

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

2986

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	3	10	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	Agenda for Somalia Working Group SVTS Tele-Conference (1 page)	09/01/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Friends of Somalia Meeting (2 pages)	09/08/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Should America Stay the Course in Somalia? How Somalis Feel (5 pages)	09/10/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: Promoting Political Reconciliation in Somalia (4 pages)	09/01/1993	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Richard Schifter to Samuel Berger, re: Judicial Program for Somalia (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: President Mubarak Agrees to Deploy Additional Egyptian Troops to Somalia (2 pages)	09/20/1993	P1/b(1)
008. report	Re: [Reconciliation Process] (8 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)
009. memo	Translation of memorandum from Italian Prime Minister Ciampi (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: Promoting Political Reconciliation in Somalia (4 pages)	09/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

31-Aug-1993 21:09 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Jeremy D. Rosner
(ROSNER)

SUBJECT: Congressional strategy re: Somalia

For use at the C-A-L lunch and for broader discussion, following are elements of a congressional strategy for defeating amendments requiring withdrawal from Somalia. This is based on discussions with State/H and Dick Clarke:

1. Democratic leadership. We should tell leadership in both chambers this is an important vote for us. Leadership support was essential for the Somalia resolution vote in the House, which essentially became a party-line vote. We need to have this whipped by leadership while avoiding any appearance that we want this to be partisan. Our meeting Tuesday with Howard Paster has helped establish this as a White House priority, which will be essential to motivate the leadership.
2. Prevent this from becoming a Republican cause. Somalia has already taken on some partisan overtones. Sen. Dole's most recent letter, urging US disengagement from Somalia, is the newest evidence. We should do everything we can to stop this from becoming a GOP cause. State has already begun discussions with House Republican leadership staff on this. We need to extend that process: direct conversations with moderate GOP figures, e.g., Michel; Kassebaum, Jeffords, etc.
3. Identify leading advocates. We need to develop a few people in each chamber who are willing to be the lead advocates for the Administration's Somalia policy. Initial candidates are Hamilton, Johnston, Payne, Hastings in the House; Pell, Simon, Lieberman in the Senate. We need to help these and other advocates develop the best case possible.
4. Congressional Black Caucus. The CBC has generally been supportive of our role in Somalia. We need to make it clear that we need them to help carry this fight.
5. Pentagon support. Sec. Aspin's speech last week was a significant step toward proving that there is Pentagon support for this mission. Howard Paster has suggested a letter from Sec. Aspin to all Members, within the context of an amendment to the DoD authorization bill, reiterating his primary points from the speech. Calls from other key DoD

officials to key Members will also help. It will be important to see if DoD efforts can enlsh support or at least quiet opposition from Rep. Murtha.

6. Sen. Byrd. On the Senate side, special attention to Sen. Byrd is warranted. As you know, he is very concerned about peacekeeping in general and Somalia in particular, and it may be necessary to provide some general assurances to him on both in order to get his support. In particular, he is looking for a greater up-front role for Congress in future peacekeeping missions with regard to both authorization and funding.

7. Op-eds. We should continue efforts to promote supportive op-eds by influential foreign policy thinkers. These can carry some weight in the debate.

8. Ordinary mechanics. We should proceed with other typical steps: a Statement of Administration Policy; letters to Members from Lake, Christopher, etc.; "Dear Colleague" letters from key Members; talking points drafted by the Administration to be distributed to leadership and others; etc.

9. UN steps. We should be aware that certain actions in Somalia or regarding Somalia likely would decrease support for such amendments: e.g., announcement of a peace conference.

Finally, we need to bear in mind that information is still fairly sketchy as to what amendments we will face in both the Hosue and Senate. The NSC, State and DoD Legislative Affairs offices will continue efforts to determine the likely wording and timing of such amendments.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
CC: Donald G. Gross	(GROSS)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

001. agenda	Agenda for Somalia Working Group SVTS Tele-Conference (1 page)	09/01/1993	P1/b(1)
-------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



Washington, D.C. 20520

DICK

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AF/E, AF/RA, AF/EPSF A X C O V E R S H E E T

DATE: 9-1-93 Page 1 of 4
(incl cover)

TO: Sean Darragh

OFFICE: NSC

PHONE: # 202 395 1492 FAX #: 202 395-1199

FROM: Ted Andrews

OFFICE: AF/E

PHONE #: 202-647-9742 FAX #: 202-647-0810

SUBJECT: Paper on Polit Reconciliation

I. Why Revival of the Reconciliation Process is Necessary

Somalia's national level political reconciliation effort remains stalled. While progress is continuing at the district level toward establishment of broadly representative councils, little movement is evident toward implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement's principal features, the Transitional National Council (TNC), the National Reconciliation Committee, and the Charter Drafting Committee. There are good reasons why it has proven difficult to establish these bodies. One reason is General Aideed and his continuing efforts to dominate the political process. This conflict has monopolized much of UNOSOM's energy since the period immediately preceding the June 5 attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers. It also has prompted other major players not to commit themselves to a process without a clear end.

Another factor reflects the inherent difficulty of getting the major factional leaders who signed the Accord to share political power with other elements of Somali society. This idea is, at bottom, a guiding principal of the Addis Ababa II agreement. The likelihood of its successful implementation was a gamble from the start. It is time to recognize that this gamble has failed.

The absence of visible progress at the national level contributes to a perception that the political reconciliation process is not working. UNOSOM's successes with the Kismayo agreement and with the establishment of the district councils have yet to register with the Somalia public and with public opinion outside the country. Activities such as the continuing discussions in Erigavo in the north face similar obstacles in terms of public perception. The slow movement toward reconciliation is a major factor behind the impression that military concerns are the dominant influence on UNOSOM's decisionmaking process.

New steps are required to change these perceptions. Failure to do so could lead to continued erosion of UNOSOM's political credibility in and outside Somalia. Diminished credibility inside the country might embolden other factional leaders to adopt a hostile attitude toward the UN operation. Diminished credibility outside it will affect the support UNOSOM receives from contributor countries.

II. What Steps are Possible?

Experience has shown that hastily-prepared political conferences retard the reconciliation process in Somalia more than they advance it. The summer 1991 Djibouti conference set the stage for violent clashes between Ali Mahdi and Aideed's factions which continued during the abortive Eritrean effort later that year to sponsor another gathering. General Morgan's

DRAFT

-2-

absence from talks in Addis Ababa early in 1993 led to fighting in Kismayo in February. The most recent agreement in Addis helped to precipitate the current conflict with General Aideed.

Despite this poor track record, we believe UNOSOM might consider the advantages of convening a political reconciliation conference in Somalia. With sufficient planning, it should be possible to overcome or limit the problems that hampered the effectiveness of previous such gatherings. Among the problems to be overcome are insuring that groups capable of disrupting the political reconciliation process play a useful role, identifying mediators or meeting facilitators acceptable to all parties, and preventing the conferences from serving simply as a breathing space between episodes of fighting.

In our judgment, there are several ways to get around these obstacles.

-- First, by limiting participation to local leaders, some of whom might be drawn from the fledgling district councils, the conference conveners would exclude the major factional leaders while offering a mechanism for representatives from such groups to take part.

-- Second, the conference organizers might consider placing only two subjects on the agenda, next steps on the disarmament program and the future role of the district councils. If disarmament is a topic, we see little point in excluding the major factional leaders, however. If the topic is limited to the future of the district councils, there would be no need to invite the leaders. By following this course, the conference would draw public attention in a dramatic way towards the district councils and involve Somalis in two areas dominated heretofore by foreigners.

-- Third, regional body like the OAU or important states in the region like Ethiopia and Eritrea could be invited to join UNOSOM in convening and organizing a conference. Ethiopia and Eritrea retain lines of communications open to the full spectrum of factions in Somalia. Outside involvement would be necessary in any event if the proposed conference took place in a third country. If a conference went forward in Somalia itself, regional bodies/states could provide practical help in making organizational preparations and tactical assistance in maintaining contacts among the participants.

III. Who Should Participate in a new Addis Conference?

The larger issue here is whether to invite the fifteen leaders who signed Addis II. If the answer is yes, we believe it would not be appropriate to include any leader who has

DRAFT

-3-

violated the Addis Agreement in an egregious way. This judgment would exclude the participation of General Aideed and his ally Omar Jess. In doing so, the conference organizers would be demonstrating to them that their presence is not essential to the continuation of the reconciliation process. However, it also will be necessary to determine what steps the conference conveners should take if General Aideed decides to block Habr Gedr participation entirely. The absence of Habr Gedr representatives without adequate explanation to other participants and the public could undercut the entire exercise.

To ensure that a new conference is broadly representative, the sponsors could invite each of the extant 23 district councils to send three or four delegates. Districts which do not have a council in operation could be invited to select a group of delegates also, perhaps through a meeting of local elders supplemented by others (professionals, women's groups, etc.). The U.N.'s political officers in the field would have to play important parts in this process.

The best way to resolve the issue of the fifteen Addis signatories is not to invite any of them. A decision not to do so might be based on a need to seek some form of popular sanction for the district and regional councils as well as for the rules governing their procedures, composition, etc. UNOSOM also could indicate publicly that it is using the conference to better its lines of communications with all segments of Somali society. If the UN adopts the course outlined above, it would have to note explicitly to the public and to the Addis II signatories that they will have to work more diligently at transforming their militias into political organizations.

IV. What Should Happen Next?

Our hope is that public announcement of plans to convene such a gathering might be made as soon as possible. Even if the venue and timing of a meeting remained unsettled, early public announcement would offer benefits in terms of public opinion in the contributing countries of UNOSOM. Similarly, it would provide a practical goal for the extant and soon to exist district councils.

DRAFT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Re: Friends of Somalia Meeting (2 pages)	09/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

9-3-93

SOMALIA - LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

- Aspin cover letter transmitting his speech was sent to all Senators and Representatives on 9-3-93
- State to circulate fact sheets and position papers on amendments to Legislative Task Force on Tuesday morning
- DOD to meet with Marilyn Elrod Tuesday to discuss floor strategy, get HASC POC, and arrange follow on meeting with House Leadership staff.
- DOD to track Murtha markup and determine Murtha's position.
- State to meet with Billy Pitts -- objective to convince Minority Leader Michel not to make Somalia leadership issue.
- State talked to Byrd staff re possible amendment. Advised that Byrd has not yet decided what he will do. DOD will follow up with Byrd's defense staff.
- DOD will contact Arnold Punaro re Nunn's intentions. Also will talk to Levin, Robb, Thurmond, and Warner staff.
- State talked to Hamilton and Lugar staff about op ed pieces. Hamilton staff was positive and asked State for suggested material. Lugar's staff was not optimistic that he would agree but will talk to him and get back to State on Tuesday. If negative response, will approach Sen Lieberman.
- State reports that SFRC Africa subcommittee members will all support Administration. Sen Jeffords, ranking Republican, was enthusiastic.
- State reports no amendments on Somalia expected in mark-up on Foreign Assistance bill.
- Next conference call Tuesday at 1:00PM

cc: R. Clarke

A handwritten signature, possibly "R. Clarke", is enclosed within a hand-drawn circle.



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

MEMORANDUM FOR SOMALIA WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: US contribution to the establishment of the Somali National Police Force
(SNPF)-ACTION MEMORANDUM

ISSUE: Cost of reestablishing the SNPF is not part of the assessed cost of UNOSOM II and is of such significance that no single donor country is able, or willing, to incur it unilaterally.

FACTS: Draft United Nations Secretary General report to the Security Council detailing the requirements for the reestablishment of a SNPF estimated the first year start up cost to be approximately 52 million US dollars with an additional 10 million for investigation of violations of international humanitarian law.

- US AID has offered to fund the first year cost for the Somali Judicial System (approximately \$6 million).
- There are numerous provisions within the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which would permit the US to provide equipment to UNOSOM. However, transfer of the equipment to the SNDF would be legally questionable since there is no existing Somali government. The Secretaries of State and Defense could agree to provide the equipment using the UN Participation Act. However, the UNPA is only available for UN chapter VI operations. It is questionable whether we can split this effort out from UNOSOMs chapter VII mandate.


OPTION

- US Weighs in with meaningful contribution to the development of the SNPF and uses diplomatic arm twisting to get the other donor countries to do the rest.
 - The UN plan outlines requirements for significant transportation equipment, communications equipment, police station restoration and weapons all of which could be rapidly provided with US stocks, services and training and would account for a significant amount of the plan. (Transport \$18,240,000; Communications \$3,140,000; Police station restoration \$1,085,000; Weapons (AK 47 and side arms) \$3,000,000; Total \$25,465,000. According to Anne Wright, the author of the plan, all cost are rough order of magnitude).
 - This contribution combined with the US AID offer to fund the \$6 million towards the Somalia Judicial System accounts for more than 50% of the estimated cost of reestablishing the SNPF.
 - Could be done rapidly without increased US force deployments.

- Provides USUN significant leverage with the other donor countries to do their part.

STRATEGY

- Policy decision that it is in the US interest to provide the equipment. (NSC/DoS/DoD)
- The Secretary of State sends a memo to the President requesting authorization to notify Congress that we will provide the equipment described above to UNSOM using section 552 (c) (2) notwithstanding sections 660 (prohibition on assistance to civilian law enforcement) and notwithstanding section 505 (end user transfer assurances). This memo should be combined with the 614 memo on the \$2 million. Drawdown could include but would not be limited to transportation equipment, communications equipment, weapons, generators, spares, services, and training not to exceed \$25 million. (DSAA wording consideration for the Presidential Directive are at TAB)
- A meeting is called in New York to solicit commitments, based on the draft UNOSOM police plan, from other donor countries to help share the burden of reestablishing the SNPF, and to expedite their involvement.
- DSAA is directed to task the services to send technical assessment teams to UNOSOM to identify technical requirements of the equipment and services US agrees to provide. (ie water tanks how big, generators how powerful etc.)
- DSAA tasks the services to locate equipment identified, by the technical assessment teams, and transport the equipment to Somalia for delivery to UNOSOM.


Ambassador Walter Stadler
Senior Fellow

Prepared by CDR William Stettinius OASD (SO/LIC) X35210

COORDINATION:

DoS AF: Mr. Martin Cheses
ASD RSA: Mr James L. Woods
JCS J-5 : RADM Boman

Proposed wording for Presidential Determination

Following is the proposed wording for the Presidential Determination for support of Somalia police as it applies to the section 552 drawdown of defense articles and services.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (the "Act"), I hereby:

(1) determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish to UNOSOM up to \$25 Million of defense articles and services pursuant to the authorities of section 552(c)(2) of the Act, for retransfer to and in support of a police force in Somalia, without regard to sections 505, 660, and 652 of the Act, or any other provision of law within the scope of section 614;

Pursuant to the authority of section 552(c)(2) of the Act, I hereby determine that

(1) as a result of an unforeseen emergency, the provision of assistance under chapter 6 of Part II of the Act in excess of funds otherwise available for such assistance is important to the national interest of the United States;

(2) such unforeseen emergency requires the immediate provision of assistance under chapter 6 of part II of the Act.

I therefore direct the drawdown of services, training and articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense to include: communications equipment, vehicles, small arms appropriate for a police force, uniform items, and basic facility utilities infrastructure items necessary for police stations, of an aggregate value not to exceed \$25 million to support a police force in Somalia under the auspices of UNOSOM and I hereby authorize UNOSOM to retransfer these items to elements of a Somali police force.

THE
CARTER CENTER
OF EMORY UNIVERSITY



September 11, 1993

Hon. W. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
BY FAX: 202-456-6292 (first of 4 pages)

Dear Tony:

As you probably know, in his conversation with President Clinton yesterday, former President Carter mentioned the letter that he had received from General Aidid of Somalia. Carter asked me to make sure that you had a copy, and it is attached.

Among the options that you might want to consider offering to General Aidid is as the Five College Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College or as a Carter Center Fellow. Just as you have vacated your position in the interest of national security so too would I.

You've got a big week ahead of you with Yaser and NAFTA. Congratulations and good luck.

Best wishes,

Robert Pastor

H: 404-491-8376

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Re: Should America Stay the Course in Somalia? How Somalis Feel (5 pages)	09/10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of Pages >

To <i>DeSantisberg</i>	From <i>R. Clarke</i>
Dept./Agency <i>D</i>	Phone #
Fax #	Fax #

NSN 7540 01 317-7368

5099-101

GENERAL SERVICES AC

Remarks Prepared for Delivery

Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
CSIS

August 27, 1993

The President's decision to deploy an additional 400 U.S. troops to Somalia has focused renewed attention on the security aspect -- indeed on the U.S. military aspect -- of what is happening there. That focus is much too narrow. There is much more to what is happening in Somalia than the story of military conflict in Mogadishu. And if there is to be a solution to Somalia's problems, it must be much more than a military solution.

Somalia was a tragedy that touched America and the world. We went there to save a people and we succeeded. We are staying there to help those same people rebuild their nation. To understand how we intend to achieve this, let's briefly recall the circumstances that prompted this international outpouring.

By the early 1990s, Somalia had seen years of brutal civil war. Bloody fighting raged between warlords who used not only arms but also food and famine as weapons against each other and a helpless population. The result was chaos and lawlessness on a massive scale. Drought made the famine worse. An estimated 1,000 a day were dying. Nearly 800,000 refugees were forced into exile.

Official sources and voluntary relief organizations estimated that as many as half a million people, largely women and children, had perished by the end of 1992. Two million more -- a quarter of Somalia's population -- were at risk.

Somalia's political institutions had crumbled, its fragile economy was virtually destroyed, and its people were almost entirely dependent on outside assistance for their survival.

The chaos and violence blunted international donor relief efforts. Many of the organizations curtailed their operations or left entirely after their food convoys were attacked, their warehouses looted, and their personnel assaulted.

U.S. involvement in Somalia began in August of 1992 and has gone through three stages in the last year. The first lasted from August to December and focused on providing food. The United States first provided large amounts of food but soon found, as other donors did, that the chaos and lawlessness in the country prevented overland delivery. The U.S. military then joined in a military airlift -- Operation Provide

Relief -- to bring food into the heart of the country. From August 1992 until February 1993 more than 30,000 metric tons of urgently needed food and other relief supplies were delivered to Somalia, 70% by the United States.

It soon became clear, however, that air delivery of food would not be enough. Violence and theft still impeded -- in some cases prevented -- deliveries within the country. Better security was needed if food supplies were to reach starving Somalis.

When we helped transport a Pakistani battalion to protect the food convoys under U.N. auspices, the forces of Mohammed Farah Aided pinned the battalion down in the Mogadishu airport and conditions in Somalia worsened.

That ushered in the second stage -- the UNITAF stage -- of U.S. involvement that lasted from December of 1992 until May of 1993. The focus now was on providing security as well as food. The United States offered to lead a military effort to provide sufficient security to deal with the famine, and the United Nations accepted in Security Council Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992.

This stage of U.S. involvement would eventually see 26,000 U.S. troops in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. Those forces, along with 13,000 troops from twenty-one other countries, operated under the U.S.-led Unified Task Force, or UNITAF. UNITAF's 39,000 troops brought about a radical change in the Somali situation.

Sufficient order was restored to permit food to reach the needy through over a thousand feeding centers. Markets reopened and the first crops in many years were planted. By the Spring of 1993, chaos and banditry throughout much of Somalia had been greatly reduced.

To sum up, UNITAF had achieved its goal of improving the security situation and feeding the population in central and southern Somalia. What remained was the task of institutionalizing the gains -- preventing the country from backsliding into the chaos that had caused the famine in the first place.

The third stage -- the UNOSOM II stage -- began in May of 1993 and extends to the present. Its focus is to create conditions whereby the Somali people can rebuild their country. Under UNOSOM II the U.N. broadened its efforts under a new Security Council resolution, UNSCR 814, passed on March 26, 1993. It called for the U.N. to begin the work of rebuilding the government, reestablishing the essential elements of a national economy and developing an adequate system of justice and police to maintain order. As agreed, the United States quickly reduced our troop contingent of more than 25,000 to about 4,000.

So where are we now? Over the course of our involvement, our objectives fell

in four categories: food, security, economics and political rebuilding. How did we do?

On food, we have done very well. The food emergency that galvanized international efforts on behalf of the Somali people effectively is over. As a direct result of United Nations humanitarian effort, catastrophic mass starvation was averted.

This year's agricultural production was good. There are still pockets of hunger but reports we receive from Mogadishu say that there is more than enough food to feed the Somali people.

U.N. officials on the scene feel confident enough to bring the emergency food supply effort to a close. Emergency food deliveries are scheduled to end this month. On security, we have made progress. Banditry has been significantly reduced throughout Somalia and in some places eliminated. Somalia is generally peaceful except for south Mogadishu, which is a very significant exception as we shall see. But it is important to understand that -- compared to what existed when UNITAF arrived in December -- progress has been dramatic.

In south Mogadishu, the Aideed stronghold, we have a major challenge to the whole U.N. enterprise. I believe the current crisis there was initiated because Aideed's power base was being eroded politically and militarily by UNOSOM. It may be small comfort today, but our present difficulty is the result of our previous success. The danger now is that unless we return security to south Mogadishu, political chaos will follow the U.N. withdrawal. Other warlords will follow Aideed's example. Fighting between the warlords will ensue, which is what brought the famine to massive proportions in the first place. The danger is that the situation will return to what existed before the United States sent in the troops.

On economics and the political reconstitution of the country, some progress has been made but more work needs to be done. Some small shops are reopening, some schools and orphanages have reopened, and in central Somalia, former government employees are back on the job providing health and education services to the population. Overall, however, economic conditions remain dire and progress towards political reconciliation has been stalled by the deteriorating security situation in the southern part of the capital. More successful work is being done in the countryside, but greater effort must be devoted to push this along. From this we see that the current situation in Somalia is mixed, and that we have some pressing problems yet to deal with.

This afternoon I want to suggest how we might go about the next phase of work in Somalia. Put another way, what are the elements of the end game in Somalia for the international community? We had goals for UNOSOM I and they were not met. That prompted us to move to UNITAF. We had goals for UNITAF and they were met, creating the conditions for a turnover to UNOSOM II. How will we know when

UNOSOM II has succeeded?

Our overall criteria for success should include progress in economic, political and security elements of the Somali problem. On security. Clearly, UNOSOM has to establish reasonable security in south Mogadishu, but it does not end there. Real progress must be made in reducing the heavy weapons in the hands of warlords and effective police forces must be created. The overall effect must be such that no group of armed Somalis should be able to take over the country by force to impose their political will and loot the markets.

On economics. The country should be sufficiently open and secure so that its markets are functioning, goods and services can flow and basic services like water and electricity are provided.

On political rebuilding. There should be a political process that reflects clan interests, regional interests, and the interests of the people of Somalia whatever their clan or region. The question remaining, of course, is how do we get from here to there? I'm going to propose here a series of specific action items that could bring real progress.

First, we should bring U.N. combined troop strength up to planned levels. The United States has recently added 400 more combat troops to its Quick Reaction Force. UNOSOM II, however, is approximately 5,000 troops short of its planned complement of 28,000. We fully expect others to do their share, as they have promised.

Second, additional efforts to set up a police force should begin immediately. Credible, neutral police forces in major population centers are critical to success in establishing security.

Third, we should continue removing heavy weapons from the militias and begin planning for implementation -- in conjunction with Somali police -- of a consistent weapons control policy. Such a policy will give those willing to cooperate some confidence that their enemies cannot rearm. The policy could begin in areas of the country where some disarmament success has been achieved.

Fourth, the United Nations must develop a detailed plan with concrete steps that will pull together its economic, political and security activities into an overall strategy. And it must provide adequate staff and budget to make progress on its political and economic objectives in Somalia.

Fifth, the United Nations should draw on the experience of its success in Cambodia to form a core group of nations to support and speed its work in Somalia. Such a group might consist of African countries as well as other members of the

United Nations that have a special interest in assisting in the political and economic reconstruction of the country.

Sixth, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity should act now to bring the parties back together on the peace track. They might use the promising model of two previous conferences on Somali national reconciliation held in Addis Ababa.

Those are concrete steps that could be taken now to put us on the path to success in Somalia. There is also another, related question that is closer to home for us. President Clinton has directed that U.S. forces remain long enough to complete their mission and no longer. The completion of the mission chiefly concerns security in Somalia.

For U.S. combat troops, I think there are three items on the checklist. First, the security issue in south Mogadishu must be settled. Second, we must make real progress toward taking the heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords. Third, there must be credible police forces in major population centers. When these three conditions are met, I believe we can remove the U.S. Quick Reaction Force from Mogadishu.

We can reduce U.S. logistics troops supporting other UNOSOM II forces when the security situation in Mogadishu permits larger scale hiring of civilian contract employees to provide the support functions.

When we consider Somalia just a year ago, we can be proud of what the United States has achieved, particularly our men and women in uniform. We should also take considerable interest in the success of the United Nations in Somalia. Without the United Nations as a first-rate peacekeeping and peace enforcing organization, we could be called upon to shoulder much more of the load. And we should also note that the most important element of any lasting solution in Somalia must be the Somali people. Just as the international community has invested greatly in creating conditions for political and economic growth in Somalia, so too must the people of Somalia invest themselves in the reconstruction of their own country.

In the meantime, President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia once again provide for its people. This is what the new world asks of American leadership and American partnership.

#

Q: What do you think about Aideed's offer of negotiations and a cease-fire?

A: We would welcome and support the UN engaging in a political settlement that would end the violence in Somalia, consistent with UN resolutions.

Q: What about a cease-fire?

A: We would support a cease-fire so long as it enables the UN forces to carry out their mission to provide security and to respond when attacked. A cease-fire should not be a cover under which disarmament agreements are violated.

Q: What do you think about President Carter negotiating with Aideed?

A: As far as we know, President Carter has not been negotiating with Aideed. He has been out in the region recently and has had wide-ranging contacts. We look forward to hearing his thoughts about the problems of the region.

We will also continue talking with the UN about how it plans to pursue a political settlement in Somalia.

Q: Will you stop trying to arrest Aideed?

A: The UN has an on-going process that involves investigations and trials for those responsible for crimes in Somalia. It is for the UN to decide how it proceeds to arrange the disposition of those who may be involved.

Q: Didn't you criticize the Italians for negotiating with Aideed and now you are saying that you think there should be talks with him? Have you changed your policy?

A: We have always supported a political solution and UN resolutions have always called for that. There is no change in our policy. We stand behind the UN resolutions that call for disarmament, reconciliation, and investigation and punishment for those found to have committed crimes.

~~SECRET~~

21006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee
on Somalia

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia, Saturday, September 11, 1993, at 10:00 a.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to forward the transmittal memo to his counterparts at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 8/30/17

2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

21006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

BG MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Somalia, September 11, 1993 (S)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Somalia, Saturday, September 11, 1993. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 01/30/17

202-2059-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

004. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

9/16/93

Delivered
to Kathy
at 3:20 P.M.

1

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	Re: Promoting Political Reconciliation in Somalia (4 pages)	09/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Somali Coalition Group for Peace and Reconstruction

Tel/Fax: 703.941.1815

September 13, 1993

**To: Ambassador David Shinn:
Somali Desk
US State Department**

Dear Ambassador:

Consistent with the spirit and the principles adopted at the Somali Peace conference held in Graves Mountain Lodge, Central Virginia during December, 1992 thru January 1993, which I coordinated with the help of American friends, we believe there is a chance to promote dialogue and reconciliation through meetings between the feuding parties of the United Somali Congress, and to bring to an end the misunderstandings between HeberGedir and UNISOM, and not use force. This can be accomplished through dialogue rather than force.

The use of force will only lead to a further bloodshed and not solve the problems. A resolution to the USC conflict would bring peace and encourage other political parties to come to the bargaining table for mediation based on the Somali traditions and the Islamic principles of collective entity which can lead towards a unified Somali Nation. Our organization strongly believes that there is alternative but to find a peaceful solution through dialogue.

SCGPR proposes the following:

- To hold an immediate meeting between SCPRG members and members from USC Central Committee, in a country neighboring Somalia.
- To call for a larger meeting between these groups in Mogadishu, in order to create committees and councils which will implement commitments made and agreed upon.
- To call for a national meeting between all Somali feuding parties in order to reconcile their differences, discuss their respective organizations, and begin serious negotiations aimed at rebuilding our country.

Postal Office Box 23823 • Alexandria, Virginia 22304

**Somali Coalition Group for
Peace and Reconstruction
Tel/Fax: 703.941.1815**

The following preliminary steps are essential:

1. A complete resolution of the conflict among USC factions is essential to any future resolution to the Somali conflict. Independent USC groups should be selected, financed and commissioned to work on all sources of conflict.
2. Similar efforts should be targeted at conflicts among other warring factions.
3. United Nations activities should be limited to humanitarian and rehabilitation projects working with and assisting Somali Non-Governmental and Private Voluntary Organizations.
4. Larger conferences should be held to broaden the reconciliation efforts in order to encourage all the warring parties to discuss methods of creating a transitional Government and of rebuilding Somalia as a nation.

The purpose of these meetings is to discuss the political issues and the economic problems prevailing in our country in a manner that has never been tried before, that is, the traditional Somali way of reconciling our differences. The United Nations failed to recognize this approach and failed in every attempt to reconcile the warring factions. **A Political solution is essential.**

One of our main goals is to reconcile all feuding parties of the Hawiye Clan, through the United Somali Congress. The present anarchy and human suffering can only be solved by Somalis. Only Somalis can end hostilities and the factional rivalry that has claimed thousands of Somali lives and left our country in ruins.

We believe that we can personally organize the activities we have suggested, provided that we receive the required political and the economic support. If you need further information about our plan please call me at 703.941.1815

Best regards,



Ali M. Mohamed Aden
Executive Producer, Somali Television Program &
Spokesman, Somali Coalition Group for Peace and Reconstruction

Postal Office Box 23823 • Alexandria, Virginia 22304

DS

Somali Coalition Group for Peace and Reconstruction

Tel/Fax: 703.941.1815

Steering Committee in U.S.A.

Producer Ali M. Mohamed Aden

Ambassador Ahmed M. Darman

Businessman Tom Andrew Seay

SCGPR Proposals on Peace, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Somalia

August 23, 1993

To: Ambassador David Shinn
Somali Desk
US State Department

Dear Ambassador Shinn:

Adhering to the spirit and the principles of the Somali Peace conference held in Graves Mountain Lodge, central Virginia during December, 1992 thru January 1993, where Somali Elders, Politicians, and intellectuals of various groups met, We have been able to put together a workable proposal for a quick action plan to reconcile feuding parties of the United Somali Congress, and the misunderstandings between HeberGedir and UNISOM.

SCGPR agendas in its proposal include:

- To hold Immediate meeting between SCPRG members, members from HaberGedir leaders, and members from USC Central Committee, in one of Somalia's neighboring countries within three weeks.
- To call for a larger meeting between these groups, within a reasonable time, in Mogadishu, Somalia, to create committees which will implement commitments made.
- To call for a national meeting between all Somali feuding parties to reconcile their differences and begin serious negotiations towards rebuilding our country.

The purpose of these meetings is to discuss the political issues and the economic problems prevailing in our country in a matter that has never been done before - the Somali way. **Political solution is a must.** Because of the determination and the expertise of this Coalition's advisory group, we believe through dialogue and negotiations the warring factions will listen to our suggestions and proposal plan.

Postal Office Box 23823 • Alexandria, Virginia 22304

Somali Coalition Group for Peace and Reconstruction

Tel/Fax: 703.941.1815

Steering Committee in U.S.A.

Producer Ali M. Mohamed Aden

Ambassador Ahmed M. Darman

Businessman Tom Andrew Seay

The focus of these talks need to be specific targeting all major problem areas yet demanding tangible results. The Somali Coalition Group needs UN/US support now in order to hold such meetings in Mogadishu, Somalia, in neighboring countries, and in the United States.

Somali Coalition for Peace and Reconstruction is committed to pave the way for immediate reconciliation. It is time that we, as Somali concerned citizens, stand together and lead our people towards reconciliation and negotiations which can result in long lasting peace among our people.

One of our main goals is to reconcile all of the feuding parties. We all know the present anarchy and human suffering can only be solved by the Somalis. Only Somalis can end hostilities and the ruthless jealous factional rivalry that has claimed thousands of Somali lives and left our country in ruins.

We believe that a new and unprecedented approach to this dilemma must be developed to tackle these problems. An independent advisory group such as Somali Coalition Group must be encouraged and supported to facilitate the UN/US peace efforts.

Through a successful reconciliation and dialogue, the conciliatory group will create working committee which will implement and fulfil the commitments made, which includes all necessary steps to bring our country back to normal in order to create hope and future for the Somali people everywhere. This will elect Governor and a Mayor to conduct day-to-day operations between UNISOM and the Somalis.

The 21-year misrule of Siad Barre destroyed our culture, traditional values, economy, and worst of all, our educational system. Our nation has experienced slow death during the two decades of neglect, killings, destruction, and above all, hatred among the closest sub-clans, all of which was engineered by Barre's regime. His legacy is the basis for the ongoing destruction in Somalia. The tragedy still continues.

Postal Office Box 23823 • Alexandria, Virginia 22304

Somali Coalition Group for Peace and Reconstruction

Tel/Fax: 703.941.1815

Steering Committee in U.S.A.

Producer Ali M. Mohamed Aden

Ambassador Ahmed M. Darman

Businessman Tom Andrew Seay

We appeal to you to support our plan and direct your representatives on the ground to initiate dialogue and reconciliation through elderly meetings, and not use force. The use of force will lead to a further bloodshed and not help to solve the problems. We strongly believe that there is no way out but to find peaceful solution through dialogue.

In conclusion, We strongly believe that it is highly important to hold SCGPR proposed meeting in order to unify the feuding parties. A resolution to the conflict of HaberGedir and UNISOM, and USC warring parties in General would bring peace and encourage other political parties to the bargaining table for a re-mediation based on the Somali traditions and the Islamic principles of collective entity which can lead towards a unified Somali Nation.

We believe that we can personally organize the activities we have suggested, provided that we have the political and the economic support we need.

Again, we ask you and the United Nations to assist us in our efforts to continue working on the Somali conflict to bring peace to our people and save our country.

Best regards,



Ali M. Mohamed Aden

Executive Producer

Somali Television Program

Spokesman,

Somali Coalition for Peace & Reconstruction

Postal Office Box 23823 • Alexandria, Virginia 22304

**Unit d St tes
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547



USIA

September 15, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO: AF/E - Ambassador Shinn
FROM: AF - Robert LaGamma 
SUBJECT: Public Affairs Strategy for Somalia

Attached please find the "Public Affairs Strategy for Somalia." All members of sub-group on public affairs for Somalia (State, DOD, AID and USIA) have cleared the document.

Please feel free to call me or policy officer Jim Williams at 619-4894 if there are any questions.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Public support for UN efforts in Somalia has waned. Violent acts against UN forces by Somali warlords have raised questions in major donor countries (including the U.S.) and inside Somalia about the UN's ability to carry out its mission. U.S. leadership in the UN effort has been viewed in some key donor countries as U.S. "dominance." Ironically, the success of the famine relief effort has caused publics in the U.S. and other key donor countries to question the continued need for the UN effort in Somalia.

The UN effort in Somalia may be brought to an abrupt end if support is not quickly renewed with publics in key donor nations, especially the U.S., in significant non-donor countries, and inside Somalia. Without a continued UN effort, Somalia will suffer continued anarchy and a return of famine. Failure of the UN effort in Somalia will seriously undermine the credibility of future international peace making/keeping initiatives at a time when such efforts may be critical.

B. GOALS

To renew public support for the UN effort and the U.S. role in Somalia requires:

- explaining the need for continued UN effort in Somalia to reconstitute civil society and to ensure famine does not recur;
- informing the U.S. public and the world community of progress made in stabilizing food production, development and rehabilitation, and in forestalling anarchy in areas outside Mogadishu;
- informing target audiences of progress being made to improve the security environment in Somalia so that the number of U.S. troops there may be reduced; and
- explaining the importance of the UN effort in Somalia to future peace making/keeping initiatives.

C. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POINTS OF EMPHASIS

- Emphasize progress in meeting the criteria for withdrawing U.S. combat troops in Somalia as established by Secretary Aspin's August 27 address, i.e., settling the security issue in south Mogadishu, disarming the warlords, and establishing credible police forces in the major Somali population centers.

- Emphasize the international character of the effort in Somalia; while the U.S. is providing key leadership and many resources, this is an international effort under the UN.
- Emphasize the great progress that has been made in most of Somalia, despite the continuing problems in southern Mogadishu.
- Emphasize the success of the international humanitarian relief effort.
- Emphasize UN progress in helping Somalis rebuild civil society, i.e., the restoration of law and order and the reestablishment of a police force, a judiciary and local and regional governments.
- Emphasize the role Somalis are taking in restoring their country with UN assistance.
- De-emphasize the personalities of the Somali warlords in public statements.

D. AUDIENCES

The public affairs effort must reach several different audiences. These audiences are not isolated from one another and messages directed at one audience will also influence the others. Maintaining a clear message to all audiences requires constant communication and coordination between all Washington agencies, between Washington agencies and the USUN, and between U.S. government agencies and the USLO in Mogadishu.

Support of the American public is essential to continued U.S. participation in the UN effort in Somalia. U.S.G. officials and authoritative opinion leaders must persuasively explain why international peace making/keeping efforts are important to world peace, and why the U.S. and the UN have important roles in those efforts.

A similar case must be made to publics in other major and potential donor nations. This must be balanced with the message that the effort in Somalia is an international one and that UNOSOM is not U.S. "dominated." Greater support (financial and military) from other donors must be urged.

Perceptions in non-donor countries, especially those in Africa, are important because those countries will judge the UN's peace-making/keeping ability by its success or failure in Somalia.

The public affairs effort with the Somali people is directed at informing them of progress on immediate security issues, at supporting Somali efforts to rebuild the civic sector, and at drawing emerging groups into cooperation with other Somalis under UNOSOM.

E. ACTIONS

- State and DOD will continue to highlight authoritative statements by USG officials on U.S. policy toward Somalia.
- State, DOD and AID, in coordination with the NSC, will continue to meet with members of Congress to provide information on the U.S. role and the UN effort in Somalia.
- State, AID and DOD will continue to seek opportunities for interviews, television appearances, and op-ed pieces from spokespersons and opinion leaders to articulate the need for US support of the UN effort in Somalia. Such persons would include officials of the present and previous administrations, members of congress, PVO representatives, and respected academics.
- USIA will continue to highlight official statements of U.S. policy and commentary by authoritative opinion leaders on Somalia to audiences overseas. Media products include texts carried by the Wireless File, video items carried by USIA TV, and radio reports via the Voice of America.
- DOD will continue its program for facilitating visits to American military units from home town journalists.
- All agencies, in coordination with USLO/USIS Mogadishu and USIS Nairobi, will continue to work with foreign media in Somalia.
- USLO Mogadishu, AID, State and DOD will continue to seek opportunities to focus media attention on improvements in the situation in Somalia.
- USIS Mogadishu will continue program efforts to help rebuild the civic sector and draw emerging groups into cooperation with UNOSOM.
- Radio remains the most important medium in Somalia. However, the current UN controlled radio station in Somalia is received only weakly in the Mogadishu area and is not received at all in most of the rest of the country. State will encourage the UN quickly to establish a more powerful radio station in Somalia. USIA has asked the Voice of America to continue its Somali broadcast beyond the six month period originally agreed upon.
- The USG should strongly encourage and offer assistance as required to the UN in establishing a public affairs planning staff for international peace keeping/making initiatives.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	Richard Schifter to Samuel Berger, re: Judicial Program for Somalia (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Biographical Data

THE HONORABLE NATHANIEL R. JONES United States Circuit Judge

Judge Jones was born in Youngstown, Ohio on May 13, 1926, to Lillian and Nathaniel B. Jones. He attended the public schools there. After service in the United States Air Force in World War II, he was educated at Youngstown State University, receiving his A.B. in 1951 and his LL.B. in 1956 (converted to J.D. in 1970). He was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1957.

While an undergraduate and law student, Judge Jones worked as a reporter. At the age of 20 he became editor of the Buckeye Review Newspaper and managed the Dickerson Printing Company. From 1956 to 1959, he was Executive Director of the Fair Employment Practices Commission of the City of Youngstown and the Mayor's Human Relations Commission. During this period, he was a member of the Mahoning County Welfare Advisory Board. A year after entering the private practice of law, Attorney General Robert Kennedy appointed him as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. He held that position until being appointed in 1967 to serve as Assistant General Counsel to President Johnson's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, also known as the Kerner Commission. This group made a study of the causes of the urban riots of the Sixties. Following the work of the Kerner Commission, Judge Jones returned to Youngstown to practice law as part of the law firm of Goldberg and Jones.

In 1969, the distinguished civil rights leader, Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, with whom Judge Jones had been associated in his work on the Kerner Commission, invited him to New York to assume the responsibility as general counsel of the NAACP. He held the position for a decade, from 1969 to 1979. He became the fourth chief counsel for that organization since its founding in 1909.

As National General Counsel, Judge Jones supervised the legal staff and programs of the organization that had chapters in 1,700 cities of the fifty states. In addition to serving as legal advisor to the various departments within the organization and to local branches, he directed all litigation in which the NAACP engaged.

In his capacity as General Counsel, Judge Jones coordinated the attack against northern school segregation and twice argued in the United States Supreme Court the Detroit school case, Bradley v. Milliken, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In addition, in 1979 he had the responsibility for successfully organizing the presentation to the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Dayton Board of Education. et al. v. Brinkman. et al., 433 U.S. 406 (1977) and Columbus Board of Education. et al. v. Penick. et al., 443 U.S. 449 (1979). During Judge Jones' tenure as NAACP General Counsel, he directed the national response to the attacks against affirmative action, led an inquiry into discrimination against black servicemen in the military, and supervised the NAACP's defense in the Mississippi Boycott case, that led to a landmark Supreme Court decision that declared the right of individuals and organizations to engage in protests under the First Amendment.

On May 17, 1979, at a White House ceremony, President Carter announced his intention to appoint Nathaniel Jones to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. After confirmation, he took his oath of office on October 15, 1979.

In addition to his judicial duties, Judge Jones participates in a variety of activities, including those related to legal education. He is adjunct professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, instructor in the trial advocacy program at the Harvard Law School and adjunct professor at the Criminal Law Institute of Atlanta University. He is currently serving as a member on the Board of Visitors at the College of Law, University of Cincinnati; the Indiana University School of Law and the Salmon P. Chase College of Law of Northern Kentucky State University.

He is a former member of the Board of Visitors at Case Western Reserve University Law School in Cleveland. He also is currently serving as a member of the Board of Governors of Nova University Law Center. Other activities include lecturing and judging moot court competitions at the following institutions: Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, Marshall Law School of Cleveland State University, Thurgood Marshall College of Law, Antioch College School of Law, Georgetown Law Center, University of Dayton, Ohio State University, Capitol University Law School, Columbia University Law School, New York University, Boston University Law School, Boston College's Law School and many others.

In 1985 Judge Jones traveled to South Africa on behalf of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, where he was a legal observer at a treason trial of 16 blacks. While on that mission, he was arrested for violation of apartheid laws. Returning to South Africa the following year, he lectured at a symposium held for thirty South African judges. In November, 1986, Judge Jones was part of a four-person team that went to the Soviet Union to meet with Soviet officials and Jewish Refuseniks, in connection with human rights. In June of 1987, he chaired a conference in Washington on "Children, The Law and Repression in South Africa." In June of 1989, Judge Jones travelled to Namibia as part of a visiting delegation to monitor the election process that would lead to the independence of Namibia.

Judge Jones has received numerous honors and awards including honorary degrees from Youngstown State University in 1970, Syracuse University in 1972, University of Akron School of Law in 1988, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis in 1990, Lesley College in 1991, William Mitchell College of Law in 1993 and Nova University in 1993. The National Bar Association conferred its Equal Justice Award in 1978.

Other activities of Judge Jones include the following:

Co-Chairman - The Roundtable - the aim of which is to broaden the involvement of minorities in the legal profession. Sponsored by the Cincinnati Bar Association and The Black Lawyers Association of Cincinnati.

Chairman, 1987 - Brotherhood National Conference of Christians and Jews, Cincinnati Region. Member - Board of Directors, Black Jewish Coalition.

On May 19, 1987, Judge Jones presented a paper at a Columbia Law School - NAACP Legal Defense Fund symposium on "Blacks and the Bicentennial of the Constitution."

Member - Committee on Code of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States

Member - Advisory Committee of the Urban Morgan International Human Rights Institute

Member - Board of Governors, Nova University

Member - Board of Trustees, Thomas More College

Member - Board of Visitors, Northern Kentucky University

Master - Potter Stewart American Inns of Court

Trustee - Interrights, USA, an international human rights organization

Trustee - National Conference of Christians & Jews

Former President - Alpha Delta Boule', Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity

Member - Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity

Member - Gothic Lodge #22 King Solomon Consistory No. 20

Mason, 33rd Degree - United Supreme Council

Member - Black Lawyers Association of Cincinnati

Member - Cincinnati Bar Association

Member - Committee, ABA Committee on Law Schools Accreditation

Coordinator - Death Penalty Task Force U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Member, University Club

Founding Director, Metropolitan Club

Judge Jones, along with his lecturing, has authored numerous articles and papers including "Yearning to Breathe Free," a report of the South African treason

trial; "Federal Power As Used to Protect Minority Rights," published in the Brigham Young L. Rev. 815 (1987); "Strategies for Completing the Job of Social Desegregation," 19 Howard L.J. 82 (1975); "Is 'Brown' Obsolete?," 3 Integrated Educ. (1976); "School and Divergent Perspectives: Changing Civil Rights Through Law -- Can It Be Done?," American Sociological Association (1977); "Metropolitan Desegregation: Where Are the Courts Heading?," Urban Rev. (1978); "Equal Protection Clause," Sw. L. Rev. Symposium (1979); "'Brown' -- 25 Years Later," Crisis Mag. (1979); "The Desegregation of Urban Schools Thirty Years After Brown," 55 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 515 (1984); "The 1964 Civil Rights Act, Twenty Years and Beyond," 18 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 613 (1984); "The Justification For Race-Conscious Remedies", Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 71 (1986); "Remarks on the Bicentennial of The U.S. Constitution, The Harvard Blackletter Journal 12 (1988); "Why Be A Minority Professor Of Law", St. Louis Univ. Public L. Rev. 431 (1991); "Milliken v. Bradley: Brown's Troubled Journey North, Fordham L. Rev. 49 (1992); "The Bill of Rights -- Then and Now -- An Ever Present Challenge, Ohio Northern Univ. L. Rev. 499 (1992); Keynote Address, NBLSA Midwest Region, 2nd Annual Midwest Recruitment and Retention Conference: Focus on Retention -- Strategies That Work, Northern Illinois Univ. L. Rev. 262 (1992).

Throughout Judge Jones' professional life he has served on a number of committees and special bodies. He was Co-Chairman of the Task Force on Administration of Military Justice, Department of Defense, 1972-1973, Trustee of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, 1975-1979, and a former member of the Task Force on Veterans' Benefits. He was also a charter member of the Youngstown Area Development Corporation, and holds membership in the Elks, the Masons, the Urban League and a Life Member of the NAACP.

He was a member of the American Bar Association and from 1969-1979 served as Co-chairman of the Constitutional Rights Committee, and the ABA Criminal Section, 1971-1973. Jones is also a member of the Federal Bar Association, the National Bar Association where he was Chairman of the Civil Rights Section in 1976, the American Arbitration Association, the Ohio State Bar Association, the Mahoning County Bar Association, the Houston Law Club and Kappa Alpha Psi. He is listed in "Who's Who in America" and "Who's Who in Black America."

Married to the former Lillian Hawthorne, they are the parents of four children, three of whom are lawyers, and one who is an Atlanta businessman.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

September 24, 1993

CHAMBERS OF
GILBERT S. MERRITT
CHIEF JUDGE
SUITE 303 CUSTOMS HOUSE
701 BROADWAY
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37203

The Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones
United States Court of Appeals
432 U.S.P.O. & Courthouse
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Dear Judge Jones:

I have your letter of September 23, 1993 asking for my opinion and judgment respecting your service as UN Advisor for the Somali Court System. You would assist the United Nations and the government of the United States, at the request of the President through Ambassador Richard Schifter, in establishing and strengthening the Somali court system.


I see no objection to your service in this capacity. It is obviously a great opportunity to sponsor and help put in place the rule of law in Somali. You are to be commended for your many services in the past in helping to strengthen the rule of law in other countries in Africa. I fully understand why the President and the Secretary General of the United Nations would want you to serve in this capacity. I can think of no one who could offer them better advice and counsel.

The canons of judicial ethics encourage judges to undertake activities to strengthen the rule of law around the world. Many judges have undertaken such activities. The Judicial Conference of the United States recently established a permanent International Judicial Relations Committee for the very purpose of encouraging judges to engage in activities which strengthen the rule of law and strengthen the court systems in foreign lands. Our country, through the state department, and often in cooperation with the American Bar Association, is sending judges to many places in the world, especially Russia and other former Soviet states, to help them in achieving this same type of objective. As chairman of that committee of the Judicial Conference, I am aware of many such activities carried on by judges - although your responsibilities may be more far reaching and more difficult.

The April 25, 1991 letter from the Committee on Codes of Judicial Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States, a letter signed by the committee chairman Walter Stapelton, certainly serves as a precedent for your engaging in such public service in conjunction with the United Nations upon the request of the government of the United States. This precedent appears to be directly in point.

I not only approve of your request but would encourage you to undertake such an assignment. Let me know if we can be helpful in making your life easier so that you can carry out your responsibilities more effectively.

Sincerely,



Gilbert S. Merritt

mss

cc: James Higgins

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	Re: President Mubarak Agrees to Deploy Additional Egyptian Troops to Somalia (2 pages)	09/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0000
 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0000
 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0000
 RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000
 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0000
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0000
 RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0000
 RUFHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0000
 RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0000
 RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0000
 RUCJAAC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB
 RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU 0000
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0000
 RUEIBS/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0000
 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0000
 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI. 0000

<SUBJ>

UNOSOM TROOP DEPLOYMENTS

<TEXT>

UNCLAS STATE 286134
 E.O. 12356: N/A
 TAGS: MOPS, UNOSOM, SO
 SUBJECT: UNOSOM TROOP DEPLOYMENTS

REF: STATE 251885

		ADDITIONAL TROOPS		
	TROOPS		DATE OF	
	ALREADY		COMPLETE	GRAND
COUNTRY	DEPLOYED	TOTAL	DEPLOYMENT	TOTAL
AUSTRALIA	30	--	--	30
BANGLADESH	950	--	--	950
BELGIUM	934	--	--	934
BOTSWANA	253	--	--	253
CANADA	4	--	--	4
EGYPT				
1ST-BATT	539	--	--	
EGYPT				
2ND--BATT		750	TBA	1789
EGYPT				
ENGR-BATT		500	--	
FRANCE	1110	--	--	1110
GERMANY	1726	--	--	1726
GREECE	120	--	--	120
INDIA	200	4675	30 SEPT.	4875
IRELAND	76	--	--	76
ITALY	2914	--	--	2914
KOREA	252	--	--	252
KUWAIT	108	--	--	108
MALAYSIA	873	--	--	873

MOROCCO	1340	--	--	1340
NEPAL	--	317	OCT.	317
NIGERIA	554	--	--	554
NEW ZEALAND	43	--	--	43
NORWAY	132	--	--	132
PAKISTAN	5014	--	--	5014
ROMANIA	236	--	--	236
SAUDI ARABIA	678	--	--	678
SWEDEN	128	--	--	128
TUNISIA	143	607	TBA	750
TURKEY	319	-- 8	--	319
UGANDA	--	300	TBA	300
U.A.E.	683	--	--	683
U.S.A.	2805	--	--	2805
(LOGISTICS)				
ZAMBIA	--	570	TBA	570
ZIMBABWE	892	--	TBA	892
FORCE	224	50	--	402
HDQTRS.	65			
INCL/PROVOST	63			
MARSHAL SEC				
SUBTOTAL	23404	7769	--	31173
U.S. QUICK REACTION FORCE	1447	--	--	1447
GRAND TOTAL	24851	7769	--	32620
CHRISTOPHER				
BT				
#6134				
NNNN				
<SECT>				
SECTION: 01 OF 01				
<SSN>				
6134				
<TOR>				
930918094913 M0611605				

$T_1 = 3$ Projected Figures - (Belgium + France + US Quick Reaction Force)

$$T_1 = 27,682$$

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Re: [Reconciliation Process] (8 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F

ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

05-Sep-1993 19:24 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: BAIDOA: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES!

<DIST>

SIT: BEERS CLARKER DARRAGH GEORGEL RICE VAX WARD

<PREC>

ROUTINE

<CLAS>

UNCLASSIFIED

<OSRI>

RUEHQDQ

<DTG>

051657Z SEP 93

<ORIG>

USLO MOGADISHU

<TO>

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2274

INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0513

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0153

RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 0264

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0367

RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0621

RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0694

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0261

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0250

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0666

RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0004

<SUBJ>

BAIDOA: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES!

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOGADISHU 001917

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, UN, SO

SUBJECT: BAIDOA: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES!

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

1. TO MARK THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE U.S. AIRLIFT
OF RELIEF FOOD TO SOMALIA'S "CITY OF DEATH," USAID-
SOMALIA, OFDA, AND USIS-NAIROBI ORGANIZED A TWO-DAY

VISIT TO BAIDOA, SEPTEMBER 2 AND 3, FOR NAIROBI-BASED JOURNALISTS. S/E GOSENDE JOINED THE GROUP SEPTEMBER 3 FOR A PRESS CONFERENCE AND A TURBULENT MEETING WITH LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS. THE JOURNALISTS SAW A STILL-BATTERED BUT LIVELY AFRICAN TOWN WHERE THE PEOPLE ARE TRADING GOODS, AND THE POLITICIANS ARE ARGUING OVER POWER. IN OTHER WORDS, A NORMAL TOWN.
DEMOCRACY AT WORK

2. THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE VISIT WAS A LIVELY MEETING HOSTED BY UNOSOM ZONE DIRECTOR JOHN RWAMBUYA, FEATURING THE NEW DISTRICT COUNCIL AND ALL THE LOCAL FACTION/PARTY LEADERS. S/E GOSENDE AND THE PRESS WATCHED AS BAIDOA'S POLITICIANS INTERRUPTED EACH OTHER AND CONTRADICTED EACH OTHER IN A NOISY, BUT GOOD-HUMORED DEMONSTRATION OF DEMOCRACY.

3. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DISTRICT COUNCIL, IBRAHIM ALI DAYO, BEGAN BY REMINDING S/E GOSENDE THAT THE COUNCIL HAD PROVIDED A DETAILED LIST OF PROJECTS WHEN THE SHINN ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITED BAIDOA IN LATE JULY. WHEN WILL WE GET AN ANSWER, HE ASKED. GOSENDE PROMISED A RESPONSE. THEN HE TURNED TO UNOSOM AND ASKED WHEN THE COUNCIL WILL BE ALLOWED TO RAISE REVENUES. RWAMBUYA SAID THAT UNOSOM WAS WORKING ON GUIDELINES.

4. ROBERT PRESS OF THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ASKED IF IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR UNOSOM TO DECIDE IF THE DISTRICT COUNCIL CAN RAISE REVENUES. DAYO GRUMBLED THAT WHEN THEY ASK UNOSOM FOR SOMETHING, UNOSOM SAYS IT IS THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITY, BUT WHEN THEY ASK FOR AUTHORITY TO RAISE MONEY TO MEET THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, UNOSOM SAYS NO, WAIT UNTIL WE ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR REVENUE-SHARING.

5. IN A MORE CONCILIATORY TONE, DAYO SAID WE WELCOME UNOSOM. THAT'S WHY WE CONSULT WITH THEM. WE WANT TO BE ABLE TO RAISE OUR OWN REVENUES AND TAKE CARE OF OUR OWN PROBLEMS. WE DON'T WANT EVERYTHING GIVEN TO US. COMMENT: DCM URGED UNOSOM POLITICAL OFFICER TO GET MOVING ON THE REVENUE QUESTION CITING THE IMPORTANCE OF LETTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. THAT MIGHT WORK IN AMERICA, HE WAS TOLD, BUT IT WOULD BE NAIVE TO LET THE SOMALIS HANDLE MONEY RIGHT AWAY. IT WILL DISAPPEAR INTO THEIR POCKETS. WE EXPECT THAT IS A TYPICAL ATTITUDE AMONG UNOSOM CIVILIAN STAFFERS WHO HAVE SEEN PETTY CORRUPTION, BUT HAVE NO EXPERIENCE WITH THE SORT OF RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS TAKE FOR GRANTED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO PERSUADE UNOSOM THAT YOU GET GOOD LOCAL GOVERNMENT BY ENCOURAGING THEM TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY AND INSURING THAT FREQUENT ELECTIONS MAKE THEM ACCOUNTABLE TO THEIR CONSTITUENCIES AND TAXPAYERS FOR WHAT THEY DO WITH THE PEOPLE'S MONEY.

6. ALTHOUGH THE ASSEMBLED POLITICIANS COULD NOT AGREE ON WHO LEADS BAIDOA, THEY DID AGREE THAT SICQURITY IS THEIR FIRST CONCERN. THE PROBLEM IN BAY REGION IS

PETTY BANDITRY. THE FRENCH TROOPS HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB OF SECURING THE REGION AND ESCORTING CONVOYS, AND THEY HAVE BEGUN THE ORGANIZING OF A LOCAL POLICE FORCE, BUT BANDITRY REMAINS A PROBLEM OUTSIDE BAIDOA AND ALONG THE MAIN ROADS TO MOGADISHU, LU'UG, AND BARDERA. DAYO REPORTED THAT BAIDOA NOW HAS 80 POLICE, 40 OF THEM ARMED, WHEN IT HAD 800 IN THE SIAD BARRE ERA.

7. THE MEETING INCLUDED VENERABLE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT LEADER (AND ALI MAHDI ALLY), ABDULKADIR MOHAMED ADEN "ZOPPO," MOHAMED NUR ALIYOW, REPRESENTING THE AIDEED/SNA WING OF THE SDM, AND SPOKESMEN OF THE NEW "CENTRIST" FACTION, SDM BONKAI. FACTIONS. WHEN ASKED WHO LEADS BAIDOA, ZOPPO SAID THAT WE ARE ALL RAHENWEYN, IT DOES NOT MATTER WHO LEADS. HE SECONDED DAYO'S CONCERNS ABOUT SECURITY, AND URGED THE U.S. TO UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 MOGADISHU 001917

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, IOV, MASS, UN, SO

SUBJECT: BAIDOA: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES! CONTRIBUTE MORE TO THE REBUILDING OF SOMALIA, SAYING THE U.S. HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP, SINCE WE HAVE TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WHOLE WORLD.

8. ONE OF THE MORE VIVID DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAST YEAR AND THIS YEAR IS THE CHANGE IN ALIYOW'S STATUS. WHEN AIDEED WAS VIRTUALLY UNCHALLENGED LAST YEAR, HE WAS RIDING HIGH. AT THIS MEETING, HE WAS ROUTINELY INTERRUPTED AND IGNORED. HE APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS CHANGE CALMLY.

9. THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT, AND THE SOMALIS PRESENT PASSED UP OPPORTUNITIES TO CRITICIZE THE U.S. OR THE UN. WHEN THE BBC REPORTER ASKED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF EVENTS IN MOGADISHU ON BAIDOA, ONE EXPLAINED THAT THE PEOPLE IN BAIDOA ARE HARD WORKERS, BUT THE PEOPLE IN MOGADISHU ARE LOOTERS WHO STRIPPED BAIDOA A YEAR AGO.

10. AN ANCIENT MAN IN THE FRONT ROW WAS THE LAST TO SPEAK. HE RAISED ONE FINGER AND WAS RECOGNIZED AND ACCORDED A DEGREE OF RESPECT THAT NONE OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS HAD RECEIVED. WITH CONSIDERABLE DIGNITY, HE ROSE AND THANKED THE U.S. AND THE UN FOR SAVING SOMALIA FROM CERTAIN DESTRUCTION.

NOTES

11. IN OTHER NOTES FROM THE BAIDOA VISIT:

-- THE FRENCH COMMANDER WORRIED ABOUT THE REPLACEMENT OF HIS TROOPS. THE FRENCH TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRN BETWEEN DECEMBER 15 AND JANUARY 15 AND NO REPLACEMENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. HE MENTIONED A RUMOR THAT BRAZILIAN TROOPS MIGHT FILL IN, A RUMOR THAT WE HAD NOT HEARD. NOR HAD GENERALS BIR AND MONTGOMERY (SEPTTEL). -- THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT A REBUILT TRAINING CENTER FOR MEDICAL WORKERS ON THE EDGE OF TOWN. PAINTED BRIGHT PINK, IT IS A VIVID SYMBOL OF NEW LIFE IN THE CITY OF DEATH.

-- WATER IS A MAJOR PROBLEM. WE PASSED ONE OF THE FEW WORKING WELLS SURROUNDED BY DONKEY CARTS LOADED WITH WATER BARRELS -- THE MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEM. UNOSOM IS BRINGING IN A WELL-DRILLING RIG.

-- ONE REPORTER, ASKED ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BAIDOA 1992 AND BAIDOA 1993, SAID NOW YOU SEE CHILDREN WITH PLUMP CHEEKS.

-- UNOSOM ZONE REP. JOHN RWAMBUYA TOLD S/E GOSENDE THAT ONE SOMALI HAD ASKED HIM WHY UNOSOM DID NOT GET ON WITH THE BUSINESS OF DEALING WITH THIS ONE MAN WHO IS BLOCKING RELIEF EFFORTS. FINISH IT, THE MAN SAID, EVEN IF SOME PEOPLE HAVE TO DIE TO GET IT OVER WITH.

-- JAN COFFEY, T.J. DOWLING, KATE FARNSWORTH, AND OTHERS WHO HELPED DESERVE THANKS FOR A JOB WELL DONE. GOSENDE

BT

#1917

NNNN

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 02

<SSN>

1917

<TOR>

930905180954 M0589529

<SECT>

SECTION: 02 OF 02

<SSN>

1917

<TOR>

930905183759 M0589532

¶

Distribution:

FOR: WARD@A1@OEOB

FOR: VAX_MAIL@OEOB

FOR: RICE@A1@OEOB

FOR: GEORGEL@A1@OEOB

FOR: DARRAGH@A1@OEOB

FOR: CLARKER@A1@OEOB

FOR: BEERS@A1@OEOB



The Ambassador

Charlie
F-11

*Embassy of Italy
Washington*

September 22, 1993

Dear Jennone,

As per our telephone conversation of today, it is my pleasure to convey an unofficial translation of the memorandum from Italian Prime Minister Ciampi concerning Somalia and a renewed political initiative in that country.

With the sentiments of my highest regard.

Yours truly

Boris Biancheri

Jennone R. Walker
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for European Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20506

RAC,

Jennone sent
this down to us.

SJD

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. memo	Translation of memorandum from Italian Prime Minister Ciampi (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	Re: Promoting Political Reconciliation in Somalia (4 pages)	09/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia [Folder 1] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]