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Folder Title:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

3827

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49	4	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	Draft Presidential Decision Directive (3 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. draft	[Duplicate of 001] (3 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003. draft	[Duplicate of 001] (3 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. draft	[Duplicate of 001] (3 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005. draft	[Duplicate of 001] (3 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: 27 March Deputies Committee: Somalia PRD/Pan Am 103 (3 pages)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
006b. agenda	Small Group Meeting (1 page)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	U.S. Policy Toward Somalia (12 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006d. paper	Deputies Committee Discussion Paper (2 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-6 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files, 1992-1993 [loose] [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4210

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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006a. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: 27 March Deputies Committee: Somalia PRD/Pan Am 103 (3 pages)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
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006b. agenda	Small Group Meeting (1 page)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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006c. paper	U.S. Policy Toward Somalia (12 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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NSC
Chonges

PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON "AN AGENDA FOR PEACE"

INTRODUCTION

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 requested the President to submit a report to Congress on proposals of the UN Secretary General contained in his report to the Security Council entitled "Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, dated June 19, 1992.

In remarks before the UN General Assembly, September 21, 1992, President Bush welcomed the Secretary General's report, also cited as "An Agenda for Peace." The analysis and recommendations of the Secretary General represent a major contribution to dialogue on ways to enhance the United Nations' role in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. President Bush's positive reaction to the Secretary General's report reaffirmed strong U.S. support for UN peacekeeping and complementary efforts by appropriate regional organizations. It acknowledged also the historically close association between the success of UN endeavors in the field of conflict resolution and the achievement of important U.S. foreign policy objectives. Our commitment to a strong, active United Nations was underscored, moreover, by President Bush's announcement in New York that, on its own initiative, the United States would henceforth undertake specific steps to help strengthen UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capabilities.

Call for Special Session of the Security Council

President Bush called for a special meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the Secretary General's proposals in five key areas:

- Development and training of military units for peacekeeping;
- Multinational training, coordinated command-and-control, and interoperability of equipment and communications;
- Sufficient logistical support for UN operations;
- Development of planning, crisis management and intelligence capabilities; and
- Equitable, adequate financing of UN operations.

New U.S. Peacekeeping Initiative

President Bush also announced U.S. willingness to undertake a number of concrete, unilateral steps to enhance the United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capabilities. These include:

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- Assisting the United Nations improve its ability to coordinate peacekeeping efforts and quickly mobilize peacekeeping assets;
- Working with the United Nations to employ most effectively U.S. lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities;
- Training combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities;
- Establishing a permanent peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools; and
- Reviewing how the United States funds peacekeeping and exploring new ways to ensure adequate financial support of United Nations in performing critical peacekeeping functions.

UN Action on "An Agenda for Peace"

The Secretary General's recommendations involve a number of UN organs. Vested by the UN Charter with special responsibilities for peacekeeping, the Security Council has taken an early lead in discussing the report, identifying specific recommendations for action, and planning for a special session on peacekeeping next spring. The General Assembly, by contrast, has chief responsibility for reviewing suggestions pertaining to the organization's budget. The United States supports the Security Council's active role in organizing discussion of the Secretary General's report in order to focus UN efforts in a concerted fashion on practical matters deserving its undivided attention. Consideration of the Secretary General's report should not disturb the useful current division of labor between the Security Council and the General Assembly on peacekeeping-related issues.

The United States is committed to improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping activities. This requires prioritization of the many recommendations put forward by the Secretary General. The enormity of challenges facing the United Nations, as well as current limitations in the organization's capacity to meet international expectations, suggest the wisdom of focusing first on concrete proposals.

The United States has joined consensus in the Security Council in according first priority to the Secretary General's recommendation that member states express willingness to specify, "forces or capabilities that could be made available to the United Nations on short notice, subject to overriding

-3- U.S.

national defense requirements and the approval of the governments providing them." In 1992, the United States advised the United Nations that a full range of military capabilities could be placed at UN disposal in appropriate circumstances. With ~~our enthusiastic support~~, the Security Council also marked for expedited consideration a future request by the Secretary General for "an enhanced peacekeeping planning staff and an operations center in order to deal with the growing complexity of initial planning and control of peacekeeping operations in the field."

The Secretary General has underscored, throughout, the indicative nature of his report and has invited UN member states explicitly to share with the international community ideas of their own. ~~Encouraged by attention now being focused on this important area~~, The United States has ~~renewed~~ pressing for adoption of its own proposals designed to improve the planning and implementation of UN peacekeeping efforts. As reflected in themes sounded by the President while in New York, these U.S. proposals build on ideas advanced by the Secretary General and/or discussed heretofore in various UN-related venues.

U.S. PEACEKEEPING AGENDA

Secretariat structure and management

The United States has long supported steps to create more effective working relationships among offices responsible for different aspects of peacekeeping operations. The President's September 21 speech indicated our support for reforms aimed at improving coordination in the field, better defining mandates, and enhancing integration among interested agencies. On the fiscal side, the President has offered to explore new ways to ensure adequate, equitable financing for UN and associated peacekeeping efforts. Particularly, we need to assure funds for start-up costs and to reconsider the formula for calculating peacekeeping assessments. Progress in these areas would alleviate current operational problems, enhance confidence in UN peacekeeping, and lay the foundation for more fundamental initiatives.

Efforts by the United States and others to strengthen UN peacekeeping must be accompanied by steps to improve the structure and functioning of the United Nations itself. In the UN Secretariat, the United States strongly advocates establishing a communications and information center designed to equip the Secretary General and his deputies with the kind of information needed to ~~provide, under the guidance of the Security Council, comprehensive and timely control over all aspects of peacekeeping operations in the field.~~ That ~~communications and information center would further facilitate~~

(aid in the flow of information relevant to peacekeeping + humanitarian operations, including a 24-hour real time link between the UN headquarters + field operations)

~~communication from the field and among other units of the UN system with useful input.~~

Aided by the existence of a communications and information center, there must be more effective operational integration among UN offices responsible for planning and implementing peacekeeping operations, and those responsible for providing logistical and budgetary support. ~~Rather than simply merging different organizational units, means must be found for assuring full and timely communication among offices so that their different perspectives can be taken wholly into account.~~

The United Nations does not require independent, high-technology means to gather intelligence. It does need, however, the ability to recognize and assess quickly threats to international peace and security, as well as to be able to relate threats and resource requirements. Toward these ends, there is a need for improved training and analytical capabilities for Secretariat staff, with effective linkage to available information resources of member states.

Field Operations

The United States believes that UN mission mandates must clearly define practical objectives to be achieved within specific time frames. This certainly should be the case for new activities; every effort must be made to define such objectives in the renewal of mandates for existing operations. In the execution of mandates, there is an increasing involvement of a broad range of UN programs and agencies. ~~This fact adds urgency to the three-year U.S. campaign for a "Unitary UN."~~ *This fact* ~~This concept envisages elimination of bloated and overlapping international bureaucracies that feed potential for waste, fraud, and abuse. As appropriate, steps should be taken to rationalize and integrate programs and agencies within specific countries.~~ *adds urgency to the* *inefficient*

Financial Management

need to make UN operations more efficient & better integrated.
The United States maintains that changes are required in the formula for calculating peacekeeping assessments to reflect more equitable sharing of costs occasioned by proliferating UN peacekeeping activities. ~~Humanitarian or Development~~ assistance aspects of peacekeeping operations are discrete and should continue to be financed by voluntary contributions, not included in assessed budgets. Funding such expenditures through mandatory assessments could invite creation of peacekeeping activities for reasons other than those directly related to maintaining international peace and security.

To better accommodate fiscal calendars of member states and more effectively compensate for incomplete initial budget estimates, peacekeeping assessment periods should be limited to no more than six months. Coincident mandates of short duration would ensure also that the Security Council has a regular opportunity to assess, and adjust as needed, the missions of various UN peacekeeping activities.

The absence of adequate financial resources can lead to delays in initiating approved peacekeeping operations. This, in turn, can greatly impair their effectiveness and result in significantly increased costs. Establishment of a revolving peacekeeping reserve fund would avoid these problems by providing the means to meet start-up costs of peacekeeping operations. With the receipt of contributions, the fund would be replenished and, thus, be available for assisting the start-up of other peacekeeping operations. We are working with other UN member states to establish a peacekeeping reserve fund which would not require additional assessments. *Now done*

Renewed efforts should be made to offset mandatory assessments with voluntary contributions from member states benefiting from a specific mission; troop contributing countries should be encouraged to forgo reimbursement where possible. The Secretary General's ~~novel~~ proposition that regional organizations, NGOs, private enterprises and foundations should be invited to help share the financial cost of UN peacekeeping merits further study and elaboration. ~~This is a concept, however, that would require much further elaboration.~~ ✓

The United Nations should pursue more aggressively a range of cost containment measures. These might include encouraging maximum recourse to outside contracting, use of civilian personnel to realize cost advantages, calculating the cost of reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment on a more realistic basis, and adjusting on a voluntary basis rotation periods for military and civilian personnel involved in peacekeeping operations. Promulgation of strict regulations governing the sale, reuse, or other disposition of UN materiel after conclusion of peacekeeping operations is ~~especially~~ *needed* indicated.

Countries hosting UN peacekeepers should be required to enter into status of forces agreements in which they undertake to provide the United Nations with the most favorable legal exchange rate, suspend all duties/tariffs, and supply needed facilities on the most cost-favorable terms. Accommodations, supplies, and local transport, for example, should be provided at no charge whenever feasible.

ANALYSIS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT

Preventive Diplomacy

The United States supports wholeheartedly the Secretary General's call for increased use of confidence-building measures -- or those steps designed to diminish suspicion and lessen tensions between potential parties to conflict. The United States favors also closer coordination with regional organizations and possible disputants. Reforms are indicated to better enable the United Nations to analyze information made available by member states concerning threats to international peace and security. *needed*

The Secretariat should have sufficient personnel to *develop* elaborate diplomatic strategies and, once approved by the Security Council, implement those strategies promptly and effectively. Information flow in the Secretariat must be rationalized to accommodate the new, larger scale of UN operations.

The United States supports, in principle, UN-monitored demilitarized zones. They can usefully separate two hostile parties, facilitate confidence-building measures, and prevent potentially dangerous mistakes. Preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces may also be an appropriate tool in volatile regions.

Peacemaking

The United States concurs with the Secretary General's recommendation that he be given greater scope for independent action in the area of peacemaking based on close consultation with the Security Council. Good offices missions in Nagorno-Karabach, Mozambique, and Abu Musa/Two Tunbs illustrate the promise of such initiatives. In principle, the United States also supports fuller exploration of the Security Council's dispute-settling capabilities. ?

The United States is concerned about recommendations of the Secretary General concerning the World Court. The Security Council and General Assembly already have the authority to request ICJ advisory opinions on legal questions relating to disputes between states. The United States sees no reason to give the Secretary General blanket authority to do also. The United States considers the determination to request an advisory opinion from the Court to be a political act appropriately vested only in political organs of the United Nations.

The United States agrees that there is a need to address more vigorously concerns of countries disproportionately affected by UN sanctions. This is an issue, however, that has far-reaching economic and political implications. The UN Charter provides simply that such states have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to the latter's enforcement measures taken against a state. While some states have raised the issue, most recently in Iraq, the Council's practice has been to make a special request to member states for economic assistance to the affected states. Other solutions have been viewed as problematic. For example, making exceptions in the sanctions regime in favor of an affected state could significantly undermine the sanctions regime. Alternatively, direct assistance from the United Nations to affected states establishes a precedent that would be difficult to control and that could have very significant financial implications for the organization and member states, especially the United States.

The United States believes that agreements envisaged by Article 43 of the UN Charter raise significant military, organizational, and political questions. Care must be taken to ensure, for example, that the existence of such agreements would not adversely affect national decisions regarding the employment and command-and-control of such forces, or the constitutional processes of member states. Rather than concluding Article 43 agreements per se, the United States endorses strongly the approach already adopted by the Security Council in its presidential statement of October 29, 1992. Member states are encouraged to declare their willingness to supply the United Nations, on short notice and subject to the national approval, forces or capabilities needed to mount peacekeeping operations. The Secretary General and countries interested in making resources available to the United Nations may then enter into a dialogue defining with greater precision, but on a case-by-case basis, what forces or capabilities could be made available on a specific timetable for particular peacekeeping operations.

The UN Participation Act (UNPA) currently limits the President's ability to deploy U.S. armed forces personnel in support of UN peacekeeping activities. Under the Act, the President can detail in support of UN peacekeeping operations no more than 1,000 non-combatant personnel. Even that limited number must be assigned to activities directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They cannot be used in connection with Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. Since the enactment of the UNPA in 1945, there has been an enormous expansion in number and scope of UN peacekeeping operations, under both Chapters VI and VII. The Executive Branch is reviewing the UNPA and other

relevant authorities ^{to determine} ~~with a view to~~ how the United States might best supply the United Nations on short notice with forces needed to defuse or confront threats to international peace and security.

As noted by the Secretary General, the Military Staff Committee is ill-suited to the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations. Nor can it, in our judgment, provide military strategic direction and command in the context of Chapter VII. The entity's size, composition, and operation by consensus are impediments to decisive action. The Committee may have a useful, more general role, however, in providing military advice, information, and planning to the Security Council and the Secretary General.

Peacekeeping

The United States concurs wholeheartedly with the Secretary General's insistence that UN operations meet certain requirements. At a minimum, these include having a clear mandate and sufficient financial and logistic support. ~~On a practical level, UN peacekeeping proposals should be guided also by a clear understanding of resources host governments will provide.~~ UN funding proposals must be cost-effective yet realistic enough to get the job done.

The United States supports efforts to integrate peacemaking and peacekeeping concepts at both planning and implementation stages. For these purposes, we define "peacemaking" as action to bring hostile parties to agreement through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies, or other peaceful means agreeable to the parties. "Peacekeeping," by contrast, is the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through third-party intervention organized and directed internationally. Traditionally, peacekeeping activities involving the deployment of UN forces have had the consent of disputing parties. However, more recently, the United Nations has been engaged in the use of military force without such consent or, as in Iraq, against the will of a party. This concept has been termed "peace enforcement" to distinguish it from more traditional UN activities. A melding of these three different, but mutually reinforcing concepts would backstop effectively both military and increasingly common electoral, human rights, and administrative components of peacekeeping operations.

The United States strongly advocates improved training of peacekeeping forces, especially in diplomatic skills, police

In the case of Somalia, we have used the term peacemaking, to describe the expanding it to include use of military tools to create conditions for peacekeeping.

activities, and de-mining. Units specializing in these and other common aspects of peacekeeping should be made available for general training purposes. The United States supports establishing or participating in the activities of training centers for peacekeepers and has offered to make U.S. bases and facilities available for multinational training and exercises. ~~The Secretary General voices appropriate concern for the safety of UN personnel.~~

The United States recommends also exploring efficient and cost-effective ways to enhance existing UN stockpiles of frequently used and generic peacekeeping items. This relates back to aspects of the U.S. agenda placing a premium on aggressive cost-containment measures. The United States sees merit to the idea that member states could identify logistic capabilities to be available on short notice, and is exploring fully modalities for U.S. participation. ~~It would be a good idea to keep specified equipment available for sale, loan or donation, depending on the circumstances of the individual situation.~~ Sea and air lift should be made available at rates reflecting market conditions. In at least some instances, the United States would expect to be credited for the value of these services as an offset against U.S. assessments for the relevant peacekeeping operation, rather than being directly reimbursed for them. As has been the case, there may be limited instances in which such services would be provided at no cost or at lower than commercial rates. *should be kept*

Peace-building

The United States wholeheartedly endorses the Secretary General's conviction that establishment of viable, democratic, market-oriented nations is key to creating conditions conducive to peace and prosperity. The United States also strongly agrees with his emphasis on building peace through holding elections, protecting human rights, strengthening governments, and promoting political participation. *The US military has a long history of nation assistance (such as building farm-to-market roads).*

Financing

President Bush announced that the United States would explore new ways to ensure adequate American support for U.N. peacekeeping. However, in the financial area, the United States has a number of serious problems with the Secretary General's proposals. While the United States may be willing to consider accelerated appropriations to defray the up-front costs of peacekeeping missions on a case-by-case basis, it believes establishment of a revolving reserve fund would be a more effective way to meet this problem. In any event, the United States cannot accept the proposal that the *such activities are valuable in post-conflict peacebuild + should be continued*
done

General Assembly appropriate one-third of estimated costs as soon as the Security Council decides to establish a peacekeeping operation. The U.S. response to these approaches, of course, must take into account the Congressional authorization and appropriations process.

We believe the issue of how member states choose to finance their peacekeeping contributions is a matter best left to individual governments. As for the United States, we firmly believe that the Department of State should continue to have lead policy responsibility for UN peacekeeping. ~~We are reviewing ways to ensure adequate funding for peacekeeping.~~ Because peacekeeping operations are undertaken for both foreign policy and national security purposes, and have both political and military ramifications, our review of funding measures includes consideration of the proposal that peacekeeping be funded -- in whole or part -- out of the National Defense function of the budget. We are convinced that there must continue to be close Department of State cooperation with the Department of Defense on peacekeeping operations and increased resources devoted to this important activity in both agencies.

The United States would be reluctant to give the Secretary General authority in exceptional circumstances to place contracts without competitive bidding. Extraordinary control procedures would be required in order to make consideration of such a practice acceptable. Effective, cost-efficient management of existing UN stockpiles, as indicated above, would minimize the need for expedited contracting.

The United States continues to consider ill-advised some past proposals endorsed by the Secretary General in his report. These include:

- Charging interest on unpaid assessments, which would increase arrears rather than provide incentive for prompt payment. The legislative and budgetary procedures of member states differ and many are not able to pay in full within the time limit prescribed.

- Suspending financial regulations and retaining budgetary surpluses. ~~(which would be unnecessary if the Secretary General exercised the discipline required to keep expenditures in line with income)~~ Retaining budgetary surpluses would penalize those who do pay.
- Increasing the Working Capital Fund to one-quarter of annual assessments, which would contradict the recommendation of the UN Joint Inspection Unit that Working Capital Funds should be about one-twelfth of annual expenditures.
- Authorizing the Secretary General to borrow commercially, which would invite a lack of financial discipline, increase the obligations of the ^{UN} Organization, and risk creating an unmanageable financial problem later. Such authority would carry with it also the political risk of less close consultation than we deem appropriate between the Secretary General and members of the Security Council. We note, moreover, that the United States is precluded by legislation from paying its share of interest resulting from external borrowing.
- Establishing a \$1 billion Peace Endowment Fund, which would be unrealistic given widespread delinquencies in assessed contributions.
- Imposing a levy on international travel and arms sales, which would be an unacceptable infringement on national revenue authority.

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007. paper	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-6 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Our goal would be to have these officers return to Haiti looking and behaving differently from police of the past. The symbols of new uniforms and professionalized behavior would send a strong signal of changes to come.

In addition, a contingent of 200 - 300 international gendarmes could be sent to act as technical advisors to the above 500. In addition to providing an international presence, these gendarmes would also continue to conduct on-the-job training.

Consultations with the UN indicate these individuals would have to be deployed on a bilateral basis and could not engage in actual police activities. Perhaps we could seek bilateral agreements and a request from President Aristide.

The idea would be to saturate this force with foreign police advisers who will be present and monitoring virtually every police post and operation.

Draw the advisers from several, preferably francophone, countries.

Begin ICITAP led police professionalization training, reaching as many policemen and recruits as quickly as possible and developing outreach working through the advisers attached to police units.

Coordinate police professionalization with the training of the VIP protective details.

C. US Military Role in Supporting the Above Program

Expand the US Humanitarian Civic Action program far beyond the initial Seabee unit in Port-au-Prince, with projects throughout the country.

Deploy detachments of MP's who would be tied to the Seabees ostensibly for protection of American Citizens, US property and to assist in evacuation.

Augment the Marine Security Guard Detachment at the Embassy to 20 - 25 for the above reasons.

Include Friends of Haiti in this process. Each project group would contain a small security unit. Project groups would work with local Haitian military personnel and keep an eye on them.

Begin military professionalization program by USG and expand it rapidly in size and if possible in geographic area.

D. Evacuation and Emergency Intervention Capability

Develop a plan for emergency evacuation of Amcits and other foreigners, including visible naval and air presence near Haiti.

Develop plans for a back-up emergency intervention force that could pacify Haiti by force if necessary to protect Amcit and other lives and restore order. This rapid deployment force could be stationed at Fort Bragg.

E. Atmospherics:

Ship visits by US and other countries such as Britain, France, Argentina, Chile, Brazil.

High level military visits.