operation. The amount of in-kind contributions each member state can credit should be limited to 30 percent of its assessed payment for the peacekeeping operation.
- Revise the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base it on a three year average of national income instead of the current 10 year average and drop Group C (middle-income countries) so that these member states pay their regular budget rate. Retain the special rate for Group D, least developed countries. The membership of Group D should be rationalized to reflect current national income levels.
- Urge member states with high GNPs (e.g., Japan, Germany) and countries directly benefitting from peacekeeping (including host states and states located within the peacekeeping region) to make significant voluntary contributions to help alleviate the disparity in UN peacekeeping funding.

Budget Management Reform

- If by June 1994, FOD has not sufficiently improved its budget management capabilities, the SYG should set up a new, independent budget preparation/execution office in the UN peacekeeping division. The USG should offer to detail highly qualified staff on a non-reimbursable basis to UN HQ for this purpose.
- Create special budgeting techniques tailored to peacekeeping operations including: use of standardized cost "modules" (based on actual market pricing) for common elements of peacekeeping field operations; flexibility to construct budgets in two parts -- an in-kind requirements budget and cash requirements budget; and use of standardized "valuation" factors, which would be updated periodically to enable countries to estimate fairly the value of their in-kind contributions.
- Establish a standing cadre of budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans.

This would enable the major contributions to take an active role in ensuring cost-effective operations. It would also provide member states with early, detailed knowledge of mission costs and help build credibility for the estimates within member governments.

- Enlarge and expand the current revolving Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (PRF) to \$500 million with voluntary contributions to help finance the start-up costs of UN peacekeeping operations pending receipt of assessed contributions.
- Revise the UN's procedures to allow \$10 million or 20 percent, whichever is greater, of the initial estimated cost of a peacekeeping operation to be obligated, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), once it is approved by the Security Council. This would enable the UN to cover quickly the typically high start-up costs of operations and contract for longer lead-time items. Current procedures allow only \$10 million to be obligated without specific approval of the General Assembly.
- Require the UN to have a status of forces agreement that provides preferential host nation support to a peacekeeping operation with the exception of countries where there is no central government (e.g., Somalia). The agreement should ensure that the host country provides necessary local facilities on the most favorable terms (e.g., accommodations, supplies and local transport at no charge when possible) and offers the UN the most favorable legal exchange rate.
- Prohibit the UN from "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations. Peacekeeping assessments should be maintained in separate accounts and should not be used -- even temporarily -- for regular UN activities.
- Urge the UN to consider the merits of establishing an unified peacekeeping budget in conjunction with a contingency reserve fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment. A unified budget should be accompanied by more regular and timely cost accounting procedures to track expenditures and ensure effective budget management.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 2/22/17
2012-0689-F

Other Financing Ideas

Other measures have been suggested for possible ways to help finance and manage UN peacekeeping operations. These include:

- Devise means (such as interest on late payments) to ensure that member states pay their peacekeeping assessments within an agreed timeframe in order to share more equitably the costs of UN peacekeeping. These carrots or sticks should not be applied until there have been adequate revisions to the UN peacekeeping assessment scale.
- Interest-bearing UN "Peace Bonds" -- would likely require enabling authority for the UN.
- UN short-term borrowing -- would likely require enabling authority for the UN (Volcker/Ogata report does not support).
- International taxes and user fees (e.g., air/sea travel, international telecommunications, arms sales) -- likely require national legislation for member states (Volcker/Ogata report does not support at this time).
- Establish a UN Peace Endowment Fund (\$1 billion) to finance peacekeeping start-up costs -- would take time to develop support and to implement (The proposal was included in Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace paper, but the Volcker/Ogata report does not support the proposal.)
- Collect "Peace Dividend" from beneficiary nations -- would take time to develop support and to implement.
- Collect tax deductible contributions from corporations and individual donors to be "Proud Sponsors of UN Peacekeeping" (Volcker/Ogata report does not support) -- would take time to develop support and to implement.
- Seek acceptance of the principle that neighbor states and regional groups bear "special responsibility" for peacekeeping operations in their region and thus an obligation to pay, in-cash or in-kind, some portion of operation costs (within a range based on aggregate GDP) in addition to their assessed contribution. Many third world countries would oppose this proposal and it would take time to develop support and to implement.
- Find a way to increase the financial contributions that other developed nations, especially Germany and Japan, make to peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations such as by

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

establishing a committee of the UN Security Council on Peacekeeping under the provision of Article 29 of the UN Charter. This committee could consist of the Perm Five, five countries elected from geographic regions by the Security Council, and countries which make a commitment to a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations either by agreeing to have their assessment increased by at least 10 percent of the total cost of each operation, or by agreeing to commit forces amounting to a fixed percentage of total peacekeeping operations without seeking reimbursement for costs. The committee would also have an advisory role in reviewing proposed and on-going peacekeeping operations. This proposal would allow for greater contributions from the developed nations, such as Japan and Germany, by providing increased visibility and participation in managing peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations and near Security Council status as an incentive. It would take time to develop support for and to implement this idea.

- Have UN staff devise a Global Security/Emergency Humanitarian Assistance spreadsheet which would allow for appropriate recognition being given to expenditures of members for non-UN activities which are authorized by the Security Council (e.g., Operation Restore Hope). Such a spreadsheet would provide useful information in itself and this information could be directly applied in establishing a single financial account for all UN peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance operations as suggested above.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/21/17
2012-0659-F

Reimbursement Policy for US Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations

There is interagency agreement that the US should be reimbursed by the United Nations (UN) when DOD contributes troops, supplies, or services to assessed UN peacekeeping operations. As a matter of policy, State and DOD have agreed to the following procedures, without prejudice to each agencies views of existing legal authorities:

1. SHORT-TERM: In the short-term, State and DOD will continue to consider each assessed UN peacekeeping operation on a case-by-case basis.

1a. DOD Troop Contributions: When DOD details forces to assessed UN peacekeeping operations under either Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace-enforcing) of the UN Charter, the US shall seek the normal reimbursement that all troop contributor nations are entitled to (\$988/troop/month; or \$1279/troop/month for specialists).

Such reimbursement, in excess of DOD component incremental troop costs, could be used, to the extent provided under existing statutes, to offset the USG's peacekeeping assessment -- paid from the State peacekeeping account.

1b. DOD Goods and Services: When DOD provides goods or services (e.g., lift, logistics support, medical, or technical services) to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, DOD shall seek direct reimbursement from the UN.

DOD and State will consult in exceptional situations which may require waiver of reimbursement. In such exceptional circumstances, when DOD and State agree, DOD would waive reimbursement. DOD believes that we should consider such a waiver only when the UN is not in a position to provide reimbursement. When the UN does not reimburse DOD, State believes that it may seek a credit against its peacekeeping assessment. State and Defense agree that we should continue to resolve these issues on a case-by-case basis.

2. LONG-TERM: The Administration would seek new legislation or clarification in the legislative history as required to allow:

2a. DOD Troop Contributions: When DOD details forces to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, the US shall seek the normal UN reimbursement for troop contributor nations (the \$988 or \$1279).

Such reimbursement, would be credited to State's peacekeeping assessment if funds are available in the appropriation for DOD

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

peacekeeping for reimbursement of DOD component incremental troop costs.

In cases where funds are not available from the appropriation for DOD peacekeeping, DOD would receive the direct reimbursement from the UN for incremental troop costs, and State could credit any excess to the State peacekeeping assessment.

2b. DOD Goods and Services: When DOD provides goods or services to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, the US shall seek reimbursement for the costs of DOD contributions.

(1) DOD normally shall seek direct reimbursement from the UN for the incremental costs of goods and services provided. Such reimbursement will be credited to appropriate DOD components appropriations.

(2) On a case-by-case basis, DOD could waive some or all of this direct reimbursement based on considerations such as: assessment of the importance of the operation to US political and security interests; the timeliness and availability of funds from the DOD appropriation for peacekeeping to reimburse DOD components, personnel, and other resources; and the impact on the Military Departments.

If DOD waives direct reimbursement:

-- State may seek reimbursement to the US through a UN credit to the US peacekeeping assessment for up to the full value (i.e., base and incremental costs) of DOD's contribution; and

-- DOD component incremental costs will be reimbursed from the DOD appropriation for peacekeeping.

3. In pursuing the above reimbursement policy, the Administration will actively oppose any efforts by the Congress to authorize and direct the transfer of DOD funds to State to pay for peacekeeping assessments; or any efforts to transfer State funding to DOD to pay for DOD participation in peacekeeping activities.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

LEGAL AUTHORITY, TERMS, AND DEFINITIONS

Terms, Legal Authority, and Force Levels

A commonly accepted set of terms with legally useful definitions is a prerequisite for framing national policy on issues relative to maintaining international peace and security under the authority of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The term peacekeeping, while it has specific meaning in the UN and international legal context, has recently been so loosely applied in describing a whole range of new UN activities that it has lost any useful meaning.

Terms used to describe efforts to maintain international peace and security, have, in the context of the UN Charter and US law, important legal and financial implications and directly affect critical decisions about the level of force authorized, the mandate of the operation, and the mission and composition of the forces required in a given operation.

In framing US policies and decisions, it is essential to both define terms and understand the ramifications and interrelationships between the legal authority for an operation, the level of force authorized or required, the mandate of an operation, the mission and composition of the forces, the environment -- permissive or non-permissive -- and the risk.

DEFINITIONS

The terms preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace building are integrally related to peace operations. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking is a key element in halting conflicts once they break out, and post-conflict peace building is essential to prevent the recurrence of violence among the parties. Peace operations become necessary when preventive diplomacy fails. Traditional and aggravated peacekeeping operations must be accompanied by peacemaking efforts to resolve the causes of a conflict.

Peace Operations

All actions taken by the United Nations or regional organizations under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and those Chapter VII operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low intensity peace enforcement operations not

~~SECRET~~

involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate.

Preventive Diplomacy

Actions taken to resolve disputes before violence breaks out.

Peacemaking

Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.

Peace Building

Action to identify and support structures which would strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Traditional Peacekeeping

Deployment of a United Nations, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations, regional organization, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.

Aggravated Peacekeeping

Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.

Peace Enforcement

Armed intervention, involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force, pursuant to authorization by the United Nations Security Council for the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression.

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	PRD-13 Peacekeeping (34 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

2012-0659-F
ke4219

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	Susan Rice to Samuel Berger, Deputies Committee Meeting on PRD-13 (6 pages)	07/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [14]

2012-0659-F
ke4219

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20737

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 2, 1993

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

By VDE NARA, Date 02/22/17
2012-0659-F

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on PRD-13 Peacekeeping

The IWG on PRD-13 reached agreement on 33 recommendations (Tab II). In the spirit of hard-won consensus, the agencies have expressed satisfaction with the scope of the PRD. This leaves only the NSC staff concerned that the recommendations may not go far enough. At Tab III is a discussion paper that outlines the issues we think merit further consideration.

Clearly, the first and most critical order of business in the Deputies Committee meeting will be to bless the agreed recommendations before the issuance of a PDD. In addition, we think that Deputies should discuss several outstanding issues. However, any move to reopen Pandora's box will be very unpopular in the interagency. Care would have to be taken to protect the agreed recommendations from fall-out over the remaining issues.

Thus, we need to decide whether PRD-13 in its current form constitutes a sufficient step forward in our peacekeeping policy or whether further recommendations are desirable.

Concurrences by: Rand Beers

RECOMMENDATION

That you schedule a Deputies Committee meeting on Wednesday, July 14, and that you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I and forward it, the Agenda at Tab A, the Agreed Recommendations at Tab II and the Discussion paper at Tab III to agency counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Itoh Memo to Counterparts

Tab A Agenda

Tab II Agreed Recommendations

Tab III Discussion Paper

Tab IV Internal NSC Background Paper on Peacekeeping Policy

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

**Deputies Committee Meeting
PRD-13: International Peacekeeping
Discussion Paper**

Purpose

The IWG on PRD-13 reached agreement on 33 recommendations reflected in the paper at Tab A. This Deputies Committee meeting is being held to review these consensus recommendations prior to the issuance of a PDD. In addition, the Deputies should be aware and may wish to discuss two issues on which consensus could not be reached:

- o Rapid Deployment Capability
- o Voluntary US Contributions for the Peacekeeping Initiative

I. Rapid Deployment Capability

The President has advocated a "stand-by voluntary UN rapid deployment force" to deter aggression and protect humanitarian relief shipments. He envisions "not...a large standing army" but a "small force that could be called up from units of national armed forces and...trained in advance".

The UN has had extreme difficulty finding sufficient troops ready to deploy when needed. There have been numerous other instances when rapidly deploying a UN mission in a preventive capacity could have reduced tensions. Kuwait in July 1990, Cambodia during the run-up to the elections, and Kosovo come to mind.

The IWG considered several ways to enhance the UN's rapid deployment capability but reached consensus only on one modest improvement. The IWG agreed to urge the UN to create a rapidly deployable headquarters team and a composite initial logistics support unit (Recommendation 16). Their purpose would be to reduce the lag time between the mandating of a new mission and the deployment of a viable complement of forces. The IWG did not agree to specific US participation in either unit.

Issue: Does agreed Recommendation 16 sufficiently fulfill President Clinton's desire to pursue a UN rapid deployment force? If not, below are several options for consideration. They are not mutually exclusive.

i) US Participation in the proposed Composite Initial Logistics Support Unit (CILSU)

The US has the world's largest and most sophisticated logistics support capability, especially airlift. Without our participation in the CILSU, the UN will not have easy access to certain unique and possibly essential US capabilities and may not be able to deploy quickly.

Any US participation should be conditioned on time-limited deployments (eg. no more than six months) long enough only to allow permanent military or commercial replacements to arrive. We would also seek normal UN reimbursement for providing personnel. Furthermore, the US would always reserve the right not to serve in any given operation.

Since much of our logistics capability is in the reserves, US participation would require greater reliance on non-active forces for peacekeeping and may necessitate certain procedural or legislative changes. Finally, care would have to be taken not to impinge upon the readiness of US forces.

ii) Establishing a UN Ready Battalion Rotation

The IWG considered but did not recommend the establishment of rotating ready battalions available for swift dispatch by the Security Council. The ready battalions would be drawn principally from infantry units and used to reinforce existing UN forces or initiate a new operation.

Countries would be asked whether and during what period they would be willing to make available a battalion for deployment on seven days notice. Based on this information, the UN could "schedule" countries to be ready for deployment during specific months of the year (e.g., Norway on call in January, for up to a six month deployment) and then verify their readiness as the month approached. Troops liable to deploy during the same month would be encouraged to train together. States could, of course, refuse to deploy in any given circumstance and would be reimbursed if deployed, as under current custom. Deployments would require UNSC authorization.

Institution of a ready battalion rotation would enable the UN easily to engage in preventive deployment and respond effectively to rapidly changing situations on the ground. Most importantly, if agreed to, it could vastly mitigate the UN's severe troop recruitment problems.

Objections to the ready battalion rotation revolve principally around the concern that its creation would result in excessive pressure for the US to participate. US participation in the ready battalion rotation, even during one month out of every twenty-four, would lend substantial political weight to the initiative. Our involvement could, however, result in US forces serving in far away places, playing roles that almost any adequately trained army could fulfill.

iii) Supporting the UN Stand-by Forces Initiative

In January, UNSYG Boutros-Ghali commissioned a multinational team to develop a concept, recruit participants and design tools for the establishment of a "UN Stand-by Force". The force would be built from the voluntary and conditional contributions by member states of personnel, equipment or funds available at the request of the UNSYG. There would be no standing UN force. Member states would keep their forces in their own countries, performing normal duties. Countries' signed agreements would be non-binding. The greatest utility of this initiative will be to

facilitate modular force planning and provide the UN with a better understanding of the limited resources available to it.

Preliminary consultations with the UN Stand-by Team reveal that the UN is depending on US support to attract other nations to sign-on. A flat US rejection would chill the effort before it is fully launched.

The US could demonstrate its support in one of three ways:

- a) signing a non-binding agreement indicating the conditions under which we would, in principle, be willing to make available to the UN specific US forces or capabilities;
- b) issuing a simple statement of support and providing the force planning information already agreed in Recommendation 17.
- c) in addition to "a" or "b", offering to dispatch a small team to the UN to help it refine its force planning tools and estimate aggregate force requirements using contingency scenarios.

By signing an agreement as in option "a", the US would make plain its commitment to strengthening UN peacekeeping. However, such a step may be premature since the UN has not demonstrated a capacity to manage such a complex set of arrangements in Headquarters, much less in the field. Alternatively, the other options afford us means to bless the effort politically by providing useful but limited assistance, while shaping the effort in our own image.

II. Funding Implementation of the USG's Peacekeeping Reform Initiatives

The core of the PRD recommendations is the idea that UN peacekeeping will be made more capable and efficient by creating a global headquarters capability within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The PRD recommends a new operations center, global communications, and information/intelligence function, unified logistics support, and a small airlift unit.

The PRD does not, however, discuss paying for these new entities, apart from suggesting that the US lobby other countries like Germany and Japan to fund the initiative.

One concept that the IWG reviewed was that the US should offer to provide gratis some of the things our proposals would require (studies, facilities, personnel, and equipment) in order to increase the probability that the US vision becomes a near-term reality. It also reviewed the use of State's Voluntary Peacekeeping Fund (set at \$75 million in FY '94) and DOD's new voluntary Peacekeeping Support Fund (set at \$300 million in FY '94) to assist with start-up contributions. Neither Department agreed to pay for any portion of the proposals in the PRD, except through detailing some staff to the UN.

A willingness to contribute US funds, however, would lend greater weight and immediacy to our proposals, helping to catalyze support both among member states and within the Secretariat. If we are not prepared to "put our money where our mouth is", it will be hard to persuade other countries with a lesser stake in the success of UN peacekeeping to do so.

The obvious problem is lack of funds. The FY '94 State and DOD budget requests, even if adopted as proposed, may not fully cover next year's peacekeeping costs. The failure of the proposed peacekeeping supplemental puts us further into arrears and underscores the difficulty of obtaining such funds. To provide tangible, immediate support for an enhanced peacekeeping infrastructure will require taking money from other sources.

Issue: Should the US offer financial support to facilitate implementation of the agreed recommendations, while lobbying other countries to do the same? If so, two options pertain:

i) Agreement and statement in principal that State and DOD will contribute funds in FY '94 to support implementation of PRD-13 recommendations.

ii) Agreement that State and DOD will contribute \$20 million and \$75 million, respectively, or jointly pay 25% of the total cost of implementing the agreed recommendations in FY '94.

III. Issues for Further Study by the IWG

The IWG recommends that the interagency Peacekeeping Coordination/Operations Group oversee further study of the following issues, with the Deputies concurrence:

--Additional ways to enhance the humanitarian relief capabilities of the UN and USG in the context of peacekeeping operations (See Tab III).

--Other ideas for improving the financing and management of UN peacekeeping (See Tab V).

DRAFT PEACEKEEPING MEMORANDUM

8 JULY 1993

In its June 30 final action on the FY 1993 Supplemental Appropriations Bill, the House/Senate conferees let fall the Administration's request for \$293 m. in additional funding to pay UN assessments for peacekeeping.

This outcome occurred despite strong Administration efforts to find ways to obtain funding for peacekeeping assessments. The Administration cobbled together funding offsets to make room for this peacekeeping funding including contributions by the Dept. of Defense (military construction funds), the National Foreign Intelligence budget, and the State Department budget (foreign buildings account and foreign assistance funds). A concerted effort, including active interventions by State Department, USUN, OMB and NSC officials still met with failure.

Peacekeeping operations and funding are being challenged on several fronts:

- The week of June 21, the House Appropriations subcommittee for Commerce, Justice, State, eliminated the Administration's FY 1994 request for a \$175 m. peacekeeping contingency fund and reduced the remainder of our request for peacekeeping 2% below the original FY 1993 appropriations level.
- The House Armed Services Committee is likely to reject the Defense Department's FY 1994 request for a \$300 m. account for peacekeeping, replacing it with an as-yet poorly defined general access to the Treasury for peacekeeping operations.
- The failure of UN operations in Bosnia, the mixed reception for UN operations in Somalia, the collapse of the Angola agreement, and the uncertainties facing peacekeepers in Cambodia have all led to increased criticism of UN peacekeeping operations in general.
- The day after the supplemental appropriations conference decision, on the Senate floor, Appropriations Chairman Sen. Robert Byrd delivered a stinging attack on the Administration's forthcoming PRD on peacekeeping, on which he had obviously been briefed.

Absent a peacekeeping supplemental appropriation, the United States will fall nearly \$500 m. behind in our payments to the UN for peacekeeping operations by the end of CY 1993, directly frustrating a presidential commitment to make up our UN arrears and become a "good citizen". The FY 1994 budget for peacekeeping, should it pass at the House level, is insufficient to meet known and anticipated assessments for CY 1993, leaving us again well behind the curve in meeting our commitments under the

terms of UN allocations. Our estimate is that by the end of FY 1994, bar other action, the U.S. could be as much as \$1 billion in arrears for UN assessed peacekeeping operations.

Spending more time and political capital futilely chasing after this receding funding target would, in my judgement, be wasted. I am coming to the conclusion that it is not a question of packaging and selling well or finding the right legislative pocket to push it through. Rather, we should undertake a more fundamental reassessment of how we approach the peacekeeping issue.

The combination of the Administration's defeat on funding and growing criticism, especially by a Senate leader whose support can make or break funding, has led us to believe that the structure and organization of the Executive Branch for peacekeeping is fundamentally flawed, as is the organization of the Congress and the United Nations itself.

This conclusions leads us to four further recommendations

- the Administration should not undertake a renewed effort, at this time, to seek the \$293 in supplemental FY 1993 funding for US contributions to UN peacekeeping. There simply is no conceivable way to construct a "deal" in the Congress that will succeed and a considerable price for continued political failure. We embarrass the President when we fail and we force him to take on a political battle when his economic program clearly has higher political priority.
- We should not pressure the Defense Department to use its general transfer authority (increased by \$500 m. by the appropriations conferees) to transfer funds to pay peacekeeping, given the significant and politically important outlay problems Defense is incurring this year and next.
- we should bring to a conclusion work on the current PRD, but send to the President only those sections that deal with the criteria for UN and US participation in peacekeeping and the organization of the UN for peacekeeping operations.
- we should hold back the sections of the PRD dealing with US government organization and funding for peacekeeping, and institute immediately an in depth review of the Executive Branch's organization and funding process for peacekeeping operations.

Background

Peacekeeping operations have dramatically changed over the past five years. For decades, peacekeeping has involved a handful of small operations involving blue-helmeted troops from smaller countries that separate warring parties by common agreement, all funded by the members of the UN, using an assessment scale that cost the US 30.4% of the total cost.

Today, these operations number 14, counting 75,000 deployed forces, some of them (Somalia) engaged in combat-style operations (peacemaking). Costs have risen to roughly \$3 b. a year, with the US continuing to pay one third. Today, as well, we may receive some reimbursement for such operations since, unlike the past, we are directly deploying US combat forces in these operations (Macedonia, Somalia).

The world of peacekeeping has changed, but UN and US arrangements for peacekeeping have not. The disorganization surrounding UN operations, the divisions in the US government and the Congress on this subject combine to frustrate our ability to find and justify the funding we are required, by agreement, to provide.

The institution of peacekeeping is broke, and needs to be fixed. It is not enough to argue that peacekeeping is a "good" thing we ought to do, despite the articulate presentations on this issue by UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright. Peacekeeping has no champion in the Executive Branch, no champion in the Congress, and the problems operations encounter internationally are giving them a bad odor among those who must vote the money. Only the diplomats and the liberal support peacekeeping; the rest give it a bye.

If we, as an Administration, are serious about our intention to make our national security policy more multilateral in character, we need to fix this system, before it becomes virtually impossible to raise the funding to support our policies. We need to find champions for peacekeeping in the Executive Branch; we need to encourage fundamental change in the way peacekeeping is organized and funded internationally, and we need to seek champions in the Congress for our efforts. We cannot do this by trying to build "Rube Goldberg" funding devices, month after month, which only have the effect of defeating us, leaving us further behind at the UN, and souring the Congress on the whole subject.

Three institutional features of peacekeeping need to be fixed. They are linked; one can cut into the pie at any point; no one institution is the sole cause of the problem. The United Nations needs fixing: it simply lacks the coherent, efficient planning structure it needs to conduct peacekeeping operations that are so large and numerous that they are overwhelming the institution. The Congress needs to be fixed: at least six

appropriations subcommittees are involved in peacekeeping funding (House and Senate appropriations subcommittees for defense, foreign operations and Commerce, Justice, State, plus, potentially, military construction), and there is no member of any of those committees (possible exception of Sen. Domenici) who is a champion of peacekeeping. Moreover, most members of Congress wish peacekeeping would just go away and others view it (and defense) as "banks" from which the President's domestic investments can be funded.

We can do some things about the UN - the PRD makes a number of very useful suggestions about how to strengthen the UN from an administrative and military point of view. We badly need to proceed as soon as possible, to begin to fix the UN in this area. We recommend ambitious leadership by the US across the range of issues discussed in the PRD. In particular, it is important for the US to take the lead in convening the principal contributors of troops and resources to UN peacekeeping operations to undertake a fundamental restructuring of the UN for this purpose.

We can do little about the organization of the Congress, directly. The authorizing committees (foreign relations/foreign affairs) contain many strong supporters of peacekeeping, but they carry little weight where the financing "rubber hits the road" - the appropriations process. In the appropriations committees we are particularly hamstrung by the even stronger Presidential commitment to reducing the budget deficit and funding domestic investments. Specifically, peacekeeping funds for FY 1994 were cut in the House appropriations subcommittee in order to make room for the President's investments in the Commerce and Justice parts of the subcommittees funding allocation. In other words, by implication, we asked them to do this to our peacekeeping funds.

In addition, the committees contain no champions of peacekeeping. Funding ostensibly comes through the CJS subcommittee, but they are systematically being cut in that subcommittee. The Foreign Operations subcommittee has jurisdiction for voluntary peacekeeping funds, but resents being asked to provide the assessed funding when it is cut by CJS. The Defense subcommittees are especially strapped with our declining defense budget and their allocations were further cut for FY 1994 in large part to make room for the President's budget priorities elsewhere in the appropriations committee. Military construction especially resisted shifting some of their funding to the peacekeeping purpose.

We cannot fix the congressional problem, however, until we fix our own in the Executive Branch. Peacekeeping is an orphan in the Executive Branch, as well. The State Dept. provides the funding to the UN, but not the forces. Peacekeeping responsibilities fall to the IO bureau at State (and, in part, to

USUN), but are not seen as a central part of the State mission. The Defense Department once provided logistics, communications and transportation support, but is now increasingly providing US forces. However, it has not been structured to fund such operations and the services tend to treat peacekeeping as a residual operation, different from and foreign to preparing to "fight and win wars." There is also some resentment that State votes for the missions and provides the assessed funding, but Defense has to provide the forces with little input in the decision to commit.

In addition, the process for deciding on peacekeeping missions in the Executive Branch is broken. All too often, high level groups, regional offices or the USUN get involved in the diplomacy of peacekeeping with minimal consultation with the offices and agencies (IO at State; OMB) that need to be involved in examining the cost and priorities. For example, on June 28, 1993, without any significant consultations outside the high level Bosnia group, State/EUR was prepared to send a cable to US NATO Mission which could have committed the US to a NATO operation in Bosnia costing an estimated \$8.5 b., of which the US share would be \$2.6 b., as assessed by the UN. Timely action by the NSC staff intercepted this cable and held off a commitment to a specific funding strategy the U.S. cannot afford, given its peacekeeping funding problems. Similar patterns of decision-making can be seen with respect to the smaller Haiti operation (1000-1500 people), and potential commitments in Rwanda and in Abkhazia (Georgia). Like a drug addict, we are continually vote for operations that come back to us as bills we cannot (and the Congress will not) pay.

As this process suggests, buried pockets of the USG are busily preparing major commitments with little or no contact with the broader world of budgeting or the Congress, leading to commitments we cannot fulfill. It seems clear that the system in the Executive Branch is broke and needs to be fixed. It is the one element of the system over which we have some control; we need to move swiftly and fundamentally to deal with this problem.

While the current PRD contains much useful and important work, it only goes part of the way to dealing with Executive Branch organizational problems. We need to create a champion in the Executive Branch in order to have champions in the Congress and to exercise our weight in the UN.

Before we go again to the Congressional well, we propose a fundamental, ground-breaking review of the executive branch structure that would deal with the following issues:

- Agency responsibility for providing forces for and funding peacekeeping;

- State structure and organization for peacekeeping, in the framework of our relationship with the UN;
- DoD structures, funding for peacekeeping.
- JCS/military service organization for peacekeeping/peacemaking, including issues of doctrine, training, exercising and operating;
- Intelligence structure for regional conflict and peacekeeping, support for the UN.

Attachment 202/515 of PAB countries