

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia Core Group [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake, re: War Powers Considerations in Bosnia (2 pages)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake, re: War Powers Considerations in Somalia (2 pages)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
003. note	Handwritten note (1 page)	02/12/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: [Somalia] (2 pages)	12/24/1992	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: [Somalia] (4 pages)	12/20/1992	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: [Guidance] (1 page)	12/22/1992	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: [Guidance] (2 pages)	12/23/1992	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: [Disarmament Operations] (5 pages)	03/31/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4200

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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001b. memo	Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake, re: War Powers Considerations in Somalia (2 pages)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ADVISER
UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
789 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017-5000

TO: Leon Weintraub DATE: 12 Feb
IO
SUBJECT: UNOSOM
MESSAGE: See attached

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GENERAL

S/ DRAFT

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of
operative paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 (1992)
(UNOSOM)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of operative paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 of 3 December 1992. In these paragraphs, the Security Council:

~~Requests~~ the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

~~Requests~~ the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of

this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;"

2. Part I of this report contains a factual description of the action taken up to 8 February 1993 to implement resolution 794 (1992). Part II sets out my current thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force, to UNOSOM. My observations are contained in Part III.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

1. The specific mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concerned:

- the operations of UNOSOM (operative paragraph 6);
- implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (operative paragraph 10);
- the establishment of mechanisms for coordination (operative paragraph 12), including the attachment of a UNOSOM liaison staff to the Headquarters of the Unified Task Force (operative paragraph 15);

- 3 -

- continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (operative paragraph 10).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

The Operations of UNOSOM

4. UNOSOM's military component currently has a strength of 715 all ranks composed mainly of a 500 strong Infantry battalion, 30 military observers, movement and logistics elements and a small headquarters' company and staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, on the advice of my Special Representative and the Force Commander, I authorized the deployment of 250 additional personnel to strengthen the Infantry Battalion and 30 officers to be included in UNOSOM Headquarters. These deployments will be completed in the near future.

Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

5. Military operations by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) of Member States Under Security Council Resolution 794 have deployed approximately 37,000 troops in Southern and Central Somalia. These forces have been establishing security throughout the nine

designated humanitarian relief sectors. Security operations are now expanding into all UNITAF areas of operations. Although isolated incidences of violence continue to occur in the major population centers and in some rural areas, the overall security situation has continued to improve. The UNITAF Commander now states all areas are stable or relatively stable except in Mogadishu. Although UNITAF forces have been the subject of sniper fire and harassment, the opposition now appears to be primarily from bandits. Most major clans and factions have welcomed the UNITAF deployment and are cooperating. UNITAF's presence in key areas of the country have greatly reduced those whose power was based on their heavy weapons. Increased disarmament measures have largely neutralized the militant warlords and their followers and considerable progress has been made in reducing the number of major weapons threatening the Somali people. However, outside of the area of UNITAF control a secure environment has not been established at all and factional fighting continues.

Mechanisms for coordination

4. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

At United Nations Headquarters:

Special Envoy, Ambassador Envoy, in order to engage

Much of

- 5 -

(a) a policy group on Somalia, is chaired by the Secretary-General and meets regularly with senior representatives of the United States Government. It reviews the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding, and planning for the future role of UNOSOM;

(b) an operational task force (chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations) comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned, and representatives of the United States meets weekly;

(c) a liaison team composed of US forces officers has been attached to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations since early January;

(d) a UNOSOM planning team is now in place in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

At UNOSOM Headquarters, Mogadishu:

(a) My Special Representative, Mr. Kittani, and the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Shaheen, are working closely with the Commander of the Unified Task Force, Lieutenant-General Johnson, and with the United States Special Enve^y, Ambassador Oakley, in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two Forces. Each of

- 6 -

the detailed planning of the transition will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM Headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose; a UNOSOM liaison staff has been working with Unified Task Force Headquarters.

7. Several of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have asked to participate in discussions with myself and my staff about the current operations of the Force and planning for the transition to continue United Nations peace-keeping operations. I have initiated regular meetings to which all states participating in the Force are invited.

Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

8. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cessation of hostilities and the observance of the cease-fire as well as the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have throughout continued to promote efforts for national reconciliation and unity in the country, in cooperation with the LAS, OAU and OIC.

9. In my last report (S/25168), I informed the Security Council about the outcome of the informal preparatory meeting for a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia which I convened at United Nations Headquarters in Addis Ababa (4 to

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15 January 1993). I noted in particular that the following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and modalities of disarmament (Supplement to General Agreement); and (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad-hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the national reconciliation conference as well as other issues pending from the informal meeting.

10. I also reported that as stipulated in the latter Agreement, the first meeting of the ad-hoc committee was scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 to submit recommendations to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993 on the criteria for participation at the national reconciliation conference. Regrettably, the committee was unable to meet because the Somali National Alliance (SNA) refused to participate alleging that the Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) had violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking its forces in and around Kismayo.

11. A further meeting of the ad-hoc committee, scheduled for the beginning of February in Mogadishu, could not, once again, be convened because of the position taken by SNA that its representatives will not attend as long as SNF and SPN forces continued to violate the cease-fire around Kismayo. As a result, the broad agreement reached in consultation with the individual

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committee members on the agenda, the rules of procedures and the list of international observers to be invited to the conference could not be formally endorsed by the Committee. The issue of criteria for participation at the conference was not discussed during the consultations with the individual members of the committee.

12. I have stressed that my efforts and those of my Special Representative will continue to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia. UNOSOM will therefore continue to facilitate dialogue and communication between the various Somali parties, movements and factions in order to help keep lines of communication open between them and to promote confidence-building measures so essential to the success of the efforts deployed for national reconciliation.

II. THE FUTURE MANDATE OF UNOSOM AND THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSITION TO CONTINUED PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

The present mandate

13. Operative paragraph 1 of resolution 794 (1992) encapsulates the mandate which the Security Council has entrusted to the Secretary-General since it adopted resolution 733 on 23 January 1992. This mandate has been to help the parties

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establish and maintain a cease-fire, to distribute humanitarian relief and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement. In resolution 751 of 24 April 1992 the Council took the further step of agreeing in principle to establish a security force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu. In resolution 775 of 28 August 1992 the Council decided to extend this mandate to cover other areas in Somalia. It was to be implemented, as originally stipulated in operative paragraph 5 of resolution 751 (1992), in consultation with the parties concerned. In practice fulfilment of this condition proved to be impossible. The agreement of "the parties" could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations forces in areas where the protection of humanitarian operations was most desperately needed; when agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in Mogadishu was agreed was not large enough to control the increasingly violent and lawless situation in that city.

14. The Council finally adopted resolution 794 (1992) in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In the same resolution the Council stated the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable it to take the necessary

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decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

15. The present position is thus that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, has entrusted to certain Member States, on a temporary basis, the responsibility of creating a secure environment for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is the wish of the Security Council that the transition back to peace-keeping operations should be achieved promptly. It is therefore of great importance that the conditions for such a transition should be achieved as soon as possible, and I have already laid emphasis on these conditions,

Recognising the need for an interim period where an expanded Chapter VII mandate would be required as outlined in para. 19.

The conditions for (transition) *from Chapt 7 -> 6 U.N. at*

Resuming Chapter VII mandate

16. The first condition is that the Unified Task Force, ^{and subsequently} should ^{UP} take effective action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed before the Unified Task Force withdraws. This condition has not yet been completely met in UNITAF area of responsibility.

17. The second, and equally essential, condition is that the authority entrusted to the international community should be exercised throughout Somalia. Operative paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992) imposes no geographical limitation, other

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than "in Somalia", on the mandate it confers. This condition has not yet been met.

18. A third, if somewhat longer-term, factor is the need to create a new, professional police force. I am studying how this might be done, both politically and technically. A team of three experts is presently assessing the situation in Somalia. The terms of reference of this team are detailed in this report.

The new mandate

19. The Council will now have to consider whether it is in a position to authorize an enlargement or a redefinition of the UNOSOM mandate to include peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. As pointed out in my previous report the consequences of such a decision will be far reaching for both political and logistical reasons, not to forget the financial commitments involved. I find that the views which I have conveyed to you during the last two months are still current and valid: without improved security the political process cannot prosper. I have, therefore, devoted a great deal of my efforts to secure that parallel steps are taken, cease-fire and reconciliation mechanisms, disarmament and creation of a civilian police force, rehabilitation alongside political dialogue. I have insisted with all the factions and elders that it is up to them to change the course of violence toward peace, that the

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international community stands ready to support such efforts in this direction. Ultimately, however, the conviction and will to reconcile must come from the Somalis themselves.

20. My view remains that the mandate of UNOSOM, to include peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter, must cover the whole territory of Somalia and must include the following tasks,

(a) to monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed, particularly the Addis-Ababa Agreement of January 1993.

(b) to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against a faction which violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities;

(c) to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly-constituted national army;

(d) to secure or maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for delivery of humanitarian assistance;

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- (e) to protect, as required, personnel, installations and equipments of United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements which attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;
- (f) to continue a programme for demining in the most afflicted areas;
- (g) to provide, as requested, advice on, and technical assistance to, the formation of a police force;
- (h) to provide assistance, as required to support efforts to inform and educate the populace;
- (i) to assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;
- (j) to carry out such other functions as may be authorized by the Security Council.

Cease-fire disarmament concept

21. Utilizing the Addis-Ababa Agreement as a guideline and the scheduled conference on 15 March 1993 as a target date, a

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All bandits are subject to having their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

(c) The cease-fire and disarmament will be conducted by Somalis. It is a Somali solution and will restore some pride amongst the Somalis that they are solving their own problems.

(d) UNOSOM will assist the Somalis in the disarmament process.

23. A cantonment is defined as a place where only heavy weapons, which include all crew served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, are to be stored. It is the intent to designate cantonment sites in the vicinity of current force locations.

(a) I recommend that a committee composed of United Nation and factional representatives mutually determine these heavy weapons which would be an asset to a new Somali national army. Those weapons would be retained and secured in cantonments. Those weapons which were mutually decided upon that could not be supported or maintained would be destroyed immediately.

(b) All heavy weapons are to be delivered to the cantonment sites by each respective faction.

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(c) All heavy weapons must be turned in prior to factional forces moving to transition sites.

(d) Due to logistical constraints, all unserviceable and inoperable heavy weapons will be destroyed on site.

(e) All heavy weapons which are not delivered as required by a specified deadline will be declared illegal and subject to immediate seizure and destruction.

(f) Cantonment sites will be separated from transition sites to prevent any temptation by factions or groups to reclaim or seize the heavy weapons located there.

(g) Cantonment site security will be the responsibility of the United Nations.

(h) In order to support stabilization of the weapon situation in Somalia, the United Nations will continue to enforce its ban on the introduction of weapons into Somalia.

24. A transition site is a location where the factional forces will temporarily reside in order to turn in their small arms, register for future governmental and non-governmental support and potentially receive some retraining or information for reentering the civilian community. Transition site locations will be

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recommended to the United Nations by factions and the United Nations will select the final site locations. Some guidelines which will be used in selecting and developing transition sites are:

(a) Factions are to provide recommended transition sites to UNOSOM no later than 22 February 1993.

(b) Recommended transition sites are to be:

1. Located near a water source and outside of cities or towns.
2. Separate from centerment sites and each other
3. Accessible for verification
4. Self-secured in that the inhabitants of each transition site will be allowed to retain a limited number of small arms for their own security force.
5. Of temporary nature providing the minimum of food, water and medical support while encouraging its inhabitants to locate and pursue a different profession.

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c. Each faction will attempt to transport its forces to transition sites, however, the United Nations will provide limited transportation in specially requested circumstances.

d. The occupation of transitions sites within the same region/geographical area will be conducted simultaneously. This action will provide a sense of security for all participants knowing that rival factions are performing the same action.

Military concept of operations

25. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate has to be substantial in the early stage, in order to minimise the risk of any deterioration in the security established by the Unified Task Force and to ensure a secured environment, as quickly as possible in those areas not covered by UNITAF. It should be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new police force becomes operational.

26. Based on information obtained from UNOSOM and UNITAF commanders, my recommendation is that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of about 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and additional personnel to conduct the logistic support required.

27. This force includes:

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- (a) a Force Headquarters;
- (b) five Brigades;
- (c) a logistic support Group.

28. The logistic support group will be, in the first phase, provided mainly by the US logistic command from UNITAF, until UNOSOM can establish its capabilities to support by organic forces and by contract. All formed military units must have an integral first line and second line support in all respects.

29. The combat forces must have the following capabilities:

- (a) Patrolling and close-combat
- (b) Information gathering and interpretation
- (c) Indirect fire
- (d) Anti-armour fire
- (e) All weather night and day operations
- (f) Casualty evacuation
- (g) Tactical communications
- (h) Air support (fire power and transport).

30. The UNOSOM Force Commander will report directly to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. There will be areas of operations allocated to brigade commanders who will report directly to the UNOSOM Force Commander. These commanders will be responsible for conducting military operations and assisting in

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the implementation of the terms of cease-fire/disarmament agreements in their respective areas of operations.

31. UNOSOM military operations will be conducted in four phases: Phase I - Transition from UNITAF, Phase II - Expansion of Security, Phase III - Transfer to civilian institutions; Phase IV - Redeployment. These phases are not meant to be applied rigidly or uniformly throughout Somalia, but merely describe a general sequence. For example, some areas may primarily be conducting Phase III operations while in another area the military forces are conducting Phase I or II operations. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase will be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programs. The Force Commander will shift forces within country to meet these changing requirements.

(a) Phase I. During this phase security operations will transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM.

1. Operations will continue to focus on providing expanded security for the major population centers and those areas necessary to ensure the continued flow of humanitarian relief as well as monitoring the terms of the Addis-Ababa agreement. Disarmament measures will focus on controlling heavy or crew-served weapons, weapons belonging to factions, and removing all weapons

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from areas essential to the humanitarian relief effort. The transition will be a sequential transfer of responsibility for relatively secure areas from UNITAF control to UNOSOM control.

2. Prior to the formal assumption of operational responsibility from UNITAF, by the UNOSOM Force Commander, there are a few broad activities which must be concluded. We have already begun to expand Force Headquarters and will continue to do so until it is operationally capable. Concurrently, UNITAF will be invited to ensure that subordinate elements remaining under UNOSOM are structured with appropriate command and control arrangements, conducive to an effective handover. I will ask the United States Government to consider forming the tactical quick reaction force that will support UNOSOM during this phase.

3. When jointly agreed to and recommended by Commander UNITAF and UNOSOM Force Commander, I will approve the assumption of operational responsibility over the designated element. Upon being responsible for a preponderance of the forces in place, the UNOSOM Force Commander would also assume responsibility for logistic support forces previously controlled by UNITAF. In this phase too, the United States tactical

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quick reaction force would be placed in support of the UNOSOM Force Commander.

4. When the UNOSOM Force Commander has assumed complete operational responsibility, UNITAF forces may redeploy at the discretion of their government and under the protection of UNOSOM troops.

5. This phase will be complete when all UNITAF forces participating in UNOSOM are placed under operational control of UNOSOM Force Commander.

(b) During Phase II the focus will be on assisting for the maintenance of security in those areas already under the control of UNOSOM forces and expanding these secure areas to areas not currently secured by UNITAF forces.

1. With the most urgent need of stopping large scale starvation, UNOSOM forces can concentrate on reducing the level of lawlessness and violence so that conditions can be created which will foster the development of Somali institutions. Close coordination with civilian components of UNOSOM and other rehabilitation efforts are vital in this phase. Supporting the provision of security for the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons will

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also assume more importance in Phase II. Wide-scale disarmament measures will be implemented during this phase to reduce the threat to citizens and to enhance the ability of the police forces to deal with acts of lawlessness.

2. A major effort will be made during this phase to expand military operations to Northern Somalia. The first goal will be to provide a base of operations for expanding south to link up with sectors that were transferred from UNITAF to UNOSOM control. The focus in the north will be on disarming and demining as necessary to maintain or restore a peaceful environment, and supporting the humanitarian assistance in areas that have not been explored.

3. Phase II will be complete when a significant UNOSOM presence is established in all sectors, the heavy weapons of all major factions are under control, and Somali police forces in the major cities and towns are organized and training has begun.

(c) Phase III military operations will focus on assisting in the transfer of responsibility to Somali institutions. Military forces will be working in support of nation-building efforts to provide security and assistance where required. The

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responsibility for managing major aspects of the infrastructure will shift from military to civilian control with oversight responsibility within UNOSOM also shifting to the civilian side. Major efforts to resettle refugees and displaced persons to secure areas will occur in this phase as the focus shifts from humanitarian assistance to self-sufficiency. This phase will be complete when Somali civilian institutions have assumed responsibility for security and infrastructure management in all major cities and towns.

(d) During Phase IV military force can begin to redeploy as responsibility for security is shifted to police forces and vital infrastructure elements become operational. This phase will be complete when all UNOSOM forces redeploy.

Rules of engagement

32. The rules of engagement, based on Chapter VII of the Charter, will be proposed by the UNOSOM Force commander. They will be guidance to commanders authorizing them to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to fulfil the mandate.

Demining

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13. The demining problems facing Somalia have not yet been seriously addressed. According to a report issued by Physicians for Human Rights, much of northern Somalia remains contaminated by mines. Most of the mines lie scattered across pastoral lands or hidden near wells or water holes. Others have been laid on secondary roads or in former military installations. They are considered to be more prevalent in the countryside surrounding two of Somalia's principal cities, Hargeisa and Burao, and in the pastoral and agricultural lands west of Burao. Now that the war has ended, the victims of the mines have been mainly civilians, of whom many are women and children.

14. No estimate has been made of the total number of mines laid, but some relief agencies pretend that many hundreds of thousands may still be in the ground. Some of these are in minefields, but many have been used as weapons of terror for denying access to homes, villages and water. There are an estimated 1,200km of roads to be demined in the Hargeisa area alone.

15. Some limited mine clearance has been undertaken by the SNM when they re-occupied northern Somalia, but out of their team of 60, some 404 became mine casualties. A UK company, RIMPAC, have been operating under contract from Médacins sans Frontières and UNHCR. They claim to have lifted some 25,000 mines in the Hargeisa area, and allowed the repopulation of the town. This has probably only scratched the surface of the problem.

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36. The military component of UNOSOM will probably have little requirement for minefield clearance, although some clearance effort will be needed if any logistic base is set up in the Hargeisa region, because the airport area is still mined. There may well be a requirement for route clearance, and mines may be used in a harassing role by any of the current factions fighting in Somalia. Vehicles will need to be fitted with precautionary sand-bagging or purpose-built mine blast protection in footwells or under passenger seating. Engineer units will have to be briefed on the types of mines likely to be found, and the procedures for their removal or destruction.
37. The humanitarian relief efforts will be more severely hampered, especially when they spread into the northern areas. The humanitarian problems will become acute when large-scale attempts are made to rehabilitate the land and re-establish the rural economy. Much of the grazing land used by nomadic tribesmen will be unusable, and villages for returning refugees will require complete cleansing before they can be restored to use.
38. Political life could well be severely hampered by the inability of electoral teams to reach major areas of Somalia due to route mining. It has been found in Cambodia and Mozambique that the effect of mines on the establishment of political life

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has been radically under-estimated in the political programme and the funding allocated for that programme.

39. It will be therefore necessary to establish a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines in Somalia. As a start, the UN Demining Expert should visit the country, to establish the extent of the problem. Following his visit, a mineclearing plan should be drawn up, using the models at present in use or being built up in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The main components of the plan will include a proper minefield survey, and extended contract mine clearance. If it becomes clear that the mines number millions rather than thousands, a mine clearance training facility will have to be established, and a force of Somali mine clearers will have to be trained up to undertake the major part of the mine clearance task, in a plan lasting years rather than months.

40. In a separate programme, a mine awareness programme will have to be established among refugees and displaced persons, and known mined areas will have to be fenced or marked off to prevent nomadic tribesmen from using mined areas for grazing.

Somali Police force

41. I had indicated in my previous reports to the Council (paragraph 30 of my report of 19 December 1992, S/24992, and

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paragraph 23 of my report of 26 January 1993, S/25168) that I considered the establishment of a Somali police force as a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia. With that in mind, I had decided to send an expert team which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, would prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia.

42. I wish to inform the Council that the expert team is currently in Somalia. The team has been requested to study the feasibility of establishing such a national police force, make recommendations and develop a strategy for implementation.

43. The expert team has also been requested to outline the appropriate modalities for training Somali personnel in the maintenance of law-and-order as well as the discharge of police responsibilities while adhering to internationally accepted principles and practices for the protection of human rights.

44. As mentioned in my report of 26 January 1993, paragraph 23, UNITAF, under its supervision and in close consultation with my Special Representative, has now constituted an auxiliary force composed of former police officers. This auxiliary force will oversee, on a temporary arrangement, the road traffic control and undertake the protection of feeding centres relieving United Nations agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations from the

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dependency on locally hired guards and freeing UNOSOM soldiers for more demanding and urgent tasks. I have requested the expert team to study the arrangements established for the auxiliary force with the view to eventually integrating some of its elements into a new civilian police force.

45. Bearing the above in mind, I consider it a matter of expediency to include a civilian police component in the future UNOSOM, but would hesitate to make any specific recommendations at this time pending the receipt of the expert team's recommendations. I will therefore bring to the attention of the Council a more detailed assessment on the establishment of a civilian police force in Somalia by the end of February.

Cantonment of troops

46. In my report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I informed the Council of the agreements reached at the Informal Preparatory Meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity held in Addis Ababa on 4-15 January 1993. (The humanitarian aspects of these agreements are discussed under chapter ...)

47. Annex III of this report, Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament, concluded that it would enter into force on 15 January 1993. Paragraph 1.2 stipulates that the militias of all political movements shall be

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encamped and disarmed simultaneously throughout Somalia and that the international community "will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep". Paragraph 1.3 requires that the future of the encamped militias shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia.

48. My staff and I have discussed this matter with UNITAF, particularly in regard to the transitional arrangements. Both UNITAF and my staff see specific problems arising in the cantonment of militias for an indeterminate number of months, especially when it has been impossible to quantify the total number of militias as different from irregular gangs. From an administrative point of view, cantonment of personnel would impose an additional logistic burden on an already complex operational structure. Our purpose should be to move away from fostering a dependency encampment situation which would not be conducive to a stable and rapid integration into nation building activities.

49. The prospects of offering material or financial incentives for disarmament is, in my opinion and that of my staff, a more suitable option for demobilized militias and UNOSOM, when correlated with cease-fire monitoring nationally. I have included this option within the draft budget for UNOSOM.

Public information programme for UNOSOM

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50. The extraordinary circumstances under which the United Nations will reenter Somalia require an intensive and expanded information campaign. Transitional arrangements from UNITAF to UNOSOM will have to be conveyed to the general public. The new mandate under which UNOSOM will be operating must be translated in vernacular languages and broadcast at large. In addition and as the political climate changes new information inputs will have to be designed in order to support every aspect of the operation and stimulate a stable social climate. It is also my intension to use public information activities in Somalia as an educational tool to strengthen the peace process, human rights and overall productive economic integration.

51. The information component in UNOSOM will absorb themes developed on a day by day basis from the different highlights of the United Nations presence in Somalia such as transitional arrangements, cease-fire observances, disarmament, demobilization of armed groups, training of civilian police, refugee resettlement, safety, health (with an angle on consumption of psychotropic substances), hygiene, just to mention the most important. The collaboration of United Nations specialized agencies and Programmes will be sought in the elaboration of some of these broadcast elements.

52. The United Nations Department of Public Information has secured an agreement with radio Cairo as of 15 January 1993, by

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which Radio Cairo's External Services network translates and broadcasts into Somalia United Nations produced material. This arrangement is expected to be in place for approximately three months, after which time the United Nations will be in a position to evaluate the service in light of internal developments and the evolving requirements of UNOSOM information programme. In the meantime the United Nations is considering a proposal for UNOSOM to assume responsibility for the operation of a daily newspaper and a radio station which are currently managed by the United States under UNITAF.

III. OBSERVATIONS

General

53. I urge all the Somali movements to do their utmost to honour the agreement they have reached to convene a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 18 March 1993. The United Nations, in cooperation with the regional organisations, will continue to support their efforts and to provide the necessary assistance to facilitate the convening of the conference.

54. There must be a smooth transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM without any hiatus which could be exploited by factions or gangs to compromise the secure environment created by

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the Unified Task Force. UNOSOM will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over instantly from the Unified Task Force in each area from which it withdraws. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area, without creating a void or a break in the secure environment, and when adequate troops, command and control and logistics are available to UNOSOM in a given area.

Military concept

55. A number of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have expressed a willingness for their contingents to serve eventually in UNOSOM. I will present recommendations to the Security Council on the national composition of the new UNOSOM as soon as the offers have been confirmed and it is possible to determine the detailed requirements. In formulating such recommendations I shall take into account the established criteria which the Security Council has endorsed in the past, including the necessary regional and political balance, military capacity and previous peace-keeping experience. Subject to these criteria, it will be my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in the new UNOSOM as many contingents as possible which will already be in Somalia serving under the command of the Unified Task Force. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments'

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concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of the Unified Task Force to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to in the preceding paragraph.

56. Any resources required by the new UNOSOM, which cannot be made available from units already serving with the Unified Task Force, will need to be deployed to Somalia in good time for the planned transition. It is my understanding that the bulk of the logistic support for UNOSOM will initially be provided by UNITAF. I have requested the United States authorities to keep logistic units in Somalia in support of UNOSOM for some while after the main body of their troops has been withdrawn. I intend to extend similar invitations to other major contributors.

Training unit in Somalia

57. The experiences from a number of peace-keeping operations indicate that incoming contingents need to have additional training in order to obtain a common level and a standardization of the operational technique as well as personal code of conduct. Since the units rotate every six months the need will remain. Once in situ the units have to be constantly in shape and well prepared to meet the various operational demands that might occur.

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58. However, since the Somalia operation also includes considerable elements of civilians, Newly recruited and recently arrived staff must be briefed and familiarized with the objectives and the task of the mission as well as the environment in which they have to execute their functions. For both the military units, military observers, election monitors and other civilian components involved in the operation this training has to be prepared in order to ensure the effectiveness in every stage of the operation.

59. A civilian and military training unit integrated in HQs should be able to provide necessary training and adequate planning. It should consist of a head (Chief Training Section), military and civilian training officers and a support staff. The Section will design programmes, after a need assessment, train trainers and make the necessary evaluation related of already executed programmes.

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