

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

3827

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	4	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	Executive Committee on Peacekeeping (1 page)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)
002. agenda	[Duplicate of 001] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)
003. agenda	[Duplicate of 001] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)
004a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (6 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)
004c. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/02/1993	P3/b(3)
004d. paper	Article 43 Discussion Paper (9 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
005. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/02/1993	P3/b(3)
006a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	Revised JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (5 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (5 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
006d. paper	JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (3 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/03/1993	P3/b(3)
008. paper	JCS Paper for PRD-13: Criteria for US Participation in UN Operations (9 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F

ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

(SVTS)
Meeting of the Executive Committee
on the Peacekeeping PRD
Monday, April 5, 1993, 12:00 P.M.

Chaired by: Richard Clarke

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE/IO

DOUGLAS BENNET	647-9600
GEORGE WARD	647-9600

STATE/SP

JOHANNES BINNENDIGK	647-2372
---------------------	----------

STATE/D/PNR

ANN RICHARD	647-7889
-------------	----------

STATE/T

LYNN DAVIS	736-4517
------------	----------

OSD

MORTON HALPERIN	(703) 697-8101
-----------------	----------------

JCS

ADMIRAL FRANK BOWMAN	(703) 695-6585
COL BATTAGLINI	(703) 695-6585
LTCOL CHARILE ARNOLD	(703) 695-6585
CHRIS KOPANG	(703) 695-6585

OMB

GORDAN ADAMS	x4657
--------------	-------

NSC

SUSAN RICE	x3736
------------	-------

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

001. agenda	Executive Committee on Peacekeeping (1 page)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)
-------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
kc4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. agenda	[Duplicate of 001] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. agenda	[Duplicate of 001] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

1. Chpt 6 forces do not usually
have equipment for Chpt 7.
- Need ON EST.
-

2. Somalia PDD *

3. OPCON → into a country
TACON → into combat
-

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**JCS OPTIONS PAPER FOR PRD-13:
MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Issue IV-B: Command, Control, and Communications. What are the UN's C3 requirements for conventional peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief and what options are there for meeting them? What options are there for what the US could provide, including facilities and hardware, both gratis and as in kind services to create the necessary system?

1. Discussion. Effective Command, Control, and Communications (C3) is essential to the success of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Effective UN C3 requires a well defined Command and Control structure and an in-place C3 architecture that consists of a Command and Control/Information Center at UN Headquarters, point-to-point connectivity from UN Headquarters to field operations and among UN humanitarian organizations, as well as intracountry/intratheater communications for those forces and relief organizations in the field.

2. Evaluative Criteria

- Availability of Funding Sources
- Ease of obtaining UN Support
- Impact on US Military Capability
- Interoperability
- Maintainability

3. Options

- Assist the UN in defining its C3 requirements and in developing a C3 architecture that meets those requirements and that can be put in place "on demand" by commercial sources.
 - Minimal funding impact.
 - UN should support. Provides excellent C3 support without projecting one country's military forces into every operation.
 - No impact on US military capability.
 - Interoperability would be excellent.
 - Maintainability would be excellent.
- Assist the UN in defining its C3 requirements and in developing a C3 architecture that meets all those requirements. Provide access to surplus DOD communications equipment (and training) that can be used in that architecture, and integrate other nations' equipment into the architecture.

UNCLASSIFIED

- Some funding impact based on identification, inventory and delivery of equipment and training.
 - UN may not be enthusiastic about difficulty in effecting a workable C3 system from surplus equipment.
 - Minimal impact to the US military.
 - Interoperability would be exceptionally difficult.
 - Maintainability would be difficult.
- Assist the UN in defining its C3 requirements and in developing a C3 architecture, to include all required capabilities, equipment, and personnel from existing DOD Reserve Component assets.
 - Funding would be significant considering equipment, capabilities, and supporting manpower.
 - UN may be reluctant to insert US forces into every operation (and US may find it politically unacceptable to provide military forces for every operation).
 - Minimal impact to US active duty military capability, but would tie up important reserve assets and manpower that might be needed in a crisis (either domestic or international).
 - Interoperability for US forces would be excellent; however, interoperability with foreign military forces and civilian relief organizations may not be sufficient. Not all required C3 capabilities reside in the reserve force.
 - Maintainability would be excellent.
 - Assist the UN in defining its C3 requirements. Provide a complete, temporary C3 package from existing DOD active duty assets that would deploy at the outset of UN operations and later transition to Reserve Component forces and equipment.
 - Funding would be significant considering equipment, capabilities, and supporting manpower.
 - UN may be reluctant to insert US forces into every operation (and US may find it politically unacceptable to provide military forces for every operation).
 - Significant impact to both active duty and reserve military capability.
 - Interoperability for US forces would be excellent; however, interoperability with foreign military forces and civilian relief organizations may not be sufficient. Not all required C3 capabilities reside in the reserve force.
 - Maintainability would be excellent.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Assist the UN in defining its C3 requirements. Provide a C3 architecture, to include all required capabilities, equipment, and personnel from existing DOD active duty assets.
 - Funding would be significant considering equipment, capabilities, and supporting manpower.
 - UN may be reluctant to insert US forces into every operation (and US may find it politically unacceptable to provide military forces for every operation).
 - Significant impact to US military in terms of loss of operational capability, required manpower to operate and maintain, and cost.
 - Interoperability for US forces would be excellent; however, interoperability with foreign military forces and civilian relief organizations may not be sufficient.
 - Maintainability would be excellent.

4. Recommendation. The first option. Assisting the UN in defining its C3 requirements and in developing a C3 architecture that could be obtained from commercial sources provides an effective, interoperable, and maintainable C3 capability to the UN; would enable the UN to access and use emerging C3 technologies; has no impact on US military capability; and prevents the US from being inserted into every UN operation because of our communications capabilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

**JCS OPTIONS PAPER FOR PRD-13:
MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Issue IV-D: Logistics and Transportation. UN Logistics deficiencies -- what are the deficiencies of UN logistics and lift systems and what are options for improvement, taking into account needs such as speed and interoperability?

1. Discussion

- Logistics functions include transportation, supply, maintenance, medical, engineering, and field services.
- UN peacekeeping operations have no organic logistics system or standard logistics procedures. Traditionally, logistics has been a national responsibility, but many nations may be willing to participate only if trained, equipped, and sustained by a US-driven system.
- UN humanitarian assistance agencies (World Food Program, UNHCR, UNICEF) do have logistic systems and procedures for normal relief programs, although improvements are needed for combined relief/peacekeeping operations.

UN has no directive authority over logistics support by member nations. Voluntary national contributions are usually the only source of military support.

- Forces from participating nations are not structured, prepared, or equipped for out-of-country operations. Most nations do not have the ability to provide support above the brigade level or in "out of sector" operations.
- US is the nation most able to react immediately with worldwide capability, especially for transporting oversize and outsize cargo and operating in an austere logistics environment.
- US is the nation most able to support large-scale logistics operations. However, the current US force structure has many critical logistics capabilities allocated to the reserves. Sufficient logistics forces can be placed in the active component only at the expense of combat, above-the-line forces. Any policy should include force structure--how much and what types of units to keep in the active force, and what percentage of forces are active and reserve.
- UN operations usually require a higher proportion of logistics personnel due to the humanitarian nature of the mission.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Evaluative Criteria

- Impact on US military readiness (assuming current force structure).
- Funding
- Availability of assets
- Ease of obtaining UN support

3. Options

- Propose creation of a UN directorate for plans and current operations manned by multinational military and civilian professionals and responsive to the SYG.
 - No impact on readiness.
 - Minimal increase in annual UN operating budget; could be offset by compensatory reduction.
 - Assets available.
 - UN would be reluctant to accept, based on previous responses from the Field Operations Division.
 - Does not solve management deficiency.
- Encourage use of commercial contracting to maximum extent possible, including pre-negotiated contracts that could be quickly implemented during contingency operations.
 - Would not adversely affect US military readiness since our forces would not be used. Once a funding source has been identified, US should continue policy of offering support for which it has unique capabilities, such as military wide-body aircraft for transport.
 - Theoretically not an increase in funding, but realistically would increase requirement; UN currently tends to solicit free contributions; does not have credibility with contractors due to financial management problems.
 - Readily available.
 - UN might support; contracting staff might need to be increased; UN would prefer to use contributions, especially US.
- Propose establishment of prepositioned UN equipment pools.
 - Impact on readiness could be significant; some excess US equipment available from drawdown could be donated to the pool from the DOD Excess Property Program; commercial off-the-shelf equipment also available. However, there is less excess logistics equipment than combat equipment because logistics units were never fully equipped.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Moderate funding increase in the UN operating budget could occur due to maintenance and procurement (if not contributed by member nations).
 - Readily available through multinational effort.
 - UN would probably accept.
 - Locations and crisis access to those locations are critical considerations.
- Propose creation of generic support force "building blocks" (tables of equipment and organization) for incremental force levels.
 - No impact on readiness.
 - No funds involved.
 - Assets available.
 - UN would support; would enhance responsiveness and operational planning.
4. Recommendation. All options are desirable, listed in decreasing importance. Each is discrete, so they can be implemented individually or in combination.

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (6 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**JCS OPTIONS PAPER FOR PRD 13:
MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Issue IV-E: Training. What options are there for developing an international peacekeeping training system?

1. Discussion: No international system now exists for training peacekeeping forces and humanitarian relief organizations/agencies when deployed conjointly. Each member nation of a peacekeeping force and/or humanitarian relief organization is responsible for training the individuals and units provided.

As noted under Section IV-A, there is no system for linking humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts when the peacekeeping interventions are to assure security and access for relief efforts. Likewise, there is no training program that focuses on improved coordination and effective joint interventions. Increasingly peacekeeping forces and humanitarian assistance are engaged in the same country and must coordinate their efforts. Most recent experiences have shown that peacekeeping forces and humanitarian assistance organizations have very different modes of operation, priorities, spheres of authority, and informational needs. Effective coordination of these two key players requires

- mutual understanding of and appreciation for the different mandates and operating systems;
- clarification of roles and responsibilities;
- agreement on joint procedures and sharing of information.

For purpose of this discussion, a comprehensive training system is defined as having the following: Policy guidance, procedural guidance which provides a training process of requirements definition, planning, execution and evaluation phases. The executable events may include: educational curriculum, classroom training, seminar and wargaming events, computer assisted Command Post Exercises (CPX) and Field Training Exercises (FTX). Facilities include classrooms and maneuver areas appropriate to the events required.

2. Evaluative Criteria

- Funding sources (costs)
- UN support
- Impact on US force combat capability

UNCLASSIFIED

3. Options

- OPTION 1: - UN Security Council (UNSC) led comprehensive review of multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance requirements. Once defined by the UN, governments with required capabilities are responsible for providing a multinational training program meeting the defined requirements. For example: The US proposed, in the Jan 93 SECSTATE to UN message, the creation of a United Nations Plans and Current Operations directorate with an Information Center. Therefore, the US would develop the training program for multinational members of the "Current Plans" directorate, and members of the proposed Information Center.

- Funding sources (Cost) - Shared by members
- UN support - Moderate
- Impact on US force capability - Dependent upon capability voids. Minimal to moderate

- Option 2: UNSC led comprehensive review of multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance requirements. Once defined, UN will lead in developing a comprehensive training program.

- Funding sources (Cost)- Shared by members
- UN support - Poor
- Impact on US force capability - Minimal

- Option 3: The United States will offer to chair a UNSC led review of multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance requirements. Once these requirements are identified, the US will assist in developing a training requirements package that can be used by participating member nations.

- Funding sources (Cost) - Shared by members
- UN support - Strong
- Impact on US force capability - minimal to moderate

RECOMMENDATION: Option 3.

Rationale: This option places responsibility for developing UN peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance requirements with a US led effort, and facilitates unity of effort and management in the development and execution of UN specific training. All members share the costs, and play a part in developing the UN training package. The US will play a major role in developing the training program, identifying ways to meet the training requirements that come out of the UN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

training system. Once requirements are defined, the US can assess how it can best utilize its unique capabilities, emphasizing the use of existing forces, equipment and facilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/02/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'93 MAR 33 10:59

IB

S/S #

-C-

MESSAGE NO. 096214 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2+9
FROM: ROBERT LOFTIS 10/UNP 647-6424 4808
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRD-13. ARTICLE 43 DISCUSSION PAPER

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Susan Ries</u>	<u>395-3736</u>	<u>302</u>
<u>OMB</u>	<u>GORDON ADAMS</u>	<u>395-4560</u>	<u>208</u>
<u>S/S-5/UN</u>	<u>Col. TIM BATEAGLINI</u>	<u>695-1322</u>	<u>25977</u>
<u>OSD/ISA/CA</u>	<u>MARE PALOVITZ</u>	<u>695-3159</u>	<u>48868</u> [004c]

(b)(3)

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: _____

[Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KOE Date: 02/17/00

2012-0659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. paper	Article 43 Discussion Paper (9 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/02/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]


WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Take to Rice
Rm 302

'93 MAR 33 P3:42

B

S/S #



MESSAGE NO. 096158 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages C+13

FROM: ROBERT LOFTIS IO/LNP 647-6424 4808
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRD-13; Sections V.A, VIIA, VII D 4/2/93
FOR 4/5 TELECONFERENCES

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Susan Rice</u>	<u>395-3736</u>	<u>302</u>
<u>DMB</u>	<u>GORDON ADAMS</u>	<u>395-4580</u>	<u>208</u>
<u>IS/J-SUN</u>	<u>Col Jim Battaglini</u>	<u>695-1322</u>	<u>28977</u>
<u>USD/ISA/GA</u>	<u>MADE. Pamela Maria Mann</u>	<u>100-2-22</u>	<u>100-2-22</u> [005]

(b)(3)

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: URGENT. PLEASE NOTIFY IMMEDIATELY

reviewed by VSC Ann drc.

S/S Officer: [Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: WDE Date: 08/17/17
2012-0659-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

V. MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND U.S. PARTICIPATION

- A. The UN Charter How do the authorities under Chapter VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter apply to the new challenges and environments for multilateral peacekeeping operations? Does the UN Participation Act need to be modified?

Discussion

In a sense, peacekeeping was invented to fill a need not foreseen when the UN Charter was drafted. The Charter does not specifically describe peacekeeping activities which have been undertaken over the past 40 years. However, the Charter is flexible and general enough to allow for a more creative, forward-leaning peacekeeping policy by the United Nations and regional bodies.

"Traditional" peacekeeping operations, where all sides assent to the deployment, will continue to have value. The consent of the parties to the operation implies a willingness on their part to accept peacefully the results of the UN intervention. As the use of force is not expressly authorized except for Chapter VII operations, these traditional operations allow for a smaller scale of operations, which in turn will be less expensive than operations contemplated under Chapter VII.

A new factor in the current international environment is the greater willingness of the Security Council and the UN Secretariat to shift from these traditional peacekeeping operations into more aggressive proactive Chapter VII activities or to intervene from the outset in cases requiring a Chapter VII type of mandate due to the nature of an on-going conflict while efforts to achieve peace are pursued.

Current trends, however, point to a greater reliance on the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII from the beginning of an operation. Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council, in response to threats to international peace or acts of aggression, to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" if non-military means such as embargoes or severing of diplomatic relations are insufficient. As originally envisioned, this authority was to be used in response to such actions as the North Korean invasion of South Korea. It is very robust, however, and allows for a very broad range of actions by the Security Council, from the interposition of troops between warring parties to enforce a ceasefire to the use of force to compel compliance with UNSC Resolutions, as happened during the Gulf War.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/17/17
2012-0689-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The key factor in the utilization of Chapter VII will be the willingness of the member states of the United Nations to use force in the face of opposition from the warring parties, and to commit their forces for such operations directly under UN command (as in UNOSOM II) or authorized by the UN (as in Operation Desert Storm and UNITAF). Application of Article 43 -- as one option available -- in this context will be discussed more fully in Section V(B); however, there seems to be little interest among nations with militaries of any value to place their forces under UN command on anything but a case-by-case basis. Article 43, although available, has not been implemented as a means of providing forces. Currently, then, each potential use of Article VII authority, therefore, will require energizing the international community to contribute forces.

The use of regional organizations, as envisioned in Chapter VIII of the Charter, offers the opportunity to relieve the UN of substantial financial burdens and to avert the danger of overwhelming the Council with a myriad of crises. As noted in Section III, however, most regional organizations are ill-equipped and ill-financed to take on a major peacekeeping role. Moreover, the Security Council should not give authorization to regional organizations to operate in the name of the UN without careful vetting of the purposes and plans of the operation and some sort of political oversight. Moscow should not be given **carte blanche**, for example, to use CIS peacekeepers to reestablish its control over the former Soviet Union.

Although flexible, the UN Participation Act (UNPA) places limits on U.S. flexibility to participate in U.N. and other peacekeeping activities, for example by limiting to 1000 the number of military personnel that may be detailed to the UN to support traditional peacekeeping activities, with no provision for peacekeeping activities under Chapter VII involving the use of force. Greater flexibility could be facilitated by certain revisions of the authorities found in the UNPA. Options for doing so are outlined in Section VI (D).

Drafted: IO/UNP: RGLoftis
SEUNPKO 14 3/31/93 647-6424
Cleared: IO: GWard
IO/USUN: DScheffer
L/UNA: BRashkow
PM/P: PPetrihos
S/P: LKeene

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

Department of State Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

By

KDE

NARA, Date

02/17/17

2012-0659-F

- VI. A. Organization OSD, JCS, STATE, AID, and the IC should describe how they are structured to support multilateral peacekeeping and examine options for improving their existing structures. They should also propose options for an interagency structure for policy development and implementation in these areas.

Current and Proposed Structure

Within the State Department, responsibility for support to UN peacekeeping and emergency overseas humanitarian relief is shared among the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), the Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM), the Bureau of Refugee Programs (RP), and the relevant regional bureaus.

IO has the lead for action taken in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA) regarding the establishment and financing/management of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief activities, and for representing the U.S. with the UN and its agencies in the implementation of such activities. Currently, the Office of UN Political Affairs (IO/UNP) has responsibility for UNSC action on establishing peacekeeping activities and the Office of UN System Administration (IO/S) is responsible for UNGA actions on the financing and management of such activities. The Office of Social and Refugee Affairs (IO/SR) takes the lead on emergency overseas humanitarian assistance activities. Other IO offices become involved to the extent the UN agencies for which they are responsible have a role in a specific activity.

In accordance with the Secretary's reorganization plan, IO is in the process of creating an Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief which will be responsible for policy formulation and oversight of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and coordination with other USG agencies.

Within PM, the Office of International Security Operations (PM/ISO) is responsible for coordinating with OSD and the Joint Staff all U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping operations and all DoD humanitarian assistance activities. Policy issues vis-a-vis peacekeeping in general are currently handled by the Office of Policy Analysis (PM/P). The Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance (PM/DRSA) prepares that part of the security assistance budget covering non-assessed peacekeeping activities and prepares requests for emergency funding or provision of equipment under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).

RP has the lead for US migration and refugee policy and State Department voluntary contributions to the major international humanitarian organizations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The various geographic bureaus play roles when a peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operation involves a country or organization within their region.

For non-UN peacekeeping activities, the relevant geographic bureau takes the lead. The Office of European Security and Political Affairs (EUR/RPM), within the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, is responsible for NATO, NACC, WEU, and CSCE peacekeeping activities. The Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States (USOAS), within the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, is responsible for any possible OAS peacekeeping or related activity. Similarly, the Africa Bureau is responsible for Organization of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping.

The Deputy Secretary's Office for Policy and Resources (D/P&R) is responsible for budgetary and resource implications of U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping operations.

Interagency Structure

One perhaps unintended benefit of the PRD process has been to bring together most of the interagency players on peacekeeping policy. The "Executive Committee" could be reconstituted at the same level of representation, into a new "Peacekeeping Committee." The new Committee, which would meet as required, would be responsible for overseeing implementation of the recommendations which follow from the PRD-13, as well as further development and refinement of peacekeeping policy. In addition, the Committee would be responsible for vetting requests for U.S. participation in or other support of UN and regional peacekeeping operations and coordinating a USG response. The Committee would seek to resolve interagency disagreements before they reach the Deputies Committee. It might be useful to have off-the-record "brainstorming" sessions from time to time with outside experts. The Committee would delegate to the working levels or to subcommittees drafting and coordinating responsibilities.

5

April 2, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC -13

Section VI. D. of PRD 13 (entitled "Legislation") asks the following questions:

What options are there for amending the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 and other legislation related to multilateral peacekeeping? Would any of the options suggested in this study require such amendment?

These issues have been addressed by the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office in consultation with the DOD General Counsel Office, and the Chairman's Legal Adviser's Office ("JCS"), and consolidates all relevant views. The following response includes ideas for legislative initiatives even though some may only be worth considering in the long term as they are currently controversial and may already be the subject of high-level intra-agency review, e.g., the principle that DOD will not in certain cases seek direct UN reimbursement and State can seek a credit to the relevant U.S. peacekeeping assessment. Even though the discussion does not provide recommendations on certain of these ideas, it seeks to provide a full range of ideas which could potentially serve Executive branch interests in the broadest manner possible despite particular agency interests.

GENERAL

U.S. participation in recent UN operations has been complicated by existing restrictions in the United Nations Participation Act. For example, Section 7 of the Act specifically precludes use of the act as the authorization for U.S. participation in "peace-enforcing" (as opposed to traditional "peacekeeping") efforts. There are other legally sufficient independent constitutional and statutory authorities which the Executive branch has successfully relied upon to provide support for "peace-enforcing" efforts (and which must not be prejudiced). There have, however, been expressions of Congressional interest in having more specific authority for U.S. involvement in such efforts. Expansion of the UN Participation Act may be desirable due to its particularly useful breadth and authorization to provide support "notwithstanding any other provision of law." A comparable authority to provide support to competent regional organizations (e.g., CSCE) for non-UN peacekeeping operations may also be desirable.

Furthermore, U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping has generally been hampered by insufficient and inflexible funding for U.S. assessed and voluntary peacekeeping contributions to multilateral efforts and by failure to identify specific sources of financing for in-kind

- 2 -

contributions of goods and services provided directly by DOD. U.S. participation could also be enhanced by additional authorities for DoD to enter into cross-servicing and other reimbursement agreements with the UN or competent regional organizations to support peacekeeping/peace-enforcing operations.

Several fairly simple legislative initiatives summarized and discussed below could be advanced to resolve these problems by authorizing:

- (1) an expansion of existing authorities for U.S. participation in UN operations to supplement existing constitutional and statutory authorities and creation of a comparable authority to provide support to competent regional organizations for non-UN-peacekeeping operations; and
- (2) budgetary and funding mechanisms which would provide flexibility in meeting financial responsibilities for peacekeeping.
- (3) DoD's entry into cross-servicing and other reimbursement agreements with the UN or regional organizations for providing support to UN peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations and non-UN peacekeeping operations.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

I. UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT (UNPA) AND COMPARABLE AUTHORIZATION FOR REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN NON-UN PEACEKEEPING

- ✓ A. Extend section 7 authorization for the provision of DOD support (currently limited to traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping operations) to Chapter VII "peace-enforcing" operations. Clarify in legislative history that this authority supplements and does not derogate from President's independent constitutional authorities to deploy U.S. troops for any peacekeeping/peace-enforcing operations.
- ✓ B. Delete entirely ceiling on authority for detailed DOD personnel, or alternatively, if Congress desires a limit, seek to raise it, e.g., from 1000 to 15,000) New number should allow us several operations at once.
- C. Delete limitation of detailed DoD personnel involvement to "non-combat" support.
- ✓ D. Provide new specific authority for deployment of (non-detailed) combat units (possibly up to 50,000) to implement UNSC decisions under Chapter VII.

- 3 -

- E. Provide new authority comparable to the UNPA to support competent regional organizations involved in non-UN peacekeeping.

II. FUNDING AUTHORIZATIONS AND ISSUES

- A. Create a State Peacekeeping Contingency Fund to supplement other peacekeeping appropriations by authorizing use of "no year" money for unanticipated needs for assessed and voluntary contributions.
- ✓ B. Resolve the issue of situations in which DoD will be reimbursed by the UN or State will seek a credit against the U.S. assessment.
- C. New Interagency Transfer Authorities, as a longer term option, to permit the transfer in exigent circumstances from DOD to State and vice versa, where funds of requesting agency are insufficient, and upon agreement of both Secretaries. (OSD/GC and JCS oppose this idea at this time.) (State has recommended that we would not pursue this authority at this time if it is decided that the DoD peacekeeping account will be used so as to allow us to seek a credit to the CIPA account.)

III. DOD AGREEMENT AUTHORIZATIONS

- A. Expand existing authorization for DoD to conclude cross-servicing agreements to support contingency operations for providing support to UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations and other non-UN peacekeeping operations.
- B. Provide new authorization for DoD to enter into other agreements allowing DoD to provide goods and services on a reimbursable basis.

DISCUSSION: I. UNPA

Amendments to the UNPA could give the U.S. much greater flexibility in providing support to the UN. Currently, section 7 of the UNPA authorizes the provision of unlimited DoD facilities, services and other assistance in support of activities directed toward the peaceful settlement of disputes, i.e., traditional UN peacekeeping activities authorized by Chapter VI of the UN Charter, but specifically precludes the act's use for supporting "peace-enforcing" UN activities "involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter . . ." It also imposes a worldwide limit of 1000 on the number of DOD personnel who can be detailed in a "non-combat" role to the UN. This authority is in addition to the President's independent constitutional authority to deploy U.S. armed forces for appropriate purposes including peacekeeping and

- 4 -

peace-enforcing. In fact, this constitutional authority has been relied upon for U.S. support in Somalia and Bosnia.

✓ Amending the act would be necessary in order to use it as legal authority for the provision of support to any UN operation performing Chapter VII peace-enforcing activities. This expansion would be particularly useful since the UNPA authorizes support "notwithstanding any other provision of law", such as foreign assistance prohibitions. It would also be useful since some in Congress would prefer the Executive be authorized specifically to deploy U.S. troops and not rely on the President's broad constitutional authorities in this respect.

✓ A. Two amendments to the UNPA would (1) authorize the provision of DOD support for UN operations under Chapter VII of the Charter in which armed force may be used and for those involving the provision of humanitarian relief (for which currently the UNPA does not expressly authorize support); (2) remove altogether or alternatively increase the current limit on the number of armed forces personnel that may be detailed for noncombat functions (from the current 1000 to 10,000 or 15,000 per operation). DoD/GC and JCS Legal believe that simply raising the ceiling on DoD personnel that may be detailed for "non combatant" support does not resolve the fundamental issue as to whether U.S. forces participating in a Chapter VII action are inherently involved in a "combat" role. Accordingly, they recommend, along with either amendment to the ceiling, a corresponding deletion of the "non-combatant" limitation be sought. These amendments would give us a powerful tool for meeting anticipated peace enforcement challenges in Somalia, Bosnia and elsewhere. In seeking any of these amendments, we would need to have clear statements in the legislative history that the President's constitutional authorities to deploy troops remain intact and that the UNPA is a more specific supplementary authority which does not affect use of those constitutional authorities.

✓ -- Subject to this qualification, it is recommended that these amendments be pursued. Congressional objection to expanding the UNPA to Chapter VII may be encountered, however, and is likely to prompt additional amendments to impose War Powers-type requirements for reports when U.S. troops are deployed for Chapter VII peacekeeping activities. If such requirements conform to current War Powers requirements, such amendments may be tolerable.

✓ B. Deleting the "noncombat" restriction on functions for which troops can be detailed may be a desirable general enhancement of the Executive's flexibility. Such a change would be likely, however, to provoke strong Congressional objection, particularly since the troops performing this role would be detailed and therefore under UN command. Furthermore, there appears to be a question within the Executive Branch whether U.S. troops would ever be detailed to the UN now or in

- 5 -

the foreseeable future in a direct combat role (as opposed to combat-equipped in a logistics/support role).

X -- It is recommended that this amendment be pursued at this time.

C. A similarly controversial, but very useful amendment, would be one that, like the amendment described immediately above, would authorize the use of U.S. troops in a combat role but without being detailed to the UN. Such new specific authority would provide for the President to deploy combat units to implement decisions under Chapter VII; such deployments would be under US command. There would probably be a need to include some limit on the number of personnel deployed worldwide under this authority, as well as some procedure for consultation and reporting to Congress.

There may be Congressional interest in providing such specific authority in light of recent informal expressions of concern in some Congressional quarters over the Executive Branch's reliance on the President's broad constitutional authorities for such deployments and its alleged disregard for the never-relied upon section 6 of the UNPA. Section 6 authorizes the President to negotiate agreements (which must be approved by an act of Congress) contemplated by Article 43 of the Charter with the UN. This article provides for member States to make available pursuant to a special agreement their troops to the Security Council on its call for Chapter VII purposes. No such special agreements have ever been concluded under Article 43.

✓ State has not viewed Article 43 or section 6 as the exclusive means for providing troops to the UN for a Chapter VII operation. DoD/GC and JCS/Legal concur in this view but believe that Section 6 of the UNPA could be regarded as the exclusive mechanism for providing troops under the UNPA. They therefore believe that, if Section 7 is amended for a Chapter VII operation, Section 6 of the UNPA should be deleted.

no. X X

-- It is recommended that this option be informally discussed with key members of Congress or staff on a preliminary basis before deciding whether to promote it.

Finally, it would be useful to secure new legislative authority comparable to the UNPA to provide support to competent regional organizations for non-UN peacekeeping operations.

-- It is recommended that this option be pursued.

DISCUSSION: II. FUNDING AUTHORIZATIONS

A. Peacekeeping Contingency Fund at State.

The normal budget process of authorizing and appropriating funds a year or two in advance has proven inadequate to deal

- 6 -

with the surge in international peacekeeping and related activities. In each of fiscal years 1991 - 1993, the U.S. has been faced with shortfalls in peacekeeping funding due to unanticipated needs.

To minimize the need to resort to supplemental appropriations every year (a time-consuming and uncertain process), a provision is being proposed in the President's budget that would, if enacted, appropriate \$175,000,000 in "no-year," contingency funds to supplement other peacekeeping appropriations. This appropriation would be part of the funds appropriated for the State "CIPA" account (traditionally for assessed peacekeeping).

The \$175,000,000 could be used to meet unanticipated needs for assessed and voluntary contributions to international peacekeeping and other activities to restore or maintain international peace and security (including related humanitarian relief). (We have expanded the formulation of covered activities beyond "international peacekeeping activities" to ensure that support is authorized not only for traditional "peacekeeping" activities, but also for "peace-enforcing" or "peace-making" activities, in addition to related humanitarian relief.) Needs would be "unanticipated" if they were simply not foreseen at the time the Department's budget was prepared.

B. DoD Reimbursement or State Credits Against the U.S.
Assessment: Sharing Financial Responsibility

DoD proposed a new account (in fact, a transfer authority, as opposed to an appropriation) within DoD's budget to finance on-going and new peacekeeping* initiatives. Specifically, appropriations to such an account will be used to finance in-kind contributions of goods and services DoD makes to the UN and other international organizations and arrangements for peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian purposes. Currently, when DoD provides goods and services under the UNPA and pursuant to Foreign Assistance Act "drawdown" authorities, the appropriate appropriations account within DoD's budget is charged -- typically, UNPA support is charged to the O & M accounts of the appropriate branch of the armed services.

Since State also has separate appropriations for peacekeeping in the CIPA and PKO accounts, the issue arises again as to the situations in which DoD will seek reimbursement

*It would be useful if the Executive branch takes the position generally that "peacekeeping" should be broadly construed to include other activities directed to the restoration or maintenance of international peace and security including humanitarian relief incident to such operations. This latter point need not be made explicit in legislation.

from the UN, or alternatively, will not, and State will instead seek a credit against its UN assessment. DoD is developing its position on this issue at this time.

-- OSD/GC believes that in the event a decision is made to allow State to seek such a credit, clarification of State's authority to credit the CIPA account should be sought. The Legal Adviser's Office disagrees with this latter proposal since GAO attorneys already concurred over one year ago that CIPA can be legally augmented in this manner and because seeking clarification could call into question the legality of past practice in this regard. JCS/Legal continues to believe that this practice constitutes an illegal augmentation of CIPA, and cites as evidence that it has only found one explicit statutory authority, section 630 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), for crediting reimbursement provided by an international organization for details of USG personnel.

Enactment of the contemplated authorization may require a partial repeal and amendment of the newly enacted section 403 of Title 10, which now provides general authority for and restrictions on the furnishing of peacekeeping assistance by the Secretary of Defense.

C. New Transfer Authorities *long term*

Another option which may be worthy of consideration in the long term to enhance Executive Branch flexibility in cases of urgent peacekeeping need would be an interagency transfer authority. Depending on how the peacekeeping burden is shared in the future by State and DOD's respective budgets, it may be worthwhile to propose legislation providing a new supplementary authority for transferring funds (as agreed upon by the Secretaries of Defense and State) in exigent circumstances from DOD to State where other State funds available for these purposes are insufficient. The authority could be structured as a reciprocal or two-way authority.

Enactment should be would be accompanied by the repeal of section 403 of Title 10.

X | -- State has recommended that we not pursue this at this time. OSD/GC and JCS also oppose such an authority as unnecessary and unjustifiable to the Congress.

D.(1) Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (10 U.S.C. 2341 et seq.)

A. Section 2342 of Title 10 (DoD cross-servicing authority) could be amended (i.e., expanded) to authorize DoD to enter into agreements with the United Nations to authorize the provision of logistic support, supplies, and services to UN Forces during contingency/peacekeeping operations.

B. Section 2347 of Title 10 (limitations on amounts that DoD may obligate or accrue) could be amended to authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive funding restrictions upon

- 8 -

certification that U.S. Forces are involved in, or will shortly become involved in, a contingency operation. Such waiver would be effective for the purpose and duration of that operation.

C. Section 2350 of Title 10 (definitions) could be amended by adding definitions of the terms "contingency operation" (same as that currently found at 10 U.S.C. 101(47)), and "transfer" (to include sale and temporary provision (e.g., lease or loan) of logistic support, supplies, and services). The current definition of "logistic support, supplies and services" could be amended to include a specific reference to "airlift" and defined as "general purpose vehicles and other items of military equipment not designated as part of the United States Munitions List."

X || -- These proposals are likely to be non-controversial, and should be pursued.

(2) New Authority for DoD TO Transfer Commodities and Services to Allied Countries Participating in Contingency Operations

New legislation could authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer commodities and services, on a reimbursable basis, to allied countries participating in combined or coordinated contingency operations with U.S. Forces. Commodities and services that could be transferred under this authority would include the same spectrum of support currently transferable under section 607 of the FAA. Such support would ordinarily be on a reimbursable basis. Reimbursements received would be credited back to the currently available appropriation concerned and would be available for expenditure by the service involved. In circumstances where the Secretary of Defense has determined it to be in the national interest, waiver of reimbursement would be authorized.

--Congressional reaction to this proposal is uncertain. The authority may be consider duplicative of Section 607 of the FAA. Thus informal consultations with key members of Congress or staff are advisable before promoting this option.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F

ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. paper	Revised JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (5 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. paper	JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (5 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

02 APR 93

**JCS OPTIONS PAPER FOR PRD-13:
MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Issue VI-B: Training. What are options for improving US military training for multilateral peacekeeping operations?

1. Discussion: Training US forces in peacekeeping operations has been minimal to date, due primarily to US policy of providing only "mission observers" rather than "US peacekeeping troop units." With a change in US policy regarding the use of US forces as peacekeeping troop units, what options are available to provide US forces trained in peacekeeping operations?

2. Evaluative Criteria:

- Funding sources (costs)
- UN support
- Impact on US force capability

3. Options

- Option 1: Provide a dedicated US force which is specifically trained to conduct peacekeeping operations.

- Funding sources - Minimal
- UN support - High
- Impact on US force capability - Reduced by capability of force identified.

- Option 2: Assign proponentcy to a single command for developing a joint and combined peacekeeping training program for its assigned forces and for use by other commands having peacekeeping responsibilities. This command, and others, would conduct joint training and combined training exercises with foreign units. In conjunction with this, develop a center of excellence for peacekeeping. Center would develop training programs to include education curriculum and publications, seminar and wargames, computer supported CPXs and FTXs. These products would be available to other commands, the Services, and UN member states. Center staffing would ideally be augmented by member nation military officers who have been trained at one of a designated number of respected military staff schools throughout the world and specifically chosen for this assignment.

- Funding sources - Moderate
- UN support - High
- Impact on US force capability - Minimal to Moderate

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Option 3: All US personnel and forces will be given training for the conduct of UN peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations. Prior to participation in any specific operation, the forces designated will undergo training. This training package should include, seminars, computer simulations and CPXs.

- Funding sources - Minimal
- UN support - High
- Impact on US force capability - Minimal

- Option 4: Identify units of the US Armed forces with capabilities meeting requirements of peacekeeping operations. Once identified, tailored training program(s) will be developed with the objective of allowing rapid integration of these forces into multinational peacekeeping forces.

- Funding sources - Minimal
- UN support - Neutral
- Impact on US force capability - Moderate

- Option 5: Designate US force(s) to a habitual relationship with the UN with peacekeeping as one of its contingency missions. Once designated, this organization(s) will conduct training up to and including combined operations with foreign units that it may be required to operate with. This organization(s) will retain its warfighting structure, but may be augmented by a UN specific element.

- Funding sources - Moderate
- UN support - High
- Impact on US force capability - Minimal to Moderate

- Option 6: Develop plans and training programs which cover all aspects of joint military-civilian operations in interventions deployed to provide security and assistance for humanitarian assistance programs. This will cover the range of requirements from simply understanding how International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) function to the much more complex joint operations where strategic, logistic and staffing actions require close coordination.

- Funding sources - Moderate
- UN support - High
- Impact on US force capability - Minimal
- USG Interagency coordination - High

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4. Recommendation: Option 2. This option best fills requirement for a peacekeeping training program for US forces. Note, however, that AID considers option 6 an integral part of all options. Integrated planning to consider political, military and humanitarian factors for all operations will be necessary to ensure all conditions are established to achieve success.

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. paper	JCS Options Paper for PRD-13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (3 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

1993

LEGISLATE Report for the 103rd Congress

Thu, April 1, 1993 12:08pm (EST)

BILL TEXT Report for S.J.R.65

As introduced in the Senate, March 16, 1993

Mandi
Sausman

Eric

S.J.R.65 As introduced in the Senate, March 16, 1993

103d CONGRESS
1st Session

S. J. RES. 65

Establishing a commission to study the creation of a standing international
military force under the United Nations Charter.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 16 (legislative day, March 3), 1993

Mr. Boren introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Establishing a commission to study the creation of a standing international
military force under the United Nations Charter.Whereas the end of the Cold War allows the United States to share the
burden of maintaining collective security;Whereas the role of the United Nations has accordingly expanded in recent
years;Whereas under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary
General is authorized to negotiate agreements for the creation of a
multinational standing military force, to be used for peacekeeping and peace
enforcement;

LEGISLATIVE Report

Page 2

April 1, 1993

Whereas the United States should take a leadership role in the creation of a multinational peacekeeping force, so that the burdens of maintaining international security are more equitably shared;

Whereas the President, the Secretary of State, the Ambassador to the United Nations, and the Director of Central Intelligence have already articulated support for the creation of a United Nations Rapid Deployment Force similar to the forces contemplated under Article 43; and

Whereas there remain many unresolved questions about how the United States would implement an agreement to participate in an Article 43 force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

There is established the "Commission on United States Participation in a Permanent United Nations Peacekeeping Force" (hereafter in this joint resolution referred to as the "Commission").

SEC. 2. COMPOSITION.

(a) In General.--The Commission shall be composed of 14 members, as follows:

(1) The Secretary of Defense or designee.

(2) The Secretary of State or designee.

(3) The Director of Central Intelligence or designee.

(4) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or designee.

(5) The Permanent Representatives of the United States to the United Nations or designee.

(6) Three members appointed by the President from among individuals in the private sector having expertise in international peacekeeping activities.

(7) Three Members of the House of Representatives, of whom two shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House and one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader, or their designees.

(8) Three Members of the Senate appointed by the President pro tempore, of whom two shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the Majority Leader and one shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the Minority Leader, or their designees.

LEGI-SLATE Report

Page 3

April 1, 1993

(b) Chair.--The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or designee shall serve as Chair of the Commission.

(c) Period of Appointment; Vacancies.--Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(d) Initial Meeting.--No later than 10 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, the Commission shall hold its first meeting.

(e) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman.

(f) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold hearings.

SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

The Commission shall study, and make recommendations regarding, the steps that are necessary for the United States to participate in the creation of a standing international military force under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

SEC. 4. REPORT.

Not later than 120 days after the first meeting held by the Commission, the Commission shall submit a report to Congress on its findings and recommendations, including recommendations on the following issues: cost, military mission, logistics, intelligence sharing, training, equipment, and war powers and other Constitutional issues.

SEC. 5. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.

(a) Hearings.--The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(b) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. Upon request of the Chairman of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.

(c) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

SEC. 6. COMMISSION PERSONNEL MATTERS.

(a) Travel Expenses.--The members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.

(b) Staff.--

(1) In general.--The Chairman of the Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. The employment of an executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission.

(2) Compensation.--The Chairman of the Commission may fix the compensation of the executive director and other personnel without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

(c) Detail of Government Employees.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

(d) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services.--The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals which do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

SEC. 7. TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION.

The Commission shall terminate 10 days after the date on which the Commission submits its report under section 4.

SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1994 to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(b) Availability.--Any sums appropriated under the authorization contained in this section shall remain available, without fiscal year limitation, until expended.

March 16, 1993

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

S2953

IV-B capped entitlement funds would be provided for comprehensive substance abuse prevention and treatment programs for pregnant women, mothers and their children. Funds would also support the child care, transportation, home visiting, nutrition, and counseling services essential for effective treatment.

Improve foster care and adoption services for abused and neglected children.

An increasing number of children who have been severely abused, neglected, abandoned or orphaned are in need of the support and treatment that family foster care, kinship care, group care, residential services, or adoption can provide. Yet while over 400,000 children now live in out-of-home care, only about half are eligible for federal support or assistance, and little help is provided to caregivers. The legislation would make numerous improvements in the Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance (and Independent Living) program to assure additional support for children, and provide respite care and other assistance to foster and adoptive parents.

Improve child welfare training, coordination, data collection, and research efforts.

The child welfare system has been overwhelmed and seriously damaged by skyrocketing caseloads and meager federal support. The legislation would support efforts to strengthen child welfare training; demonstrate innovative services; improve research, evaluation, and data collection; and improve the overall coordination and delivery of child welfare services.

Promote state and local flexibility and public-private partnerships.

The legislation would provide states with broad flexibility in the use of increased federal support and assistance, while assuring overall accountability. In addition, the legislation fully supports a strong partnership between public agencies and private non-profit providers.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, we are all familiar with the African proverb "It takes a village to raise a child." And certainly we are all a critical part of the larger community—the village—which is raising our children.

And, while the village is terribly important, I think each and every one of us would agree that the main responsibility for the cultivation of character and personality, and of bringing a child from infancy to maturity, rests with the parents of the child rather than the village.

I have fought hard for programs and policies which benefit families in need throughout my 20-year career in public service. While Governor of Missouri, I fought hard to expand access to prenatal care for low-income pregnant women, and for the WIC Program. I also pushed hard for the Parents as Teachers Program, which we finally got done in my last year. The program now provides guidance to over 100,000 Missouri parents of children from birth to 3. I also implement a special needs adoption campaign.

Since coming to the Senate, I have fought hard to provide Federal seed money to Parents as Teachers Programs throughout the country. I ought to be sure that the needs of latchkey children were taken into account during the child care debate. And most recently I teamed up with Sen-

ator DODD in providing a workable family and medical leave compromise.

And the reason that I have fought hard for programs and policies which strengthen the family unit is that I believe a great conservative case can be made for each of the above programs: strengthening and preserving families. Certainly many of the problems facing society today can be attributed to the weakening of the American family.

We are living in a society which glamorizes violence and promiscuous sex, in which children must go to schools which resemble war zones rather than places of learning, in which younger and younger teenagers become pregnant at an ever-increasing rate, and in which almost all children spend less time with their parents than ever before.

Some great thinkers have concluded that we are facing a spiritual deficit greater than any material deficit. And I believe this may be true. If it is true, it is something that Government can't fix.

But I am here today because there are plenty of things that Government can do to reinforce the natural bonds between parents and children, and to strengthen and preserve the family unit.

It is in the interest of all of us—of any political party or no political party—to keep families strong. We have a unique opportunity to forge a bipartisan consensus on children and family issues in this Congress. We have just enacted a family leave law—about 40 days ago. I plan to continue to build bipartisan momentum for family issues, much like we did for family leave. Today Senator ROCKEFELLER and I and several others are introducing the child protection reform bill [CFPR].

This bill will provide additional funds for title IV-B of the Social Security Act, which funds innovative alternatives to foster care for children and families in crisis situations. We spend billions of dollars per year placing children outside their homes and families in foster care. In cases of extreme abuse and neglect, this is necessary. However, often the family is simply facing a crisis too big to handle on its own: loss of a job; illness; inadequate housing or homelessness, or a lack of parenting skills. In these cases it makes far more sense to do what Missouri is doing: family preservation services. The family in crisis is given 1 to 2 months of intensive counseling and assistance, and we in Missouri have found that in 85 percent of cases, this is enough to keep the family together.

We have a number of success stories in Missouri which show the value of the program. A single mother named Linda and her family were referred for family preservation services at a time when her children were at risk of being removed from the home due to unsafe living conditions. The roof over the kitchen was falling in. A pole was used to keep the major structural beams from collapsing. The condition on the

home was also causing health problems for the children. Linda's ex-husband owned the house and refused to make any repairs. The family's income came from AFDC. Linda wasn't able to accumulate enough money to move into a different home.

The family preservation specialist was able to help Linda locate new housing through HUD. The specialist assisted Linda in negotiating a payment schedule for the rental deposit with her new landlord. Once Linda and her children were in their new home Linda felt more independent and in better control of her situation. Thus one family was able to avoid the emotional pain of being split up, and the State of Missouri saved a great deal in averted foster care costs.

Missouri now offers family preservation to about one-third of its families who are threatened with their children being taken away. My State has a goal of serving one-half of its families in this way.

The only way Missouri will be able to do this is if we pass this legislation providing additional funds for title IV-B.

This bill would also provide additional funding for desperately needed substance abuse prevention and treatment services for pregnant women and young mothers. You in the child welfare community know better than anyone that one of the main reasons for increased abuse and neglect over the decade has been crack cocaine. This bill would provide funding for treatment, as well as for the child care, transportation, and home visiting services necessary for effective treatment.

Our hearts go out to all young children in need. But I believe we must pay more attention to young children who are in danger of losing what is to them even more precious than food, shelter or health care: their families.

I urge my colleagues' support of this measure.

By Mr. BOREN:

S.J. Res. 85. Joint resolution establishing a commission to study the creation of a standing international military force under the United Nations Charter; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE COMMISSION ACT OF 1993

Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I am introducing today a joint resolution relating to the peacekeeping role of the United Nations. Last August, Senator BREN and I urged the President to initiate negotiations with the United Nations about the creation of a standing multinational peacekeeping force. Since that time, this proposal has gained wide currency, within the administration and among outside experts as well.

Mr. President, the bloody ethnic conflicts unleashed in Bosnia and Somalia since the end of the cold war have put enormous pressure on the United States to act, to intervene, to stop the

S2954

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

March 16, 1993

senseless violence. America does have some responsibility to help. But we have neither the obligation nor the capacity to act alone.

The opportunity for the United Nations is clear. After 45 frustrating years, the United Nations has the chance to finally fulfill its original mission: to provide, in the absence of great power confrontation, a truly effective mechanism for collective security.

Under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, Mr. President, the Secretary General has the authority to ask member nations to designate military units that can be deployed to "maintain international peace and security." It is time to make that authority a reality. It is time for the United States to push the United Nations to establish a multinational standing army.

Imagine such a force, Mr. President, the troops from around the world, training together, establishing lasting ties and sharing common experiences and purposes. As the New York Times has written, a blue-helmeted army is "the most promising way to contain chaos and combat death" in this new era of regional wars, ethnic conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Critics may immediately complain about the inefficiency of the United Nations. They may fear that America will be yielding sovereignty. They may rue, in effect, for a new American isolationism. Let me address each of these arguments in turn.

First, it is true that the United Nations as an institution is in need of serious reform. No one will dispute that today, at the height of its global peacekeeping activity, the bloated U.N. bureaucracy is under great strains. But this argues not for disengagement, but for more effective involvement of the United States, using our influence to effect long-needed reforms at the United Nations.

The second argument, that America will yield sovereignty to the United Nations, is provocative but groundless. Let us not forget that the United States retains veto power at the U.N. Security Council. There is simply no circumstance under which American forces would be involved in a U.N. peacekeeping or peacemaking operation without American approval.

The third argument is perhaps the most pernicious. It is rarely stated in so many words, but the argument essentially is that America must withdraw, that we must retreat. No policy, Mr. President, could be more dangerous today, when our economic wellbeing and national security are so dependent upon developments outside our borders.

It is true—and I believe strongly—that our allies must share more of the burden of maintaining international peace and security. To borrow a well-known phrase, we cannot be the world's policeman. That is good cause, however, to become more engaged in collective security efforts, to rely more on

the United Nations, to make sure that American men and women are not the only ones to put their lives on the line for international peace. We cannot bury our heads in the sand and hope that ethnic conflicts, proliferation, terrorism, and other threats will just go away.

I would note that for this very reason, Mr. President, the Secretary of State, and the Ambassador to the United Nations have each expressed their support for the creation of a U.N. Rapid Deployment Force. What they are envisioning here, Mr. President, is not at all unlike the kind of international peacekeeping force authorized under Article 43.

At this point, however, we have been dealing only in generalities about possibilities for—and obstacles to—the establishment of such a force. The resolution I am introducing today would move us from rhetoric to real issues. It would create a short-term commission to evaluate and recommend the practical steps that would be necessary for the United States to participate in an Article 43 force. The commission will study such issues as cost, logistics, training, standardization of equipment, and intelligence sharing. In addition, it will study war powers issues raised by the creation of such a force.

The commission, Mr. President, will be comprised of 14 members: the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, the National Security Adviser, the U.N. Ambassador, three outside experts appointed by the President, three Members of the House, and three Members of the Senate. The National Security Adviser will chair the commission. It will make its report 120 days after it first meets, and it will be dissolved within 10 days after it issues its report.

This is not a new and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy, Mr. President. It is a mechanism which will allow the administration to focus on the risks, realities, and technical issues raised by American participation in an article 43 peacekeeping force.

Implicit in my introduction of this joint resolution, Mr. President, is my strong continued support for the creation of such a military force. I believe that this proposal deserves a fair and informed hearing. And I expect that the commission we will create with this joint resolution will help us toward that end.

Mr. President, the headlines every day seem to tell us of a new conflict, a new challenge for U.N. peacekeepers, a new request for American military intervention. We have now an historic and fleeting opportunity to fulfill the promise of the United Nations. We in the Senate need not freeze ourselves between the false and unappealing choices of doing nothing or going in alone when regional crises flare up. We have another option: Let us help the United Nations help us in the long run, by carrying more of the load. Let us allow the United Nations to become a

truly effective multinational alternative.

Of course, Mr. President, even in this new era of multilateral action, American leadership is still absolutely necessary. America must lead the United Nations into the 21st century. The reality is that an article 43 force will simply never come to pass unless the President of the United States initiates consultations and negotiations for that purpose. And the President will only do that if he is well-informed about all elements of such an initiative. This resolution, in its small way, will help our President. It will help the United Nations. And it will help all of us move one more step toward making the "new world order" more than just a slogan.

By Mr. THURMOND (for himself and Mr. BAUCUS):

S.J. Res. 86. Joint resolution to designate the weeks beginning April 18, 1993, and April 17, 1994, each as "National Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Week"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

NATIONAL ORGAN AND TISSUE DONOR AWARENESS WEEK

Mr. THURMOND. I rise to introduce a joint resolution to designate the week beginning April 18, 1993, and the week beginning April 17, 1994, each as "National Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Week."

Mr. President, by highlighting the importance of organ and tissue donations, this resolution could literally save the lives of many of our fellow citizens. Thousands of lives have been lost simply because those who may have donated organs and tissues were never aware that they could.

At any given time, there are 30,000 adults and children waiting for organ and tissue donations. Approximately every 20 minutes a new patient is added to the national patient waiting list for an organ transplant. There is an adequate supply of transplantable organs. We simply need to make our citizens aware of the importance of organ and tissue donations.

We should encourage our citizens to decide now, whether, in the event of a future tragedy, they are willing to be a donor. This will inevitably lessen the burden on the family when asked by the medical profession if they may allow a particular organ or organs to be removed for transplantation. Although this decision is frightening to many people, these vital organs and tissues could be used to give the gift of life.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this worthy measure, and I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the resolution appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/03/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

STAMP OR PRINT CLASSIFICATION/CODEWORD

WAT FAX

UNCLAS

-3 JAN 1993 05 10

SITE D 882
MSG NBR

C

DATE AND TIME TRANSMITTED

MSG NBR

DATE AND TIME RECEIVED

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTOR

FROM MARC PALEVITZ OFFICE/DESK USD/P/GLOBAL PHONE NBR 695-3159

SUBJECT PRD on Peacekeeping (u)

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES 2

☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS
☒ IMMEDIATELY

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
NSC	Susan Rice	OEOR	302	395-3637
OMB	Gordon Adams	OEOR	208	395-4580
(b)(3)				
OVP	Brad Wiss	OEOR	290	395-4213
STATE	Bob Loftis	IO/UNP	4808	647-6424
STATE	DAVID SCHEFFER	USUN/W	6333	736-7578

REMARKS: AID paper for PRD Section VI. A.

JCS J-3 FORM 6
JAN 84

REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

UNCLAS

STAMP OR PRINT CLASSIFICATION/CODEWORD

VI. THE UNITED STATES (DOD)

A. Organization: OSD, JCS, State, AID, and the IC should describe how they are structured to support multilateral peacekeeping and examine options for improving their existing structures. They should also propose options for an interagency structure for policy development and implementation in these areas.

A.I.D. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

A.I.D. is the USG agency designated by the President (FAA Section 493) to coordinate foreign emergency responses. A.I.D. thus has the institutional capacity to formulate an emergency assistance strategy appropriate to the existing situation. The Food and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food For Peace (FHA/OFDA and FHA/FFP) have formulated and implemented the USG relief plans for Northern Iraq, Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia, other than the excess military commodity distribution, all integral parts of Peacekeeping operations.

INTERAGENCY STRUCTURE FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

The current interagency structure for coordination consisting of the Principal's Committee (PC), Deputy's Committee (DC), Inter-Agency Working Group (IWG), and other staff-level groups (Task Forces, Core Group - Somalia, and Working Groups) serve to bring the agencies together effectively for most normal interagency concerns. In the case of the humanitarian interventions over the past two years, however, events have been fast breaking, politically complex, and precedent-setting. This structure has weaknesses in addressing these issues unless modified.

A.I.D.'s mandate requires it to take action independently to respond to humanitarian emergencies. It was performing contingency planning during the Gulf War for anticipated post-war relief activities, it was engaged in Somalia over a year before the military intervention, and it financed the first airlift into Sarajevo before the UN launched the airlifts on a continuing basis. In the complex emergencies where access is denied to at-risk populations, A.I.D. thus provides the early-warning capability for the USG, advising when more serious interventions are needed in order to prevent significant loss of life. A.I.D. also has the capability through its development assistance mandate to provide resources to assist a nation or a segment of population from the crisis stage through rehabilitation and into reconstruction.

The USG hasn't made effective use of A.I.D.'s mandates. The USG approach has been ad hoc, not systematic. It has been driven by the degree of visibility and its political manifestations rather than by the recognition that a careful examination of the problems at the early stages are needed to determine if certain actions

might be taken to prevent crises from occurring. It has not sufficiently assessed the changing world conditions and developed policies for the role humanitarian interventions play in U.S. foreign policy. Nor has it determined how to perform the strategic, integrated planning (political, military, humanitarian) necessary to engage the U.S. effectively in these complex emergencies.

Thus the current interagency structure does not address the developing crises early enough or sufficiently in depth to manage them effectively. It does not bring highly qualified non-government resources to bear in the initial analyses. It is very compartmentalized in its planning at the staff levels. The urgency of the tasks based on an ad hoc approach precludes effective integration of far-sighted planning among agencies. Consequently, the U.S. consistently underestimates the effort needed to stabilize social, economic and security factors as an integral element of humanitarian success.

RECOMMENDED OPTIONS

1. Early-Warning, Policy Development: The U.S. should establish a systematic mechanism to address potential humanitarian emergencies which might require military intervention early by mandating A.I.D. to initiate inter-agency coordination based on its early warning information capacity. A.I.D. would then coordinate the mobilization of the assessment and analysis resources required. The principal product of the analysis stage would be to determine the likelihood of the need for the intervention, the criteria and requirements to achieve success, and the options for the U.S. It is critical to form a skilled and experienced, integrated planning group (State, DOD, A.I.D., USIA, other) at the earliest stages which will also tap the Non-Government Organizations, the academic community and the think-tank institutions appropriate to the potential crisis.

2. Implementation: Given the establishment of the early-warning mechanism above, members of this group can coordinate the implementation of the integrated plans established. The USG implementation of the Somalia effort has evolved the "Core Group", and lately an "Integrated Planning Group" which may be the prototype of the interagency coordination mechanism needed for effective USG management of complex humanitarian emergencies. This experience will need to be evaluated to determine its effectiveness.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. paper	JCS Paper for PRD-13: Criteria for US Participation in UN Operations (9 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1992-1993 [loose] [9]

2012-0659-F
ke4215

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]