

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia Core Group [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

2986

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                               | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. memo                | From Samuel Berger, re: Somalia Core Group - Taskings (2 pages)             | 02/08/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. cable               | Re: South Korea: Participation in UNOSOM II (1 page)                        | 02/17/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. paper               | UNOSOM (6 pages)                                                            | 03/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. list                | Appendix A: Forces Reasonable Committed to UNOSOM II (1 page)               | 03/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005. list                | Appendix B: Forces Considering Participation in UNOSOM II (1 page)          | 03/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. paper               | Issues Concerning Pakistani Participation in UNOSOM II (4 pages)            | 03/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007. paper               | Equipping the Pakistanis (and others) (2 pages)                             | 03/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 008. cable               | Re: US Support for Pakistani Forces in UNITAF and UNOSOM II (2 pages)       | 02/21/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 009. report              | The Terrorist Threat in Somalia (5 pages)                                   | 02/03/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 010. paper               | Quick Reaction Force (1 page)                                               | 03/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 011. paper               | QRF Command Relationship with UNOSOM (1 page)                               | 03/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 012. paper               | Command of Headquarters Support Forces in Somalia During UNOSOM II (1 page) | 03/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

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Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F

ke4197

### RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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| 013. paper               | Presidential Review Directive/NSC-5 (2 pages)                                                                            | 02/08/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 014. memo                | State Department Memo, re: Conclusions Reached at the February 26 Interagency Working Group Meeting on Somalia (2 pages) | 03/05/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 015. report              | Re: [Somalia] (7 pages)                                                                                                  | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 016. table               | Military and Political Intervention in Somalia (1 page)                                                                  | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 017. paper               | Re: [Regional Impact] (1 page)                                                                                           | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 018. paper               | U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in Somalia (8 pages)                                                                            | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 019. paper               | US Policy Toward Somalia (6 pages)                                                                                       | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 020. cable               | Re: 3/12/93: Perm 5 Counselors Meet for Intial Review of Somalia Resolution (3 pages)                                    | 03/13/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 021. list                | Somalia Core Group Meeting [partial] (1 page)                                                                            | 03/04/1993 | P3/b(3)     |
| 022. cable               | [Incomplete cable re: Somalia] (1 page)                                                                                  | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 023a. talking points     | Additional Points for Christopher-Boutros Meeting (4 pages)                                                              | 01/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 023b. briefing paper     | Somalia (1 page)                                                                                                         | 01/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

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## FY 1994 BUDGET FOR PEACEKEEPING

The FY 1994 President's Budget will request nearly \$1 billion to support international peacekeeping. Of this, over 2/3rds is in the State Department's budget and nearly 1/3rd is in the Defense budget.

### State Department Budget

- Peacekeeping Costs Assessed by the UN - The Budget will request \$620 million for the US share (30.4%) of UN peacekeeping activities, including large operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Approx. \$22 million will go to pay arrears to the UN.
  - Our request is \$160 million over the \$460 million appropriated in FY 1993.
  - IO budgets for assessed contributions in the Contributions for International Peacekeeping (CIPA) account; the Commerce, Justice, State (CJS) Appropriations Subcommittees appropriate funds.
- Voluntary Contributions to Peacekeeping - The Budget will request \$77 million for voluntary contributions to multinational peacekeeping efforts, such as the CSCE in the former Soviet Union and the UN/OAS observer mission in Haiti.

This is \$50 million over the \$27 million appropriated in FY 1993.

- PM budgets for voluntary contributions in the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account; the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees provide funding.

### Defense Department Budget

- For the first time, DOD will request \$300 million in a new budget account to support international peacekeeping.
  - This account will cover the costs DOD contributions, such as military goods and services or detailed US troops, to the UN and other multinational peacekeeping efforts.
  - Some of these military contributions may lead to UN credits against our future peacekeeping assessments, reducing the amount of appropriations the State Department will need to request.
  - DOD does not want to use funding from its new account to pay UN assessments directly.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

### **Arrears & FY 1993 Supplemental**

- The FY 1994 Budget will also seek \$307 million in FY 1993 supplemental funding for UN and other peacekeeping efforts.
  - We are seeking \$293 million toward UN assessments and \$14 million for voluntary contributions to peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Bosnia.
- The FY 1994 Budget will also request \$305 million to pay all of our arrears to the UN and other international organizations.

### **SUMMARY: What is New for FY 1994**

- The State Department is requesting more funding for UN assessed peacekeeping costs than ever before.
- For the first time, State is seeking to devote more resources to regional and other non-UN peacekeeping efforts that are funded on a voluntary basis.
  - Our requested increase for the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account is a departure from the Bush and Reagan Administration budgets.
  - Voluntary contributions, where we determine the extent of our financial involvement on a case-by-case basis, can be a cost-effective alternative to paying 30.4% of UN peacekeeping costs.
- The Department of Defense has never had an account dedicated solely to peacekeeping; DOD has had to divert funds from other program budgets to make in-kind contributions to UN peacekeeping. A new DOD budget account for peacekeeping will ensure that DOD is prepared to support peacekeeping operations when needed.
- Depending on the outcome of a decision by the Secretary, we may be requesting authority to transfer funds between the CIPA and PKO accounts, so that we have more flexibility in deciding how and when to contribute to peacekeeping efforts.

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|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| 004. list | Appendix A: Forces Reasonable Committed to UNOSOM II (1 page) | 03/00/1993 | P1/b(1) |
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# UNITAF TO UNOSOM II TRANSITION



## UNOSOM II FORCE MATRIX

|              | KISMAYU/BARDERA                       | ODDUR/BAIDOA                                | GIALALASSI/BELET UEN                 | MOGADISHU/SALEDOGLE                                           |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| MAJOR FORCES | INDIA<br>BELGIUM                      | FRANCE                                      | ITALY                                | PAKISTAN<br>MOROCCO<br>JORDAN                                 |
| LOGISTICS    | US<br>INDIA<br>BELGIUM<br>CONTRACTORS | US<br>IRELAND<br>NEW ZEALAND<br>CONTRACTORS | US<br>ITALY<br>GREECE<br>CONTRACTORS | US<br>PAKISTAN<br>MOROCCO<br>KUWAIT<br>CONTRACTORS            |
| MEDICAL      | INDIA<br>SWEDEN<br>BELGIUM            |                                             | ITALY<br>ARGENTINA<br>ALGERIA        | PAKISTAN                                                      |
|              |                                       |                                             |                                      | BOTSWANA<br>EGYPT<br>NIGERIA<br>TUNISIA<br>TURKEY<br>ZIMBABWE |

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OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Feb. 16, 1993

PAKISTAN/UNITAF

Q: If Pakistan were made part of UNITAF, could the UN be billed for the furnishing of goods and services directly to Pakistan under the current US-UN 607 Agreement and the UN Fund?

A: Yes.

Q: What agreements must be negotiated in order to authorize the furnishing of the goods and services directly to Pakistan if we want to do so under the existing UN 607 Agreement?

A: -- From a strictly legal standpoint, no agreement has to be negotiated at this time. DOD will be billing the UN for goods and services furnished to other countries since early December even in the absence of bilateral agreements.

-- We are, however, negotiating bilateral agreements through military channels with the eligible UNITAF countries in order to obtain good procedures, appropriate end use assurances, etc. These are sound housekeeping agreements, but do not appear to be required by law.

-- We should negotiate such an agreement with Pakistan also if we provide support to them under UNITAF, but it does not have to be negotiated in advance.

Q: Is a 614 waiver required to furnish goods and services to Pakistan under the UN 607 Agreement?

A: A waiver is not required if we furnish traditional services (e.g., logistics, transportation) and non-Munitions List items (e.g., food, water, petrol). A waiver would be needed if we wanted to provide Munitions List articles (guns, bullets) or technical data under the ITAR.

Q: What has to be done to get things moving to authorize support to Pakistan as part of UNITAF and pursuant to the current 607 Agreement?

A: A cable from Washington that has been properly cleared. If the cable directs USCINCCENT to furnish goods and services to Pakistan as part of UNITAF and if no Munitions List articles/technical data are involved, it could go out as soon as the policy clearances are obtained.

Q: Are there any monetary limits on reimbursable support that can be provided under the 607 Agreement?

A: The Agreement and accompanying guidelines preserve at least 85% of Fund proceeds for reimbursement to DOD (approximately \$86 million based on donations to date). We do not know how much of this limit has been exhausted by DOD's provision of support to date.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                             | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 009. report              | The Terrorist Threat in Somalia (5 pages) | 02/03/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                 | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 010. paper               | Quick Reaction Force (1 page) | 03/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
kc4197

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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Mike--

Dolores called to say the passports  
are in Admin, not Lake's office.

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PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                 | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 011. paper               | QRF Command Relationship with UNOSOM (1 page) | 03/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F

ke4197

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 012. paper               | Command of Headquarters Support Forces in Somalia During<br>UNOSOM II (1 page) | 03/04/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

### RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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2201(3).

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                 | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 013. paper               | Presidential Review Directive/NSC-5 (2 pages) | 02/08/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

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|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 014. memo                | State Department Memo, re: Conclusions Reached at the February 26<br>Interagency Working Group Meeting on Somalia (2 pages) | 03/05/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

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|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 015. report              | Re: [Somalia] (7 pages) | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

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|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 016. table               | Military and Political Intervention in Somalia (1 page) | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

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| 017. paper               | Re: [Regional Impact] (1 page) | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

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## Clinton Library

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|            |                                               |            |         |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| 018. paper | U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in Somalia (8 pages) | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1) |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|---------|

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
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# **Humanitarian Relief and National Reconstruction in Somalia**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Before considering the next steps in relief and reconstruction for Somalia, it is important to consider some of its economic realities. **Somalia has never moved beyond a nomadic subsistence economy** dictated primarily by the limited natural resources and harsh environment of the country. **Even during "normal" times, Somalia was dependent on donor assistance** for much of its food requirements, all of its investment and development funding, and a significant part of its recurrent and foreign exchange budget. It is not at all clear that Somalia could ever achieve economic self-sufficiency.

An unprecedented international humanitarian intervention now is underway in Somalia which must be transformed into a cost-effective international rehabilitation and recovery effort. Establishing and maintaining security will allow the Somali people to continue efforts to find peaceful ways of reuniting and governing their country. **US financial and political commitments must be carefully constrained and linked to harshly realistic objectives** and analysis of the type of interventions which are likely to be sustainable.

The United States has taken a highly visible lead position on Somalia over the past four months. **We must concentrate over the remainder of 1993 on facilitating a transition to a strong United Nations led international effort in Somalia,** where primary support comes from traditional bilateral donors and the multi-lateral donor community.

Essential conditions for an **effective long term food supply and distribution system** in Somalia include: movement toward increased food security, focused primarily on **livestock**; a **secure environment** for herders and farmers; increased **donor participation and coordination** in providing necessary inputs; and **participation of the Somali private sector** in marketing agricultural outputs.

Because of the frequency and severity of drought, **farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology.** With improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could perhaps in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption, but since the country's apparent **comparative advantage is livestock production,** a robust trade in livestock commodities appears to be a much sounder development and food security strategy than a goal of cereal self-sufficiency.

Similarly, we do not yet have comprehensive information on the cost of physical reconstruction for Somalia. Estimates range from \$500 million to \$1 billion. We understand that the World Bank and UNDP currently are working to refine these

estimates. We recommend a multi-donor assessment to identify both appropriate interventions and funding mechanisms. **The donor community may want to delay major reconstruction projects until regional governments or other authorities are in place to protect and sustain them.**

Assuming the present security situation does not deteriorate, we anticipate that the U.S. humanitarian program will continue to **focus primarily on emergency activities in 1993 with a gradual move toward rehabilitation programs.** The current US strategy is to **focus on rehabilitation programs in the agriculture and health sectors as well as employment generation activities and refugee repatriation.** The strategy assumes that **other donors will take responsibility for rehabilitation efforts in key sectors such as education.** If the security situation remains stable, we estimate the funding requirements for this strategy to be \$191 million in FY 1993 and \$137 million in FY 1994. Funding sources include A.I.D., State Department, USIS and Department of Agriculture.

**Current US policy in Somalia emphasizes the need to strengthen and rebuild local institutions as the basis for stabilizing relief programs, establishing local security and ultimately bringing about national reconciliation.** Experience with the national government in Somalia over the last two decades argues against recreating most of its institutions in their earlier form. **There are, however, some functions which normally are carried out by national level structures.** Multi-lateral lending institutions normally require the existence of a national government to deal with. Regional governments or authorities may be used for many of these purposes, but delaying national reconciliation may have some consequences.

**Social services and economic production activities can most effectively be carried out at the local and regional level.** Although it is extremely management intensive, this decentralized approach can take advantage of local participatory and national reconciliation initiatives implemented by NGO's. **The international community must work with the Somalis to identify a minimum set of policies and guidelines for the operation of this system.**

**There is no compelling historical evidence that a unified Somalia state will succeed; however, in many communities in Somalia, the establishment of security has allowed for the re-emergence of basic civil society.** We believe that visible US assistance to civic organizations will reinforce their prestige and help to undercut the armed factions which currently dominate southern Somalia.

**A fundamental question is whether development of civic organizations will create or support a social and political environment that will respect individual rights.** The events of the past several decades would indicate that an active civil society can be an important contributing element to political openness, but by itself is insufficient to prevent authoritarian patterns of rule.

allocated and linked to harshly realistic objectives. Establishing and maintaining peace and security will allow the Somali people to continue efforts to find peaceful ways of reuniting and governing their own country. The unity of the territory that was Somalia should not be considered as a necessary or achievable objective; nor should it be a prerequisite for continued assistance.

## **1. Requirements for a Long-term Food Supply and Distribution System:**

Essential conditions for a long term food supply and distribution system to operate in Somalia include: movement toward increased food security; a secure environment for farmers and herders; donor coordination; and responsible participation of the Somali private sector.

**Toward Food Security:** Somalia's economy is based on agriculture - livestock production, subsistence grain production, and relatively new export oriented horticulture. Prior to the current disruptions, agriculture accounted for almost two-thirds of domestic output, over 90 percent of exports, and provided employment for the vast majority of the population. In 1989, 75 percent of Somalia's population lived in rural areas, with one-third in settled agriculture and two-thirds in nomadic and semi-nomadic bands. Livestock production was the major economic activity.

An estimated 700,000 MT of cereal grain is needed annually, of which some 500,000 MT could be produced in Somalia in years of good rains (three out over every ten years). Historically, the shortfall has been met by international relief shipments (20% of total need) and commercial imports (10% of total). As in many parts of Africa, the country's urban population has increasingly moved away from coarse grains and prefers rice, wheat and pasta, all largely imported. With a growing urban population, serious production and marketing constraints, variable and poorly distributed rainfall, and a large proportion of the country not suited to crop production, Somalia is unlikely to become food self sufficient.

The donor community should assume for the current year that the estimated national cereal grain requirements of 700,000 MT will come in equal amounts from local production, relief distributions and commercial imports or monetized donor food. Since the balance between free and monetized donor food varies by area and over time, systems to monitor production and marketing must be strengthened so that food aid does not become a disincentive to local production or private trade.

The livestock sector provides the primary source of calories for most Somalis; its current capacity is unclear. Despite the large numbers of animals stolen, slaughtered and/or dead due to drought large herds of all categories of

livestock are observed in the south and central rangelands and appear in relatively good condition because of good pasture resulting from better than average rains. Significant exports of livestock are taking place, suggesting that commercial trade in livestock is continuing. Livestock health looms as the biggest issue in the sector and should be a focus of donor attention.

Several field assessments of the current crop and livestock situation are planned by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP). Together with information from NGOs providing basic production packages (seeds and tools) for grain production and assistance to herders, it should be possible to refine needs estimates for the rest of 1993 in the next several months.

**Security:** Since the present conflict began, crop production has been devastated by drought, looting, and the resulting displacement of large numbers of settled farmers. Preceding military intervention in December 1992, cultivation of food crops had declined to a tiny fraction of the approximately one million hectares of arable land. Seed stocks were consumed for food.

Because of favorable 1992/93 "der" rains, resettlement of some agricultural households and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided agricultural inputs, there was significant planting in some areas. Preliminary estimates are that cereal production may be up to one third of normal for the short rain season. Continued improvement will depend heavily on security, good rainfall in April-May 1993, and expanded distribution of agricultural inputs, before the "gu" planting season this fall.

**Donor Coordination:** Reviving domestic agriculture while meeting the emergency and relief food import requirements is a major challenge. It is important not to create disincentives for Somali farmers and commercial traders through the free distribution of large amounts of food. At the same time, farmers, like private traders and importers, face a relatively weak demand for agricultural commodities because of low purchasing power of the general population which is impoverished, largely unemployed and presently dependent on outside food aid. This precarious situation calls for careful monitoring by the international community and effective donor coordination on the types and levels of food assistance needed.

**Responsible Private Sector Participation:** Restoring a sustainable food delivery system will depend ultimately on the private sector, including farmers, herders, merchants and commercial importers. The elements of this system are currently in place and only need encouragement, sound policies and a secure operating environment in the towns and countryside. There should not be donor support for trucking fleets and other forms of transportation services, warehousing for grain

or similar public sector-type interventions.

## **2. What is required to achieve various levels of indigenous production?**

Crop production in Somalia is primarily rainfed. Nonetheless, there is substantial scope to restore cereal production in Somalia, even beyond historic high levels of the mid to late 1980's. However, because of the frequency and severity of drought, farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology, even in irrigated areas.

**Irrigation:** Irrigation is limited to the Shebelle and Juba river valley areas. Improved technological packages, inputs and better water management are needed to increase yields in these areas. These and expanded irrigated production are results of long-term development which are not appropriate to a recovery program.

**Inputs:** Draft animal usage is practically unknown despite the large numbers of livestock. Tillage is almost exclusively with hand tools using family labor. This level of technology limits areas of cultivation per household.

Crop production programs should emphasize the multiplication, procurement, and distribution of seeds. Care must be taken to select only those varieties suitable for the unique conditions in Somalia.

Fertilizer usage is very limited so that average crop yields are therefore very low. Significant donor investment in fertilizer would not be effective in the short term because farmers are not accustomed to using it, traditional practices of agronomy will not respond to it, and there are no mechanisms for warehousing and distribution.

In sum, with improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption. But, since the country's apparent comparative advantage is livestock production, a robust trade in livestock commodities appears to be a much sounder long-run strategy than a goal of cereal self-sufficiency.

### **Funding Levels**

**Short term:** The only possible avenue for spurring agricultural rehabilitation in the short-term (the remainder of 1993 and into 1994) is by expanding support to NGOs currently working in the sector. NGO implementation capacity already is severely stretched. Additional funding of some \$30 million could support the following programs:

- continued provision of seeds and tools
- expanded irrigation rehabilitation
- tool making/employment generation for blacksmiths
- livestock health programs
- expanded monitoring capability/data collection

**Medium term:** Expansion of agricultural production in the medium term would assume a secure environment and increased capacity of our operating partners, particularly Somalis. It would require strong U.N. leadership and donor coordination. Given the uncertainties, it is difficult to predict a time frame and a funding level for these interventions. Activities could include:

- importation of basic seed
- survey of canal potential and reservoirs
- increased number of veterinary clinics
- livestock market assessment and promotion

**Longer term:** In the long term we would envision World Bank/IMF as lead agencies. It is not possible to estimate funding levels at this time, however, World Bank and UNDP assessments may provide a clearer picture in the near future. Activities could include:

- expansion of irrigation system
- privatization of veterinary services
- rehabilitation of watering points
- increased use of fertilizer

#### **4. What are the reconstruction assistance requirements, their costs, and possible funding sources?**

There have not yet been any comprehensive estimates of the cost of physical reconstruction for Somalia. Most types of infrastructure have been rendered inoperable, stripped of all salvageable parts or destroyed. Estimates by the UNDP for physical reconstruction in Hargeisa and Burao made in the late 1980's were as high as \$800 million. A.I.D.'s regional office in Nairobi prepared a notional estimate of some \$500 million for the rehabilitation of major urban and rural infrastructure, including roads and telecommunications. REDSO/EA notes that this could easily rise to \$1 billion as more detailed information becomes available.

A World Bank Task Force is preparing a multi-sectoral rehabilitation paper for Somalia that will provide estimates for restoring critical services and facilities. Informal discussions indicate that their initial estimates will probably be below \$500 million for high priority projects over the next several years. UNDP will

prepare a multi-year rehabilitation plan for Somalia over the next nine months. This plan focuses on economic, social and institutional infrastructure, but is unlikely to include technically credible estimates for physical infrastructure.

It would be appropriate for the USG to propose that development of an overall reconstruction plan for Somalia be initiated by a multi-donor group within the next six months. Because the World Bank is generally better equipped than the UN to deal with long-term investment issues, this survey and planning effort should be led by the Bank and include staff from other involved donors and institutions. A Bank led, multi-donor effort is more likely to produce a document that could be acceptable as a common reference and planning instrument by interested donors.

### **Funding Sources**

The United States should not assume responsibility for financing the reconstruction costs of physical infrastructure in Somalia. But U.S. assistance in planning for this effort and U.S. funding of feasibility, survey and design studies are entirely appropriate, particularly if they lead to equal, or privileged, access for U.S. firms bidding on potential reconstruction projects.

Funding for the significant costs of reconstruction should be possible from the IBRD, AFDB, EEC and hopefully Arab aid organizations and from community and some private Somali sources. It is not realistic to expect any regional or national government financing of significant infrastructure costs. "The only contributions might be donations of land or other resources in kind, or schemes under which future revenue streams can be used to repay initial external financing. One of the major advantages of a comprehensive, multi-donor, infrastructure study on Somalia is the opportunity it would present to explore and identify appropriate funding methods. This will be particularly critical in Somalia, where risks are likely to be high and assured returns on investments quite low for the foreseeable future.

### **5. What are the requirements and sources for U.S. assistance funding?**

Funding requirements for U.S. civilian assistance to Somalia are projected for the remainder of FY 93 and for FY 94. During FY 92 and FY 93 most of the USG's support for relief and humanitarian assistance has been channeled through Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) working in Somalia. We expect this will remain true for the rest of FY 93 and FY 94. While the overall costs that the international community will face in Somalia will be substantial, the U.S. share of overall civilian assistance should begin to fall as Somalia's more traditional donors become more active.

## Agency for International Development

**Food aid contributions** are provided under the legislative authority of PL 480 and Sec. 416 (b), by A.I.D. and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In FY 1992 and so far in FY 1993, the USG contributed a total of 317,311 MT valued at \$145.2 million. A.I.D. is considering additional P.L. 480 allocations in FY 93 to support direct feeding programs and market intervention initiatives. Actual commitments will depend on security conditions, other donor contributions, updated needs assessments and indigenous food production.

FY 93 contingency planning for repatriation of Somali refugees now in Kenya will include 20,000 MT, and \$8.3 million. Programming of food for repatriated refugees will be done on the basis of re-directing existing resources from Kenya to Somalia as needed.

FY 94 food assistance requirements from PL 480 and other sources are estimated at \$67.1 million. This excludes possible needs for returning refugees. Depending on actual refugee movements, State/RP and A.I.D. will determine if funding may continue by redirecting existing resources or providing additional resources.

A.I.D. expects to spend at least \$50 million from the \$100 million Sub-Saharan African Disaster Assistance Fund in FY 93 for **relief and rehabilitation activities** in Somalia. This funding level assumes that security conditions do not deteriorate to the extent that airlifts are necessary again, and that they do not radically improve to the extent that widespread rehabilitation is possible.

|               |                |
|---------------|----------------|
| Program Funds | \$29 million   |
| Civ. Airlift  | \$17 million   |
| DOD Airlift   | \$ 3.2 million |

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|                   |                |
|-------------------|----------------|
| Total ADA to date | \$49.2 million |
|-------------------|----------------|

Based on the proposal prepared in January 1993 by the Regional Office in Nairobi, A.I.D. is prepared to program up to \$32 million in funds from the African Disaster Assistance (ADA) Fund and the Development Fund for Africa for rehabilitation activities and recovery preparation in 1993. Actual budgetary impact, the amount of funds required beyond ADA Funds, is estimated at \$12 million.

If requirements for Somalia exceed this level, it will be necessary to seek other funding sources, either IDA funds, borrowing authority from other A.I.D. accounts, or a supplemental.

In FY 94 A.I.D. is currently budgeting \$20 million for emergency relief (and rehabilitation) activities in Somalia. These funds would come from the FY 94 disaster appropriations. This projected budget level assumes that emergency relief needs will decrease, and that rehabilitation funding would come primarily from other (non-disaster) A.I.D. funds.

A.I.D. has made a initial estimate of \$25 million in DFA and other funds for rehabilitation and recovery, to be spent under the special authorities of the Horn of Africa Act and other appropriate authorities for FY 94. This assumes that rehabilitation activities will expand, and that some recovery efforts and reconstruction planning is well along. This level would not permit significant USG funding of infrastructure reconstruction, Commodity Import Programs or other such forms of assistance. There will be an additional cost to A.I.D. of seconded direct hire and contract staff working with the United Nations, and possibly with other international assistance efforts for Somalia. The cost of seconded staff members is not currently known.

#### **State, Bureau for Refugee Programs**

In FY 1993 the Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) will continue to support UN and NGO activities for Somali refugees in the neighboring countries as well as the ICRC efforts inside Somalia itself. While most of the funds contributed from the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account (MRA) will be unearmarked, it is anticipated that at least \$26 million of RP's FY 1993 support could eventually be attributed to addressing the Somali crisis. Additional funding could be available from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund under a Presidential determination to address Somalia cross-border needs and requirements resulting from an organized repatriation program.

As UNITAF forces have asserted control in southern Somalia and the provision of relief supplies has been expanded, the numbers of refugees fleeing Somalia has decreased. To date, only a few thousand refugees have spontaneously returned. However, UNHCR is planning for the relatively quick return of 85 % of the refugees in Kenya contingent on two conditions: 1) assurance of physical security, or minimum assurances against inter-clan fighting and generalized banditry and 2) assurance of material security, or predictability of food supplies up until the next harvest and the presence of a network of humanitarian rehabilitation agencies. UNHCR planning for the repatriation of remaining "Somali-land" refugees in Ethiopia and Djibouti is far less advanced. Given the mobility of Somalis and the interconnectedness of the Horn's pastoralist economy, it is critical to see Somalia as part of a larger catchment area.

In FY 1994, RP will continue to support UNHCR's repatriation program as well as care and maintenance programs in asylum countries for those refugees

unable or unwilling to return home. Assuming that there is relative stability under UNOSOM II, by 1994 it is anticipated that funding for ICRC will be decreased as their operations will most likely be scaled back as UN agencies and NGOs fund relief and rehabilitation programs. Any decrease in RP funding for ICRC is likely to be offset by an increase in the funding for UNHCR's repatriation program. Therefore, RP anticipates that roughly \$25 million will be needed to address the ongoing Somalia situation in FY 1994.

#### **United States Information Agency**

FY 93 - \$124,000

FY 94 - Estimated \$470,000

#### **6. What feasibly can be done to build functioning national and local administrative structures, including police?**

Current U.S. policies in Somalia emphasize the need to strengthen and rebuild local institutions and capabilities both as the basis for stabilizing relief programs and for establishing local security. The same basic process would provide the organizational base for supporting local security forces (auxiliary police, etc.), undertaking local rehabilitation and recovery, and is a major step toward building a new national political system. This policy is consistent with the regionally based approach developed by the previous UN Special Representative in Somalia.

#### **National Government**

Experience with the national government in Somalia over the past two decades argues strongly against rushing to recreate most of its institutions. There are, however, some functions which may be difficult to organize at the regional and local level, and the lack of a national government may delay access of Somalia to multi-lateral funding under the current rules of institutions such as the World Bank.

In the coming year, while the dialogue on national reconciliation continues and local and regional rebuilding continues and strengthens, interim, internationally mandated authorities are needed to carry out critical functions. These functions could include coordination among regional police forces, establishing a monetary authority, and operating postal telecommunications and air traffic control services. Such authorities could be based on consortia of donors, NGOs and Somalis, or by more regional (Horn of Africa) groupings where appropriate, operating under United Nations mandate.

provide an extremely sound basis within which to develop local systems.

## **7. What can be done to build a civil society in Somalia that respects political and individual rights?**

Since it was given its independence thirty years ago, Somalia has been under various forms of authoritarian rule for most of its brief history. In the place of the relatively unified regime under Barre, there is now an undesirable combination of fragmented and warring regimes, most of which are authoritarian. The imposition of order by outside military forces is clearly an extraordinarily undesirable way to enforce a modest level of stability, and only buys time for Somalis to attempt to work out a new basis for a nation. The current attempt at moving toward a single nation-state, based on some system of federation, may or may not succeed.

In some communities and towns in Somalia, the establishment of peace has allowed for the re-emergence of basic forms of civil society -- governance, the maintenance of security, the provision of basic services and various forms of social, cultural and religious activities. The objective of international efforts to strengthen the basis of a peaceful and productive Somalia must be to encourage and spread locally initiated and valued patterns of interaction.

Efforts are underway to encourage and support the establishment of local security forces. These must be paralleled by the establishment of functioning judicial systems and locally relevant legal structures. There is a widespread need to train judicial authorities in the impartial administration of justice. International support is being sought for this effort (Italy), and future A.I.D. and other U.S. Government support will be available as part of broader support for the development of civil society, systems of governance and human rights monitoring groups, including support to the UNHRC. Most locally based and organized relief and rehabilitation projects will also serve to strengthen local authorities and institutions.

USIA already has been able to initiate a number of successful efforts to identify and encourage professional, civic, sports and cultural groups in Mogadishu and other stabilized towns. These efforts have demonstrated that there is a strong and long pent-up desire for civil society to be built on.

There are a number of approaches to supporting and encouraging various institutions and activities that will strengthen civil society in Somalia, if security can be maintained. Although management intensive, we can accomplish two goals with relatively small grants to Somali civic organizations. First, all groups require some material help to function and small project grants are an efficient way to assist them. Secondly, visible American assistance to these groups will

reinforce their prestige and undercut the armed factions which currently dominate Somalia. However, care must be taken to avoid creating dependency on U.S. funding. Self sufficiency and voluntarism must be overarching values in our assistance approach. The empowerment of Somali civic organizations and Somali civil society generally will weaken the current perverse incentive system which rewards the gunmen and ignores the healthy elements of society.

According to USLO Mogadishu reporting, many intellectuals and other potential civil sector leaders remained in Somalia despite opportunities to leave and defended the remnants of civic order at the risk of their own lives, a risk that continues today. Somalis are ready to begin the restoration of a normal society, but need assistance to be successful.

We will need to send in Americans and U.S. trained Somali's (whether or not they are U.S. citizens) for short and medium term visits to run seminars in conjunction with Somali host organizations and advise civil sector groups. Sending Somalis to the United States as participants in exchange programs is probably premature. Assistance must be carefully gauged to avoid overwhelming local groups or threatening their independence. Help to the civil sector should be disbursed through a series of small grants, much like the A.I.D. program in South Africa.

USIS has identified what they consider to be immediate needs in the areas of education, support to the local press, justice, women's groups and sports activities. These types of activities are illustrative of the broader range of activities that will emerge as more of the country becomes secure. Beyond pursuing its own core programs, USIS will manage self-help and other USG-funded small projects which would promote the development of a civil society in Somalia.

The more fundamental question is whether the development of cross-cutting forms of civic, cultural, professional and religious activity in Somalia will necessarily create or support a social and political environment that will respect political and individual rights, or lead to political systems that will promote the peaceful maintenance and transfer of power. The events of the past several decades in Somalia would indicate that an active level of civil society can be an important contributing element to political openness, but by itself is insufficient to prevent authoritarian patterns of rule from being established.

### **A Strategy for U.S. Economic and Technical Assistance to Somalia**

The United States has taken a prominent and visible role in the UN mandated intervention in Somalia. We cannot realistically abandon the precedent setting international effort now underway, without running the risk of Somalia

returning to the chaos of the past two years, further discrediting the United Nations as an effective force for international mediation and problem solving. We need to pursue a strategy which will strongly support the United Nations' efforts in Somalia and will shift the leadership and financial burden to other donor nations.

We must strengthen the civilian side of UNOSOM II so that an invigorated and expanded UN presence in Somalia can assume a more aggressive and effective role in relief and rehabilitation efforts. USG agencies have supported UN operations by providing funds, personnel and material resources. We currently are looking at ways to supplement UN staffing for the UNOSOM II phase so it can become an effective and credible force in Somalia.

UNDP has already initiated plans to carry out a multi-year planning exercise for the rehabilitation of Somalia to be completed primarily by outside experts and consultants by the end of 1993. The detailed scope of this effort is still not available, but it appears to focus on restoring basic services and institutions, rather than long term reconstruction.

Longer term physical and institutional reconstruction efforts will be the most costly item, other than ongoing military expenditures, in the international community's efforts to rebuild Somalia. The best way to achieve a credible and realistic plan for this effort, that will attract as much international financial support as possible, is for the World Bank to be asked to organize an International Consortium for the Reconstruction of Somalia. The first stage of such an effort would involve two parallel steps. One is to convene a working group, including Somali experts, to recommend the basic policy framework for a reconstructed Somali economy.

The second step is to prepare a detailed technical and financial plan for the physical reconstruction of Somalia. This effort should be led by the World Bank, staffed by consultants and experts (including Somalis) jointly funded by participating donors, and produce a comprehensive plan for the medium term (5 year) reconstruction of Somali infrastructure. As conditions and political reconciliation permit, this would be used as the basis for international funding of the gradual rebuilding of Somalia. Much of this effort would initially focus on regional reconstruction rather than work at the national level.

The third element is to promote the reconstruction of Somalia is the vitalization and strengthening of the group of neighboring Horn of Africa Group of countries which have been involved in political reconciliation and peace efforts in Somalia. This organization should be provided with support, and encouraged to maintain ongoing consultations with Somalia, the international reconstruction consortia and the UN. This organization represents a critical force in ensuring

that potential problems and conflicts are discussed and peacefully mediated by the involved countries in the region. It will be critical for the political reconciliation process to ensure that pressures and interventions from neighboring countries are carefully managed. Such an organization would also have the longer term value of providing a venue for actions on regional issues of common concern and interest, and ultimately as a basis for regional economic and political cooperation.

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March 4, 1993

## U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA OPERATIONS

### Funding Requirements

-- The estimated U.S. funding requirement to support peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia is \$174 million for the rest of FY 1993 (March-September) and \$366 million for FY 1994. The funds to support these requirements are included in agencies' FY 1993 budgets and FY 1994 budget requests. (Detailed table attached.)

-- Support for peacekeeping operations includes State Department funding for the U.S. assessed share (31 percent) of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II): remaining FY 1993 funds totalling \$121 million and FY 1994 request of \$223 million.

Defense Department funding for the U.S. troop contribution to UNOSOM II (i.e., incremental military personnel costs, including hazardous duty and family separation pay): remaining FY 1993 funds of \$6 million and FY 1994 request of \$6 million.

-- Peacekeeping funding estimates do not credit Defense troop contribution costs against the U.S. assessed payment. The UN has not agreed to this approach. A high level State/USUN/UN consultation would be required to pursue this idea.

State staff believe that if countries with large peacekeeping assessments credit their in-kind contributions to reduce their assessed payments it would result in UN cash shortages and hinder peacekeeping operations world-wide.

-- Support for humanitarian assistance totals \$35 million for the rest of FY 1993 and \$112 million for FY 1994. This includes food aid, disaster relief and refugee assistance funding provided by State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Defense Department to support bilateral and multilateral (e.g., international organizations and private voluntary organizations) assistance.

WE must  
change this.

We need  
some  
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off

March 2, 1993

U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA OPERATION

Humanitarian Assistance  
(\$ in millions)

| <u>Activity</u> | <u>Remaining<br/>FY 1993<br/>Req'mnt</u> | <u>FY 1994<br/>Req'mnt</u> | <u>Description</u>                                                                                                              | <u>Funding Source/Availability</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Food Aid        | \$0                                      | \$ 67                      | Direct food aid (i.e., agricultural commodities and ancillary costs of transport) and market intervention (e.g., monetization). | <p>USDA/State/AID/P.L. 480 Title II of the Foreign Assistance Act. Section 416 of the Agriculture Act of 1949 may provide additional available authority.</p> <p><u>FY 1993</u> U.S. has provided \$103 million in food aid (approx. 237 thousand metric tons of food) from these sources.</p> <p><u>FY 1994</u> budget request assumes \$67 million in food aid for Somalia.</p> |

| <u>Activity</u>         | <u>Remaining<br/>FY 1993<br/>Req'mnt</u> | <u>FY 1994<br/>Req'mnt</u> | <u>Description</u>                                                                                                         | <u>Funding Source/Availability</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Disaster Relief         | 20                                       | 20                         | Disaster and relief assistance; assumes no resumption of airlifts. Includes a small number of rehabilitation projects.     | <p>AID/African Disaster Assistance (ADA), International Disaster Assistance (IDA) or other, i.e., AID "borrowing" authorities.</p> <p><u>FY 1993</u> U.S. has already provided \$30 million in disaster relief. The additional \$20 million will be funded from the Africa Disaster Assistance and International Disaster Assistance accounts.</p> <p><u>FY 1994</u> \$20 million for Somalia included in disaster assistance budget request.</p> |
| DOD Disaster Assistance | 10                                       | 0                          | Military assistance, in-kind goods and services, to help support emergency humanitarian assistance operations of UNOSOM I. | <p>Defense/Disaster Assistance funding for global disaster relief. FY 1993 DOD Appropriation makes \$50 million available for global disasters. \$10.3 million committed to Somalia leaving \$39.7 million available.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |

March 2, 1993

U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA OPERATION

Rehabilitation  
(\$ in millions)

| <u>Activity</u> | <u>Remaining<br/>FY 1993<br/>Req'ment<sup>1</sup></u> | <u>FY 1994<br/>Req'ment</u> | <u>Description</u>                                                                                                                                                                                      | <u>Funding Source/Availability</u>                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Rehabilitation  | 12                                                    | 25                          | Funds limited rehabilitation and recovery projects (e.g., road construction). Assumes rehabilitation projects will expand and other donor countries will make significant contributions to this effort. | AID/Development Fund for Africa has budgeted FY 1993 resources to cover this requirement. Funding for FY 1994 is included in the budget request for the Development Fund for Africa and Disaster Assistance accounts. |

<sup>1</sup> Remaining (March-September) FY 1993 requirement.

Attachment  
March 2, 1992

Potential Additional Funding Sources for Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Assistance  
(\$ in millions)

| <u>Item</u>                                    | <u>Amount<br/>Available</u> | <u>Comment</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <u>DOD Sources of Humanitarian Assistance:</u> | <u>87.2</u>                 | (DOD estimates as of 2/26/93.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <u>Disaster Assistance</u>                     | (21.5)                      | <u>Sources:</u> FY 92 DOD Appropriation Sec. 8105A allows DOD to use \$25 million for unanticipated costs of DOD disaster relief activities. \$3.5 million used to date was for Somalia.                                                      |
| <u>Disaster Assistance</u>                     | (39.7)                      | <u>Sources:</u> FY 93 DOD Appropriation makes \$50 million available under the "Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies" heading for DOD global disaster relief activities. Another \$39.7 million available after the Somali commitment. |
| <u>Contingencies</u>                           | (14.0)                      | <u>Sources:</u> FY 93 DOD Appropriation allows DOD to support global contingencies/emergencies with \$25 million from the CINC initiatives account. Amounts committed to date were used for requirements other than Somalia.                  |

| <u>Item</u>                                               | <u>Amount Available</u> | <u>Comment</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <u>Humanitarian Assistance</u>                            | (12.0)                  | <u>Sources:</u> FY 93 DOD Appropriation and FY 93 National Defense Authorization Act, Sec. 304 make \$28 million available for DOD humanitarian assistance efforts. \$13 million has been used for global relief, including Somalia and \$3 million is set aside for Kurdish relief. DOD says remainder needed for other relief operations (e.g., Bosnia). |
| <u>Other State/AID Authorities Sources of Assistance:</u> | <u>140.0</u>            | (There may be other claims on the resources listed below.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| <u>Disaster Relief</u>                                    | (25.0)                  | <u>Sources:</u> Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Sec. 451 allows the President to use up to \$25 million in already enacted appropriations under the FAA for "unanticipated contingencies." Full \$25 million available.                                                                                                                                       |
| <u>Disaster Relief and Refugee Assistance</u>             | (75.0)                  | <u>Sources:</u> FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) permits the President to draw down up to \$75 million worth of DOD goods and services for disaster relief and refugee assistance. Full \$75 million available.                                                                                                                                                          |
| <u>UN Peacekeeping</u>                                    | (40.0)                  | <u>Sources:</u> FAA Sec. 552(c) allows transfer of \$15 million in cash from other FAA accounts and \$25 million in kind from any USC agency for peacekeeping. Full \$40 million available.                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>TOTAL, Potential Additional Funding Sources</b>        | <b>227.2</b>            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |

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*Dick Clarke*

## **Draft Resolution on Expansion of UNOSOM**

**The Security Council,**

**Reaffirming its resolutions 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, and 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992.**

**Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,**

**Acknowledging the need for a prompt transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM,**

**Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia,**

**Deeply concerned that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,**

**Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,**

**Considering the restoration of law and order in Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, and the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,**

**Stressing the desire to assist the people of Somalia to participate in free and fair elections when conditions permit,**

- 2 -

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored preparatory conference on Somali political reconciliation held in Addis Ababa January 4-5, 1993,

Noting the report of states concerned of 17 December 1992 (S/24976) and of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 (S/24992) on the implementation of resolution 794 and the attainment of the objective of the establishment of a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/24992) and endorses the recommendations contained therein;
2. Urges the parties concerned to work toward the disbanding of all paramilitary and irregular forces in Somalia;
3. Decides to expand the size of UNOSOM and its mandate to ensure the maintenance of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations taking all appropriate actions against elements threatening that secure environment, and to promote reconciliation and a political settlement in Somalia;
4. Calls upon the Secretary-General and, through him, the

- 3 -

UNOSOM Commander, to take actions necessary to implement this mandate; and to this end:

- a) to take, as a matter of priority, all necessary measures in order to disarm the warring factions and place their heavy weapons under UNOSOM control, in accordance with the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 15 January 1993;
  - b) to deploy UNOSOM throughout Somalia, including the border areas, such deployments to be carried out under the exclusive authority of the United Nations and not subject to the agreement of any local authorities;
  - c) to ensure the effective monitoring of the cease-fire in coordination and cooperation with the appropriate Somali authorities and factions, pursuant to the agreement reached at the informal preparatory meeting held at Addis Ababa in January 1993;
  - d) to take all necessary measures to ensure full compliance by all concerned with the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia as called for in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 733 (1992).
- \* 5. Calls upon the Secretary-General to direct the Commander of UNOSOM, upon a determination by the Commander of UNITAF submitted by the Member State concerned that a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations has been established in a part of Somalia, to assume responsibility for the maintenance of secured sectors as part of a phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to assist the Somali people to achieve a political reconciliation;

- 4 -

and to this end calls upon the Secretary-General to convene a national reconciliation conference taking into account the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 1993, as well as the need to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somali movements, factions, community leaders, women, intellectuals, elders ... are suitably represented in that conference.

7. Calls upon the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for Somalia and with assistance, as appropriate, from UNOSOM and all appropriate United Nations offices and specialized agencies;

- a) to provide for the establishment of indigenous police forces to assist in the restoration of peace, stability and law and order in Somalia;
- b) to provide for the maintenance and repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;
- c) to assist the people of Somalia in the reestablishment of basic public services and the rehabilitation of their economy;
- d) to assist the people of Somalia in the establishment of democratic institutions; and
- e) to receive, collect and preserve information relating to serious violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia;

Calls upon all organs, agencies and programmes of the United Nations, especially the United Nations Development Programme, to assign priority to extending all possible assistance to the Somali people in pursuing comprehensive and coordinated measures

- 5 -

towards the rehabilitation of the reconstruction of Somalia.

8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council within 15 days containing his recommendations for the expansion of UNOSOM and further reports as soon as possible thereafter for implementing the provisions of this resolution;

9. Requests United Nations agencies, Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to extend, in coordination with the Secretary-General, financial, material and technical support to the people of Somalia;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

**OUTGOING FACSIMILE****DATE: 3 March 1993**

|                                                                 |                                                             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>TO: Ambassador Walker<br/>US Mission<br/>to the UN</b>       | <b>FROM: Elisabeth Lindenmayer<br/>Senior Officer, DPKO</b> |
| <b>FAX NO: 415-4415</b>                                         | <b>FAX NO: 963-6460</b>                                     |
| <b>ATTN:</b>                                                    |                                                             |
| <b>TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 6</b> |                                                             |

The attached has been discussed with Mr. Annan and General Baril. May I attract your attention to paragraph 5 which needs clarification.

Copy to:  
Mr. Fromuth  
Colonel Kearney

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 019. paper               | US Policy Toward Somalia (6 pages) | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                            | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 020. cable               | Re: 3/12/93: Perm 5 Counselors Meet for Intial Review of Somalia<br>Resolution (3 pages) | 03/13/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

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Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
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of gift.

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2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

<DIST>SIT: CLARKER JETT RAGLE VAX

<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI>RUEHCAA<DTG>131754Z MAR 93  
<ORIG>SECSTATE WASHDC  
<TO>RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0000  
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC 0000

<SUBJ> SOMALIA: REVISED TEXT OF NEW UNSC RESOLUTION

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 077036  
USUN POL:FROMUTH, SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AS, JCS/J5  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MARR' MOPS, EAID, UNSC, SO  
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: REVISED TEXT OF NEW UNSC RESOLUTION  
REF: A) STATE 67709

B) FROMUTH-WEINTRAUB FAX RESOLUTION OF 3/9/93

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. DEPARTMENT ACKNOWLEDGES FURTHER UN REVISION OF US  
DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM II  
(REF B). PARA. 3 BELOW CONTAINS A FURTHER USG DRAFT  
TEXT. MISSION IS REQUESTED TO PRESENT NEW DRAFT TEXT FOR  
UN VIEWS BEFORE BEGINNING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SC  
PERM-5. EXPLANATORY NOTES IN PARA. 4 BELOW MAY BE USED TO  
EXPLAIN CHANGES TO UN OFFICIALS.

-----  
3. REVISED DRAFT TEXT, SOMALIA FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION  
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 794 (1992) OF 3 DECEMBER 1992,  
775 (1992) OF 28 AUGUST 1992, 767 (1992) OF 27 JULY 1992,  
751 (1992) OF 24 APRIL 1992, 746 (1992) OF 17 MARCH 1992.  
AND 733 (1992) OF 23 JANUARY 1992,  
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF MEMBER STATES ACTING PURSUANT TO  
RESOLUTION 794 (1992) TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT  
FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA,  
ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED FOR A PROMPT, SMOOTH AND  
STEP-BY-STEP TRANSITION FROM THE UNIFIED TASK FORCE TO  
UNOSOM.

NOTING WITH DEEP REGRET AND CONCERN THE CONTINUING REPORT  
OF WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  
AND THE GENERAL ABSENCE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOMALIA,  
RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA BEAR THE PRINCIPAL  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND  
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY,  
NOTING THE NEED FOR CONTINUED HUMANITARIAN RELIEF  
ASSISTANCE AND FOR THE REHABILITATION OF SOMALIA'S  
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY

EXPRESSING ITS APPRECIATION TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN  
UNITY, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF  
THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOR THEIR COOPERATION WITH, AND  
SUPPORT OF, THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN SOMALIA,  
FURTHER EXPRESSING ITS APPRECIATION TO ALL MEMBER STATES  
WHICH HAVE MADE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FUND ESTABLISHED  
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 11 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION  
794 (1992)

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/01/17

2012-0689-f

CONVINCED THAT THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER THROUGHOUT SOMALIA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS, RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. AS WELL AS TO THE REHABILITATION OF SOMALIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, EXPRESSING ITS READINESS TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA TO PARTICIPATE IN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT, ENCOURAGING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR WORK AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN REHABILITATING THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, WELCOMING THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE UNITED NATIONS-SPONSORED INFORMAL PREPARATORY MEETING ON SOMALI POLITICAL RECONCILIATION HELD IN ADDIS ABABA JANUARY 4-15 JANUARY 1993, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE CONCLUSION OF THE THREE AGREEMENTS BY THE SOMALI PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND FACTIONS, AS REPORTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/25168, INCLUDING ANNEXES), NOTING THE REPORTS OF STATES CONCERNED (S/ ) AND OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 19 DECEMBER 1992 (S/24992) AND 26 JANUARY 1993 (S/25168) ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 794, HAVING EXAMINED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT (S/25354 OF 3 MARCH 1993), DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA CONTINUES TO THREATEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION, ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS;

1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (S/25354) AND ENDORSES THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN;
2. DECIDES TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF UNOSOM AND ITS MANDATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/25354, PARAS. 56-75);
3. AUTHORIZES THE MANDATE FOR THE EXPANDED UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1993, UNLESS PREVIOUSLY RENEWED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL;
4. EMPHASIZES THE URGENCY OF CONTINUING THE EFFORTS AT DISARMAMENT THROUGHOUT SOMALIA AS DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/25354);
5. WELCOMES THE CONVENING OF A THIRD UNITED NATIONS COORDINATION MEETING FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR SOMALIA IN ADDIS ABABA FROM 11 TO 13 MARCH 1993 AND CALLS UPON GOVERNMENTS TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO THE 1993 PROGRAM FOR RELIEF AND REHABILITATION FOR SOMALIA;
6. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND FACTIONS IN SOMALIA COMPLY FULLY WITH THE COMMITMENTS THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN IN THE AGREEMENTS THEY CONCLUDED AT THE ADDIS ABABA INFORMAL PREPARATORY MEETING, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH THEIR AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE AND ON MODALITIES OF DISARMAMENT (S/25168. ANNEX III);
7. FURTHER DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND FACTIONS IN SOMALIA TAKE ALL MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES AS WELL AS THE STAFF OF THE ICRC AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED IN PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN REHABILITATING

THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY AND PROMOTING  
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION;

8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MONITOR AND ENFORCE  
FROM WITHIN SOMALIA THE ARMS EMBARGO ESTABLISHED BY  
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 733 (23 JANUARY 1992).  
UTILIZING THE EXPANDED UNOSOM FORCES (UNOSOM II)  
AUTHORIZED BY THIS RESOLUTION, AND TO REPORT ON THIS  
SUBJECT, WITH ANY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MORE EFFECTIVE  
MEASURES IF NECESSARY, TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL;

9. CALLS UPON ALL STATES, IN PARTICULAR NEIGHBORING  
STATES, TO COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMS  
EMBARGO ESTABLISHED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 733;

10. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROVIDE SECURITY,  
AS APPROPRIATE, TO ASSIST IN THE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES  
AND THE ASSISTED RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS,  
UTILIZING UNOSOM II FORCES;

11. REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT ALL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS,  
AND FACTIONS IN SOMALIA IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST FROM  
ALL BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND  
REAFFIRMS THAT THOSE WHO COMMIT OR ORDER THE COMMISSION OF  
SUCH ACTS WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT  
OF SUCH ACTS;

12. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THROUGH HIS SPECIAL  
REPRESENTATIVE, TO DIRECT THE COMMANDER OF UNOSOM II TO  
ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSOLIDATION, EXPANSION AND  
MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT THROUGHOUT SOMALIA ON  
AN EXPEDITED BASIS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS  
CONTAINED IN HIS REPORT (S/25354);

13. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THROUGH HIS SPECIAL  
REPRESENTATIVE, TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER  
ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN REHABILITATING  
THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY AND PROMOTING  
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, IN  
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN HIS  
REPORT (S/25354). INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR:

A) TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF RELIEF AND IN THE  
ECONOMIC REHABILITATION OF SOMALIA INCLUDING THE RETURN  
TO THEIR HOMES OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED  
PERSONS. BEARING IN MIND THE NEED FOR JOBS AND WORK FOR  
UNEMPLOYED;

B) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA TO PROMOTE AND ADVANCE  
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND THE REESTABLISHMENT OF  
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL  
ADMINISTRATION IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY;

C) TO ASSIST IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF INDIGENOUS POLICE  
AUTHORITY TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF  
PEACE. STABILITY AND LAW AND ORDER, INCLUDING THE  
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF  
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

D) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN REMOVING MINES  
THROUGHOUT SOMALIA, !8, :)7\$8,& 5#3 35-?)8#.3,5 9! -

:9#343,5 -, \$ 8,53&4-53\$ 049&4-. !94 5#3 43.9;-) 9! 7:#  
.8,3;

E) TO DEVELOP APPROPRIATE PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN  
SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA;

14. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAINTAIN THE FUND  
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 794 FOR THE PURPOSE OF  
RECEIVING CONTRIBUTIONS FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE EXPANDED  
UNOSOM FORCES FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF UNITAF FORCES AND  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIGENOUS POLICE AUTHORITY AND CALLS

ON MEMBER STATES TO MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS FUND;

15. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE INFORMAL PREPARATORY MEETING HELD IN ADDIS ABABA IN JANUARY 1993, AND OTHER CONFERENCES AS APPROPRIATE. AND HIS EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT, AS APPROPRIATE ALL SOMALI MOVEMENTS, FACTIONS, COMMUNITY LEADERS, WOMEN, INTELLECTUALS, ELDERS AND OTHER GROUPS ARE SUITABLY REPRESENTED AT SUCH CONFERENCES;

16. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ICRC FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTION AND ASSISTANCE AND REQUESTS THEM TO CONTINUE TO EXTEND. IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, FINANCIAL, MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE SOMALI PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY;

17. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ESTABLISH A FUND TO RECEIVE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM STATES AND OTHERS TO ASSIST IN THE REHABILITATION OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY OF SOMALIA;

18 REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL FULLY INFORMED ON ACTION TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND ON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN ACCOMPLISHING THE PURPOSES SET OUT IN IT;

19. DECIDES TO CONDUCT A FORMAL REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING THE PURPOSES OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 31, 1993;

20. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

-----  
4. EXPLANATORY NOTES  
-----

THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATORY NOTES MAY BE HELPFUL IN RESPONDING TO UN SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS ON WHY VARIOUS SECTIONS IN THEIR LATEST DRAFT RESOLUTION (REF B) WERE DROPPED OR AMENDED. PREAMBULAR (PP) OR OPERATIVE (PP) PARAGRAPH NUMBERS CITED BELOW REFER TO THE LATEST UN DRAFT TEXT (REF B)/LATEST US TEXT (ABOVE), RESPECTIVELY.

-- PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS

PP 3/PP 3: WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE ON THE RECORD THAT THE UNITAF-TO-UNOSOM II TRANSITION BE PROMPT, AS WELL AS SMOOTH AND STEP-BY-STEP; THESE CHARACTERISTICS ARE IN NO WAY CONTRADICTORY. AND ALL MAY BE INCLUDED.

FP 5/PP 15: THIS PARAGRAPH, IN KEEPING WITH GENERAL UNSC PRACTICE, ESTABLISHES THE CONDITION NECESSARY FOR CHAPTER VII ACTION AND HAS BEEN RELOCATED TO THE PENULTIMATE LOCATION IN THE PREAMBULAR SECTION.

PP 7/PP 6: SECOND HALF OF THIS PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO MAKE IT CONSISTENT WITH OTHER, SIMILAR REFERENCES IN THIS AND PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS.

PP 13/PP 12: WE BELIEVE IT IS TOO EARLY AT THIS POINT TO UTILIZE LANGUAGE ENDORSING THE IDEA OF A SINGLE CONFERENCE ON "NATIONAL" RECONCILIATION; HENCE, OUR PREFERENCE FOR LANGUAGE OMITTING SUCH A REFERENCE.

--OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS

THE SECRETARIAT-PROPOSED OP 2 PURPORTS TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE QTE MANDATE UNQTE FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THE UNOSOM OPERATION. IT FAILS TO DISTINGUISH. HOWEVER BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL UN PEACEKEEPING FUNCTION INVOLVING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES-- WHETHER UNDER CHAPTER VI OR CHAPTER

VII--AND THE NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF UN ACTIVITIES SUCH AS REHABILITATION OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY. TRADITIONALLY, RESOLUTIONS APPROVE OF THE QTE MANDATE UNQTE FOR THE MILITARY ASPECTS AND PROVIDE A DATE FOR TERMINATION OR RENEWAL OF SUCH A FORCE. THE TERM QTE MANDATE UNQTE TRADITIONALLY IS NOT USED IN SC RESOLUTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE UN; SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE RATHER ADDRESSED IN SUCH RESOLUTIONS BY REQUESTS TO THE SYG. WHILE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT BOTH ASPECTS OF UNOSOM'S ACTIVITIES AS CALLED FOR IN THE SYG'S REPORT--THE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY--ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT, THE TWO ASPECTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED IN THE RESOLUTION--AS THEY ARE IN THE SYG'S REPORT. WE MUST ALSO ESTABLISH A DATE TO REVIEW AND RENEW THE MILITARY MANDATE. THIS PROCEDURE REFLECTS THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE IS USUALLY INCLUDED IN THE SYG'S REPORT, BUT IS NOT REFLECTED IN S/25354. WE ALSO NEED TO REVIEW THE OTHER, NON-MILITARY ASPECTS. FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THESE AND OTHER CHANGES REFLECTED IN THE LATEST US DRAFT TEXT.

OP 2/OP 2: WE REVERT TO THE LANGUAGE IN OUR EARLIER DRAFT (REF A) TO PROVIDE GREATER SPECIFICITY FOR EXACTLY WHAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS CALLING FOR. THIS PARAGRAPH REFERS SPECIFICALLY TO THE UNOSOM FORCES, AS DISCUSSED IN THE REF PARAS OF THE SYG'S REPORT AND NOT THE OVERALL UN OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA (ALSO GOING BY THE UNOSOM ACRONYM). --/OP 3 (IN US VERSION ONLY): THIS ADDED PARAGRAPH, NOT/NOT PRESENT IN REF B, ESTABLISHES AN AUTHORIZATION PERIOD FOR UNOSOM II' SUBJECT TO RENEWAL BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

OP 6/OP 7: WE BELIEVE OUR OWN LANGUAGE (REF A, PARA 3) IS BETTER, BEING MORE INCLUSIVE, BUT ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UN LANGUAGE IN DESCRIBING THE PEOPLE WHOSE SAFETY IS TO BE ENSURED.

OP 7/OP 8: WE BELIEVE THE LANGUAGE CALLING FOR ACTION ON THE ARMS EMBARGO NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED AND INCLUDE A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO USE OF UNOSOM II FORCES.

OP 9/OP 10: LANGUAGE CALLING FOR SECURITY FOR RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS ALSO NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED, AS PROVIDED IN OUR SUGGESTED CHANGE.

OP 11/OP 12: REFERENCE TO THE SYG ACTING THROUGH HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IS OVER THE MILITARY AS WELL AS THE NON- MILITARY UN OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA.

OP 12/OP 13: REFERENCE TO THE SYG ACTING THROUGH HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED; OTHER LANGUAGE IS CHANGED OR ADDED FOR CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER PARAGRAPHS IN THE RESOLUTION.

OP 12(B)/OP 13(B): PREFER TO REVERT TO "THE PEOPLE" (VICE "POPULATION") FOR CONSISTENCY WITH PAST REFERENCES.

OP 12(C)/OP 13(C): PREFER TO AVOID MENTION OF A SINGLE POLICE FORCE, AS THIS MIGHT FORECLOSE OTHER OPTIONS (E.G., REGIONAL FORCES).

OP 12(D)/OP 13(D): DOES THE SYG PLAN ONLY TO ESTABLISH A DEMINING PROGRAM, OR WILL HE ALSO ASSIST THE SOMALIS IN DEMINING? WE PREFER TO STAY WITH THE BROADER PROGRAM.

OP 13/OP 14: EXPANDED USE OF THE FUND, SUCH AS FOR POLICE. SHOULD BE CHECKED CAREFULLY WITH THE JAPANESE; AGAIN WE PREFER TO AVOID MENTION OF A SINGLE POLICE

FORCE, AS THIS MIGHT FORECLOSE OTHER OPTIONS (E.G.,  
REGIONAL FORCES).

OP 14/OP 15: AGAIN WE PREFER TO AVOID MENTION OF A SINGLE  
CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

OP 15/OP 18: LANGUAGE ACCEPTED, BUT MOVED FURTHER DOWN IN  
THE RESOLUTION.

--/OP 17 (IN US VERSION ONLY): REQUESTS THE SYG TO  
ESTABLISH A NEW FUND FOR THIS EFFORT.

--/OP 19 (IN US VERSION ONLY): CALLS FOR A FORMAL REVIEW  
OF PROGRESS NO LATER THAN 12/31/93.

CHRISTOPHER

NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN>7036<STOR>930313130703 M0278424  
<TOR>930313132608

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                 | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 021. list                | Somalia Core Group Meeting [partial] (1 page) | 03/04/1993 | P3/b(3)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F

ke4197

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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Somalia Core Group Meeting  
Thursday, March 4, 1993, 4:30 P.M.  
(SVTS)

Chaired by: Randy Beers

JCS

|               |                |
|---------------|----------------|
| Frank Bowman  | (703) 695-6585 |
| Col Baltimore | (703) 695-6585 |

OSD

|                |                |
|----------------|----------------|
| Jim Woods      | (703) 697-2864 |
| Donald Johnson | (703) 697-2864 |

STATE

|                   |          |
|-------------------|----------|
| Marty Cheshes     | 647-9742 |
| William Garvelink | 647-9742 |
| David Shinn       | 647-9742 |
| Melinda Kimble    | 647-9604 |
| John Piazza       | 647-8698 |

AID

|                |          |
|----------------|----------|
| Dayton Maxwell | 647-8924 |
|----------------|----------|

OMB

|              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| Gordon Adams | x4657 |
|--------------|-------|

(b)(3)

[021]

OVP

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Jim Carmen | x6033 |
|------------|-------|

NSC

|             |       |
|-------------|-------|
| Randy Beers | x5066 |
| Dennis Jett | x3391 |

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
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| 022. cable               | [Incomplete cable re: Somalia] (1 page) | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0173

January 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY/RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Additional Somalia Points for Christopher/Boutros Meeting

The memo at Tab I provides additional points on Somalia for use by Secretary Christopher in his February 1 meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The approach is consistent with the decisions made by the President on this subject.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Marc Grossman  
Tab A Additional Talking Points  
Tab II State Department paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/10/17

202-0059-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0173

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Additional Somalia Points for Meeting with  
Boutros-Ghali

Attached are additional talking points on Somalia for use by Secretary Christopher at his meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on February 1. The points and approach are consistent with the decisions made by the President on this subject.

William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachments  
Tab A Additional Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/01/17  
2012-0659-F

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|                         |                                                             |            |         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| 023a. talking<br>points | Additional Points for Christopher-Boutros Meeting (4 pages) | 01/00/1993 | P1/b(1) |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------|

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



## United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 29, 1993

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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Paper on Somalia for the Secretary's Meeting  
with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, February 1

The attached briefing paper for the Secretary's February 1  
meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was prepared  
following the Principals' meeting of January 28.



Marc Grossman  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Briefing Paper on Somalia.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 02/01/17  
2012-0659-F

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE    | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------|-------------|
| 023b. briefing<br>paper  | Somalia (1 page) | 01/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)  
OA/Box Number: 2986

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Core Group [1]

2012-0659-F  
ke4197

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Date: 28 Jan 93

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: LTG Johnston's "Commander's Assessment  
of Operation Restore Hope"

Just received from Joint Staff, which just got it from CENTCOM, faxed in from Mogadishu. Note the final paragraph on page 14: "War is over, we won; time to come home." Presumably, this is the document to be shared with the UN next week, to put pressure on them to speed up the hand-off.

It came in unclassified but Joint Staff agrees we should handle it as OVO at this time.

A couple of pages are skewed, and CENTCOM is trying to get Mog to resend. We will send you the new pages when we get them.

  
Jim Woods

DISTRIBUTION:

Mr Wisner  
Mr Locher  
Mr Slocombe  
Mr Covey  
Mr Ford  
Mr Palevitz  
State: Amb Grove  
NSC: Mr Ordway

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## Commander's Assessment of Operation Restore Hope

1. INTRODUCTION. This assessment is presented in three sections. The first section is an overview of the situation in Somalia immediately prior to D-Day and the conditions today compared to that initial state. The second section describes the concept of operations undertaken by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia with rationale for the approach and courses of action. The third section is the transition plan UNITAF proposes for turning the operation over to United Nations Command under UNOSOM II.

2. SITUATION. On 9 December Restore Hope forces landed on Somali territory. Virtually all institutions of modern society and government had ceased to exist in an atmosphere of widespread violence and total lawlessness. Clan and factional warfare, extortion, banditry, individual acts of armed theft, and indiscriminate shooting had displaced millions of people and destroyed the economy, the security, and the health services throughout southern Somalia. Approximately 4.5 million of a total Somali population of 6 million had been affected by the war, factional conflicts, and drought. Countrywide, more than 2 million were displaced. Over half a million displaced people were without food and shelter in Mogadishu alone. Relief organizations estimated children's malnutrition rates as high as 95%, and held 1.5 million at risk of death from starvation.

The abysmal political situation grew from the civil war that began in 1988. Despite Siad Barre's final defeat and exile in May 1992, warfare continued as numerous factions splintered and fought for control. The widespread fighting combined with the effects of drought to impoverish most of the southern part of the country and make food very scarce.

Mogadishu, including the port and the airfield, was divided, paralyzed, and virtually destroyed by the conflict between the two major factions of the United Somali Congress, one led by Mohammed Farrah Aideed and the other by Ali Mahdi. A "no man's land" roughly six blocks wide extended from north to south through the city. This "green line" separated the territories controlled by Aideed and Mahdi. It was well known to all residents, and could be crossed only with much difficulty and payment of tribute. The port and airfield were controlled by Aideed, but both could be, and were, frequently taken under fire from Mahdi's territory. This crippled relief efforts. Aideed would not share the port with Mahdi, so Mahdi drove ships away. Only one ship was able to dock between September and November. It delivered 12,000 metric tons of relief supplies, but could not move them outside of the immediate port area. Two relief ships were fired upon and had to turn away.

The other southern Somalia major port of entry, Kisumu, was

was controlled by another faction led by Omar Jess. Jess controlled access to the port, and charged usurious rates for access and services. He had ample supplies in the city, and no concern for the welfare of any Somalis in the interior. Inland, other factions fought for control of territory, and routinely sustained themselves by raiding the countryside, and by stealing or extorting resources from the relief agencies.

The warring factions, combined with the cultural lack of concern by any clan for any but their own, produced stalemate. The economy and all other societal institutions shut down. Looting, banditry, and thievery became necessary to ward off starvation and death. As many as 14 major clans fought for turf and influence, areas shown at enclosure (1), with many smaller, lesser known groups, fighting within those clan areas.

As the political stalemate continued, the leaders of the various clans were unable or unwilling to establish control within their various clan areas, and began encouraging their groups to resort to theft and extortion to maintain their weapons and supplies. Compromise and political settlement, absent external coercion, was impossible.

This political stalemate produced conditions of scarcity. The resulting combination of political stalemate and scarcity of life-sustaining goods and services produced total insecurity throughout the area. Personal security was established through individual arms, and alliances within the clan and sub-clan structure. Weapons of all calibers were visible everywhere, and readily used everywhere. Possessing weapons meant one could acquire food. Possession of a lot of food, in turn, meant one had the power to acquire more arms. Having neither meant starvation. The Mogadishu daily violent death toll was estimated to be above 150 per day, at the hospitals. Others may never be known.

Relief agencies tried to deliver food and medical supplies to the stricken population, but armed gangs, either associated with Somali factions or operating independently stole, extorted, and hoarded the supplies. Food became a weapon, to be acquired for one's own survival and power, and denied to all others. The relief agencies were manipulated, forced to buy protection, and in many cases became targets of the very people they were trying to help. In a typical episode, only four trucks, of a food convoy of 25, completed a journey from Mogadishu to Baidoa and Oddur and back. Five were given away for permission to leave Mogadishu. 12 were hijacked enroute. Eight reached their destination, only to be looted there. No food reached the intended people.

In August of 1992 Provide Relief, based out of Mombasa, began to airlift supplies to disaster centers in the interior of Somalia. Provide Relief forces were able to deliver supplies when a permissive environment existed at the delivery

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sites. Provide Relief delivered approximately 2,700 metric tons of supplies a week, which equates to about 770,000 meals per day. This was an impressive, and expensive, effort that saved many lives, but the magnitude of the pending disaster, and the warlord's continued truculence, made it only a partial success. Continuing efforts by armed elements, and the magnitude of the supplies needed, called for additional measures. The subsequent UN deployment to Mogadishu proved too little and too late. The small UN battalion at the airport, with rules of engagement better suited to traditional peacekeeping, emboldened the lawless elements, and added to the security problems of the international relief agencies.

The Somali infrastructure that had survived the civil war was destroyed as everything of value was stolen, and sold or bartered for cash or services. Electrical wire was removed for its copper. Pipes, sewer and fresh water, were pulled from the earth and sold. Roads were purposefully holed and damaged to slow vehicles, making them vulnerable to extortion and theft. Everything else left standing was thoroughly trashed. The first use of our firetrucks unloaded from the MPS ships was forcefully hosing out a warehouse to make it habitable. All forms of public transportation and communication had ceased. All forms of commerce, save hidden black market bartering, had ceased. Only two distribution systems worked, khat (a shelf life of 24-48 hours, not grown yet widespread in Somalia) and arms supplies. There was no employment except that offered by and for those with weapons.

Preying on foreigners working with relief agencies and the international media was especially profitable. Extortion and theft produced hard currency directly. The security needs created by Somali extortion and theft produced employment opportunities for weapons-bearing Somali's, thus producing hard currency indirectly. A National Public Radio reporter covering the famine was relieved of US \$3,000 by the driver and security guard she had hired as protection. The United Nations, for the year 1992, had over 150 vehicles hijacked, almost one every other day. These vehicles, 4-wheel drive Toyota pickups, were especially prized as "technical vehicles." The universal use of that term is itself an acknowledgment of the pervasive lawlessness and extortion. It originated with the line in the United Nations and relief agency expense vouchers justifying expenditure of funds for "technical assistance" - resources devoted to protection bought by paying hired thugs. These were resources that never reached the beleaguered famine population.

The situation on 28 January, D + 50, has changed. The factions that paralyzed and virtually destroyed Somalia have been largely neutralized. This has been done through negotiation from strength, backed by a willingness to use force in response to unacceptable acts. Within our security framework and with our strong encouragement, the factional political and military leaders are negotiating and working out

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points of agreement. Most often this is done through a combined committee, composed of members of all major factions. Meanwhile, long-suppressed community leaders are emerging, and asking for our help in regaining control of their neighborhoods from the independent lawless elements. Throughout Somalia, long dormant public institutions are struggling to regain their role.

Early in the operation, we forced passage of the green line areas through strong combat patrols. Now, through the combined efforts of UNITAF combat arms and related political efforts, crossing the green line is almost routine. Many local citizens walk and shop now in those areas.

The port is available to all shipping. Since 10 December, 16 ships have unloaded here, free from fire and usurious port user fees formerly collected by port "officials" - those with the biggest guns in the area. This made over 42,000 metric tons of relief supplies available. The new port security situation also permitted the distribution of the 12,000 tons previously trapped in storage.

Major weapons systems have been reduced through an aggressive search and destroy program coupled with opportunities for voluntary cantonment. Those not placed in cantonments have been or will be destroyed or forced into the hinterland. Technical vehicles were once commonplace in Mogadishu. Now they are rare. The same is true in all other areas where we have been able to establish a presence. Those weapons that retreated into the hinterland will present a capability for mischief and local insecurity for a short time. Soon they will become useless through lack of support and maintenance. Their crews and soldiers will lose their morale and allegiance when they must forgo their previous standard of living.

Lighter weapons, including personal arms, are being reduced through enforcement plans based on the security considerations in each area. Stability is rewarded, instability is punished. Consequently, only occasionally are weapons sighted in public, and often they are confiscated as a result. Arms will always be present in Somalia, just as they are in many countries around the world, but rules must govern their display and use.

Total weapons confiscated by Restore Hope forces include over 1500 rifles and pistols, 30 large-caliber machine guns, over 60 rocket launchers, 5 tanks, 50 fighting vehicles, nearly 150 crew served weapons, 39 artillery pieces, including U.S. made M-198 towed howitzers, and nearly 100 mortars of all calibers. Captured ammunition quantities are so large they defy accurate accounting. Many more weapons and vehicles have been destroyed in combat.

The neutralization of the major factions brought the security environment to a condition more nearly normal. The threat of banditry and lawlessness remains, but the mere presence of alert security forces serves to maintain peace. The almost immediate emergence of local markets and commerce in areas of UNITAF operations, and the absence of visibly carried weapons, attests to the new environment.

Humanitarian aid now flows throughout the area of operations. The vast majority of the food and medicine gets through. Over 94 million meals have been delivered to grateful recipients since the beginning of Restore Hope. Entire communities have been vaccinated against disease after being secured by UNITAF forces. Minor pilferage still occurs, but wholesale theft and hijacking, and the use of food and medicine as instruments of warfare, is over.

Much, if not virtually all, of the current minor pilferage is perpetrated by orphaned children. These unfortunate creatures lack any means of support, so they must live by their wits and steal to survive. One young boy was recently caught at the port. He was told that we would release him if he promised not to steal any more. He replied, through our interpreter, that he had no other way to make a living, and nobody to support him. Rapid involvement of agencies, other than the military, equipped to start schools and orphanages is necessary if his generation is to be saved.

Major infrastructure rebuilding efforts are underway to restore the roads, airfields, and seaports, and public utilities destroyed by the fighting and looting. Electricity has been restored to a large part of Mogadishu, as has water services. Roads are being restored, and in some cases flood-proofed, among the major population centers. Plans for further development are completed and available for further development by civilian agencies and indigenous labor.

UNITAF engineers have identified ten main supply routes that connect the major southern Somalia population centers for improvement. Although only 30% complete, we have already cut the time from Baidoa to Oddur by 50%. The goal on all roads is unimpeded two-way traffic. Roads will be passable in both the dry and the monsoon seasons. Mogadishu to Baidoa used to take eleven hours. It will soon take less than six. This will greatly aid nation-building efforts by stitching together previously isolated sections, and cut costs for relief agencies and contractors. A major part of this effort was the installation of two bridges. These now provide unimpeded access to Kisamaayo, spanning water gaps that previously isolated the port from lines of communication. One bridge, recently dedicated by Ambassador Oakley and UNICEF officials, was christened the "Sean Devereaux Bridge" after the main Kisamaayo UNICEF official.

Mine clearing efforts are running concurrently with the road improvement projects. Over 371 kilometers have been cleared thus far. The population has demonstrated their support by showing us many mines, and physically delivering many more to us - a personal service we did not request.

UNITAF engineers and maritime forces continue to improve the port infrastructure. Sunken objects have been removed to ease access at both Mogadishu and Kisamaayo. Warehouses and hardstands have been repaired. ISO containers, previously blocking port roads for security reasons, have been removed as the situation has improved.

The runways, parking ramps and taxiways at all eight airstrips served by UNITAF flights have been improved and weatherproofed by UNITAF "Red Horse" engineer squadrons. These efforts reduce the hazards to both aircraft and crews, and improve the flow of supplies and traffic through the airstrips.

UNITAF efforts have created the first working Somali airspace control system since before the revolution. Initially, the UNITAF Airspace Control Authority (ACA) focused on airspace management issues for military applications alone. Very quickly, however, it became apparent that airspace management was more than a question of controlling the airspace for military aircraft. In mid-January UNITAF airplanners held our first meeting with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to begin planning for opening up Somali airspace to international air traffic. While numerous details are yet to be developed, (customs, contraband procedures, etc.) this event helps Somalia on the road back to membership in the international community. Perhaps as a result, on January 25th, two former Somali air traffic controllers approached UNITAF forces and offered to return to work.

Medical help has been provided by UNITAF in cooperation with the international medical relief agencies. All of our medical organizations have become involved. We have provided help with teaching, equipment repair, limited medical supplies, specialty consultation, immunization, and preventive medicine assistance. Through these associations we learned many interesting things.

The daily violent death toll in Mogadishu before our arrival was as high as 150. Gunshot wounds exceeded all other forms of trauma by as much as 10 to 1. Now the daily violent death toll is between 5 and 15. In Kisamaayo it has gone from 25 to 1. Armed squatters used to occupy the beds in many hospitals. Now they are empty or filled with patients who used to feel it was too dangerous, due to muggers on the way or at the destination, to go to the hospital. Pharmaceutical availability has increased with the increased security.

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The most gratifying impression is that the Somali medical and welfare establishment remains competent. Our most useful contribution is the peacemaking. A sheriff is needed more than specific medical help.

As security improves local citizens are trying to regain control of their security. Many of the police forces in the cities UNITAF controls have begun to work in support of their communities. Cities that currently have operational police forces include Kisamaayo, Bardera, Baidoa, Belet Uen and Oddur.

These forces are composed of former police officers who are either working for free or for food provided by relief agencies. They are chosen by village elders and work for them enforcing local laws. Most conduct combined patrols with UNITAF forces.

In Mogadishu, individual officers have been reporting for work. The combined political committee has appointed officials to implement a force of about 3,000 policemen.

In summary, the military forces of UNITAF have done much to change the situation on the ground in the assigned area of responsibility. UNITAF provided the shock and the power to force rapid change. Forward momentum is established. Now the stage is set for rapid political, social and cultural advancement if the proper agencies can be put in place.

### 3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. UNITAF MISSION. To conduct military operations in Somalia in order to secure the major airfields, seaports, key installations and relief distribution sites. At the same time ensure the free passage of relief supplies through security of relief convoys and relief organization operations. Finally, assist the United Nations and Non-Government Organizations in providing humanitarian relief under United Nations auspices.

#### b. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(1) Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSS). The HRSSs in southern Somalia were initially developed by taking into consideration the eight major distribution sites/cities and major road junctions as guidelines. These distribution sites consisted of the following cities: Mogadishu, Baledogle, Baidoa, Gialalassi, Belet Uen, Oddur, Bardera, and Kismayo. Each HRSS has its own character, set of problems, strengths, weaknesses, etc. As Operation Restore Hope progressed, it was discovered that sector boundaries had to be adjusted to accommodate the realities of the most promising authority structures/clan in each area. Different leadership entities were identified and given stature and credibility based on what

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best worked in each area. These modifications eventually led to the creation of a ninth HRS, HRS MARKA.

(2) UNITAF Objectives. UNITAF objectives were designated to be the operational airfields located at the major distribution site in each HRS. Following the successful seizure and securing of the first two UNITAF Objectives, a policy was developed by which all future UNITAF Objectives would be secured. First, on D-2 a psychological operation would be conducted using a leaflet drop. This drop would inform the Somali inhabitants in the vicinity of the objective that friendly UNITAF Forces were about to arrive and assist in solving the food shortage problem. Second, on D-1, Ambassador Oakley would arrive at the UNITAF Objective to reinforce the previous days leaflet drop and personally reassure the Somalis of the UNITAF's honest intentions. Finally, on D-Day the UNITAF Forces would arrive to initially secure the objective in a military fashion and then commence humanitarian relief operations. As part of the commencement of humanitarian relief operations, a food shipment was scheduled to arrive at each UNITAF objective on D-Day either by air or convoy.

(3) Phases. UNITAF conducted a multi-national joint/combined operation in four event dependant phases to establish security conditions necessary for the continuation of humanitarian relief operations in Somalia; stabilize the security and famine relief situation throughout the assigned area and transition the operation to UN or other international organization control.

(a) Phase I was initiated with the seizure and securing of UNITAF Objective 1 (Mogadishu Airport) on 9 December 1992 by SPMAGTF CENT(SOC). UNITAF Objective 2 (Baledogle Airfield) was secured by U.S. Marine Forces to include SPMAGTF CENT(SOC) on 13 December. Phase I officially ended with the securing of UNITAF Objective 3 (Baidoa Airfield) on 16 December again by U.S. Marine Forces to include SPMAGTF CENT(SOC).

(b) Phase II commenced with an amphibious landing to secure UNITAF Objective 4 (Kismayo Port and Airfield) on 20 December by a combined Belgian, U.S. Marine and U.S. Navy Force. The commander of U.S. Naval Forces was designated Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the commander of Belgian Forces was designated Commander Landing Force (CLF). The second UNITAF Objective secured during Phase II was Objective 5 (Bardera Airfield) on 24 December. Objective 5 was secured by U.S. Marine Forces. Simultaneous with U.S. Marine Forces securing Objective 5, a combined French and U.S. Marine Force under French command commenced operations to secure UNITAF Objective 4 (Oddur Airfield) on 24 December. UNITAF Objective 4 was secured on Christmas Day. UNITAF Objective 6

(Gialalassi Airfield) was the next objective to be secured. Objective 6 was secured by Italian Forces with U.S. Marine Air support on 27 December. The last UNITAF Objective to be secured during Phase II was UNITAF Objective 8 (Belet Uen Airfield) on 28 December. This operation consisted of an air assault by a combined U.S. Army and Canadian Force under U.S. Army command.

(c) Phase III of Operation Restore Hope commenced on 28 December by UNITAF Forces with the aim to expand the security and humanitarian relief operations beyond the UNITAF Objectives throughout each HRS. In an attempt to open up an additional port facility, the city of Marka was designated UNITAF Objective 10 and secured on 28 December. A combined U.S. Army and Italian Force under U.S. Army command conducted the operation. Although limited in its port facilities and capabilities, Marka enabled the off loading of many smaller intra-coastal freighters with food for relief organizations.

(4) Logistics. The logistics concept included receiving theater support through the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the C5/C-141 capable airfields at Mogadishu, Baledogle and Kismayo. The logistics concept was further refined as four cities were designated to be the theater logistics hubs from which all logistical support would be provided. The designated UNITAF logistics hubs were Mogadishu, Baledogle, Baidoa and Kismayo. From D-Day (9 December 1992) until D+50 (28 January 1993) U.S. Marine Forces provided the logistical command, control and support to UNITAF extending its support to at least four times greater than its doctrinal capabilities. On D+50 the command, control and support responsibilities were transferred to the Joint Task Force Support Command a U.S. Army commanded organization.

(5) Engineer Tasks. The UNITAF engineers immediately upon arrival in theater conducted an engineer survey to determine the engineer projects required to be accomplished in support of the UNITAF mission. The engineer projects were prioritized in the following manner: airfield/port/helipad construction and improvements, main supply routes (MSRs) improvement and HRS base camp construction. All engineer assets and personnel were then task organized into two Engineer Task Forces; one consisting of U.S. Army assets and one consisting of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps assets. The engineer projects which have been accomplished or are currently being conducted with a 28 February 1993 target completion date are:

(a) All airfields have been cleared of overgrown vegetation and are capable of receiving at a minimum C-130 aircraft. These airfields are being maintained on a daily basis to retain their C-130 capability.

(b) Nine MSRs have been identified and are currently being upgraded to a all-weather two lane capability.

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(c) All nine MSRs have been cleared of mines and are continually being inspected.

(d) The power plant for the Mogadishu city water authority is now 33% operational.

d. FORCE COMPOSITION. UNITAF's current task organization is as follows with force locations depicted in Enclosure (2):

CTF SOMALIA

LTGEN JOHNSTON

CANADIAN FORCES COL LABBE  
FRENCH BDE MGEN DELHOME  
INDIAN NAVAL SQUADRON SOMALIA COMO PILLAI  
ITALIAN FORCES MGEN ROSSI  
FOLGARE AIRBORNE BDE  
SAN MARCO TACTICAL GROUP

JCSE

JOINT TASK FORCE SUPPORT COMMAND BGEN SOLOMON  
TUNISIAN FORCES

TF PROVIDE RELIEF BGEN FRATARANGELO  
DET, I MEF

DET, JCSE

DET, CENTCOM

US AFFOR MGEN MIKOLAJCIX

GERMAN AIR FORCE, C-160 DET

ROYAL AIR FORCE, C-130 DET

US ARFOR MGEN ARNOLD

10TH MTN DIV (-)

1ST BELGIAN PARACHUTE BN (-)

1ST ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

MOROCCAN FORCES

TF KISMAYO

ENGINEER TASK FORCE 16

US MARFOR MGEN WILHELM

RCT-7 (-)

3D MAW (-)

1ST FSSG (-)

ENGINEER TASK FORCE 30

BOTSWANAN FORCES

EGYPTIAN FORCES

KUWAITI FORCES

NIGERIAN FORCES

PAKISTANI FORCES

SAUDI ARABIAN FORCES

TURKISH FORCES

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FORCES

ZIMBABWE FORCES

US NAVFOR COMO PETERSON

PHIBRON THREE, CTF 156

CTF 155

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SPMAGTF CENT (SOC)  
 HMCS PRESERVER  
 DET, NAV LOG SUP  
 US SOFOR LTC FAISTENHAMMER

e. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). In order to ensure that a constant line of communication was maintained between UNITAF and the numerous relief organizations operating in southern Somalia, a CMOC was established as a model coordination body. This was established at the Headquarters, United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) and is being improved so that it can continue under U.N. direction with no diminution of effectiveness. The same structure has been established for all the centers of HRSS. The CMOCs have set in place the mechanisms to achieve a parallel direction in political development and humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

(2) Psychological Operations. Psychological operations have been conducted by UNITAF to keep the people informed, encourage them and counter anti-UNITAF propaganda toward them. The success and positive reception of the UNITAF radio and newspaper media, both named RAJO, which means Hope in English, should be continued under the U.N. as a positive avenue of communications with the people. Their focus is on military operations, humanitarian relief efforts and reestablishment of basic public services (police, schools, etc). The radio station broadcasts four daily programs of forty-five minutes duration covering newspaper articles, Somali short stories and poems from local poets and "man in the street" interviews. The newspaper is a one page, front and back, daily paper which is distributed free of charge to each city secured by UNITAF. UNITAF is currently printing 20,000 copies daily with the intention of increasing to 25,000 to 30,000 within the next week.

(3) Civil Affairs. The three, four man Civil Affairs teams have been tasked organized to each of the Humanitarian Operations Centers and have served as the critical point for the interaction between Humanitarian Organizations, the Somali populace and the military. Despite a void created by the lack of United Nations personnel, these teams have worked with Somali elders and have organized grass roots level local non-partisan institutions that will form the basis for the emerging government. They have also been instrumental in coordinating the distribution efforts of the 36 Non-Governmental Organizations that operate in country. Serving as the Operations Center for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies, Civil Affairs Teams have coordinated the military support and security necessary for relief supplies to safely reach the civilian populace. Since their arrival, the child mortality rate has dropped in some

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areas from a daily high of 50 children a day to less than 10 a week.

(4) Convoys. The convoy system, which is for providing food to relief organization warehouses and food distribution centers, is the single most important aspect in the food distribution process. If the convoy system is working efficiently, food will get into the mouths of starving Somalis, the cost for food for sale on the open market will decrease, the decrease in the cost of food on the open market will decrease the basic reason why food convoys are robbed and hijacked and violence across Somalia will decrease. Since their arrival, UNITAF Forces have aggressively increased and enforced convoy escort in order to distribute the current endless supply of food to starving Somalis. With the arrival of each UNITAF Force in Somalia, convoy escorts have increased with the end result of food distribution increasing. U.S. Army Forces are currently escorting food convoys on a regular basis to Baidoa. Italian and Canadian Forces are currently working hand in hand to provide convoy escorts to Gialalassi and Balet Uen. In addition there are two major convoy security and escort operations that are in their final stages of planning.

(a) The first project which is to commence in early February 1993, entails the daily mass distribution of food to thirty-five food distribution centers for ninety straight days in Mogadishu. This program requires the daily arrival of a truck with ten tons of food at each of the thirty-five distribution centers between 0700 and 0900. U.S. Marine and Italian Forces are currently planning the escort and security of these convoys to ensure that all of the food dedicated to this program arrives on time.

(b) The second program deals with conducting food convoys from Mogadishu to Baidoa, Oddur, and Bardera. The intent of the NGO's is to run super convoys in order to fill up the warehouses as quickly as possible at each of these three locations. U.S. Army forces will be responsible for security and convoy escort from Mogadishu to Baidoa. At Baidoa, Australian Forces will assume security of the food convoys and be handed off to either U.S. Marine or French Forces. U.S. Marine Forces will provide security and convoy escort from Baidoa to Bardera, and French Forces will provide security and convoy escort from Baidoa to Oddur.

(5) Airspace Control. Control of Somali airspace was nonexistent prior to the arrival of UNITAF Forces. Initially, AF Airspace Control Authority (ACA) focused on airspace management issues for military applications alone. Very quickly, however, it became apparent that airspace management was more than a question of controlling the airspace for military aircraft. On 14 January UNITAF air planners held their first meeting with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to begin planning for opening up Somali

airspace to international air traffic. While there are numerous details yet to be worked out (customs, procedures for contraband, etc.), this event opens the door for Somalia to become a full-fledged member of the international community.

#### 4. Transition to UNOSOM II

a. Concept. The concept for transition of command and control of forces from UNITAF to UNOSOM II is an incremental process that is event driven. The first step is to stand up a UNOSOM II staff with the capability to command, control and coordinate activities of subordinate forces. When the UNOSOM II staff has the capability, to include communications assets, command of Humanitarian Relief Sectors is passed, sector by sector, from UNITAF control to UNOSOM II control. Transfer of each HRS is predicated by agreement of all commanders concerned that the sector is ready to switch from a Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping mission. As certain HRS's are transferred to UNOSOM control, they can be consolidated from the current total of 9 HRSs to five HRSs, each under a brigade size command element as displayed in enclosure (3). When all HRS's are transferred to UNOSOM II control, UNITAF's Peace Enforcement Mission is complete.

b. Transfer of Control. Pending the final approval of each HRS commander, it is currently felt that all HRSs could immediately be transferred to a Peacekeeping Mission.

(1) Resistance. The visibility of technicals and crew served weapons outside of Authorized Weapons Storage Areas is actually nonexistent. Individual weapons exist, but, are not only displayed in public as they were prior to UNITAF's arrival on 9 December 1992. Limited check points and road blocks also exist, but, are decreasing in number as UNITAF's operations expand the number and frequency of patrols and convoys throughout southern Somalia. Actions against UNITAF continue, however, they do not appear to be organized and are tied to isolated banditry incidents.

(2) Humanitarian Relief. Escorted convoys continue to food uncontested and with confidence throughout the country. As a result of the successful convoy escort program, NGOs are currently planning on increasing the scope and frequency of the convoys as explained in paragraph 3a(4). The activity for relief organization warehouses continues to increase as there have been no major warehouse thefts reported in the last two weeks.

(3) Infrastructure. UNITAF's two Engineer Task Forces continue to make superior progress towards their mission. Establishment target date referred to in paragraph 3b(5). At over fifty percent of the targeted MSRs have been achieved to an all-weather two lane capability. Most recently, as stated above, all of the MSRs have been

cleared of mines. It was also reported today by the J-4 that UNITAF has reported the most water stockpiled since its arrival, and with the assistance of ROWPU assets and new wells will commence to restock some of Mogadishu's water reservoirs.

(4) Populace. Local civilian councils and CMOCs have either been established or are being established in all HRSS to ensure both the Somali and UNITAF long term goals are interoperable. Relief food warehouses are currently filling up and larger ones are being built in some of the HRSS in anticipation of the increased food convoy program. In addition every HRS has either an ongoing local security program or is in the planning stages of initiating one.


5. The final assessment of the situation in southern Somalia is that the Peace Enforcement Mission is completed and UNITAF is ready to commence the Peacekeeping Mission by moving into Phase IV, transition of command and control to UNOSOM II. Over twenty nations are now participating in the operation with more indicating a willingness to join. The vast majority of these will remain for UNOSOM II and those already here are in assigned areas they could retain under the UN phase. This greatly facilitates the turnover as many of these forces will simply continue operating successfully in known regions.

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### CLAN/FACTIONS AREAS OF INFLUENCE

SLIDE 1



USF - ABDULLAH  
 SDA - ROBILE  
 SNM - TUR/DEGEWEYNE/EGAL/KAHIN  
 USP - DIR  
 SIU - WARSAME  
 SSDF - ABSHIR/YUSUF  
 SNF - MORGAN/GANNI/HASHI  
 USC - AIDEED/MAHDI  
 SDM - ALILU


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# UNITAF SOMALIA PHASE IV

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SLIDE 2

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# UNITAF SOMALIA

## CURRENT SITUATION

