

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Somalia Core Group [3]				
Staff Office-Individual: Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard				
Original OA/ID Number: 2986				
Row: 49	Section: 3	Shelf: 10	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Ceasefire Committee Meets in Mogadishu (1 page)	02/16/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Request for Embassy Feedback and Recommendations on UNITAF - UNOSOM II Transition (2 pages)	02/17/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Pakistan and UNITAF-UNOSOM Transition (2 pages)	02/16/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Requests for Embassy Feedback and Recommendations on UNITAF - UNOSOM II Transition (1 page)	02/16/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Your Question About Somalia (1 page)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	Re: The Making of a Deal (2 pages)	09/17/1993	P1/b(1)
006. email	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger and Kristien Cicio, re: Draft Somalia PC Paper (4 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
007. email	Richard Clarke to James Reed, re: CLAM: Somalia (2 pages)	09/14/1993	P1/b(1)
008. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re: Somalia: Next Steps (2 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)
009. report	Re: [Somalia] (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Annex IIThe General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 4 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia, would like to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has facilitated this meeting in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa.

We also thank the Government and people of Ethiopia, and H.E. Meles Zenawi, President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, for hosting the Meeting and for his personal engagement in assisting our efforts to reach the following agreement.

We, the Somali participants, further express our deep appreciation for the concern of the international community for the humanitarian crisis in our country and recognize their wish for us to reach a peaceful solution to our country's severe problems.

After discussing our problems and considering all options, we have agreed on the following points:

1. The convening of a National Reconciliation Conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993;
2. The declaration of an immediate and binding cease-fire in all parts of the country under the control of the concerned warring factions, subject to paragraph (a) below;
3. The immediate cessation of all hostile propaganda against each other and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and peace;
4. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, will be responsible for the logistical preparations of the National Reconciliation Conference;
5. The establishment of further mechanisms for the continuation of free dialogue amongst all political factions and leaders in Somalia in preparation for the National Reconciliation Conference;
6. To continue and enhance our full and unrestrained cooperation with all international organizations working inside and outside Somalia to distribute humanitarian relief to our people;

7. To commit ourselves, without reservation, to facilitating the free movement of Somali people throughout the entire country as a measure of confidence-building before the National Reconciliation Conference.

This agreement shall be valid upon completion and adoption by consensus on the following three points, and a separate communiqué will be issued before leaving Addis Ababa.

- a. The establishment of the modalities for implementing the cease-fire amongst all warring parties and the creation of a mechanism for disarmament;
- b. The agenda of the National Reconciliation Conference;
- c. The criteria for participation in the National Reconciliation Conference.

This agreement, signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993, shall be considered binding on all the undersigned parties henceforth and all signatories shall be obliged to secure the support and implementation of this agreement amongst their movements and followers.

Annex III

Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities
of disarmament

(Supplement to the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa
on 8 January 1993)

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Having agreed on the need for a viable and verifiable cease-fire to promote the peace process in Somalia;

Recognizing that such cease-fire is intricately linked to questions of disarmament;

Further recognizing that disarmament cannot be accomplished in a single event but through a sustained process;

Hereby agree on the following:

I. Disarmament

- 1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such time as a legitimate Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and be completed in March 1993.
- 1.2 The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in appropriate areas outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon as possible. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.
- 1.3 The future status of the encamped militia shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible demobilization.
- 1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.

II. Cease-fire monitoring group

2.1 A cease-fire monitoring group comprising UNITAF/United Nations troops shall be established immediately. There shall also be a committee composed of representatives of the warring factions to interlocate with the monitoring group and observe the implementation of the agreement by UNITAF/United Nations troops.

III. All sides agree in principle that properties unlawfully taken during the fighting shall be returned to the lawful owners. This shall be implemented as and when the situation allows.

IV. All POWs shall be freed and handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross and/or UNITAF. This process shall commence immediately and be completed by 1 March 1993.

The present agreement shall enter into effect on 15 January 1993.

Annex IV

Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee, signed
in Addis Ababa, on 15 January 1993

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Determined to continue our efforts to resolve all pending issues from the Informal Preparatory Meeting, in particular, the question of criteria for participation at and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference scheduled to begin on 15 March 1993;

Further determined to ensure the immediate implementation of all agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting;

1. Hereby decide to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to continue the discussion aimed at resolving the question of criteria for participation and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference, as well as any other issues pending from the Informal Preparatory Meeting;
2. The Ad Hoc Committee, whose sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for continuing the search for a solution to outstanding issues, shall work in consultation with all Somali political movements;
3. The Ad Hoc Committee shall hold its first meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 22 January 1993;
4. The Ad Hoc Committee shall submit its recommendations on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference and on other outstanding issues to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993;
5. The following facilities, to be utilized solely for the purpose of carrying out the mandate set out in the present agreement, shall be placed at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee: an office in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to facilitate consultations with the United Nations and the relevant regional and subregional organizations, as well as telecommunication and transportation facilities;
6. The Ad Hoc Committee shall be composed of seven members at any one time with two coming from the SNA and five from the other political movements. The SNA shall have the right to rotate its participants at every session of the Ad Hoc Committee if it so wishes;
7. Notwithstanding the pending status of the agenda and the issue of criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference, the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 shall enter into force with immediate effect.

Distr.
GENERAL

S/ DRAFT

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Further Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance
of operative paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 (1992)
(UNOSOM)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of operative paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 of 3 December 1992 in which the Security Council:

"Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of

this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;"

2. Part I of this report contains a factual description of the further action taken since my report of 26 January 1993 to implement resolution 794 (1992). Humanitarian activities are covered in Part II, political reconciliation in Part III, establishment of a Somali police force in Part IV, public information activities in Part V. Part VI sets out my current thinking on the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to what will become UNOSOM II. Financial aspects are covered in Part VII and my observations in Part VIII.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

(From 26 January 1993 to 28 February 1993)

3. The specific terms of reference entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concern:

- A. the operations and further deployment of UNOSOM
(operative paragraph 6);
- B. implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations
(operative paragraph 10);

- C. the establishment of mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and UNITAF (operative paragraph 13), including the attachment of UNOSOM liaison staff to the headquarters of UNITAF (operative paragraph 15);
- D. continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (operative paragraph 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

A. The Operations of UNOSOM

4. In my report of 26 January 1993 to the Security Council I indicated that a major preoccupation for UNOSOM at that juncture was the planning for the transitional arrangements of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning included present plans for deployment of troops to Northern Somalia, proposals for demining, creation of a Somali police force and gradual strengthening of the UNOSOM headquarters military component.

5. The military component of UNOSOM currently has a strength of 715 all ranks, composed mainly of an infantry battalion of 500 all ranks, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements and a small headquarters company and staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia, which

had been authorized under resolution 775 of 28 August 1992, was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, I am continuing to strengthen UNOSOM headquarters. I have also appointed a Force Commander who will manage the transition process and command UNOSOM II when it is established.

B. Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

6. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 794 UNITAF has deployed approximately 37,000 troops in Southern and Central Somalia. No troops have been deployed in the North and in border areas. The overall security situation in the sectors under the control of UNITAF has slowly improved, although incidents of violence continue to occur in the major population centers and in some rural areas. The UNITAF Commander has declared that "all areas are stable or relatively stable". However, UNITAF forces have continued to be the target of sniper fire and harassment, and, especially in recent weeks, major incidents of resumed fighting or rioting have been reported from Kismayo and Mogadishu. While most major clans and factions have welcomed the UNITAF deployment and have cooperated, the positions of some of the faction leaders have not always remained consistent. UNITAF's presence in key areas of the country has reduced the influence of those whose power was based on their heavy weapons. A number of disarmament forays have been carried out on a limited

scale, both in Mogadishu and in other locations within the designated sectors. It should be noted that the area under UNITAF control only comprises 40% of the country's territory. No systematic attempt has been made to establish a secure environment outside this area.

C. Mechanisms for coordination

7. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

a. At United Nations headquarters:

(1) a policy group on Somalia is chaired by the Secretary-General and meets regularly with senior representatives of the United States Government. It reviews the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding, and planning for the future role of UNOSOM;

(2) an operational task force (chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations) comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned, and representatives of the United States meets weekly;

(3) a liaison team composed of United States officers has been attached to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations since early January;

(4) a UNOSOM planning team is now in place in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

b. At UNOSOM headquarters, Mogadishu, the UNOSOM Force Commander and the Commander of UNITAF are working closely in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two Forces. Much of the detailed planning of the transition will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose. A UNOSOM liaison staff has been working with UNITAF headquarters.

8. Several of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have asked to be consulted on the current operations of the Force and progress on planning for the transition. I have initiated regular meetings to which all States participating in the Force are invited.

D. Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

9. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cessation of hostilities and the observance of the cease-fire as well as the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people

of Somalia, I have, in accordance with the mandate given to me by the Security Council, continued to promote efforts for national reconciliation and unity in the country, in cooperation with regional organizations, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

10. In my last report (S/25168), I informed the Security Council about the outcome of the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Somalia which I convened at United Nations headquarters in Addis Ababa (4 to 15 January 1993). I noted in particular that the following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting:

- a. General Agreement of 8 January 1993;
- b. Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and modalities of disarmament (Supplement to General Agreement); and
- c. Agreement on the establishment of an Ad-hoc Committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference as well as other issues pending from the informal meeting.

11. I also reported that as stipulated in the latter Agreement, the first meeting of the Ad-hoc Committee was scheduled to be

held in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 to submit recommendations to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993 on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference. Regrettably, the Committee was unable to meet because the Somali National Alliance (SNA) refused to participate alleging that the Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) had violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking its forces in and around Kismayo.

12. A further meeting of the Ad-hoc Committee, scheduled for the beginning of February in Mogadishu, could not be convened because of the position taken by SNA that its representatives would not attend as long as SNF and SPM forces continued to violate the cease-fire around Kismayo. As a result, the broad agreement reached in consultation with the individual Committee members on the agenda, the rules of procedures and the list of international observers to be invited to the Conference could not be formally endorsed by the Committee.

13. Subsequent consultations with the SNA on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference have helped clear the way for convening a formal meeting of the Ad-hoc Committee. SNA has agreed not to insist on the exclusion of the smaller parties from participation at the Conference. It was also agreed that the participants should include politicians,

community leaders, women and military representatives of the warring parties.

14. The only aspect of participation which has yet to be resolved is the size of the respective delegations of the parties. The parties have requested the United Nations to devise a formula for a fair allocation of delegates to each party.

15. Following these encouraging developments, my Special Representative issued invitations to the parties to attend a formal meeting of the Ad-hoc Committee in Mogadishu. The Committee held its first formal meeting on 23 February 1993 and completed its work when it resumed its meeting on 27 February following three days of interruption due to rioting and fighting in Mogadishu (24 to 26 February). All Committee members, except the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), were represented at the meeting. In addition to the United Nations, representatives of the Horn of Africa Committee and of the Non-Aligned Movement were also present at the meeting.

16. On the first day of the meeting, the Committee adopted a report on participation, the draft agenda and on procedures for reaching decisions. When the meeting resumed on 27 February, the SNA submitted written reservations notably on the criteria for participation. The Committee agreed to circulate immediately its report to all political movements since time constraints would

not allow the reconvening of the informal preparatory meeting of the whole to which it was expected to submit its report.

17. The progress achieved by the Committee has cleared the way for proceeding with arrangements for a meeting on national reconciliation. It is my intention to invite a broad cross-section of Somalis, representing political movements, community, religious and women's groups, civic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as elders and eminent persons to a Conference on National Reconciliation, to be held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 19 March 1993. The categories of participants have been agreed to by the Ad-hoc Committee. In addition to national reconciliation, the meeting will also consider organizational matters.

18. I have stressed that my efforts and those of my Special Representative will continue to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia in accordance with the mandate given to me by the Security Council. UNOSOM will therefore continue to promote and facilitate dialogue and communication between the various Somali parties, movements and factions in order to help keep lines of communication open between them and to promote confidence-building measures so essential to the success of the efforts deployed for national reconciliation.

II. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

19. As mentioned in my progress report of 26 January 1993, the deployment of UNITAF forces has facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia at a quickly increased rate. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation has fallen dramatically in many areas.

20. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is bound to be affected by the security situation, which has tended to vary at times from week to week and from region to region, even though during the early period of the deployment of UNITAF, the security situation had improved. Many of the "technical" vehicles were reported to have been withdrawn or placed in cantonment, and large-scale looting decreased substantially. Commercial and market activities appeared to be picking up and some schools were reopened. Agricultural activities have been on the increase. However, in recent weeks the security situation had deteriorated.

21. As of the writing of this report, the situation in many parts of the country remains complex and tense. Especially in rural areas and along Somalia's borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, security conditions remain unstable. The murders in January and February 1993 of UNICEF, ICRC and other relief workers highlight the extreme fragility of the security situation in spite of the

presence of large numbers of military forces. This also highlights again the importance of a secure environment for the effective delivery of emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance.

22. It is in this context that the United Nations, in close cooperation with relevant organizations of the United Nations system and international NGOs as well as Somali representatives, is in the process of preparing a relief and rehabilitation programme for 1993.

23. The needs of Somalia are immense and urgent. In the South and Central parts of the country, large numbers of people remain destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. Measles, diarrhea and other infections continue to take a heavy toll, particularly on small children. Lack of access to clean water sources and poor sanitation present major health threats. With the present security arrangements enabling areas hitherto inaccessible to be reached, some for the first time in many months, it has been confirmed that increased and expanded emergency programmes will be needed through most - if not all - of 1993.

24. It has become apparent that a substantial portion of Somalis are ready to rebuild their lives and their society. The first steps towards recovery and normalcy must be rapidly and

judiciously supported to prevent further social and economic deterioration or a lapse into a new cycle of internecine killing and brutality.

25. Two major challenges in 1993 will be to facilitate the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees, according to figures provided by UNHCR, and internally displaced persons as well as providing jobs and work for the many millions of Somalis who are presently unemployed. Among these groups are the many thousands of crews of "technicals", armed gangs, militias and private armies of the various factions. While channeling these people into lawful pursuits may be difficult, creation of work through large-scale labour forces carrying out activities such as road repairs, canal clearing and sanitation, is essential if Somalia is ever to become stable. Alongside such endeavours, vocational training programmes and adult literacy courses must also be explored.

26. As regards refugees and displaced persons, some have already spontaneously returned to their home areas in recent months. These groups will need assistance to return to agricultural and/or livestock pursuits. However, many refugees and displaced people have indicated they are not yet willing to return home because of uncertain security in their areas of origin. These groups require continued relief assistance. For others who have

lost their homes and their land, or where other families now occupy these areas, new alternative sites must be found. Given the current situation on the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya and political pressures for the Somali refugees to return to their own country, it is also imperative that contingency plans and stocks of household goods, food and other commodities are in hand to cope with sudden mass influxes back to Somalia.

27. A third major challenge concerns national capacity building. National and regional Somali institutions and civil administration have virtually ceased to exist. Nonetheless there remains considerable institutional memory and expertise on the part of former civil servants and local leaders. Programmes planned in 1993 must utilise these resources to the fullest extent possible, particularly in the consultative process of project identification and subsequent implementation. Somali women have assumed a stronger economic and political role as a result of civil strife. This trend will be encouraged in 1993 through the close involvement of Somali women's groups in both the planning and delivery of assistance.

28. Countrywide, Somalis are calling for assistance in reestablishing education facilities. Most youngsters have no access to schools and the education of former students in the 15-25 age group has been totally disrupted. For want of

alternatives, many of them have joined the bands of armed gangs roaming the streets and the countryside. The reopening of schools countrywide will be of vital importance to the process of returning to peace and stability.

29. The 100-Day Accelerated and Expanded Programme of Assistance for Somalia, which ended on 19 January 1993, was launched at the height of the crisis in 1992 at a time when the focus was rightly on saving lives. At the Addis Ababa Followup Conference on the 100-Day Programme in early December 1992, participants agreed that efforts in 1993 should focus on beginning to return Somalia to normalcy. While the present relief and recovery programme for 1993 recognises the need for continued large-scale relief assistance, it has been designed to go beyond the ongoing relief effort to pave the way for large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction.

30. The cost of restoring Somalia as a nation and society will be enormous. It will take many years even to reach pre-war levels. As prospects for peace and stability improve, the international community will undoubtedly be called upon to assist the people of Somalia in supporting long-term national reconstruction and development. In the interim, much can be done immediately through the joint efforts of the international community and the Somali people. A main objective of the 1993

Programme is thus to set the stage for such initiatives by enhancing the absorptive capacity of Somalia's human and institutional resources.

31. Underlying the programming process is a sectoral core group structure to assess needs and devise projects for the 1993 Programme. Ten core groups, comprising representatives of local and international NGOs, Somali organisations, donor governments, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and United Nations agencies, have been formed to cover the following priority sectors: health, water, food, security, nutrition, sanitation, employment, administrative rehabilitation, police forces, agriculture and livestock. These core groups will serve as the focal points for sectoral monitoring and reviews, leading to periodic updates. Simultaneously with this process, regional input was sought through the established relief communities in the nine regional centres in the South and Central parts of the country. Inputs from the Northeast and the Northwest, primarily for rehabilitation, are put together through the UNOSOM regional offices in those areas. Their inputs have also been reflected in this document.

32. A United Nations conference on humanitarian assistance for Somalia will be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the relief and rehabilitation programme and receive pledges from

donors. The active involvement of a wide spectrum of Somalis is indispensable to the effective implementation of the programme. Every effort will therefore be made to achieve broad Somali participation in the conference. A positive outcome of the humanitarian conference could provide added incentives for the national reconciliation process.

33. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the programme, particularly the coordination of relief efforts and the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be provided in the context of UNOSOM II with the necessary support in order to enable him to discharge his responsibilities.

Demining

34. The demining problems facing Somalia have not yet been seriously addressed. According to a report issued by Physicians for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization, much of northern Somalia remains contaminated by mines. Most of the mines lie scattered across pastoral lands or hidden near wells or water holes. Others have been laid on secondary roads or in former military installations. They are considered to be more prevalent in the countryside surrounding two of Somalia's principal cities, Hargeisa and Burao, and in the pastoral and

agricultural lands west of Burao. The victims of the mines have been mainly civilians, of whom many are women and children.

35. No estimate has been made of the total number of mines laid, but some relief agencies have reported that many hundreds of thousands may still be in the ground. Some of these are in minefields, but many have been used as weapons of terror for denying access to homes, villages and water. There are an estimated 1,200 km of roads to be demined in the Hargeisa area alone.

36. Some limited mine clearance has been undertaken by the SNM when they re-occupied northern Somalia, but out of their team of 60, some 40% became mine casualties. A United Kingdom company, RIMFIRE, has been operating under contract from Médecins sans Frontières and UNHCR. It is reported that it has lifted some 25,000 mines in the Hargeisa area, and enabled the repopulation of the town. This has probably only scratched the surface of the problem.

37. The UNOSOM military component will not have clearance of minefield as a mission objective although some clearance effort will be needed if any logistic base is set up in the Hargeisa region, because the airport area is still mined. There may well

be a requirement for route clearance since mines may be used in a harassing role by some of the factions.

38. The humanitarian relief efforts will be more severely hampered, especially when they spread into the North. The humanitarian problems will become acute when large-scale attempts are made to rehabilitate the land and re-establish the rural economy. Much of the grazing land used by nomadic tribesmen will be unusable, and villages for returning refugees will require complete clearing before they can be restored to use.

39. It will therefore be necessary to establish a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines in Somalia. As a start, it is my intention to send the United Nations Demining Team of Experts to Somalia to establish the extent of the problem. Following this visit, a mineclearing plan should be drawn up, using the models at present in use or being built up in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The main components of the plan will include a proper minefield survey, and extended contract mine clearance. If it becomes clear that the mines number millions rather than thousands, a mine clearance training facility will have to be established, and a force of Somali mine clearers will have to be trained, as in Cambodia, to undertake the major part of the mine clearance task, in a plan lasting years rather than months.

40. In a separate programme, a mine awareness programme will have to be established among refugees and displaced persons, and known mined areas will have to be fenced or marked off to prevent nomadic tribesmen from using mined areas for grazing.

III. POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

41. Ultimately, all the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia are directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance. The absence of a central government has aggravated the social, economic and political difficulties in the country. In fact, the non-existence of a government in Somalia is one of the main reasons for the now more robust role of the Organization in the country.

42. Various avenues have been actively explored to enhance Somalia's capability to govern itself. In this connection, my Special Representative and other senior officials have been consulting with elders, leaders, warring factions and women's professional groups on how best to create a broad-based government.

43. I and my Special Representative have encountered difficulties in our efforts aimed at promoting national reconciliation in Somalia. National reconciliation is a difficult process in the best of circumstances; it is particularly difficult in Somalia because of the multiplicity of parties, factions and other leaders and the total absence of law and order in all parts of the country. The primary initiative for national reconciliation must be left to the Somalis themselves. While this may be the ideal approach, the experience thus far has clearly shown the need for the United Nations to be given a broader mandate, not only in organizing, but also in promoting and advancing, the cause of national reconciliation.

44. As reported to the Security Council in my progress report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I convened an informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The participants reached agreement on three major documents (see paragraph 10 above).

45. As indicated in paragraph 30 above, a United Nations conference on humanitarian assistance is to be held in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993, to be followed immediately by the Conference on National Reconciliation. These meetings are expected to provide an opportunity for all segments of Somali society, including the political factions, movements, community

leaders, women, intellectuals and others to meet under one roof and discuss the problems of political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance as well as programmes for viable rehabilitation and reconstruction.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOMALI POLICE FORCE

46. I had indicated in my previous reports to the Council (paragraph 30 of my report of 19 December 1992, S/24992, and paragraph 23 of my report of 26 January 1993, S/25168) that I considered the establishment of a Somali police force as a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia. With that in mind, I had sent an expert team which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, would prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia.

47. The team was requested to study the feasibility of establishing such a national police force, make recommendations and develop a strategy for implementation.

48. The expert team was also requested to outline the appropriate modalities for training Somali personnel in the maintenance of law and order as well as the discharge of police

responsibilities while adhering to internationally accepted principles and practices for the protection of human rights.

49. As mentioned in my report of 26 January 1993, paragraph 23, UNITAF, under its supervision and in close consultation with my Special Representative, has now constituted an interim auxiliary force composed of former police officers. This auxiliary force will oversee, as a temporary arrangement, the road traffic control and undertake the protection of feeding centres thus relieving United Nations agencies and NGOs from the dependency on locally hired guards and freeing UNOSOM soldiers for more demanding and urgent tasks. I have requested the expert team to study the arrangements established for the auxiliary force with the view to eventually integrating some of its elements into a new civilian police force.

50. Bearing the above in mind, I consider it a matter of expediency to include an international civilian police component in the future UNOSOM II, but would refrain from making any specific recommendations at this time pending the receipt of the expert team's recommendations. I will therefore shortly bring to the attention of the Council a more detailed assessment on the establishment of this civilian police force.

V. PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

51. To support the execution of the new mandate for UNOSOM II an intensive and expanded information campaign will be required. Transitional arrangements from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will have to be conveyed to the general public. The new mandate under which UNOSOM II will be operating must be translated into vernacular languages and broadcast at large. In addition and as the political climate changes new information inputs will have to be designed in order to support every aspect of the operation and stimulate a stable social climate. It is also my intention to use public information activities in Somalia as an educational tool to strengthen the peace process, human rights and overall productive economic integration.

52. The information component in UNOSOM II will absorb themes developed on a day-to-day basis from the different highlights of the United Nations presence in Somalia such as transitional arrangements, cease-fire observances, disarmament, demobilization of armed groups, training of civilian police, refugee resettlement, safety, health, hygiene, just to mention the most important. The collaboration of United Nations specialized agencies and programmes will be sought in the elaboration of some of these broadcast elements.

53. The United Nations Department of Public Information has secured an agreement with radio Cairo as of 15 January 1993, by which Radio Cairo's External Services Network translates and broadcasts into Somalia United Nations produced material. This arrangement is expected to be in place for approximately three months, after which time the United Nations will be in a position to evaluate the service in light of internal developments and the evolving requirements of UNOSOM II information programme. Similar arrangements with radio stations in the neighbouring countries will be explored. In the meantime the United Nations is arranging the modalities for UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the operation of a daily newspaper and a radio station which are currently managed by the United States under UNITAF.

VI. THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM II

The present situation

54. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, had authorized the Secretary-General and certain Member States to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

55. There is no doubt that the presence and operations of UNITAF have had, especially during the initial period of its deployment, a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, as indicated in paragraphs 18 and 19 above, this improvement cannot yet be regarded as irreversible and conditions are still volatile. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. As mentioned above, UNITAF has deployed only in the Central and Southern parts of the country. Disarmament is far from complete.

The new mandate

56. The Council will now have to consider whether to authorize an enlargement of UNOSOM and redefine its mandate to include operations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The consequence of such a decision would be far-reaching for political, legal and logistical reasons, and would entail major financial commitment. The view which I have conveyed to the Security Council during the last two months is still current and valid: without improved security all over the country the political process cannot prosper and humanitarian operations will remain vulnerable to disruption. I have, therefore, devoted a great deal of my efforts to ensure that

parallel steps are taken: cease-fire and reconciliation mechanisms, disarmament and creation of a civilian police force, rehabilitation alongside political dialogue. I have insisted with all the factions and elders that it is up to them to change the course of violence toward peace and I have assured them that the international community stands ready to support their efforts in this direction.

57. My firm view, as stated in my letter to President Bush of 8 December 1992, remains that the mandate of UNOSOM II must cover the whole territory of Somalia and include disarmament. Moreover, as indicated in my report of 19 December 1992 (S/24992), UNOSOM II's mandate will include the following military tasks:

(a) to monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed, particularly the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993.

(b) to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction which violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities;

- (c) to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly-constituted national army;
- (d) to seize small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and to assist in the registration and security of such arms;
- (e) to secure or maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- (f) to protect, as required, personnel, installations and equipments of United Nations and its agencies, the ICRC as well as the NGOs and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements which attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;
- (g) to continue the programme for demining in the most afflicted areas;
- (h) to assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

(i) to carry out such other functions as may be authorized by the Security Council.

58. It is clear to me that the effort undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment in Somalia is far from complete and in any case has not attempted to address the situation throughout all of Somalia. Moreover, there have been, especially recently, some disheartening reverses. Accordingly, the threat to international peace and security which the Security Council ascertained in the third preambular paragraph of resolution 794 (1992) is still in existence. Consequently UNOSOM II will not be able to implement the above mandate unless it is endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Cease-fire and disarmament concept

59. In my report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I informed the Council of the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity held in Addis Ababa on 4-15 January 1993. Annex III of that report, "Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament", concluded that it would enter into force on 15 January 1993. Paragraph 1.2 stipulates that the militias of all political movements shall be encamped and disarmed simultaneously throughout Somalia and that the

international community "will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep". Paragraph 1.3 requires that the future of the encamped militias shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia.

60. On the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, a combined planning committee composed of senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM has developed a Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept.

61. Under this concept, the disarmament process would be continuous and irreversible. It would continue as long as required or until a Somali government was functioning effectively. A standardized and simple process would be used to disarm all factions. Once a faction had committed itself to disarmament by placing its heavy weapons in cantonment sites or relinquishing its small arms at a transition site, it would not be entitled to reclaim these weapons.

(a) Throughout the process, it would be useful to keep the major faction leaders informed about progress in disarming all the factions. This would place political pressure on factions that seek to delay or fail to comply with the disarmament process, and would provide a sense of security for the factions complying with that process.

(b) To be effective the disarmament process should be enforceable. Those factions or personnel who fail to comply with timetables or other modalities of the process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

(c) As called for in the Addis Ababa agreements, both the cease-fire and the disarmament process should be carried out under modalities agreed to by the Somalis themselves under the supervision and with the cooperation of UNOSOM II.

62. The concept outlined above would require the establishment of cantonment and transition sites. A cantonment is defined as a location where heavy weapons, including all crew-served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, would be stored. A transition site is defined as a location where factional forces would be given temporary accommodation while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received guidance and training for eventual reintegration in civilian life.

63. Cantonment sites should be designated in the vicinity of current force locations. Transition sites should be selected by the United Nations after consultation with the Somali factions. Cantonment and transition sites should be separated from each

other to prevent any temptation by factions or groups to seize the heavy weapons.

64. A committee composed of United Nations and faction representatives should jointly determine those heavy weapons which would be an asset to a new Somali national army and which would be retained in the cantonments, and the rest would be destroyed. The heavy weapons should be delivered to cantonment sites by faction personnel before they proceed to the transition sites. Cantonment site security would be the responsibility of UNOSOM II.

65. Some personnel in the transition sites should be allowed to retain a limited number of small arms for security purposes. Accommodation in the new sites should be temporary, pending relocation and reintegration in civilian society. The transition sites should at all times be open for verification by UNOSOM. Limited assistance would be offered by the United Nations in transporting faction personnel to the transition sites. Transition sites within each region/geographical area would be occupied simultaneously, in order to provide a sense of security for all participants.

66. The operational concept outlined in the above paragraph is based on the assumption that UNOSOM will assist in implementing

the Addis Ababa agreements (see S/25168, annex III). Both UNITAF and my staff are aware of the administrative and financial problems that will arise in the storage of heavy weapons and in the accommodation and upkeep of demobilized militias for an indeterminate period of time. I consider however that alternative methods, such as material or financial incentives for disarmament, should be considered an option to be kept under review in light of the experience that will be gathered in this process.

Military concept of operations

67. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate would have to be substantial in the early stage in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security conditions and to ensure a secure environment as quickly as possible both in those areas covered by UNITAF and those that are not. It could be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new police force becomes operational.

68. It is estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support required. The logistic contingent, the bulk of which would initially come from UNITAF, will constitute an integral

part of UNOSOM. I have also received an understanding from the United States Government that a tactical quick reaction force would be available in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II; a memorandum of understanding will be concluded between the United States and UNOSOM during the transfer phase.

69. To put the proposed strength in perspective, it is useful to bear in mind that UNITAF, with an initial strength of 37,000, is deployed in 40% of the territory. It might be asked why in that case the recommendation is for a total military component of only 28,000 for deployment in the entire territory of Somalia.

70. At the beginning of the operation, UNITAF introduced into the theatre a large force of approximately 37,000, including approximately 8,000 at sea, in order to breakdown resistance and take control of the situation. Once this was done and organized fighting with heavy weapons had largely ceased, the requirements were scaled down. At present there are approximately 28,400 UNITAF forces ashore, including heavy construction forces. The task at hand now is to control sporadic and localized fighting and can therefore be dealt with by fewer troops. Secondly, intelligence gathering capabilities which have been developed on the ground, will give UNOSOM warning of violent situations developing and allow the Force Commander to readjust his troop deployment. Thirdly, it is believed that the establishment of an

auxiliary police force should help in improving law and order and in releasing UNOSOM soldiers from guard duties for other more demanding tasks. Lastly, a tactical quick reaction force will be available at the request of the Force Commander.

71. In light of the above, I am prepared to accept the above-mentioned recommendations at this stage, given the need for maximum economy and efficiency and my constant endeavour to keep the size of the United Nations presence in any situation to the minimum. However, I should like to emphasise that I must reserve my right to revert to the Council in case I feel the need for additional troops to increase the strength of UNOSOM II, depending on the progress made in establishing a secure environment throughout the country. In conclusion I must point out that the security conditions in Somalia might compel me periodically to review the troop strength required to implement the mandate of UNOSOM II.

72. The force mentioned in paragraph 66 above will include:

- a. a Force Headquarters;
- b. five Brigades;
- c. a logistic support group.

73. The logistic support group would, in the first and second phases, be provided mainly by the UNITAF logistics forces, until UNOSOM II can establish the necessary logistic support through organic forces or by contract. I would like to stress however that the ability of UNOSOM to carry out its mandate will depend on critical logistical and other support from the United States, including a tactical quick reaction force.

74. The combat forces would need the following capabilities:

- a. Patrolling and close-combat
- b. Information gathering and interpretation
- c. Indirect fire
- d. Anti-armour fire
- e. All weather night and day operations
- f. Casualty evacuation
- g. Tactical communications
- h. Air support (fire power and transport).

75. The UNOSOM Force Commander would report directly to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. Areas of operations would be allocated to brigade commanders who would report directly to the UNOSOM II Force Commander. These commanders would be responsible for conducting military operations and assisting in the implementation of cease-fire/disarmament

agreements in their respective areas of operations. A tactical quick reaction force of at least battalion strength to be provided by the United States will be available in support of UNOSOM II.

76. UNOSOM military operations would be conducted in four phases:

Phase I - Transition from UNITAF;

Phase II - Consolidation and expansion of security;

Phase III - Transfer to civilian institutions;

Phase IV - Redeployment.

These phases are not meant to be applied rigidly or uniformly throughout Somalia, but merely describe a general sequence. For example, some areas of operations might be implementing Phase III while in another area Phase I or II would still be in effect. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase would be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programs. The Force Commander may shift forces within country to meet these changing requirements.

a. Phase I. In this phase, military operations would concentrate on the transition of operational control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Military support to relief activity and the disarming of factions would continue throughout the transition.

(1) Prior to the UNOSOM II Force Commander's formal assumption of operational responsibility from UNITAF, certain preparatory steps would be required. The expansion of UNOSOM II Force headquarters would have to continue until it was operationally capable. UNITAF would have to ensure that subordinate elements which would remain in Somalia under UNOSOM II were given appropriate command and control structures. The United States Government would be asked to form a tactical quick reaction force to support UNOSOM II's Force Commander.

(2) Upon receipt of a joint recommendation by Commander UNITAF and UNOSOM II Force Commander, I would approve UNOSOM II's assumption of operational responsibility for the unit or units concerned. At the appropriate stage the UNOSOM II Force Commander would also take over the logistic support forces previously controlled by UNITAF. In all phases, the United States

tactical quick reaction force would be placed in support of the UNOSOM II Force Commander.

(3) When the UNOSOM II Force Commander has assumed operational responsibility within an area of operation, UNITAF, in that area of operation, will be redeployed to their countries of origin at the discretion of their government(s) and under the protection of UNOSOM II troops.

(4) This phase would be complete when all UNITAF forces participating in UNOSOM, as well as other forces provided by other troop contributing countries, have been placed under operational control of UNOSOM II Force Commander.

b. Phase II. Military operations in phase II would be designed to consolidate United Nations operational control over all assigned elements and designated activity. Continued efforts to assist relief activity and participate in the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements would involve all military forces. Operations would be extended into Northern Somalia, based on the port cities of Berbera and Bossasso, and moving to Hargeisa and Garoe. UNOSOM II military forces would assist any new humanitarian initiatives started in this region, particularly

demining projects as addressed earlier in this report. Phase II would conclude when UNOSOM II was deployed and operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions.

c. Phase III. In this period, major efforts would be made to reduce military activity and assist civil authorities to exercise greater responsibility, according to their ability to do so. National rehabilitation and reconciliation initiatives under Somali leadership would be encouraged and supported by United Nations representatives. Military presence might be scaled down in the more stable areas and the tempo of military operations reduced as circumstances allow. Phase III would end when a Somali national police force was operational and major United Nations military operations were no longer required.

d. Phase IV. At an appropriate stage I would make a recommendation to the Council to redeploy or reduce the forces.

Rules of engagement

77. The rules of engagement would be defined by the UNOSOM II Force Commander. They would authorize and direct commanders to take certain specific actions if they were judged necessary to fulfil the mandate.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

78. The concept outlined in this report would require a substantial input of financial resources. I shall circulate shortly an addendum to the present report which will contain the preliminary cost estimate for UNOSOM II for a period of 12 months. Overall operations will require 20,000 military personnel of all ranks plus 8,000 logistical support, as well as a considerably strengthened civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council agree to the deployment of UNOSOM II, that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a Special Account to be established for this purpose. It would further be my intention to maintain the United Nations fund for operations in Somalia authorized by paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992). I appeal to all Member States which are in a position to do so to contribute generously to that fund. Such voluntary contributions would reduce the burden that Member States would have to bear under the assessment scheme. With this in mind, I intend to send emissaries to certain Heads of State or Governments to explain

the operations and to encourage them to make generous donations to the fund.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

79. As the members of the Council are aware, the mission of UNITAF was originally envisaged as a short-term police action. I believe that UNITAF has made an important contribution in the international effort to stop the lawlessness and disarm the warring factions in its area of operations. However, events in Kismayo and Mogadishu during the week of 21 February 1993 have demonstrated the volatile situation which still exists. They underscore the fact, which I have indicated in this report, that a secure environment has not yet been established. Moreover, there has been no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the Northeast and Northwest, or along the Kenyan/Somali border, where security is a matter of grave concern. I believe, therefore, that if the Council determines that the time has come to move to another stage in its operations in Somalia, it should be prepared to ensure that UNOSOM II is fully in a position to carry out its tasks.

80. The mandate of UNOSOM II, as conceived in this report, would confer authority for appropriate action, including enforcement

action as necessary, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II would seek to complete through disarmament and reconciliation the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance, and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

81. Notwithstanding the compelling necessity for authority to use enforcement measures as appropriate, I continue to hold to my conviction that the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace must spring from the Somalis themselves. Even if it is authorized to resort to forceful action in certain circumstances, UNOSOM II cannot and must not be expected to substitute itself for the Somali people. Nor can or should it use its authority to impose one or another system of governmental organization. It may and should, however, be in a position to press for the observance of United Nations standards of human rights and justice.

82. UNOSOM II will continue to assist the factions in completing the total disarmament and demobilization process called for in the Addis Ababa accords, to ensure that the secure environment is established on a country-wide basis, and to monitor the strict observance of the cease-fire.

83. A secure environment continues to be essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the reconstruction of the country. The deployment of UNITAF forces has enabled a substantial increase in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and opened up access to more remote areas. Emergency relief assistance will continue to be required throughout 1993. There is also an urgent need for the international community to accelerate its efforts to assist the Somalis to rebuild their society, rehabilitate the decayed infrastructure and pave the way for a secure return of all refugees. To achieve these objectives, the United Nations is putting together a Humanitarian Programme for 1993 with the active participation of the Somalis, United Nations organizations, ICRC and NGOs. I look forward to the support of donors for this Programme at the United Nations Humanitarian Conference to be convened in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993.

84. There must be a smooth transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II without any hiatus which could be exploited by factions or gangs. UNOSOM II will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over seamlessly from UNITAF in each area from which it withdraws and to deploy troops in the North and along the boundaries with Kenya. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area, when adequate troops, command and control and logistics are available to UNOSOM II in a given area.

85. A number of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have expressed willingness to have their contingents serve eventually in UNOSOM II. It is my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in UNOSOM II as many contingents as possible which are already in Somalia serving under the command of UNITAF. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of UNITAF to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to in the preceding paragraph. While it is difficult to determine when this transfer will be completed, for budgetary and administrative purposes, the formal date of transfer of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will be 1 May 1993.

86. One further point would need to be clarified in any Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of UNOSOM II under the new mandate, namely that the deployment will be at the discretion of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force Commander acting under the authority of the Security Council. Such deployment would not be subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders. The deployment of UNOSOM II would have to cover the whole country, including its borders, both for the purpose of controlling the movement of refugees and to prevent the illicit introduction of arms into Somalia and to avoid destabilization of the neighbouring countries.

Furthermore, Member States should be encouraged to monitor and report violations of the arms embargo established by the Security Council in its resolution 733 (1992), particularly those Member States who have ships operating off the coast of Somalia and the neighbouring countries of the Horn of Africa, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

87. I am aware of the very delicate question of the secession proclamation in the North. However, as the mandate of UNOSOM covers the entire country, troops will be deployed in the North as well as in the South. Such international presence should help the process of rehabilitation and delivery of international assistance. The deployment of UNOSOM to the North would not prejudice in any way the decision of the Somali people on their

national future. I believe that the Somali political reconciliation process is broad enough to accommodate discussions and negotiations among all groups and factions.

88. With regard to political reconciliation, it is essential to maintain the momentum gained in Addis Ababa and convene a national reconciliation conference which could build on the results of the informal preparatory meeting of January 1993. This may be particularly important in view of the difficulties encountered in activating the Ad-hoc Committee established at Addis Ababa. It would also be desirable for such a conference to have broad participation by all Somali movements, factions, community leaders, women, intellectuals, etc.. This would help to ensure that the validity and decisions of the conference would be recognized by the Somali public at large. I am also reassured by the tangible support extended to me by the LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Horn of Africa Committee. Their assistance in the creation of the Somali trust fund and in our efforts to establish a rehabilitation programme as well as their contribution towards political reconciliation have been valuable.

89. It was the uniqueness of the situation in Somalia which led to the adoption of resolution 794 (1992) by the Security Council. While the emergency operation launched by the international

community in the form of UNITAF has achieved, to a considerable extent, the immediate objective of reaching humanitarian assistance to the needy, I must emphasise that the unique features of the situation continue to prevail. There is still no effective functioning government in the country. There is still no organized civilian police force. There is still no disciplined national armed force. As recent events have tragically demonstrated, the atmosphere of lawlessness and tension is far from being eliminated. I have repeatedly stated that my major concern has been with the existence of large amounts of armaments in the hands of the factions and guerilla bands. The operations launched by UNITAF, especially in the past few weeks, have undoubtedly succeeded in getting some of these stocks of weaponry confiscated and destroyed. It is, however, obvious that we have only scratched the surface of the problem so far. Disarming the factions and placing their heavy weaponry under international control for eventual destruction or placement at the disposal of the new national army of Somalia is, in my view, the most urgent and pressing task for UNOSOM II.

90. UNOSOM II would be the first operation of its kind to be authorized by the international community. It would be an expression of the international community's determination not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own. It would also be an answer of the

international community to the universally shared concern that the situation in Somalia, though primarily of a domestic nature, could affect the peace and stability of the entire region of which Somalia forms an integral part, unless energetic and timely action was taken to avert a major humanitarian and security disaster. The task ahead would not be easy. UNOSOM II might frequently come under criticism for acts of omission or commission. It is also difficult to anticipate, with any degree of certainty, the duration of UNOSOM II'S mandate. Nonetheless, I am satisfied that the recommendations I have made in this report are a necessary, indeed inescapable response of the international community to the tragedy in Somalia.

91. As the mission of UNITAF nears completion, I wish to express my profound appreciation to the Government of the United States for its timely initiative in offering its assistance to the United Nations at a crucial stage of its operation in Somalia, and for the skill and efficiency with which UNITAF has carried out its mandate. I also wish to express my gratitude to all the other Governments that have contributed contingents to UNITAF, and to their soldiers for their dedicated service to this operation.

92. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Kittani, my Special Representative and to Brigadier-General Shaheen, the

Force Commander, and the staff of UNOSOM, as well the staff of the ICRC and of the NGOs, for the devotion, skill and leadership which they have demonstrated, often in extremely trying circumstances, in the service of the United Nations in Somalia.

93. Lastly, I wish to express my sincere condolences to the Government of the United States upon the death of members of its contingent while serving with UNITAF in Somalia. I should also like to pay a heartfelt tribute to the staff members who died in the performance of their duties in Somalia as well as the members of the relief community, including those of UNICEF, ICRC and the NGOs who sacrificed their lives while assisting the Somali people.

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES -6- DATE 3/8/93

FROM IO/UNP: LWEINTRAUB TELEPHONE _____

TO OFFICE: OSD/ISA +JCS/J-5 FAX TEL NUMBER _____
NSCS FAX 703-695-4620

DISTRIBUTE TO: OSD/ISA/AF - Col. M. Johnson TEL 703-697-9753
FAX: 703-697-0255

JCS/J-5: Col. P. Baltimore TEL 703-614-9406
FAX 395-1207

NSCS: Dick Clarke TEL 395-3393

NSCS Susan Rice FAX 395-1199
TEL 395-3736

SUBJECT SOMALIA/UNOSOM II DRAFT RESOLUTION

REMARKS UN version with a few changes to US draft
sent in STATE 67709; more changes may be
proposed
pls call with any reactions. lu

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP FAX NUMBER 202-647-0039
TELEPHONE 202-647-2392

07-03-1993 14:03 P.02
2
Draft Resolution on Expansion of UNOSOM

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, and 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992.

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and the rebuilding of a civil society in Somalia,

Welcomes the convening of a Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and calls upon Governments to contribute generously to the 1993 Programme for Relief and Rehabilitation for Somalia;

3

Considering the restoration of law and order in Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, and the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Stressing the desire to assist the people of Somalia to participate in free and fair elections when conditions permit,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation held in Addis Ababa January 4-15, 1993, including in particular the conclusion of the three agreements by the Somali parties, movements and factions, as reported by the Secretary-General (S/25168, including annexes),

Noting the reports of states concerned (S/) and of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 (S/24992) and 26 January 1993 (S/25168) and 3 March 1993 (S/25354) on the implementation of resolution 794 and the attainment of the objective of establishment of a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/) and endorses the recommendations contained therein;

2. Demands that the parties, movements and factions in Somalia comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the Addis Ababa informal preparatory meeting, and in particular with their agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (S/25168, Annex III);

3. Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in providing humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation;

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to use all means as necessary to realize the objectives set upon this mandate, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General (S/ , paras. 56-58 and 67-75);

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to direct UNOSOM forces, incidental to but without undermining its other functions, to monitor and enforce from within Somalia the arms embargo established by Security Council resolution 733 (23 January 1992) and to provide security, as appropriate, within Somalia to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced persons;

6. Reiterates its demand that all parties, movements, and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law and reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

7. Calls upon the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to direct the Commander of UNOSOM to assume responsibility for the maintenance of a secure environment in Somalia on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report (S/ , paragraph 76 (a));

8. Calls upon the Secretary-General, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report (S/);

a) to provide for the relief and economic rehabilitation of Somalia, including the return to their homes of refugees and internally displaced persons, and attention to the need for jobs and work for unemployed (paras 25-26);

b) to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation and the reestablishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration (paras 27-30 and 43-45);

c) to provide for the establishment of an indigenous police force for the maintenance of law and order, and to assist in the restoration of peace, stability and law and order, including the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law (paras 46-50);

d) to assist the people of Somalia in removing mines throughout Somalia, including the establishment of a coherent and integrated program for the removal of such mines (paras 34-40);

(e) to support the activities of the United Nations in Somalia through the use of appropriate public information activities (paras 51-53).

9. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 for the purpose of receiving contributions for maintenance of the expanded UNOSOM forces following the departure of UNITAF forces;

10. Endorses the efforts of the Secretary-General to convene a National Reconciliation Conference taking into account the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 1993, and his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somali movements, factions, community leaders, women, intellectuals, elders and other groups are suitably represented at that Conference;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement this resolution and on the progress achieved in accomplishing the purposes set out in it;

12. Requests United Nations agencies, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to extend, in coordination with the Secretary-General, financial, material and technical support to the people of Somalia;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES -6- DATE 3/8/93FROM IO/UNP: LWEINTRAUB TELEPHONE _____TO OFFICE: OSD/ISA +JCS/J-5 FAX TEL NUMBER _____
NSCS FAX 703-695-4620DISTRIBUTE TO: OSD/ISA/AF - Col. M. Johnson TEL 703-697-9753 ✓
FAX: 703-697-0255 ✓Jcs/J-5: Col. P. Baltimore TEL 703-614-9406
FAX 395-1207 ✓NSCS: Dick Clarke TEL 395-3393NSCS Susan Rice FAX 395-1199
TEL 395-3736SUBJECT SOMALIA/UNOSOM II DRAFT RESOLUTIONREMARKS UN version with a few changes to US draft
sent in STATE 67709; more changes may be
proposed.
pls call with any reactions. lw

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP FAX NUMBER 202-647-0039
TELEPHONE 202-647-2392

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Draft Resolution on Expansion of UNOSOM 2

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, and 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992.

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and the rebuilding of a civil society in Somalia,

Welcomes the convening of a Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and calls upon Governments to contribute generously to the 1993 Programme for Relief and Rehabilitation for Somalia;

3

- 2 -

Considering the restoration of law and order in Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, and the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Stressing the desire to assist the people of Somalia to participate in free and fair elections when conditions permit,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation held in Addis Ababa January 4-15, 1993, including in particular the conclusion of the three agreements by the Somali parties, movements and factions, as reported by the Secretary-General (S/25168, including annexes),

Noting the reports of states concerned (S/) and of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 (S/24992) and 26 January 1993 (S/25168) and 3 March 1993 (S/25354) on the implementation of resolution 794 and the attainment of the objective of establishment of a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/) and endorses the recommendations contained therein;

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

- 3 -

2. Demands that the parties, movements and factions in Somalia comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the Addis Ababa informal preparatory meeting, and in particular with their agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (S/25168, Annex III);

3. Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in providing humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation;

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to use all means as necessary to realize the objectives set upon this mandate, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General (S/ , paras. 56-58 and 67-75);

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to direct UNOSOM forces, incidental to but without undermining its other functions, to monitor and enforce from within Somalia the arms embargo established by Security Council resolution 733 (23 January 1992) and to provide security, as appropriate, within Somalia to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced persons;

6. Reiterates its demand that all parties, movements, and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law and reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

- 4 -

7. Calls upon the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to direct the Commander of UNOSOM to assume responsibility for the maintenance of a secure environment in Somalia on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report (S/ , paragraph 76 (a));

8. Calls upon the Secretary-General, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report (S/);

a) to provide for the relief and economic rehabilitation of Somalia, including the return to their homes of refugees and internally displaced persons, and attention to the need for jobs and work for unemployed (paras 25-26);

b) to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation and the reestablishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration (paras 27-30 and 43-45);

c) to provide for the establishment of an indigenous police force for the maintenance of law and order, and to assist in the restoration of peace, stability and law and order, including the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law (paras 46-50);

d) to assist the people of Somalia in removing mines throughout Somalia, including the establishment of a coherent and integrated program for the removal of such mines (paras 34-40);

(e) to support the activities of the United Nations in Somalia through the use of appropriate public information activities (paras 51-53).

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

- 5 -

6

9. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 for the purpose of receiving contributions for maintenance of the expanded UNOSOM forces following the departure of UNITAF forces;

10. Endorses the efforts of the Secretary-General to convene a National Reconciliation Conference taking into account the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 1993, and his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somali movements, factions, community leaders, women, intellectuals, elders and other groups are suitably represented at that Conference;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement this resolution and on the progress achieved in accomplishing the purposes set out in it;

12. Requests United Nations agencies, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to extend, in coordination with the Secretary-General, financial, material and technical support to the people of Somalia;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Ceasefire Committee Meets in Mogadishu (1 page)	02/16/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Re: Request for Embassy Feedback and Recommendations on UNITAF - UNOSOM II Transition (2 pages)	02/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Re: Pakistan and UNITAF-UNOSOM Transition (2 pages)	02/16/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Re: Requests for Embassy Feedback and Recommendations on UNITAF - UNOSOM II Transition (1 page)	02/16/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8898

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RA*

SUBJECT: The President's Question About Somalia

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/02/17

2012-0659-F

The President asked a question (Tab A) about a newspaper story concerning a message (Tab B) sent by Ambassador Gosende's.

A reply for your signature is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Newspaper Article
Tab B Ambassador Gosende's Message

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Your Question About Somalia (1 page)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 11/12

Benny
What is the deal
here?

WHAT IS THE DEAL HERE?

Mogadishu Embassy Urged Policy Shift

SOMALIA, From AP

Focusing on political talks, staff writer Daniel Williams reported in Washington. Secretary of State Warren Christopher discussed the altered approach with U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on Sept. 20, the officials said.

[But the new policy, they said, was not worked out fully until after the Oct. 3 firefight, which speeded up U.S. pressure on the United Nations to stop chasing Audeed and began talking with his representatives.]

According to the sources here, the cable outlined a series of diplomatic initiatives close to the approach the Clinton administration embraced later, after the 18 deaths. The embassy suggested a halt to military activities and an offer for Audeed to do the same; an independent commission to investigate Audeed's involvement in the June 5 ambush of Pakistani peace keepers; a return to the March Addis Ababa accords as the basis for a political settlement in Somalia; and a suggestion that Audeed consider leaving Somalia for exile to a third country, like Ethiopia, until the commission delivered its findings.

The cable was entitled "The Making of a Deal: Getting Off Dead Center With the Habr Gedir and Audeed." The Habr Gedir is Audeed's subclan.

The existence of the cable was made known last month by some of Gosende's supporters. It was confirmed today that the cable had been sent.

Diplomatic sources said the cable reflected a growing realization by Gosende and other U.S. diplomats here that the campaign to capture Audeed was not working, because casualty levels on both sides were becoming unacceptable and the administration was unwilling to commit the needed manpower and political capital.

An earlier, Sept. 6 cable from the embassy had argued for a hard-line approach and requested more U.S. troops because, in the words of one diplomat, "If we're going to take the military approach, we should take it and not pussyfoot around." Portions of that Sept. 6 cable were leaked in Washington by officials who apparently wanted to discredit the embassy, diplomats here said.

By the middle of September, said one diplomat involved in the policy debate, "We sat down and agreed that the military option wasn't going to work—that the gloves were never going to be taken all the way off, but they'd be off just enough to get us in trouble."

One main element outlined in the Sept. 17 cable was the idea that American-led U.N. troops should seize the public relations initiative by

declaring a unilateral cease-fire in the destructive war in Audeed-controlled south Mogadishu, sources said. "We declare some kind of cease-fire and ask them to respond," one diplomat said.

Eventually, Audeed called his own unilateral cease-fire on Oct. 9, forcing the United States and the United Nations to respond by halting their forces' offensive operations.

U.S. Soldier Shoots Somalis Loading Heavy Weapons

Associated Press

MOGADISHU, Somalia, Nov. 10—An American sharpshooter shot two Somalis who were loading heavy weapons into a van today, military officials said. Somali witnesses claimed two were killed and four wounded.

The shootings occurred near the Kilometer Four traffic circle shortly before 5 p.m. An American soldier atop a former soap factory spotted two men loading a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and a heavy machine gun into a van, said an American military spokesman.

The Somalis did not shoot, but the spokesman said the rules of engagement in Somalia allowed the soldier to fire because of the weaponry involved.

Uzbek Dissidents Beaten in Moscow

2 Journalists, Poet Accuse Agents of Central Asian Government

By Fred Hiatt
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Nov. 10—Repressive Central Asian governments are reaching beyond their borders to beat up and intimidate dissidents and journalists living here, human rights activists alleged today.

Three dissidents from Uzbekistan, two journalists and a poet, said they were tied up, clubbed and threatened with a gun last week by six men who ransacked their apartment and stole their passports and some antigovernment literature. The head of the band, an Uzbek, concluded the four-hour intrusion by saying, "If you want to live, say nothing about this," the dissidents claimed. The intruders did not take money or other valuables.

Human rights activists criticized the Russian government for providing little protection to dissidents

bert Musun. Abdurashid Shampov and Yadgar Abid—offered no proof that the Uzbek secret service was involved in last week's attack, and a spokesman for Uzbekistan's embassy here said he knew nothing about it. The spokesman, Fakhritdin Parpiev, also criticized human rights activists for musing the big picture—the calm and stability in his Central Asian country.

"We have no fratricidal wars and no bloodshed," he said. "I don't know what they really want, these human rights defenders. So one man was shoved around, while blood is being shed everywhere, and they are shouting about just one single person. Everything is normal in Uzbekistan."

Oleg Panfilov, head of the Committee for the Defense of Journalists, said last Thursday's attack represents part of a pattern. Panfilov, who writes frequently about Tajikistan's human rights record, was

chaotically. A vicious civil war in Tajikistan has produced mass killings of political opponents, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have argued that democratization and human rights must be embraced gingerly, so as not to jeopardize social peace.

Human rights groups have charged that, as a result, opposition newspapers have been banned, opposition parties shut and government critics jailed, fired and otherwise harassed. Alexei Smurnov of the Center for Human Rights here said the atmosphere in those nations is "even worse and more dangerous" than in the Soviet Union before the liberalization and reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev.

As a result, many government opponents have taken refuge in Moscow. But the Uzbek activists and their defenders said Central Asian dissidents are particularly at

Parties Ruled Eligible for Russia Parliamentary Election

Fred Hiatt
Post Foreign Service

10—Eight political parties will participate in the Dec. 12 ballot for parliament today, including groups opposed to President Yeltsin.

The picture was not one of Election Commission participation, a strongly le-certifying some of the strongest opponents, the Communist Party.

All the parties removed will be able to run for individual districts if they can secure the necessary signatures. But their parties will compete for 225 seats—half of the total—that will be decided on the basis of

their nationwide election showing. The eight parties stricken were among 21 that, seeking to participate in the parliamentary elections, had submitted petitions Saturday.

Thirteen parties have met qualifications to participate in the Dec. 12 voting.

ostensibly containing 100,000 or more signatures of support. The commission, after examining the petitions for three days, concluded that only 13 had submitted enough legitimate voters' signatures.

Today's action is likely to revive charges from Yeltsin's opponents that free and fair elections cannot take place. Since dissolving parliament Sept. 21 and routing its hard-line holdouts in bloody battle on Oct. 3-4, Yeltsin has ruled the country with little challenge from any quarter.

Today, he fired the rebellious leader of his home region of Sverdlovsk who had failed to heed Kremlin warnings against setting up a "Urals Republic" to increase the region's political clout.

A statement from Yeltsin's office said Eduard Rossel, whom Yeltsin had appointed, was fired for exceeding his authority. Tuesday, Yeltsin nullified a vote by local authorities to create a new internal republic, saying such moves would unacceptably increase separatist pressures in the country.

Nikolai Ryabov, an ally of Yeltsin who heads the election commission, denied any political motivation in the commission's work and said the parties that were disqualified had simply failed to meet requirements set for all. The 13 parties eligible to participate reflect "the whole spectrum of political forces" and thus guarantee a truly democratic election, he said.

The 13 include the three largest pro-reform democratic groups, two centrist blocs, the Communists, the pro-Communist Agrarian Party, the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, an environmentalist group and a women's party.

Among those eliminated was the Russian National Union, led by radical nationalist Sergei Baburin, a leading Yeltsin opponent in the parliament the Russian leader dissolved last September. Baburin charged

Saturday that Interior Ministry troops raided his party headquarters and seized petitions containing 22,000 names.

The Interior Ministry has acknowledged that some of its people were at the union headquarters then but officials denied lists were taken. Ryabov said today that an investigation confirms Baburin's charge his party may be reinstated. But even without such disruption, many Yeltsin opponents have charged that not enough time remained before the election to prepare properly.

Among parties stricken by the election commission was the Association of Independent Professionals, led by a strong Yeltsin supporter, Pyotr Filippov. But most of those stricken were anti-Yeltsin, including the neo-fascist National-Republican Party, Russia and the pro-Communist Constitutional Democratic Party.

Somalia Envoy Urged Policy Shift Before 18 GIs Died

burgh
Source

Somalia, Nov. 18—American officials urged on the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu to shift policy in the direction urged in the cable, but only after the Oct. 3 raid by U.S. Army Rangers that left

18 American soldiers dead and 75 wounded.

The Sept. 17 cable, apparently failed to generate a change in policy at the highest levels of the Clinton administration, however, and diplomats in Mogadishu said they were surprised and frustrated when they did not receive an immediate response.

The administration eventually did shift policy in the direction urged in the cable, but only after the Oct. 3 raid by U.S. Army Rangers that left

18 American soldiers dead and 75 wounded.

The cable was sent out over the signature of then-U.S. ambassador Robert Gossend. Gossend, considered a hard-liner in pushing the hunt for Aideed, was removed from his post and replaced by career diplomat Richard Bogosian, a former ambassador to Niger and Chad who is scheduled to arrive here Friday.

Gossend's allies expressed belief that he has unfairly become a victim of the administration's earlier, failed

Somalia policy. Many journalists here remember Gossend as a passionate advocate for the U.S. and U.N. policy of arresting Aideed. But Gossend's supporters said the cable shows that the ambassador became an advocate for a new approach to Aideed in September, after the Rangers dispatched here in August botched several attempts to catch the warlord, and that more senior administration officials did not focus on Somalia until disaster struck.

The cable was marked NIACT,

one of the most urgent priorities for messages from the field, and diplomats said it would have been seen at the assistant secretary's office of the State Department, as well as at the National Security Council, the U.S. mission to the United Nations, and the U.S. military's Central Command.

U.S. Embassy diplomats here were so certain their cable—which they said resembled a position paper—would lead to an immediate turnaround in administration policy

on Somalia that they drafted a press release to explain the shift to reporters. The cable was sent on a Friday, and diplomats said they expected a response after senior officials in Washington used the weekend to consider it.

But another diplomat here said, "We got no response—none. Not even a cable back."

State Department officials said Gossend's advice was not ignored, but contributed to a shift toward

See SOMALIA, A44, Col. 1

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	Re: The Making of a Deal (2 pages)	09/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger and Kristien Cicio, re: Draft Somalia PC Paper (4 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	Richard Clarke to James Reed, re: CLAM: Somalia (2 pages)	09/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re: Somalia: Next Steps (2 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. report	Re: [Somalia] (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Eye Only

MEMORANDUM

TO: DICK CLARKE, NSC
JIM DOBBINS, STATE

for (202) 395 1199 4:01

FROM: MIKE SHEEHAN, UNOSOM II, OSRSG

DATE: 5 NOVEMBER 1993

SUBJECT: SOMALIA UPDATE

FAXOUT-174
MISC-6769

POLITICAL:

1. UNOSOM reps Mike Sheehan and Kevin Kennedy met with SNA reps after USLO meeting on 03 November at USLO to discuss the humanitarian conference.
2. Mogadishu Security Committee met 04 NOV at old UN Headquarters to discuss security environment in Mogadishu. Attendees included representatives from UNOSOM military forces and Somali factions, including one representative from the SNA. See USLO cable Mog 2423.
3. Sheehan and Marks met with DCM McIlvane and Colonel Dotto 05 NOV to discuss further talks with SNA. Ambassador Oakley called during meeting -- emphasis will be on pressure for the SNA to show up on Monday to next Security Meeting.
4. On suggestion from UNOSOM, USLO attempting to schedule a follow-on informal meeting with SNA to further discuss humanitarian conference. This will provide continued dialogue with the SNA and a different channel than the confrontational SNA rep at the Security Committee.
5. No decision on detainees at this time. Cooperative attitude from SNA in Monday meeting should bear fruit.
6. Col Dotto told Ethiopian and Eritrean interlocutors that USLO will help organize a UNOSOM chaired sub-group of the Security Committee with 5 members of Aideed group and 5 from Ali Mahdi -- to meet on Monday afternoon after the full Committee meeting.

FORCES:

1. Nepalese infantry assumed patrol of Southern Compound from Pakistani forces.

POLICE/JUSTICE:

1. Please expedite assignment of police advisor. Since Ann Wright has left there have been some shifts in thinking among the police advisors here at UNOSOM. They are taking a minimalist approach to the issue. Need help to receive US equipment (DSAA) and to jump start the program (Stittinius).
2. Justice: Where is the US money? UNOSOM has not received it yet!

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

PERSONNEL:

1. Admiral Howe requested UN recruit the following individuals for immediate assignment to SRSO staff:

Tim Carney, currently assigned to State Department, to be assigned as Special Advisor.

Keith Mines, currently assigned to Embassy Tel Aviv, to be assigned as Special Assistant.

COL Russell Howard, US Army, currently assigned to CINCLANT Norfolk, to be assigned as Chief, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Demining Division.

William Stittinius, currently assigned to Office of Secretary of Defense, to the Police Division.

LOGISTICS:

1. Forces Command (FC) still has concerns about Brown and Root contracting essential log support in a Chapter VII environment. If conditions deteriorate, after the US departure, B&R can depart and still be paid costs plus 1%. (If they stay they get 10% profit margin!) Other key log issues: support ship for Kismayu, level three hospital (Swedes and US), medevac (frames and crews -- French and Belgians leaving soon), more log support for Indians operating in south (that had expected support from German contingent that is in the north).

HUMANITARIAN:

1. Humanitarian meeting scheduled to start in Addis Ababa 29 or 30 November.

2. Planning for the conference needs clarification. I have spoken to Mark Wentley about an AID augmentation of project planners (much like was done for the police program). Planners would design actionable short term projects for immediate implementation. Please send 5 AID planners to UNOSOM (or USLO with duty to UNOSOM) prior to the conference and for attendance at the conference. (With lap tops and WP 5.1 and Lotus software). AID staffers Bill Anderson and Jerry Cashion would be outstanding additions to the effort -- based on their great work on the police program.

D3 (Demobilization, Disarmament, and Demining):

1. Disarmament program has not made much progress in past several months. I will chair inter-divisional and create a joint task force to move the process. Will try to expedite "pilot programs." Although this should be a very high priority, D3 remains grossly understaffed (two people in the entire division).

2. I plan to put together an ad hoc task force of "on-hand" talent to get the program moving. I will be canvassing under employed people in UNOSOM (military and civilian) -- but may ask for additional temporary help from the military and AID. The five AID planners could also help in this arena.

3. Please check with Peter Romero (former Ambassador to El Salvador) for ideas on programs and talent to implement demob programs of the FMLN.
Phone: 212-963-3085 (extensions: Sheehan: 2112 -- Marks: 2138)