

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

2986

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	3	10	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Thoughts on Liberia (3 pages)	11/09/1992	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: UN Role in Liberia - Ceasefire Policy (3 pages)	11/06/1992	P1/b(1)
003. memo	John Ordway to Jonathan Howe, re: Deputies Meeting on Angola/Liberia (2 pages)	11/06/1992	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Robert Houdek to PCC Participants, re: PCC Meeting on Somalia (1 page)	11/06/1992	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: UN Request for Additional Lift to Somalia (2 pages)	10/27/1992	P1/b(1)
006. minutes	Minutes of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (10 pages)	10/21/1992	P1/b(1)
007. memo	John Ordway to Jonathan Howe, re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (3 pages)	10/20/1992	P1/b(1)
008a. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (1 page)	10/21/1992	P1/b(1)
008b. list	Options for Airlift Transition (1 page)	10/00/1992	P1/b(1)
008c. report	Interagency Planning Group Status Report (1 page)	10/15/1992	P1/b(1)
008d. paper	Long Term Political Strategy for Somalia (4 pages)	10/00/1992	P1/b(1)
009a. email	John Ordway to Thomas McNamara, re: Sahnoun meeting (1 page)	10/16/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [7]

2012-0659-F
kc4206

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. note	Note for Admiral Howe (2 pages)	10/16/1992	P1/b(1)
010. note	Handwritten notes (2 pages)	10/00/1992	P1/b(1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-Nov-1992 15:42 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Thomas E. McNamara

(MCNAMARA)

FROM:

John M. Ordway
(ORDWAY)

SUBJECT:

Swing's recommendations on Liberia

Bill Swing is advocating a fairly bellicose policy.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/13/17

2012-0659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Re: UN Role in Liberia - Ceasefire Policy (3 pages)	11/06/1992	P1/b(1)

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003. memo	John Ordway to Jonathan Howe, re: Deputies Meeting on Angola/Liberia (2 pages)	11/06/1992	P1/b(1)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9221021
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 92 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 06 NOV 92
SOURCE REF: 9223066

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

PCC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: 12 NOV PCC MTG ON US POLICY RE SOMALIA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 11 NOV 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
HILL
HOWE
MCNAMARA
NSC CHRON
ORDWAY
SCOWCROFT
SITTMANN

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By YDE NARA, Date 02/13/17

2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S 9223066

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

November 6, 1992

By KDE NARA Date 02/13/17
2012-0659-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM TO:

MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Affairs Advisor
The White House

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


CPT H.L. SHEFFIELD, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
United States Information Agency

MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: PCC Meeting on U.S. Policy Regarding Somalia
November 12, 1992, 10:00 a.m., Room 3519
Department of State

Please transmit the attached meeting notification and papers to principals of the Policy Coordinating Committee for Africa.


W. Robert Pearson
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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004. memo	Robert Houdek to PCC Participants, re: PCC Meeting on Somalia (1 page)	11/06/1992	P1/b(1)
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: WDE Date: 08/13/17
2012-0659-F

'92 (0) -3 PRASE

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

082 NOV -4 PM 0:42

MESSAGE NO. 088713 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 3

FROM: Ross Wilson S/S 75302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO USUN NEW YORK: UN REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
LIFT TO SOMALIA

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	William Sittmann	456-6534	WHSitrm
NSCS	Kenneth Hill	456-6534	WHSitrm
NSCS	Executive Secretariat	456-6534	WHSitrm
	<u>W/KE</u>		
	<u>ORDWAY</u>		
	<u>MCNAMARA</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ - - - COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 11/3. Urgent.

F/I - Ordway cleared w/changes.

S/S Officer: Ross Wilson

Ross Wilson

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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005. cable	Re: UN Request for Additional Lift to Somalia (2 pages)	10/27/1992	P1/b(1)

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20971

October 27, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH:

TED MCNAMARA

FROM:

JOHN M. ORDWAY

SUBJECT:

Minutes of the Deputies Committee Meeting on
Somalia, October 21, 1992, 2:00 - 3:15 pm

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: LOE Date: 02/13/17

2012-0659-F

Attached at Tab I are the Minutes for the DC meeting on Somalia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and file the attached Minutes for the record.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Minutes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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006. minutes	Minutes of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (10 pages)	10/21/1992	P1/b(1)

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 20 OCT 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
DC

AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DC MTG ON SOMALIA 21 OCT

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 19 OCT 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HINDLE

HOWE

MCNAMARA

NSC CHRON

ORDWAY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/13/17

2012-0659-F

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSJSL

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
 ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 15
 FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 456-6534
 (Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON SOMALIA

NSC Log # 20922

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXEC SEC		
DOD	EXEC SEC		
CIA	EXEC SEC		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

*** STATE: HARD CY TO FOLLOW ***

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KDE Date: 02/13/17

2012-0689-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 02/13/17
2012-0659-F

LOG 9220922
DATE 20 OCT 92

SUBJECT: DC MTG ON SOMALIA 21 OCT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

JACKSON, K
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

COPY: 1

ZOELLICK, R

COPY: 1

PEARSON, W
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

October 20, 1992

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/13/17
2012-0659-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development


MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (U)

Attached is the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia scheduled for October 21. Attendance is limited to principal plus one. ~~(S)~~

Also attached is an NSC-drafted paper outlining options for the airlift transition (Tab B), and AID-drafted discussion paper on the transition (Tab C), and a DOD-drafted paper on the status of the interagency planning process for security related proposals (Tab D). ~~(S)~~



William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Airlift Option Paper
Tab C Airlift Discussion Papers
Tab D Planning Process Paper (without Tabs)

cc: Bob Zoellick

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (1 page)	10/21/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4206

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. list	Options for Airlift Transition (1 page)	10/00/1992	P1/b(1)

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Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
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
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**MILITARY TO CIVILIAN TRANSITION PLAN
FOR OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF**

Purpose:

To define a plan of action for the orderly transition from the use of U.S. military to civilian aircraft assets, while maintaining overall capacity and flexibility to reach those in need in Somalia.

Assumptions:

1. Other donors and relief organizations now contributing aircraft to the relief effort will continue to do so, or will provide funding for substitute civilian aircraft capacity until 31 December.
2. Commercial Hercules are able to carry 17 to 20 metric tons per flight depending on the type and condition of the destination runway.
3. U.S. military aircraft are able to carry an average of 10 metric tons per flight, depending on the type and condition of the destination runway.
4. The two Southern Air Transport Hercules presently funded as an in-kind contribution by the U.S. to ICRC and WFP will continue to be funded by the U.S. or some other donor. They are not counted in the proposed transition schedule below.

Current Capability:

U.S.

- 14 C-130s have an average maximum capacity per day of 200 metric tons. (No more than 10 planes are available per day to fly relief commodities.)

Federal Republic of Germany

- 2 C-160s have an average maximum capacity per day of 36 metric tons.

Canada

- 3 C-130s have an average maximum capacity per day of 72 metric tons. (One C-130 is used as a backup.)

Belgium

- 1 C-130 has an average maximum capacity per day of 36 metric tons.

Lutheran World Federation

- 1 Southern Air Transport Hercules has an average maximum capacity per day of 40 metric tons.

World Food Program

- 1 Southern Air Transport Hercules has an average maximum capacity per day of 40 metric tons.

International Committee of the Red Cross

- 1 Southern Air Transport Hercules has an average maximum capacity per day of 40 metric tons.

Total present maximum capacity per day of all aircraft is 464 MT. The total capacity of the U.S. airlift per day is 200 MT. The schedule agreed upon by DOD and OFDA for the transition follows. Normal operational requests may require minor modifications to this schedule.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>USG-FUNDED CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>DOD AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TOTAL US MTs</u>	<u>TOTAL MTs</u>
15 Oct.	0	14=10*	200	464
31 Oct.	0	14=10	200	464
15 Nov.	2	10= 7	212	476
30 Nov.	4	6=3	204	468
15 Dec.	5	0	180	444

* The number after the (=) sign is the estimated number of aircraft of the total available per day to fly relief commodities. Other aircraft are used for AirBorne Command & Control Center (ABCCC), are on backup standby, or are down for mechanical repair.

Observations:

1. The above schedule allows for a transition without having, at any time, a reduction in carrying capacity except at the end of the transition period. The difference would have to be made up there through the trucking operations.


2. If airdropping becomes an option, the number of DOD aircraft might be reduced because there may not be a need for an AirBorne Command & Control Center (ABCCC) or a standby, and the maximum tonnage deliverable by DOD contingent will increase.

3. A successful U.S. effort to recruit additional donor participation in the airlift will decrease the need for USG-funded civilian aircraft.

Note: ICRC has said if they had access to 2 commercial Hercules, besides the one they now have, they would have no further requests of DOD for airlift of relief supplies.

Timeline of Deployment

DOD and USG-Funded Civilian Aircraft



ADDENDUM A

Management of the Civilian Airlift

The PCC requested that this addendum be added to the Transition Paper to outline how management of the U.S.-funded civilian aircraft would be handled. Below are two options for the management of the FHA-funded civilian air lift. The first is the plan strongly preferred by A. Natsios and the DART team in Nairobi, and the second is not.

Option 1.

The first and preferred alternative is to second the USG-funded civilian aircraft replacing DOD planes to international organizations involved in moving food and other relief supplies. The UN World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross will be provided with all or at least the lion's share of the aircraft as an "in-kind" contribution. Other relief organizations may be provided with aircraft, depending on lift requirements. Aircraft will be provided for a specified period of time - most likely on a month to month basis - at the end of which FHA/OFDA will have the ability to reallocate the planes among relief agencies, or discontinue use of planes if road convoys can begin.

As is the case for FHA/OFDA relief operations world-wide, when civilian aircraft are contracted and donated in-kind, the USG is no longer directly involved in the day-to-day use and scheduling of the aircraft. These tasks fall to the recipients of USG donations, in this case WFP, ICRC, or an NGO. The Nairobi-based OFDA/DART, however, will monitor the use of the resources to determine if they are used efficiently and have achieved the agreed-upon objectives. It will fall to the receiving agency to request additional resources from the DART - or from other representatives of the international community - should they be required.

The DOD Joint Task Force (JTF) could leave a "transition cell" of some 3-5 people in place in Kenya to assist WFP, ICRC and others in managing the civilian airlift from the time the DOD airlift departs until January 1. The FHA/OFDA DART team reports that WFP may also request the assistance of JTF communicators and provision of some equipment.

All civilian aircraft provided by the USG will benefit from WFP's creation of an Operations Dispatch Center, (ODP). The purposes of the ODC is to follow aircraft flights, collect all flight schedules and deconflict those schedules, and to provide information on airstrip conditions and security situations at airports. (Note. The ODC will not, and cannot by international regulations, control aircraft; it can only advise and inform. The ODC also will not have any say in such issues as what goes on which airplane or prioritization of flights. As indicated above, the agencies provided with the aircraft have that responsibility. WFP and ICRC are currently closely coordinating their food shipments.)

ADDENDUM B

Alternative Viewpoint on Phase-Out Schedule of DOD planes

While this Transition Paper recommends a phase-out of DOD aircraft by December 15, Special Coordinator for Somali Relief, Andrew Natsios, asked that this addendum be attached to the paper highlighting his concerns about the current proposed DOD phase-out schedule.

Mr. Natsios is concerned that a complete transition to civilian airlift on December 15 - even if tonnage goals and scheduling flexibility is assured - will: 1) not allow the U.S. government to maintain its current high profile in the international press and 2) not allow the U.S. to maintain its current leadership role vis a vis the UN and other donors.

1.) The U.S. government will not receive "credit" in the international press for the U.S.-funded aircraft because, in accordance with normal AID/OFDA procedures, the planes will be seconded to relief agencies and fly under the logos and flags of those agencies.

For example, it is little known that A.I.D. is already funding two civilian aircraft because one is flying for the UN World Food Program and the other is flying for the International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC). The UN and ICRC airlifts are regularly highlighted in the press, but with no mention of the U.S. funding source for some of their planes.

2.) The U.S. will not be able to maintain its leadership role vis a vis the UN agencies and other donors through funding of civilian aircraft. If U.S.-funded planes are seconded to international agencies, the U.S. will NOT get involved in the day-to-day decision-making of how the planes are used. Our role in the airlift operations would therefore significantly diminish.

We could not, for example, have much leverage over the UN World Food Programs' use of the planes for airdrops, even though the DART team and AID/FHA do not currently believe the operational details of using airdrops have been adequately worked out.

In addition, while we have been encouraging other governments to second aircraft, it will be exceedingly difficult to convince them of the seriousness of our commitment if DOD aircraft leave while they are just making plans to provide airlift support.

It should also be noted that UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Somalia relief, Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, has expressed serious reservations about the departure of DOD aircraft and would like to see a DOD presence beyond the December 15 deadline.

CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATION

With a complete phase down of DOD aircraft by December 15, it is likely that the U.S. leadership role will be diminished and that overall relief efforts will lose some of the momentum created by the presence of the DOD planes and personnel.

Mr. Natsios would prefer to see a small number of DOD planes (4) left on the ground to continue airlifting supplies into the new year. He would recommend another review of the necessity of those planes remaining in the area at the end of the year.



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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008c. report	Interagency Planning Group Status Report (1 page)	10/15/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 20, 1992

Admiral Howe:

1. Upon further reflection I deleted all agency positions since the Deputies could have different views than those expressed by their agencies at the PCC.
2. It's not clear what DOD and JCS support. What is clear is that JCS wants out by Christmas.
3. Tab C Classification: AID drafted and circulated this as unclassified. This particular horse is out of the barn. If you want to prevent future episodes, you should mention it to Edelman. AID does not normally "think" classified.
4. I included the tabs to Tab D since they are mentioned in the text, but have now dropped them.

John Ordway

October 19, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: TED MCNAMARA *of*
FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY *g*
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia October 21

We have prepared an agenda (Tab A) for Wednesday's Deputies Committee meeting and attached three papers mandated by the PCC (Tabs C and D). One of them, an AID paper on airlift transition, does not address the full range of options. We therefore have prepared a paper which briefly outlines all the options and their pros and cons (Tab B). Tabs II, III and IV are papers already circulated in the interagency and attached for your information.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to transmit the agenda and related papers to his counterparts.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann memo
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Airlift Option Paper
Tab C Airlift Discussion Papers
Tab D Planning Process Paper
Tab II Public Diplomacy Strategy
Tab III Long Term Political Strategy
Tab IV Monetization Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *KDE* NARA, Date *02/13/17*
2012-0659-F

The purpose of this paper is to underscore the importance of public diplomacy as an integral part of the USG's Somalia relief initiative at this time, propose regularization of inter-Agency cooperation, and gain support for a number of operative steps to enhance public affairs support of USG actions.

Background:

In response to the Administration's Somalia relief initiative, formally announced on August 14, USIA, State, AID and DOD mobilized their media and public affairs resources to pursue several initial key objectives:

- A. Deliver the U.S. message and publicize U.S. actions worldwide;
- B. Highlight the U.S. leadership role and U.S. support for U.N. action;
- C. Underscore Washington's commitment to helping Somalia;
- D. Focus international attention on the human tragedy in Somalia and the need for concerted international action, which would also serve to accentuate the U.S. role in dealing with the Somali crisis;
- E. Through public diplomacy, build support in potential donor countries to join in the U.S. effort;
- F. Inform the American public through the U.S. media of the Administration's relief measures.

We believe that it is important at this stage to build upon this endeavor by developing closer inter-Agency public affairs cooperation in supporting U.S. objectives with regard to the Somali crisis. It is proposed that participants in this effort include representatives of USIA, State AF/PA, AID/EA, OFDA and DOD.

Public Affairs Strategy: Phase I

The above objectives comprised the first phase of a collective public affairs strategy in support of the USG's Somali initiative. Implementation of this phase involved internal coordination; cooperation among USIA, State, AID and DOD; and cooperation between the USIS Public Affairs Officer and Information Officer in Kenya and AID and DOD public affairs officers on the scene to provide the fullest possible assistance and information to a swelling corps of U.S. and international journalists. Moreover, USIA directed its PAO's overseas to seek broad media placement of U.S. statements and actions and pursue active personal diplomacy in support of its public affairs objectives.

AID's Bureau for External Affairs helped line up Messrs. Natsios and Kunder for USIA Worldnet Dialogues, telepress conferences and a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center.

AID/EA drafted an op-ed article under Administrator Roskens' byline, which has already been transmitted in the USIA Wireless File for placement in foreign papers. Using footage shot by U.S. combat film crews in Kenya and Somalia, USIA transmitted news of the humanitarian effort in its daily "Newsfile" program. VOA continues to provide extensive coverage of the Somalia story.

In Kenya, USIS officers continue to be the main contact point for resident and non-resident U.S. and international journalists and have worked assiduously to respond to their needs and provide them with information. USIS Nairobi has arranged a steady stream of press conferences for U.S. officials, including a recent news conference for Andrew Natsios and CEO's of leading American PVO's.

Public Affairs Strategy: Phase II

A longer term goal of U.S. policy regarding Somalia involves support for U.N. and other efforts toward reconciliation of clan leaders and elders in Somalia. This grows out of the earlier phase of U.S. strategy, since the U.S. and multilateral relief endeavor can be fully successful only if the fundamental security problems and state of anarchy and conflict are dealt with adequately. An effective public affairs strategy thus has to focus on the twin priorities of (a) building up support for a greater multilateral response to the Somali crisis and (b) influencing the situation inside Somalia by encouraging inter-factional cooperation and reconciliation and urging support for U.N. and other international mediation efforts.

With this in mind, USIA began to map out a second phase of public affairs action. This was premised on the thesis that, with the absence of a U.S. information presence in Somalia, radio is the only or primary means of communicating with audiences within Somalia as well as in other locations in Africa and the Middle East where significant Somali communities exist.

VOA does not at this time broadcast in Somali. The BBC, which does, enjoys a wide listenership in and outside Somalia. We have and should continue to make news about the U.S. role in the Somali crisis known to the BBC Somali Service. We have clear evidence that the BBC's afternoon Somali language broadcasts have large listening audiences. Somalia's literate and educated classes, who speak Arabic by virtue of their Islamic upbringing and English if they had a modern education, are also known to listen to VOA's Arabic and English language broadcasts.

Against this backdrop, three proposals were submitted for consideration:

1. Initiating VOA broadcasts in Somali. This would be the most effective and reliable, though costliest, way of utilizing radio transmission in support of U.S. goals. If resources become available, this project could be implemented quickly.

2. Enhancing VOA Arabic broadcasts to Somalia, by dedicating part of the Arabic transmission to Somali concerns. (FYI: The Arabic Service has already introduced a special 15-minute segment on Somalia.)

3. Feeding information to foreign radio networks broadcasting in Somali (e.g. Kenyan Broadcasting Corp., Radio Djibouti) by means of voice feeds transmitted via USIA's satellite subcarrier and/or printed materials.

Issues for Discussion:

- o Public affairs is an important dimension of the U.S. Somali relief initiative and should be integrated in the overall policy planning and implementation process as a high priority objective.
- o This public affairs effort has an international and a domestic component, both of which should be addressed through a rational division of labor:
 - AID/EA, OFDA and State AF/PA would coordinate the dissemination of information to the U.S. press and to private citizen groups in the United States.
 - Dissemination of information in Africa and around the world about U.S. actions to help stave off starvation in Somalia and help resolve the Somali crisis would primarily be undertaken by USIA, in collaboration with OFDA and DOD.
- o USIA would continue to utilize its electronic and print resources (Worldnet, VOA, Wireless File, telepress conferencing) and bring its speaker program into play in support of USG objectives.
- o With reference to the above, USIA would recruit a senior USG official to tour donor countries under the American Speaker program, to meet with the press, government representatives and PVO's.
- o USIA has been cooperating with State, AID and DOD on an ad hoc basis. Cooperation should now be regularized through the setting up of an inter-agency public affairs coordinating committee to meet bi-weekly.
- o In concert with State, USIA and DOD, a public information strategy designed to support Somali national reintegration should be developed in support of U.S. and U.N. diplomatic initiatives.

Drafted by:AF-SKouttab_____/1473j

Cleared by:AF-RLaGamma____

C-Mr. Russell____

B-Mr. Untermeyer____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008d. paper	Long Term Political Strategy for Somalia (4 pages)	10/00/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

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AN ASSESSMENT OF RISKS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH "MONETIZATION" OF RELIEF FOOD IN SOMALIA

I. Background

The international community has not been able to deliver sufficient food to all areas of Somalia because of continuing security and logistical constraints. We are not able to reach the monthly UN/ICRC-estimated emergency target of 52,000 metric tons. Many Somalis are still dying because they have little or no access to food.

Under these conditions, the expansion of food delivery through commercial, market channels (such as "monetization" -- the sale of food to Somali merchants for delivery inside Somalia) can be an important supplement to other food delivery systems. Market intervention programs like monetization complement -- and do not replace -- free distribution programs. Free food will have to be distributed to the destitute, those without any resources. Even lacking a Somali government structure, commercial strategies can be built to take advantage of the special capabilities of Somali merchants and traders, who are in an excellent position to deliver the goods under the present risky security conditions because they operate under long-established marketing arrangements and maintain their own private security forces. Private markets in Somalia are not looted.

II. Benefits

USAID, WFP, and PVO's are familiar with the operation of monetization and similar commercial systems for delivering food, including deliveries under emergency conditions. In FY92, for example, USAID operated \$65.2 million of PL 480 Title II monetization programs in 17 nations, of which eight are in Africa.

The benefits of such market intervention programs are well known and widely recognized in the relief and development communities, and include:

- o increased access to food by a larger percentage of the at-risk population, as use of commercial channels allows more food to enter target areas;
- o the creation of an indigenous lobby, the merchant class, in Somalia pressing elders and warlords to reduce violence and looting.
- o increased employment opportunities and greater ability of the at-risk population to buy at least some of their food, as commercial traders hire shippers, truckers, porters and other wage-earners to move and process the monetized food;

- o reduced pressures that encourage people to steal relief food and, thereby, improved security, as the overall price of food falls relative to other commodities; and,
- o the generation of financial resources for rehabilitation activities from the money collected from merchants for the food sold to them.
- o inducement of the delivery of hoarded food on to markets in Somalia by taking the profit out of hoarding; i.e., lowering food prices.

III. Monetization Strategy in Somalia

The goal of this program is to increase the access to food by a larger percentage of the at-risk populations in Somalia through the normal commercial marketing system. This will be accomplished by selling some of the donor-supplied commodities at favorable, but near-market prices. The commodities would be marketed in targeted towns and the sales proceeds would be used in and around these towns by PVOs for labor-intensive cash-for-work schemes in priority sectors, including nutrition, health, rehabilitation of social infrastructure, warehouses, agriculture, road/runway repair, and garbage collection. In addition, PVO Somali staff salaries can be met by using sales proceeds.

Lacking government structure, it will be important to get the local elders involved in discussions on how to spend sales proceeds from monetization programs. This will reinforce their traditional authority structures, a principal strategy of our relief effort. The increased employment opportunities should permit a larger percentage of the population to begin participating in the local economy and should enable a greater percentage of the population to start buying at least some food.

IV. Location

The proposed market intervention programs are to be implemented in both southern Somalia and northern Somalia. Djibouti will be used as the base of monetization programs for the north, and commodities will be delivered by CARE to ports like Berbera and Bosaso. For the south, Mombasa will be used as a base for implementing monetization programs. Initially, CARE intends to deliver the monetized commodities to two ports in southern Somalia, Brava (south of Mogadishu) and Uarsciek (north of Mogadishu). Mogadishu will be avoided, at least initially, because of potential security problems. The monetized commodities will first be marketed in towns in the Bay and Middle Shebelle Regions -- including towns currently served by the U.S. airlift.

An existing WFP Emergency Operational Plan, which assigns CARE as the implementing intermediary, provides a precedent to implement the monetization process. CARE has been provided with a grant from USAID to coordinate and implement market intervention programs in

both NE Somalia, NW Somalia (Somaliland) and southern Somalia. Under the WFP Operational Plan, CARE will arrange to sell food commodities provided by donors to local Somali traders/merchants for local currency (Somali shillings) at favorable but near-market prices. CARE will arrange the delivery of the monetized commodities to various ports of entry where the title of the commodities will be transferred to the Somali merchants.

V. Coordination/Support

The proposed market intervention programs have received support from PVOs as well as the ICRC and UN organizations operating relief programs in Somalia. The EEC has already agreed to supply CARE, through WFP, with 36,000 MT of commodities over the next year for monetization programs for NE/NW Somalia.

CARE will handle the technical aspects of the monetization program, but many other NGOs, such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), have agreed to participate in monetization programs by helping CARE identify interested merchants in the regions, monitoring the movement of monetized commodities from the point of entry to targeted towns, identifying and designing local currency projects, and following market prices and commodity availability. WFP supports market intervention programs and will be providing some of the commodities in its pipeline to CARE to be monetized. The Government of Ireland has agreed to support market intervention programs in southern Somalia by providing 100,000 pounds to CARE/Somalia through Irish Concern to enable CARE to begin implementing market intervention programs immediately.

VI. Estimated Food Requirements for Monetization Programs

Over a twelve month period, CARE believes it is possible to monetize up to 60,000 MT of commodities (such as wheat flour, vegoil and other commodities such as pasta, sugar, tomato paste) in southern Somalia. These commodities would come from the EEC in addition to U.S. PL 480 commodities. In addition, CARE believes it may be possible to monetize up to 40,000 MT of commodities in the north, out of Djibouti, over a one year period.

Food commodities will be sold on a monthly basis to Somali merchants representing the various clans and regions. However, it is anticipated that initial sales of commodities will be limited to pilot sales programs to gain a better understanding of suitable pricing structures.

VII. Identification of Merchants

Identifying suitable merchants who are willing to participate will be critical to the success of any monetization program. CARE intends to involve clan elders and other influential leaders to help identify well established and reliable wholesalers who have proven financial and logistical capabilities and continued presence inside their respective regions to purchase the commodities at

Djibouti or Mombasa. The selection process must be equitable vis-a-vis participation or representation of all clans.

VIII. Risks

Delivery of relief food through commercial channels in conflictive environments -- like the distribution of free food in those environments -- carries with it certain risks. AID, WFP, and the PVO's are familiar with these risks, which include:

- o the commodities might not reach the targeted town, (i.e., they might either be re-exported or sold at the port of entry);
- o the commodities might be sold at a price that is too high, thereby having little impact on food prices at the target destinations;
- o the disbursement of funds generated by sales proceeds in the target towns might not coincide with the arrival of the monetized commodities, thereby spawning instability; or,
- o of special concern in the Somalia crisis, traders might reap large profits that could be used to purchase armaments and fuel the insecurity situation.

IX. Safeguards

Obviously, no one is able to offer a foolproof food delivery system in the chaotic conditions in Somalia. However, relief professionals are building important safeguards into monetization programs in Somalia.

For example, in order to reduce the possibility that the commodities will not reach the targeted towns, merchants who already have a presence in the targeted town will be recruited, their selection publicized to local clan leaders, and the amounts provided will be modest. If the monetized commodities are not marketed in the targeted town, the merchant would be blacklisted from future participation in the program. To reduce the likelihood that the traders would sell the food in Mombasa or Djibouti or re-export food from Somalia, the food will be delivered to the traders at ports or secure locations in Somalia from where it would be very expensive to re-export.

A great deal of consideration has been given to appropriate price levels in the design of these monetization programs. The selling price should not be so high as to make the commodity inaccessible at Somalia markets and not attractive to traders. Conversely, it should not be so cheap as to create an artificial price structure that is highly subsidized and will only increase the profit margin

for traders; i.e., will not be reflected in lower consumer prices.

The monetized food and cash disbursements to PVOs from sales proceeds should arrive simultaneously. If the cash arrives first and there is no food, the pressure to steal food from relief agencies will increase. Funds from village sales must also be reinvested into the same community. Otherwise, the community's money supply will dwindle, and the consumers' purchasing power will decline. Thus, the cash will not be disbursed until the monetized commodities arrive in the local markets of the targeted towns.

If the program is designed as outlined above, and operated with prudent monitoring controls, it is unlikely that merchants will be able to use profits from their participation in the market intervention programs to fuel interclan conflict. Merchants' payment from local purchasers and, therefore, their profits will only be in local currency (Somali shillings). Generally, according to expert observers of Somali market procedures, guns and ammunition, as well as the local narcotic drug, qat, are purchased in hard currency. Moreover, if the merchants sell the monetized commodities at such high prices that the majority of the population cannot afford them, in an attempt to generate additional revenues for arms purchases, they will no longer be able to participate in the program.

X. Conclusion

Given extensive previous experience by WFP, AID and the PVO community with monetization of relief food, and given the desperate need to use all available channels to address the food shortfall in Somalia, USAID/FHA believes that monetization programs should be used to supplement free food distribution in Somalia and has initiated such programs. Given the special security concerns there, such programs must be designed, and are being designed, to guard against program abuse. With sound design and prudent monitoring controls, the advantages of using commercial channels outweigh the risks associated with this procedure.

Somalia Peacekeeping

Background.

The additional 3,000 UN guards will not be deployed to Somalia soon. Best chance estimates -- Canada in mid November, Belgium in mid December, Egypt unknown, Austrian replacement unknown.

DoD/JCS preliminary planning for additional "points of security" entails the deployments of a Brigade sized, 3,000 man unit to provide security for one additional town, its convoys and storage facilities. This is not feasible.

Given the costs and international and internal political obstacles of large force deployments, **current security strategies are not providing the answer for Somalia.**

Sahnoun has advocated the reestablishment of the Somali national police (a force the USG helped found) to start building an indigenous security presence. This is a good, long term solution and given the problems in deployments of UN guards should be accelerated as a possible near term objective.

An effective security strategy for Somalia will require a combination of international guards and the rebuilding of an indigenous security force.

The USG Role.

Although the USG will retain civilian contract aircraft in Somalia, its presence will be drastically reduced by December. The USG could consider other means of remaining engaged in Somalia:

-- A **military planning cell in New York** to help shape strategies for UN guards, Somali security force, and the integration of security and relief strategies. This cell could be a precursor to the President's UNGA planning initiative. General Baril (Canadian advisor to Boutros) has agreed to meet with US military planners after a few weeks of experience with the Paks in Mogadishu.

-- The USG could play a role in the **training and observing of the new national security force** which will probably be a hybrid police/military organization. We have good recent experience in this activity in Panama and El Salvador.

Bottom line: If we want to retain a leadership role in Somalia we will need more than contract aircraft to Southern Air Transport. The USG needs to consider a small but serious planning cell (with a designated JCS flag officer) in New York. In addition, the USG should review the possibility of deploying low numbers of training cadres and observers to Somalia as part of the international effort to rebuild the Somali security force and integrate it with blue helmet guards and relief efforts.

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009a. email	John Ordway to Thomas McNamara, re: Sahnoun meeting (1 page)	10/16/1992	P1/b(1)
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2012-0659-F
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009b. note	Note for Admiral Howe (2 pages)	10/16/1992	P1/b(1)

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This weekend, U.N. observers finally made it official. Angolan President Eduardo Jose dos Santos has carried the day in the country's storm-tossed presidential election, by 49.57 percent. That's more than opposition leader and formerly U.S.-backed rebel leader Jonas Savimbi got, but not enough to avoid a runoff election for the presidency. Right now, that's probably the best outcome one could have hoped for in the 2½-week standoff over the election.

For the moment the threat of the resumption of Angola's 16-year civil war appears to have been averted, and it will be incumbent upon the United Nations and other international observers to ensure that the second round of the elections is scrupulously fair, as it is becoming evident that the first round was not — despite the assertions of the four-man U.N. team that spent a week trying to deal with the angry charges of government-sponsored election fraud brought by Mr. Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

When Angolans went to the polls Sept. 29 and 30, the election was widely hailed as a textbook exercise in democracy. But, as election observers return to the United States and tell their stories, it's now becoming clear that it was nothing of the sort. It's equally clear that Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos never meant it to be.

What Mr. dos Santos and his ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) really want is to legitimize their rule in the eyes of the world and reap the benefits: control of the country, international aid and, not to forget, the elimination of U.S. and South African support for UNITA.

When UNITA began raising questions about voting procedures and irregularities in the counting — as the MPLA took the lead — a lot of people dismissed its complaints as sour grapes. "If Mr. Savimbi wishes to march backward," an editorial in the New York Times sneered, "Americans — especially his conservative admirers — have an obligation to make plain that he will march alone."

But even under pressure from the United States, there's little chance that UNITA — or the other 14 opposition parties that have protested — will acquiesce. Clark Bowers and Brad Phillips, who went to Luanda as accredited election observers at the behest of Reps. Dana Rohrabacher and Christopher Cox, believe there are good reasons not to accept it. These are some of their allegations:

■ The number of U.N. observers was far too low to guarantee adequate supervision — a mere 400 in a nation of 4.7 million people and 5,800 polling stations that is three times the size of Texas. By comparison, the United Nations sent 1,700 observers to Namibia, a nation with 1.5 million people. According to Mr. Bow-

ers, "About 300 of the U.N. observers were registered in a hotel in Luanda during the election. That's how they covered all that territory."

■ The government-controlled National Election Commission cut off the registration of voters prematurely, on Aug. 10, when UNITA's registration drive turned out to be too successful for the MPLA's comfort. This happened over the protests of the United States, Russia, Portugal and the United Nations. As a result, an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 voters in UNITA-dominated rural areas were left out.

■ Voter registration lists were not provided to opposition-party observers, making verification impossible. The published results from the voting precincts were summaries, not the authenticated tally-sheet results that observers had signed off on at the polling stations.

Thus by a highly remarkable — almost miraculous — coincidence, the number of votes cast for presidential candidates in Luanda, Bie, and Kwanza-Norte districts turned out to be exactly the same. In all three places Mr. dos Santos received precisely 11,456 votes, according to a press release from the opposition National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the third largest party. There is no reason to believe this is an isolated incident.

■ In the southern provinces of Namibe and Cunene, several thousand Namibians were brought across the border to vote for the MPLA.

■ At least 100 polling stations were set up without the knowledge of the opposition, and thousands of extra ballots were secretly printed by a Brazilian company and distributed.

■ The number of nullified ballots was disproportionately high in UNITA areas, about 60,000.

■ The MPLA had complete control of the media during the year-long election process. Moreover, says Mr. Phillips, the National Election Commission thought nothing of dismissing all translators during meetings and proceeding in Portuguese, which few of the international observers understood.

■ Police were present at many polling stations, and UNITA followers were repeatedly attacked and arrested.

■ Eighty ballot boxes were stolen.

Clearly these are not insignificant allegations. For the sake of Angola's future, they must be taken seriously. At this stage, it's too soon to talk of the United States upgrading diplomatic relations and sending an ambassador to Luanda — although that is what Herman Cohen, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, did last week during congressional hearings on Angola. Until all sides can agree that free and fair elections have indeed taken place and a winner emerged, regardless of who it might be, such a move would be premature.

Just for the record

For all the high dudgeon of the media about this absolutely, totally and utterly unprecedented questioning of a presidential ticket's veracity and candor, trust does remain a pertinent issue. A change of conviction on crucial issues, a tendency to be on both sides of every debate, speaks volumes about the character and integrity of the candidates involved.

Take Sen. Al Gore's earnest asseveration Tuesday night that he and Gov. Bill Clinton "support the right of a woman to choose" — and always have. Mr. Gore was perhaps not quite as pithy as Adm. James Stockdale, who believes that "a woman owns her body and what she does with it is her own business," but the two

Civil Rights Act, H.R. 5490, to the effect that the term "person" would include unborn children from the moment of conception. That amendment, of course, would have made abortion equal to murder; the woman who chose an abortion a murderer and the doctor who performed it an accessory to murder.

In 1987, Mr. Gore wanted to prohibit the use of federal funds for abortion, except when the mother's life is endangered. Thus he voted for legislation, H.R. 1729, introduced by Rep. Henry Hyde on March 19, 1987, to ensure that Title X family planning programs not promote abortions.

Indeed, Mr. Gore was so proud of his unwavering pro-life position in those days that he wrote a constituent in 1987: "During my 11 years in Congress, I

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