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Folder Title: Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]				
Staff Office-Individual: Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Haiti: The Security Component (4 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: UNTAC's Request for Security-Related Assistance (3 pages)	05/10/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (5 pages)	04/16/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (1 page)	04/17/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	Discussion Paper: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (4 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	Summary of conclusions of the Small Group Meeting on Somalia and Libya (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)
004a. paper	Gaining Troop Support for UNOSOM II Strategy Paper (4 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	The Warlords and the Transitional National Council (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004c. draft	Draft Presidential Decision Directive (3 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-6 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	Rand Beers to Samuel Berger, re: Deputies Committee on Somalia (4 pages)	08/13/1993	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	Next Steps in Somalia (10 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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006c. memo	State Department Memo, re: Somalia Inter-Agency Assessment (6 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006d. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	08/04/1993	P1/b(1)

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

April 1, 1993

TO: DOD - Mort Halperin
DOD - Mark Palevitz
DOD - Warren Hall
JCS - Admiral Bowman
JCS - Col. Battaglini
USUN - Rick Inderfurth
USUN - Mr. Scheffeur
ST - George Ward
ST - John Fox
ST - Anne Richard
NSC - Dick Clarke (Susan Rice)

FROM: Tracy Davis
Tel: (202) 395-4580

Attached is the final draft of the OMB/NSC "Financing and Budget Management of International Peacekeeping" paper. The paper will be considered for final approval at the peacekeeping telecon on Monday, April 5, at 12:00 noon.

NOTE: The only substantive change from the March 29, 1993, 2:00 p.m. draft, was to move the item on possible sanctions for nonpayment of assessments from the "grab bag" number A4 to make it a stand alone item A4 and to renumber the previous A4 to A5.

April 1, 1993
9:00 A.M.

FINANCING AND BUDGET MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Background

The number and costs of peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations are growing at an unprecedented rate (see Attachment A). Also, the nature of these operations is changing from the traditional observer/monitoring troops (e.g., the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights) to more complicated peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention operations (e.g., the UN Operation in Somalia II). This has created greatly increased cash requirements which donor countries cannot meet; a need for greater numbers of troops than traditional troop contributing countries can supply. In addition, the management capability to plan for, deploy and support peacekeeping operations worldwide is lacking given the UN's outdated peacekeeping apparatus (e.g., poor organization, structure, telecommunications). Successful peacekeeping operations help to maintain global stability through multilateral endeavors which spread the cost of keeping the peace.

In this regard, it is important that current and future operations be run effectively and efficiently. To be able to justify continued large contributions, donor countries need assurance that the UN's peacekeeping management and budget structure operates quickly and effectively and that UNGA-passed peacekeeping budgets are realistic and well-justified. Emerging cash flow problems of traditional contributors like Russia add urgency to the need for peacekeeping budget/management reform. For example, currently UN peacekeeping budgets are prepared on an ad hoc basis after the UN and member states commit to an operation. Member states are provided with little if any detailed information to explain the budget estimates. Recognizing all of this, the Secretary General has asked the United States for urgent help in getting the management, funding, and operations of UN peacekeeping activities under control.

There follows a number of budget management and financing proposals the United States should consider for discussions with the top 21 cash and troop contributing countries (list at Attachment B). The goal would be to develop consensus around the proposals and work with the Secretary General on implementation. The proposals are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

A. Financing Measures

1. Have the United Nations credit the value of in-kind contributions (e.g., troop contributions, goods and services, including transportation) against member state assessments. Limit the amount of in-kind contributions each member state can credit to 30 percent of its assessed payment for a peacekeeping activity. Member state peacekeeping assessments are funded through cash contributions at the special peacekeeping scale of assessment. The UN Secretary General has indicated his willingness to consider crediting the value of troop contributions for the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) against member state peacekeeping assessments. Troop contributions would be credited at the standard rate at which the UN reimburses member states for troops -- \$988/troop/month or \$1,279/troop/month for specialists. Goods and services would be valued and credited at market rate. NOTE: How the United States would implement the crediting of its in-kind assistance, assuming such assistance is legally permissible, remains under consideration by the departments.

The UN is currently dependent on cash contributions to finance its peacekeeping operations. Some believe that crediting of in-kind contributions could result in a cash poor UN that would not have the funds necessary to pay for peacekeeping expenses, especially operation start-up costs. This could be addressed by limiting the percent of in-kind assistance contributed by member states (as discussed above) or by developing peacekeeping budgets with two parts -- an in-kind requirement and a cash requirement (see item B2).

2. Eliminate the special peacekeeping scale of assessments and have all member states pay their regular UN budget assessment to fund peacekeeping operations. The special UN peacekeeping scale is based on the regular UN budget scale but reduces the peacekeeping assessment for developing countries and redistributes it among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This places most of the financial responsibility for peacekeeping operations on four of the Perm Five (France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). Last December the UN increased the U.S. assessment to 31.7 percent, reflecting the decrease in the Russian assessment compared to that of the former USSR, but tentatively agreed to cap U.S. payments

at the former 30.4 percent level pending a review of anomalies in the peacekeeping scale. NOTE: China's regular budget assessment is only 0.8 percent and their peacekeeping assessment is 1.0 percent.

The peacekeeping scale divides member states into four categories. Group A consists of the Perm Five which, as described above, each pay about 27 percent more than their regular budget share. Group B comprises developed nations who contribute to peacekeeping at the same rate that they contribute to the regular UN budget. Group C is made up of economically less developed states which contribute at a rate of 20 percent of their regular rate of assessment. Group D consists of least developed states that are assessed at 10 percent of their regular budget rate.

In the past the Perm Five bore the greatest financial responsibility for peacekeeping but were not involved in fielding operations. The Perm Five are now making significant troop contributions to UN operations and providing ad hoc peacekeeping forces, such as the U.S. lead Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia. Eliminating the special peacekeeping scale would more equitably spread among member states the responsibility of funding UN peacekeeping operations. NOTE: Revising the regular budget scale to base it on a three year average of national income instead of the current 10 year average would further eliminate the disparity in funding for peacekeeping as well as for the regular budget.

It will likely be very difficult to completely eliminate the special peacekeeping scale because it would require convincing 97 member states in Group C to pay five times more than they now pay for peacekeeping operations and 54 member states in Group D to pay ten times more. An alternative that is probably more saleable because it affects fewer member states would be to drop Group C and have these member states pay their regular budget rate but keep the special rate for Group D. This would require the Perm Five to continue to pay slightly more than their regular budget assessment. (The United States' assessment would drop to approximately 26.2 percent from the anticipated 31.7 percent.)

3. Encourage member states with high GNPs (e.g., Japan, Germany) and countries directly affected by peacekeeping

(e.g., Gulf States) to make significant voluntary contributions to help alleviate the disparity in UN peacekeeping funding. Japan, with the second largest GNP in the world next to the United States, pays only 12.5 percent of assessed peacekeeping budgets while the United States is assessed 31.7 percent. Germany pays 9.0 percent, Saudi Arabia 0.19 percent and Kuwait 0.05 percent. An institutionalized voluntary fund would provide the opportunity for these countries to increase their contributions for peacekeeping.

Voluntary contributions could be solicited through an annual fundraising drive or with the deployment of each peacekeeping operation. Although the current mandates of all peacekeeping forces allow the Secretary General to collect voluntary contributions this has not been pursued with vigor by the Secretariat or member states. Voluntary contributions made to specific peacekeeping operations would offset (decrease) the amount of the budget member states would be assessed for. In addition, an annual fundraising drive could provide a vehicle for non-governmental organizations, foundations and private enterprises to help share the costs of international peacekeeping (Volcker/Ogata report does not support).

4. Consider means to ensure that member states pay their peacekeeping assessments on time contingent on implementation of adequate revisions to the UN peacekeeping assessment scale to establish a more equitable burdensharing of the cost of UN peacekeeping activities (as discussed in item 2). To this end the United Nations could be given the authority to impose additional sanctions upon and provide incentives to member states to encourage timely and full payment of assessed contributions. These sanctions could include charging interest on late payments with the interest being deposited in the revolving Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and providing a "Prompt Payment Discount" to member state which make payments in full and on time (e.g., 3 percent). NOTE: State staff believe this idea is not well enough developed (e.g., potential impact on the Russian Federation) and should be remanded for further study within the U.S. Government prior to the "Group of 21" consultation.

The only sanction currently available to the UN to secure timely payment of assessed contributions is Article 19 of the UN Charter which provides that if a member state is in

arrears equal to or exceeding the amount of two years of its contributions it can lose its vote in the General Assembly.

5. Other measures have been suggested for possible ways to help finance and manage UN peacekeeping operations. These include:

- Interest-bearing UN "Peace Bonds" -- would likely require enabling authority for the UN.
- UN short term borrowing -- would likely require enabling authority for the UN (Volcker/Ogata report does not support).
- International taxes and user fees (e.g., air/sea travel, international telecommunications, arms sales) -
- likely require national legislation for member states (Volcker/Ogata report does not support at this time).
- Establish a UN Peace Endowment Fund (\$1 billion) to finance peacekeeping start-up costs -- would take time to develop support and to implement (Volcker/Ogata report does not support).
- Collect "Peace Dividend" from beneficiary nations -- would take time to develop support and to implement.
- Collect tax deductible contributions from corporations and individual donors to be "Proud Sponsors of UN Peacekeeping" (Volcker/Ogata report does not support) -
- would take time to develop support and to implement.
- Find a way to increase the financial contributions that other developed nations, especially Germany and Japan, make to peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations such as by establishing a committee of the UN Security Council on Peacekeeping under the provision of Article 29 of the UN Charter. This committee could consist of the Perm Five, five countries elected from geographic regions by the Security Council, and countries which make a commitment to a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations either by agreeing to have their assessment increased by at least 10 percent of the total cost of each operation, or by agreeing to commit forces amounting to a fixed percentage of total peacekeeping operations without

seeking reimbursement for costs. The committee would also have an advisory role in reviewing proposed and on-going peacekeeping operations. This proposal would allow for greater contributions from the developed nations, such as Japan and Germany, by providing increased visibility and participation in managing peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations and near Security Council status as an incentive. It would take time to develop support for and to implement this idea.

- Establish a single financial account for all UN peacekeeping operations financed by a special peacekeeping assessment (Volcker/Ogata recommendation) -- would take time to develop support and to implement.
- Get UN staff to devise a Global Security/Emergency Humanitarian Assistance spreadsheet which would allow for appropriate recognition being given to expenditures of members for non-UN activities which are authorized by the Security Council (e.g., Operation Restore Hope; Russian peacekeeping efforts in CIS, assuming they gain Security Council authorization). Such a spreadsheet would provide useful information in itself and this information could be directly applied in establishing a single financial account for all UN peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance operations as suggested above.

Some of these measures are complicated and therefore longer-term in nature. Such measures cannot be implemented in the short term but should be remanded for further study within the U.S. government prior to the "Group of 21" consultation.

B. Budget Management

1. Set up a new special budget preparation/execution office in the UN peacekeeping division. This new staff would be responsible for working with representatives of the UN Secretariat and major donors (see experts group in item B3) to develop detailed budget submissions for future peacekeeping operations. This staff would include financial, logistical, and planning specialists. Detailed budget preparation instructions (similar to OMB Circular A-11 used by Federal agencies) should be developed and used by staff to provide standard presentations of budget and

financial plans for donors. This would be part of a broader reorganization and strengthening of the UN peacekeeping operations group and a possible transfer of components of the Field Operations Division (FOD) from the Under Secretary General for Administration and Management to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (discussed in JCS/OSD paper on the operational aspects of peacekeeping).

A specialized peacekeeping budget preparation/execution staff could do the following to provide better accountability for peacekeeping operations and to control expenditures:

- Prepare regular and frequent status reports to member states on the implementation of peacekeeping operations with a full accounting of expenditures as well as payments and non-payments of assessments (and voluntary contributions).
- Require regular internal audits on peacekeeping financing, especially disposition of resources once operations are terminated.
- Secure competitive global contracts for frequently needed goods and services to help reduce acquisition costs.
- Limit peacekeeping operation assessment periods to six months to allow for adjustments/corrections in peacekeeping budgets based on actual experience in the field.
- Maximize use of contracting out for support services (e.g., communications, transportation).
- Increase use of member state civilian personnel on a non-reimbursable basis to staff the civilian components of peacekeeping operations (e.g., voter registration, civilian administration).

An alternative to a completely new budget preparation/execution office for peacekeeping would be to expand and enhance the current budget staff so that they can perform the required functions. This would prevent possible duplication of budget functions but it may be hard to affect

the peacekeeping budget function and staff while they are part of the larger UN budget office.

2. Create special budgeting techniques tailored to peacekeeping operations. The UN division responsible for peacekeeping budgeting should develop and use standardized pricing "modules" for common elements of peacekeeping field operations -- i.e., communications, troop type and size, shelter, transportation, and other logistical support (Volcker/Ogata recommendation). Such modules should be developed based on experience of actual cost data gained with previous peacekeeping operations. In addition, the UN should assess the viability of developing budgets for peacekeeping operations in two parts -- an in-kind requirements budget and cash requirements budget. This approach could provide flexibility to enable donor countries to fulfill their assessment percentage through a combination of cash and in-kind support. Finally, standardized "valuation" factors should be prepared and periodically updated to enable countries to fairly estimate the value of their in-kind contributions (e.g., airlift per flight hour; per capita troop factor, etc.)
3. Formalize a standing cadre of budget experts from member states to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans. A permanent team of expert budget staff from the top contributing countries (e.g., United States, Japan, Germany, Russian Federation) should be identified to work with UN Secretariat and peacekeeping budget staff (as described in item B1) to help formulate peacekeeping operations budgets. This would enable the major contributors to take an active role in ensuring that the operations are cost effective. It would also provide early, detailed knowledge of costs of individual operations to member states and help build credibility for the estimates with member governments' legislatures. The experts could be pre-selected by participating member states and assigned on a TDY basis to UN headquarters when needed. This is consistent with the recent UN Secretariat request to the United States to send expert staff to help prepare the UNOSOM II budget.
4. Prior to Security Council approval of resolutions on mandates for peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat should make available informally to Security Council members alternative mandates, each with well explained cost

implications. In addressing a situation that may require a peacekeeping operation, members of the Security Council should receive from the Secretariat on an informal basis alternative mandates, each with well explained cost implications indicating the major items of expense and cost factors and assumptions used in pricing out the alternative. To help identify the alternatives for presentation to the Security Council, the Secretariat should conduct separate, prior consultations with the Perm Five. This would permit Security Council members to take scope, duration, and costs of operations into consideration before mandating peacekeeping activities. More detailed budget estimates should be prepared (as discussed in item B2) for final Fifth Committee and UNGA review and approval.

5. Enlarge and expand the current revolving Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (PRF) with voluntary contributions to help finance the start-up costs of UN peacekeeping operations pending receipt of assessed contributions. (The Volcker/Ogata report recommends a \$400 million fund.) In 1992 the UN, at the encouragement of Japan, set up a Peacekeeping Reserve fund (PRF), capped at \$150 million, to help finance start-up costs of new, expanded or renewed peacekeeping operations. The PRF was capitalized initially at \$60 million through the transfer of surpluses and interest earnings of previous peacekeeping operations. In addition, the FY 1993 \$34 million U.S. arrears payment to the UN regular budget will go to the PRF bringing the fund total to \$94 million.

One of the major criticisms of UN peacekeeping management is that they do not move quickly enough to put troops in the field once an operation is approved. A Peacekeeping Reserve Fund would be cash-in-hand for the UN to use to set up peacekeeping operations pending the receipt of assessed contributions. An alternative to collecting voluntary contributions to capitalize the fund would be the assessment of member states as recommended by the Volcker/Ogata report. This would, however, put even more pressure on some financially strapped member states (e.g., Russia).

6. Develop a computerized inventory control system of peacekeeping equipment/property. A workable inventory control and tracking system of tangible property (vehicles, portable housing, medical units, other equipment) could enable the UN to reuse these items in subsequent operations.

This would reduce (somewhat) the need for new equipment and the costs of future operations for the donors. Could be broadened to include inventories of stockpiles identified by member states for possible UN peacekeeping use.

7. Keep humanitarian/rehabilitation cost requirements separate from assessed peacekeeping budgets. Peacekeeping operation budgets should be limited to those activities directly in support of the peacekeeping mission to end hostilities. While humanitarian relief and other activities should be closely coordinated or may be carried out on the ground by peacekeeping forces, their budgets should be developed by appropriate agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC, UNDRO, etc.) and their funding should be strictly voluntary as is current practice. This avoids duplicating the expertise and infrastructure that currently exists in these agencies. It also allows certain countries to provide extra support (through specialized UN relief agencies) for the total operation when their geographic responsibility or historical ties dictate (e.g., Japan).
8. Revise the UN's procedures to allow \$10 million or 20 percent, whichever is greater, of the initial estimated cost of a peacekeeping operation to be obligated, with the concurrence of the ACABQ, once it is approved by the Security Council (Volcker/Ogata recommendation). This would enable the UN to begin deployment of large missions while their budgets are being prepared in detail and then approved by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the General Assembly. The UN would have the capability to cover costs of start-up operations quickly and contract for longer lead-time items. Current procedures allow only \$10 million to be obligated without specific approval of the General Assembly.
9. Require the UN to have a status of forces agreement with the host country to a peacekeeping operation with the exception of countries where there is no central government (e.g., Somalia, Yugoslavia). The agreement should ensure that to the extent possible the host country provides for the necessary facilities on the most favorable terms (e.g., accommodations, supplies and local transport at no charge when possible) and that the most favorable legally available exchange rate is applied. Currently status of forces agreements are not always worked out with host countries. These agreements would require host countries to provide the

UN with whatever assistance they can. This should be especially true for on-going operations in economically stable countries (e.g., the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission).

10. Prohibit the UN from "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations (Volcker/Ogata recommendation). Peacekeeping assessments should be maintained in separate accounts and should not be used -- even temporarily -- for regular UN activities. This would reduce the UN's cash management flexibility.

**Peacekeeping Missions
Assessments in 1992 and Estimated Expenditures**

Mission	Authorization: Assessment	1992 Cost
UNTSO (Middle East)	Authorized in Regular Budget	\$25 million
UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan)	Authorized in Regular Budget	\$6 million
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	Voluntary Contributions	\$31 million
ONUCA (Nicaragua)	11/91 - 4/92: \$12 million	\$7 million
UNDOF (Middle East)	12/91 - 11/92: \$35 million 12/92 - 5/93: \$17 million	\$39 million
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	2/92 - 1/93: \$144 million	\$153 million
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)	10/91 - 10/92: \$60 million 11/92 - 4/93: \$19 million	\$68 million
UNAVEM II (Angola)	1/92 - 10/92: \$56 million 11/92 - 2/93: \$25 million	\$67 million
ONUSAL (El Salvador)	1/92 - 10/92: \$36 million 11/92 - 2/93: \$8 million	\$35 million
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	Authorized 9/91; not yet fully operational	\$18 million
UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia)	1/92 - 10/92: \$250 million 12/92 - 2/93: \$298 million	\$222 million
UNAMIC (Cambodia advance mission)	11/91 - 4/92: \$33 million	\$20 million
UNTAC (Cambodia)	5/92 - 10/92: \$802 million 11/92 - 4/93: \$313 million	\$637 million
UNOSOM (Somalia)	5/92 - 4/93: \$108 million	\$39 million
ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	to be authorized in March, '93 at estimated cost of over \$200 million	-
Total		\$1.37 billion

Source: "Financing an Effective United Nations," The Ford Foundation, February 1993 (Volcker/Ogata)

Attachment B
March 22, 1993

"Group of 21"

Largest Financial and Troop Contributors to
UN Peacekeeping

Largest financial contributors to UN peacekeeping:

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| 1. United States | 7. Italy |
| 2. Japan | 8. Canada |
| 3. Germany | 9. Spain |
| 4. Russian Federation | 10. Ukraine |
| 5. France | 11. Australia |
| 6. United Kingdom | 12. Netherlands |

Largest peacekeeping troop contributors (would include France, United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands named above):

- | | |
|---------------|----------------|
| 13. Indonesia | 17. India |
| 14. Ghana | 18. Nepal |
| 15. Poland | 19. Finland |
| 16. Pakistan | 20. Bangladesh |

Other Perm Five Member:

21. China

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (5 pages)	04/16/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
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purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003b. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (1 page)	04/17/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003c. paper	Discussion Paper: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (4 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F

ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003d. paper	Summary of conclusions of the Small Group Meeting on Somalia and Libya (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F

ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CONFIRMED* CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNOSOM II

	COUNTRY	Troops On Station for UNITAF**	Troops Expected UNOSOM II	Troops On-station UNOSOM II	TYPE OF FORCES	WHERE LOCATED
1	Argentina	0	90	90	Field Hosp	TBD
2	Australia	926	48	48	INF BN III mid-May	BAIDOA
3	Bangladesh	0	779	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
4	Belgium	789	869	761	ABN/INF	KISMAYU
5	Botswana	206	200	200	INF	MOGADISHU
6	Egypt	235	610	235	MECH INF	MOGADISHU
7	France	1143	1100	1100	MECH INF	ODDUR
8	Germany	0	(1500)	0	ENG/LOG	MOMBASA,KE
9	Greece	110	120	110	MED/LOG	MOGADISHU
10	Hungary	0	50	50	Field Hosp	TBD
11	India	5	(4000)	5	INF/LOG	TBD
12	Indonesia	0	777	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
13	Ireland	0	80	0	Transpo CO	TBD
14	Italy	2558	2400	2400	ABN/INF	GIALALASI
15	Jordan	0	880	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
16	Malaysia	0	856	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
17	Morocco	1265	966	966	MECH INF	BALEDOGLE
18	New Zealand	67	110	67	AIR TRANS	MOGADISHU
19	Nigeria	562	627	562	RECON	MOGADISHU
20	Norway	0	140	0	HQS	MOGADISHU
21	Pakistan	880	4004	1680	INF	MOGADISHU
22	Rep. of Korea	0	250	0	ENG BN	TBD
23	Romania	0	260	0	Field Hosp	TBD
24	Saudia Arabia	680	674	674	INF	MOGADISHU
25	Sweden	162	150	150	MED	MOGADISHU
26	Tunisia	133	133	133	INF	MOGADISHU
27	Turkey	300	459	300	INF	MOGADISHU
28	U.A.E.	640	753	640	INF	MOGADISHU
29	U.S.A.	9174	(3900)	3900	LOG & QRF	VARIOUS
30	Zimbabwe	160	160	160	INF	MOGADISHU
TOTAL:		19995	26945	14231		

As of: 130700L Apr 93

*Figures are based on UN information approved in the field

**Canada and Kuwait have 1209 & 138 troops respectively in UNITAF but will not be in UNOSOM II

COUNTRIES CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION
(STATUS UNKNOWN)

	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Troops Possible Contribution</u>	<u>TYPE OF FORCES</u>
1	Algeria	TBD	MED
2	Brazil	TBD	TBD
3	Chile	TBD	INF
4	Djibouti	TBD	INF
5	El Salvador	TBD	HELO UNIT
6	Ghana	TBD	INF
7	Jamaica	TBD	ENG UNIT
8	Latvia	TBD	INF
9	Mali	TBD	MED
10	Namibia	TBD	INF
11	Nepal	TBD	INF
12	Russia	TBD	MED
13	Thailand	TBD	MED/TRANSP
14	Uganda	TBD	INF
15	Yemen	TBD	LINGUISTS
16	Zambia	TBD	INF

TOTAL:

0

As of: 130700L Apr 93



9307508
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 12, 1993


2336

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Gaining Troop Support for UNOSOM II

The attached paper outlines an interagency-cleared strategy to obtain troop support for the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).


Mary Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Strategy Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

By KDE NARA, Date 02/16/17

2012-0659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. paper	Gaining Troop Support for UNOSOM II Strategy Paper (4 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FROM ADMIRAL HOWE TO UN HQTS.
7 APRIL 1993

1. You have asked us to examine the potential shortfall between the logistics capabilities the US currently intends to retain in Somalia to support UNOSOM II and our own assessment of our requirements.

2. A progress report passed to New York about a week ago reached the following conclusion, "what they are proposing to leave in place is a limited divisional logistic capability with a 25% divisional engineering strength. In our view, this structure will only be able to support fully second line capable self sufficient brigades in the south, with insufficient space capacity to fill missing brigade support elements and no realistic capacity to support the center and north". We are still in the process of validating the concerns expressed in the above assessment, but I want to flag the following issues based on two meetings I have held in the last 24 hours with UNITAF and UNOSOM personnel.

A. Capability in South (Current UNITAF Area). While the US is leaving behind a capability (2300 in number) which they have calculated will support a divisional strength force (10000). This calculation was based on an assumption by UNITAF that the remaining brigades would be complete with their logistic support elements and that the ration support would be field rations (MRE) only.

B. Capability to Expand (Center, North and Kenyan Borders South). In view of the capability gaps in the current UNITAF area it is likely that expansion on the mission can only take place once the southern position has been consolidated. As additional forces arrive, we will only be able to deploy them North if the requisite support elements are available (e.g. engineering).

C. Engineers. Of all the capability gaps, the most acute is in engineering. Early assessment suggests that what UNITAF plans to leave would be barely capable of maintaining the status quo in the current UNITAF area. With the Monsoon imminent even this is questionable. I understand your military staff has already made a request to re-configure the German contribution to a mix of engineers and logistic support companies. This will be essential if UNOSOM it is to be in a position to expand beyond UNITAF confines.

D. Medical. In view of the apparent intention of the Swedish field hospital to withdraw by early July, the Mogadishu area may well have inadequate medical capability. Until the capability of the medical units being contributed by Argentina, Greece, Hungary and Oman is confirmed, there may be some gaps. In addition, we are concerned about restraining adequate Medevac helicopters.

3. The fundamental problem we have is that we are still several weeks away from identifying specifically what we need. At the same time, in the absence of more specificity, UNITAF has taken a "bare bones" approach to our anticipated needs. In view of the limited (in scope and mission) though capable support being left by the US, we should leave open the channels with the US and ask for an option to request assistance to fill any critical gaps which remain once our situation is clearer. The need for more US engineer support is likely.

4. We will work this problem hard and let you know as soon as possible what specific shortfalls must be filled. We also will be assessing other support areas -- communications, special forces, psychological operations, air surveillance, and helo and fixed wing lift.

Best Regards.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	The Warlords and the Transitional National Council (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. draft	Draft Presidential Decision Directive (3 pages)	04/00/1993	PI/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

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Fr R Clarke

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10/20

Dick -

Here's the first
set of documents
we talked about.
Tony got these
last night.

Krishe

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-6 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F

ke4214

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Principal Committee Meetings
Somalia, Bosnia & Haiti

TOTAL NUMBER OF PC MEETINGS 38

NUMBER OF MEETINGS RELATED TO
SOMALIA, BOSNIA & HAITI 23

February 2, 1993	Bosnia
February 5, 1993	Yugoslavia
February 15, 1993	Bosnia & Iraq
February 19, 1993	Bosnia
March 13, 1993	Bosnia, Iraq & Haiti
March 25, 1993	Bosnia
March 27, 1993	Bosnia
April 9, 1993	Bosnia
April 13, 1993	Haiti
April 17, 1993	Bosnia
April 20, 1993	Bosnia
May 1, 1993	Bosnia
May 3, 1993	Bosnia
May 6, 1993	Bosnia
May 17, 1993	Bosnia
August 6, 1993	Bosnia
September 1, 1993	Bosnia
September 2, 1993	Peacekeeping Funding Initiative
September 17, 1993	PRD 13 - Peacekeeping
September 20, 1993	Bosnia
October 2, 1993	Bosnia
October 12, 1993	Haiti
October 19, 1993	Haiti
October 5, 1993	Meeting with the President on Somalia
October 6, 1993	Meeting with the President on Somalia

DATE	TYPE OF MEETING	SUBJECT
February 2, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
February 5, 1993	Principals Committee	Yugoslavia
February 15, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia and Iraq
February 19, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
March 13, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia, Iraq and Haiti
March 23, 1993	IWG Chaired by Anthony Lake/ Bob Rubin	International Programs and Resources
March 25, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
March 27, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
March 31, 1993	Meeting Chaired by the Vice President	Encryption Policy
April 9, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
April 13, 1993	Principals Committee	Haiti
April 17, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
April 20, 1993	Meeting with the President	Bosnia
April 24, 1993	Principals Committee	North Korea
May 1, 1993	Meeting with the President	Bosnia
May 3, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
May 6, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
May 8, 1993	Principals Committee	Secretary Christopher Trip Report
May 13, 1993	Principals Committee	Iran
May 14, 1993	Principals Committee	Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)
May 17, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
June 1, 1993	Principals Committee	Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)
June 16, 1993	Principals Committee	Vietnam
August 5, 1993	Principals Committee	Bottom-Up Review
August 6, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
September 1, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia

September 2, 1993 (4:30 pm)	Principals Committee	War Powers
September 2, 1993 (5:00 pm)	Principals Committee	Peacekeeping Funding Initiative
September 7, 1993	Principals Committee	Vietnam
September 9, 1993	Principals Committee	PRD 20- International Programs and Resources
September 10, 1993	Principals Committee	Nonproliferation
September 17, 1993	Principals Committee	PRD 13 - Peacekeeping
September 20, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
September 24, 1993	Principals Committee	Response to China Nuclear Test
October 2, 1993	Principals Committee	Bosnia
October 12, 1993	Principals Committee	Haiti
October 18, 1993	Principals Committee	US NATO
October 19, 1993	Principals Committee	Haiti

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETINGS
CONVENED BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
20 JAN 1993 - 19 JAN 1997

January 23, 1993	Haiti
January 25, 1993	Somalia
February 8, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
February 9, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
February 13, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
February 15, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
February 17, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
February 22, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
February 26, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
March 4, 1993	Bosnia-Hercegovina
March 9, 1993	Bosnia-Hercegovina
March 27, 1993	Libya & Somalia
March 30, 1993	Haiti & POW/MIA
April 17, 1993	Somalia
April 19, 1993	Somalia
May 17, 1993	Haiti
May 18, 1993	Haiti
May 26, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
May 27, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
July 14, 1993	Somalia
July 19, 1993	Peacekeeping
July 26, 1993	Former Yugoslavia
August 2, 1993	Peacekeeping Funding
August 4, 1992	Somalia
August 16, 1993	Somalia
August 25, 1993	Somalia
August 27, 1993	Peacekeeping Funding
September 11, 1993	Somalia
September 11, 1993	Haiti
September 30, 1993	Somalia
Total DC Meetings from 20 Jan 1993 to 19 Oct 1993: 60	
Total DC Meetings on Haiti, Somalia & Bosnia: 30	

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETINGS
CONVENED BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
20 JAN 1993 - 19 JAN 1997

MTG #	SUBJECT	DATE HELD	TIME	MIN	SOC	LOG #
0001	NSC Priorities	23 Jan 93	1730		YES	20041
0001A	Haiti	23 Jan 93	1100		YES	20019
0002	Somalia	25 Jan 93	1810	YES	YES	20021
0003	NSC Priorities	28 Jan 93	1030		YES	20048
0004	Former Yugoslavia	8 Feb 93	1100			
0005	Former Yugoslavia	9 Feb 93	1900			
0006	Former Yugoslavia	13 Feb 93	1300		YES	20112
0007	Former Yugoslavia	15 Feb 93	1100		YES	20112
0008	Former Yugoslavia	17 Feb 93	1400		YES	20137
0009	Former Yugoslavia	22 Feb 93	1200		YES	20148
0010	Intelligence Matters	26 Feb 93	1600			
0011	Former Yugoslavia	26 Feb 93	1700		YES	20182
0012	Bosnia-Herzegovina	4 Mar 93	1800		YES	20209
0013	Bosnia-Herzegovina	9 Mar 93	1600		YES	20227
0014	North Korea Nuclear	18 Mar 93	1030	YES	YES	20302
0015	Japan	24 Mar 93	1130	YES	YES	20301
0016	Libya & Somalia	27 Mar 93	1200		YES	20296
0017	Haiti & POW/MIA	30 Mar 93	1530	YES	YES	20315
0018	Japan	6 Apr 93	1700	YES	YES	20901
0019	North Korea Nuclear	7 Apr 93	1330	YES	YES	20334
0020	Iran	15 Apr 93	1530	YES	YES	20432
0021	Somalia	17 Apr 93	1100			
0022	Somalia	19 Apr 93	1430		YES	20392
0023	Climate	19 Apr 93	1700			
0024	China	27 Apr 93	1730	YES	YES	20826
0025	Nuclear Testing	30 Apr 93	1530	YES	YES	20453
0026	Cambodia	3 May 93	1730		YES	20468
0027	COCOM	5 May 93	1730		YES	20480
0028	Haiti	17 May 93	1700	YES	YES	20536
0029	Haiti	18 May 93	1500		YES	20538
0030	China MFN	19 May 93	1530	YES		20537
0031	Africa	21 May 93	1100	YES	YES	20545
0032	South Asia	25 May 93	1500	YES	YES	20576
0033	Former Yugoslavia	26 May 93	1630		YES	20603
0034	Former Yugoslavia	27 May 93	1030		YES	20603
0035	Vietnam	27 May 93	1400			
0036	North Korea	8 Jun 93	1600		YES	20633
0037	Turkey	10 Jun 93	1030			
0038	Africa	18 Jun 93	1630			
0039	Africa	21 Jun 93	1630		YES	20702
0040	COCOM	24 Jun 93	1530		YES	20724
0041	Somalia	14 Jul 93	1430		YES	20781
0042	Peacekeeping	19 Jul 93	1700		YES	20789
0043	China	21 Jul 93	1530		YES	20805
0044	Former Yugoslavia	26 Jul 93	1400		YES	20820
0045	Peacekeeping Funding	2 Aug 93	1500		YES	20847
0046	Angola & Liberia	2 Aug 93	1600		YES	20851
0047	Somalia	4 Aug 93	1700		YES	20882
0048	Cambodia	13 Aug 93	1530		YES	20906
0049	Somalia	16 Aug 93	1100		YES	20895
0050	Somalia	25 Aug 93	1530		YES	20948
0051	Peacekeeping Funding	27 Aug 93	1600		YES	20950
0052	Sudan & Terrorism	30 Aug 93	1430		YES	20961

MTG #	SUBJECT	DATE HELD	TIME	MIN	SOC	LOG #
0053	North Korea	7 Sep 93	1400	—	YES	20991
0054	NATO Summit	8 Sep 93	1100	—	YES	20997
0055	Somalia	11 Sep 93	1000	—	YES	21006
0056	NATO Summit	15 Sep 93	1230	—	—	—
0057	Haiti	17 Sep 93	0915	—	YES	21031
0058	Counternarcotics	24 Sep 93	1100	—	YES	21074
0059	<u>SOMALIA (?) PER MMB</u>	<u>30 SEP 93</u>	—	—	—	—
0060	—	—	—	—	—	—
0061	—	—	—	—	—	—
0062	—	—	—	—	—	—
0063	—	—	—	—	—	—
0064	—	—	—	—	—	—
0065	—	—	—	—	—	—
0066	—	—	—	—	—	—
0067	—	—	—	—	—	—
0068	—	—	—	—	—	—
0069	—	—	—	—	—	—
0070	—	—	—	—	—	—
0071	—	—	—	—	—	—
0072	—	—	—	—	—	—
0073	—	—	—	—	—	—
0074	—	—	—	—	—	—
0075	—	—	—	—	—	—
0076	—	—	—	—	—	—
0077	—	—	—	—	—	—
0078	—	—	—	—	—	—
0079	—	—	—	—	—	—
0080	—	—	—	—	—	—
0081	—	—	—	—	—	—
0082	—	—	—	—	—	—
0083	—	—	—	—	—	—
0084	—	—	—	—	—	—
0085	—	—	—	—	—	—
0086	—	—	—	—	—	—
0087	—	—	—	—	—	—
0088	—	—	—	—	—	—
0089	—	—	—	—	—	—
0090	—	—	—	—	—	—
0091	—	—	—	—	—	—
0092	—	—	—	—	—	—
0093	—	—	—	—	—	—
0094	—	—	—	—	—	—
0095	—	—	—	—	—	—
0096	—	—	—	—	—	—
0097	—	—	—	—	—	—
0098	—	—	—	—	—	—
0099	—	—	—	—	—	—
0100	—	—	—	—	—	—

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	Rand Beers to Samuel Berger, re: Deputies Committee on Somalia (4 pages)	08/13/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. paper	Next Steps in Somalia (10 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.


Accomplished

In Progress

UNOSOM II Strategy

Decision Points / Follow On Actions

PASSAGE
OF
UNOSOM II
RESOLUTION



UN GOALS / Phased US Withdrawal
(proposed short term)

 Phased US withdrawal
 Has an impact on phased US withdrawal

HUMANITARIAN

Regional NGO Assessments
Humanitarian Div coord.

MILITARY / SECURITY

"Team Building" - Commanders Conferences - Consultations - Exercise
Solution
Security forces (GRF)
Recognize Reconciled Areas
GRF redploys (?)
US Log Force (-)
Aggressive military

POLITICAL

Internationalize/Africanize UN effort
Establish Judicial/Penal system
Regional Councils
District Councils
TNC

Aug 93 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 94

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. memo	State Department Memo, re: Somalia Inter-Agency Assessment (6 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.


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Accomplished

 In Progress


UNOSOM II Strategy

Decision Points / Follow On Actions




Proposed UNOSOM II Strategy

Decision Points / Follow On Actions



Proposed U.S. goals for UNOSOM



13 2048 NO. 160011951 PAGE

SOMALIA PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSESSMENT/CHALLENGES

Reports from the Inter-Agency Assessment Team on Somalia have indicated that problems in the UNOSOM II public affairs operation and additional public affairs efforts are needed.

Organizational Concerns: The current staff in Mogadishu is grossly mismatched with the needs facing this initiative. It is headed by a Director of Public Information/Spokesman and subdivided into three sections - military, political and humanitarian. In addition to lacking long term vision of the long term proactive issue management, UNOSOM Public Affairs is barely reacting to events. The lack of internal information has contributed to a morale problem between UNOSOM II and relief workers. This is a possible contributor to negative news stories about the humanitarian progress within the country.

The humanitarian and political branches are so small that there is little ability to do anything more than reactive public affairs.

The military branch should be headed by a non-US person to better represent the multi-national composition of the operation and to lessen the perception that the military operation is strictly a US operation. The section is seriously undermanned and is unable to carry out any planning activities either for upcoming military interventions or for military humanitarian activities in the outlying areas which are conducted by non-US forces. It is imperative that this aspect of the organization have adequate staff to ensure accuracy of reports.

Issues: News coverage has clearly shifted from the humanitarian aspects of the operation to military/combat related activities.

The press corps in Somalia have been in the region a long time and have covered the humanitarian assistance/development stories at least once. The military activities -- including the hunt for Aideed and the continuous fire fights -- continue to be the major stories.

10

US PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS

Message:

The US supports the UN and UNOSOM in the monumental and historic task of nation-building in Somalia, that the relief effort was a success and is over, that rehabilitation and reconstruction has begun and is proceeding apace, and that neither the US nor the UN will be deterred by thugs and murderers from their mission of helping the Somali people rebuild their nation.

Although the USG should not be out front in the UN public affairs effort, it must deal with both domestic and foreign public affairs issues on its role in UNOSOM.

Given the deaths of four American soldiers, the US has maintained a very high public affairs profile over the last week.

Secretary Christopher appeared on CNN "The World Today" on August 12.

Ambassador David Shinn, State Department Special Coordinator for Somalia, appeared on MacNeil-Lehrer and Nightline, gave an on-the-record press briefing carried live by C-SPAN and quoted on several network news show, and gave an op-ed piece to Gannett News Service and gave a number of background and on-the-record interviews to publications, i.e., New York Times and U.S. News and World Report.

U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, has appeared on a number of television shows and had an op-ed piece in the 8/10 New York Times

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. TIME LINE

A. Short Term:

- Mogadishu: Pressure the UN to recruit qualified public affairs officers from other countries to send to Mogadishu, to signal the multi-national composition of UNOSOM.
- Point 1: In addition, continue to work with the UN to actively recruit qualified USG officers to assist UNOSOM personnel as second/third line in the public affairs field.
- Point 2: Task US ambassadors in troop donor nations to ask host country governments to encourage recruitment of public affairs officials to send to Somalia.

- Point 3: Recommend to troop contributing countries that they send military public affairs officers with their troops to be seconded to UNOSOM public affairs. It would be good for the "complexion" of UNOSOM and good training/experience for the officers.
- Point 4: Urge installation of a satellite dish on embassy/university compound for use of disseminating UNOSOM message to conduct a proactive public affairs operation.
- UN New York: Send a team of public affairs officers (State, USIA, DoD) to UNNY to help the public affairs office organize a strategy for a public affairs effort on Somalia specifically. Advantages: No increased American presence in Somalia.

B. Long Term:

- Strongly encourage USG assistance/expertise to UNNY to help it
 - A) completely reorganize its entire public affairs apparatus, or
 - B) Suggest to the UN that it hire a public relations firm to help it completely reorganize its entire public affairs apparatus and teach it how to conduct public relations in a changed, post-Cold War world.

2. SPECIFIC Issues:

- A. Aideed:** Admiral Howe's public focus on arresting Aideed has given Aideed a huge public affairs advantage. No matter that Aideed is a murderer and a thug, he can outwit the US military and UNOSOM forces and still remain at large.

He should focus less on arresting Aideed and more on the success of the relief effort and the ongoing rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, Aideed would lose some power in the press.

Admiral Howe discussing rehabilitation and reconstruction would also put a much-needed spotlight on those efforts, which have been sadly underreported. Installation of a satellite dish on the embassy/university compound should be strongly considered.

B. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS:

The UNOSOM operation is currently reactive and not able to significantly encourage coverage. Drop in visits by Admiral Howe and USUN Albright do not send the positive message of the humanitarian success story.

A major speech by a top level Administration official who has visited the area would send a potent message to the international and US domestic media.

3. IMPLEMENTATION

State Department Activities:

- Continue high-profile media outreach, including on-the-record and background print and electronic media interviews by prominent State Department officials, including Assistant Secretary George Moose, Ambassador Shinn, Ambassador Albright, Assistant Secretary Doug Bennet.
- We have been in touch with Chet Crocker and other prominent Africanist academics to consider doing a series of op-eds on Somalia.
- Put together a chronology of Aideed's atrocities against UNOSOM peacekeepers, relief workers and journalists. It will strengthen the case for arresting this thug and murderer. Or expand the chronology to include all those killed by lawless elements in Somalia (like Shaun Devereaux, the WFP official killed in Kismayo in January).

USAID Activities:

- Ask Brian Atwood or Carol Lancaster to do an op-ed on the success of the relief effort and the beginning reconstruction and rehabilitation effort in Somalia (Renee Bafalis, AID/XA, will do).
- Arrange an on-the-record briefing by Bill Garvelink, OFDA, and someone from AFR to discuss the end of relief and the beginning of reconstruction.
- Offer USAID officials like Administrator Atwood, Ms. Lancaster, AA/AFR John Hicks, D/AA-AFR Dick Cobb, Acting AA/FHA Lois Richards, OFDA's Bill Garvelink, for electronic and print media on-the-record and background interviews.
- Call Dr. Bob Arnott, health consultant for CBS, and suggest he return to Somalia and revisit villages he covered during the famine. Ask him to look for particular children he featured last fall to check their progress (particularly the 14-year old boy who was given up for dead and nearly buried before he made a noise).

Department of Defense

- Make DoD officials including Under Secretary Wisner, A/S Freeman available for on-the-record and background interviews.
- Mount an aggressive hometown media program. Offer seats aboard transports going into Somalia to hometown media escorted by a unit PA. Unit would take care of hometown media.
- Arrange for media, escorted by a public affairs officer, to accompany visiting dignitaries on visits to Somalia.
- Increase numbers of DoD PA second/third level support people in Somalia. Under no circumstances is the goal to raise the US profile.
- Assign internal information and combat camera teams to the UNOSOM military public affairs office. Charge that team with visiting outlying areas developing stories, videotapes and photographs for UNOSOM PA office and DoD to distribute to external news media.

U.S. Information Agency

- In conjunction with USIS/Nairobi, DoD, USAID and USIS/Mogadishu, offer an airplane for a press excursion from Kenya to Somalia commemorating the one-year anniversary of the start of Operation Provide Relief (next week). Make sure to include African journalists on the airplane. Trip would go to outlying areas as well, like Baidoa ("City of Death") and other cities in the "starvation triangle."
- In conjunction with DoD, look into doing a flight from Europe for foreign journalists. However, this would have to wait until there were sufficient PA personnel on the ground to shepherd them around.
- Continue covering the story via the Wireless File, VOA, Worldnet and through policy guidance.

Attachment:

DOD Paper of 7/30/93

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	08/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 3827

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4214

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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