

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Somalia [Folder 1] [3]				
Staff Office-Individual: Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard				
Original OA/ID Number: 2986				
Row: 49	Section: 3	Shelf: 10	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: General Hoars Meetings with Senior Pakistani Officials: Somalia and Other Peacekeeping Issues (5 pages)	09/28/1993	P1/b(1)
002. note	Handwritten notes from meeting (4 pages)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Report from Oakley in Mogadishu (1 page)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: [Somalia] (2 pages)	10/12/1993	P1/b(1)
005. map	Mogadishu: Violent Incidents on 3 and 4 October (1 page)	10/04/1993	P1/b(1)
006. map	Somalia: Deployment of Coalition Forces as of Mid-August (1 page)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: [Next Steps] (2 pages)	08/24/1993	P1/b(1)
008. report	Re: [Somalia] (4 pages)	08/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

25 September 1993

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have given much thought to what you said about Somalia at our meeting on 20 September and I have carefully studied the "non-paper" which you handed me then. I appreciate the non-paper's frankness. Peace and prosperity cannot be returned to Somalia without the United Nations or the United States. It is therefore essential that there should be openness between us. I shall be equally frank in setting out how I view our current dilemma.

I share your concern at the erosion, in the United States and elsewhere, of support for our common endeavour in Somalia. But I was encouraged by the meeting which I convened on 16 September with 30 of the most important troop-contributing countries, all of whom expressed support for our continuing operation.

I nevertheless agree with you that urgent action needs to be taken to highlight the political and humanitarian aspects of the international community's efforts in Somalia and to correct the media's current emphasis on the military aspects, and especially on our efforts to detain Aidid. Admiral Howe and I have agreed on a number of steps to be taken during the next few weeks to redirect attention to the political and humanitarian objectives which UNOSOM II is pursuing.

His Excellency
The Hon. Warren Christopher
Secretary of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

2



As a first step, I held a meeting on 23 September with representatives of the World Bank to discuss the next phase of Somalia's rehabilitation and reconstruction. I am emphasizing in public that, following the adoption of resolution 865 on 22 September, the formation of the national police force is proceeding apace. I shall make brief visits to Addis Ababa and Mogadishu in mid-October and will concentrate on the non-military aspects of UNOSOM II's operation. The World Bank is convening a donors' conference in Paris on 22 October, to be followed in the first week of November by a Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa, with full Somali participation.

On the political front I have asked Admiral Howe to examine the feasibility of establishing an Interim Government which would work closely with him as he implements UNOSOM II's mandate. There are certain snags which have to be circumvented: an Interim Government would have to be designed in a way that was compatible with the Transitional National Council to which all the parties agreed in Addis Ababa in March; and it would be necessary to ensure that the Habr Gedir clan, as well as the USC/SNA, was represented, notwithstanding the expected opposition from Aidid.

I believe that these initiatives will, with your support, help to shift media attention away from the hunt for Aidid. None of them, however, enables us to side-step the problem he creates. It was his refusal to share power after the overthrow of Siad Barre that led to civil conflict in Somalia. That conflict, in turn, led to human suffering which the international community could not tolerate and which brought about the deployment initially of UNOSOM I and then of UNITAF. From the beginning, I and my colleagues made every effort to bring Aidid into the political process and the search for national reconciliation, as did Ambassador Oakley when he was in Mogadishu. Initially we received a good deal of cooperation from Aidid, especially at the Addis Ababa Conference in March.



However, the killing and mutilation of 24 United Nations soldiers on 5 June created a new situation and obliged the Security Council to instruct me to detain and bring to trial those responsible for that crime. Until the Security Council decides to change those instructions, I am obliged to make every effort to bring Aidid to justice. I know that you understand and support this position. //

At the same time, my mind is not closed to other ways of neutralizing Aidid, by which I mean bringing about his removal from Somalia to controlled residence in another country from which he would not be able to direct military operations by his supporters in Somalia or otherwise block our efforts to achieve national reconciliation.

I have been in regular contact with the Presidents of Ethiopia and Eritrea, especially the former, and I have instructed Admiral Howe and his staff to cooperate with the Ethiopian/Eritrean initiative. I have also encouraged them to take action themselves to sound out leading members of Aidid's clan on the possibility of an agreement for his voluntary departure from Somalia. I have to confess that my knowledge of the personalities involved does not inspire optimism about the feasibility of such solutions. But I agree with you that they should be explored, while not forgetting the mandate conferred on me by Security Council resolution 837. However, confidentiality has to be maintained and at this stage these moves cannot be used to correct the current misperception of United Nations efforts in Somalia. //

This problem of Aidid strengthens a conviction which I have held for almost a year. This is that our efforts to restore peace and prosperity in Somalia will not succeed unless we can disarm the clans and factions. I made that position clear in my letter of 29 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council. I repeated it in my letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush and again in my report of 19 December 1992 to the Security Council. The crucial importance of disarmament has been emphasized in Security Council resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 and subsequent resolutions. //

in Somalia. My concerns on this point were expressed in my letter of 3 May 1993 to Ambassador Albright. Any restrictions now on the use of the Quick Reaction Force would greatly undermine UNOSOM II's ability to disarm the parties and would be contrary to the understandings we reached when the transition took place from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Actual withdrawal of the Force would in my judgement lead to the rapid decomposition of the whole UNOSOM operation. //



The fact that UNITAF did not disarm the clans and factions was one of the principal reasons why I pressed that it should not hand over to UNOSOM II prematurely and that, when that hand-over took place, significant United States combat forces should remain in Somalia. My concerns on this score were spelt out in my letter of 3 May 1993 to Ambassador Albright. Any restrictions now on the use of the Quick Reaction Force would greatly undermine UNOSOM II's ability to disarm the parties and would be contrary to the understandings we reached when the transition took place from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Actual withdrawal of the Force would in my judgement lead to the rapid decomposition of the whole UNOSOM operation.

I recognize, of course, that public and parliamentary opinion in the United States and other troop-contributing countries may eventually turn against our present approach. (Indeed, there are signs that this is already beginning to happen, though I have been encouraged by the continuing determination of the troop-contributing Governments themselves. But let us have no illusions about what the consequence would be if their determination should weaken and oblige the Security Council either to withdraw UNOSOM II or to surrender control of south Mogadishu to Aidid. Not only would that condemn the people of Somalia to a resumption of civil war and all the horrors that would result; it would also represent a humbling of the United Nations and of the efforts of the United States and other countries to restore peace and human decency to Somalia. This would have a devastating effect on your and my efforts to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to contribute to a better world.

In short, I agree with you that we must continue to give high priority to the political and humanitarian aspects of our endeavours in Somalia and that we must improve our public presentation of them. But at the same time I believe that there is no practicable alternative to our current efforts to

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

5 -

complete the restoration of security in south Mogadishu. I count on the continuing support of the United States of America, without which our efforts will not succeed. // ✓

Yours sincerely,

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

100-111111

UNITED
NATIONS



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/26476

21 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Provisional Resolution 865 (1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 755 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 817 (1993) of 6 June 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26317) of 17 August 1993,

Stressing the importance of continuing the peace process initiated by the Addis Ababa agreement and in this connection welcoming the efforts of African countries, the Organization of African Unity, in particular its Horn of Africa Standing Committee, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in cooperation with and in support of the United Nations, to promote national reconciliation in Somalia,

Stressing the commitment of the international community to help Somalia regain a normal, peaceful life, while recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Expressing its appreciation for the improvements in the overall situation, which have been achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), in particular, eradication of starvation, establishment of a large number of district councils, opening of schools and resumption by the Somali people in most areas of the country of their normal lives,

Recognizing the continuing need for broadbased consultations and consensus on basic principles to achieve national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions,

S/26476
English
Page 2

Calling upon all Somali parties, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve reconciliation, peace and security,

Recognizing that the highest priority for UNOSOM II is to assist the people of Somalia in the furtherance of the national reconciliation process and to promote and advance the re-establishment of regional and national institutions and civil administration in the entire country, as set out in resolution 814 (1993),

Noting with great concern, despite the improvements in the overall situation in Somalia, continuing reports of violence in Mogadishu and the absence of law enforcement and judicial authorities and institutions in the country as a whole, and recalling the request to the Secretary-General in resolution 814 (1993) to assist in the re-establishment of the Somali police and the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order,

Convinced that the re-establishment of the Somali police, and judicial and penal systems, is critical for the restoration of security and stability in the country,

Gravely concerned at the continuation of armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II, and recalling its resolution 814 (1993) which emphasized the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

A

1. Welcomes the reports by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in resolution 814 (1993);

2. Commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and all the personnel of UNOSOM II, for their achievements in greatly improving the conditions of the Somali people and beginning the process of nation-building apparent in the restoration in much of the country of stable and secure conditions in stark contrast with the prior suffering caused by inter-clan conflict;

3. Condemns all attacks on UNOSOM II personnel and reaffirms that those who have committed or have ordered the commission of such criminal acts will be held individually responsible for them;

4. Affirms the importance it attaches to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995;

/...

5. Requests, in that context, the Secretary-General to direct the urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities and to report thereon to the Council as soon as possible;

6. Urges the Secretary-General to re-double his efforts at the local, regional and national levels, including encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to continue the process of national reconciliation and political settlement, and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy;

7. Calls on all Member States to assist, in all ways possible, including the urgent full staffing of UNOSOM II civil positions, the Secretary-General, in conjunction with regional organizations, in his efforts to reconcile the parties and rebuild Somali political institutions;

8. Invites the Secretary-General to consult the countries of the region and regional organizations concerned on means of further reinvigorating the reconciliation process;

B

9. Approves the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in annex I to his report of 17 August 1993 (S/26317) relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems in accordance with resolution 814 (1993) and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps on an urgent and accelerated basis to implement them;

10. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to convene at the earliest possible date a meeting of Member States interested in supporting UNOSOM II in the re-establishment of the police, judicial and penal systems, for the purpose of determining specific requirements and identifying specific sources of support;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General to undertake actively and as a matter of great urgency an international recruiting programme for staffing the UNOSOM II Justice Division with police, judicial and penal system specialists;

12. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to maintain the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) and maintained in resolution 814 (1993) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems in addition to the establishment of the Somali police, other than for the cost of international staff;

13. Urges Member States, on an urgent basis, to contribute to that fund or otherwise to provide assistance for the re-establishment of the Somali

S/36476

English


Page 4

police, judicial and penal systems, including personnel, financial support, equipment and training to help attain the objectives outlined in annex I to the Secretary-General's report (S/26317);

14. Encourages the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure continuation of the current police, judicial and penal programme from October to the end of December 1993 until additional funding from Member States is forthcoming, and to make recommendations as appropriate to the General Assembly;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council fully informed on a regular basis on the implementation of this resolution;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Agency for International Development
Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

DATE: 10/08/93

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING
THIS COVER SHEET: 2

PLEASE DELIVER THIS FAX TO

Name: Susan Rice

Office: NSC

Telephone: 395-7310

Fax: 395-1199

THIS FAX IS FROM

Name: Valerie Newsom

Office: OFDA

Telephone: 647-7482

Fax: (202) 647-5269

NOTE: Attached are some additional facts and figures regarding humanitarian progress in Somalia. I hope they are helpful! We have also commented directly on the latest draft (or rather draft #3) of the report to congress and have submitted our comments to Bob Loftis. I will be in the office over the weekend so call if you need further info and we will do our best to provide.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

ADDITIONAL FACTS AND FIGURES ON HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS

Prepared by FHA/OFDA

-- In mid-1992, 60,000 MT per month were needed to feed the population in Somalia; now, WFP estimates that 18,000 MT of food per month are needed.

-- Before UNOSOM, relief organizations were unable to keep any food stocks in country; now, the U.N. has over 17,000 MT of food stocks in Somalia.

-- The U.N. World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 198,967 MT of food is required through December 1994. Of this, WFP reports that 134,888 MT is already in the food pipeline. //*

- WFP reports that 167,000 people currently receive food daily from feeding and food distribution programs. /*

-- In mid-1992, anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 people were dying each day from starvation. Now, there are only isolated cases of starvation-related deaths.

-- In mid-1992, over one million Somalis were displaced within Somalia; now, an estimated 700,000 are displaced of which 120,000 will be resettled by December.

-- In mid-1992, under 5 hospitals were functioning and there were no maternal child health centers; now 32 hospitals and 91 MCH centers are now operational.

-- Now, 750,000 children have been vaccinated against measles.

-- In mid-1992, no schools were operating in Somalia; now 234 schools are operating.

-- Although exact figures are not available, UNOSOM reports that an estimated 2 million women and children have benefitted from non-governmental organization (NGO) implemented/UNOSOM supported humanitarian assistance programs in Somalia.

-- An estimated 1 million people need continued humanitarian assistance in Somalia. This figure includes 700,000 displaced and 300,000 urban destitute. (/*)

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DM4A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10.12

Tony,

See attached report
from Randy.

Did

SRB/RC

Circ^(since) with them both
current funds.

R

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

C

MESSAGE NO. 105884 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages C+34

FROM: Bob Loftis IO/PHO 647-2708 5323
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION FIRST DRAFT OF REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOMALIA.
COMMENTS/CLEARANCE NEEDED BY COB WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Susan Rice/Sean Darragh</u>	<u>395-7310</u>	<u>303</u>
<u>OSD/ISA/AFR:</u>	<u>Jim Woods</u>	<u>697-8924</u>	<u>4B747</u>
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FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE DELIVER QOB SEPTEMBER 28

S/S Officer: _____





Washington, D.C. 20520

September 27, 1993

MEMORANDUM

To: Distribution

From: IO/PHO - Bob Loftis

Subject: First Draft: Report to Congress on U.S. Policy in Somalia

The first draft of the Report to Congress on Somalia is attached. Your agency comments and clearance are requested by COB, Wednesday, September 29. Please note that there are several questions scattered through the text in bold type. Your assistance in answering them promptly is appreciated. If you have changes or additions that you want in the report, let me know as soon as possible.

As noted earlier, the first draft will have to go to the printer October 1. However, we will be able to make some textual changes up to October 12. Developments after that date will have to be covered by an addendum or a letter to the Congress.

Your cooperation and assistance in putting together this report are greatly appreciated.

JCS/J-5/MEAF: Please share a copy with JCS/J-5/UN.
OSD/ISA/AFR: Please share a copy with OSD/D&P/PK/PE.

I can be reached on 202-647-2708, or unclassified fax number 202-647-4006.

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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIAI. SUMMARY

The United States is participating in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to help the United Nations restore that country to a reasonable degree of security and stability to ensure that Somalia does not relapse into the anarchy which led to over 300,000 deaths and put another two million at risk of starvation. The original UNOSOM I, with its Chapter VI mandate and lightly-armed forces, was unable to ensure the delivery of aid or establish the conditions for political reconciliation in Somalia. Faced with a humanitarian disaster of immense proportions, in December 1992 the UN authorized the American-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) mission, which was successful in ending the immediate threat of mass starvation. Control of the operation was turned over to the UN-led UNOSOM II operation in May, 1993. This transfer of responsibility, with a more ambitious mandate, was envisioned from the start of UNITAF: the UN recognized that delivering a large supply of food and medicine would only be a temporary succor to the desperate people of Somalia. Addressing the problems of political reconciliation and economic rehabilitation are crucial to the longer-term stability of Somalia and the region. Premature withdrawal of international forces and allowing the situation to deteriorate once more would have betrayed the promise of Operation Restore Hope.

The United States deployed over 25,000 troops in Somalia at the height of the UNITAF effort. There are now less than 6,000 Americans in Somalia, performing vital and necessary logistical support and providing an effective back-up combat capability to meet extraordinary threats to UNOSOM forces.

The most important of UNOSOM's goals are national reconciliation and reestablishing political institutions and the economy. Progress on these fronts will permit the UN to reduce its presence without fear of allowing famine and misery to return. It is likely, however, that Somalia will be dependent upon foreign assistance for the foreseeable future, but this aid should be channelled through normal bilateral and multilateral programs. The military component of UNOSOM II and the American contribution to it are responsible for providing the security to allow the political process to move forward. Clearly, political and economic development would be nearly impossible without the security represented by the troops of the UN and the U.S.

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Progress in Somalia has been slowed by the attacks of forces loyal to warlord Mohammed Aideed on UNOSOM peacekeepers. Other warlords are moving slowly on disarmament, waiting to see if Aideed will succeed in forcing out the UN and allowing Aideed to return to his plundering of the Somali people. Failure to deal with Aideed and to bring his clan back into the peace process will jeopardize the entire mission.

The vast majority of Somalis welcome the UN and American presence in their country and are counting on the international community to help them rebuild their lives. The responsibility for putting Somalia together again belongs with the Somali people, but the UN and the U.S. can provide a window of opportunity until a new government that looks to the welfare of its people is able to function.

II. U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOMALIA

U.S. interests are two fold: preserving the gains of the humanitarian relief effort that began with Operation Restore Hope and UNITAF, and supporting the U.N.'s first peace enforcement effort under Chapter VII of its charter.

To advance the first interest, the United States has three sets of complementary objectives:

- 1) to assist the UN and Somalis in political development so that the country does not fall back into the chaos that claimed so many lives;
- 2) to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the beginnings of economic development so that Somalia is not dependent upon emergency assistance, and;
- 3) to help provide a secure environment so that the first two objectives can be met.

Peacekeeping

The United States led the UNITAF intervention in Somalia in December in large part because the UN itself was incapable of halting the horror that had claimed so many lives. UNOSOM II was established to take advantage of and build upon the environment created by UNITAF. In many ways, UNOSOM II is a unique response to a man-made humanitarian disaster, and its success or failure may determine the international community's response to future such crises. In a world rife with conflict and suffering, it is in the interest of the United States to help develop an international capability to deal with these crises so that American forces are not always called upon.

At the same time, it should be remembered that the United Nations is not an independent entity, but a collection of nations. It has few assets of its own, and cannot do more than its member states will allow it or give it the resources to do. The United States is clearly the leading nation within the United Nations. As one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S. holds a crucial veto over Security Council action. If the UN is going to take up this burden, U.S. leadership and participation are crucial.

Finally, peacekeeping is a flexible tool to help contain conflict. It is not a panacea, nor is it an end in itself. It is an instrument of diplomacy that seeks to end fighting so that political solutions can be found. In some cases, the search for a political solution may take more time than originally anticipated. The alternative, however, is continued war and disruption, or as in the case of Somalia, continued starvation and suffering.

Political Reconciliation

The UN, as reflected by Security Council resolutions and the Secretary General's reports, has had as a core goal the encouragement of political reconciliation among the warring parties. UN Security Council Resolution, which authorized the expansion of UNOSOM I into UNOSOM II with a Chapter VII mandate, further refined the political goals of the UN mission.

Finding a political solution is possible only so long as UNOSOM remains militarily strong and firm in its resolve. Nevertheless, the U.N.'s perceived absorption in a military conflict with General Aideed has contributed to growing dissatisfaction with the Somalia situation, and has tended to overshadow in the eyes of many observers the fact that UNOSOM is primarily a political and humanitarian operation. Therefore, the U.S. is aggressively supporting several avenues for the UN to advance the political process in Somalia, and the U.S. actively supported UNSC Resolution 865, which called on the Secretary General to redouble his efforts to find a political solution to the problems in Somalia. These initiatives would proceed along parallel tracks.

Following the earlier examples of the reconciliation conferences in Addis Abbaba, the U.S. is encouraging a third round of talks to be held in Somalia under UN auspices with the support of neighboring countries and the OAU in early November. The conference would follow the October 22 World Bank-sponsored donor's conference in Paris. The conference would have three primary purposes: (a) re-energizing the national reconciliation process started in March with the Addis Ababa Agreement; (b) speeding the local reconciliation process on which the UN already has made a solid start with the creation of district councils; and (c) implementing the disarmament plan agreed to by the signatories of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

4

Participants would include the original signatories of the Addis Ababa Agreement, minus General Aideed and Ahmed Omar Jess, who both have been egregious violators of the Agreement. Representatives of their organizations should be invited to take part, however. Representatives of the extant district councils would be invited as well.

The Secretary General has met informally with the representatives of about a dozen countries, with the intention of forming a Somalia Advisory Group along the lines of the Cambodia Core Group. The group, consisting of representatives of the Security Council, major donors, and interested governments, would provide political support and advice to the Secretary General and his staff, and would demonstrate the wider international community's continuing interest in Somalia.

The U.S. is encouraging President Meles of Ethiopia and President Issaiahs of Eritrea to become personally engaged in efforts to stop the fighting and create a climate which will permit political reconciliation. Both men are well-respected by all parties and would bring the perspectives of their own reconciliations after years of bitter civil war.

Similarly, the Foreign Ministers of neighboring African countries, including Eritrea, should also become more fully involved. These ministers could visit Somalia as a group during the first half of October to evaluate the progress of UN operations there and to offer suggestions for improvement and meet with factional leaders to emphasize the importance of the proposed political reconciliation conference and the need to include district council members in the conference.

The U.S. has also suggested that the UN establish an international commission linked to a ceasefire, in part to test General Aideed's sincerity in his August 30 appeal to the UN "to appoint an independent commission composed of internationally known statesmen, scholars and jurists from different countries to investigate the events in Mogadishu since June 5, 1993 and to determine those who are responsible for the crimes committed. We have also repeatedly called on the U.N. to settle the conflict peacefully through dialogue but to no avail."

Such a commission of inquiry, composed of Somalis (including members of Aideed's Habr Gidr sub-clan), and other recognized experts chosen by the UN, would serve as a grand jury. For such a commission to work, Aideed would have to leave the country under house arrest.

Somalia's tragedy was caused by the collapse of society into a Hobbesian nightmare where life indeed was "nasty, brutish and short." Somalis must relearn the habits of cooperation and learn the lessons of democracy. The UN cannot take that step for them, but it can provide a window of opportunity and

5

protection for those Somalis who do not want to surrender their country to the warlords and their guns.

Humanitarian/Economic Development

The unprecedented international humanitarian intervention now underway in Somalia must be transformed into a cost-effective international rehabilitation and development effort. U.S. commitments to this effort must be carefully constrained and linked to realistic objectives and analysis of the types of interventions which are likely to be sustainable. U.S. assistance therefore will be based on the following premises:

Close coordination with UNOSOM II: To maximize the effectiveness of our assistance package, the U.S. will support UNOSOM II as the lead agent for coordinating all donor inputs. Over the past year, the U.S. has provided to the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM temporary personnel, computer equipment and administrative support. As we move in complex development issues, our assistance to this important UNOSOM division will become even more critical.

Multilateral, multi-national effort: At the request of UNOSOM and with the encouragement of donors, the World Bank has agreed to act as UNOSOM's agent for donor coordination and longer term planning. Under the aegis of the World Bank, UNOSOM is preparing a framework for longer term interventions in Somalia's productive sectors. Donors and international NGOs are participating in the development of this framework. Once complete, the framework will form the basis of discussions between Somalis and donors to devise mutually agreeable donor assistance packages. A World Bank donors conference is scheduled for October 22. U.S. longer-term assistance will be provided in this context.

Regional emphasis/approach: Social service and economic production activities can most effectively be carried out at the local and regional level. This decentralized approach can take advantage of local participatory initiatives and NGO activities. It also allows us to take into account and respond to differences which directly affect humanitarian and economic interventions, including culture, security and political reconciliation efforts. At the same time, the international community must work with the Somalis to identify a minimum set of policies and guidelines for the operation of this system.

In setting goals for humanitarian and economic development interventions it is important to keep in mind the realities of Somalia. Somalia has never moved beyond a subsistence economy dictated primarily by the limited natural resources and harsh environment of the country. Even during "normal" times, Somalia relied on donor assistance for much of its food requirements, all of its investment and development funding, and a significant

part of its recurrent budget. It is not all clear that Somalia could ever achieve economic self-sufficiency.

Help ensure reliable supply of food: Because of the frequency and severity of drought, farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology. With improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could perhaps in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption, but since the country's apparent comparative advantage is livestock production, a robust trade in livestock commodities appears to be a much sounder development and food security strategy than a goal of cereal self-sufficiency.

Continue to move from a relief to a development-oriented program: The U.S. is working closely with other donors and the World Bank, which is acting as UNOSOM's agent for donor coordination and longer term planning, to establish a framework for economic development in Somalia. When complete in early 1994, the plan will provide an analysis of the status of most of Somalia's productive sectors as well as social services and financial management capability. This framework will provide the basis for substantive discussions between Somalis and donors on specific donor interventions.

In the meantime, international and local private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are managing over 80 percent of all donor assistance to Somalia. It is imperative that we continue to support these organizations that are addressing rehabilitation as well as continuing relief needs throughout the country.

Facilitate return home of refugee and displaced populations: An estimated 700,000 Somalis are displaced and remain dependent upon relief assistance. In addition, there are currently over 545,000 Somali refugees abroad in Kenya (300,000), Ethiopia (140,000), Yemen (55,000) and Djibouti (50,000) who are of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Voluntary return of these people to their homes is obviously the most desirable solution for most refugees and displaced persons. It is important that Somalis return home to participate, both politically and economically, in the rebuilding of their country. Equally important is avoiding the establishment of semi-permanent large scale refugee camps, which the international donor community can ill-afford to support.

Help develop revenue-collecting capacity for the emerging government: The U.S. is working closely with UNOSOM and other donors to establish a trust fund which would collect revenue from Somali businessmen for services which a government would normally charge. Examples include port fees, airport fees, animal vaccinations and animal certifications. Funds collected could be used to pay public servants such as teachers, hospital workers, and police.

This fund would serve as the basis for a national treasury and would eventually be turned over to a Somali government. It is necessary to set up this fund as soon as possible since donors cannot support all recurrent costs of public services. It is also important that local governmental entities have revenue-generating systems in place in order to address priority needs at the district level.

Help restore traditional economic base: Restoring a sound economic base will depend ultimately on the private sector, including farmers, merchants and traders and commercial importers. The elements of this system are in place, but require encouragement, sound policies and a secure operating environment in the towns and countryside.

Military

The U.S. military missions in Somalia are to provide logistical support for the other military contingents in UNOSOM and, through the Quick Reaction Force, to provide a combat capability that UNOSOM otherwise would lack. The QRF is to respond to extraordinary threats, such as those presented by warlord Mohammed Aideed.

Other national contingents escort humanitarian aid convoys, conduct weapons sweeps and will begin the process of disarmament of the factions. These measures will help provide the secure environment necessary for political reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, and refugee and displaced person repatriation to go forward. The military contingents themselves, however, are not responsible for this aspect of UNOSOM's mandate.

The President has continued the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia as part of, and in support of, UNOSOM II pursuant to his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. The President's reports provided information on the June 5 attacks against UN peacekeepers and our actions since that time in support of the U.N. mandate and directed against those responsible for the murder or wounding of peacekeepers. UN-led operations against Aideed's forces and compound have not involved sustained military action.

III. ROLE OF U.S. FORCES

U.S. forces in Somalia furnish logistical support for the other UN contingents and provide a strong combat arm, if necessary, through the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). A list of units, their locations, and functions is contained at Annex I.

insert wire diagram of command arrangements

A. Logistical Support Contingent**Command, Operational and Administrative Control Arrangements:**

The U.S. logistical support force serves under the command of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and functions under the operational control of the Commander of UNOSOM II Force Command, Turkish Lt. General Cevik Bir. The Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM), General John Montgomery, is the senior American military officer and is dual-hatted as Deputy Commander of the UNOSOM II Force Command.

The logistics support command provides command, control, and management of common item theater-level logistics support for UNOSOM II Force Command, including all units of USFORSOM deployed in support of UNSC Resolution 814. It provides selected common item support/common-user services support and inland distribution of bulk POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), as required to support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command. Among the services provided by the U.S. logistical units are supply of rations and potable water, delivery of bulk supplies up-country, handling and storage of bulk cargo in the port of Mogadishu, and medical support services.

B. Quick Reaction Force (QRF)

Given the continuing presence of well-armed private militias that had proven themselves able to intimidate the lightly-armed UNOSOM I peacekeepers and the UN's inexperience in putting together a Chapter VII operation, the U.S., in consultation with the UN, offered to make available a Quick Reaction Force to reinforce UNOSOM's combat capabilities. The QRF was designed to respond to hostile threats and attacks that exceed UNOSOM military force capabilities. It will not be used to spearhead routine operations, escort convoys, or perform long-term security actions. As security conditions improve and when directed by the U.S. National Command Authorities, the QRF will move off-shore from Somalia and thence out of the area. A QRF would be available, however, to return to Somalia if conditions warrant.

Command Arrangements: The U.S. QRF serves under the command and operational control of the USCINCCENT (Commander in Chief, Central Command). Tactical control of the QRF is delegated from USCINCCENT to the Commander of USFORSOM in situations within Somalia that exceed the capabilities of UNOSOM II Force Command forces and require emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or for show-of-force operations. Requests to use the QRF for purposes other than these narrowly-defined missions require explicit CINCCENT approval.

-9-

QRF units and their functions: As of September 21, the QRF consisted of 1,291 personnel, including:

- a headquarters unit of the 10th Aviation Battalion and the 10th Mountain Division;
- an assault helicopter task force of 31 aircraft;
- the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Mountain Division, with an engineering platoon, a military police platoon, a psychological operations team, a civic affairs team, a truck section, a bulldozer team and a Special Forces team, and;
- the 46th Forward Support Battalion with a platoon of MP's.

insert wire diagram of command arrangements-

IV. UNOSOM I and UNITAF

It would be useful to recall the circumstances leading to the current U.S. involvement in Somalia.

In mid-1992, humanitarian conditions in Somalia were horrendous. The internal food production and distribution systems had completely ceased during the civil war and armed clan groups roamed the country, preventing relief operations from reaching the most needy. As a result, over 1.5 million Somalis perched precariously on the brink of civil strife-induced starvation and three times that number required relief assistance. Anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 people were dying each day from hunger and malnutrition-related disease and up to 50 percent of Somali children had perished. Of the surviving children, an estimated 75 percent were malnourished.

While several relief agencies valiantly attempted to provide food and other relief assistance, their efforts were severely hampered by insecurity. Relief ships were rarely able to berth at the main southern ports, and when they managed to dock due to submission by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to extortion by local "authorities," the humanitarian convoys were looted by the bandits that roamed the countryside.

On August 28, 1992, the U.S. Government launched a military airlift, known as Operation Restore Hope, from Mombassa, Kenya to deliver food to Somalia. Before ceasing operations in March, 1993, U.S. military aircraft had flown 875 sorties, carrying 23,354 metric tons (MT) of food. USG-funded civilian aircraft carried another 19,435 MT in Somalia and northern Kenya. The airlift was only an emergency measure, however, and was incapable of meeting the 60,000 MT per month needed to feed the southern Somali population. Relief planners realized that massive quantities of relief food would have to enter Somalia through ports and travel by land to address the food needs. Thus, the U.S. delivered 338,000 metric tons of relief supplies by 15 common use ships and 2 FSS (JCS - what is an FSS?)

Establishment of UNOSOM I: UNOSOM was established By Security Council Resolution 751 of April 24, 1992, which authorized the deployment of 50 unarmed cease-fire observers, appointed a Special Representative, and agreed in principle to a UN security force. Resolution 767 established four operational zones in Somalia as part of the mission. UNSC Resolution 775 of August 1992 expanded the authorized strength of UNOSOM I to 3,500, although only Pakistan provided a force of 500 for the mission.

Because of organizational difficulties, the Pakistani battalion was delayed in deploying to Somalia. Once the Pakistani contingent arrived in Mogadishu in late September, however, they immediately came under fire from heavy caliber weapons. Having undertaken the mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which only allowed use of force in self-defense, and faced with superior numbers and firepower from the warlords controlling Mogadishu, the Pakistani commander made the decision to hunker down at the airport and not directly confront the warlords.

In the meantime, as more food became available through the airlift and NGO activity increased, relief efforts were increasingly hijacked by armed bandits and extortionist Somali "officials." An estimated 60-80 percent of the relief food was looted by bandits or diverted by corrupt authorities before reaching the desperate population. By November 1992, it became clear that unless the security situation in Somalia improved, relief efforts would be wasted and death rates would continue to rise.

A number of NGO's and UN relief organizations, plagued by banditry and extortion, began to pull out of Somalia. Many tried to operate from neighboring Kenya or Ethiopia, but large segments of the population were isolated from the aid.

The Decision to Deploy UNITAF: UNOSOM I had failed in its mission. Only Pakistan had offered a contingent, and it was bottled up in the airport. After consultations with the UN, the Bush Administration volunteered to lead an international coalition into Somalia to ensure delivery of relief supplies. In December 1992, under authorization of UN Security Council Resolution 794, over 25,000 American troops were sent to Somalia.

Security Council Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992 authorized the U.S. to establish an operation to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. Among its other provisions Resolution 794 called for the Secretary General to develop a plan to ensure that UNOSOM would be able to fulfill its mandate of promoting political reconciliation once UNITAF withdrew. To that end, the Security Council decided to proceed with the full deployment of the 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM I authorized earlier by Resolution 775.

-11-

Upon arrival in Mogadishu, UNITAF forces quickly secured the Mogadishu port, enabling the arrival and offloading of relief ships. Under military escort, relief food and other humanitarian supplies began to move out of the Mogadishu port for distribution in the Mogadishu area and to Baidoa, Bardera, Hoddur, Wajit, Gailalassi, Belet Uen and Merca. Extensive road repair and mine clearing operations on the major distribution routes by UNITAF forces further accelerated the movement of food. By February, malnutrition levels in Mogadishu had fallen from an estimated 70 percent in August to less than 18 percent and the number of children attending supplemental feeding centers had dropped dramatically. In other areas, nutritional conditions also began to show dramatic improvement: in Belet Uen the malnutrition rate fell from 45 percent to 22 percent; in Kismayu, assessments at supplemental feeding centers indicated that malnutrition was 13 percent in February as opposed to 32 percent in October. In Baidoa, death rates fell from 50 to 15 per 10,000 per day. Also, as troops expanded into the surrounding districts, food and relief assistance was also able to reach rural populations, thus permitting some of the displaced to return home. This was a critical step in laying the foundations for eventual self-reliance as large quantities of relief food would continue to be necessary until Somalis were able to plant and harvest decent crops.

-12-

(chart)

UNITAF FORCE CONTRIBUTORS
(as of March 23, 1993)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>	<u>Type of Forces</u>	<u>Location</u>
Australia*	931	Infantry	Baidoa
Belgium	761	Air Inf	Kismayu
Botswana	206	Infantry	Mogadishu
Canada**	1164	Mech Inf	Belet Uen
Egypt	235	Mech Inf	Mogadishu
France	1578	Mech Inf	Oddur
Greece	110	Med/Log	Mogadishu
India***	5	Advance	Mogadishu
Italy	2558	Air Inf	Gialalasi
Kuwait	138	Infantry	Mogadishu
Morocco	126	Mech Inf	Baledogle
New Zealand	67	Air Trans	Mogadishu
Nigeria	565	Recon	Mogadishu
Pakistan	880	Infantry	Mogadishu
Saudi Arabia	680	Infantry	Mogadishu
Sweden	180	Medical	Mogadishu
Tunisia	133	Infantry	Mogadishu
Turkey	300	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.A.E.	640	Infantry	Mogadishu
Zimbabwe	160	Infantry	Mogadishu

Total Non-U.S. 12,555

On January 19, U.S. troop strength hit its peak at 25,074.

* Australia withdrew its infantry battalion at the conclusion of UNITAF, leaving in place a traffic control unit.

** Canada withdrew its infantry contingent at the end of UNITAF.

*** Indian forces did not arrive in time to take part in UNITAF.

(end chart)

The Somalia Trust Fund

UNSC Resolution 794 also established the Somalia Trust Fund, which was to be used to help defray the costs of certain participating nations that otherwise would not be able to contribute forces to UNITAF. The bulk of the Fund came from Japan, which contributed \$100 million out of a total of \$106 million. According to the terms of reference for the Fund negotiated by the U.S., Japan and the UN, the Fund could be used to reimburse the United States and other developed countries for the costs they incurred in supporting certain developing countries: the Fund would not be available to pay the costs of the U.S. and other developed countries. Since the U.S. was providing the bulk of the forces for UNITAF, including the logistics support, up to 85 percent of the Somalia Fund was set aside to reimburse the U.S. for expenses incurred in supporting other nations. By mid-September, the U.S. had submitted final bills totalling \$27.5 million to the UN for reimbursement. A panel made up of representatives from the UN, the U.S., and Japan is now examining bills submitted by other countries to determine if they meet the terms of reference for the Fund, before beginning disbursement. We have urged the UN to expedite this process, both so that the U.S. can be reimbursed for its eligible expenses, and to identify any potential surplus which might be used in supporting the establishment of the Somali police. U.S. costs were lower than originally estimated because the tempo of operations was lower than anticipated, and several contingents that the U.S. expected to help support did not arrive until after UNITAF had turned responsibility over to UNOSOM II.

(Sidebar)

UNITAF casualties

UNITAF casualties included four Americans and four coalition partner soldiers killed in action, with 11 Americans and 12 coalition wounded in action. As of September 27, UNOSOM II has suffered seven Americans killed and 57 wounded, with 50 coalition soldiers killed and 171 wounded in action.

(end sidebar)

V. UNOSOM II

UN Security Council Resolution 814 of March 26, 1993, returned control of the Somalia operation to UNOSOM. UNOSOM was to continue its mission of seeking political reconciliation, and promoting economic rehabilitation, but it was also given the tasks of facilitating refugee repatriation, reestablishing the police and judiciary systems, and creating a demining program. Moreover, UNOSOM was charged with creating a secure environment

-14-

and disarming the factions. Most importantly, UNSC Resolution 814 cited Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gave the operation the right to use force, if necessary, to implement its mandate.

UNOSOM II forces took command of the Somalia operations on May 6, 1993.

UNOSOM II's mandate was further modified by Resolution 837 of June 6, 1993, which condemned the premeditated armed attacks by forces apparently of the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against UNOSOM II personnel on June 5, and the use of radio broadcasts to incite attacks against such personnel, and stressed the importance of the restoration of law and order. The resolution asked the Secretary General, again under Chapter VII of the Charter, to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the attacks, including arrest, detention, trial and punishment.

UNSC Resolution 865 of September 22, 1993 focused on the continuing violence in Mogadishu and the absence of law enforcement and judicial authorities and institutions, and asked the Secretary General to re-double his efforts to promote national reconciliation and re-establish the Somali police, judicial and penal systems.

-15-

(chart)
 UNOSOM FORCE CONTRIBUTORS
 (as of September 23, 1993)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>	<u>Type of Forces</u>	<u>Location</u>
Australia	57	Log Staff	Mogadishu
Bangladesh	950	Inf/Sig	Mogadishu
Belgium	943	Infantry	Kismayu
Botswana	253	Infantry	Bardera
Canada	7	Staff	Mogadishu
Egypt	539	Infantry	Mogadishu
France	1113	Infantry	Oddur
Germany	1724	Eng/Log	Belet Uen
Greece	122	Med/Log	Wajid
India	1700	Inf/Log	Belet Uen
Ireland	7	Trans	Mogadishu
Italy	2801	Infantry	Gialalasi
Kuwait	108	Infantry	Mogadishu
Malaysia	873	Inf/MP	Mogadishu
Morocco	1346	Infantry	Baledogle
New Zealand	69	Air Trans	Mogadishu
Nigeria	558	Infantry	Belet Uen
Norway	141	HQ staff	Mogadishu
Pakistan	5005	Infantry	Mogadishu
Romania	236	Fld Hosp	Mogadishu
Saudi Arabia	678	Infantry	Mogadishu
South Korea	252	Engineer	Mogadishu
Sweden	113	Medical	Mogadishu
Tunisia	143	Infantry	Mogadishu
Turkey	320	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.A.E.	663	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.S.A.	5461	Log/QRF	Mogadishu
<u>Zimbabwe</u>	<u>899</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Baidoa</u>
Total	27,081		

Expected additional arrivals

India	2820	Inf/Log	Belet Uen
Ireland	73	Trans	Mogadishu
Nepal	320	Inf/MP	?
Tunisia	463	Infantry	Mogadishu
Uganda	300	Infantry	Mogadishu
Zambia	570	Infantry	?

(sidebar)

wire diagram of military and civilian components
 (end sidebar)

Command and Control Difficulties

There have been command and control difficulties within UNOSOM that have hampered its effectiveness. It should be recognized that UNOSOM II is the first UN peace enforcement operation, where the international community sought to impose an end to fighting on recalcitrant parties. The difficulties have stemmed from several sources.

The novelty of working together under such a system has kept the players behind the learning curve. Except for the members of NATO, the world's militaries have little experience in working within large multilateral organizations. While these problems of coordination are being corrected, there will continue to be difficulties in language, different procedures and incompatible equipment.

At the same time, some countries have arrived in Somalia with clearly differing perspectives on what be required of them. Some contingents view UNOSOM as an extension of traditional peacekeeping operations, where the peacekeepers take great pains to avoid using force or appearing to take sides in the conflict. Other contingents have little real combat experience, and are reluctant to take on the warlords. Still others recognize more clearly that UNOSOM is a unique experiment that requires the skills of both traditional peacekeeping and the more robust efforts of peace enforcement. Closer consultations between the UN and the troop contributing countries before they arrive and continuing close consultations both in the field and in New York are necessary to overcome these differences. Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan has instituted periodic briefings of troop contributing countries in New York; the U.S. has encouraged him to make these more frequent and deeper.

Finally, nations have arrived with differing opinions of how their forces will relate both to the UN Force Commander and their national capitals. In some cases, this has meant referring almost all orders to capitals for agreement, which has resulted in delays and, in some cases, mutual recrimination. U/SYG Annan's consultations in New York are aimed at clarifying these positions.

Public Affairs Problems

UNOSOM II has suffered as well from public relations difficulties. The assaults on UN forces loyal to Aideed and the UN and U.S. reponse have made it appear that all of UNOSOM's efforts are focussed solely on a vendetta against one warlord. The larger story of the end of starvation and the beginnings of political reconciliation, are being lost. UNOSOM, and the UN in general, need to do a better job of explaining what it is doing both to the people of Somalia, to undercut any Aideed claim that

he is a nationalist hero, and to the world at large, so that they can see what they are contributing to in that war-torn land.

VII. PROGRESS TO DATE

Political

Despite the problems in South Mogadishu, progress is being made in areas outside of Mogadishu that have traditionally been controlled by Somali warlords. Of Somalia's 84 districts, 13 now have working district councils and 40 will shortly. These councils are broad based organizations that will oversee the reconciliation process in their areas and, eventually, take on full responsibility for local administration. Peace talks are being conducted under UNOSOM sponsorship in Kismayu, and the large-scale starvation that prompted the international community's intervention has come to an end.

The Secretary General's Special Representative, retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, in address to the Somali people on July 1 outlined an ambitious list of goals in all spheres of UNOSOM activities, including political reconciliation and economic rehabilitation. He endorsed the goal, as agreed in Addis Ababa by Somali representatives, of a two year period for political reconstruction during which elected Somali officials would assume responsibility for self governance. Two years, however, is a goal rather than a firm target date.

The Addis Ababa peace accord remain the basis for ensuring political reconciliation and the restoration of the Somali government. However, attacks on UN peacekeepers and foreign journalists and the need to respond to these attacks have complicated efforts to form the "Transitional National Council" called for in the agreement.

Further progress on the political front will be impossible without resolving the problem of Aideed. Other warlords will delay their own disarmament while they await the outcome of the struggle between the UN and Aideed. They will want to be ready to return to the battlefield against Aideed if he succeeds in neutralizing the UN and then turns his guns against his rivals. And so long as the threat of renewed warfare among the warlords hands in the air, political reconciliation will be extremely fragile.

Security

The UN Secretary General's August 17 report on Somalia calls for \$45 million to fund the initial costs of reestablishing a Somali justice system comprising police, judicial and prison components. The Report notes that a consensus was reached at the Third Coordinating Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in March in Addis Ababa, that national capacity building should be given urgent attention, including the police, judicial and penal systems.

In response to the urgent need, the U.S. is proposing a three part package in support of the judicial and police components of the UN plan. The U.S. will provide a \$6 million grant to UNOSOM which will cover all initial costs of reestablishing the judicial system, including: salaries of judges and other personnel of the various courts, the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General; rehabilitation of facilities, provision of vehicles, supplies and equipment; and support for UNOSOM personnel.

To support the police component, we plan to draw down up to \$25 million in commodities and services from U.S. government agencies, subject to Congressional approval. The drawdown could include vehicles, vehicle maintenance packages, radios, uniforms and weapons. While this drawdown will respond to some of the requirements of the police component, the issue of police salaries has been especially problematic. We therefore plan to provide an additional \$2 million to help cover police salaries, also contingent upon Congressional concurrence.

Beyond the direct benefit to the UN effort that will come from this package of assistance, the U.S. commitment will provide leverage for the U.S. and the UN to induce other donor countries to contribute to the UN plan.

In the past week, a U.S.-chaired UN working group has succeeded in obtaining commitments from a number of nations to donate money, equipment and trainers to set up Somalia's police force, including Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have also expressed interest in assisting.

Disarmament

UNITAF dealt with the issue of disarmament only within the context of its limited mission -- ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid in the southern part of the country. To have done otherwise would have involved the U.S.-led coalition in matters that would have complicated attempts to make sure that starving people received food. That said, to carry out its mission, UNITAF found that it had to negotiate a number of limited disarmament accords.

UNITAF forces captured and destroyed over 3,000 personal weapons between December 1992 and May 1993. An additional 373 crew-served weapons were confiscated and destroyed.

The U.S.-led coalition did recognize the importance of disarmament before UNOSOM began the larger task of rehabilitation. Among other things, UNITAF strongly encouraged the signatories to the Addis Ababa Agreement to make disarmament one of the key objectives. During this period, the U.S. and others also ensured that this goal was included in the U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized UNOSOM.

Progress has slowed since the transition to UNOSOM, due largely to the continuing fighting between Aideed and UNOSOM.

C. Humanitarian/economic

Current Activities: Currently, the USG is funding a number of relief and rehabilitation activities in virtually all areas of southern and northern Somalia. While feeding kitchens and general food distribution have stopped, targeted food distributions to displaced persons and other vulnerable groups continue. Supplemental feeding of high-protein foods for children under five years old continue to ensure that improved nutritional conditions are sustained. While earlier medical efforts focussed on emergency surgery and hospital support needs, current health efforts attempt to continue to address reduced emergency needs while providing training and establishing community health networks that will eventually be self-sustaining. Water projects, a critical element in any relief strategy, are being implemented country-wide and have transitioned from the provision of hand pumps, to the rehabilitation of existing wells and the excavation of new ones. The USG funds over 20 of the 25-30 international NGOs working in Somalia and has already provided \$268,521,183 to address the Somalia crisis. (AID- can you give a list of NGOs?)

Affect of Security on Relief: While humanitarian efforts in Mogadishu have been severely hampered by the violence in the capital, there is also a reduced need for emergency assistance in the area. One prominent NGO in Mogadishu, Save the Children U.K., which produced a survey in May providing convincing evidence that supplementary feeding should continue in some parts of town, is now reporting that all supplemental feeding in Mogadishu should cease by mid-October. Apparently, many of the children attending the special feeding centers no longer fall within the nutritional criteria for feeding and are ready to graduate to regular dry food distributions. CARE was providing dry food rations thrice weekly through 32 distribution centers, reaching 400,000 people, but due to the availability of food on the market, was scheduled to phase out this program on September 20.

Reduction of feeding programs all over southern Somalia will have to take into account the reality, however, that certain groups in Somalia continue to be blocked access to food and relief supplies due to inter-clan rivalries and that vulnerable groups, particularly displaced persons, women and children under five, continue to exist in pockets of suffering. In Kismayu, for instance, the UN halted food distribution programs in displaced camps to encourage the displaced persons to return home, but when they did not move out of the camps, malnutrition resurfaced. In Bardera, a poor harvest forced many displaced who had gone home to return to the city only to find that food

distributions had stopped. While the UN and NGOs moved quickly to respond to both these situations when they arose, these examples serve to illustrate that humanitarian progress made in Somalia remains fragile. Maintenance of progress made and forward movements are contingent on expanded and sustainable security as well as continued relief and rehabilitation assistance. The U.S. Government will continue to focus interventions on the health/nutrition, water/sanitation/agriculture/livestock, employment generation, food security and resettlement sectors and will address any emergency needs that arise.

Refugee Return: The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is operating with international and local staff in eight locations in Somalia and is funding some 40 national and international NGOs that are providing relief and rehabilitation assistance in areas along the Kenya/Somali border. UNHCR uses a community-based approach which gives assistance to needy persons, including internally displaced persons in areas to which refugees are returning.

More than 200,000 refugees have been registered by UNHCR for voluntary repatriation. It is estimated that some 50,000 refugees have spontaneously returned during the last few months and UNHCR has directly assisted some 15,000 refugees with organized transport by land and air.

UNHCR also is assisting displaced persons in Kismayu and Bardera to return to their homes. They report that 2,624 families from Mogadishu and Kismayu have returned to 35 villages surveyed in Lower Juba.

Indices of economic activity: Economic activities in Baidoa and Belet Wayne (two of the hardest hit areas) have picked up and the populations of both towns are able to move around freely. Many more schools have been opened because of the improved security in these areas. One NGO reports 23,000 primary school students are enrolled in 22 schools in Bay, Bakool, Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle regions.

In Hiran region, troops have assisted in the repairs of rural health posts, wells and the rehabilitation of schools.

Large numbers of animals were being exported from Mogadishu port during the fighting in 1991, but exports ceased when the port was closed in November 1991 due to extremely heavy fighting in the port area. When UNOSOM took control of the port in early 1993, livestock exports resumed in substantial numbers. Significant livestock exports also are taking place out of the ports of Berdera and Bosaso in the north

After a year of virtually no commercial imports into Mogadishu port, the private sector has resumed substantial commercial imports to Mogadishu port since January 1993.

(AID - any idea what we mean by significant and substantial - how about some numbers?)

Shift from Emergency Assistance to Longer Term Development: The famine is over and NGOs have closed down their feeding kitchens throughout southern Somalia. Widespread dry distributions of food to the general population have also ceased, enabling NGOs to target food aid to pockets of vulnerable groups through food-for-work schemes and supplementary feeding. ICRC was able to end its costly delivery of food via coastal barges with the opening of Mogadishu port.

In Lower Shabelle, 32,000 hectares were planted for the "GU" (April-May 1993) planting season with an estimated harvest of 33,000 metric tons of food and non-food crops. During FY93, NGOs assisted Somalis in excavating 164 secondary canals and 19 primary canals for a total of 1,000 kilometers of canals that irrigate 46,000 hectares of farmland. Some 19,000 families benefitted from short term employment through this labor-intensive canal excavation program.

VII. PLANNING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES

As Secretary of Defense Aspin noted in his August 27 speech, "logistics troops supporting other UNOSOM II forces can be reduced when the security situation in Mogadishu permits larger scale hiring of civilian contract employees to provide the support functions."

While improvement of the security situation depends upon developments on the ground in Somalia, negotiations are continuing between U.S. and UN personnel regarding the contracting of UNOSOM logistics functions. In order to accelerate the UN contracting and logistics process, the Joint Staff has provided the UN nine experts for a period of 60-75 days to help strengthen the UN program. To date, one contract for food and another for fuel have been discussed, although neither has been signed. The food contract is currently undergoing UN legal review. Award of either of these two contracts would release of only a limited number of U.S. logistics soldiers, however. The U.S. soldiers now performing these functions belong to units that have other responsibilities to the UN and to the other members of the U.S. contingent. It would not be effective to withdraw partial elements from U.S. units.

Moreover, the UN is hesitant to pursue further the fuel contract and any new contracts at this time for a variety of reasons. In the current circumstances, potential contractors are asking a high hazard premium, adding significantly to the cost at a time when the UN is financially constrained. The UN also recognizes that delaying a payment to the U.S. or other troop contributors will not cause service to be terminated: that would not be the case with a civilian contractor. Although the U.S. has detailed nine experts to New York, the UN headquarters

staff is still undermanned and overwhelmed by the contracting requirements. Finally, the UN is reluctant to see the U.S. replaced by contractors because continued participation by some nations may well depend upon a continued U.S. presence.

As Secretary Aspin noted in his speech, the "President has directed that U.S. forces remain long enough to complete their mission and no longer. The completion of the mission chiefly concerns security in Somalia. For U.S. combat troops there are three items on the checklist. First, the security issue in south Mogadishu must be settled. Second, we must make real progress towards taking the heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords. Third, there must be credible police forces in major population centers." The Joint Staff is working with OSD to develop a U.S. forces exit strategy and achievable, quantifiable, exit criteria which will reflect the Secretary's August 27 speech. These U.S. forces criteria could also be used by the UN for its disengagement.

ANNEX I

Location and Functions of U.S. Forces in Somalia

507th Corps Support Group (CSG):

Headquarters: University Compound, Mogadishu
 Personnel: Officers: 33, Enlisted: 224.
 Military
 Specialties: Command and control/management functions

561st Corps Support Battalion.

Headquarters: Hunter Base, Mogadishu
 Personnel: Officers: 13, Enlisted: 41
 Military
 Specialties: command and control/management functions,
 materiel management, transportation management

102nd Quartermaster Company (POL)

Mission: Provides receipt, issue, and storage of petroleum
 for U.S. and UNOSOM Forces in Theater. The
 company maintains the bag farm and the _____?
 and Petroleum Distribution System, which transfers
 fuel from docked ships to the bag farm.

Location: Airfield

Customers

supported: U.S. and UNOSOM Forces.

- (a) Mogadishu: JP-5 capacity is 2,620,000 gal./MOGAS capacity is 300,000 gal.
- (b) Baledogle (Morocco): JP-5 capacity is 40,000 /MOGAS capacity is 20,000 gal.
- (c) Baidoa (France): JP-5 capacity is 120,000
- (d) Bardera (Botswana): JP-5 capacity is 40,000/MOGAS is 20,000 gal.
- (e) Belet Uen (Germany): JP-5 capacity is 100,000/MOGAS is 20,000 gal.
- (f) Waajid (Zimbabwe): JP-5 capacity is 76,000/MOGAS is 26,000 gal.
- (g) Balcad (Korea): JP-5 capacity is 34,000 gal.

(h) Totals JPS: 3,030,000
 MOGAS 412,000

Personnel: Officers: 6, Enlisted: 119
 Military
 Specialties: Petroleum Specialist, Light Wheeled Vehicle
 Mechanic, QM Shipment Repairman

-24-

594th Transportation Company.

Mission: Provides light transportation support for messengers and general cargo for both local and line haul missions.

Equipment: 48 ea. H923 (5T TRK, CGO), 10 ea. M931A2, 17 ea. M871 (30ft. trl.)

Location: Hunter Base (as of 30 Aug 93).

Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces.

Personnel: Officers: 5, Warrent Officers: 1, Enlisted: 120.

Military Specialties: Truck Drive, Heavy Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic

196th Quartermaster Detachment (Water Purification Section).

Mission: Provides purification, issue, storage, distribution of bulk water for U.S. and UNOSOM Forces. Operates and maintains a tactical water distribution system (TWDS).

Location: Airfield.

Customers supported: The unit is operating five production sites (see below), producing potable and nonpotable water with the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification system (ROWPO). Bulk water is delivered to Baledogle, Baidoa, Bordera, and Belet Uen.

(a) Mogadishu:

1. Airfield (capacity): 80K.
 2. Embassy (capacity): 40K.
 3. New Port (capacity): 210k.
 4. Reservoir (capacity): 260k
 5. University (capacity): 40k.
- Total: 630k

- (b) Baledogle, Morocco (capacity): 76k
- (c) Baidoa, France (capacity): 60k
- (d) Bardera, Botswana (capacity): 56k
- (e) Belet Uen, Germany (capacity): 70k

Personnel: Officers: 22, Enlisted: 40.

Military Specialties: Water Purification Specialist, OM Equipment Repairman, Preventive Medicine Specialist

79th Quartermaster Company

Mission: provides graves registration and Theater Mortuary Evacuation Point (TMFP) services for U.S. Forces.
Location: Airfield.
Customers supported: U.S. Forces in Theater are supported. While the terms of Reference (TOR) identify the processing of remains as a national responsibility, to include Somalis' remains incident to hostile action with UNOSOM II Forces, the TMEP has processed most of the remains in Theater.
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 16.
Military
Specialties: Mortuary Affairs Specialist

40th Transportation Company.

Mission: Provides transportation for bulk water and fuel for local and line haul missions.
Equipment: 60 ea 2A2 (Trac.), 20 ea. M967 (5K fuel tankers). and 40 ea. M1098 (water tankers).
Location: Hunter Base.
Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
Personnel: Officers: 5, Enlisted: 120.
Military
Specialties: Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic, Supply Specialist, Truck Driver

POL LAB (managed by the 561st CSB/individual augmentees)

Mission: Test fuel samples to ensure quality
Location: Hunter Base
Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 4
Military
Specialties: Petroleum Lab Specialist

568th/362nd Construction Support Equipment (CSE) company

Mission: Primarily responsible for MSR maintenance repair
Location: Hunter Base
Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
Personnel: Officers: 6, Enlisted: 195
Military
Specialties: Heavy construction Equipment Operations, Heavy Construction Shipment Mechanic, Truck Driver

TF 24/10th Terminal Battalion

Headquarters: New Port, Mogadishu

567th Transportation Company

Mission: Provides terminal service support for Mogadishu New Port. The service includes the discharging and handling of cargo from ships at dock.
Equipment: Crane and MHE capability (includes RTCH capability).
Location: New Port.
Customers supported: All U.S. Forces are supported. The unit has provided limited support to UNOSOM forces and NGOs when available.
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 75
Military
Specialties: Port (terminal) Operations Specialists.

551st Cargo Transfer Company

Mission: Provides ADACG support for passengers and cargo on all U.S. incoming and outgoing flights.
Equipment: MHE capability
Location: Airfield International Terminal
Customers supported: All U.S. Forces are supported. (UNOSOM Forces' services are handled by UNOSOM at the north ramp.)
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 38
Military
Specialties: Warehouse Specialist

13th Corps Support Battalion.

Headquarters: Sword Base. The Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP) laboratory and the Logistics Assistance Office (LAO) are at this location.
Personnel: Officers: 15, Enlisted: 31.
Military
Specialties: command and control/management function, Automated Supply Specialist, Supply Specialist

227th Quartermaster Company

Mission: Provides direct support of Class I rations to all U.S. Forces. Receives, stores, and issues perishable rations to all U.S. Forces.
Location: Sword Base
Customers supported: U.S. Forces (5,167 personnel)
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 79
Military
Specialties: Class I Warehouse Specialist

598th Maintenance Company

Mission: Provides Direct Support and back-up unit level maintenance support for U.S. forces under UNOSOM II. Provides class IX management and support for U.S. Forces
Location: Sword Base
Customers supported: All U.S. Forces in Theater supported. While the TOR does not require it, the unit has provided repair, repair technical assistance, and class IX technical assistance to UNOSOM forces.
Personnel: Officers: 5, Enlisted: 176
Military
Specialties: Wheeled Vehicle Repairman, Track Vehicle Repairman, Power Operation Repairman

533rd Transportation Company

Mission: Provides general cargo transportation for local and line haul missions
 Equipment: 50ea. M915A1, 80 ea. M872 (40 ft. trl.)
 Location: Sword Base (as of 30 Aug 93.)
 Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
 Personnel: Officers: 4, Warrant Officers: 1, Enlisted: 116
 Military
 Specialties: Petroleum Specialist

57th EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal) Detachment

Mission: Provides explosive ordnance disposal and demolition for U.S. and UNOSOM Forces in Theater
 Location: University Compound
 Customers supported: U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
 Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 11
 Military
 Specialties: EOD Specialist

406th Quartermaster Company

Mission: provides direct support of class I semi-perishable rations, packaged rations, and bottled water to U.S. Forces. It also provides packaged rations and bottled water to UNOSOM Forces. The unit receives, stores, and issues to all UNOSOM Forces that are not self-supporting.
 Location: Sword Base.
 Customers supported: U.S. and UNOSOM Forces (3,730 personnel)

The following UNOSOM Forces are supported outside Mogadishu:
 (The class I manager maintains a current status of the UNOSOM Forces supported for rations and bottled water.)

<u>Site Supported</u>	<u>UNOSOM Force</u>	<u>Item</u>
Baledogle	Moroccans	Bottled Water
Baidoa	French	Bottled Water
Bardera	Botswanans	Rations/Bottle Water
Belet Uen	Germans	Bottled Water
"	Nigerians	Rations/Bottle Water
Waajid	Zimbabwe	Rations/Bottle Water

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 46
 Military
 Specialties: Ration Storage Specialist

508th Ordnance Company, Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)

Mission: Operate an ammunition supply facility (CSA/TSA)
for receiving, storing, re-warehousing, combat
configuration, and issuing conventional ammunition.
Location: Airfield
Customers
Supported: All U.S. Forces
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 45
Military
Specialties: Ammunition Supply Specialist

Task Force II, Signal

Mission: Provide all switching/relaying and communication
equipment for areas away from Mogadishu. 507th
provides all communication and equipment for the
Mogadishu area.
Location: University Compound (Headquarters). Note sites
are operated throughout the Theater.
Customers
supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
Personnel: Officers: 13, Enlisted: 185
Military
Specialties: Communication Specialist

18th AG Detachment

Mission: to provide direct postal services to include
receipt, distribution, sorting, routing and
dispatch, and directory assistance.
Capabilities: Processing and handling 35,000 lbs daily
Location: University Compound/Airfield.
Customers
Supported: All U.S. Forces in Theater
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 15
Military
Specialties: Admin Specialist

546th Personnel Service Company (PSC)

Mission: Provide personnel and finance support to include record updates, check cashing, casual payments, claims, travel and contract payments.
Location: University Compound
Customers supported: All U.S. Forces in Theater
Personnel: Officers: 2; Enlisted: 6
Military
Specialties: Admin Specialist

13th PAO

Mission: To provide public affairs support to all U.S. Forces in Theater; specifically, a command information program and media relations support.
Location: University Compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 3
Military
Specialties: Photojournalist, Broadcaster

Army Materiel Command (AMC)

Mission: Provide assistance in all areas of logistics. Can perform DS/GS maintenance on the majority of U.S. Force equipment in Theater.
Location: Sword Base
Customers
Supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces in Theater in accordance with the Terms of Reference.
Personnel: 10 GS 12/13, Supply and Maintenance Technicians

Medical Support by the Combat Support Hospital
Requirements of the Subordinate Supporting Units

46th Combat Support Hospital (CSH)

Location: The headquarters is at the Embassy Compound.
Personnel: Officers: 42, WO 1, Enlisted: 127
Military
Specialties: Doctors, various specialties; nurses, various specialties; other health care providers; administrators

-31-

82nd Medical Company (Air Ambulance)

Mission: Provide medical evacuation for U.S. Forces with
six UH-60 helicopters.
Location: Airfield, international airport
Personnel: Officers: 4, Warrent Officers: 10, Enlisted: 29

528th Combat Stress Psychologist (CSC)/Individual Augmentees

Mission: provide treatment/counselling for U.S. Forces
suffering from combat stress related-illnesses
Location: Embassy compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 1

32nd Medical Logistics

Mission: Provide Medical Task Force 46 with all necessary
Class VIII Medical Supplies for all U.S. Forces.
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 9

248th Medical Detachment (Vet)/Individual Augmentees

Mission: Inspect food items and living conditions for U.S.
Forces
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 2.

261st ASMS

Mission: Conduct sickcalls and provide ambulance drivers
for all U.S. personnel
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 4, Enlisted: 34

926th Medical Detachment

Mission: Operate vehicle mounted insect spraying unit
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 3

Military Specialties for all subordinate CSH Units:

Officer Specialties:

Air Ambulance Pilots
Ground Ambulance Administrators
Preventive Medicine Physician
Environmental Medicine Physician
Environmental Science Officer
Social Worker
Veterinarian

Enlisted MOSs

Practical Nurses
Medical Specialist
Operating Room Specialist
Respiratory Specialist
Pharmacy Specialist
X-Ray Specialist
Biological Medical Specialist
Medical Technician (Air Ambulance)
Medical Technician (Ground Ambulance)
Veterinary Technician
Behavior Science Specialist
Preventive Medicine Specialist

Other support MOSs: Patient Administration; food service, communications, medical supply, vehicle maintenance, laundry and bath, administration, etc.

-33-

ANNEX II

SUMMARY OF COSTS IN SOMALIA

U.S. COSTS

UNOSOM I:	UN assessments - U.S. share:	\$33.3 million
	DoD Incremental Costs...FY 92	9.3 million
	DoD Incremental Costs FY 93	10.8 million

	SUBTOTAL	\$53.4 million
UNITAF:	Non-reimbursable DoD expenses	\$750 million
	DoD claims against	
	Somalia Trust Fund	27.5 million

	SUBTOTAL	\$777.5 million
UNOSOM II:	UN assessments	\$148.9 million
	DoD Incremental Costs	218.7 million

	SUBTOTAL	\$367.6 million

U.S. ARREARAGE

The \$33.3 million assessment for UNOSOM I has been paid; of the \$148.9 million assessment for UNOSOM II, \$5.1 million has been paid, leaving an arrearage of \$143.8 million.

PROJECTED COSTS FOR FY 94

State estimate of	
U.S. share of UN assessments	\$301.6 million
DoD estimate of incremental costs	200 million*

SUBTOTAL	\$501.6 million

*This estimate assumes the Quick Reaction Force and U.S. logistics personnel would be withdrawn during FY 94 and U.S. troop strength would fall to 1,000 by the end of FY 94.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 25, 1993

UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Richard Clarke
DOD/JCS - Perry Baltimore
DOD/OSD - Vince Kern
AID/AFR - Dick Cobb
USIA - Bob LaGamma
USUN - Rick Inderfurth

FROM: SDCWG - David Shinn (✓)

SUBJECT: Somalia - Suggested Press Themes

Attached are some suggested press themes which can be used in on-the-record or background discussions with the media. These respond to a request made at the August 24 teleconference.

Attachments: As Stated.

SEEDIR 4
8/25/93

UNCLASSIFIED

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

SOMALIA QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Aren't we failing in Somalia? Aren't we bogged down?

- NO. THE U.N. EFFORT IN SOMALIA IS CONTINUING TO MOVE FORWARD, DESPITE THE UNDENIABLE SECURITY PROBLEM IN SOUTH MOGADISHU CAUSED BY GENERAL AIDED AND HIS MILITIA.
- ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, UNOSOM HAS HELPED ESTABLISH ABOUT TWO DOZEN DISTRICT COUNCILS. THESE BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE LOCAL BODIES WILL HELP MANAGE LOCAL AFFAIRS AND OVERSEE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. REGIONAL COUNCILS ARE THE NEXT STEP.
- IN ADDITION, LOCAL LEADERS IN KISMAYO RECENTLY SIGNED A PEACE AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDES A CEASE-FIRE, DISARMAMENT, AND A MECHANISM FOR PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION. UNTIL LAST MAY, KISMAYO WAS THE SCENE OF FREQUENT FIGHTING BETWEEN RIVAL MILITIAS.
- ON SECURITY, PROGRESS IS ALSO APPARENT OUTSIDE MOGADISHU. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, BANDITRY IS MUCH REDUCED AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE REMAINS RARE.
- ON THE ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, STARVATION HAS ENDED ALTHOUGH POCKETS OF DEPRIVATION CONTINUE. FOOD AVAILABILITY HAS IMPROVED TO THE POINT THAT WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF STOPPING EMERGENCY FOOD DISTRIBUTION. IT IS NO LONGER NEEDED. THE LOCAL FOOD HARVEST WAS THE BEST IN THE LAST THREE YEARS.
- WE ARE ALSO SEEING SIGNS OF A REVIVAL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. AS AN EXAMPLE, SMALL PRIVATE MARKETS ARE REOPENING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Q.: Why is the U.S. still in Somalia?

- THERE ARE THREE REASONS WHY.
- FIRST, IT IS APPROPRIATE AND HUMANE FOR THE "HAVES" OF THE WORLD TO COME TO THE AID OF THE "HAVE NOTS."
- SECOND, THE U.S. AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY HAVE MADE AN ENORMOUS INVESTMENT IN SOMALIA SINCE LATE LAST YEAR. STARVATION HAS ENDED, POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE IS NOW RARE OUTSIDE SOUTH MOGADISHU, BANDITRY IS ON THE DECLINE, AND, UNDER U.N. AUSPICES, EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO FOSTER POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.
- THESE EFFORTS ARE BEARING FRUIT, AS EVIDENCED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT THIS SUMMER OF SEVERAL DOZEN DISTRICT COUNCILS AND THE CONCLUSION LAST WEEK OF A PEACE AGREEMENT AMONG THE DOMINANT CLANS IN KISMAYO, ONCE A CENTER OF INTENSE CONFLICT.
- THE PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE FROM THE U.S., WOULD PLACE THIS INVESTMENT AT RISK.
- THIRD, THE MULTINATIONAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN SOMALIA IS AN INNOVATIVE RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF THE POST COLD WAR WORLD. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE U.N. IS ACTING UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER VII OF ITS CHARTER, WHICH AUTHORIZES PEACE-ENFORCING, RATHER THAN THE MORE FAMILIAR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
- IF THE EFFORT IN SOMALIA CONTINUES TO SUCCEED, IT WILL PROVIDE A MODEL WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FACES NEW, SIMILAR CHALLENGES. IF IT IS ALLOWED TO FAIL, THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES COMMITTED TO PEACE WILL HAVE TO FIND ANOTHER -- PERHAPS LESS EFFECTIVE -- WAY TO DEAL WITH THE SOMALIAS OF THE FUTURE.

Q. Haven't we changed our mission?

- NO. THE U.S. MISSION HAS NOT CHANGED. THE U.S. IS SUPPORTING THE U.N. WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNOSOM II ON MAY 4, 1993, THE U.N. MANDATE WAS BROADENED TO INCLUDE RESTORING SECURITY, PROMOTING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, AND HELPING REESTABLISH NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND A FUNCTIONING ECONOMY. THE U.N. WANTS TO INSURE THAT SOMALIA DOES NOT SLIDE BACK TO CIVIL WAR AND FAMINE.
- AS A UNOSOM PARTICIPANT, THE U.S. IS FULLY ENGAGED IN ALL PHASES OF THIS EFFORT, INCLUDING THE RESTORATION OF SECURITY. OUR PARTICIPATION IS ESSENTIAL -- WE HAVE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES AND ENSURING SECURITY IS NECESSARY FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS ON OTHER ISSUES.
- IF SECURITY BREAKS DOWN, THE U.N. EFFORT IN SOMALIA WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY FAIL -- THUS UNDOING ALL THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE SINCE THE END OF 1992.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Q.: Aren't we overemphasizing Aideed?

- NO. AIDEED IS THE ONLY MAJOR FIGURE IN SOMALI POLITICS WHO IS OPPOSING UNOSOM WITH VIOLENCE. HIS GREATEST AREA OF SUPPORT IS IN SOUTH MOGADISHU, SITE OF KEY UN FACILITIES, THE PORT, AIRPORT, NGO OFFICES, AND ALL AMERICAN TROOPS. HE CANNOT BE IGNORED.
- THE EFFORT TO DEAL WITH AIDEED IS PART OF A LARGER EFFORT TO RESTORE SECURITY TO SOMALIA. PROGRESS HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE OUTSIDE THE AIDEED-CONTROLLED AREA INCLUDING NORTH MOGADISHU BUT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THIS GOAL IN SOUTH MOGADISHU.

SUBJECT: The Situation in Somalia: Points for a Speech

- • On December 9, 1992, 28,000 American soldiers landed in Somalia to join the United Nations in addressing one of the most compelling disasters of this century. An unprecedented drought, combined with a civil war produced a famine which had by late 1992 claimed the lives of 500,000 Somalis. The United Nations and voluntary organizations believed that unless urgent steps were taken an additional 2 million Somalis would lose their lives.
- • Taking the leadership of the emergency relief mission, the United States, working under an umbrella resolution of the United Nations, brought about a radical change in the Somali situation. Sufficient order was restored to permit food to reach the needy, markets to open, and the first crops in many years to be planted. By the spring of 1993, insecurity and banditry throughout much of Somalia had been reduced, and the situation stabilized to a point where the United States could give the responsibility for leadership of the Somali effort back to the United Nations.
- • A new Security Council resolution, UNSCR 814 was passed, calling on the United Nations to begin the work of rebuilding the government, reestablishing the essential elements of a national economy, and developing an adequate system of security for Somalia. With the new Security Council mandate, the Secretary General launched a program for political reconciliation for Somalis, aimed at permitting them to decide their future through elections which would lead to local, regional and, in time, a reconstituted national governmental authority.
- • Since the spring of 1993, the United Nations has made further progress. By August 15th, the last 22 emergency feeding centers were closed. Some 20 district councils have been formed as a result of elections and the strife-torn city of Kismayo has seen its 20 clans come together in a UN-brokered peace accord. Across the country, small shops are reopening, some schools and orphanages have reopened, and in central Somalia, former government employees are back on the job providing health and education services to the population.

• • The road ahead in Somalia is long and hard. Chaos has grown deep roots in the country and violence has become a way of life to many. Security, especially in Southern Mogadishu, where the violence provoked by dissident warlord, Mohammed Farah Aided is an issue of great concern. Aided has challenged the United Nations' authority, murdered peacekeepers from Pakistan, Italy and the United States. His objective is clear; he seeks to impose his will through violence. He does not enjoy the support of the great majority of Somalis. His followers are narrowly drawn from members of his tribal clan.

• • Because Aided operates in the capital city, the violence he has undertaken threatens to complicate the entire UN mission and cannot be ignored. The United States contributes 4,000 soldiers to the 20,000-man UN security force in Somalia. The UN has asked us to strengthen our ability to deal with Aided's threat and it has called on other nations to increase their military presence in the country. We responded favorably. The world cannot allow the ambitions of one Somali warlord to snatch hope away from millions of his fellow countrymen, who have only just begun to realize the promise of peace.

• • The additional forces which we dispatched on August 25 will be part of the UN's effort to extend security to all of Somalia. Specifically, they are trained to deal with Aided and his men. Bringing the threat to an end will take time.

• • Security is the key to further political and economic progress in Somalia. It will not come easily. The United Nations must also get on with its assigned mission so that the US and other troop contributors can withdraw their forces. We look to the United Nations to lay out a clear plan of action. We look to it to staff its functions rapidly, with officials of competence. We count on the United Nations to get on with the tough job of establishing security, reducing Somalia's still dangerous levels of armaments, and instituting a police force and judicial system.

• • While it will take years to rebuild Somalia, the UN must show its leadership by moving beyond the provision of food to beginning programs which will rebuild Somalia's infrastructure, create jobs and establish a banking system, and restore a modicum of economic stability to the country.

• • Improved security and the beginnings of economic progress need political direction. We expect the United Nations to press ahead with elections which will produce representatives for district and regional

authorities, and the national government. These are the goals that were set out in the UN resolution and they must be achieved. Failure to do so will condemn Somalis once again to a uncertain future. The UN's inability to carry out its peace enforcement mission in Somalia would have grave consequences for it as a peacemaker elsewhere in the world. As a member of the United Nations, we cannot let this happen. We have a role to play in building a strong United Nations, just as we had responsibility to respond to the tragedy of Somalia. We look forward to reducing the American contribution to the overall Somali effort and sharing it with other members of the international community. But we are determined that the suffering in Somalia will end and the United Nations will finish its work and move on to deal with the many other threats to the peace in our troubled world.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9305418
RECEIVED: 23 JUL 93 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MURTHA, JOHN P

DOC DATE: 14 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RFM REP MURTHA RE DEPLOYMENT OF US TROOPS TO SOMALIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 27 JUL 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: WARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WARD

FOR CONCURRENCE
CLARKE
ROSNER

FOR INFO
GROSS
ITOH
KENNEY

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

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DOC 1 OF 1

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5418

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FREDERICK G. MOHRMAN

TELEPHONE:
(202) 226-2771

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
~~Committee on Appropriations~~
Washington, DC 20515-6015

July 14, 1993

Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you know, I have had reservations about the deployment of U.S. troops to Somalia from the beginning of the policy initiated by the previous Administration. While the purpose of the mission is noble, we must have a realistic assessment of what goals are achievable and to what extent it is in our national interest to pursue those goals.

On my inspection trip to Somalia in January, I was struck by the extent to which the suffering and hunger was caused by the fighting among the various clans and sub-clans, as opposed to being caused simply by adverse weather. I was most impressed with the achievement of the American troops in basically attaining the goals set forth by President Bush--create a secure environment in the hardest hit areas so that food can be distributed and then pass the security mission over to the United Nations.

However, the ongoing violence and opposition to the U.N. presence by many Somalians make it clear that the mission is no longer contributing to the stabilization of Somalia. An additional concern I have is the performance of major U.N. peacekeeping operations when the U.S. is not in control.

I recommend that your Administration develop a timetable for the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces and discuss that plan with the Congressional leadership.

Sincerely,

John P. Murtha
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense

93 JUL 18

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 16, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: HOWARD G. PASTER *HP*
SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President from various members of Congress.

Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in having drafts written.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call LeeAnn Inadomi at x7500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- ✓ 1) John Murtha (D-PA), concerning Somalia;
- 2) Ron Dellums (D-CA), concerning ABM Treaty;
- 3) Elizabeth Furse (D-OR) and Pat Schroeder (D-CO), concerning gays in the military.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JULY 21, 1993

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JOHN P. MURTHA

SUBJECT: REQUESTS PRESIDENT TO DEVELOP A TIMETABLE FOR
THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES
AND DISCUSS PLAN WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
HOWARD PASTER		ORG	93/07/21		C	93/07/21
REFERRAL NOTE:						
ANTHONY LAKE		RSA	93/07/21			
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230 _____
 _____ MAIL USER CODES: (A) D PA (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE     *C-COMPLETED        *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****
  
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. map	Somalia: Deployment of Coalition Forces as of Mid-August (1 page)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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007. cable	Re: [Next Steps] (2 pages)	08/24/1993	P1/b(1)

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8/31

Dick Clarke,

What I discussed with Tony is a background paper for general distribution. This is what I came up with, with Jim Bishop's input. Looking at what you sent me, I may have overstated the pacification of the countryside.

Please let me know what you think.

—
Dick Helms

August 31, 1993

BACKGROUND PAPER

FROM: RICHARD SCHIFTER
SUBJECT: Somalia

After twenty-one years of dictatorial rule, President Siad Barre of Somalia was overthrown in January 1991. The groups responsible for deposing Siad Barre were unable to agree on the formation of a new government. As a result, Somalia, a country of 7 million people, sank into anarchy. Local warlords organized military bands, which occasionally fought against each other, but which, above all, plundered the civilian population. The country's fragile economy was progressively destroyed. As farmers fled the land, food production plummeted. Somalia's GNP dropped from _____ in 1990 to _____ in 1992. Food production went from _____ in 1990 to _____ in 1992.

In November 1991 a truce negotiated between the two rival warlords in Mogadishu came apart. Subsequent fighting made it impossible for emergency food shipments to be distributed in the capital and in the countryside. It became evident that the disruption of food production and of food distribution would lead to mass starvation. People soon were dying by the thousands. By the Fall of 1992, the number of deaths from starvation in Somalia was to climb beyond 300,000, about 5% of the country's total population.

The phenomenon of mass starvation resulting from drought has faced many communities, even in recent times. In the mid-seventies and again in the mid-eighties the United States led the international community in responding to drought-induced famine in East and West Africa. The phenomenon of mass starvation resulting from dislocation caused by war or as the result of deliberate measures of warfare can also be encountered frequently. But the conditions of Somalia in 1991 and 1992 were unusual for our time period, in that people were starving to death simply because warring tribal leaders and marauding thugs were preventing food from being produced and distributed. The basic fabric of human civilization was in the process of being destroyed in Somalia as the result of the creation of a state of utter lawlessness.

The situation in Somalia was uniquely suited for consideration by the United Nations Security Council. The country lacked any semblance of national government. No major power had a political or economic stake in Somalia. Thus, when the United Nations

Security Council in early 1992 began to deal with the issue, it could deal with a humanitarian problem in its purest form. No one could argue that it was necessary to await an appeal from the government affected, because there was no government. For the same reason, no one could argue that this was a case of interference with the domestic concerns of a member government.

Recognizing that the humanitarian relief organizations were simply unable to perform the tasks which they had set themselves unless they received military protection, the United Nations decided to provide such protection. In April 1992 the Security Council arranged for 500 soldiers to be dispatched to Somalia. The troops began to arrive in Somalia in _____. But it turned out that they were too few in number and were not adequately equipped to provide the needed military shield for the distribution of food. The problem of mass starvation continued, with approximately one thousand Somalis dying each day through the summer and fall of 1992.

These were the circumstances which caused President Bush in December 1992, to send United States troops into Somalia, to lead an international force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Within a matter of weeks, they were able to establish sufficient security for the distribution of food supply throughout the country. As order was restored, the problem of mass starvation was brought to an end.

Recognizing that disarming all the military bands throughout the country was a well-nigh impossible task, the U.S. forces made no effort to disarm any of the bands, beyond insisting that armed vehicles be garaged. It was hoped that mere intimidation would suffice to restore order.

The policy worked in most parts of Somalia. Tens of thousands of Somali farmers have returned to their farms. The 1993 crop is expected to meet, by and large, local food requirements. Order has been restored to areas of the country in which 85% of the people of Somalia reside. Efforts have begun to reconstitute government from the ground up, bringing all elements of Somali society into a process dominated since early 1991 by the warlords.

Early this year it became evident, however, that one of the warlords, Mohammed Farrah Aideed, not only wanted to be installed as President of Somalia, but would disrupt any effort to arrange for a solution to the country's problems which was likely to preclude the achievement of his goal. Committed to attaining his objective by force, he refused to participate in any meaningful truce negotiations. As a result we have witnessed sporadic terrorist attacks in South Mogadishu by Aideed forces against soldiers of the United Nations contingents.

It is estimated that Aideed's armed band has approximately 2-3000 members, almost all of whom are located in South Mogadishu. He retains the support, based on kinship, of his sub-clan, the Habr Gida, consisting of approximately men, women, and children. It is clear that peace will not come to Mogadishu until the Aideed forces lay down their arms. As long as the situation in Mogadishu is not resolved, the stability of the entire country continues to be at risk, for warlords elsewhere may follow his example if he succeeds in defying the United Nations' authority.

It was clear from the outset that the United Nations effort, in order for it to have a chance of succeeding, would (a) have to have significant U.S. military support, and (b) would have to continue over the extended period of time needed to reestablish a semblance of law and order in the country. It is, therefore, incorrect to suggest that the mission of the U.N. contingents has changed. The mission was, from the beginning, to end the turmoil which has resulted in more than 300,000 victims from starvation and which, should it reoccur, could claim hundreds of thousands more. Nothing would have been accomplished by the major effort undertaken since December, 1992, if Somalia returns to the conditions which existed prior to a landing of U.S. forces, if UN intercession has meant no more for many Somalis than a postponement by one year of death by starvation. Yet such a disastrous result would be inevitable if the United States now withdraws its support from the United Nations operation.

The Somali expedition has been and continues to be a United Nations effort. A number of other countries are effectively engaged in Somalia. We do not intend to Americanize the problem. It remains to be resolved with the active participation of the United Nations and of forces from other UN members. Clearly, not all of the participants fully appreciated how seriously their resolve would be tested. In this Chapter VII effort the United Nations is in uncharted waters, trying to put back together a state torn apart by warlords and thugs. It should come as no surprise that there have been unexpected developments, some of them quite unpleasant.

What remains at stake is the survival of the millions of Somalis who were rescued by the United Nations operation. What is also at stake, given the tragic failure of the international community in Bosnia, is the reputation of the United Nations as an organization capable of dealing with threats to the peace. If the United Nations and the United States cannot even stand up to a petty warlord like Aideed, who commands a band of less than 3000 men, what chance is there of establishing a world order based on the rule of law?

It is clear, however, that the problems of Somalia can not ultimately be solved by anyone but the Somali people themselves.

That is why the United States has given its support to efforts to lay the foundation for a democratic government in Somalia and for the creation of institutions which would guarantee the rule of law.

Hand carry to
Amb. Shifter
(return a copy to me)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Re: [Somalia] (4 pages)	08/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [3]

2012-0659-F
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