

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

2986

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	3	10	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	John Ordway to Jonathan Howe, re: Somalia: Airlift Transition and Marketization (2 pages)	10/13/1992	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	Re: ICRC-U.S.-Somalia/Relief Operations (2 pages)	10/13/1992	P1/b(1)
002a. paper	Discussion Paper: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (5 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	Summary of Conclusions of the Small Group Meeting on Somalia and Libya (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	Gaining Troop Support for UNOSOM II Strategy Paper (4 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	The Warlords and the Transitional National Council (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. paper	[Duplicate of 002a] (5 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (4 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	[Duplicate of 002d] (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. list	DC Paper Distribution [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1993	P3/b(3)
005a. paper	[Duplicate of 002a] (5 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. paper	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)
005c. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (3 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005d. paper	[Duplicate of 002d] (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9207287
RECEIVED: 29 SEP 92 10

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: WEISS, HAROLD S

DOC DATE: 10 SEP 92
SOURCE REF: 350096

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE HUNGER RELIEF EFFORTS FOR SOMALIA

ACTION: MEMO WFS TO SHIRLEY GREEN

DUE DATE: 02 OCT 92 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ORDWAY

FOR CONCURRENCE
MCNAMARA

FOR INFO
HAASS
HULL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

7287

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9219892

Date September 25, 1992

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President
From: The Reverend Harold S. Weiss
Date: September 10, 1992
Subject: Hunger Relief Efforts for Somalia


WH Referral Dated: September 24, 1992
NSCS ID# (if any): _____

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☒ A draft reply is attached.
_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
_____ A translation is attached.
_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
_____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:


Director
Secretariat Staff

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT REPLY

Dear Reverend Weiss:

This is in response to your letter of September 10 on the crisis in Somalia. We share your view that the scale of the crisis requires a comprehensive approach to bring relief, reconciliation, and recovery to the Somali people.

In that regard, we remain firm in our support of U.N. initiatives to expand food deliveries, increase security for food distribution, and promote political reconciliation among Somali factions. President Bush committed the United States to transport the first contingent of armed security guards authorized by the U.N. to protect relief efforts, and those guards will all be in Somalia by the end of this month. We also support a U.N.-sponsored international relief coordination conference on Somalia and are encouraging our allies to step up their relief efforts.

The Reverend

Harold S. Weiss, D.D.,

Bishop, Northeastern Pennsylvania Synod,

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America,

Reading, Pennsylvania.

The United States has been involved deeply in providing relief to Somalia for more than 19 months. To date we have pledged over \$151 million in emergency assistance. This includes a commitment to an additional 145,000 MT of food, scheduled to arrive over the next 12 months. This brings the total USG food commitment in FY 91 and 92 to 225,000 MT. The Department of Defense airlift team, which arrived in Kenya on August 16, is making daily relief flights into Somalia delivering food stockpiled in Mombasa, Kenya.

No relief strategy or diplomatic initiatives will be fully successful in ending hunger-related deaths and politically-motivated bloodshed in Somalia without the full cooperation of Somali leaders. It is critical that they all agree to join the process of national reconciliation. Our Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Peter de Vos, is supporting the U.N.'s reconciliation efforts.

The monumental tragedy will not lend itself to simple or immediate solutions. The United States will continue to pursue all means to get food to the hungry and to help address the underlying cause of suffering.

Sincerely,

9219892

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

SEPTEMBER 24, 1992

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 350096
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1992
TO: PRESIDENT BUSH
FROM: THE REVEREND HAROLD S. WEISS
BISHOP, NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
SYNOD
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN
AMERICA
527 WASHINGTON STREET
READING PA 19601

SUBJECT: SUGGESTIONS TO SUPPORT HUNGER RELIEF EFFORTS
IN SOMALIA

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

9219892

ID# 350096

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 140

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 15, 1992

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE REVEREND HAROLD S. WEISS

SUBJECT: SUGGESTIONS TO SUPPORT HUNGER RELIEF EFFORTS
IN SOMALIA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
WILLA SMITH		ORG	92/09/15		1/1
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:


ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 4500

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		* OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE *			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY *			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

350096



NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA SYNOD
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA

9219892

September 10, 1992

President George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Together with many citizens and Christians, I ask that you support hunger relief efforts in Somalia by pursuing and seeking the implementation of the following policies:

- + increasing airlifts of food by the United States, other countries, and charitable organizations, so that Somalia will be adequately supplied with essential commodities, thereby lessening tensions which attend its access and distribution
- + supporting the deployment of United Nations security troops in appropriate numbers, so that relief efforts may be protected and made truly viable
- + urging the United Nations to set up processes of conflict resolution among the various tribal elements in Somalia, so that relief efforts and security forces will be accepted, and stability and peace may be sought among the warring factions

Since the lives of an estimated 1.5 million people are at immediate risk, and since over 4 million people are in danger in the longer term, we encourage you to continue and increase our country's international leadership, working closely with the United Nations and international as well as private relief agencies.

Thank you for your service, not only to our country, but to the wider world.

Sincerely,

The Rev. Harold S. Weiss, D. D.
Bishop, Northeastern Pennsylvania Synod
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 5, 1992

Presidential Determination
No. 93-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 2(c)(1) of the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as
Amended -- Kenya and Somalia

Pursuant to section 2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2601(c)(1), I hereby determine that it is important to the national interest that \$1,500,000 be made available from the United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to meet the urgent and unexpected needs of Somali refugees, conflict victims, and displaced persons in Kenya and Somalia.

You are hereby directed to inform the appropriate committees of the Congress of this determination and the obligation of funds under this authority and to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

GEORGE BUSH

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Oct-1992 10:26 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX_MAIL@OEEOB
RAGLE@A1@OEEOB
ORDWAY@A1@OEEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY

<DIST>
SIT: ORDWAY RAGLE VAX
<PREC>
PRIORITY
<CLAS>
UNCLASSIFIED
<OSRI>
RUEHGV
<DTG>
131345Z OCT 92
<ORIG>
USMISSION GENEVA
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4986
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0786
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 4602
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0081
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0040
RUFHSN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0578
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0429
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0402
RUEHZG/NATOC COLLECTIVE
<SUBJ>

UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY
AMBASSADOR MOHAMED SAHNOUN, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SOMALIA

<TEXT>
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 08177
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY
AMBASSADOR MOHAMED SAHNOUN, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SOMALIA

1. THE UNITED NATIONS COORDINATION MEETING ON
ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA OPENED ON MONDAY, OCT 12, 1992.

DURING THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION, AMBASSADOR MOHAMED SAHNOUD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SOMALIA MADE THIS STATEMENT:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
IT IS AN HONOUR AND PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO PRESIDE OVER THE FIRST DONOR'S CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO SOMALIA. THE FIRST BECAUSE, IN THE PAST, WE HAVE PARTICIPATED IN CONFERENCES CONCERNED WITH THE HORN OF AFRICA AS A WHOLE. ONLY TWO MONTHS AGO WE SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING THE INTERIOR REMOTE AREAS OF SOMALIA THANKS TO THE AIRLIFTS OPERATION. UNTIL THEN, THE TRUE DEPTH OF THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE WAS ONLY PARTLY PERCEIVED. ALTHOUGH FULL ACCESS TO ALL AFFECTED AREAS HAS NOT YET BEEN ACHIEVED THE AVAILABLE STATISTICS AND THE HORRIFIC IMAGES SEEN SO FAR ON TELEVISION SCREENS ACROSS THE GLOBE HAVE CAPTURED TO A LARGE EXTENT THE DEPTH OF THIS HUMAN TRAGEDY. WE KNOW THAT IS A CRISIS OF FRIGHTENING PROPORTIONS; AND THAT WE ARE PAYING THE PRICE FOR PAST NEGLECT. A WHOLE YEAR SLIPPED BY WHILST THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SAVE FOR THE ICRC AND FEW NGOS WATCHED SOMALIA DESCEND INTO THIS HELL. THE DAMAGE WILL NOT BE REPAIRED. I BELIEVE A MINIMUM OF 300.000 SOMALIS, MOSTLY CHILDREN, WOULD HAVE SUCCUMBED, SOME OF THEM IN AGONY, OVER THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF. IT SHOULD BE A DUTY FOR THE UN TO LOOK BACK AND SERIOUSLY INVESTIGATE THE REASONS FOR OUR FAILURE TO ACT PROMPTLY. BECAUSE THE IMPORTANT QUESTION IS HOW CAN WE IN THE FUTURE AVERT SIMILAR TRAGEDIES AND IMPROVE THE UN PREVENTIVE ACTION BOTH POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN. BUT TODAY, EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE HAVE NOT GATHERED HERE TO EXAMINE THE PAST OMISSIONS AND COMMISSIONS. WE ARE HERE TO GRASP THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE STOCK OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOMALIA, TO EVALUATE THE HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CURRENTLY UNDER WAY; TO IDENTIFY THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED SO FAR; AND TO CHART THE COURSE FOR OUR FUTURE PROGRAMMES. WHAT PICTURE CAN I GIVE YOU OF SOMALIA TODAY? IT IS STILL A COUNTRY WITHOUT CENTRAL, REGIONAL OR LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS AND WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES, NO ELECTRICITY, NO COMMUNICATIONS, NO HEALTH SERVICES, NO SCHOOLS. POTABLE WATER IS SCARCE AND THE PRODUCTIVE BASE, BOTH URBAN AND RURAL, HAS BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY DESTROYED. ANARCHY PREVAILS. THE COUNTRY AND ITS CITIES ARE DIVIDED INTO POCKETS CONTROLLED BY FRACTURED POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, FACTIONS AND SUB-CLANS. IN THE NORTHWEST, ONE OF THE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS HAS UNILATERALLY PROCLAIMED AN INDEPENDENT "REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND". THE SOUTHERN PART OF SOMALIA REMAINS UNSTABLE WITH A TENUOUS STALEMATE AMONG THE WARLORDS WHO HAVE BATTLED FOR THE CONTROL OF VARIOUS TOWNS AND SEAPORTS. THE TENSION IN THAT AREA HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY DISTURBING INCIDENTS ALONG THE BORDER. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES ARE GOING BACK AND FORTH SEEKING

HELP WITH SOMETIMES A FLOW OF ARMS ACCOMPANYING THESE
CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENTS.
AMID THIS CHAOS, HOWEVER, SOME POSITIVE TRENDS ARE
BEGINNING TO EMERGE. THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS
NEGOTIATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS
WARRING FACTIONS IN DIFFERENT REGIONS HAVE BEEN
RESPECTED TO A GREAT EXTENT. THUS, SINCE APRIL-MAY,
SOMALIA HAS NOT HAD LARGE-SCALE FIGHTING OR MAJOR OPEN
HOSTILITIES OF THE KIND WE ARE CURRENTLY WITNESSING IN
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 GENEVA 08177
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO
SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY
YUGOSLAVIA. WE HAVE TRIED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO REINFORCE
THESE POSITIVE TRENDS. IN MOGADISHU, WHICH WAS THE
EPICENTRE OF THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING, FIFTY UNITED NATIONS
MILITARY OBSERVERS WERE DEPLOYED LAST AUGUST AND HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO SOME STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION.
THEY COULD DO BETTER IF THEY RECEIVE THE REQUIRED
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. TWO OF THEM HAVE BEEN WOUNDED IN AN
AMBUSH. I WOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THEIR COURAGE.
IT IS NOT EASY TO MOVE AROUND AND CHECK ON SOMALIS,
WHILE THEY ARE THEMSELVES UNARMED.

SECURITY REMAINS A MAJOR PROBLEM. LAWLESSNESS, BANDITRY
AND LOOTING HAVE TAKEN THE PLACE OF MAJOR FIGHTING AND
OPEN FACTIONAL HOSTILITIES. MARAUDING ARMED GROUPS,
LOYAL TO NO PARTICULAR WARLORD, BUT ONLY TO THEMSELVES,
POSE A GRAVE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL AS WELL
AS THE LOCAL POPULATION, AND HINDER THE EFFECTIVE
DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES.
IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THIS SECURITY PROBLEM, FIVE HUNDRED
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN
MOGADISHU. THEY WILL, IN PRINCIPLE, ENSURE THE
PROTECTION OF RELIEF OPERATIONS AT THE SEAPORT AND
AIRPORT AS WELL AS ALONG THE ROUTES USED FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THIS WILL,
HOPEFULLY, CONTAIN LOOTING AND SEE TO IT THAT FOOD
REACHED THE AREAS WHERE IT IS NEEDED. THE FACTION
LEADERS IN THE NORTHEAST HAVE ALSO SIGNED AN AGREEMENT
FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF 750 UNITED NATIONS TROOPS TO
PROVIDE SECURITY AT THE PORT OF BOSSASO AND TO ENSURE
THE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN AND
REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE TO THE WHOLE OF THE REGION.
NEGOTIATIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER WAY WITH THE POLITICAL
LEADERS IN THE SO-CALLED "SOMALILAND" FOR THE DEPLOYMENT
OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY PERSONNEL AT THE PORT OF
BERBERA, AND ALSO WITH THE LEADERS IN THE SOUTH FOR THE
SAME OPERATION AT THE PORT OF KISMAYO, WHICH HAS CHANGED
HANDS MANY TIMES AND PRESENTED US WITH SERIOUS SECURITY
PROBLEMS. THE PORT OF KISMAYO IS TOO IMPORTANT FOR THE
EMERGENCY RELIEF IN THE SOUTH THAT ANY DELAY IN ENSURING
SECURITY THERE IS TO BE STRONGLY DENOUNCED. IT SHOULD
HAVE HAD, WITH MOGADISHU, OUR PRIORITY CONCERN FROM THE

BEGINNING.

THERE IS, HOWEVER, ONE RELATED MATTER TO WHICH I MUST INVITE YOUR ATTENTION. OWING TO THE COMPLEXITY AND SENSITIVITY OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN SOMALIA, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY PERSONNEL TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT THE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF SOME LOCAL SOMALI SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THIS MATTER. THE OPTION OF A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE WAS EXPLORED BUT ON REFLECTION IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE CREATION OF SUCH A POLICE FORCE, IN THE ABSENCE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, WOULD PRESENT SERIOUS PROBLEMS. NOR CAN WE CONTINUE TO RELY ON THE SERVICES OF THE PRESENT SO-CALLED "TECHNICALS". WE HAVE, THEREFORE, DECIDED TO ESTABLISH SMALL SECURITY UNITS OF SOMALIS TO ASSIST UNITED NATIONS FORCES AT THE AIRPORT, SEAPORT, AND THE DISTRIBUTION CENTRES, STARTING WITH MOGADISHU WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS TROOPS HAVE ALREADY ARRIVED. IT IS ONLY AN ARRANGEMENT OF THIS NATURE THAT CAN ASSURE SAFETY FOR RELIEF WORKERS AND PROTECTION FOR HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES. THIS COULD ULTIMATELY FORM THE NUCLEUS OF A SOMALI POLICE COUNTRY WIDE. THESE PROPOSED SOMALI GUARDS WOULD REQUIRE UNIFORMS, TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. IT IS AN AREA WHERE WE NEED URGENTLY THE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE OF GOVERNMENTS. I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT SOME, LIKE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, HAVE ALREADY MADE SOME INITIAL OFFERS, BUT MORE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED, URGENTLY. THESE SECURITY CONDITIONS ARE AN IMPERATIVE TODAY BECAUSE THE TEMPTATIONS FOR LOOT AND GREED ARE SPREADING WITH THE PROSPECT OF MORE SUPPLIES REACHING SOMALIA.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 GENEVA 08177

ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I AM GRATEFUL TO THE ENTIRE DONOR COMMUNITY FOR THE MASSIVE OPERATION THAT HAS BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS. RELIEF EFFORTS HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE AUGUST. THANKS TO MORE FREQUENT SHIPMENTS INTO THE PORTS OF MOGADISHU AND KISMAYO, AND TO THE AIRLIFT OPERATION THAT STARTED OVER THIS PERIOD, THE RELIEF COMMUNITY HAS BEEN ABLE TO IMPROVE LARGELY ON ITS RESPONSE TO THE NEEDS OF THE SOMALI POPULATION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED US OF A NEW LARGE CONTRIBUTION AND I KNOW FROM PRESS RELEASES THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE TAKEN THE SAME STEP. THANKS TO THIS SUPPORT FROM YOUR GOVERNMENTS ICRC, WFP, AND UNICEF ARE PROVIDING NOW INCREASED AMOUNTS OF FOOD AND SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING SUPPLIES TO THE SOUTH OF SOMALIA REACHING AN AVERAGE OF 20.000 MTS A MONTH. THIS IS MORE THAN DOUBLE THE QUANTITY SUPPLIED BEFORE THE MONTH OF AUGUST.

IN EARLY AUGUST, FRANCE PROVIDED A DIRECT SHIPMENT OF 2,000 MTS OF FOOD ITEMS AND DIESEL. SAUDI ARABIA SENT 4,000 MTS AND ANOTHER VESSEL IS AT PRESENT WAITING TO BE UNLOADED AT MOGADISHU PORT. THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT DONATED 2,000 MTS OF BABY FOOD WHICH ARE CURRENTLY BEING DISCHARGED BY WFP IN MOGADISHU.

NOW THAT SHIPMENTS ARE BEING DELIVERED ON A MORE REGULAR BASIS AND A SIGNIFICANT AIRLIFT OPERATION HAS COMMENCED, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO REACH POPULATIONS IN AN INCREASING NUMBER OF VILLAGES AND TOWNS SO AS TO STEM THE FLOW OF DISPLACED PEOPLE, AND PREVENT THE CREATION OF MORE "DEATH CAMPS" SUCH AS BAIDOA.

ALTHOUGH BELATED, THE AIRLIFTS AND AIRDROPS HAVE, HOWEVER, CLEARLY FACILITATED A MUCH BETTER PENETRATION OF THE INTERIOR OF SOMALIA, AND HAVE BEEN A REAL, THOUGH TRAGIC, EYE-OPENER. SINCE THE OPERATION STARTED, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO INCREASE GRADUALLY THE CAPACITY OF EACH ROTATION. AT PRESENT, THIS OPERATION BRINGS 240 MTS PER DAY TO MOGADISHU, BAIDOA, BARHERE, WAJIT, SACO UEN AND BELET UEN. THE RECENT TRIAL AIRDROP OPERATION OF A TOTAL OF 150 TONNES TO TIGIEGLO AND EL GARAS HAS PROVED A SUCCESS. IT ENCOUNTERED NO SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS AND THE RECOVERY RATE WAS ESTIMATED AT 95%.

THESE AIRDROPS SHOULD CERTAINLY CONTINUE AND EXPAND BECAUSE THEY HELP A FURTHER DISPLACEMENT OF PEOPLE. LET ME UNDERLINE ONCE MORE THE FACT THAT THE AIRLIFT HAS MADE A TREMENDOUS DIFFERENCE IN OUR RESPONSE TO THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF THE STARVING POPULATION. THOUSANDS OF LIVES ARE BEING SAVED. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, THE GERMAN AIR FORCE AND THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN CRUCIAL. WITHOUT THE COMBINED AIRLIFTS OF THESE DONORS, LIKEWISE THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS DONORS, THE PROVISION OF FOOD ASSISTANCE INTO ISOLATED AREAS WOULD HAVE BEEN PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE AIRLIFT OPERATION, IF SUSTAINED, WILL ALLOW US TO EXPLORE ALL AREAS WHERE ACCESS ON THE GROUND IS STILL TOO DIFFICULT OR TOO DANGEROUS. I DO APPEAL TO THESE GOVERNMENTS, WHILE CONVEYING TO THEM THE GRATITUDE OF SO MANY SOMALIS, TO PLEASE CONTINUE THEIR MAGNIFICENT EFFORTS AND SUSTAIN IT FOR A WHILE.

ON THE NON-FOOD SIDE, WHO AND UNICEF CONTINUE TO PROVIDE DRUGS AND ESSENTIAL MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO SOMALIA BUT IT IS STILL INSUFFICIENT AS NOTICED BY SOME OF THE DISTINGUISHED VISITORS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS PLANNING TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL PHARMACY, INITIALLY IN DJIBOUTI. THIS IS GOING TO BE EXTENSIVELY HELPFUL, BECAUSE MORE PEOPLE ARE DYING NOW OF DISEASES INCLUDING HUNGER-RELATED DISEASES AND THE PROPORTION OF ADULT VICTIMS IS HIGHER; MORE THAN 50%. NGOS ARE STRENGTHENING THEIR CURATIVE PROGRAMMES AND TOGETHER WITH UNICEF ARE EXPANDING THEIR PROGRAMMES OF IMMUNIZATION AND VACCINATION. MANY NGOS ARE ALSO

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 GENEVA 08177
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY
PROMOTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THERAPEUTIC FEEDING
CENTRES BOTH IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN SOMALIA.
OXFAM, WHICH WAS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURAL ASSESSMENTS,
HAS NOW COMMITTED ITSELF TO ESTABLISHING A JOINT
PROGRAMME WITH UNICEF TO PROVIDE SEEDS AND TOOL
PROVISION. THE PROGRAMME WILL BENEFIT UP TO 16,000
SEVERELY MARGINALIZED FARMING FAMILIES IN THE JUBA
VALLEY. WFP AND ICRC WILL BE PROVIDING THE NECESSARY
FOOD SUPPORT TO THESE FAMILIES. THIS IS THE FIRST
SIGNIFICANT INTEGRATED REHABILITATION PROJECT UNDERTAKEN
IN THIS REGION FOR OVER 18 MONTHS. SOME OTHER NGOS ARE
PLANNING TO CARRY OUT A SEEDS AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION
PROGRAMME, AND I BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND
SUPPORTED BY THE DONOR COUNTRIES. IT IS TIME WE THINK
ALSO IN TERMS OF REHABILITATION OF THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE WHICH AMNY SOMALIS ARE PRESSING FOR.
UNDP IS EMBARKING ON A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME WHICH
INVOLVES THE KIND OF RURAL REHABILITATION AS WELL AS
BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE, INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING, AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT. SPECIFICALLY, THE AGENCY IS ENHANCING ITS
CURRENT PROJECT FOR THE RESTORATION OF WATER SUPPLY IN
MOGADISHU AND OTHER TOWNS. IT IS ALSO PLANNING TO
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL,
RECONSTRUCTION OF POWER PLANTS AND DISTRIBUTION LINES,
AS WELL AS SPECIAL PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES, WITH A LARGE
NUMBER OF NATIONAL PROFESSIONALS TO BE ENROLED IN THESE
PROGRAMMES.
THE EXPANSION OF THE EMERGENCY RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
HAS CALLED FOR AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF RELIEF
WORKERS OPERATING ON THE GROUND. BOTH UN AGENCIES AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE INCREASED THEIR
STAFF SIGNIFICALLY OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. I CANNOT
OFFER GREAT ENOUGH PRAISE TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF NGOS
WHICH HAVE EITHER STARTED NEW SPECIFIC PROJECTS IN
SOMALIA OR GIVEN THEIR VALUABLE RESOURCES TO EXISTING
OPERATIONS. WHAT A BEAUTIFUL TESTIMONY OF HUMAN
SOLIDARITY. MOBILIZATION OF LOCAL WORKERS IS ALSO ON
THE INCREASE, FOLLOWING THE OBJECTIVE OF HELPING
POPULATIONS BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
ONE IMPORTANT AREA WHERE MANY RESPECTABLE ELDERS HAVE
REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE IS THE DISARMAMENT OF
THE POPULATION AND THE DEMOBILIZATION OF IRREGULAR
FORCES. THE SOMALI NATION HAD BECOME HOSTAGE TO
GUNMEN. TO RESCUE IT FROM THIS PREDICAMENT, WE NEED TO
MOVE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE TO CREATE A RESPONSIBLE CIVIL
SOCIETY. FOR THIS, A TRUST FUND IS NEEDED. WITH SUCH A
FUND, WE CAN ENDEAVOUR TO ENCOURAGE THE FORMATION AND
ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH A VESTED INTEREST IN
PEACE, SUCH AS ELDERS COUNCILS, YOUTH MOVEMENTS, WOMEN'S
ORGANIZATIONS, ;INTELLECTUAL ASSOCIATIONS, PROFESSIONAL

ASSOCIATIONS AND MERCHANTS' UNION. TODAY, THERE ARE TOO MANY ELEMENTS WITH A VESTED INTEREST IN DISORDER. THEY SCORN PEACE.

I HAVE BEEN TALKING TO MANY SOMALI INTELLECTUALS WHO ARE READY TO ASSIST IN THE REBUILDING OF THEIR CONTRARY. WITH THE CLOSURE OF ALL FACTORIES AND INSTITUTES, AND THE COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, MANY QUALIFIED CADRES IN DIFFERENT FIELDS REMAIN UNEMPLOYED. THEIR SERVICES COULD BE UTILIZED IN THE PROMOTION OF A RESPONSIBLE CIVIL SOCIETY WHILE MAPPING OUT A RECOVERY PROGRAMME FOR THE COUNTRY. SIMILARLY, THEY ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REACTIVATION OF THE DIFFERENT VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTRES WHICH WOULD OFFER VENUES FOR THE ABSORPTION OF SOMALI YOUTH CURRENTLY LIVING BY THE GUN, IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER VIABLE OPTIONS. THIS IS A BETTER INCENTIVE THAN THE FOOD FOR ARMS SWAP WHICH IS HAVING VERY LITTLE SUCCESS.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 GENEVA 08177

ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO
SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY
IN ALL FAIRNESS, IT WOULD BE LESS THAN TRUTHFUL IF I DID NOT ALSO INFORM THIS CONFERENCE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT WE ARE FACING IN OUR OPERATIONS ON THE GROUND IN SOMALIA. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND BECAUSE OF THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF LOCAL STRUCTURES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL RELIEF AGENCIES HAVE HAD TO ESTABLISH COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS ON AN AD HOC BASIS WITH SOME SOMALI PARTNERS. THESE INCLUDE THE SO-CALLED "TECHNICALS" FOR SECURITY, SOMALI PORTS AND AIRPORTS SELF-APPOINTED AUTHORITIES, PORTERS, TRANSPORTERS, DRIVERS, LANDLORDS, MERCHANTS, SOMALI NGOS HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING SEPARATELY WITH THEM REGARDING CONDITIONS OF WORK, FEES, TARIFFS, ETC. THIS HAS LED TO ESCALATED DEMANDS FROM THE SOMALIS, AND CONTRIBUTED TO SECURITY PROBLEMS IN CASES WHERE ARMED "TECHNICALS" AND GUARDS HAVE USED, OR THREATENED TO USE, FORCE TO HAVE THEIR DEMANDS MET. WE ARE CURRENTLY GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF TRANSITION AFTER WHICH A SYSTEM WILL BE DEVELOPED TO ENSURE COORDINATION AND EQUITY IN CONDUCTING BUSINESS WITH OUR SOMALI PARTNERS. I APPEAL FOR THE COOPERATION OF ALL, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF BIG AGENCIES. MOREOVER, IN DEALING WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VARIOUS SOMALI PARTIES, FACTIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SOME AGENCY FIELD OFFICERS FURNISH THESE LEADERS WITH INFORMATION THAT CONFLICTS WITH THE REPORTS THEY MAKE TO US. THIS HAS OFTEN RESULTED IN SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS. IT REPRESENTS A GREAT LIABILITY IN ORGANIZING OUR EFFORTS AND PROGRAMMES WILL BE ENORMOUSLY UNDERMINED. WE HAVE ALSO FACED PROBLEMS FROM THE LACK OF COORDINATION REGARDING THE ARRIVAL OF VESSELS CARRYING

HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES AT SOMALI PORTS.

WHILE WE WELCOME ALL RELIEF VESSELS, THOSE THAT COME UNANNOUNCED WERE THE CAUSE OF SERIOUS CONCERN FOR US. SOME SHIPS HAVE HAD TO STAY OFFSHORE FOR SEVERAL DAYS AWAITING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITY, UNLOADING, NEGOTIATIONS FOR PAYMENT OF PORT TARIFFS AND UNLOADING FEES, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORTATION. I WISH TO APPEAL TO ALL CONCERNED TO CONSULT WITH US SO THAT VESSELS WILL LEAVE FOR SOMALIA WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THEIR CARGO IS TO BE HANDLED UPON ARRIVAL. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION MIGHT COMPEL US TO DELAY THE MOVEMENT OF SHIPS; AND WE, THEREFORE, NEED THE TOTAL COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF ALL.

I SHOULD ALSO STRESS THAT THE QUALITY OF FOODSTUFFS DELIVERED TO SOMALIA MATTERS A GREAT DEAL. HIGH QUALITY ITEMS SUCH AS SUGAR, RICE, FLOUR AND COOKING OIL, WHILE VERY MUCH WELCOME, HAVE MANY TIMES CAUSED UNNECESSARY DEATHS AND INJURY BECAUSE, BY AND LARGE, THEY INVITE LOOTING AND CONSEQUENT FIGHTING. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT FOR GRAINS, LOOTING IS ESTIMATED AT 15% OF DELIVERED SUPPLIES, WHILE FOR HIGH QUALITY ITEMS, THE PERCENTAGE CAN BE AS HIGH AS 40%. IT HAS BEEN DISHEARTENING FOR ME TO VISIT HOSPITALS AND TO SEE WOUNDED PEOPLE SMEARED WITH THE VERY FLOUR THAT IS SUPPOSED TO SAVE LIVES. IT IS, THEREFORE, VERY IMPORTANT FOR DONOR COUNTRIES TO CONSULT WITH US ON THE TYPES, QUALITY AND PRIORITY DESTINATION OF ITEMS ;THAT COULD BE SENT TO SOMALIA. AS THE PEOPLE ON THE SPOT, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO OFFER ADVICE ON THIS AND WHERE THE FOOD ITEMS COULD BE DELIVERED.

I WOULD, IN THIS CONNECTION, VERY STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE ISSUE OF MONETIZATION BE SERIOUSLY TAKEN UP. THERE IS SO MUCH HESITATION AND LACK OF MOTIVATION WHEN I BRING UP THE SUBJECT THAT I NOW DESPAIR OF SEEING THIS VERY IMPORTANT OPERATION OVER IMPLEMENTED. YET IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH SOMALIS, I FIND A TOTAL ADHERENCE TO THIS NOTION WHICH EVERYBODY AGREES WILL ENABLE US TO RESOLVE MANY CRUCIAL PROBLEMS AND ENHANCE SECURITY. IT WILL PROVIDE JOBS TO SOMALIS AND INVOLVE THEM MORE IN UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 07 GENEVA 08177

ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY THE PROCESS OF REESTABLISHING MARKET ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
LET ME MAKE A SPECIAL PLEA FOR THE NORTHWEST AND CENTRAL SOMALIA. THERE IS NO GREATER NEED FOR THE RESTITUTION OF WAR DAMAGE THAT IN THE NORTHWEST (SOMALILAND), WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN SHAMEFULLY NEGLECTED. SOMALILAND'S TWO MAJOR CITIES, HARGEISA AND BURAO, AND SEVERAL OF ITS SMALLER TOWNS AND VILLAGES, WERE ALMOST TOTALLY

DEVESTATED BY A COMBINATION OF AIR BOMBARDMENT, GROUND MISSILES AND OTHER HEAVY WEAPONS DURING THE LAST YEARS OF SIAD BARRE'S TENURE. WITHOUT ELECTRICITY AND RUNNING WATER, WITH THOUSANDS OF INHABITABLE DWELLINGS AND LAND MINES NUMBERING TENS OF THOUSANDS, THIS REGION'S PLIGHT CRIES OUT FOR NEW AND CONCENTRATED EFFORTS TOWARDS REHABILITATION. WHILST THE NEED OF STARVING POPULATION IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA HAVE CAPTURED WORLD ATTENTION, UNDERSTANDABLE, SOMALILAND, THE NORTHEASTERN AND THE CENTRAL REGION, MUST NO LONGER BE NEGLECTED. THEY MUST RECEIVE AN EQUITABLE SHARE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND HELP WITH RECONSTRUCTION. IN FACT THE NORTHEAST, BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIVE STABILITY AND GOOD COOPERATION WITH THE UN, CAN BECOME A MODEL FOR THE OTHER REGIONS AND DESERVES A SPECIAL ATTENTION AIMING AT A COMPREHENSIVE RECOVERY PROGRAMME. IT MIGHT WELL BE A KEY TO AN OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE SOMALI PROBLEM.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE DELIVERY OF RELIEF ASSISTANCE AND THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT WE ARE PUTTING INTO PLACE WILL NOT BY THEMSELVES RESOLVE THE CRISIS IN SOMALIA. THEY ARE MERE STOP GAP MEASURES. THE SOLUTION LIES IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AMONG ALL SOMALI PARTIES, FACTIONS AND MOVEMENTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE RESORATION OF GOVERNMENT AND A RETURN TO NORMALCY. WITHOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TO FACILITATE RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, SOMALIA WILL BECOME A BOTTOMLESS PIT INTO WHICH THE DONOR COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO POUR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WITH NO END IN SIGHT. AND, THUS, THE RISK OF A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES WILL CONTINUE TO HAUNT US. THEREFORE, WE NEED TO CONVENE A NATION RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKING INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS IN THIS REGARD WITH THE SOMALI POLITICAL LEADERS AND ELDERS BOTH AT REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL. I AM GLAD TO SAY WE ARE MAKING CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS. WE HOPE THAT BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, ALL THE PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND FACTIONS WILL PARTICIPATE IN A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE. THERE ARE NOW REAL POSSIBILITIES OF CROSSING THE THRESHOLD INTO A PHASE WHERE ALL THE FACTIONS WILL BE ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE. BUT THERE REMAIN A FEW HURDLES WE NEED TO OVERCOME. THESE HURDLES ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE. WE NEED THE SUPPORT OF ALL GOVERNMENTS. THERE ARE SOME GOVERNMENTS WITH GREATER INFLUENCE AND LEVERAGE ON SOME OF THE PARTIES, AND WITH THEIR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE, THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COULD BEGIN VERY SOON. I WISH TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO THE LEADERS OF THE HORN OF AFRICA AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE GIVEN THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT TO MY EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE AMONG THE SOMALI PARTIES.

IN CONCLUSION, I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS NOW STRENGTHENING ITS PRESENCE IN SOMALIA.

WE ARE OPENING ZONAL POLITICAL OFFICES IN MOGADISHU, BOSSASO, HARGEISA AND KISMAYO. THESE OFFICES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROMOTING RECONCILIATION AT THE REGIONAL LEVELS, NEGOTIATING WITH THE LOCAL LEADERS IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY IMPEDIMENTS TO THE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, LIAISING WITH OTHER RELIEF AGENCIES OPERATING IN THESE AREAS AND PROMOTING REHABILITATION AND EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIONS. I WOULD UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 GENEVA 08177

ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY LIKE TO ENCOURAGE GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES TO START NOW RETURNING TO SOMALIA AND JOINING IN THE EFFORTS TO BEGIN THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS. I WISH TO THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN AND TO EXPRESS MY READINESS TO WORK WITH ALL OF YOU TO FIND SOLUTIONS THAT WILL RESCUE THAT UNHAPPY COUNTRY, SOMALIA, FROM THIS CRISIS. END TEXT. ABRAM

BT

#8177

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SECTION: 01 OF 07

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SECTION: 02 OF 07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Oct-1992 10:26 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX MAIL@OEOB
RAGLE@A1@OEOB
ORDWAY@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY

<DIST>

SIT: ORDWAY RAGLE VAX

<PREC>

PRIORITY

<CLAS>

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USMISSION GENEVA

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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4993

INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0793

RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 4609

RUEHDI/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0088

RUEHKKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0047

RUFHNSN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0585

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0436

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0409

RUEHZG/NATOEC COLLECTIVE

<SUBJ>

UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 08178

ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY

A.I.D. ADMINISTRATOR ROSKENS

1. THE UNITED NATIONS COORDINATION MEETING ON

ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA OPENED ON MONDAY, OCT 12, 1992.

DURING THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION, A.I.D. ADMINISTRATOR

RONALD W. ROSKENS MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT OF RONALD W. ROSKENS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

OCTOBER 12, 1992

IT IS HARD TO OVERSTATE THE URGENCY OF THIS CONFERENCE. BY NOW ALL OF US ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE NUMBING STATISTICS AND TRAGIC SCENES OF STARVATION THAT DEFINE CONDITIONS IN MUCH OF SOMALIA. OVER 800,000 SOMALIS ARE NOW LIVING IN SQUALID REFUGEE CAMPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND AS MANY AS ONE QUARTER OF SOMALI CHILDREN UNDER FIVE HAVE DIED. SOME 1.5 MILLION PEOPLE -- IF NOT MORE -- MAY ULTIMATELY DIE OF STARVATION. THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE AND THE IMPROVED PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION THAT SHOULD RESULT FROM IT NO DOUBT WILL MEAN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE OR DEATH FOR MANY SOMALIS.

WE COMMEND UN UNDER SECRETARY ELIASSON AND HIS STAFF FOR CALLING THIS CONFERENCE. WE ALSO APPLAUD THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR SOMALI RELIEF MOHAMMED SAHNOUN FOR HIS REMARKABLE LABOR IN WORKING WITH SOMALI LEADERS EXPEDITING THE PLACEMENT OF UN SECURITY GUARDS IN MOGADISHU AND WORKING TIRELESSLY TOWARD THE GOAL OF RECONCILIATION. HE HAS EARNED NOT ONLY OUR THANKS BUT OUR TOTAL SUPPORT.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN AID TO SOMALIA SINCE THE START OF THIS CRISIS OVER NINETEEN MONTHS AGO. IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR, AT THE DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT BUSH, WE REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS WITH A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-INITIATED AIRLIFT. WE PRESENTLY HAVE 14 AIRCRAFT BASED IN MOMBASA, KENYA FERRYING RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO SOMALIA AND DROUGHT- AND REFUGEE-IMPACTED AREAS OF NORTHERN KENYA.

WE ARE GRATEFUL TO THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT FOR PROVIDING ITS FULL COOPERATION IN THIS EFFORT AND ARE HOPEFUL THAT OTHER DONORS, IN KEEPING WITH REPEATED APPEALS MADE IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, WILL CONTINUE TO OFFER MORE OF THEIR OWN AIRCRAFT OR FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR THE CONTRACTING OF COMMERCIAL PLANES TO HELP IN THE AIRLIFT.

OVER THE COMING WEEKS WE WILL FURTHER INCREASE OUR CHARTER AIRCRAFT AS WE GRADUALLY TRANSITION FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN AIRLIFT. IN DOING SO, OUR GOAL WILL BE TO MAINTAIN THE AMOUNT OF RELIEF AID THAT IS CURRENTLY MOVED BY AIRLIFTS UNTIL LAND CORRIDORS CAN BE OPENED TO REPLACE THEM. I URGE OTHERS TO JOIN IN WHAT IS BECOMING A GENUINELY MULTILATERAL AIRLIFT EFFORT CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN WORLD FOOD PROGRAM.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO PLACED A 20-PERSON A.I.D. DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM, ALSO KNOWN AS DART, IN THE FIELD. THIS TEAM -- WITH AUTHORITY TO COMMIT FUNDS -- HAS APPROVED SINCE ITS ARRIVAL IN NAIROBI IN LATE AUGUST AN ADDITIONAL USDOLS 11 MILLION FOR RELIEF PROGRAMS, INCLUDING SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING AND MOTHER-CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS, THE PURCHASE OF MEDICAL

SUPPLIES FOR HOSPITALS, SEED DISTRIBUTIONS, WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAMS AND FOOD MONETIZATION PROGRAMS. TO DATE WE HAVE COMMITTED OVER USDOLS 190 MILLION IN RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA.

I AM ANNOUNCING FOR THE FIRST TIME NOW OUR INTEREST UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 08178
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO
SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY IN PLEDGING AN ADDITIONAL USDOLS 250,000 TO ESTABLISH AN OPERATIONS CENTER IN NAIROBI TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION OF THE OVERALL RELIEF EFFORT.

OUR USDOLS 190 MILLION DOLLAR COMMITMENT INCLUDES A PLEDGE THIS MONTH OF AN ADDITIONAL 85,000 METRIC TONS OF FOOD AID FOR OUR FISCAL YEAR 1993. ADDING THAT TO OUR AUGUST COMMITMENT OF 145,000 METRIC TONS AND PREVIOUS FOOD PLEDGES, OUR TOTAL FOOD AID COMMITMENT TO SOMALIA COMES TO 310,000 METRIC TONS IN FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993. GIVEN THAT THE ICRC AND UN ESTIMATE THAT 52,000 METRIC TONS OF FOOD ARE REQUIRED A MONTH TO FEED SOMALIA, MORE IS CLEARLY NEEDED.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO MOVE ITS FOOD AID NOT ONLY THROUGH THE RELIEF AGENCIES, BUT THROUGH SOMALI COMMERCIAL CHANNELS. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS PARTICULAR "MONETIZATION" STRATEGY FOR A MOMENT AND MAKE AN APPEAL TO ALL OTHER DONORS AS WELL AS UN AGENCIES AND NGO'S PRESENT HERE TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT HOW WE CAN INTEGRATE OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE THIS APPROACH FULLY EFFECTIVE.

THE SALE OF FOOD TO SOMALI MERCHANTS -- BOTH "OFFSHORE" IN DJIBOUTI AND KENYA AND INSIDE THE COUNTRY -- IS NOT MEANT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ON-GOING FREE DISTRIBUTIONS TO THE MOST DESTITUTE, BUT RATHER TO COMPLEMENT THEM. IT IS A CRITICAL RELIEF INTERVENTION THAT IS DESIGNED TO HELP DRIVE DOWN AND STABILIZE FOOD PRICES AND ALLOW MORE SOMALIS TO ACCESS THE MARKET. IT WILL INCREASE THE OVERALL FOOD SUPPLY IN THE COUNTRY, MAKING FOOD LESS VALUABLE TO THIEVES AND REDUCING INSECURITY THAT IS ITSELF ATTRIBUTABLE TO FOOD.

MONETIZATION PROGRAMS CAN BE CONDUCTED DESPITE INSECURITY -- WHICH IS PRESENTLY, I MIGHT ADD, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE TO MOVING IN LARGE QUANTITIES OF FREE FOOD -- BECAUSE IT RELIES ON SOMALI MERCHANTS WITH THEIR OWN CLAN-BASED SECURITY SYSTEMS TO MOVE FOOD INTO THE MARKETS. CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS INTERVENTION IS THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF LOCAL CURRENCY GENERATED BY THE SALE OF FOOD TO BEGIN LABOR INTENSIVE CASH-FOR-WORK AND OTHER PROGRAMS. THESE PROGRAMS WILL BEGIN TO ALLOW THE POOREST IN SOMALIA TO RE-ENTER THE MARKET ECONOMY.

AS WE HAVE REVIEWED MONETIZATION OPTIONS WE HAVE REALIZED THAT THE COMPLEXITIES RELATED TO DETERMINING SALE PRICES FOR FOOD, SELECTING APPROPRIATE COMMODITY

MIXES, AND WORKING WITH THE SOMALI TRADERS WILL CALL FOR A HIGHLY-COORDINATED UN, NGO AND DONOR EFFORT. GIVEN THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE MARKETPLACE AND THE COMPLEX BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS TO BE CONDUCTED WITH MERCHANTS WE MUST, AS A GROUP, CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATE ANY COMMERCIAL SALES PROGRAM IF IT IS TO HAVE ITS FULL IMPACT.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT TODAY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PLAN TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL UN GUARDS IN SOMALIA. THE SOMALI FACTIONS AND CLAN LEADERS MUST REALIZE THAT INTRODUCTION OF THESE FORCES IS PURELY FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES AND THAT THEY ARE CRUCIAL TO IMPROVING SECURITY AND FACILITATING RAPID DELIVERY OF RELIEF AID INTO THE COUNTRY. WE CANNOT BEGIN LARGE-SCALE REHABILITATION PROJECTS AND MOVE TO LAND DELIVERY OF FOOD ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA UNLESS SECURITY IS ASSURED.

ONCE UN FOOD GUARDS ARE DEPLOYED TO THE PORTS LISTED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S AUGUST REPORT, WE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW BEST TO SAFEGUARD FOOD DELIVERIES INTO THE INTERIOR. IN THAT CONNECTION, UN FORCES MIGHT WORK IN COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES -- INCLUDING CLAN ELDERS AND POLICE -- TO HELP THEM REASSERT THEIR TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP ROLES IN SOMALI SOCIETY. WE NEED TO EXAMINE IN PARTICULAR HOW LOCAL POLICE FORCES WHOSE MEMBERS ARE KNOWN TO BE WELL-RESPECTED IN THEIR UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 08178 ROME ALSO FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MASS, SO

SUBJECT: UN COORDINATION MEETING ON SOMALIA: SPEECH BY COMMUNITIES COULD BE RECONSTITUTED TO HELP MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER.

IN THOSE AREAS WHERE CONDITIONS ARE STABLE AND THE CLAN ELDERS ARE ABLE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES PEACEFULLY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE. (NATURALLY, DIRECT RELIEF ASSISTANCE IN ADDITION TO REHABILITATION PROGRAMS, MUST CONTINUE TO BE OFFERED IN ALL AREAS OF NEED.) SUCH REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE WILL DEMONSTRATE THE VALUE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PLACES ON PEACEFUL MEANS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

ULTIMATELY THE SOLUTION TO THIS MAN-MADE DISASTER IS FOR SOMALI FACTION AND CLAN LEADERS THEMSELVES TO REALIZE THAT RECONCILIATION IS THE ONLY WAY TO END THE VIOLENCE AND CHAOS IN THEIR COUNTRY. WE BELIEVE THAT AMBASSADOR SAHNOUN'S APPROACH TO RECONCILIATION -- RESOLVING REGIONAL ENMITIES BEFORE TACKLING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION -- MAKES A GREAT DEAL OF SENSE. WE ARE ALSO HOPEFUL THAT SOMALIS' WILLINGNESS TO SET ASIDE CLAN DIFFERENCES TO HELP IN THE ONGOING RELIEF EFFORT WILL BRING THEM A STEP CLOSER TO RESOLVING THEIR OTHER DIFFERENCES.

IN THAT REGARD WE SUPPORT PLANS TO HOST A FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE WITH SOMALI LEADERS TO SECURE THEIR

COOPERATION IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE COUNTRY.

WE MUST, ALL OF US, REMAIN SEIZED WITH THE UNPARALLELED HUMAN TRAGEDY NOW UNFOLDING IN SOMALIA.

TODAY, AS WE ENJOY THE COMFORTS THAT GENEVA HAS TO OFFER, AN ESTIMATED ONE THOUSAND PEOPLE IN SOMALIA -- MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN -- WILL DIE. IT IS WITHIN OUR POWER WITH THE HELP OF THE SOMALI LEADERS TO REVERSE THIS DYNAMIC.

WE MUST NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO SLIP INTO "DONOR FATIGUE" AND GROW NUMB TO THE WRETCHED IMAGES OF DEATH AND STARVATION THERE. WE MUST MOVE FORWARD WITH GRIM DETERMINATION AND WORK TOGETHER TO BRING SOMALIA OUT OF ITS DEADLY SLIDE IN ARMAGEDDON. END TEXT. ABRAM##

BT

#8178

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<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 03

<SSN>

8178

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921013100616 M0279092

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SECTION: 02 OF 03

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SECTION: 03 OF 03

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001b. cable	Re: ICRC-U.S.-Somalia/Relief Operations (2 pages)	10/13/1992	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002a. paper	Discussion Paper: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (5 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002b. paper	Summary of Conclusions of the Small Group Meeting on Somalia and Libya (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)
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CONFIRMED* CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNOSOM II

	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Troops On Station for UNITAF**</u>	<u>Troops Expected UNOSOM II</u>	<u>Troops On-station UNOSOM II</u>	<u>TYPE OF FORCES</u>	<u>WHERE LOCATED</u>
1	Argentina	0	90	90	Field Hosp	TBD
2	Australia	926	48	48	INF BN till mid-May	BAIDOA
3	Bangladesh	0	779	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
4	Belgium	789	869	761	ABN/INF	KISMAYU
5	Botswana	206	200	200	INF	MOGADISHU
6	Egypt	235	610	235	MECH INF	MOGADISHU
7	France	1143	1100	1100	MECH INF	ODDUR
8	Germany	0	(1500)	0	ENG/LOG	MOMBASA,KE
9	Greece	110	120	110	MED/LOG	MOGADISHU
10	Hungary	0	50	50	Field Hosp	TBD
11	India	5	(4000)	5	INF/LOG	TBD
12	Indonesia	0	777	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
13	Ireland	0	80	0	Transpo CO	TBD
14	Italy	2558	2400	2400	ABN/INF	GIALALASI
15	Jordan	0	880	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
16	Malaysia	0	856	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
17	Morocco	1265	966	966	MECH INF	BALEDOGLE
18	New Zealand	67	110	67	AIR TRANS	MOGADISHU
19	Nigeria	562	627	562	RECON	MOGADISHU
20	Norway	0	140	0	HQS	MOGADISHU
21	Pakistan	880	4004	1680	INF	MOGADISHU
22	Rep. of Korea	0	250	0	ENG BN	TBD
23	Romania	0	260	0	Field Hosp	TBD
24	Saudia Arabia	680	674	674	INF	MOGADISHU
25	Sweden	162	150	150	MED	MOGADISHU
26	Tunisia	133	133	133	INF	MOGADISHU
27	Turkey	300	459	300	INF	MOGADISHU
28	U.A.E.	640	753	640	INF	MOGADISHU
29	U.S.A.	9174	(3900)	3900	LOG & QRF	VARIOUS
30	Zimbabwe	160	160	160	INF	MOGADISHU
TOTAL:		19995	26945	14231		

As of: 130700L Apr 93

*Figures are based on UN information approved in the field

**Canada and Kuwait have 1209 & 138 troops respectively in UNITAF but will not be in UNOSOM II

COUNTRIES CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION
(STATUS UNKNOWN)

	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Troops Possible Contribution</u>	<u>TYPE OF FORCES</u>
1	Algeria	TBD	MED
2	Brazil	TBD	TBD
3	Chile	TBD	INF
4	Djibouti	TBD	INF
5	El Salvador	TBD	HELO UNIT
6	Ghana	TBD	INF
7	Jamaica	TBD	ENG UNIT
8	Latvia	TBD	INF
9	Mali	TBD	MED
10	Namibia	TBD	INF
11	Nepal	TBD	INF
12	Russia	TBD	MED
13	Thailand	TBD	MED/TRANSP
14	Uganda	TBD	INF
15	Yemen	TBD	LINGUISTS
16	Zambia	TBD	INF

TOTAL:

0

As of: 130700L Apr 93



9307508
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 12, 1993

2336

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR


MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Gaining Troop Support for UNOSOM II

The attached paper outlines an interagency-cleared strategy to obtain troop support for the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By WE NARA, Date 02/08/17
2012-0659-F


for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Strategy Paper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002c. paper	Gaining Troop Support for UNOSOM II Strategy Paper (4 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FROM ADMIRAL HOWE TO UN HQTS.
7 APRIL 1993

1. You have asked us to examine the potential shortfall between the logistics capabilities the US currently intends to retain in Somalia to support UNOSOM II and our own assessment of our requirements.

2. A progress report passed to New York about a week ago reached the following conclusion, "what they are proposing to leave in place is a limited divisional logistic capability with a 25% divisional engineering strength. In our view, this structure will only be able to support fully second line capable self sufficient brigades in the south, with insufficient space capacity to fill missing brigade support elements and no realistic capacity to support the center and north". We are still in the process of validating the concerns expressed in the above assessment, but I want to flag the following issues based on two meetings I have held in the last 24 hours with UNITAF and UNOSOM personnel.

A. Capability in South (Current UNITAF Area). While the US is leaving behind a capability (2300 in number) which they have calculated will support a divisional strength force (10000). This calculation was based on an assumption by UNITAF that the remaining brigades would be complete with their logistic support elements and that the ration support would be field rations (MRE) only.

B. Capability to Expand (Center, North and Kenyan Borders South). In view of the capability gaps in the current UNITAF area it is likely that expansion on the mission can only take place once the southern position has been consolidated. As additional forces arrive, we will only be able to deploy them North if the requisite support elements are available (e.g. engineering).

C. Engineers. Of all the capability gaps, the most acute is in engineering. Early assessment suggests that what UNITAF plans to leave would be barely capable of maintaining the status quo in the current UNITAF area. With the Monsoon imminent even this is questionable. I understand your military staff has already made a request to re-configure the German contribution to a mix of engineers and logistic support companies. This will be essential if UNOSOM it is to be in a position to expand beyond UNITAF confines.

D. Medical. In view of the apparent intention of the Swedish field hospital to withdraw by early July, the Mogadishu area may well have inadequate medical capability. Until the capability of the medical units being contributed by Argentina, Greece, Hungary and Oman is confirmed, there may be some gaps. In addition, we are concerned about restraining adequate Medevac helicopters.

3. The fundamental problem we have is that we are still several weeks away from identifying specifically what we need. At the same time, in the absence of more specificity, UNITAF has taken a "bare bones" approach to our anticipated needs. In view of the limited (in scope and mission) though capable support being left by the US, we should leave open the channels with the US and ask for an option to request assistance to fill any critical gaps which remain once our situation is clearer. The need for more US engineer support is likely.

4. We will work this problem hard and let you know as soon as possible what specific shortfalls must be filled. We also will be assessing other support areas -- communications, special forces, psychological operations, air surveillance, and helo and fixed wing lift.

Best Regards.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	The Warlords and the Transitional National Council (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

2012-0659-F
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003a. paper	[Duplicate of 002a] (5 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
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Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
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003b. paper	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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CONFIRMED* CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNOSOM II

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4	Belgium	789	869	761	ABN/INF	KISMAYU
5	Botswana	206	200	200	INF	MOGADISHU
6	Egypt	235	610	235	MECH INF	MOGADISHU
7	France	1143	1100	1100	MECH INF	ODDUR
8	Germany	0	(1500)	0	ENG/LOG	MOMBASA,KE
9	Greece	110	120	110	MED/LOG	MOGADISHU
10	Hungary	0	50	50	Field Hosp	TBD
11	India	5	(4000)	5	INF/LOG	TBD
12	Indonesia	0	777	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
13	Ireland	0	80	0	Transpo CO	TBD
14	Italy	2558	2400	2400	ABN/INF	GIALALASI
15	Jordan	0	880	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
16	Malaysia	0	856	0	INF BN/MPs	TBD
17	Morocco	1265	966	966	MECH INF	BALEDOGLE
18	New Zealand	67	110	67	AIR TRANS	MOGADISHU
19	Nigeria	562	627	562	RECON	MOGADISHU
20	Norway	0	140	0	HQS	MOGADISHU
21	Pakistan	880	4004	1680	INF	MOGADISHU
22	Rep. of Korea	0	250	0	ENG BN	TBD
23	Romania	0	260	0	Field Hosp	TBD
24	Saudia Arabia	680	674	674	INF	MOGADISHU
25	Sweden	162	150	150	MED	MOGADISHU
26	Tunisia	133	133	133	INF	MOGADISHU
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28	U.A.E.	640	753	640	INF	MOGADISHU
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TOTAL:		19995	26945	14231		

As of: 130700L Apr 93

*Figures are based on UN information approved in the field

**Canada and Kuwait have 1209 & 138 troops respectively in UNITAF but will not be in UNOSOM II

COUNTRIES CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION
(STATUS UNKNOWN)

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4	Djibouti	TBD	INF
5	El Salvador	TBD	HELO UNIT
6	Ghana	TBD	INF
7	Jamaica	TBD	ENG UNIT
8	Latvia	TBD	INF
9	Mali	TBD	MED
10	Namibia	TBD	INF
11	Nepal	TBD	INF
12	Russia	TBD	MED
13	Thailand	TBD	MED/TRANSP
14	Uganda	TBD	INF
15	Yemen	TBD	LINGUISTS
16	Zambia	TBD	INF

TOTAL:

0

As of: 130700L Apr 93



9307508
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 12, 1993

2336

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR


MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Gaining Troop Support for UNOSOM II

The attached paper outlines an interagency-cleared strategy to obtain troop support for the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By WDE NARA, Date 02/08/17
2012-0659 F


for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Strategy Paper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (4 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FROM ADMIRAL HOWE TO UN HQTS.
7 APRIL 1993

1. You have asked us to examine the potential shortfall between the logistics capabilities the US currently intends to retain in Somalia to support UNOSOM II and our own assessment of our requirements.
2. A progress report passed to New York about a week ago reached the following conclusion, "what they are proposing to leave in place is a limited divisional logistic capability with a 25% divisional engineering strength. In our view, this structure will only be able to support fully second line capable self sufficient brigades in the south, with insufficient space capacity to fill missing brigade support elements and no realistic capacity to support the center and north". We are still in the process of validating the concerns expressed in the above assessment, but I want to flag the following issues based on two meetings I have held in the last 24 hours with UNITAF and UNOSOM personnel.

A. Capability in South (Current UNITAF Area). While the US is leaving behind a capability (2300 in number) which they have calculated will support a divisional strength force (10000). This calculation was based on an assumption by UNITAF that the remaining brigades would be complete with their logistic support elements and that the ration support would be field rations (MRE) only.

B. Capability to Expand (Center, North and Kenyan Borders South). In view of the capability gaps in the current UNITAF area it is likely that expansion on the mission can only take place once the southern position has been consolidated. As additional forces arrive, we will only be able to deploy them North if the requisite support elements are available (e.g. engineering).

C. Engineers. Of all the capability gaps, the most acute is in engineering. Early assessment suggests that what UNITAF plans to leave would be barely capable of maintaining the status quo in the current UNITAF area. With the Monsoon imminent even this is questionable. I understand your military staff has already made a request to re-configure the German contribution to a mix of engineers and logistic support companies. This will be essential if UNOSOM it is to be in a position to expand beyond UNITAF confines.

D. Medical. In view of the apparent intention of the Swedish field hospital to withdraw by early July, the Mogadishu area may well have inadequate medical capability. Until the capability of the medical units being contributed by Argentina, Greece, Hungary and Oman is confirmed, there may be some gaps. In addition, we are concerned about restraining adequate Medevac helicopters.

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4. We will work this problem hard and let you know as soon as possible what specific shortfalls must be filled. We also will be assessing other support areas -- communications, special forces, psychological operations, air surveillance, and helo and fixed wing lift.

Best Regards.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. paper	[Duplicate of 002d] (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4202

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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004. list	DC Paper Distribution [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1993	P3/b(3)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


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Shinn 4

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. paper	[Duplicate of 002a] (5 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 2986

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. paper	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	03/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

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2012-0659-F
ke4202

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As of: 130700L Apr 93



9307508
United States Department of State

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
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By KOE NARA, Date 02/08/17

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2012-0659-F
ke4202

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D. Medical. In view of the apparent intention of the Swedish field hospital to withdraw by early July, the Mogadishu area may well have inadequate medical capability. Until the capability of the medical units being contributed by Argentina, Greece, Hungary and Oman is confirmed, there may be some gaps. In addition, we are concerned about restraining adequate Medevac helicopters.

3. The fundamental problem we have is that we are still several weeks away from identifying specifically what we need. At the same time, in the absence of more specificity, UNITAF has taken a "bare bones" approach to our anticipated needs. In view of the limited (in scope and mission) though capable support being left by the US, we should leave open the channels with the US and ask for an option to request assistance to fill any critical gaps which remain once our situation is clearer. The need for more US engineer support is likely.

4. We will work this problem hard and let you know as soon as possible what specific shortfalls must be filled. We also will be assessing other support areas -- communications, special forces, psychological operations, air surveillance, and helo and fixed wing lift.

Best Regards.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005d. paper	[Duplicate of 002d] (2 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

[Somalia] [Folder 2] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/25889

6 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

837(1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 June 1993,

Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal attacks,

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the people of Somalia in re-establishing conditions of normal life,

Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in order to help the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries due to years of civil strife in that country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including movements and factions,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the USC/ANA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,

Recalling the statement made by its President on 31 March 1993 (S/25493) concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife and committed to consider promptly measures appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions,

Taking note of the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-General on 6 June 1993,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);

2. Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;

3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993, and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;

4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, annex III);

5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;

6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to enquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;

7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all ranks, as well as equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report (S/25384);

8. Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its mandate;

9. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its adoption;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Letter to Senator Mitchel

You have asked for the Administration's views on the resolution on Somalia. We welcome Congressional support for the US participation in the humanitarian relief mission in Somalia. We have, and will continue to, act in Somalia consistent with the War Powers Resolution and pursuant to the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief. We anticipate a new UN resolution shortly, transferring the mission to a UN led force.