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U.S. Agency for International Development
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OFFICE/
EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (REDSO/ESA)

SOMALIA:
FROM RELIEF TO RECOVERY

Nairobi
21 January 1993

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I. PREFACE

This report: a) summarizes the current political and security situation in Somalia, and on-going emergency relief operations; b) provides an initial assessment of the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements; and c) presents various proposals for A.I.D.-funded recovery assistance -- in FY 1993 and beyond -- as conditions permit.

The report was prepared by REDSO/ESA in Nairobi, following consultations in Somalia by a five-member REDSO team, headed by Fred C. Fischer, Director; and including John Flynn, Chief, Agriculture and Natural Resources Division; Margaret Neuse, Chief, Health, Population, Nutrition Division; Robert Rose, Chief Engineer; and Tom Staal, Project Development Officer. OFDA's DART team, located in Nairobi and Mogadishu, provided important information that greatly assisted REDSO in preparing this document.

In addition to numerous meetings in Mogadishu, one or more team members visited Merca, Baidoa, and Quorioley. There was no opportunity for any travel to the North. Annex A lists all the persons interviewed by the REDSO team in Somalia and Kenya.

The team's consultations in Somalia coincided with the arrival in Mogadishu of Ric Machmer, the newly-named Director of USAID/Somalia. Machmer participated in many of the team's interviews and deliberations.

For readers unfamiliar with Somalia's past, Annex B provides a Quick Overview of Somalia's people, geography, and former political and economic structure, as well as the historical events which led to Somalia's present state.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Somalia is still very much in an emergency relief situation -- and likely to continue so for some time.

The arrival of U.S. and other military forces on December 9, 1992 provided the essential security to allow donor relief operations to go into high gear. But several million Somalis remain at risk, and large quantities of food and other relief supplies must continue to be distributed throughout the country for at least the remainder of 1993.

In any event, there is still a significant security threat. Some parts of the country are pacified; but in other areas -- including Mogadishu itself -- the situation remains very unstable. While the technicals no longer roam Mogadishu and other major cities, there are still daily reports of shooting incidents and banditry. Moreover, the security that does prevail was initially achieved --

and is currently being maintained -- primarily by American military forces.

The U.S. troops -- the "peacemakers" -- are immensely more popular (and respected) than any other foreign forces. There is real fear that the "bad guys" -- who are now in hiding, with most of their weapons -- will return as soon as the UN takes over.

Of equal concern is the lack of movement toward the establishment of an indigenous political structure and civil administration (including a national police force). The on-going national "political reconciliation" process is viewed with a mixture of hope and skepticism.

Further complicating the current situation -- and deeply frustrating the international donor community -- is the mixed performance of the UN in the whole Somali political, military and relief equation. Only the tireless efforts of U.S. military and civilian personnel -- who are manning the key posts in UNOSOM headquarters in Mogadishu, and most posts in the field -- has kept the current international relief effort going.

In sum, the security situation -- while fragile -- has stabilized sufficiently to allow emergency relief to reach most of the people at risk. But there is grave concern about what will happen when the U.S. military depart; and there is very slow progress on political reconciliation and the reestablishment of a civil administration. In this environment, the donors/NGOs have been too busy managing the revitalized relief effort to focus much attention on medium-term recovery, let alone long-term development.

Nevertheless, some small scale rehabilitation activities (e.g., ag paks and immunizations) have gotten underway. Some NGOs have begun to prepare proposals for donor-funded projects beyond the immediate relief stage. Somalia's recovery and reconstruction needs are clearly immense. This paper is an initial effort to catalog those needs, and identify potential recovery activities for U.S. and other donor funding.

One very important consideration is the management of the recovery exercise itself. This is an area in which the U.S. Government can play a key, catalytic role.

For the remainder of FY 1993, it is recommended that A.I.D.:

-- Continue to focus heavily on the provision of food and other emergency assistance, including providing U.S. leadership and expertise in managing the international donor relief effort; and

-- Provide additional financial and professional resources to begin to design and implement some recovery activities, as security and other conditions permit.

The proposed recovery activities -- with potential funding of up to $32 million -- include:

-- Quick-impact rehabilitation projects in the agriculture; sector;

-- Varied projects in the health sector, particularly targeting war victims, displaced, orphans, and children in general;

-- Special, income producing projects aimed at immediate employment and job creation;

-- Providing U.S. leadership and expertise in helping to plan and manage -- and serve as a catalyst for other donor involvement in -- the recovery process; and

-- More detailed assessments of Somalia's recovery problems and needs in various sectors.

Some additional projects are proposed for A.I.D. funding in FY 1994 and beyond. But this report focuses mainly on what can be started now (i.e., in FY 1993) to begin to spur Somalia's recovery. It is much too early to even begin to think about long-term development projects.

In any event, nothing in Somalia will come quickly and easily. It will take years -- and require hundreds of millions of donor dollars -- to bring the country back to even its former (mid-1980s) economic and social level. And it would be a huge mistake to believe that Somalia can be remade into a prosperous and viable nation state in this century, if ever.

III. THE SECURITY SITUATION

In the latter half of 1992, the security situation throughout Somalia had deteriorated to the point where anarchy and lawlessness reigned and the international donor relief effort was virtually at a standstill.

On December 9, 1992, massive U.S. military forces arrived in Mogadishu under UN auspices to launch Operation Restore Hope, with the objective of bringing security and stability to the southern and central regions of the country and facilitating the distribution of food and other humanitarian relief supplies. More than 20,000 U.S. troops (joined by smaller military units from several dozen other countries) moved quickly and effectively -- and with mercifully few casualties -- to secure eight "regions," starting with Mogadishu, and spreading out to include Kismayo, Bardera, Baidoa, Oddur, Belet Wein, Gialalassi, and Baledogle.

Annex C is a map showing these regions and the major military forces (e.g., U.S., French, Italian, Canadian, Belgian) who have assumed primary responsibility for maintaining security in each of the eight regions. Within somewhat confused Rules of Engagement, the various military units -- under overall U.S. command -- have disarmed many of the "technicals" and other gunslingers who previously terrorized their regions -- or driven them into the bush. Numerous weapons, ranging from tanks and heavy artillery to small arms and mines have been collected and/or destroyed. In some regions, e.g., Baidoa, almost complete security appears to have been reestablished, with people actually unafraid to walk around in Baidoa town at night.

On the other hand, a recent ICRC report described the situation as follows: "Despite recent developments in the country, the situation remains highly unstable, and serious security incidents still happen on a regular basis. At the beginning of January, a UNICEF expatriate employee was killed in Kismayo, for example, which led the ICRC to temporarily suspend its food airlift to the town and cut down its activities there. Countless other incidents of looting and death threats continue to hamper the relief effort: the majority of Somalis are still armed, which makes most of the country a highly dangerous place to work in."[1]

Everyone agrees that the security situation throughout southern and central Somalia remains fragile. <u>Millions</u> of weapons (and ammunition) remain in the country, and looting and banditry continues wherever (or <u>when</u>ever) the coalition troops are not present. Moreover, as of mid-January, many parts of Mogadishu were still completely insecure. The original U.S. military plan called for capturing key positions in Mogadishu (e.g., the airport, seaport), and then spreading out to pacify the rest of the sprawling city.

But frantic calls for help from NGOs in Baidoa and other inland locations required major U.S. combat units to be moved inland prematurely. As these American units were relieved by other foreign contingents, they were <u>brought back to Mogadishu</u> to continue the pacification of the city. U.S. Marines are currently engaged in this exercise, which involves confrontations with militia loyal to the two main warlords who had control of much of the city, Ali Mahdi and General Aideed, as well as independent bandits and snipers.

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[1] As this report was being finalized, an ICRC expatriate was reported killed in Bardera during a robbery of the ICRC compound.

At the same time, the UNITAF forces are being urged to expand their operations further north and south. On January 11, UNHCR, citing increasing insecurity in southern Somalia, called for the deployment of troops into the Gedo region and along the Somalia/Kenya border, plus the establishment of a "peace corridor" from Kismayo to Doble to combat the on-again/off-again presence of maverick General Morgan's forces.

Earlier in the month, UN officials in New York made a strong pitch for UNITAF to extend its operations into northern Somalia (i.e., Somaliland). The official U.S. response has been that the current focus should remain on stabilizing the central and southern regions -- but that the U.S. would be prepared to provide logistical support to UNOSOM Phase II units (the UN "Peacekeepers"), some of whom will be assigned to the North. So operations aimed at further stabilization continue in the eight regions which the UNITAF troops initially occupied, and expanded operations into other regions of the country may be in the offing.

More than 10,000 troops from 25-30 other countries are expected to serve in the "Peacekeeping" force in Phase II. The timing and details of the planned "hand-off" of responsibility from a primarily U.S.-led and dominated military operation in Phase I, to a predominately UN operation in Phase II, are currently being negotiated between the U.S. and the UN.

However, the expected departure of the American military forces fills everyone in Somalia with dread. The <u>American</u> Marines and soldiers were warmly welcomed. They remain immensely popular, and respected, and few Somalis and expatriates have any confidence in the UN's ability to maintain the peace when the U.S. troops depart. There is great concern that the UN Peacekeepers' Rules of Engagement will be so weak as to be ineffectual. With millions of arms still in country, and many of the "bad guys" perceived to be biding their time until the Americans leave, a return to the anarchy and lawlessness of the past two years is greatly feared.

On January 16, it was officially announced in Washington that an 850-man U.S. Marine battalion would be withdrawn from Baidoa by the end of the month, and replaced by an Australian Army battalion. On January 18, a U.S. Marine spokesman in Mogadishu announced that the U.S. plans to turn over military control to the UN "in as little as two weeks." But he added that the UN Security Council had not yet adopted resolutions necessary for the transfer, nor the command structure and rules of engagement, for Phase II. And, on the ground in Somalia, there remains great fear that Phase II, in which the U.S. military role is greatly diminished, will see a return to anarchy and lawlessness.

This fear pervades the thinking of most Somalis and the international donor community, with the result that few are able to think beyond their immediate emergency relief operations and begin to plan for medium-term rehabilitation and recovery, let alone long-term reconstruction and development. Their thinking is further colored by their added perception that there is very little movement toward national political reconciliation and the reestablishment of civilian administration and indigenous institutions capable of maintaining public safety.

IV. THE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS

Somalia has had no national government since President Siad Barre was driven from office on January 26, 1991. In the intervening two years, all Government institutions and all forms of civil authority and public administration have collapsed -- in all parts of the country.[1] The many clan-affiliated warring factions that have been ravaging the country have imposed their own authority, but provided precious little in the way of governance or public services in the areas under their control.

In early December of 1992, as the UN Security Council was debating the deployment of U.S. and other military forces in Somalia, some 70 Somalis, representing many (but not some of the major) rival factions, met in Addis Ababa to begin a dialogue on national political reconciliation. The most important outcome of that conference was the agreement to reconvene in Addis early in 1993.

The second Addis conference, held in early January 1993, produced some concrete results, at least on paper. All of the major Somali political factions were represented (except the Somaliland Republic). An agreement was reached which reads as follows:

> "We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 10 January 1993 at the informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation in Somalia;
>
> Having agreed on the need for a viable and verifiable cease-fire to promote the peace process in Somalia;
>
> Recognizing that such cease-fire is intricately linked to questions of disarmament;
>
> Further recognizing that disarmament cannot be accomplished in a single event but through a sustained process;
>
> Hereby agree on the following:

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1 With the possible exception of Northwestern Somalia, where an "independent" Somaliland Republic was proclaimed in 1991.

I. Disarmament

1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safe-keeping until such time as a legitimate Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and be completed by 1 March 1993.

1.2 The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in appropriate areas outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon as possible and be completed by 1 March 1993. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.

1.3 The future status of the encamped militia and their arms shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible demobilization.

1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.

II. Cease-fire monitoring group

2.1 A cease-fire monitoring group comprising UNITAF/UN troops shall be established immediately. There shall also be a committee composed of representatives of the warring factions to interlocute with the monitoring group and observe the implementation of the agreement by UNITAF/UN troops. The composition of the committee shall be announced by the Somali political leaders before departing Addis Ababa.

III. All sides agree in principle that properties unlawfully taken during the fighting shall be returned to the lawful owners. This shall be implemented as and when the situation allows.

IV. All POWs shall be freed and handed over to the ICRC and/or UNITAF. This process shall commence immediately and be completed by 1 March 1993.

The present agreement shall enter into effect on 11 January 1993."

The conferees also agreed to draw up a national charter and discuss forming a new interim government at a third meeting in Addis, scheduled for March 15. The full conference agenda will include:

"1) Report and verification of the implementation of the agreement on ceasefire and modalities of disarmament;
2) Causes and lasting solution for the present political crisis;
3) The Somali unity issue;
4) Reestablishment of peace and stability and the necessary mass orientation campaign;
5) Resettlement of refugees and displaced people;
6) Reconstruction and rehabilitation;
7) Establishment of a national committee for the settlement of property claims;
8) Programme for the protection of fundamental human rights;
9) The issue of the international forces deployed in Somalia;
10) The regional autonomy;
11) The relief and humanitarian aid programmes;
12) The drawing up of a provisional constitution and the establishment of a provisional government;
13) Appointment of an international committee to investigate the crimes committed against the Somali nation;
14) The international guarantee for the implementation of the National Reconciliation Conference's deliberations by the UN Security Council, the regional organizations: OAU, LAS, OIC and the Standing Committee of the Horn."

Whether or not the factional leaders who signed the ceasefire can deliver remains to be seen. Many observers doubt that they have sufficient control over their unruly militias to enforce the truce and strip them of their weapons. In any event, there are thousands of armed "independents," bandits and looters who are not likely to be influenced by any agreements signed by others in Addis.

Whether or not the next Addis conference produces a meaningful political settlement also remains to be seen. The U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley, believes that political reconciliation can only be achieved by first establishing local and regional government, and then moving to the national level. He discounts the possibility of a "top down" political deal.

Ambassador Oakley notes that "things have begun to sprout, politically, economically and socially" at the local level. A Somali-organized town council of some 200 persons is setting the relief and rehabilitation priorities in Baidoa (what schools to repair, what clinics to open, what roads to fix, etc.). The goal (of the U.S. Marines and civilians in Baidoa who started the process) is to bring Somalis into the relief and rehabilitation effort and ultimately make them responsible for the peaceful resolution of political disputes. A similar exercise has gotten under way in Merca, with U.S. Army and civilians as the catalysts. (In both cities, it is American personnel, not UN representatives, who are encouraging and supporting these grass roots efforts.)

In Mogadishu, Ambassador Oakley has been trying to get General Aideed and Ali Mahdi to agree on a municipal council. They say national reconciliation must come first. But there is reportedly a good deal of sentiment in the country that a new national government should not be built around the very warlords who had plunged the country into the present chaos.

From wherever it does come -- from the top down or vice versa -- it will clearly be a long time before real political reconciliation is achieved, and indigenous institutions to govern and administer the country are in place.

V. ON-GOING RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

As Somalia plunged into complete anarchy in 1992, the international donor relief effort floundered. With their food convoys attacked, their warehouses looted, and their personnel assaulted, many of the NGOs and IOs severely curtailed their relief operations, or pulled out entirely, until the security situation improved.

(In mid-August of 1992, Operation Provide Relief, a massive military airlift from Mombasa, involving dozens of aircraft from the U.S. and several other countries, was launched. Over the past six months, more than 30,000 MT of urgently needed food and other relief supplies -- 21,000 MT by the U.S. -- were delivered to Somalia by this effective, but very costly, means.)

With the successful launching of Operation Restore Hope last December, the international donor community was able to put its relief operations back into high gear. The reopening of Mogadishu and other ports allowed large quantities of food and other relief supplies to arrive. With military escort, large convoys have been able to transport the supplies to the eight regions of southern and central Somalia which have been made relatively secure.

For example, since the arrival of the UNITAF troops, ICRC has brought three ships carrying a total of over 15,000 MT of food into the harbor in South Mogadishu, and has transported food across the former frontline into North Mogadishu, thus allowing the more difficult supply route through El Ma'an, to the north of the city, to be suspended. Supply ships are now also being unloaded in Obbia, Bosaso and Merca. The airlift from Mombasa is scaling down, with no additional food scheduled to be shipped to Mombasa. By the end of February or early March, all food for Somalia should be delivered through Somali ports and overland from there.

On the assumption that the security situation will remain relatively stable, the donors believe that the worst of the emergency is over -- that the "back of the famine can be broken" in the next several months. Already the death rates in most regions have dropped dramatically, though some (mainly young children) are continuing to perish because they were not reached in time. Relief supplies are still concentrated in the larger towns and villages. Measles, diarrheal diseases and respiratory tract infections are continuing to take a toll, given the low resistance of many Somalis, particularly the children, and the still limited reach of immunization and medical care.

In any event, there is an overwhelming consensus that the emergency feeding and related relief operations must continue for much, perhaps all, of 1993. The NGOs and IOs caution that two million people will <u>remain</u> at risk for some time; and they have no intention of slackening their relief efforts. They express concern that they may not continue to receive the food and other financial support required to maintain their relief programs at current levels.

For the moment, it appears that there is sufficient food in country and in the pipeline. During the first week of January, Mogadishu was actually reported to be "awash in food," raising sudden fears that there would be a glut that could prove a disincentive to restoring agricultural production.

In this regard, the recent good rains in the cereal producing regions of the country -- coupled with a substantial distribution of seeds and tools by the NGOs -- give promise of a good "small" crop this March, and a particularly fine "large" crop in September/October. If, indeed, this year's "large" crop is large, then the NGOs feel their feeding programs can begin to be reduced; but that is still 6-9 months away. In addition, many of the large numbers of displaced people - 500,000 or more - will continue to require relief food until they are able to return to their homes or find some means of livelihood.

Given their continuing focus on immediate relief operations, the donors/NGOs have paid very little time and attention to medium-term recovery programs; and long-term economic development is way off their screen. Everyone is saying "wait and see," until they are sure of the long-term security situation.

Nevertheless, some small-scale rehabilitation activities are being undertaken or planned, and some NGOs are even venturing into activities that may be considered "recovery."

Annex D is a chart showing which NGOs are currently engaged in these activities. As the chart shows, the majority of NGOs (and IOs) are involved in relief and some rehabilitation activities. The numbers thin out considerably in the reconstruction activities. Also at Annex D is a chart which shows AID/OFDA-funded relief and rehabilitation activities in FY 1992, and thus far in FY 1993.

Several NGOs had already carried out some distribution of seeds and tools last August/September for the "small" agricultural season, and are planning a larger-scale program for the up-coming "large" agricultural season. ICRC and SCF/US also began undertaking cattle vaccination programs during 1992 and plan to expand that activity in 1993, with the addition of veterinary staff on their teams. SCF/US is also planning to repair damaged irrigation canals to improve agricultural prospects in the Lower Shabelle region.

A number of NGOs are also trying to move beyond immediate relief activities in the health sector. As an example, IMC has begun to identify former health workers in villages in the Bardera district and provide them some refresher training, rehabilitate damaged clinics and restock them with basic drugs. Several NGOs are transforming their feeding centers into MCH centers, gradually reducing the amount of feeding as the need decreases.

Employment schemes are another area of focus among the NGOs and IOs. Since the vast majority of the people are now unemployed (one observer put it at "99% unemployment"), it is important to provide work, especially for those young men who have been living by the gun for the last two years.

The United Nations organizations, and particularly the UNOSOM office called the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), came late into the relief operation in Somalia. Many NGOs were able to keep operating, at some level, throughout 1991 and 1992, while the UN only returned to the scene late in 1992. It has yet to get sufficient numbers and quality of staff on the ground in Somalia, and its organizational structure is not geared toward an active operational role. Therefore, the NGOs and the local population have a low regard for the UN, which will take some time and some dynamic leadership to overcome. As it is, many of the functions which should be done by the UN are now being carried out by U.S. civilians (the AID/OFDA DART personnel) and the U.S. military.

There are at least 40 international NGOs currently active in Somalia, plus an undetermined number of indigenous NGOs. They have formed a consortium based in Mogadishu, which provides a common forum for members to discuss issues of mutual interest and share information. However, there is still very little real coordination among the NGOs; in fact, some competition exists. Certainly, there is a lack of uniform standards for assistance (such as feeding rations, health training, etc.) and coverage around the country is very uneven. Here again, the UN should play a stronger role, since there is no central government to regulate and coordinate NGO activities. Nevertheless, the NGOs continue to be the crucial link in providing humanitarian assistance to the people, and the majority of them are committed to staying in Somalia beyond the relief phase.

UNOSOM Headquarters in Mogadishu has launched a rehabilitation planning exercise, with specific goals to be achieved in "10 areas of concentration" by the end of 1993. Attached as Annex E is an outline of the plan, which is due to be finalized in early February for formal presentation at a Rehabilitation/Recovery Conference on Somalia to be held in Addis Ababa on February 25 and 26. The planning exercise entails participation from a variety of groups: UN agencies, NGOs and some Somali people and/or organizations. While the specific goals outlined in the plan appear overly ambitious in terms of scope and timing, it is a good listing of many of the relief and rehabilitation needs facing Somalia.

VI. SOMALIA'S RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS

A. General

Somalia has always been one of the world's poorest countries. It has few natural resources, a limited infrastructure, and an inadequate human resources base. Even before the country's complete collapse in early 1991, the economy was highly dependent on exports of a few products, remittances from abroad, and donor assistance.

Two years of internecine warfare have not only killed, wounded or made refugees of a million Somalis, but completely shattered the country's fragile economy and badly destroyed its infrastructure. The warfare and looting throughout the country has ruined virtually every public building, and much of the infrastructure that supports either the economy or the provision of social services.

By mid-1992, almost all normal economic activity had ceased, and looting donor commodities had become the main source of income and employment. Today, more than 90 percent of the potential workforce remains unemployed.

Simply put, Somalia and the Somali people are in desperate shape. It will take years to bring the country back just to its previous (mid-1980s) level, let alone put the country on the path of sustained economic growth. And Somalia's recovery will not only take years, but it will require hundreds of millions of dollars. (The estimated cost of restoring the country's physical infrastructure to its former levels could be as high as one billion dollars.)

Even more important is the need for the Somali people to reestablish control over their own destiny. This is a tall order, given that the country is currently being managed by expatriates and most Somalis, including the professionals who stayed, remain traumatized and demoralized by the experiences of civil war, anarchy, famine, and now the external occupation of their country. What were thin layers of educated professionals are even thinner, as most who could have fled the violence. Many who would be considered community leaders made compromises with looters and warlords in order to survive, and have lost credibility.

From these remains, the Somalis must establish credible and legitimate civilian authorities at all levels of the society, and put aside long-standing inter-clan conflicts which have been further intensified by the recent years of civil war. Without the Somalis' will to work for the recovery of their own country, all donor support will be in vain.

There has been neither time nor opportunity for a full assessment of the total damage done to the country, and the total recovery and reconstruction needs. The Sections which follow briefly describe the former and current situation in a number of sectors, and provide an initial assessment of assistance requirements in those sectors. In many cases, a more thorough assessment is recommended as a next stage in the recovery process. Specific options for A.I.D.-funded recovery activities in these sectors follow in Section VII.

B. Refugees and Displaced

The most critical need in the short to medium term -- as Somalia moves from relief to recovery -- is to get people back home and back to work.

Millions of Somalis are either refugees abroad, or displaced within their own country. Millions of Somalis are unemployed, and/or lack the basic means to restart their former economic pursuits.

With respect to the refugees, some 450,000 are in neighboring Kenya; the great majority are pastoralists or farmers who will require the basic wherewithal to rebuild their herds or replant their crops. Of this number, there are perhaps 50,000 intellectuals, professionals, former business people -- who are not completely destitute, and who need to be coaxed back home to help rebuild their country. The same applies to the large number of Somali refugees in other neighboring countries: Ethiopia (375,000), Djibouti (20,000), Yemen (70,000), and Saudi Arabia (150,000). Another 50,000 or more Somalis -- many with critical public and private sector skills -- are living as exiles in Europe and the United States. They, too, need to be convinced to return home and contribute to the recovery process.

Perhaps a million Somalis are internally displaced -- refugees in their own country. Most are rural people, farmers, pastoralists, and small business people, who have fled to Mogadishu and other cities. There they have found some succor, in terms of emergency feeding programs, but no jobs, and no economic prospects. The displaced need much of the same kind of help as the refugees in returning home and obtaining the means to once again feed and otherwise support themselves and their families.

Then there is a special group, that requires special and immediate attention in terms of employment generation: the hundreds of thousands of armed men who have been terrorizing the country. These include: the "militia" and private armies of the major clan chieftains (who are supposed to be disarmed and therefore become unemployed, as a result of the recent Addis conference ceasefire agreement); the many former "technicals" who are being dismissed by the international donor community as the security situation stabilizes; and the thousands of other armed bandits and gunslingers that still roam the country.

With respect to the armed forces under the nominal control of the clan chieftains, the Addis agreement actually calls on the donor community to take on responsibility for their care and feeding. Putting them to legitimate work is the real requirement. The same can be said for the thousands of former "technicals," though finding ways to channel the independent gangsters and gunslingers into lawful pursuits may be an impossible task. But clearly an effort must be made to design special, income-producing activities, aimed at immediate job creation for Somalia's great mass of unemployed.

C. Infrastructure

1. General

Somalia's physical infrastructure -- which was already in a deplorable state due to years of mismanagement and neglect -- has been utterly ravaged by the wanton destruction and looting of the past two years. Most public buildings in the major cities and towns have been destroyed and stripped of all furnishings, including electric wiring and plumbing fixtures. Two square miles of downtown Mogadishu's main government and business section are in rubble, recalling images of bombed-out cities from World War II. The ports of Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other coastal towns have been damaged, but not as bad as had been feared.

There are no municipal power or telecommunications systems functioning anywhere in the country. Urban and rural water and sanitation systems are in a shambles. The main and secondary roads are in disrepair. Most of the country's irrigation schemes are inoperative.

The job of restoring the country's physical infrastructure to even its pre-war (mid-1980s) state, will take years and could cost as much as one billion dollars. The following information on conditions and potential recovery needs in various subsectors was compiled by the REDSO/ESA study team during its brief reconnaissance visit to Somalia, which did not include the North.

a. The Road System

Prior to the civil war, Somalia had on the order of 20,000 km of roads, with perhaps 20 percent or 4,000 km paved or gravel. As with most other infrastructure sectors, poor management of resources and, in many areas, an almost total lack of maintenance had already created serious local and regional transportation problems, particularly during the rainy season.

The U.S. military is currently rehabilitating the 2,000 km regional road system between the centers of Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bardera, Wajit, Baidoa, Oddur, Baledogle, Belet Wein and Gialalassi to fully handle two-lane, all weather, heavy truck traffic by the end of February. Reconstruction will be completed using existing materials along the routes, and will follow parallel diversions (created by traffic in areas where the established roadway has become impassable) and in entirely new alignments where appropriate, rather than trying to reconstruct the roadways within established rights-of-way to original or planned national standards. Present plans call for the military to turn the responsibility for maintenance over to the U.S. firm of Brown and Root (BR), as part of their continuing work under their Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract with the U.S. Army (USN administration).

There are no plans for further road rehabilitation or work by the U.S. military or under any UN-administered military units which will be assigned to replace the U.S. forces. As it stands now, other than a 17-span Bailey bridge over the Juba River, all U.S. military equipment and materials will be removed and taken out of Somalia with the military construction battalions.

b. Urban Water Supply

Before the current crisis, 58 percent of the urban population (87 percent in Mogadishu) is reported to have had access to safe water, some through house connections, most from public standpipes. The size of the urban water supply systems, and the fact that a high percentage of the assets are buried, prevented damage to the extent that occurred at almost all rural wells. Rehabilitation of the Mogadishu supply system (wellfields near the city) and the distribution system (tanks, mains and service connections) has actually been going on for over a year; and the system is presently capable of operating at about 50 percent of its capacity. UNOSOM is active in providing assistance in Mogadishu and in coordinating continuing but reduced NGO/PVO water programs.

The existing Yoontoy water treatment plant located on the Juba River, approximately 30 km north of the city of Kismayo, has been out of service for over two years; and it was operating at minimum capacity and producing very poor quality water prior to the civil war. At present 175-200,000 people are dependent on traditional residential shallow wells, which are presently adequate due to high rains in the Juba watershed, and up to 100,000 people are expected to be returning from Kenya over the next 6-8 months. The shallow aquifer cannot support a population of this magnitude, even at minimum standards and major health problems are certain to result by the end of 1993, if something is not done soon; and there is always the potential for earlier and perhaps permanent damage to the aquifer from the intrusion of salt water from the underlying strata.

c. **Rural Water Supply**

In the rural areas and small towns, water has traditionally been obtained from shallow dug wells, or a variety of surface water sources, many of which have been contaminated. Perhaps 90 percent of the bored and hand dug wells which were equipped with pumps of any kind are out of service. It is impossible to formulate a general description of the situation, since the extent of purposeful damage and destruction may have been limited to certain areas. But thousands of power generating units and pumping equipment (electrical and hand pumps) have been removed or damaged throughout the country.

Present NGO repair and rehabilitation programs, however critical to meeting localized health and food distribution problems, are hardly making a dent in the overall rural water situation. In addition, it is not clear what permanent value, if any, the water supply systems being installed by the U.S. military.

d. **Sanitation**

Although the collection system has been cleaned, Somalia's only public sewerage treatment plant, in a small area of Mogadishu, is still not working. In large urban areas refuse is normally burned, but few small towns do so. A small number of urban houses have septic tanks or cesspools, but most lack even latrines. The overall sanitation situation in the country can be summed up as primitive to absent.

e. **Power and Telecommunications**

There are presently no municipal power utilities functioning anywhere in Somalia and it is doubtful that any service from these stations can be restored in the near future. The only electricity in the country is that which is produced by diesel-fueled generators. The country is basically dark at night, and without any appreciable energy sources to run machines. The national telephone system, always in poor shape, has completely ceased to function.

f. Airports and Seaports

The major international airports and seaports at Kismayo and Mogadishu are in surprisingly good condition and are being improved as necessary to support the relief operations. Security measures in Mogadishu have been improved, additional storage is planned at the port and, in general, both facilities are probably operating at above their design capacities and certainly at a higher capacity than in the past. The port of Kismayo is presently being improved by the military and will form part of the road supply route to Bardera. The major problem in returning the port to its original capacity will be the removal of sunken vessels, an operation not necessary for relief activities.

Although six regional dirt airstrips have been upgraded for military/relief operations, the physical improvements will be removed when road transport capabilities are adequate, probably by early March.

As far as is known, no major destruction has occurred at the other seaports, but it is expected that minor damage will have to be repaired and new equipment provided before the ports can be returned to minimum service.

2. Infrastructure Recovery Needs

The job -- and cost -- of rebuilding Somalia's infrastructure are clearly immense. An illustrative, order-of-magnitude list of potential major reconstruction projects (and their estimated costs) would read as follows:

Urban and Rural Water Supply	$100,000,000
Urban Sanitation and Solid Waste Disposal	20,000,000
Rehabilitation of the Major Seaports of Mogadishu and Kismayo	20,000,000
Rehabilitation of Major Airports	30,000,000
Rehabilitation of Other Ports (Export Oriented)	10,000,000
Urban Power Supply and Distribution	100,000,000
Reconstruction of Secondary Road System	30,000,000
Feeder Road Rehabilitation Program	50,000,000

Rehabilitation of Primary Road System	50,000,000
Irrigation Systems (Shebelli & Juba Rivers)	10,000,000
Reconstruction of the Domestic Radio System	15,000,000
Restoration of National and International Telecommunication Systems	25,000,000
TOTAL	$500,000,000

In recent weeks, two major international organizations have announced their intention to draw up plans for rebuilding Somalia. UNDP has begun to prepare a five-year rehabilitation plan. The World Bank has established a Task Force to focus on Somalia's overall reconstruction requirements. Both agencies presumably will put together a proposed package for multi-donor funding. Hopefully, the two agencies will coordinate their respective exercises. They might even meld the two, with UNDP focussing on technical assistance needs and the Bank concentrating on capital projects.

In any event, it is strongly recommended that A.I.D. let the UNDP and World Bank take the lead in financing more detailed assessments and preparing proposals for rebuilding Somalia's physical infrastructure, while keeping open the option of buying into one of their reconstruction programs at some future time.

D. The Agriculture Sector

1. The Present Situation

The agricultural sector of Somalia has traditionally been the mainstay of the economy, contributing the majority of employment and GDP through both subsistence and commercial activities. Since the conflict began, the sector has been devastated by drought, looting, security problems and the resulting displacement of large numbers of rural dwellers. The entire government agricultural support system, including agricultural extension and marketing services, irrigation system operation and maintenance and any other support has long ceased to exist. The few Somalis trained in agriculture have fled the country, been killed or are scattered around the country. A few are working for NGOs in agricultural projects. Virtually the only support to the sector, and the only reason it has begun even a modest recovery, is because of the direct assistance from the NGO community.

Preceding the U.S. and U.N. military intervention in December, 1992, cultivation of food crops had declined to a tiny fraction of the approximately 1,000,000 hectares of arable land. Seed stocks were consumed for food and livestock was looted and slaughtered. In the wake of an improving security situation, several NGOs recognized the need to get farmers resettled and back to agricultural activities and initiated small projects to distribute seeds and other agricultural inputs. In a few instances, appropriately adapted seed varieties were not available locally and food crop seeds were therefore imported. In the majority of cases, however, appropriate varieties were identified and provided through free distribution programs. Because of favorable 1992-93 *der* rains, resettlement of some agricultural households and NGO support for agricultural inputs, there was significant planting in some areas, particularly the Shabelli River basin and parts of the Bay region.

An agricultural assessment is currently being conducted by a consortium of NGO's and the FAO. This assessment will focus on crop production, <u>not</u> the livestock sector. Information on areas planted by crop, estimates of yields, number of agricultural households by region and related data will be available by the first week of February. Presently, any estimates are strictly anecdotal. A cursory and highly preliminary estimate is that cereal production may be one third of normal for the short rains or *der* season. This is based upon the generous rainfall received over most of the southern and high potential agricultural regions, the extent of plantings observed on field trips and discussions with NGO's and others who have been working in the field.

Shelter (housing) has not been a major obstacle to resettlement because the traditional houses are quickly constructed using locally available materials. With improved security and feeding programs expanding the means to survive until crops are harvested by distribution of relief goods, families seem determined to return to their farms. Several NGO's are very active in the agricultural area, principally in seed and other agricultural input distribution, irrigation system rehabilitation and livestock health care. These programs appear to be having a major impact on the ability of the agricultural sector to recover.

<u>Crop Production:</u> If aggregate crop production is near the level indicated above, i.e., about one third of normal, there should be adequate food in the agricultural areas of the Bay region and the lower Shabelli river basin to sustain more than one half of the agricultural population until the next major cropping season is completed in September-October 1993. There may even be several households with considerable marketable surpluses. The lower Juba region, an area that typically produces a substantial proportion of domestic maize and cattle, has reportedly been much less productive because of persistent security problems and slow resettlement of the agricultural population.

But an obstacle to agricultural recovery is a weak market for domestic cereals, caused by the destitution and low purchasing power of rural households that were unable to cultivate their land, unemployment in the urban areas and vast quantities of food aid readily available throughout the country. In some localized areas, grain surpluses will be produced. It is possible that where these marketable surpluses occur, food aid will depress the market, stunt the income of surplus agricultural households and stall recovery of the agricultural economy. The food market situation will need to be carefully monitored for these types of effects and supplies of food assistance should be managed to foster market equilibrium. Auction-type food monetizations, as are now beginning to be implemented, can serve as one mechanism to stabilize the food market along with more carefully targeted free food distribution to those with little or no ability to purchase food in the commercial market.

Preparation for agricultural assistance for the main wet season *(gu)* is now underway by most NGO's, and current funding appears adequate for the immediate basic programs being planned and the implementation capability of the NGO community. Most ongoing agricultural programs involve seed multiplication, procurement and distribution; agricultural tools distribution, irrigation rehabilitation and livestock health. There is some concern that seed varieties available for these programs would not be of the proper type; either not adapted to Somalia's ecology or unsuitable for the tastes of consumers. Care should be taken to select only those varieties suitable for the unique conditions in Somalia for the next planting season in April. To the maximum extent feasible, seeds should be selected from Somali stock that has produced well during the short rains and a minimum should be imported. High-yielding, adapted lines could be imported as part of a seed multiplication program for the *gu* season.

Livestock Sector: The situation in respect to the livestock sector is unclear. Large herds of all categories of livestock are observed in the south and central rangelands and appear in relatively good condition because of good pasture resulting from much higher than average *der* rains. Anecdotal reports from other regions are similar. A large quantity of cattle (1600 head) was exported to Yemen from Kismayo on January 14, suggesting that commercial trade in livestock has commenced. Reports abound of stolen and slaughtered livestock as a result of war, drought and dislocation. It will remain difficult to verify and document these occurrences.

Livestock health looms as the biggest issue in the sector, with vaccination programs of highest priority and treatment of animal diseases as second. These interventions are needed to stem the ravages of highly communicable and fatal diseases. Several donors are already active in this area, notably ICRC with the support of FAO and OFDA among others. This program has fielded 18 veterinary teams comprising expatriate and Somali veterinarians with the capability to provide vaccinations and related services in most areas with high livestock populations.

2. Agriculture Recovery Needs

Crop Production:

a. Agricultural Inputs

Family labor, land and seeds are the basic requirements to get agricultural (crop) production moving. Based on the estimated production of cereals during the short rains, there should be sufficient seed available in Somalia for the long rains season. NGO "buy-back" and redistribution programs are the most likely way to get the seed input program to quickly expand. Basic seed is unlikely to be available in Somalia and will need to be imported. However, this would be a longer range need and could be postponed until the current "emergency" situation is eased.

Fertilizer would not be an essential input for the short-term, although it may be possible to expand production rather more rapidly by applying modest quantities of fertilizer. However, most Somali farmers are not accustomed to fertilizer use, it should only be included in a medium-term program. Tools would also likely have to be imported, but would consist of several sets of hoes and pangas per household. These simple tools could be acquired in nearby countries such as Kenya. In fact, many NGO's have already made plans to import tools for distribution. In the medium term, employment generation could be fostered through supporting local blacksmiths to produce agricultural tools by importing appropriate materials such as steel ingots.

b. Irrigation Rehabilitation

An extensive, if rather primitive gravity irrigation system was constructed in the Shabelli River basin over 20 years ago. It is a gravity flow system, with a series of water control structures in the river itself, and a series of main and secondary canals that distribute water to blocks of farms. The system has suffered from lack of maintenance for the last ten years and the canals have completely silted full in many locations, control structures are not functioning or in need of repair, and the main storage reservoir is dilapidated. Short-run emergency desilting of main and secondary canals is underway in a few locations by NGOs using both mechanical excavators and village labor through "cash for work" programs. This program could be expanded substantially to bring more smallholder as well as commercial farms under production.

Livestock Production

a. Stock Distribution

Livestock is a much more complicated subject to deal with because of the likely difficulty of establishing losses and the likely change of "ownership" due to widespread looting. Some type of a redistribution program could be considered, with some version of a "buy out" scheme purchasing animals from the market and distributing them to those families who can be confirmed to have lost their herd during the recent past. Importing new stock would be undesirable at this point because sufficient stock are available in-country for a distribution program. A redistribution approach could be potentially very costly and fraught with complications to determine eligible beneficiaries. An assessment of the livestock sector should be undertaken very soon.

b. **Animal Health**

Animal health with a focus on livestock vaccinations will be a priority and major undertaking. Several million animals require vaccination at a large cost of manpower and serum. The ICRC has mounted a vaccination and disease treatment program in conjunction with FAO. This program should be expanded and accelerated to tackle this potentially disastrous health problem. Rehabilitation of watering points may be required, but this intervention would need to be approached cautiously, as it could have significant environmental implications of concentrating unsustainable herds of livestock and disrupting normal migration patterns.

Agricultural Markets

Markets are functioning, but under "extortion" conditions. Large merchants have monopoly power and there are few buyers of agricultural products. Prices of agricultural products are depressed because of the large amount of food aid available. Transportation systems, including roads and trucking firms, are relatively high cost because of the competition for movement of food aid. Physical marketing points have been completely destroyed by looters.

E. The Health Sector

1. Present Situation

Consistent with the situation of anarchy, widespread looting, civil war, and long-standing neglect of the health sector by the former government, the health care delivery system and its infrastructure in Somalia is in shambles. If still standing, most clinics, hospitals, training schools, and administrative structures are devoid of equipment and fittings which would make them functional; the exceptions are those rehabilitated for use by NGOs and International Organizations (e.g., UNICEF) as offices and locations for supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs and MCH/PHC and out-patient services. All former vehicles, drugs, office equipment and furniture have been looted. Health care staff are widely scattered: a large number have left Somalia altogether; others are slowly being identified and hired by NGOs and International

Agencies to work in the feeding programs and their evolution to broader primary health care programs. What was a poorly functioning system with limited reach (only about 10% of Somalis had access to modern health care services in the mid-1980s), is now totally non-functional. It is not now possible to estimate even the number of sites which are functional.

The disappearance of health services comes at a time when the Somali people most need them. The impact of the widespread malnutrition, infectious diseases such as measles, and diarrheas, etc., are seen in the very high death rates reported by recent CDC/ UNICEF assessments in Baidoa, Bardera, and Lower Shebelli Region. In a recent report from Bardera, children under 5 years of age made up only 9 percent of the population, as compared with the 20 percent common in developing countries.

As noted earlier, large numbers of the Somali people who have lived through the last two years of civil war and famine have been displaced, even within Mogadishu. Accurate numbers of displaced people, families, children, and orphans are very difficult to calculate; in some cases, empty villages have been found, and their former inhabitants have not yet been located. If security continues to improve and extend to larger geographical areas during the next several months, it should be possible to conduct on-site assessments and develop more accurate estimates.

For similar reasons, the numbers of war wounded with long-term rehabilitation needs have also not been accurately estimated. The representative from the International Medical Corps (IMC) estimates that about 30,000 people are in need of protheses, 15,000 in Mogadishu alone.

Returning displaced people to their own homes and areas will require adequate security, provision of basic supplies (farm tools, seeds, household equipment), availability of key services (food and health care), and psycho-social support. Even with these, returnees are likely to function at a less than optimal level for some time, given the level of physical and psycho-social stress they have undergone. Recovery in all senses will take a long time.

Other services and infrastructure critical to good health, such as water and sanitation, food production and consumption, and information dissemination, are also in total disarray, although there are scattered pockets where infrastructure has or is being rehabilitated and security allows production of crops. Small-scale radio broadcasting and printing are being supported, but have had little reach beyond Mogadishu.

2. <u>Recovery Needs</u>

In terms of the health care delivery system, recovery will need to start almost from scratch. While daunting, the advantage is that the system can now be oriented from the beginning towards primary health care, starting at the grassroots and structured to enhance and reinforce community support and management. Given the limited time spent in Somalia for this assessment and difficulties in gathering information, it is not appropriate or feasible to define in any detail a vision of the appropriate health care delivery system for Somalia. However, some key features of what would be needed are identified below. With more, on-going analytical work (see Section VII), these can be defined in greater detail.

a. Community-level Primary Health Care Services

For neighborhoods in the cities (e.g., Hargeisa and Mogadishu) and larger towns (e.g., Baidoa), and large and small villages, community health workers, health posts, and centers should be established to provide effective preventive services (MCH including immunization, nutrition, health education, and child spacing services), key child survival interventions (diarrheal disease control, control of respiratory tract infections, malaria treatment), and limited out-patient services.

These service providers and sites (1500-2500 total) should be linked closely to legitimate community administrative structures and supported by the communities both financially and in-kind (e.g., community labor used to rehabilitate or build infrastructure).

b. War victims, displaced families and children, and orphans

Special programs will be needed to meet the specific, unique needs of these groups: documentation and tracing of family contacts, reunification with family members, psycho-social counseling, prosthetics, and physical and vocational rehabilitation.

c. Approaches tested and expanded for providing services to nomadic and semi-nomadic families and communities

For those who have retained or return to the largely pastoral way of life, greater efforts than in the past should be devoted to finding effective mechanism of meeting their health care needs.

d. Referral and support services at district and regional levels

Communities and their PHC service providers will need assistance from higher administrative and technical levels for support services such as drug and medical supply logistics, equipment repair and maintenance (e.g. for cold chain), supervision and training (trainers, curricula, materials), and health and management information systems. In addition, community level service providers will need referral sites for cases they cannot manage on their own, and each district will need some referral facility such as a hospital. These referral facilities will require rehabilitation or construction, equipment, supplies, and trained staff. As with community level services, district and regional health management teams should be closely linked with legitimate regional and district level administrative authorities.

e. Private sector strengthening and expansion

With a return to some normalcy and away from what is essentially an extortionist economy, the private sector, through pharmacies and other commercial networks, private health practitioners and traditional healers, should be regulated so as to foster participation and high standards of safety and care.

f. Development of components in linked sectors, such as water resources development, education (formal and non-formal), information dissemination (mass, small and folk media), and food production and consumption

As important as health care services are to curing disease, maintaining good health is more closely linked with household level resources and access to water, good, nutritious food, and healthy habits, areas often the purview of non-health-oriented ministries and programs. Communities and public authorities will need to assure that these services, too, are supported as key elements in improving health.

The probable cost of restoring Somalia's public health system to even its former, very modest levels, is in the $50-75 million range.

F. The Education Sector

1. Present Situation

The education sector has suffered the same level of destruction as the health sector, and had been affected by similar neglect even before civil war. In the formal education area, many, possibly even most, schools have been damaged and looted in the fighting. The Curriculum Development Center of the Ministry of Education, its production facilities, and all of the materials produced there, are presumed to have been destroyed. Teachers and administrators have left, been displaced, or unemployed during the last two years. On the non-formal side, similar destruction has affected the Women's Education Centers; materials have all been looted, and instructors scattered. Some university professors managed to protect their homes and turf at the University campus in Mogadishu.

Some NGOs have started small-scale education efforts, identifying teachers, simple, limited education materials (i.e., chalkboards and chalk), and starting classes at their feeding centers. Teachers from some of the technical schools, including LaFolle for agricultural extension workers, and from the University, have established a group and are working with the USIS staff assigned to the U.S. Liaison Office in Mogadishu, to start small-scale education projects of their own.

2. Recovery Needs

The education system needs total rebuilding and presents daunting challenges. According to many NGOs, rebuilding the education system probably has the highest priority among most Somalis. But while communities may be able to assist in the construction of a school and identification and payment of teachers, they are not able to assume, on their own, the training or refresher training of the teachers (a problem in the past for assuring quality), nor the design of an appropriate curriculum, and production of textbooks and other materials. These are likely to require assistance and management at the national or regional levels. Technical training and non-formal, adult education are also likely to require support from higher levels of local government and administration.

Back in 1983, USAID reportedly funded a major education sector assessment, which to date the REDSO team has been unable to locate. That assessment no doubt still provides a useful overview of the problems and potential of Somalia's education sector.

Although rebuilding the education sector will clearly be a very crucial element in Somalia's recovery, it would be straining U.S.G. resources and capabilities for A.I.D. to also attempt to be a major player in this sector. However, this should not necessarily exclude support for a health education component of a major primary and secondary school curriculum reform effort, at some point down the road.

G. Public Safety

The UNITAF forces are currently maintaining such public safety as there is anywhere in Somalia. But here and there in the major cities, former national policemen have been reappearing on the streets, directing traffic and assisting UNITAF troops in their patrols. More than 300 former police have placed themselves back on duty in Kismayo; 60 have done so in Merca. Neither they nor their colleagues elsewhere in the country who have voluntarily gone back to work are drawing any pay.

Old timers remember the national police force that was established in the 1960s with respect and even affection. Trained and outfitted by West Germany, it apparently was one of the few relatively honest and efficient public institutions, until it too was corrupted by the Siad Barre regime.

Clearly, some new public safety institution(s) must be established to take over the ultimate responsibility for maintaining internal security after the UN military forces depart, i.e., at the end of UNOSOM Phase II. Germany, France, and Italy have expressed an interest in assisting in the reestablishment of the old national police, and the three governments are reportedly drawing up a joint proposal for such assistance for presentation to the UN.

The U.S. Congress has generally prohibited U.S.A.I.D. from funding police-related activities and when it has intended that such funding could occur (as in Latin America) it has provided specific statutory authorization. Section 660 of the FAA prohibits the use of funds (including local currencies) "to provide training or advice, to provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or any other law enforcement forces for any foreign government ..." ADRRR and the Foreign Disaster Assistance account, FAA Section 491, however, authorize funding "notwithstanding any other provision of law." Despite this apparent exception to FAA Section 660, Congressional disdain for funding police-related activities is clear, as reflected in the legislative history of Section 660:

> "United States participation in the highly sensitive area of public safety and police training unavoidably invites criticism from persons who seek to identify the United States with every act of local police brutality or oppression in any country in which this program operates. It matters little whether the charges can be substantiated, they inevitably stigmatize the total United States foreign aid effort. In underdeveloped areas of the world, the cost of the public safety programs are better left to be underwritten from local resources and the United States assistance efforts directed towards less sensitive areas of social or economic development." (Senate Foreign Relations Comm. Rep. on FAA § 112, S. Rep. 93-377, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., August 2, 1973.)

Thus, although the ADRRR and FAA Section 491 technically allow funding (under such appropriations) of police-related activities in Somalia, in light of the legislative history of Section 660 such assistance should be undertaken only after careful consideration of the consequences and after consultation with the appropriate Congressional committees, and after all other donor assistance avenues have been thoroughly explored and exhausted.

H. Commerce and Finance

Most normal commercial and related financial activities have been destroyed or disrupted.[1] Here and there some small-scale commerce is restarting, mainly the reopening of local food markets in Mogadishu and other cities. But most of the business being conducted by Somalis still relates to the donor relief effort. NGOs wryly say that Somalis are "either working <u>for</u> us, or looting us."

The former National Bank of Somalia is a gutted pile of rubble, partly occupied by U.S. Marines as a downtown command post. No private banks are functioning anywhere.

But though there have been no formal banking institutions in Somalia for almost two years, the Somali shilling (SOSH) has continued to serve as a medium of exchange. The use of other currencies (dollars, riyals, etc.) has apparently also grown, and exchange rates between these currencies and the SOSH have fluctuated widely with market conditions.[2]

In August, 1992, for example, the SOSH/dollar exchange rate was 7,000 to 8,000/1; with the influx of the U.S. military and international media in December, 1992, the rate fell to approximately 3,000 to 4,000 to 1 in Mogadishu. Outside of Mogadishu, and in Djibouti, higher rates continue to be offered.

The magnitude of these fluctuations in the rates has caused grave concern on the part of the U.S., UN, and NGOs, as the value of their dollars suddenly halved, putting some NGOs in very serious financial straits.

The exchange volatility has made budgeting difficult and renegotiations of wage rates a necessity. <u>Death threats</u> are routinely made by Somalis during such renegotiations of payments for goods and services. It is not unfair to characterize the current situation (at least in Mogadishu) as an "extortionist economy." Profiteering on the part of Somalis has also made the situation highly sensitive for most NGOs, who feel they are being

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1 However, one business has apparently managed to flourish despite the anarchy and chaos: the "illegal" <u>chat</u> industry (whose profits have helped pay for some of the arms and ammunition used by the warring factions.) Indeed, the warring factions control much of the importation of chat, and its distribution and sale in the regions under their control. The chat for southern and central Somalia comes from Kenya, much of it in small planes flying out of Nairobi's Wilson airport. Northern Somalia gets its chat from Ethiopia.

2 A further complication is that there are <u>two</u> issues of Somali Shillings, an "old and a "new", the "new" issue emanating from the enclave of one of the principal warlords of Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi.

robbed by a few, as they try to do good for the many.

Overall, it would appear that the influx of additional aid, as well as the external currencies, have caused substantial deflation in the Somali economy. The relief managers are concerned to better understand the monetary situation in Somalia and the extent to which they are (unwittingly) affecting it in ways which might be harmful or helpful to both themselves and Somalia's economic recovery.

VII. PROPOSED U.S. RECOVERY ASSISTANCE

A. Legislative and Funding Constraints

On January 4, 1990, Somalia fell one year behind on repayments of loans made under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), thus triggering Brooke Amendment sanctions for the then USAID program. Arrears to the U.S. on assistance provided under the FAA exceeded $21.7 million, of which $8.9 million was one year or more overdue. (About 95 percent of the arrears stemmed from military assistance loans and hence are not eligible for debt relief.)

Unless the Brooke Amendment is waived, A.I.D. is severely constrained in the terms of both the appropriation accounts that can be used to fund Somalia's recovery, and in the implementation mode/agents that can be utilized in managing the recovery activities. The complex legal situation is as follows:

1. Funds Available

a. Food aid under PL-480, and international disaster assistance (IDA) under section 491 of the FAA. These are the funding sources for the ongoing relief program managed by OFDA/DART. As of the end of 1992, approximately $138.4 million has been committed ($79.2 million for food aid and $59.2 million in grants to NGOs and international organizations). Such rehabilitation activities as Food-for-Work projects could be funded from this account.

b. DA/DFA funds under the special FY 1993 $100 million appropriation for Africa Disaster Relief, Rehabilitation and Recovery (ADRRR). (Use of these funds is not restricted to PVOs and international organizations.)

c. DA/DFA funds (particularly for reconstruction/long-term development assistance) under Section 6 of the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act. (Any activities using these funds must be implemented through PVOs and international organizations.)

d. DA/DFA funds in the FY 1993 Appropriations Act "notwithstanding any other provision of law" earmarked for War Victims (not less than $5 million) and Displaced Children (not less than $10 million). In addition, Section 542 of the FY 1993 Appropriations Act authorizes funds, notwithstanding country prohibitions, for Child Survival activities (up to $8 million for OE, no dollar ceiling).

2. **Potentially Available**

a. DA/DFA funds (for development assistance) under Section 562 of the FY 93 Appropriations Act, but only with a Presidential Certification that such aid is in the U.S. national interest. (Restricted to NGOs.)

b. DA/DFA funds generally, with a Presidential waiver of the Brooke Amendment. (Not restricted to NGOs and international organizations.) Note: a Presidential waiver for Somalia would be most useful. At some point further down the road, full forgiveness of Somalia's debt to the U.S. should be seriously considered. This would seem to be the only way that Somalia will ever be able to get out of Brooke.

Given the above, it would seem that the ADRRR is the most obvious and flexible source to fund A.I.D.'s recovery activities in Somalia. But it is not clear how much of the $100 million in this account remains available. Most -- if not all -- appears to have already been obligated, committed or reserved for on-going, OFDA-funded relief and rehabilitation activities in Somalia, or in similar programs in other African countries, e.g., Mozambique.

If this is correct, then the next best source of funding for recovery activities is the DFA. But using DFA funds generally for Somalia (permissible under Section 6 of the Horn of Africa legislation) means that A.I.D. can only operate through PVOs (NGOs) and international organizations.

The most flexible use of DFA funds would clearly be for War Victims, Displaced Children and Child Survival activities. Any broader use of the DFA than that mentioned above requires either a Presidential waiver or debt forgiveness.

B. The Former USAID Program

Consideration of any recovery-cum-development effort by A.I.D. in Somalia should take into account the immediate past experience with the USAID programs, as they were being phased out in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some of these activities may provide a useful foundation for new interventions, and all of them represent an important context as A.I.D. considers restarting its involvement in Somalia.

The USAID program in Somalia had declined from a high of $82 million in FY 1984 to a proposed $0.7 million in FY 1990. In its last several years, the program has focussed on policy reform, agricultural development, management training and family health. U.S. aid was sharply cut back in 1989, as two major projects, Shebelli Water Management and Kismayo Water Supply, were terminated for security reasons; and construction planned under a third project, Livestock Marketing and Health, was cut back by two-thirds, also because of security concerns.

The seven continuing projects in the USAID portfolio were nearing completion when the Brooke sanctions took effect. USAID/ Mogadishu's Brooke Phase Down Plan (of May 6, 1990) called for two of the seven to end in FY 1991, three in FY 1992, and the last two in FY 1993, with the immediate deobligation of $29 million in previously committed funds. However, the forced evacuation of all U.S. Embassy and USAID personnel from Somalia in January of 1991 put an even earlier end to all U.S. development assistance.

There remains a very large ($15.5 million) pipeline from the former A.I.D. program. But these funds (broken out in Annex G) are not available for reprogramming in Somalia. When de-obligated, they will revert back to the U.S. Treasury, or perhaps A.I.D. for general reuse.

An understandable initial impulse is to simply pick up where the phase-down program left off. This would afford, on its face, the greatest continuity and present the smallest administrative obstacles in an accelerated start-up. However, by and large, these apparent advantages do not stand up upon closer examination.

First, whatever administrative advantage might have been gained in revitalizing the old phase-down projects has been lost with the deobligation of unexpended balances and deauthorization of ongoing bilateral projects. (Some participant training expenditures are continuing under the centrally financed/ authorized AFGRAD project.) To reauthorize these activities would necessitate an entirely new documentation trail, and with the passage of time of approximately one-to-two years since the ongoing project activities were deauthorized, substantial revisions in procedural arrangements would be appropriate, if not mandated. Second, and more importantly, the context of the old Somalia program is vastly different from the conditions (and opportunities) which must or should govern any new effort from today. Monumental changes have taken place in the institutional competence (perhaps even effective existence) of Somali governmental and non-governmental bodies, in relative development priorities after two years of civil war and drought, and in the most fundamental assumptions about the kind of society and economy that Somalis will want.

REDSO's Somalia Planning Committee considered in turn each of the activities under the old Somalia program that were to be continued throughout the phase-down period:

1. **Somalia Management Training for Development (SOMTAD)** - This project combined long-term graduate level training (up to 210 fellowships) with a scattering of long-term advisory services in key ministries. The source and assignment (upon return) of any new group of Somalia participant trainees is unclear at best at this stage. New institutional priorities, both public and private, and sectoral development emphases have to be assessed in depth entirely anew, once the post-recovery "development" phase is underway. If and when long-term participant training appears timely, it may well make more sense to initiate it under the centrally-administered ATLAS facility of the Africa Bureau, through buy-ins from a Somalia Mission OYB. Depending upon the speed with which public and private institutions are reconstituted, both at the central/national level and on a more local basis, two SOMTAD elements might be considered, in revised form, under the reconstruction phase: (a) U.S. advisors for two or more years placed in government bodies on an "OPEX" basis, and (b) reconstitution of the Worksite Management Training Unit to provide on-the-job training and management workshops to private and public sector employees. Presumably, the topical emphases and probably the implementation modalities of the latter would be altered.

2. **Policy Initiatives and Privatization** - Two long-term advisors in the Ministries of Industries (parastatal divestiture and general business development) and Finance and Treasury (budgeting) were deployed, as well as policy studies and short-term training in reforms implementation. This activity **per se** is considered of lower overall priority, although some elements could appear in the medium to longer term as the re-institutionalization process gets underway.

3. **Jubba Development Analytical Studies** - Supportive of the Jubba Valley and Bardera Dam development schemes, this activity entailed environmental and socioeconomic studies, soil and land use classification/mapping, computerized data bases, and institutional strengthening. Essentially, all but the last component were completed. Information produced by the project could provide useful inputs to any development schemes in the area(s) without restarting the activities.

4. **PVO Partners in Development (PVO-P)** - This umbrella PVO/NGO project supported four U.S. grantees and up to 20 local groups, although only one of the local groups had actually received a grant, due to difficulties with A.I.D. and Government registration requirements. This bilateral project gave the Government of Somalia the leading role in the selection of PVOs and program emphases (e.g., rural and community development). Because Somalia lacks a functioning government to resume this role and because many more established U.S. PVOs are now active in Somalia, albeit for relief and (later) rehabilitation purposes, a more flexible, open

modality than PVO-P, appears necessary.

5. **Family Health Services** - An information/education/communications (IEC) project directed at family spacing and, ultimately, family planning was implemented by half a dozen governmental and NGO intermediaries. At first glance, a "family planning" effort in Somalia given the high reported number of deaths--especially amongst children--would now appear inappropriate. This would be an oversimplification: in fact, proper child spacing will be especially important in the short- to medium-term to ensure the health of nursing mothers and infants already in a weakened condition. However, other medical/health needs, such as immunizations, basic primary care infrastructure, surveillance, and child survival initiatives may have immediate precedence. Also, competent FP intermediaries may have changed significantly in the intervening two year period.

6. **Livestock Marketing and Health** - The thrust of this project was export marketing of livestock. Construction of three cattle quarantine facilities in northern, central and southern Somalia were scaled back to one station at Warmahan (Mogadishu) as security conditions worsened. To be added to this reduced operation was short-term technical assistance (15 person/months) in lab operation, fodder production, marketing and financial management. Reestablishing a modernized livestock export capacity would appear now to take a subordinate position to medium-term needs arising out of the emergency: herd re-immunization, herd redistribution, and functioning domestic markets. An initial impression, subject to more intensive on-ground assessment, is that export marketing interventions can be delayed until the "development" stage is well underway and herd stability has been established.

Finally, other activities during the phase-down period included HRDA and AFGRAD supported training, PD&S and Refugee Resettlement. These projects will be or, in the case of Resettlement, have been subsumed under present OFDA programs or likely future Africa Bureau programs, such as ATLAS.

C. Operating Assumptions and Imperatives

The United States is currently pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into Somalia, in terms of immediate food and other emergency relief, and the enormous costs associated with the U.S. military deployment. As further U.S. assistance is considered for medium-term recovery activities, the following assumptions and imperatives should govern the decision-making process:

1) The security situation remains very fragile; it could deteriorate again if the U.S. military "hand-off" in UNOSOM Phase II does not go well.

2) The national political reconciliation process is moving forward in fits and starts; it will be a long time before indigenous institutions to govern and administer the country are in place.

3) Somalia is still very much in an emergency situation -- and likely to continue so for some time.

4) For many overlapping reasons -- logistic, security, legal, budgetary, and operational -- all on-going and new A.I.D.-funded activities will have to be managed by a small number of USDH personnel, and implemented by intermediaries.

5) The UN's management of on-going relief -- and its planning for medium-term recovery -- will continue to be weak; the U.S.G. may have to play a key management and catalytic role in the overall relief and recovery process.

6) It is much too early to even begin to think about long-term development projects; in any event, A.I.D. should not envision investing in the large and traditional aid projects of the past.

7) Planning for long-term reconstruction of the country's physical infrastructure will be the responsibility of the World Bank and UNDP; A.I.D. should consider buying-in to a modest portion of that planning, at the appropriate time.

8) Nothing in Somalia will come quickly and easily; it will take years (and require hundreds of millions of donor dollars) to bring the country back to even its former (mid-1980s) economic and social level.

9) It would be a huge mistake to believe that Somalia can be remade into a prosperous and viable nation state in this century, if ever.

D. Recommendations

For the remainder of FY 1993, it is recommended that A.I.D.:

-- Continue to focus heavily on the provision of food and other emergency assistance, including providing U.S. leadership and expertise in managing the international donor relief effort; and

-- Provide additional financial and professional resources to begin to design and implement some recovery activities, as security and other conditions permit.

The proposed recovery activities -- with potential funding of up to $32 million -- include:

-- Quick-impact rehabilitation projects in the agriculture sector;

-- Varied projects in the health sector, particularly targeting war victims, displaced, orphans, and children in general;

-- Special income producing projects aimed at immediate employment and job creation;

-- Providing U.S. leadership and expertise in helping to plan -- and serve as a catalyst for other donor involvement -- in the overall recovery process; and

-- More detailed assessments of Somalia's recovery problems and needs in various sectors.

The specific activities and funding levels recommended in these five areas are as follows:

1. The Agricultural Sector

The only possible avenue for spurring agricultural recovery in the short-term is by expanding support to NGOs currently working in the sector. Fortunately, there are already on-going programs, some partially or wholly funded by OFDA grants managed by DART. It would be relatively straightforward to expand these grants, although NGO implementation capacity is already severely stretched. The FAO has developed a very preliminary estimate of funding and activities required for immediate sector recovery. A very urgent need is to develop and manage a coordinated sector program with a concerted strategy to systematically attack the recovery constraints as the security situation allows. Total additional funding of up to $10 million could support the following programs.

a) **Continue support to NGOs to provide agricultural inputs, particularly seeds.** Five or six NGOs are already active or interested in this activity and it should be coordinated carefully by a steering committee, probably directed by AID. Information from the ongoing agricultural assessment would be analyzed to target assistance to regions and individual households. Grants should contain the provision for NGOs to enlarge their operating staff, particularly by hiring trained Somali agriculturalists. Priority should be given to contracting with local farmers to produce high-quality seeds under technical supervision for distribution to targeted farm households. Tools and implements packages and perhaps basic household wares should be provided to complement the seed packages. Fertilizers and pesticides should not be provided at this time. Contracting of tractors to plow land that has been out of cultivation will also be required. (<u>$6,000,000</u>)

b) **Irrigation rehabilitation should be expanded and accelerated, with major structures repaired as a priority and main canals desilted.** This work would be contracted by NGOs to local firms and individuals with heavy equipment. Desilting of secondary and field canals should be done through village labor to generate employment and involve the beneficiaries in the projects. Either "cash or food-for work" approaches are recommended. (<u>$2,000,000</u>)

c) **Livestock health programs should be expanded and accelerated.** Vaccination is the priority and the current number of 18 veterinary teams could be doubled, with adequate field support such as vehicles, cold chains, vaccines and manpower provided. The program should be implemented by the ICRC as is currently being done, with additional NGOs having animal health experience added if possible. The target population of livestock for FY 93 vaccination should be one million animals. A comprehensive livestock assessment should be completed this year. (<u>$1,900,000</u>)

d) **Market assessment should quickly be done.** It should determine market distortions from food aid, the competitiveness of the existing market structure, and determine if physical marketing facilities should be constructed as trading and bulking points and perhaps even export handling facilities for major export commodities, such as bananas, other horticultural products and livestock. This could be accomplished through a buy-in to an R&D project (AMIS II) or an IQC funded by DD&S. (<u>$100,000</u>)

2. <u>The Health Sector</u>

A.I.D. is already funding a wide variety of health activities through OFDA grants administered by the DART. Priorities given below for additional, complementary funding emphasize development, expansion, and strengthening of primary health care services and meeting the special needs of war victims and displaced families, children and orphans primarily through international and local NGOs and UNICEF. NGO efforts would be assisted with complementary technical assistance using R&D/Health and Nutrition-managed projects. The total funding level of $8,000,000 for FY 1993 assumes that expansion will be relatively steady, but slow, given likely on-going security problems.

a) Continue to support the transformation of NGO (and IO) managed supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs into integrated primary health care (with MCH) programs. (Total funding proposed: $3,500,000 from either the Horn of Africa Earmark or DFA Child Survival)

Priority should go to programs giving emphasis to key interventions (prevention including immunization, nutrition monitoring and Vitamin A distribution, antenatal and child spacing and control of diarrheal disease, ARI, and water and sanitation); close collaboration with local, legitimate authorities; limited rehabilitation of available infrastructure; recruitment and refresher training as appropriate of local, already trained health care providers; collaboration with local, indigenous NGOs; and, linkages with other development activities such as income-generation.

-- Increase funding to permit expanding NGO and UNICEF grants already in place. ($1,000,000)

  -- encourage where security and management capability exist, expansion and extension of PHC and related services from towns to rural villages and settlements;

  -- strengthen PHC programs, where feasible, with improved training, supervision, and management of logistics and related systems;

-- Add funding to existing grants to NGOs and UNICEF or fund new grants for PHC programs in order to expand efforts, where feasible, into priority (need and population density relatively high) underserved areas, e.g., from preliminary review of immunization activities in Southern Somalia, areas of Lower and Middle Juba and large areas of Mudug and Galgadud Regions appear underserved; large areas of Northeast are also likely underserved. ($2,000,000)

-- If needed to support expanded NGO programs, increase funding through UNICEF to assure availability of immunization supplies (vaccines, cold chain equipment kits, etc.). ($500,000)

b) **Fund grants to NGOs (international, local and/or joint ventures) to support war victims, through assistance in prosthetics and physical and vocational rehabilitation, and displaced families, children and orphans, with documentation and tracing of families and children, assistance in relocation to home areas, psycho-social counseling, literacy and vocational training, and income generation.** (<u>$3,000,000 from War Victims and DCOF earmark</u>)

c) **Fund technical assistance to support and backstop OFDA-DART staff, assist UN efforts at leadership in addressing priority health issues, and better assure that relief and rehabilitation efforts build towards longer-term development needs.** (<u>$1,000,000 from DFA Child Survival Earmark, and from War Victims and DCOF Earmarks</u>)

-- Intermittent or resident technical assistance (through Child Survival Fellow program and DCOF funding mechanisms), with two staff; (Approximately $400,000):

  -- Primary Health Care programming to: develop criteria for review of new grant applications for PHC and related projects; assist UNOSOM, UNICEF, and recently established health services task force in building collaboration, exchange and common strategy development for PHC among the NGOs; and actively monitor and analyze the PHC models being implemented to determine their effectiveness and operational problems under these difficult conditions.

  -- Displaced families, children and orphans, and war victims support programs; given numbers of displaced and needs for coordination of efforts among international and local NGOs, this will be a large and complex area to manage.

-- Continue and possibly expand support with complementary technical assistance, if needed, to efforts already underway to strengthen health and nutrition surveillance. (<u>$100,000</u>)

-- Make available to NGOs implementing PHC and related programs technical assistance from several key R&D/Health and Nutrition projects through OYB transfer, specifically WASH, IMPACT, WIN, PRITECH, REACH and/or BASICS. (<u>$100,000 each for total $500,000</u>)

d) **On Site Assessments and Analyses.** (<u>$250,000 from War Victims and DCOF Earmarks and Horn and DFA Child Survival</u>)

Implementation of several of the above proposals will require additional data gathering and analysis in Somalia by small, specialized teams so that proposals with realistic implementation plans and budgets can be prepared. Among the analyses needed are:

-- Assessment of numbers and needs of displaced families, children and orphans; other donors and groups prepared to support efforts in resettlement in home areas. (<u>$100,000</u>);

-- Assessment of water and sanitation needs to support planning for PVO projects with this component. (<u>$100,000</u>); and

-- Assessment and support to databank development and updating on PVO activities, population coverage, infrastructure developed, etc.in collaboration with UNOSOM/UNICEF and the NGO Consortium. (<u>$50,000</u>)

e) **With interested international or local NGO, develop and/or produce relevant health education materials; as feasible, utilize radio and small media (pamphlets, booklets, and posters), and folk media (poems and songs).** (<u>$250,000 from Horn or DFA Child Survival</u>)

3. **<u>Employment and Job Creation</u>**

Section VI.B described the serious unemployment problems facing Somalia: literally millions of refugees, displaced persons, and armed men (who will, hopefully, soon be <u>dis</u>armed) who need jobs.

Various innovative job creation programs, e.g., food for work, cash for work, or maybe food or cash for guns, must be devised and implemented to reach this mass of unemployed. The potential (NGO managed) projects to employ primarily men range from clearing the rubble and rubbish in Mogadishu and other large cities, to helping repair and rehabilitate civil works throughout the country: roads, bridges, wells, irrigation systems, sanitation systems, etc.

Innovative ways should always be found to assist in creating jobs and economic opportunities for Somali <u>women</u> -- who are said to be more honest, efficient, hardworking, and clever (in business pursuits) than Somali men. (<u>$1,050,000</u>)

4. **<u>U.S. Leadership and Expertise in the Overall Recovery Process</u>**

As previously noted, American civilians (primarily OFDA-funded USDH and PSC personnel) are carrying much of the burden of coordinating and managing the on-going emergency operations (in the absence of UN personnel). It appears that U.S. personnel are also needed to fill key operational positions in UNOSOM Phase II; assist in the planning of the entire recovery process; and act as a catalyst to get other donors involved in recovery and reconstruction. Thus the recommendation that 6-7 senior USDH or PSC personnel be seconded to UNOSOM for this purpose, for periods of 9-12 months. ($2,000,000)

5. Project Design and Support (PD&S)

Some funds should be made available for normal PD&S purposes, including assessments in other sectors besides agriculture and health. There are two immediate needs: a) a study of the currency and banking situation, for which REDSO/ESA has already prepared a Scope of Work and is currently seeking an IQC-funded consultant; and b) the design of a proposed PVO Umbrella Project.

6. PVO Umbrella Project

Given that most, if not all, A.I.D.-funded activities will have to be implemented by intermediaries, a PVO Umbrella Grant project to serve as a flexible funding modality, is highly desirable. REDSO/ESA has already prepared a "PID-like" concept paper for this proposed project. ($10,000,000)

* * *

The table on the following page lays out all the proposed funding for the remainder of FY 1993, including the potential appropriation accounts to tap.

The grand total comes to $32 million. But if the proposed PVO Umbrella project ($10 million) incorporates some of the $18 million proposed for activities in the agriculture and health sectors, rather than on a direct grant basis to an intermediary, the overall total would be commensurately reduced.

It should also be stressed that the total of $32 million is probably on the high side, in terms of the recovery activities that can actually be started in FY 1993, given the current situation in Somalia.

PROPOSED RECOVERY ASSISTANCE FOR SOMALIA

FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 1993

USES	SOURCES OF FUNDING ($ MILLIONS)					
	A.D.R.R.R.	DFA				
		"HORN"	OTHER	WAR VICTIMS	ORPHANS	542
AGRICULTURE SECTOR						
– AGRICULTURAL INPUTS (SEEDS, TOOLS, ETC.)		6.00				
– IRRIGATION REHABILITATION	2.00					
– LIVESTOCK HEALTH		1.90				
– AGRICULTURE MARKET ASSESSMENT		0.10				
HEALTH SECTOR						
– PHC/MCH PROGRAMS		3.50				
– WAR VICTIMS & DISPLACED/ORPHANS				1.50	1.50	
– CHILD SURVIVAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT						0.40
– STRENGTHEN HEALTH/NUTRITION SURVEILLANCE						0.10
– R&D/HEALTH & NUTRITION BUY–INS		0.50				
– ASSESSMENTS & ANALYSES		0.15			0.10	
– HEALTH EDUCATION MATERIALS		0.25				
SECONDMENT OF U.S. PERSONNEL TO UN	2.00					
EMPLOYMENT/JOB CREATION		1.05				
PD & S						
– CURRENCY & BANKING STUDY			0.30			
– PVO UMBRELLA PROJECT DESIGN			0.15			
– OTHER ASSESSMENTS			0.50			
SUB–TOTAL	4.00	13.45	0.95	1.50	1.60	0.50
PVO UMBRELLA PROJECT *	10.00					
POTENTIAL GRAND TOTAL			32.00			

* Note: Many activities listed under the health and agriculture sectors, as well as employment/job creation, could be funded under the PVO Umbrella Project, thus reducing the total dollar amount.

FY 1994 and Beyond

It is simply too early to propose funding levels -- and specific interventions -- for recovery activities in FY 1994 and beyond. It is highly unlikely that conditions will permit all of the interventions proposed for the remainder of FY 1993 to actually be launched in the next eight months. So at least some of the proposals for FY 1993 funding (listed above) will doubtless spill over into FY 1994.

About all that can be further said at this juncture is that new interventions in FY 1994 should build on those programs/projects that are successfully launched in FY 1993. In this connection, the following activities -- in the health and agriculture sectors -- may deserve serious consideration:

1. The Agricultural Sector

The primary focus for FY 1994 and beyond should be to complete the FY 1993 effort of distribution of agricultural inputs through at least two cropping seasons for each affected or eligible household, to expand and complete the rehabilitation of the irrigation system, to expand the animal health program to target approximately double the FY 93 population vaccinated and provide routine animal health care services. Introduction, testing and multiplication of elite primary food crop varieties such as maize and sorghums would be started and gradually expanded. Fertilizer and improved crop husbandry methods would be introduced and disseminated.

Agricultural inputs should be continued with NGO implementation support. Improved seed production would be done with the assistance of the international Agricultural Research Centers such as ICRISAT, CYMMT and CIAT. Estimated costs including input distribution through two growing seasons and seed multiplication, technical assistance from the IARCS, would be $10 million.

Irrigation rehabilitation should be continued and expanded to rehabilitation of a major storage reservoir in the upper Shabelli region and extended to the Juba river as resettlement occurs and security conditions warrent. Total estimated costs for complete irrigation rehabilitation is $20 million.

Livestock health programs will require expansion and maintenance. Vaccination, quarantine and related activities are likely to cost $2 million per year.

Agricultural market rehabilitation will consist of some infrastructure improvement, and a market information system. Estimated costs are dependent upon the extent of agricultural rehabilitation.

2. **<u>The Health Sector</u>**

a) **Continue and expand support to NGOs through a health component of a PVO Umbrella-type Project.** <u>($5,000,000 from similar Horn or DFA Child Survival Earmarks)</u>

Under this project, give emphasis to:

-- Further expansion of PHC programs and activities to underserved and more remote areas and strengthening of programs through application of lessons learned from 1993 PHC activities;

-- Building into new grants plans for developing longer-term sustainability of health care activities for transfer both of management and technical oversight to Somali counterparts in management teams at the district and regional levels and responsibility for portion of financial support; and

-- Continuation, as needed, of support for War Victims and displaced families, children, and orphans.

b) **Renew grant to UNICEF as appropriate and indicated by monitoring findings to continue support to immunization and PHC programs.** <u>($2,000,000 from Horn and/or DFA Child Survival Earmark)</u>

c) **Continue technical assistance backstopping for NGOs with OYB transfers to selected R&D/Health and Nutrition projects, similar to those utilized for 1993, but more selectively given experience with assistance in 1993.** <u>($1,000,000 from DFA Child Survival Earmark)</u>

Expand audience for technical assistance if local administrative units, districts, regions or central government are sufficiently well-established, legitimate and request assistance in selected areas of health policy-making, standards-setting, and health planning.

Special areas of on-going technical assistance and support should continue to be health and nutrition surveillance system development and utilization; on-going monitoring and evaluation of PHC activities and programs.

d) **Plan and conduct a broader-scale health, population and nutrition sector assessment at end FY 1994, to identify longer-term investment options as input into bilateral HPN project design in FY 1995.** <u>($250,000 from Horn and/or DFA Child Survival Earmarks)</u>

e) **Staffing and Management. Continue staffing through funding mechanisms used for 1993.** ($500,000 from Horn, War Victims and DCOF Earmarks) However, expand scope of PHC-Child Survival Fellow to include assistance in design of health component of PVO umbrella project and manage HPN sector assessment. Backstopping assistance to be provided by REDSO.

E. Program Management and Staffing

1. General Living and Working Conditions

Living and working in Somalia is extremely difficult and dangerous for the hundreds of expatriates who make up the international donor community.

All U.S.G. personnel live, eat, and work at the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO), which occupies the two residences that make up the former CONOCO compound in South Mogadishu. Approximately 30 State, USIS, and A.I.D. personnel share the compound's very limited office and living space. All are on extended TDY status, except the new USAID Director, Ric Machmer, who has been permanently assigned.

Everyone (except the Ambassador) must share a room with from two to six others, often sleeping on army cots. (State Communicators sleep on the sofas.) Ten to 12 people have to share a shower. Six U.S. Marines live on the balcony/roof and routinely exchange gunfire with snipers.

Everyone works seven days a week, from early in the morning until late at night. In any event, it's too dangerous to venture off the compound after dark. Although the environment is extremely stressful, morale is high. But people also appear tired; they can run on adrenalin just so long. Since everyone has his/her limits, no one should be required to endure the current work pressure and danger for extended periods.

All U.S. personnel assigned to Mogadishu on a permanent or TDY basis should receive maximum benefits in terms of hardship allowances and danger pay.[1] Mogadishu will also have to remain an "unaccompanied Post" for the foreseeable future.

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[1] And the absolutely ludicrous policy which prevents TDY personnel from drawing danger pay on weekends must be immediately changed. A case in point: two REDSO team members who prepared this report were involved in two separate shooting incidents in Mogadishu, one when CODEL Murtha came under sniper fire. But since the incidents happened to be on a Saturday and Sunday, they were not eligible to collect danger pay!

2. Managing the A.I.D. Program

Since August of 1992, all on-going A.I.D. emergency assistance activities -- including PL-480 food programs and OFDA-funded grants -- have been managed by the OFDA/DART: Disaster Assistance Response Team (with limited support services from REDSO/ESA).

The 15-30 (the number varies) USDH and USPSC DART personnel are variously stationed in Nairobi, Mombasa (the airlift) and Mogadishu. DART personnel have not only designed and implemented the very large U.S. relief operation, but played an absolutely essential role in liaisoning with the U.S. military on Operation Restore Hope, and in manning many of the key positions in the UNOSOM headquarters (given the failure of the UN system to adequately staff up its own operation).

Given its very operational role, the DART has not had much time to closely monitor implementation of the scores of OFDA-funded grants which it made in late FY 1992 and the first four months of FY 1993. Nor has the DART had much time to devote to rehabilitation/recovery planning. On the other hand, some grants have been made, e.g., to SCF-US, for agricultural rehabilitation, i.e., seeds, tools, desilting, etc.

In any event, the DART is stretched, in terms of both managing its relief portfolio and performing operational chores for UNOSOM. Present OFDA planning apparently has: a) the DART office in Mombasa closing at the end of February; b) most or all of the DART personnel leaving Mogadishu by the end of April; and c) a small DART contingent remaining in Nairobi for a longer period, primarily to monitor the existing food programs and emergency grants through periodic TDYs to Somalia.

However, OFDA is also considering funding the secondment of 6-7 U.S. direct hire or contractor personnel to the UNOSOM Phase II operation. In other words, providing competent Americans to continue to play a key operational and catalytic role in both managing the on-going, short-term relief effort and in planning/managing the medium-term recovery process which is just beginning. REDSO/ESA strongly endorses this proposed secondment of U.S. personnel to UNOSOM, with the required funding (up to $2 million in FY 1993) to come from one or more of the OFDA or Africa Bureau accounts that can be tapped for Somalia.

But REDSO/ESA requests OFDA to reconsider its plans to maintain a long-term presence in Nairobi. REDSO suggests placing 3-4 OFDA-funded USPSCs in Mogadishu for at least the remainder of FY 1993, and have them assigned to the new USAID/Somalia, with responsibility for monitoring the on-going U.S. emergency assistance program on the ground, not from Nairobi. In any event, with the reestablishment of USAID/Somalia, the responsibility for managing all A.I.D. activities -- and supervising all A.I.D.-funded personnel -- should pass to the new USAID Director. Thus, REDSO recommends that all DART or other OFDA-funded personnel working in Somalia become a part of USAID/Somalia.

3. Staffing USAID/Somalia

Every possible constraint -- legal, budgetary, programmatic, security, logistics -- argues for USAID/Somalia to have a very small staff -- the absolute minimum required to do its assigned tasks. Assuming that these tasks will include: a) managing the continuing U.S. emergency relief program (with the assistance of 3-4 DART or other OFDA-funded personnel); and b) expanding into the design and implementation of the new rehabilitation/recovery program recommended above, then USAID/Somalia will require at least five U.S. direct hire officers:

1) Director (Ric Machmer);
2) General Development Officer (Deputy);
3) Agriculture Officer;
4) Health Officer; and
5) Executive Officer.

Also required are: one PSC/GSO; one U.S. secretary, on a PSC or extended TDY; plus 10-20 local employees to serve as drivers, guards, and other support personnel.

USAID/Somalia will have to rely heavily on REDSO/ESA for many of its technical support services, including project development, economic and social analysis, legal, contracting, commodity management, and the full range of Controller functions.

An initial OE budget request of $1.5 million for FY 1993 has been presented to AID/W by REDSO/RFMC/Nairobi. Machmer has requested the immediate TDY assistance of an Executive Officer to check out possible office and residential living accommodations in Mogadishu and to begin to deal with all the administrative/logistic problems associated with establishing the new USAID/Somalia. In this connection, security considerations may require special arrangements that were not factored into the initial OE budget request.

PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY REDSO/ESA TEAM

Mogadishu

U.S. Liaison Office

Ambassador Robert Oakley
John Hirsch, Political Officer
Leonard Scensny, Political Officer
John Fox, Political Officer
Don Teitlebaum, Political Officer
Robert Gosende, USIS
Bill Garvelink, DART
Kate Farnsworth, DART
Lauren Landis, DART
Kim Maynard, DART
Nick Mariani, DART

UNOSOM

Saleem Kassum, Acting Chief of Staff to Ambassador Kittani
Phil Johnston, Acting Coordinator, Humanitarian Operations Center
Col. Kevin Kennedy, Deputy Coordinator HOC (USMC)
Pat Banks, Sector Coordinator (UNDP)
Lt.Col. Bob McPherson, Civilian/Military Operations (USMC)
John Marks, UNOSOM Representative, Baidoa
Torsten Uwe Frenzel, Senior Water Engineer
Dr. George Ngatiri, Health Coordinator
Bob Harari, Food Security Chairman

U.S. Military

Brig.Gen. Zinni, USMC
Lt. Col. Charles Able, USMC
Col. Richard Mentmeyer, USAF, USLO Liaison
Maj. Richard Hooker, USMC, USLO Liaison
Col. Washachek, 10th Mt. Division (Engineers)
Capt. Sutton
Cmdr. Budreau, USN (Seabees)
John Avant, Project Manager, Brown & Root (Civilian)
Gary Damashi, Dept. of the Navy, SPORE (Civilian)

U.S. Congress

Martin S. Rendon, Staff Director, Select Committee on Hunger
Terry Peel, Staff Director, House Appropriations Committee

Save the Children/UK

Steven Rifkin, Director
Vilma Mayes, MOH Advisor
Ali Omar Abdullah
Omar Abdi Mohamad (formerly GOS Water Development Authority)

ICRC

Umberto Mosimann, Administrator

CARE

Rhodri Wynn-Pope, Team Leader
Jim Stearns

Inter Action (American Council for Voluntary International Action

Peter J. Davies, President and Chief Executive Officer
Richard Carr
Lisa Mullins

Save the Children/USA

Charles MacCormack, President
Barnett F. Baron, Vice President, International Programs
Willet Weeks, Sub-Regional Director
Jens Braun, Director
Laurie Vollen, Acting PHC Coordinator

CRS

Bill Berquist, Team Leader

World Concern

Kent Elliott, Director

International Medical Corps (IMC)

Bob Wilson, Adminstrator
Dawn McRae, PHC Coordinator

Somali Red Crescent

Nur Hassan Hussein, Secretary General

CISP

Dr. Ali, PHC Coordinator

ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency International

Dr. Hugo Sosa, Country Director

Pharmacies Sans Frontieries (PSF)

Guillaume

UNICEF

Mark Stirling, Director
Faduma Haji Mohammed, MCH Nurse
David Alnwick, Nutrition Advisor

World Health Organization (WHO)

Robert Hagen, Management Officer (Acting WHO Representative at the time)

Health Sector Committee - Mog. South (indigenous organization)

Dr. Abdullah M. Geilani, PHC Coordinator
Halima Abdi Sheikh, MCH Coordinator

Merca

U.S. Military

Col. Sikes, Cmdr., 10th Mountain Div.
Maj. Bob Vallor, Civil Affairs Unit
Lt. Laveille, Civil Affairs Unit

ICRC

Several ICRC Staff, including Acting Delegate Remy

Annalinna

Dr. Annalinna, head of the private TB hospital
Dr. Mario, on Annalinna's staff

Baidoa

Bruce Menser, World Vision
Mary O'Reilly, International Medical Corps
Concern (Ireland) field staff
Various U.S. Marine & Australian Army Officers

Mombasa

Brig.Gen. Paul A. Fratarangelo, Commander, Joint Task Force - "Operation Provide Relief"
Capt. James Spore, USN (Seabees)
Ms. Jett Smith, Dept. of the Navy
Lt.Cmdr. Dan Berenato, USN
Evan MacGibbon, DART
Les Peverall, DART
Ron Libby, DART

Nairobi

James Kunder, OFDA
Tom Dolan, DART
Catherine McKeag, CARE PHC Consultant
Peter Schumann, UNDP Mogadishu
Charles Petrie, UNOSOM NGO Liaison
Sigmund Hanson, Lutheran World Relief (LWR)
C.D. Kellums, Contractor (Well Rehabilitation)

Somalia: A Quick Overview

A. Geography , Climate, People[1]

Somalia comprises the perimeter of the Horn of Africa, the easternmost part of the continent. The country, shaped like a figure 7, extends about 1,000 miles along the Indian Ocean, 500 miles along the Gulf of Aden and about 200 miles inland. Its total area of 246,000 square miles is roughly the size of Texas. Flat country prevails in the south, with few areas rising over 1,000 feet. Much of the northern region is plateau, with altitudes reaching 3,000-4,000 feet and rising to peaks of almost 8,000 feet. Southern Somalia is traversed by two rivers which flow toward the sea from Ethiopia. The Juba River flows into the Indian Ocean near the Port of Kismayo, and the Shebelli River disappears into marshlands near the sea about 200 miles southwest of Mogadishu.

Somalia's climate is hot and dry. There are four seasons: two wet and two dry. The major rainy season, called the Gu, is from late April to late June. It is followed by a dry season, the Haggai, which lasts until early September. A minor rainy season, the Der, begins in September and continues until early December. It is followed by the major dry season, the Jilal, which lasts until the onset of the major rains.

Somalia's population is estimated at 7.5 million. Approximately 100,000 Somali citizens live and work in the Gulf States. There are currently more than 400,000 Somali refugees in Kenya.

Although Somalia is populated by one ethnic group -- the Somali -- it is divided into five clan families (the Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Isaak and Sab); these groups are, in turn, divided into clans, sub-clans or lineages and, finally, extended families. For centuries these clan groups have contested water and grazing rights among themselves. More than half of the Somali population are nomadic or seminomadic pastoralists; 20 percent are settled agriculturalists, and the remainder are town dwellers. Most Somalis (99 percent) are members of the Sunni Sect of Islam.

Somali is the country's official language. But English is used predominately in diplomatic circles, and in Mogadishu Italian is still used in all walks of official and domestic life. Arabic, the second official language, is also spoken by many Somalis.

In 1981, I.M. Lewis (London School of Economics and Political Science) produced a booklet entitled "Somali Culture, History and Social Institutions." Several passages from his booklet provide

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1 Much of this section was paraphrased from the Department of State's Somalia Post Report of September 1986.

excellent insights into the complex character of the Somalia people. Lewis wrote:

> "Although the Somali people had, traditionally, a strong sense of cultural and linguistic unity, they did not form a single political unit. They were a nation, not a state, although they possessed all the prerequisites for effective statehood.
>
> "Despite their strong sentiments of national self-esteem, they wish to guard the secrets of their culture and only to share them on their own terms and as they choose. The suspicion which greets the stranger is not reserved only for non-Somali foreigners. People of one clan behave similarly towards those of another, potentially hostile group. The cautious traditional greeting, shouted at a distance while approaching "Is it Peace?', is frequently a literal request for information. In the harsh struggle for survival which is the nomad's lot, suspicion is the natural attitude towards those with whom one competes for access to scarce pastures and water. This defence mechanism is extended to all contexts of social interaction and hence becomes a national characteristic. Since generosity, especially in receiving guests, is also highly valued and a source of pride, the stranger often encounters conflicting attitudes in his hosts.
>
> "This guarded approach to the outside world, coupled with a politician's gift for seizing the advantage, makes the Somalis formidable adversaries. These qualities amongst the nomads are combined with an aggressive self-confidence and, traditionally, open contempt for other people. This is closely bound up with the nomad's sense of independence and defiant scorn for those who seek to impose their dominion upon him. Displays of superior force earn only temporary respect as these most ungovernable people bide their time. One can argue with them, one can cajole them, but one cannot securely command them. Connected with this is a certain lack of predictability, in routine situations. Particularly outside their traditional nomadic setting, with its inbuilt pattern of impulses and constraints, Somalis are brilliant improvisers and entrepreneurs if less dependable in humdrum tasks."

B. The Economy[2]

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. It has few natural resources, a limited infrastructure and an inadequate human resource base. Even before the country's collapse in early 1991 into complete political and economic chaos, the economy was highly dependent on exports of a few products, remittances from abroad and donor assistance. Agriculture contributed two-thirds of domestic output and over 90 percent of exports. Livestock alone contributed nearly one-half of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and until recently almost two-thirds of exports. The principal livestock are camels, cattle, sheep, and goats. Other exports have consisted primarily of bananas, grown on some 120 plantations, plus hides and skins, and incense. The leading markets were Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and the Gulf States.

Crop production accounted for 15 percent of agricultural production and added about $25 million annually to foreign exchange earnings. Other crops in addition to bananas included sugarcane, maize, sorghum, sesame seed, cotton, and peanuts. Agriculture grew at an average annual rate of 2.8 percent between 1977 and 1989, while overall GDP grew at an estimated 1.3 percent during the same period.

The major agricultural region is in the south, particularly in the areas between the Juba and Shebelli Rivers. There were many irrigation schemes along the two rivers, although the Shebelli dries up during the longer of the two dry seasons.

Somalia has very little industry. The most important manufacturing plants were the sugar refineries at Johar and Marere, a cotton mill at Balad, a fish-freezing plant at Afgoi, a petroleum refinery, and a number of small factories in Mogadishu, producing canned meat, fish, fruits, vegetables, textiles, cigarettes and matches.

Gypsum, feldspar, columbite, iron, and uranium deposits have been identified, but their full extent and economic potential are still unknown. Deposits of sepiolite, or meerschaum, are among the world's largest and constitute a potentially valuable but largely unexploited resource. Western oil companies have explored for oil and gas, but have found no commercially exploitable amounts. The country has been almost wholly dependent on foreign sources for manufactured goods, processed foods, petroleum products, transport equipment, and machinery.

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2 Much of the material in this section (and the section following on Social Sectors) was paraphrased from the USAID Country Development Strategy Statement for Somalia, written in 1989.

C. The Social Sectors

There are no current and reliable data on the social sectors in Somalia.

In 1990 the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated life expectancy in Somalia at 42 years, among the lowest in the world. Only 10-15 percent of the population had access to primary health care services; most people relied on traditional health practitioners and pharmacists, who had no formal training. The nomadic population, with virtually no health services, was most vulnerable to disease and malnutrition.

Infant mortality rates of 152 per 1,000 were reported in the late 1980s -- twice the A.I.D. standard for this indicator. The mortality rate for children from one-to-five years of age was also very high (105 per 1,000). The leading causes of mortality in children under five were diarrhea, tetanus, pneumonia, birth complications, measles and premature birth. Somalia also had one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, with 1,100 mothers dying per 100,000 births, three times the average in all other low-income countries. The major constraints to reducing child and female mortality were the lack of public awareness of nutrition, hygiene, and child spacing, female circumcision, and poor and poorly distributed health care services.

At independence in 1960, Somalia inherited a very weak educational structure and a population which, with the exception of a small elite, was mostly illiterate. In fact, there was no generally accepted form of written Somali until the early 1970s. As of the late 1980s, only 17 percent of all primary-school-aged children and only 12 percent of school-aged girls were enrolled in schools. The adult literacy rate is currently estimated at 17 percent, with overall female literacy at 6 percent, and as low as one or two percent among nomads.

Although family planning is a very new concept in Somalia, child spacing has traditionally been widely practiced among nomads. Private pharmacies in the major cities carried contraceptives, but the number of couples using them was probably very small. The overall rate of contraceptive use is believed to be about one percent. In the short-run, urban migration is a more important factor than high population growth. Mogadishu tripled in size during the 1980s, straining basic services, such as water, electricity, health, housing and schools long before the present difficulties brought even more people into the capital and other major cities.

D. Recent History, Political Structure

Somalia's present geographic boundaries and political institutions date back to 1960, when the Somali Republic was created by the merger of the former colonies of Italian Somalia and British Somaliland (the northwestern quadrant of the country). Left out of the new nation were hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis living in Djibouti (then French Somaliland), and large areas of northern Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Somalia's first decade after independence was characterized by efforts to build viable new political institutions on top of the widely divergent Italian and British colonial systems which the country inherited. The process was particularly furthered by the majority party in the National Assembly, the Somali Youth League, whose nationalistic leaders sought to submerge the traditional clan divisions and rivalries.

With substantial foreign aid, mainly from the West, Somalia's early years also saw modest gains in economic and social development of the country. But Somalia's foreign policy was dominated by the "unification issue," i.e. the fact that three parts of what was considered to be Somalia were under foreign rule in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. This led to a protracted guerilla war by Somalis living in Kenya (1963-67) and a Somali uprising in the Ogaden that led to a brief but major military confrontation between the Ethiopian and Somali armed forces.

These border confrontations -- in which Somalia failed to gain any of the disputed territories -- contributed to the assassination of the President (1969) and the overthrow of the civilian government in a military coup (October 1970).

The impetus for the coup came from a group of young army officers who were impatient with the corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency of the civilian government. But it soon became clear that General Muhammad Siyad Barre, the Commander of the Army, held all the reins of power, as the new Head of State. Barre, who was to remain in office for 20 years, embarked on an energetic policy of internal reform, which was given the ideological title of "Scientific Socialism" (in Somali, literally "wealth sharing with knowledge").

Scientific socialism was basically an assault on traditional Somali society in an effort to secure modernization through popular participation in local councils and workers' committees and state control of the economy. Large industrial units, most services, including trade, and much agricultural land were nationalized. The ideological swing also reflected the Army's (and, thus, Somalia's) growing dependence on the Soviet Union and other bloc countries (China, North Korea) and the country's emergence as a pawn in the Cold War.

The first phase of General Barre's rule was one of concentration on internal problems: local political and economic development and consolidation of the regime's authority. By the mid-Seventies, however, Somalia embarked on a new expansionist phase, which included: a) successfully influencing the events which led to the independence of Djibouti from France, with an ethnic Somali as the new country's first President; and b) massive support for the Western Somali Liberation Front which was seeking to wrest much of the Ogaden from Ethiopia.

In a startling reversal of Cold War roles, however, the Soviet Union and its bloc allies switched their allegiance to the new Marxist regime in Ethiopia. And, with substantial Soviet arms and 17,000 Cuban troops, the Ethiopians (in 1978) crushed the Somali uprising in the Ogaden and soundly defeated the Somali armed forces which came to their aid.

Somalia summarily expelled its former Soviet patrons in September of 1978, and, within 18 months, granted the United States strategic access rights to the port of Berberra and other potential military sites in the country. Thus, throughout the 1980s, maintaining Somalia's independence and stability became a major U.S. foreign policy objective. The U.S. became Somalia's leading aid donor, with a program designed to help liberalize the economy and reverse the previous decade of decline, brought on by centralized state control, the war with Ethiopia, and a very serious drought (1978-80). GDP had fallen by an average of three percent annually between 1978 and 1980.

The decade of the 1980s was marked by increasing political opposition to President Barre, fueled by dissatisfaction with his regime's economic performance, his increasingly autocratic rule and human rights abuses, and a resurgence of traditional clan rivalries, some of these deliberately exacerbated by Barre to help maintain his grip on power. In 1981 the Government embarked on a major IMF-supported stabilization program, which initially produced positive results. But the recovery was halted in 1984 by a renewed drought and the imposition of a ban on Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia (which cut off Somalia's main source of export earnings) after rumors of a rinderpest outbreak in East Africa.

The Government compounded the problem by failing to implement further stabilization measures, eschewing a devaluation, price controls, or other financial restraints. There was a brief period of high economic growth from 1985 to 1987, as a result of a dramatic revival of the livestock sector. But further IMF and World Bank adjustment programs floundered, and by 1988 most donors and potential investors kept their distance as Somalia began to disintegrate politically.

Progressive political disintegration had begun in the mid-1980s, as various factions, many formed along clan lines, expressed their increasing opposition to President Barre and his narrow circle of followers. Two major opposition groups emerged: the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the North and the United Somalia Congress (USC) in the South These two heavily armed groups forged an alliance in the second half of 1990, and heavy fighting against the Government forces erupted throughout the country. At the end of 1990, USC forces entered Mogadishu and, on January 26, 1991, President Barre fled the country. Other groups also formed, most on clan lines -- for example, the USC was a Hawiye organization and the SNM was dominated by the Isaak.

The overthrow of the Barre regime brought no peace to the country. Instead, the SNM proclaimed a self-styled Somaliland Republic in the north[3], and the USC split into two major warring parties in the south, led by the interim President, Ali Mahdi, and General Mohammed Farad Aideed. Bloody fighting raged between these two factions for control of Mogadishu and other regions of the south and central parts of the country through much of 1991 and 1992. This led to a complete breakdown of all law and order, in which other minor warlords and armed bandits were free to ravage both the major towns and the countryside. By the end of 1992, Somalia had virtually ceased to exist as a nation state. Its political institutions had crumbled; its always fragile economy and infrastructure had been almost completely destroyed; and its people were in desperate straits, entirely dependent on outside assistance for their survival.

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3 No foreign government has officially recognized this splinter state, which has its "capital" in Hargeisa.

UNITAF SOMALIA

PHASE I-II



ANNEX C

SOMALIA - FROM RELIEF TO RECOVERY

GENERIC ACTIVITIES BY CATEGORY	DONORS/AGENCIES CURRENTLY ACTIVE
A. RELIEF	
- FOOD AID/DISTRIBUTION	- WFP, ICRC, WVRD, CRS, CARE, AICF, SCF/UK, SCR, ACORD
- FOOD TRANSPORT/LOGISTICS	
OVERLAND	- WFP, CARE
AIRLIFT	- SAT, US MIL, WFP
LOGISTIC SUPPORT	- MSF/F
- MEDICAL/SURGICAL AID HOSPITALS VILLAGE OR FIELD CLINICS	- AFSC,IMC, DAWA, AICF, GOAL, MSF/F, CARE, MSF/B, SCR, IMC, SCF/UK, MSF/S, ITALCOOP, WORLD CONCERN, ANNALINA, IARA, CARITAS, SOS, CISP
- DRUGS/MEDICINES	- UNICEF, WHO, CISP, AFSC, MSF/F
- EMERGENCY WATER/SANITATION	- AICF, SCF/UK, OXFAM, CARE, GOAL, CONCERN, CRS, ITALCOOP, MSF/F,
- CLOTHES/BLANKETS	- AFSC, CONCERN
- EMERGENCY SHELTER	- CONCERN, CARE, GOAL
- SUPPLEMENTARY & THERAPEUTIC FEEDING AND MCH PROGRAMS	- CONCERN, SCF/UK, IMC, MSF/F, AICF, ANNALINA, IARA, GOAL, IIRO, MSF/H, WORLD VISION, CISP, MSF/S, WORLD CONCERN, MSF/B, SCF/US, DAWA, AFSC, CARITAS, IMT, SCR, CRS, COOPI, HISAN, ITALCOOP
B. REHABILITATION	
- MINE CLEARING	- RIMFIRE, ACORD, U.S. MILITARY
- SEEDS/TOOLS (AG PAKS)	- ACORD, CARE, CONCERN, CRS, GOAL, IARA, IDRM, OXFAM, UNICEF, SCF/UK, WORLD VISION
- MONETIZATION	- CARE, INTERTEC, SCF/US
- REPAIR OF WELLS/WATER SYSTEMS	- MEDIC, CRS, OXFAM, ACORD, AICF, CARITAS
- ROAD REPAIR FOR RELIEF DELIVERY	- CONCERN
- SANITATION SYSTEM REPAIR	- CONCERN
- IMMUNIZATION (ESP. FOR CHILDREN)	- UNICEF, MSF/F, ICRC, SCF/US
- MEDICAL FACILITY REPAIR	- SCF/US, CARITAS, IMC, ACORD
- CATTLE VACCINATION	- ICRC, AFSC, FAO
- FIRST AID & ESSENTIAL HEALTH CARE	- HISAN (PLANNED), MDM, CISP, MSF/S, SCF/US
- SANITATION CAMPAIGNS (STREET SWEEPING)	- UNDP

C. RECOVERY/RECONSTRUCTION	
- RUDIMENTARY MEDICAL TRAINING/RETRAINING	- IMC (PLANNED), SCF/US, SCF/UK
- REESTABLISH HEALTH CARE NETWORK	- IMC (PLANNED)
- MAJOR ROADS	- U.S. MILITARY
- IRRIGATION SYSTEMS	- ACORD
- WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS	- ACORD
- INCOME GENERATING PROJECTS	- HISAN, CONCERN, ACORD
- ORPHANAGE RECONSTRUCTION	- IMC
- SCHOOLS	- DAWA
- AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK RESTORATION REBUILDING HERDS VETERINARY SERVICES INSECTICIDES/SPRAYS OXEN SUPPLY FOR PLOWING	- AFSC, SCF/US, TROCAIRE, IDRB, SCR, ACORD
- REBUILD CIVIL SOCIETY TOWN COUNCILS LOCAL NGOS WOMENS GROUPS	- ACORD, U.S. MILITARY, UNOSOM
- REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES	- AFSC, UNHCR

REDSO/ESA
January 19, 1993

U.S.G. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA RELIEF/REHABILITATION

GRANTEE	$ AMOUNT	DESCRIPTION/LOCATION
	OFDA GRANTS	
FY 1992		
A. RELIEF ACTIVITIES		
USAID/OFDA	157,957	SOMALIA RELIEF COORDINATOR
IMC	607,627	MEDICAL – MOGADISHU
IMC	162,132	CHARTER FLIGHTS & MEDICAL SUPPLIES
SCF/UK	221,088	FLIGHTS OF FOOD AND MEDICINE
MSF/FRANCE	383,500	MEDICAL PROGRAM – MOGADISHU
WORLD CONCERN	245,630	HEALTH PROGRAM – KISMAYU & SOUTHERN SOMALIA
ICRC	2,240,000	EMERGENCY AIRLIFT – BELET WEYNE
UNDP	1,392,552	AIR SUPPORT – ALL OVER
IMC	1,276,966	MEDICAL – MOGADISHU, BELET WEYNE, OTHERS
MSF/FRANCE	396,650	SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING – MERCA
SCF/UK	277,800	SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING – MOGADISHU
SCF/UK	312,300	SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING – BELET WEYNE
FRED CUNY/INTERTECT	22,942	CONSULTANT TRAVEL TO MOGADISHU
ICRC	900,000	IN-KIND CONTRIBUTION OF C-130 FOR ONE MONTH
WFP	900,000	IN-KIND CONTRIBUTION OF C-130 FOR ONE MONTH
WFP/AVIOR	909,000	AIRLIFT COORDINATION CENTER
IMC	3,206,203	MEDICAL & MEDICINES – MOG., BAIDOA, BELET WEYNE
IMC	550,840	SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING
MSF/BELGIUM	419,076	SUPPL. FEEDING & FOOD DIST. – KISMAYU & GELIB
CONCERN	448,307	SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING – MOGADISHU & BAIDOA
SCF/UK	167,390	HEALTH CARE – NORTHERN SOMALIA
SUB-TOTAL RELIEF	15,197,960	

GRANTEE	$ AMOUNT	DESCRIPTION/LOCATION
B. REHABILITATION ACTIVITIES		
USAID/UNDP	59,986	WATER SYSTEM SPARES – MOGADISHU
AICF	640,700	FOOD AND WATER – MOGADISHU
ICRC	3,000,000	AIRLIFTS, VETERINARY SVCS, AG PAKS, BLANKETS
CARE	1,457,049	MONETIZATION (NORTH) & FOOD DIST. (SOUTH)
MSF/FRANCE	1,252,300	WATER, SANITATION, FEEDING, MEDICAL – THREE TOWNS
WORLD VISION	1,044,000	SUP. FEEDING, DRUGS, AG PAKS, SHELTER – BAIDOA, BARDERA
LWR/MEDIC	318,772	WATER WELL REHAB. – NORTHEAST
CARE	1,376,204	FOOD AND SEED DIST. – BAIDOA & BARDERA
GOAL	340,500	HEALTH, FOOD AND SEED DIST. – BAIDOA
IRC	686,468	MONETIZATION & CROSS BORDER FEEDING
CARE	1,000,000	MONETIZATION – SOUTH
SUB-TOTAL REHAB.	11,175,979	
TOTAL FY 1992	26,373,939	
FY 1993		
A. RELIEF ACTIVITIES		
USAID/OFDA	90,658	FUNDING FOR DART MEMBERS
SAT	5,251,770	EMERGENCY AIRLIFT SERVICES – ALL OVER
CISP	332,250	HEALTH FACILITIES – MOGADISHU, ADALE, EL-DOR
IMC	181,688	AIR TRANSPORT SUPPORT FOR MEDICAL/SURGICAL PROGRAM
MSF/SPAIN	701,880	HEALTH CARE ACTIVITIES – ADEN YABAL, JOWHAR
SCF/US	132,831	HEALTH INITIATIVES – LOWER SHABELLE
W. GIERTSEN	129,000	SIX RUBB HALL TENTS
USAID	275,000	DART ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT
SUB-TOTAL RELIEF	7,095,077	

GRANTEE	$ AMOUNT	DESCRIPTION
B. REHABILITATION ACTIVITIES		
USAID/UNDP	221,601	WATER SYSTEM SPARES THRU SEVERAL NGOS
SEVERAL NGOS	150,000	FUNDS FOR MONETIZATION – SEVERAL NGOS
IRC	250,000	CROSS–BORDER FOOD MONETIZATION
MSF/HOLLAND	154,976	MINE CLEARING – HARGEISA
IMC	223,566	ORPHANAGE REPAIR/REHAB
UNDP	524,700	STREET SWEEPERS – MOGADISHU
CARE	223,547	FEEDING, MARKET SALES – MOGADISHU
SCF/US	990,000	AGRICULTURE REVITALIZATION – LOWER SHABELLE
SUB–TOTAL REHAB.	2,738,390	
TOTAL FY 1993	9,833,467	
	FOOD AID	
<u>FY 1991 TITLE II FOOD</u>		
WFP & CARE	5,743,700	12,210 MT OF TITLE II FOOD, THRU WFP AND CARE
<u>FY 1992 TITLE II FOOD</u>		
SEVERAL AGENCIES	42,373,700	79,900 MT OF TITLE II FOOD AID, THRU SEVERAL NGOS AND IOS
<u>FY 1993 FOOD</u>		
WFP	31,130,000	125,000 MT SECTION 416(B) MAIZE & TRANSPORT
ICRC	31,803,400	44,521 MT TITLE II RICE, LENTILS, OIL, BULGHUR
CRS	2,167,500	3,750 MT TITLE II FOOD
WFP	780,200	1,296 MT TITLE II WHEAT/SOY BLEND
UNALLOCATED	11,846,300	39,352 MT TITLE II FOOD AND TRANSPORT
FAO	5,565,100	TRANSPORT COST OF RICE
TOTAL FY 1993	83,292,500	

NOTE: ANY GRANT WITH AT LEAST SOME REHABILITATION ACTIVITIES IS LISTED UNDER THE REHABILITATION COLUMN. MANY OF THEM INCLUDE RELIEF ACTIVITIES AS WELL.

UNOSOM
1993 REHABILITATION PLAN FOR SOMALIA
PROGRAMMATIC AREAS OF CONCENTRATION
DRAFT REVISED 10/1/93

1. To develop a local administration capacity in six regions.

   Objective:

   To create a regional capacity to administer the governance, social and economic development of the region.

2. To develop a regional police force charged with the responsibility of promoting security in the region.

   Objective:

   To recruit, train, equip and deploy a regional police force capable of creating and maintaining a secure environment.

3. To develop a food security system for the country.

   Objectives:

   A. To develop a health monitoring capability that yields timely data as to the nutritional status of Somalis on a regional basis.

   B. To develop a crop production monitoring capability that yields timely data on anticipated crop yields of basic grains.

   C. To develop a storage capacity in each region sufficient to hold a buffer stock to provide coverage of nutritionally at-risk people as well as capacity to absorb some of the peaks and valleys of harvests.

4. To reestablish a basic health system for each region.

   Objectives:

   A. To reestablish and elevate to a functional level 6 regional hospitals, 90 health clinics and 500 health posts.

B. To provide funding for health facility personnel through the regional administration.

C. To provide for health and sanitation training needs.

5. <u>To increase the availability of potable water and enhance sanitation</u>.

Water Objectives:

A. To provide 15 liters of potable water per individual per day in those areas to be covered by the water sector of the 1993 Rehabilitation Plan.

B. Reestablish water maintenance systems, including training of operators, mechanics, technicians and engineers in the water sector to maintain the target of 15 liters per day.

C. To record all available data about locations of wells/ water resources, quality and quantity of drinking water through the establishment of a data base system.

Sanitation Objectives:

A. To establish a refuse collection and disposal system in the major towns.

B. To rehabilitate sanitation systems in the major towns.

C. To provide latrines, the means for rubbish disposal and shelter to the displaced and identified communities.

D. To rehabilitate the slaughter houses (abattoirs) in the main centers.

6. <u>To promote the reestablishment and expansion of agriculture</u>.

Objectives:

A. To expand production of grains to meet the domestic needs of the country.

B. To survey existing irrigation systems, particularly those which serve small farmers, as well as canal potential and reservoirs for expansion possibilities.

C. To repair and rehabilitate existing irrigation schemes, particularly those serving small farmers, using appropriate technical inputs and using wherever possible renewal energy systems.

D. To establish a crop production monitoring capability that yields timely data on anticipated crop yields of basic grains.

E. Within the framework of the crop production monitoring capability, establish appropriate mechanisms to protect crop prices.

7. <u>To create maximum employment opportunities for Somalia's unemployed</u>.

Objectives:

To design rehabilitation activities to maximize labor-intensive instead of machine-intensive activities. Among these activities will be the following:

- Repair and maintain secondary roads in the southern and central regions of the country.

- Repair and maintain main trunk roads as well as secondary roads in the northern regions of the country.

- Clean and repair existing irrigation canals.

- Expand irrigation systems to their fullest potential.

These activities should be based on cash-for-work as preferable to food-for-work.

8. <u>To reestablish basic education in each region</u>.

Objective:

To reestablish a primary education capacity in each region in cooperation with the local administration. As with the reestablishment of basic health and veterinary services, we will have to assume the obligation of operating costs for at least the first three years.

9. <u>To promote the return of refugees and the displaced</u>.

Objective:

Foster the economic and social conditions within the country that will create a conducive climate for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees. However, successful reentry to normal life will be facilitated by starter supplies. We will work with the local administration to ensure the return is facilitated and the starter supplies given.

10. <u>To reestablish the veterinary services and promote other projects aimed at enhancing the livestock sector</u>.

Objectives:

A. To reestablish the veterinary services as well as the animal health certification process in the 6 regions of the country.

B. To assist pastoralists who have lost their herds due to war and/or drought by providing starter herds from stocks in Somalia.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Fred C. Fischer

FROM: Tamera A. Fillinger

SUBJECT: Assistance to Somalia and the Sub-Saharan Africa Disaster Assistance Legislation in the FY 1993 Appropriations Act

DATE: December 21, 1992 (Revised)

Background

You have asked me to discuss three issues with regard to USAID assistance to Somalia: 1) Brooke Amendment and other limitations on DA/DFA/ESF assistance; 2) special legislation and funding mechanisms allowing continued assistance (despite 1)); and 3) the new Sub-Saharan Africa Disaster Assistance legislation in the FY 1993 Appropriations Act.

Discussion

1. <u>What We Can't Do:</u> Since January, 1990, when Somalia fell one year behind on repayments of loans it received under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), USAID has been prohibited by Section 518 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (the Brooke Amendment) from providing assistance (other than disaster assistance) under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. Thus, USAID may not make new obligations of DA, DFA or ESF funds to Somalia for other than disaster assistance. Pursuant to the Brooke Amendment and Section 617 of the FAA, the existing USAID/Somalia program was phased down. After Somalia was evacuated in January, 1991, USAID began to terminate and deobligate outstanding funds for all remaining projects. All funds still on the books for USAID/Somalia projects are slated to be deobligated by FY 1994.

2. <u>What We Can Do:</u>

a) Humanitarian Assistance.

USAID continues to provide food and disaster assistance to Somalia under Section 491 of the FAA (OFDA) and P.L. 480 (Food for Peace). Section 491 of the FAA permits disaster assistance even after the imposition of sanctions under other provisions of law (e.g., the Brooke Amendment). Such funds are provided "notwithstanding any other provision of law" for "disaster relief and rehabilitation, including assistance relating to disaster preparedness, and to the prediction of, and contingency planning for, natural disasters abroad."

Funds for P.L. 480 Food for Peace assistance are authorized and appropriated under separate legislation and, therefore, are not affected by restrictions on assistance under the FAA or the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

b) Development Assistance.

Also, USAID may (but does not yet) provide development assistance to Somalia under various other provisions. For example, Section 562 of the FY 1993 Appropriations Act authorizes USAID to provide funding (from any account and with no dollar ceiling) through NGOs, "notwithstanding any provision of law that restricts assistance to foreign countries" (e.g., Brooke, Pressler), but requires a Presidential Certification (which is difficult to obtain) that such assistance is in the U.S. national interest.

Under Section 6 of the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act of 1992 USAID may provide DA or DFA funds to the countries of the Horn without a Presidential Certification through PVOs and international organizations, "notwithstanding any provision of law that would otherwise restrict assistance to such countries" (Brooke, Pressler). Although Section 6 prohibits AID from working directly with governments, it allows PVOs and international organizations funded by USAID under Section 6 to work with appropriate government ministries or departments.

Section 6 authorizes funding for longer term development assistance. Activities funded under Section 6 should substantially, although not exclusively, be those listed in below:

(1) reforest and restore degraded natural areas and reestablish resource management programs;

(2) reestablish veterinary services, local crop research, and agricultural development projects;

(3) provide basic education, including efforts to support the teaching of displaced children, and rebuild schools;

(4) educate young people outside of their countries if conflict within their countries continues;

(5) reconstitute and expand the delivery of primary and maternal health care; and

(6) establish credit, microenterprise and income generation programs for the poor.

In addition, the FY 1993 Appropriations Act authorizes funds "notwithstanding any other provision of law" for War Victims (not less than $5 million) and Displaced Children (not less than $10 million). Section 542 of the FY 1993 Appropriations Act authorizes funds "notwithstanding any provision of law that restricts assistance to foreign countries" for Family Planning, Child Survival and AIDs activities (up to $8 million for OE, no dollar ceiling).

3. <u>What More Can We Do:</u> The FY 1993 Appropriations Act includes a special provision of $100 million for Sub-Saharan Africa Disaster Assistance, with not less than $25 million earmarked for Somalia. The $100 million: 1) is available for disaster relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance, 2) is provided notwithstanding any other provision of law and 3) is in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes. In other words, the Brooke Amendment and other such prohibitions on assistance do not apply and the funds are available immediately for longer term rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

U.S. foreign assistance and appropriation legislation rarely includes requirements or recommendations regarding what division or office is responsible for implementation. This is left to the agency. In a memorandum titled "Proposed Policies and Procedures for FY 1993 Sub-Saharan African Disaster Relief, Rehabilitation and Recovery Appropriation," dated November 20, 1992 to Scott Spangler, AA/OPS, Alison Rosenberg, AA/AFR, and Andrew Natsios, AA/FHA, set forth recommendations for uses and divisions of responsibility for the $100 million sub-Saharan African disaster relief, rehabilitation and recovery (ADRRR) appropriation. Scott Spangler signed and approved the memorandum on November 25, 1992.

The memorandum defines the following terms:

"Relief" is assistance which has an immediate impact on the condition of disaster victims.

"Rehabilitation" consists of assistance needed to restore disaster victims to self-sufficiency. This might include, but is not limited to, provision of seeds, agricultural or construction hand tools, roofing materials, emergency repair of sanitary facilities, repair or deepening of wells for drinking water, and flood protection dikes.

"Recovery" is assistance which aims to bring the stricken community to a state beyond immediate self-sufficiency, or to improve the pre-existing state of that community. Reconstruction is used synonymously with recovery.

The memorandum made the following recommendations:

1. FY 1993 Funding from IDA Account for Africa

At least at present, all USAID funding in sub-Saharan Africa for disaster assistance will be programmed against the ADRRR appropriation. This means that the regular FHA/OFDA IDA appropriation ($40 million) will be tapped for non-Africa disaster assistance.

2. Funding for Somalia

Due to other urgent needs in the region, only $25 million will be used for Somalia (the legislation reads "not less than $25 million"). The entire $25 million is expected to be devoted to immediate relief uses. FHA/OFDA will administer these funds, but AFR is to be involved in and concur in the general programming of activities for Somalia from the fund.

3. Division of Funding among Relief, Rehabilitation and Recovery

The memorandum notes that it is important to "fence off" some funding for longer-term disaster recovery efforts in the region. However, because it is too early in the year to make definitive allocations among the various possible uses of the ADRRR appropriation, AFR and FHA recommend the following allocation of the funding from the $75 million remaining after the $25 million Somalia earmark:

* $25 million for emergency relief and rehabilitation activities throughout Sub-Saharan Africa;

* $25 million for major recovery/reconstruction efforts in no more than three priority countries to be chosen based on their need for rehabilitation funding and their commitment to resolving political conflicts and implementing economic and social policies appropriate to a significant recovery effort; and

* $25 million reserved for uses to be determined at a later date.

4. Responsibilities of FHA/OFDA and AFR

The $100 million fund, including amounts for Somalia, shall be programmed in close collaboration between FHA/OFDA and AFR. FHA/OFDA shall manage all relief activities throughout the region. Project management responsibility for activities other than immediate relief, shall be determined on a flexible, case-by-case basis. AFR shall undertake reconstruction activities that fall clearly outside FHA/OFDA's mandate. Either FHA/OFDA or AFR shall take the lead on rehabilitation, disaster mitigation, and some recovery activities. In all cases, mutual coordination is required.

Based on conversations with Ed Spriggs, GC/AFR and Steve Tisa, GC/FHA, in effect this means that OFDA will have primary responsibility for the $25 million to Somalia and for the $25 million regional relief fund -- but they are to coordinate with AFR. It is likely that AFR will manage and implement the $25 million recovery/reconstruction fund. It is still unclear which office will have responsibility for the contingency fund.

In addition, the mandate of the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) Task Force is to be expanded to include coordination of general planning priorities for the ADRRR appropriation. SADE's responsibilities will include selecting countries for the recovery focus, facilitating communication between FHA/OFDA and AFR and other bureaus and the U.S. Government, participating in the review of proposals and recommendations on the appropriate lead office for each, referring disagreements to the DAA level for resolution, and providing summary and analytical information within AID and to Congress on implementation of the appropriation.

5. Earmarks

OPS and FA/B request an earmark of at least $9 million from the appropriation to be allocated for activities that contribute to AID's child survival earmark and an additional $4 million to meet the displaced children earmark.

As stated above, the memorandum was approved and became effective on November 25, 1992. Requests for funding under the appropriation are to be made by cable. To date, allocations from the relief fund have been made for $5 million to Ethiopia and an additional $14 million to be divided between Liberia, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Zaire.

USAID/SOMALIA
Project Pipeline Report as of 12/31/92

	Project No	Project Title	Appropriatn	Budget Plan Code	Unliquidated Balances	Totals
	9071032.00	Extention of Jan Westcott Cont.	72-1111021	JDNA9129649JG41	28,560.00	
			72-11X1035	JFDX9129649HG41	4,843.00	
			72-11X1035	JFDX9129649IG41	17,636.00	
	TOTAL FY91				51,039.00	
1.	PROJECT 9071032.00 TOTAL					51,039.00
	6490510.00	Prog. Dev. & Support	72-11M1014	GSSA8821649KG63	15,678.00	
	TOTAL FY88				15,678.00	
2.	PROJECT 6490510.00 TOTAL					15,678.00
	6490109.00	Livestock,Mktg& Hlth	72-11M1021	GDAA8621649AG13	788,249.00	
	TOTAL FY86				788,249.00	
			72-11M1021	GDNA8721649KG13	3,094,700.00	
	TOTAL FY87				3,094,700.00	
			72-119/01037	GES98921649KG13	549,246.00	
			72-1191014	GSSA8921649KG13	460,000.00	
	TOTAL FY 89				1,009,246.00	
3.	PROJECT 6490109.00 TOTAL					4,892,195.00
	6490129.00	Shebelli Water Mgmt I	72-11M1014	GSSA8821649KG13	500,000.00	
	TOTAL FY88				500,000.00	
4.	PROJECT 6490129.00 TOTAL					500,000.00
	6490134.00	Juba Valley Dev.Studies	72-11M1021	GDAA8621649AG13	17,029.00	
	TOTAL FY86				17,029.00	
5.	PROJECT 6490134.00 TOTAL					17,029.00
	6490138.00	PVO Dev. Partners	72-11M1021	GDA58621649CG13	6,465.00	
			72-11M1021	GDAA8621649AG13	1,540,431.00	
			72-11M1021	GDAA8621649CG13	685,085.00	
	TOTAL FY86				2,231,981.00	
			72-11M1021	GDNA8721649KG13	1,076,219.00	
	TOTAL FY87				1,076,219.00	
			72-11M1014	GSSA8821649KG13	250,000.00	
	TOTAL FY88				250,000.00	
6.	PROJECT 6490138.00 TOTAL					3,558,200.00
	6490140.00	Somalia Refugee Settmt	72-11X1035	GFDX8721649KG43	2,030,415.00	
	TOTAL FY87				2,030,415.00	
7.	PROJECT 6490140.00 TOTAL					2,030,415.00
	6490119.00	SCM Mgt Trng & Dev.	72-11M1021	GDEA8721649KG13	238,757.00	
	TOTAL FY87				238,757.00	
			72-119/01037	GES98921649KG13	3,530.00	

				72-1191014	GSSA8921649KG13	1,628,131.00	
	TOTAL FY89					1,631,661.00	
8.	PROJECT 6490119.00 TOTAL						1,870,418.00
		6490131.00	Family Health Services	72-11M1021	GDAA8621649BG13	1,148,796.00	
	TOTAL FY86					1,148,796.00	
				72-1101014	GSSA9021649KG13	302,215.00	
	TOTAL FY90					302,215.00	
9.	PROJECT 6490131.00 TOTAL						1,451,011.00
		6490132.00	Policy Init & Priv.	72-11M1037	GES78721649KG13	2,885.00	
	TOTAL FY87					2,885.00	
				72-118/91037	GES88821649KG13	69,550.00	
	TOTAL FY88					69,550.00	
10.	PROJECT 6490132.00 TOTAL						72,435.00
		6980433.24	African Manpower Dev.	72-11M1021	GDAA8621649AG12	2,239.00	
				72-11M1021	GDAA8621649EG12	1,667.00	
	TOTAL FY86					3,906.00	
11.	PROJECT 6980433.24 TOTAL						3,906.00
		6980463.49	Human Resource Dev.	72-11M1014	GSSA8821649KG12	41,176.00	
	TOTAL FY88					41,176.00	
12.	PROJECT 6980463.49 TOTAL						41,176.00
	COUNTRY TOTAL						14,503,502.00