

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994) [loose] [8]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

2986

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	3	10	2	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Presidential Order Maintaining the QRF in Somalia (2 pages)	08/27/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-6 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Richard Clarke and Susan Rice, re: Discussion Paper for Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (5 pages)	07/14/1993	P1/b(1)
004. note	Anthony Lake to James Woolsey [partial] (1 page)	10/16/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994) [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F

ke4190

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GONZALEZ, HENRY B

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 31 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY TO REP GONZALEZ RE SOMALIA

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 16 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DARRAGH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE
DARRAGH
NSC CHRON
ROSNER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY  DATE 1/1 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 4 OF 4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 31, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter regarding US troops in Somalia and advocating close executive branch cooperation with Congress regarding Bosnia.

There are approximately 4,000 US troops of a current total of 20,000 in UNOSOM II. This is significantly down from the 28,000 US troops that were in Somalia in January. Most of these remaining US personnel are providing logistical support but there is also a US Quick Reaction Force available to assist other UNOSOM II troops, if necessary.

Our troops have been instrumental in bringing peace and hope to the vast majority of Somalis. American forces have been instrumental in bringing about order and stability throughout the country, which in turn has enabled the UN to continue and extend relief activities. As a result, there is greater calm and security in such important cities as Kismayo and Baidoa than at any time in recent months. In many places, the Somali people are also making significant progress in establishing representative political institutions.

Only in parts of Mogadishu has the security situation deteriorated. This is due to the violence directed by the brutal warlord Aideed. I do not believe that the appropriate response is to withdraw in the face of adversity. The UN has a vital humanitarian and peace-building mission to fulfill. We must not allow a self-aggrandizing warlord to flout the will of the international community and deny food and peace to the people of Somalia.

As you know, over recent months we have closely consulted with Congress on Bosnia and intend to continue to do so. In the event US military action is required, I will welcome Congressional debate and support. It is imperative that we work together on this.

I look forward to working closely with Congress to bring peace to Bosnia and to continue our historic efforts to restore hope to the people of Somalia.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gonzalez", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

The Honorable Henry B. Gonzalez
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 27, 1993

THE PRESIDENT
C 3 3193

7/27/93 8:18

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT:

Reply to Letter from Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez
on US forces in Somalia and Possible Airstrikes in
Bosnia

Purpose

To reply to a letter from Congressman Henry Gonzalez.

Background

Congressman Gonzalez wrote to you to request the immediate withdrawal of all US troops from Somalia and to ask that you maintain close consultation with Congress on possible airstrikes in Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Presidential Letter to Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez
Tab B Letter from Congressman Gonzalez

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

HENRY B. GONZALEZ
20TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

2413 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4320
202-225-3236

HOME OFFICE:
B-124 FEDERAL BUILDING
727 E. DURANGO STREET
SAN ANTONIO, TX 78206-1288
210-229-6195

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4320

6089
COMMITTEE:
BANKING, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEES
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN
CONSUMER CREDIT AND INSURANCE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FINANCE,
TRADE, AND MONETARY POLICY
5:38

August 3, 1993

FILE REF:

B06AF
jcs

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President
United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to request immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Somalia. When I wrote to you in March, you responded March 31st that "we expect the bulk of our military presence to be withdrawn in the very near future" because "the current phase of operation is almost at an end." Mr. President, nothing has ended in Somalia, and in fact matters have grown worse.


Our mission has mutated and become muddled and very risky for American personnel. Ten years ago, I warned for a year in speech after speech on the House floor of imminent catastrophe when our troops were sent to Lebanon as "peacekeepers," and look what happened there. Without a clearly defined military role, we are subjecting our troops to grave danger and are calling on them to be something that they are not.

Mr. President, I also wrote to you in March about Bosnia, and you indicated that you would remain in close consultation with key members of Congress. I am writing to remind you of that pledge, as clearly the situation has escalated with the possibility that U.S. airstrikes will be ordered. Airstrikes have not been authorized by Congress, and I hope you will not do what President Bush did in the case of the Persian Gulf War and wait until Congress has recessed for a month, a recess which this year will begin at the end of this week. I called in August 1990 for Congress to reconvene to address the impending war in the Persian Gulf, but the House and Senate leadership did not heed my calls.

The Honorable William J. Clinton -- Page 2

Time has proven the wisdom of my call. If matters progress with regard to Bosnia, I will reiterate my call this year and hope that the congressional leadership responds so that the will of the people regarding war in Europe can be expressed through their elected representatives in Congress.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Henry B. Gonzalez". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "H".

Henry B. Gonzalez
Member of Congress

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 16, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARK *RA*
FROM: SEAN J. DARRAGH *SJD*
SUBJECT: Reply to Letter to the President from Congressman
Henry B. Gonzalez

Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez wrote to the President asking that he withdraw US troops from Somalia and maintain close consultation with Congress on the possibility of airstrikes in Bosnia. At Tab A is the President's reply reiterating our commitment to support the UN operation in Somalia and detailing our close consultation with Congress on Bosnia thus far, and our intent to continue this practice.

Concurrences by: R. Rand Beers, Jeremy Rosner, Jane Holl *JH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Letter to Congressman Gonzalez
Tab B Letter from Congressman Henry Gonzalez

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
PDD

SPECIAL FORCES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES ORDER MAINTAINING QRF IN SOMALIA

ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 04 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DARRAGH

LOGREF:

FILES: IFD

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~CLARKE~~

DARRAGH

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 01/30/17

2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 2 OF 2

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Presidential Order Maintaining the QRF in Somalia (2 pages)	08/27/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994) [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4190

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-6 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994) [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4190

RESTRICTION CODES

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20970

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

August 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *lh*

FROM: SEAN J. DARRAGH *SD*

SUBJECT: Presidential Order Maintaining the QRF in Somalia

In order to maintain the QRF in Somalia beyond the summer of 1993, the President must order its retention in accordance with PDD-6. The attached memorandum asks the President to order the retention of the QRF.

Concurrences by: R. Rand Beers, Susan Rice, Jennifer Ward *NA*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President formally requesting that he order that the QRF be maintained in Somalia.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A PDD-6

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *YDE* NARA, Date *2/3/17*

2012-0659-F

*Required to
do so only by
terms of PDD-6,
not by law.
(See TAB A, p2)*

SD

*Para on where
we are*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 13 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
SOC

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC OF DC MTG ON SOMALIA 11 SEP

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 16 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLOXTON

CICIO

CLARKE

KRECZKO

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 01/30/17

2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 13, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

COL. ROBERT P. McALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Somalia, September 11, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Somalia, Saturday, September 11, 1993. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A. Kearney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 01/30/17
2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994) [loose] [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4190

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~~SECRET~~

21006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RA*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee
on Somalia

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia, Saturday, September 11, 1993, at 10:00 a.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to forward the transmittal memo to his counterparts at Tab I

Approve *✓ per Dick Clarke*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *LOE* NARA, Date *01/30/17*

2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TO: BERGER

Chron

FROM: CLARKE
RICE

DOC DATE: 14 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
DC

UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 14 JUL DC MTG ON SOMALIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 17 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE
NSC CHRON
RICE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By LOE NARA, Date 9/13/17
2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY:

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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003. memo	Richard Clarke and Susan Rice, re: Discussion Paper for Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (5 pages)	07/14/1993	P1/b(1)

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Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9307966
RECEIVED: 14 OCT 93 18

TO: WOOLSEY, J

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 16 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

INTELLIGENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LAKE THANK YOU NOTE TO WOOLSEY FOR CIA HELP IN PRODUCING SOMALIA
RPT

ACTION: LAKE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE
NSC CHRON
RICE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY JAL DATE 10/18 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9307966

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002

Z 93101518 FOR SIGNATURE
X 93101810 LAKE SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 931016 WOOLSEY, J

UNCLASSIFIED

JWR
10/15

PROOFED BY: KA LOG # 7966
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG KA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>16</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>1/11/16</u>	
ExecSec.			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>		
APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>Nat Sec Advisor</u> has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>10/16</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>19/17</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

10/15/16 2:23

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has dispatched

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1993

Dear Jim:

Just a short note to thank you for the extraordinary help the Agency provided us in publishing the Somalia Report.

Your staff, in particular [redacted] (b)(3) bent over backwards to ensure that the report was produced in less than twenty-four hours and available for distribution on the Hill by mid-afternoon on Wednesday.

[004]

They did a tremendous job as well.
Thanks again for the excellent team work.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable James Woolsey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20530

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen

October 14, 1993

ACTION


MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: SUSAN  RICESUBJECT: Thank You Note to Woolsey for the CIA's Help in
Producing the Somalia Report

At our request, the CIA edited, produced and published the Somalia Report to Congress in less than twenty-four hours. They did great work under considerable time pressure with good humor. Moreover, they never complained about our getting it to them at the eleventh hour. This enabled us to fulfill the President's pledge to have the report on the Hill two days in advance.

At Tab I is a letter to the DCI thanking him for the Agency's help in getting the job done.

Concurrence by: George  TenetRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Jim Woolsey at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Letter to Jim Woolsey

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALAN KRECZKO *AK*FROM: NEAL WOLIN *NW*

SUBJECT: Supplemental Report to Congress, Consistent with the War Powers Resolution, on the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Somalia

Attached for transmittal to the President is a recommended supplement to the June 10 and July 1, 1993, War Powers reports to Congress on our deployment of armed forces to Somalia.

The report, attached at Tabs A and B, simply provides a factual update since the President's last report. It does not concede anything with respect to the applicability of the WPR to events in Somalia, but, like previous reports, will moot any debate about whether we are meeting our reporting requirements. Mike O'Neill of Speaker Foley's staff called our office this morning and indicated the Speaker would want such a report so that congressional debates do not get distracted by the issue.

The report has been coordinated with the Counsel to the President and the Departments of State, Justice and Defense, including JCS. (Secretary Christopher has approved the report. DOD/GC informs us that they provided a copy to Secretary Aspen last night, but have not heard back from him.)

Concurrences by: *NW* *DR* *NW* *NW*
Jeremy Rosner, Rand Beers, Jennifer Ward

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I forwarding the supplemental report to Congress on Somalia.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to the Speaker of the House
Tab B Letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Supplemental Report to Congress, Consistent with
the War Powers Resolution, on the Deployment of
United States Armed Forces to Somalia

Purpose

To provide a supplemental report to Congress regarding the status of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia.

Background

Attached is a supplement to the June 10 and July 1, 1993 reports you sent to Congress on our deployments of armed forces in Somalia. The report simply provides a factual update since your last report, focusing on last weekend's incidents. It does not concede anything with respect to the applicability of the War Powers Resolution to events in Somalia, but, like previous reports, will moot any debate about whether we are meeting our reporting requirements.

The report has been cleared by the Counsel to the President and the Departments of State, Justice and Defense (including JCS).

RECOMMENDATION

That you report to Congress on the status of the deployment of Armed Forces to Somalia by signing the letters at Tabs A and B.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
Tab B Letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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B

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In my letter to you of June 10, 1993, regarding the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia, I reported on the deplorable June 5 attacks on forces of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) instigated by Mohammed Aideed. On July 1, I provided a supplement to my June 10 report describing further the actions taken by U.S. Armed Forces in response to those events. I am now writing to provide a further report on this situation, consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

I will continue to consult closely with Congress on developments in Somalia and intend to provide a full report to Congress by October 15 as requested in provisions of the Senate and House versions of the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act.

As you know, Mohammed Aideed and his followers have not ceased their criminal attacks on UNOSOM personnel and on international relief workers in the Mogadishu area. These have included periodic assaults with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons against U.S. forces taking part in UNOSOM operations and against U.S. and U.N. facilities.

A particularly intense series of encounters with Aideed's forces occurred in Mogadishu on October 3. At one location a U.S. HMMWV light vehicle was destroyed by a command-detonated land mine. At another location a five-ton U.S. Army truck was destroyed by a rocket-propelled grenade.

In the most serious encounter of the day, U.S. Army Rangers launched an operation near the Olympia Hotel for the purpose of detaining persons in Aideed's organization thought to have committed earlier assaults on U.N. forces. During the course of this operation, two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters were shot down and U.S. Army personnel established a perimeter around one of the crash sites in an attempt to rescue U.S. helicopter crew members. These personnel were subjected to intense fire for most of the night until other UNOSOM forces (including U.S. Army personnel) could reach the crash site and evacuate them. Three other U.S. helicopters were hit and forced to withdraw during these incidents.

Thirteen U.S. personnel were killed, 85 were wounded, one is known to be detained by Aideed's followers, and four others are missing. UNOSOM forces of other nationalities suffered losses as well. Every effort is being made to find and extract the missing personnel, and we have made it clear that Aideed and his followers will be held strictly responsible for their criminal

acts and for any mistreatment of our personnel. I deeply regret these tragic deaths and injuries.

I have directed the implementation of several measures to strengthen our ability to protect U.S. and other UNOSOM forces, and to enhance our ability to assist UNOSOM in carrying out its mandate to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief. I have ordered the deployment to Somalia of additional U.S. military personnel and equipment under U.S. command which are intended to provide force-protection capability for U.S. and U.N. contingents assigned to Mogadishu. The deployment of these forces will lessen the threat to U.S. and other U.N. forces assigned in Somalia.

These deployments have been made pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. They are consistent with differing versions of a proposed joint resolution adopted separately by the Senate on February 4 and the House on May 25. I welcome the support expressed in these resolutions for our efforts in Somalia, and I look forward to continuing our consultations on this essential humanitarian effort.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

In my letter to you of June 10, 1993, regarding the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia, I reported on the deplorable June 5 attacks on forces of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) instigated by Mohammed Aideed. On July 1, I provided a supplement to my June 10 report describing further the actions taken by U.S. Armed Forces in response to those events. I am now writing to provide a further report on this situation, consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

I will continue to consult closely with Congress on developments in Somalia and intend to provide a full report to Congress by October 15 as requested in provisions of the Senate and House versions of the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act.

As you know, Mohammed Aideed and his followers have not ceased their criminal attacks on UNOSOM personnel and on international relief workers in the Mogadishu area. These have included periodic assaults with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons against U.S. forces taking part in UNOSOM operations and against U.S. and U.N. facilities.

A particularly intense series of encounters with Aideed's forces occurred in Mogadishu on October 3. At one location a U.S. HMMWV light vehicle was destroyed by a command-detonated land mine. At another location a five-ton U.S. Army truck was destroyed by a rocket-propelled grenade.

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Thirteen U.S. personnel were killed, 85 were wounded, one is known to be detained by Aideed's followers, and four others are missing. UNOSOM forces of other nationalities suffered losses as well. Every effort is being made to find and extract the missing personnel, and we have made it clear that Aideed and his followers will be held strictly responsible for their criminal

acts and for any mistreatment of our personnel. I deeply regret these tragic deaths and injuries.

I have directed the implementation of several measures to strengthen our ability to protect U.S. and other UNOSOM forces, and to enhance our ability to assist UNOSOM in carrying out its mandate to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief. I have ordered the deployment to Somalia of additional U.S. military personnel and equipment under U.S. command which are intended to provide force-protection capability for U.S. and U.N. contingents assigned to Mogadishu. The deployment of these forces will lessen the threat to U.S. and other U.N. forces assigned in Somalia.

These deployments have been made pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. They are consistent with differing versions of a proposed joint resolution adopted separately by the Senate on February 4 and the House on May 25. I welcome the support expressed in these resolutions for our efforts in Somalia, and I look forward to continuing our consultations on this essential humanitarian effort.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 6, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RGB*

SUBJECT: Transcript of Remarks RE: Somalia

I thought you might be interested in reading the remarks Senator Nunn made yesterday in reference to our options in Somalia.

Concurrence by: Richard Clarke *Mr*

Attachment
Tab A Transcript of Remarks

NOT PROOFED

Senator Sam Nunn
Transcript of Remarks
Interview w/ Judy Woodruff, CNN
October 5, 1993
RE: Somalia

Judy Woodruff: For more on Somalia, we are joined now by the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn. Thank you for joining us. You were briefed yesterday and again today both by military officials and by Secretary Christopher and Secretary Aspin. What is your understanding, now, of U.S. forces position in Somalia. You said earlier that you didn't think we had enough military power to protect our own forces. Do you still stand by that?

SN: Yes, Judy, I think we have a mismatch between our strategy there -- the mission and the overall force levels. We have the paradox of having a narrow mission when we went in, purely humanitarian, a safe environment for humanitarian, but that was when we had the maximum number of United States troops and power there. Then we reduced our force but we broadened the mission, we being the United Nations. The mission now is much more into disarming the factions and the clans and also nation building. I think that is the mismatch that has to be addressed and addressed, I think, rather urgently.

JW: So, what was the mistake that was made, just to clarify? Was the mistake for the United States to go along with the U.N. in expanding the mission?

SN: Yes, I do not think we should have expanded the mission. If the U.N. wanted to do it, we should have told the U.N., okay we will support you politically and economically but we have done our military job, now. We have done a marvelous job there and I think we ought to understand that we have saved a lot of lives.

JW: Yesterday, Senator, I think you were quoted as saying that the United Nations did not have any long-term plan about how this mission would end. Today, a U.N. spokesman said, "with all due respect, Senator, you are wrong." He said, "we do have a long range plan and it is to restore Somalia as a functioning entity to the people of Somalia." How do you respond?

SN: Well, that is long-range, I would say. That is very, very long-range. Our question is whether we want to be a part of that. As I said, Judy, we really have two or three options now. One option, the Administration I think is clearly engaged on and that is what I would call status quo plus. They are beefing up our forces somewhat. I certainly agree we ought to get the kind of equipment in there we need to protect our forces as long as they are there.

A second option would be, as some of our colleagues are calling for, is to move out, and say, "we are through and we are going to leave." A third option would be to substantially reinforce the military mission we have there with equipment and manpower and thereby be able to carry out that mission which we certainly can do if we want to pay the price in terms of, both money and military commitment. I would prefer none of those options, they all have downsides and they have upsides but I would prefer what I call an exit strategy option.

First of all, we need to cut out the urban warfare element in terms of American forces going after one or two or three or four individuals. The other forces there, the other United Nations forces in Somalia, are guarding certain areas. They are not moving around. The U.S. is bearing the brunt of going after Aideed. I hope we get him but I don't want to pay a huge price in American lives. I don't think it is worth it. I would change the tactical mission to the United States around Mogadishu by having our forces protect the key areas, the airports and the ports.

The second thing I would do is tell the United Nations that we are going to depart. We are not going to stay here forever and we want you to tell us how you are going to substitute for American forces. Finally, I would say the U.N., itself, and we are a member of it, I would say the U.N., itself needs to rethink its strategy on nation building. I think that is too long-term and I think they are biting off too much.

JW: So, just to be clear, you are saying, "stay there long enough to get the captured U.S. troops but then get out as quickly as possible." Even if that means that General Aideed is in charge and even if it means that Somalia returns to a situation of starvation which is what Secretary Christopher said today that he did not want to have happen.

SN: Well, none of us want that to happen. I believe that we certainly should do everything we can to get our troops back. I believe we ought to coordinate any departure with our allies. I would not pull the rug out from under our allies. We have an obligation to them. As far as Aideed is concerned, we don't have to leave all of Somalia at once in order to isolate Aideed. The best thing to do is to isolate him in southern Mogadishu and not try to hunt him down in an urban area. We are really playing his game when we go into his territory with a few lightly armed people and that puts them at risk.

JW: Yes or no, Senator, are sending adequate forces in now to protect our own troops?

SN: No, we are not sending in adequate forces if we are going to continue the same mission we have now. We need to narrow that

mission and we need to have an understanding with the U.N. on an exit strategy for the U.S.

JW: Alright, Senator Sam Nunn, we thank you for being with us.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9307782
RECEIVED: 08 OCT 93 12

TO: MCLARTY, T

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 18 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY TO SEN GINGRICH RE SOMALIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 14 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF: 9307698 9307723

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE
DARRAGH
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9307782

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 CLARKE
002 CLARKE
003 CLARKE
004 LAKE
005

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 93100812 PREPARE MEMO FOR ITOH
Z 93101213 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
Z 93101416 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
Z 93101520 FOR SIGNATURE
X 93101811 LAKE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

005 931018 MCLARTY, T

UNCLASSIFIED

REC'D 7/16 12:24 pm

Jwz
10/16

LOG # 2782

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

DOCLOG KA A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Will	
ExecSec			
Staff Director	2	review	
D/APNSA	3	cy provided	
APNSA	4		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor	
West Wing Desk	5	has seen	
NSC Secretariat	6		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Lynda - have NSE drift response; return to Meach for his sign. Needs to go out this week.

we need to get
her up at the
T to compress
Somalia for the
asheth files

we can 10- in shell files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MACK MCLARTY

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT:

Reply to Congressman Newt Gingrich

Congressman Gingrich wrote to ask you to ensure that the President's report to Congress on Somalia clearly delineate our mission, commitment and plan.

At Tab A is a draft letter to Congressman Gingrich thanking him for his letter and explaining to him that the President has clearly met his wishes in his recent Report to Congress on Somalia. We have included a copy of the report (at Tab B) which will accompany the attached letter.

Attachments

Tab A Draft Letter to Congressman Gingrich
Tab B Report to Congress on Somalia

DRAFT

Dear Newt:

Thank you for your letter outlining your ideas on how the President's Report to Congress on Somalia should be structured. I believe you will find that the President's Report clearly and forthrightly addresses the mission of U.S. forces, our commitment to that mission and the plan for carrying it out.

With the support of Congress we can now work together to complete the mission that we have committed to in Somalia. Your support in the coming months on this and other issues is very important to us.

Thanks again for taking the time to give us the benefits of your thoughts on this issue.

Sincerely,

Thomas F. McLarty

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RM*
FROM: SEAN J. DARRAGH *SJD*
SUBJECT: Reply for Thomas F. McLarty to Congressman Newt
Gingrich on Somalia

Congressman Newt Gingrich wrote to Thomas McLarty encouraging him to ensure that the President's report to Congress on Somalia clearly delineate^s our mission, commitment, and plan.

At Tab A is a draft letter to Congressman Gingrich from Thomas McLarty thanking him for his letter and explaining that the President has clearly met his wishes in his recent report to Congress. We have included a copy of the report to Congress in this packet.

Concurrences by: Jennifer Ward, Susan Rice, Jeremy Rosner

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Thomas McLarty.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Thomas McLarty
Tab A Letter from Thomas McLarty to Congressman Gingrich
Tab B Report to Congress on Somalia
Tab II Incoming from Congressman Gingrich

From the Office of the Chief of Staff

Phone: 202/456-6797 Fax: 202/456-1121

Date:

Oct. 13

Response needed by:

Oct. 14

COS Office Contact:

LYNDA RATHBONE

	Action	FYI		Action	FYI
Joan Baggett			Leon Panetta		
Rahm Emanuel			Howard Paster		
Mark Gearan			John Podesta		
David Gergen			Jack Quinn		
Jack Gibbons			Carol Rasco		
Marcia Hale			Bob Rubin		
Alexis Herman			Eli Segal		
Nancy Hernreich			Ricki Seidman		
Tony Lake	✓		George Stephanopoulos		
Bruce Lindsey			Christine Varney		
Katie McGinty			David Watkins		
Regina Montoya			Maggie Williams		
Dee Dee Myers					
Roy Neel					
Bernie Nussbaum					

Remarks:

PER NOTE ON LETTER, WE NEED A
RESPONSE TO CONG. GINGRICH
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THANK YOU.

Response:



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

October 7, 1993

Mr. Thomas F. McLarty III
Chief of Staff To the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mack:

The President's report to the country should put everything in context:

1. Bush was right: 350,000 died, maybe 2,000,000 saved.
2. At our request with our leadership 27 countries have come (list names).
3. At our request and with our leadership other countries have helped maintain security; Pakistani losses, other losses; they have suffered, more are suffering; they are still holding firm.
4. The loss of a retreat would be large and worldwide.
 - a. killing Americans gets Americans out
Every terrorist, every faction will learn that, and every American everywhere will be in greater danger;
 - b. every nation which came in at our request will feel betrayed;
 - c. the Somali people will be in danger of starvation and death again;
 - d. the future challenges to freedom and human rights will face huge costs of distrust and disbelief in American staying power;
 - e. the losses are tragic, our heart goes out to their families; we will do everything to protect our young men and women and we will do everything we can to avenge our dead, but the cost of retreat would devalue their lives and deprive their deaths of meaning. Precisely because they died for a noble cause, we must honor their sacrifices by sustaining that cause for freedom.

Mr. Thomas F. McLarty III
October 7, 1993
Page 2

5. Therefore, here is our mission, here is our commitment, here is our plan, and here is what you can hold me accountable for. (This can be expanded and I am glad to help, but I do not understand it at the present time, so I cannot explain it)


I would like to help support you in Somalia, but our House Republican leadership letter indicates how troubled we are by the confusion, incompetence, and ineptness in the current policy.

We have to be convinced you know what you want to do, that it is worth doing, and that you know how to do it. After Aspin's disastrous briefing on Tuesday and today's discussion, I cannot at this time express confidence or offer support.

Your ability to answer number 5 above "what is the mission, commitment, plan, and accountable command structure?" is the key to our changing our current opposition. So far I have seen nothing to convince me you have solved the problem.

Please let me know if I can be of help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Newt", with a stylized, sweeping flourish extending from the end.

Newt Gingrich

NG: jkh

THE REPUBLICAN WHIP

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1006
(202) 225-4501



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

October 7, 1993

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

After listening carefully to an extraordinary dialogue on Somalia between your administration and the legislative leadership, there seem to be four major lessons to be learned out of the mess we are in.

First, prior consultation for major foreign policy decisions is an absolute requirement under our political system. The Legislative branch will not sustain the Executive branch if it is not systematically and routinely consulted. "Don't ask me to be in on the landing if I am not in on the takeoff" was Lyndon Johnson's advice to Dwight Eisenhower (which Johnson himself tragically and disastrously forgot when he left the Legislative branch for the White House). On Somalia, your administration failed to follow this principle prior to Tuesday.

Second, any commitment of the American military must meet a national security requirement, have a clear definition of victory, and have a clearly defined mission. If lives are involved there should also be a moral purpose. Since your administration accepted the United Nations expansion of the goals for Somalia, there has been a failure to redefine our national security interests, our clear definition of victory, our clear statement of mission, and our moral purpose.

Third, the use of the military must be competent. Everything about last Sunday reeks of incompetence. The fact that your administration rejected requests from Mogadishu for heavy equipment smacks of Washington micromanagement of military affairs by civilian political appointees (the McNamara disease). On the grounds of current evidence, it is hard to believe your appointees could implement a military policy even if we agree with its goals.

Finally, the effort to blame the United Nations for its obsession with getting Aidid misses the entire point of most Americans' objections to your administration's policy of subordinating American interests and American men and women to

President Bill Clinton
October 7, 1993
Page 2

the United Nations. According to your administration's hindsight comments, over a dozen young Americans were killed last weekend in pursuit of a United Nations' obsession.

It is precisely the administration's unwillingness to recognize the current ineffectiveness and incompetence of the United Nations and to change Presidential directives that makes us very hesitant to support a policy of engagement.

Your administration must reshape its strategies, its structures, and its habits to implement these four principles on a regular, routine basis.

Without these changes to sustain an active foreign policy it will be extraordinarily difficult for us to work with you to help enlarge freedom and to work to build a freer, safer, more prosperous world.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Newt", with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Newt Gingrich

NG: jkh

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7766
Redo

October 10, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Draft Contents and Themes of Somalia Report for
Senator Byrd

The President agreed to provide Senator Byrd with an outline of the Somalia Report by noon on Monday. At Tab I is a draft Table of Contents and Key Themes of the Somalia Report for transmittal to Senator Byrd as promised.

Senator Dole has also sent to Howard Paster a number of questions that he thinks must be addressed in the report to Congress. We have forwarded the attached Dole questions to the State Department drafter of the Somalia report and will work to ensure that they are adequately addressed in the final report to Congress.

Concurrences by: Jeremy  Fisher

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the transmittal of this document to Senator Byrd.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Draft Table of Contents and Themes of Somalia Report
for Senator Byrd
Tab II Memo from Howard Paster with Attached Letters from
Gingrich and Question from Dole

Report to Congress on Policy in Somalia

Working Draft Outline

I. Executive Summary

II. The United States and United Nations Missions

A. The US Mission

The US military objective is to assist in providing a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian relief, by providing US military logistical services to UN forces and an US combat unit to act as an interim force protection supplement to UN combat units in emergencies.

In carrying out this US military mission, US forces have four tasks:

1. to protect US personnel and bases;
2. to assist in keeping open and secure lines of communication for supplies and relief operations
3. to assist in keeping pressure on those who caused the famine and anarchy last year and who attacked US and UN personnel
4. through that pressure and their presence, to assist in preventing renewed civil war and creating a limited opportunity for the Somalis, working with others, to reach agreements peacefully so that famine and anarchy do not resume after the departure of the international force.

o Size of US forces: In conducting this mission, the US will soon have deployed approximately 4000 Army combat personnel and approximately 3000 Army logistics troops in Somalia. Off shore will be two Marine Amphibious Ready Groups with 3600 Marines, an aircraft carrier with 58 strike aircraft, and Air Force gunships stationed nearby. (Detail about units and locations at annex.)

o Command Structure: All are under US command. The logistics troops are assigned to the UN's Force Command for operational control.

B. The United Nations Mission

The UN mission, created by UN Security Council resolutions, is to end the famine and anarchy and create an environment that reduces the likelihood of their return upon the departure of the international presence. Toward the end, the UN is

1. providing security
2. providing relief and humanitarian assistance
3. providing mediation and support for peaceful national political reconciliation

o Security: The UN military force consists of approximately 23,000 non-US forces from approximately 25 nations. That force will probably rise to approximately 28,000 in the next several weeks.

o Relief: Despite progress in eliminating famine and reconstituting the food supply system, almost one million people are still totally dependent upon relief supplies. Those who are less dependent, are self sufficient to a limited degree only because the international presence is preventing the renewal of the civil war that had disrupted their ability to sustain themselves. The UN is also engaged in a refugee return program.

o Political: UN sponsored national political conferences had created a cease-fire and arms control/disarming program. The decision by one group to attack the UN in early June derailed the cease-fire and arms program. Nonetheless, outside of Mogadishu over thirty district councils have been established as part of a plan to create a transitional national authority. A program to create a police and judiciary is underway.

The UN currently plans to continue these functions through early 1995.

III. US Strategy and Policy

A. Recent Decisions

1. Military Force Protection: Because of increased level of military threat, the President added approximately 2000 Army personnel and armored equipment, the two Marine groups, the aircraft carrier, and Air Force gunships stationed in a nearby country.

2. Political Process: The President dispatched Amb. Oakley to meet with leaders in the region to accelerate the creation of a political solution by African leaders working with Somalis. Ethiopian President Meles agreed to lead the effort. The US does not seek to dictate or block any African and Somali solution. The US is thereby reducing the emphasis on forced apprehension of those wanted in connection with the murder of peacekeeping forces and increasing the search for a political outcome, including a resolution of the charges in those murders.

3. Duration of US Military Presence: The US will complete the transition of its military logistics support to the UN to civilian contractors and other nations' logistics units by 31 March 94. US combat forces will also be withdrawn by that date, if all US missing are returned or accounted. A small number of US military will remain in the UN Force Command headquarters and the US embassy. The US will assist the UN in deploying additional forces from other nations. Pakistan, Egypt, and India now have additional forces readying for dispatch to Somalia.

These steps, taken together, will provide the Somalis sufficient time to have a chance at achieving a political solution. They will also give the UN time to assess its mission and to adjust the UNOSOM Force Command to operate without US logistical support or back-up combat units. Neither the Somalis nor the UN should think they can count on an open-ended US commitment. Such a perception could slow the achievement of the goals of the US and UN operations.

B. US Interests and the Risks of Percipitous Withdrawal

The US has a humanitarian interest in preventing the return of the mass death caused by anarchy and famine. It has a national security interest in being seen to fulfill its commitments to the many nations who deployed with us and to the UN. It has a national security interest in making an international burden sharing system work, so that crises can be met in ways that include other nations' forces and funds. Finally, it has a national security interest in preventing potential enemies and terrorists from believing that they can change our policies by killing some of our people.

URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 7766ACTION OFFICER: CLARKEDUE: 10/8; 2PM☒ Prepare Memo For Lake/Berger☐ Prepare Memo For Podesta☐ Prepare Memo _____☐ Appropriate Action☐ Prepare Memo For Itoh

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

Concur

FYI

☐☐ Andreasen☐☐ Andricos☐☐ Aoki☐☐ Barth☐☐ Beers☐☐ Bell☐☐ Burns☐☐ Canas☐☐ Clarke☐☐ Clarke, P.☐☐ Claussen☐☐ Farrell☐☐ Fauver☐☐ Feinberg☐☐ Forsythe☐☐ Fry☐☐ Gati☐☐ Gottemoeller☐☒ Gross☐☐ Hahn

Concur

FYI

☐☐ Harris☐☐ Holl☐☐ Hooker☐☐ Hull☐☐ Indyk☐☐ Jett☐☐ Jones☐☐ Kelly☐☐ Kristoff☐☐ Kupchan☐☐ Kyle☐☐ Lowenkron☐☐ Menan☐☐ Merchant☐☐ Morley☐☐ O'Leary☐☐ Owens-Kirkpatrick☐☐ Poneman☐☐ Primosch☐☐ Rice

Concur

FYI

☐☐ Riedel☒☐ Rosner☐☐ Saeed☐☐ Sanner☐☐ Schwartz☐☐ Sheehan☐☐ Spalter☐☐ Tenet☐☐ Tilley☐☐ Van Eron☐☐ Waguespack☐☐ Walker☐☐ Walsh☐☐ Wayne☐☐ Wiedemann☐☐ Wilson☐☐ Witkowski☐☒ WOLIN☒☐ KRELZKO☒☐ WARD

INFORMATION

☒ Itoh☒ Kenney☒ Soderberg☐ Exec Sec Desk☒ Lake☒ Berger☒ Records Mgmt.

COMMENTS

PER LAKE'S OFFICE, PLEASE HAVE DUE TODAY 10/8; 2PM.

URGENT

Logged By

JOAReturn to Records Mgmt.
379 OEGB

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9308058
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 93 14

TO: PETERSON, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 20 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
UN

PEACEKEEPING
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DOD PROPOSED TESTIMONY ON US MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN UN OPERATIONS
IN SOAMLIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 21 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE

EXECSEC

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY DATE 10/20 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSMEM


DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH 

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Testimony on U.S. Military
Participation in UN Operations in Somalia

The NSC staff concurs on the subject document.

8058

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

URGENT


October 18, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #M-780

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249
STATE - Julia C. Norton - (202)647-4463 - 225

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for )
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Daniel COSTELLO (395-4570)

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Proposed Testimony on U.S. Military
Participation in U.N. Operations in Somalia

DEADLINE: 5:00 P.M., Today, October 18, 1993

COMMENTS: If you do not respond by the deadline, we will
assume that your agency has no comment.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before
advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or
receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

D. Costello
B. Sasser
T. Davis
J. Palmieri
H. Paster

OCT 15 '93 9:58 FROM OSD-LRS

TO PETERSON

PAGE. 003

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT B. JOHNSTON
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON UNITED STATES MILITARY
PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS
IN SOMALIA
14 OCTOBER 1993

CLEARED
FOR OPEN PUBLICATION

OCT 13 1993 22

DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND SECURITY REVIEW (OSD-PA)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OSD(PA) DROPS 13-01027

OCT 15 '93 9:58 FROM OSD-LRS

TO PETERSON

PAGE.004

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee:

It is an honor for me to appear before this committee. Today I wish to present my personal views on President Clinton's plans for continued United States Military participation in United Nations operations in Somalia.

I am convinced that a decision to immediately withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia would cause the United Nations led coalition to unravel and destine the mission to failure. Many of the contributing countries would simply follow us out or even beat us out. It is not unreasonable to expect Aideed's militia to capitalize on such an exodus and continue to engage U.S. and coalition troops. Retrograde in a non-permissive environment with troops moving to and through a single congested port and a similarly congested single airfield would make our troops even more vulnerable than they presently are. We must also recognize that the U.S. Army Logistics Support Command sustains the entire coalition in a general support role and absent an orderly transition to civilian contracted logistics support the United Nations operation would grind to a halt.

If we accept the possibility that the United Nations coalition would begin to unravel with an immediate U.S. withdrawal, we must also consider the higher likelihood that our friends and allies would be more vulnerable to attack and suffer

OCT 15 '93 9:59 FROM OSD-LRS

TO: PETERSON

PAGE.005

unwelcomed casualties. While the coalition is now a United Nations organization, ^{most of} the contributing countries ^{originally} committed forces on the basis of U.S. leadership of Operation Restore Hope. Operationally each country sought a bilateral relationship with the U.S. Command Structure. I firmly believe we have a responsibility to disengage with some regard for how our decision may impact on countries we may wish to call upon for future operations more clearly in our National Interest.

RECOMMENDED
AGREED
DATE 10/18/93

President Clinton's plan to send more troops to Somalia is a sound one, and I strongly support it. The addition of tanks and armored fighting vehicles will provide enhanced protection of our in-place forces and allow the on-scene commander to move more rapidly within Mogadishu and swiftly remove road blocks that set up troops in "thin-skinned" vehicles to ambush. I do not view this reinforcement as a signal of intent to escalate military action - quite the contrary - it will discourage engagement of U.S. troops by Aideed's militia. This heavier force does not guarantee that there will be no challenge to its presence and the tanks and armored fighting vehicles are not invulnerable. Land mines and rocket propelled grenades (RPG's) remain a threat, however the machine gun-toting militiaman is neutralized.

The offshore Marine Expeditionary Units provide unique capabilities from independent operations to reinforcing and in-extremis hostage rescue. The Marines have great mobility and hardened vehicles which complement the capability of the U.S.

OCT 15 '93 9:59 FROM OSD-LRS

TO: PETERSON

PAGE 006

Army forces that will be deployed to Somalia. This force is self-sustaining for on-shore operations and with off-shore staging leaves no footprint in Mogadishu.

The timetable for President Clinton's plan is reasonable and provides some flexibility in achieving the desired outcome. Clearly it will take two or three weeks to load out, sail, off-load in Somalia and deploy within Mogadishu. The Marine units already deployed at sea can close on Mogadishu within days. In broad terms, we should expect to achieve some results from the additional forces within a thirty day time frame. Given our experience during Operation Restore Hope, the presence of newly acquired weapons in the city and the sheer size of Mogadishu with a population of more than a million, it could take an additional 30-60 days to establish a truly secure and stable environment. During this time the political process must be in the forefront and working toward a permanent cease fire and an irreversible commitment by the Somalis to get on with the business of reconciliation and rebuilding of a governmental, police and judicial system. I am not suggesting that our redeployment is tied to specific measures of progress on reconciliation - simply that the process is moving firmly in the right direction. In the timeline equation we must allow for the orderly retrograde of heavy equipment through a small port and an 8,000 foot airstrip with limited staging areas and consequently limited throughput. We must allow for transition of the logistics support from U.S. Army to civilian contractor. We must also plan for an orderly

OCT 15 '93 10:00 FROM OSD-LRS

TO PETERSON

PAGE.007

handoff to additional United Nations forces which will flow through the same port and airfield. I suspect the replacement forces will come by sea which, of course, takes time and competes with outgoing sealift for berthing space. I believe the 31 March deadline accounts for all of the above considerations. It may be possible to compress timelines with measured progress in the political process, however, we should allow ourselves some flexibility to accomplish an orderly and professionally executed retrograde.

It is my strong conviction that this additional force must be led by a U.S. Commander.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared text. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: State Proposed Testimony on U.S. Military
Participation in UN Operations in Somalia

Attached at Tab I is a response to an OMB request for views on State proposed testimony on U.S. military participation in UN operations in Somalia.

Concurrences by: Randy Beers, Jeremy Rosner, Susan Rice,
Jenniffer Ward

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Ronald Peterson.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to OMB
Tab II Incoming from OMB

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9307862
RECEIVED: 12 OCT 93 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE
WH EXECUTIVE CLERK

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT TO CONGRESS ON SOMALIA

ACTION: PRES SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK

DUE DATE: 15 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DARRAGH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE
DARRAGH
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9307862

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 93101218 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
Z 93101408 FOR SIGNATURE
X 93101408 PRES SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 10/12

8:55 PM

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 7862

URGENT NOT PROOFED: 788

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG ASK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WE</u>	_____
Staff Director	<u>2</u> <u>Cops</u>	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>who</u> Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>DN</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec's office has disltd


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 12, 1993

President sgd per WH
Executive Clerk 13 Oct 93ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Somalia

Purpose

To respond to the request of the Congress that you provide a report on Somalia policy by October 15, 1993.

Background

Congress requested that you provide a report outlining U.S. policy in Somalia by October 15, 1993. The cover letter attached at Tab A will be attached to each report to Congress. The report will be sent to each member of Congress.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached cover letter at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Cover Letter to the Report to Congress on Somalia

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made to you and other Members on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the UN to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the UN create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the UN and the United States, approximately thirty nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

- o We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.

- o What the U.S. is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the UN, relief organizations and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The UN, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the UN leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."

o We cannot leave immediately because the UN has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the U.S. to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank you and the many other Members who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA

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V. The UN Mission	7
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After 350,000 people had died in the famine and anarchy that gripped Somalia in 1992, the United States intervened militarily with 25,000 U.S. troops to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to the two million who were at risk of death by starvation. In May 1993, the United States turned this mission over to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and withdrew over 20,000 troops, leaving less than 5,000 until the events of the past week.

The Mission of the United States Military in Somalia

The U.S. military mission is to assist in providing a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian relief. We are carrying out this mission by providing U.S. military logistical services to UN forces and by providing U.S. combat units to act as an interim force protection supplement to UN forces in emergencies. Thus, the U.S. military mission is supportive of, but more limited than, the overall UN mission, which is described later in the report.

- o Size of U.S. forces: Prior to October 7, the U.S. had approximately 4,500 troops in Somalia: 2,800 logisticians, 1,300 in the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and 400 Rangers. Since the recent attack on U.S. forces, the President has ordered the deployment of approximately 3,000 additional Army combat personnel. Off-shore will also be two Marine Expeditionary Units, with 3,600 Marines on board, an aircraft carrier with 58 strike aircraft, and Air Force gunships stationed nearby.

- o Command Structure: All U.S. troops are under U.S. command. The logistics troops are assigned to the UN's Force Command for operational control only.

U.S. Policy

The President recently modified U.S. policy in Somalia through the following three decisions:

- o Military Force Protection: Due to the increased military threat to U.S. and UN personnel, the President deployed the additional troops and equipment described above. These forces are intended to protect our troops and enable our forces to complete their mission. These forces will provide greater air power and greater armor protection.

- o Political Process: The President dispatched Ambassador Robert Oakley to the region to accelerate the achievement of a lasting political solution by African leaders working with Somalis. Ethiopian President Meles has agreed to

lead this effort. The U.S. does not seek to dictate a solution to Somalia's political problems but merely to stimulate African engagement in achieving such an arrangement. The President decided that the political process would be enhanced if the UN military effort were depersonalized, with less U.S. military effort focused on the capture of Mohammed Aideed. At the same time, the President has not ruled out any military options.

- o Duration of U.S. Military Presence: The U.S. will complete the transition of its military logistics support to civilian contractors and other nations' logistics units no later than March 31, 1994. U.S. combat forces also will be withdrawn no later than that date. Approximately 200 to 300 members of the U.S. military may remain in the UN Force Command headquarters and assist in protecting the U.S. Liaison Office. The U.S. will also assist the UN in deploying additional forces from other nations. Pakistan, Egypt, Nepal and India now have additional forces readying for dispatch to Somalia.

These steps, taken together, will provide the Somali people time to have a reasonable opportunity of achieving a political solution. They also will give the UN time to assess its mission, secure alternative logistic support, and to adjust the UNOSOM Force Command to operate without U.S. back-up combat units. Neither the Somalis nor the UN can count on an open-ended U.S. commitment. Such a perception could slow the achievement of the goals of the U.S. and UN operations.

U.S. Interests and Providing an Opportunity for Peace

The U.S. has a humanitarian interest in preventing the return of the mass death caused by anarchy and famine. Approximately one million Somalis still depend upon relief supplies, and the open roads and lines of communication that are required. The U.S. has a national security interest in:

- o fulfilling its commitments to the many nations who deployed with us and to the UN;

- o making international burden sharing work, so that on those occasions when it is clearly in our interest to do so, we can meet crises in ways that include other nations' forces and funds;

- o preventing potential enemies and terrorists from believing that they can change our policies by killing our people.

The risks of withdrawing prematurely from Somalia are significant. An immediate U.S. withdrawal would force many other nations that are now dependent on U.S. logistical support and force protection to leave Somalia with us. The result would be

the collapse of UNOSOM, the probable return of anarchy and civil war and with it famine, and the loss of the very significant gains achieved to date under two administrations. A precipitous withdrawal, with the likely collapse of the relief effort, would also devalue the noble efforts of the thousands of U.S. servicemen and women who have served with distinction in Somalia, particularly those who have given their lives to this noble cause.

All that two U.S. administrations, thousands of Americans, and people from thirty countries worked hard to achieve could be lost because the United States had left early, quickly, and under pressure.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States went to Somalia to help stop one of the great human tragedies of our time. By the end of 1992, a third of a million Somalis had died of starvation and disease caused by anarchy and civil war; among them were almost half of all the children in Somalia. Another two million Somalis were at risk of starvation. Their suffering was exacerbated by a handful of Somali bandits and warlords who stopped food and other relief supplies from reaching their own countrymen. In our nation's best tradition, America took action with bipartisan support to end this human disaster.

As a result, in November, President Bush ordered U.S. troops to Somalia to help create a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies. That has remained the primary mission of U.S. troops throughout the operation.

On February 4, 1993, the Senate adopted S.J. Res 45, authorizing the U.S. operation in Somalia. On May 25, the House adopted S.J. Res 45, as amended, authorizing that operation for 12 months. Congress has never acted to conference these two versions of the bill, despite Administration statements welcoming such a resolution.

On May 4, 1993, the United Nations assumed responsibility for the tasks that we had performed. Approximately 25,000 troops from approximately thirty nations deployed to take our place, and the Clinton Administration removed over 20,000 U.S. troops from Somalia.

Today, United States military forces remain in Somalia to help provide a secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid. Although the starvation in Somalia has largely ended, there remains a substantial need for foreign relief. Almost a million people are completely dependent on relief supplies. The reviving indigenous food system is fragile and would again collapse if the peacekeepers left precipitously and civil war resumed.

Despite images of Somalis opposed to U.S. and UN involvement, most impartial analysts agree that the overwhelming majority of Somalis are grateful for our presence and wish us to remain. Television carried pictures of small groups of Somalis celebrating American casualties, but not the thousands that mourned them in a gathering in the same city the next day. With the exception of one sub-clan leader and his armed faction, the clan leaders, elders, womens groups, and most other organized elements have pleaded that we not abandon them to the men with the guns and civil war again.

II. THE MISSION OF THE U.S. MILITARY

A. Mission Statement

The mission of the U.S. military in Somalia is to assist in providing a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian relief by providing U.S. military logistics services to UN forces and U.S. combat units to act as an interim force protection supplement to UN forces in emergencies. This has consistently been the mission of our forces. At no time have U.S. forces been tasked with such missions as "nation building."

In carrying out their mission, U.S. forces now have four tasks:

- 1) protect U.S. troops in Somalia and their logistic bases;
- 2) keep open and secure the key roads and lines of communication that are essential for the UN and relief workers to keep the flow of food, supplies and people moving freely throughout the country, so that starvation and anarchy do not return;
- 3) keep the pressure on those who originally cut off relief supplies and attacked our people;
- 4) through that pressure and the presence of our forces, help make it reasonably possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so they can solve their own problems and survive after we leave.

B. Size of U.S. Deployment

Prior to October 7, the U.S. had approximately 4,500 troops in Somalia: 2,800 logisticians, 1,300 in the QRF, and 400 Rangers. As this report is prepared, additional U.S. forces are preparing for deployment or are en route to Somalia. The numbers used in this report, therefore, are close approximations.

The U.S. forces in support of the Somalia operation may be grouped into four classes:

- 1) the logistics and support units that the U.S. committed to support the UN operation. They number approximately 3,000.
- 2) the U.S. Army units that protect U.S. personnel and perform a force protection function to assist UN units. With the addition of approximately 3,000 Army combat personnel, they will soon total about 5,000.
- 3) the Marines aboard ships off-shore in a back-up U.S. force protection role. They will soon total 3,600.

U.S. FORCES IN SOMALIA
(AS OF OCTOBER 11, 1993)

<u>IN PLACE FORCES</u>	<u>SIZE</u> (approx)	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
UNOSOM II Staff	50	Mogadishu	Individual Staff Officers Officers seconded to UN
Logistics Support Command	2,900	Mogadishu	Provide logistical & HQ Staff support to UNOSOM II Force Command
Quick Reaction Force	1,400	Mogadishu	Provide US combat capability for rapid response in support of UNOSOM II to counter specific threats that exceed UNOSOM II force capabilities
Ranger Task Force	<u>950</u>	Mogadishu	To support US forces in Somalia
TOTAL (As of Oct 11)	5,300		
 <u>DEPLOYING FORCES</u>			
Additional Ground Forces	2,800	Mogadishu	To reinforce and enhance US force protection capability
Marine Expeditionary Units	<u>3,600</u>	Offshore	(Same as above)
TOTAL AFTER DEPLOYMENT	11,700		

4) the combat air support units aboard the aircraft carrier Lincoln and the U.S. Air Force gunships stationed nearby. These units will provide over 60 strike aircraft.

Thus, there will soon be approximately 8,000 U.S. military personnel in Somalia, supported by others off shore and nearby. Further detail is provided in Annex II to this report.

C. Command and Control

All U.S. military personnel are under U.S. command. In addition, all U.S. combat forces are under U.S. operational control.

The logistics units that support the overall UN military presence are assigned to the UN commander for operational control through the UNOSOM Deputy Commander, Major General Thomas Montgomery, U.S. Army. That means that for purposes explicitly agreed in writing between the U.S. and the UN, the UN commander may provide them direction in their logistics mission of supporting UN units. These units do not have any combat role.

The commander of U.S. forces in Somalia is Major General Thomas Montgomery, U.S. Army. He reports to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, General Joseph Hoar, U.S.M.C.

In addition, Major General Montgomery is the Deputy Commander of all forces assigned to the UNOSOM Force Command by other nations. LTG Cevik Bir, Turkish Army, is the Commander, UNOSOM Force Command.

III. U.S. POLICY

The U.S. goal in Somalia is humanitarian. We seek to carry out certain functions in support of the overall UN effort to assist the Somali people so that civil war, with its attendant anarchy and famine, does not return when the international presence departs.

The Administration sees the problems of Somalia as fundamentally humanitarian and political, not military. We actively support the efforts of the Somali people, working with the UN and others, to reach a political solution. Nonetheless, the widespread presence of weapons and the intention of some to use them for personal and political gain, requires a strong international security presence while the humanitarian and political situations are addressed.

In the wake of stepped up violence directed against U.S. and UN personnel, the President recently has authorized a number of steps to accelerate the completion of the U.S. military mission and to strengthen the UN in its mission.

A. Protection of U.S. Forces

Hostile factions in Mogadishu have recently reintroduced heavy weapons into the city and have been increasingly using these weapons against U.S. and UN forces. Forces from the U.S., Pakistan, Italy, Nigeria, Morocco, France, Turkey and Malaysia have been killed. To enhance security, the U.S. is in the process of augmenting its forces as described in the foregoing section.

B. Accelerated Political Track

On October 8, 1993, the President dispatched Ambassador Robert Oakley, who has served two U.S. administrations in Somalia, to work with African leaders to accelerate progress towards a political solution. The President decided that the political process would be enhanced if the UN military effort were depersonalized and less focused on the capture of Mohammed Aideed. At the same time the President has not ruled out any military options.

President Meles of Ethiopia, who is the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) designated official on Somalia, has agreed to work with President Issaias of Eritrea and others to undertake new diplomatic steps to assist the Somalis to return to the course of peaceful political reconciliation. President Meles and other African leaders will attempt to facilitate a Somali solution, not one imposed from the outside. Neither the United States nor the United Nations seek to dictate a political outcome in Somalia. We will support a Somali solution to Somalia's problems.

C. Completing the U.S. Military Mission

The U.S. had earlier planned with the UN to reduce the number of U.S. logistics personnel from about 3,000 to about 1,400 by early 1994, and to withdraw the remainder of the American logistics units before the beginning of 1995. Now the U.S. intends to hand-off its logistical mission to other nations' forces and to civilian contractors on a more rapid basis, concluding by March 31, 1994. The U.S. will contract for civilian support on such functions as distributing food and petroleum. The U.S. will also assist the UN in securing its own civilian contractors. In addition, we will seek with the UN to identify non-U.S. units to assume the critical functions now performed by U.S. military logisticians. No U.S. combat forces will remain in Somalia beyond March 31, 1994.

Forces from other countries have more than offset U.S. force reductions and continue to arrive in Somalia. The Indian Army is in the process of deploying a brigade of over 4,000 troops to Somalia. Pakistan has announced that it is dispatching another

1,500-man brigade, bringing its force in the country to almost 6,000. Egypt is also adding a 1,500-man brigade to the force it already has deployed. The Nepalese Army plan to dispatch several hundred highly-skilled light infantry/commandos to Mogadishu.

With these steps, this period of time also will afford the UN operation sufficient time and opportunity to complete the transition to an effective operation without U.S. military units. The U.S. is also affording the Somali people a reasonable opportunity to overcome the barriers to a peaceful process of national political reconciliation.

After March 31, 1994, there will be no U.S. military units in Somalia, with the possible exception of approximately 200-300 hundred military personnel providing assistance and protection to the U.S. Liaison Office. This drawdown of U.S. military personnel is not conditioned upon the successful completion of any steps by the Somali people or the UN.

D. Missing U.S. Personnel

The U.S. is committed to have its missing or detained personnel well-treated and returned as soon as possible. Toward that end, a number of steps are being taken. One of them was the request to the International Committee of the Red Cross that they arrange visits to American personnel. The first such visit to one American soldier has been carried out. Other steps are underway. The U.S. is coordinating its efforts with the UN, which also has a Nigerian soldier missing and detained.

IV. U.S. INTERESTS AND PROVIDING A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE

The U.S. diplomatic and military efforts in Somalia have been based on humanitarian concerns over one of the most devastating human catastrophes in recent history. Such humanitarian efforts have long played an important role in U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. however, has important national interests at stake in how we complete our mission in Somalia. All U.S. military units, except for a few hundred non-combat support personnel, will be withdrawn no later than March 31, 1994. The U.S. must not leave Somalia in a manner that increases the danger to Americans all over the world, effectively undermines the substantial accomplishments of U.S. forces in Somalia, or severely damages the prospects for international burden-sharing in the future.

The U.S. committed to the UN that we would provide logistics support for most of the approximately thirty nations in UNOSOM II. Making alternative arrangements may take up to six months. The UN and the many nations that deployed to Somalia at our

request also have been relying on the U.S. Quick Reaction Force to come to the aid of UN forces under attack. Alternatives to that capability sufficient to handle the recently increased security threat cannot quickly be put in place.

The peaceful political process must also be given a reasonable time to succeed. Those Somalis who oppose it should not be given an easy opportunity to wait out the UN. Instead, there must be time for a new structure to be created and begin working while there is a strong security presence. There is also a direct relationship between progress on political reconciliation and the ability of the UN force to operate after the U.S. leaves. More nations will be inclined to continue their participation in the UN force beyond March if a viable political solution has been reached.

The U.S. commitment is not open-ended. We can, however, provide a reasonable opportunity -- a limited window of opportunity -- to the Somalis, the nations that have joined us, and the UN. Providing that opportunity for peace and effective completion of the U.S. mission is best achieved by a deliberate, phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over a six month period. The risks of leaving Somalia precipitously include the following:

- o U.S. Missing: Were we to leave now we would be leaving behind and unaccounted for, missing or detained U.S. servicemen and reducing our ability to recover them.

- o Open Season on Americans: Were we to be seen to retreat after U.S. casualties, we would be inviting adversaries, terrorists and thugs all over the world to kill U.S. citizens as a means to change U.S. policy. In a world where Americans must operate in potentially hostile environments, and where there are many who may wish us ill and do not hesitate to use violence, this is a message we cannot send.

- o Getting Others to Share Burdens: It is in our interest to be able to recruit other nations to send troops and funds to take on tasks with us, or instead of us, in circumstances where that serves U.S. interests. If we left abruptly, we would damage our relations with the thirty other countries that are serving in Somalia at the direct request of the U.S. Many of these countries also have suffered serious losses in pursuit of this humanitarian mission, including the Pakistanis, the Nigerians and others. If the U.S. breaks its commitments in Somalia, these and other nations would be reluctant to join the U.S. in future coalition efforts because they would perceive our resolve as weak, and our commitments unreliable.

- o Forcing Others Out: Leaving other nations' forces in Somalia without essential logistical support and protection will cause many of them to depart. U.S. logisticians are in Somalia

providing material support for more than 25,000 other troops from all over the world. The U.S. QRF is the only force in the country now capable of coming to the swift aid of other forces under attack. An immediate American withdrawal, without allowing time for the UN to replace these U.S. capabilities, would force other contingents to leave Somalia without completing their mission.

o Return of Starvation: Since there has not yet been adequate progress on political reconciliation, the premature departure of the U.S. and many of the international contingents would almost certainly result in renewed civil war, and with it, renewed anarchy and famine. The images of starving children and a devastated country would return to haunt us. The accomplishments of the many U.S. and international forces that have served and sacrificed in Somalia would be lost, and their efforts would be largely in vain.

V. THE UNITED NATIONS

The U.S. military mission is one component of the broader UN mission. As a leading member of the UN, we are also contributing to other aspects of the UN mission.

The UN mission is three-fold: security, humanitarian relief and reconstruction, and political reconciliation.

A. Security

The U.S.-led UNITAF operation turned over vast sections of Somalia from U.S. military control to UN forces in May. Belgium leads the UN forces in the south, including the port of Kismayu. France leads the force in the interior, around Baidoa. Pakistani, Nigerian and Egyptian forces are among the larger contingents in Mogadishu. Other large contingents have come from Italy and India.

African states have provided support to UNOSOM. Significant and effective units have deployed from several African states, including Botswana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.

Details on the non-U.S. deployments are in Annex IV.

The UN is working to reconstitute a Somali police and judiciary system that gradually can assume the security role in some areas. Already 5,000 Somali police have returned to their jobs. The UNOSOM Justice Program is working to train and equip them. Promises of assistance have come from Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Italy and Egypt. The U.S. has offered \$2 million for police salaries and up to \$25 million in DOD equipment. We have also provided up to \$6 million for the judicial program.

B. Humanitarian Assistance

Approximately 300,000 urban destitute and another 700,000 displaced persons still depend entirely on international humanitarian assistance. Over 18,000 metric tons of food relief are required monthly.

In addition, there currently are over 545,000 Somali refugees abroad in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti who are dependent upon international aid and who will require some assistance as they return to their homes. These Somalis want to return home to participate, both politically and economically, in rebuilding their country once it is safe to do so. Equally important is avoiding the establishment of semi-permanent large-scale refugee camps, which are destabilizing for neighboring countries and which the international donor community can ill-afford to support.

Although the UN effort has been successful in reducing the numbers of people dependent on relief assistance, the indigenous food system that has returned remains fragile. It is dependent upon the secure supply of materials such as fertilizers and seeds as well as on access to market towns. Renewed civil war would destroy much of it quickly, returning hundreds of thousand to dependence upon relief.

There are some unqualified successes, however. This Spring, approximately 70 percent of Somali children were vaccinated, twice as many as in 1989, and basic medical assistance is now available in most villages. A year ago no schools were operating. Today 234 are open. Most importantly, mass starvation has ended. In Baidoa, for instance, 60-70 percent of the children suffered from malnutrition, many of them severely. Today, that number has dropped to 10-20 percent. The signs of progress abound, and increasingly the humanitarian challenge is shifting to rehabilitation.

The UN is taking steps to reduce Somalia's dependence on emergency foreign relief assistance. The World Bank has agreed to act as UNOSOM's agent for donor coordination and longer term planning. The World Bank is holding a donors conference on October 22.

C. The Political Mission

The UN has sponsored two conferences in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where Somali leaders came together to end the civil war and find ways to create a government peacefully. Those conferences produced agreement to a cease-fire and the cantonment under international inspection of heavy weapons. The leaders of the prominent Somali clans and factions also agreed to create

district and regional councils, building towards the creation of a Transitional National Council and leading to a Somali national government.

Although Mohammed Aideed participated in these conferences and agreements, he apparently decided that this process ruled out his opportunity to assume control of the country. Having led a faction in the civil war that tried to seize national institutions in Mogadishu, he later hired forces mainly from his own sub-clan, using money gained in trafficking the drug khat. These forces blocked international relief supplies from moving out of the Mogadishu port and airport prior to the U.S. intervention. In June, Aideed's forces broke the cease-fire and the arms cantonment agreement.

Since then, the national political reconciliation process has been stalled. Nonetheless, the creation of district and regional councils has continued. Over thirty district councils have been created and another forty are in process. The major clan and faction leaders continue to support a peaceful political reconciliation process to determine the shape of a new national government. The current diplomatic efforts of Presidents Meles and Issaias and the UN greatly increase the prospects of a peaceful political solution.

ANNEX I: KEY BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. Famine and Civil War

In mid-1992, humanitarian conditions in Somalia were horrendous. Even in normal times, Somalia's periodic droughts forced the country to rely on foreign assistance to help feed its people. The effects of the drought of the early 1990's, however, were grossly exaggerated by the outbreak of civil war between warlords fighting for control of Somalia after the fall of dictator Siad Barre. Food supplies became a weapon of war. Food stocks were destroyed, markets disrupted, and shipments hijacked. Farmers abandoned even the few productive fields, and herdsmen fled to safer areas with what remained of their livestock. The resulting famine led to over 300,000 deaths, including almost half of all Somali children, and another two million Somalis were at risk of starvation.

While relief agencies valiantly attempted to provide food and other assistance, their efforts were severely hampered by insecurity. Relief ships were rarely able to berth at the main southern ports. When they managed to dock, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were subjected to extortion by local "authorities" and humanitarian convoys were looted by the bandits that roamed the countryside.

B. The U.S. Response

On August 28, 1992, the U.S. launched a military airlift, known as Operation Provide Relief, from Mombasa, Kenya to deliver food to Somalia. Before ceasing operations in March, 1993, U.S. military aircraft had flown over 2,000 sorties, 875 cargo sorties, and 1156 aerial refuellings, carrying 28,727 metric tons (MT) of food. USG-funded civilian aircraft carried another 19,435 MT to Somalia and northern Kenya. The airlift was only an emergency measure, however, and was incapable of meeting the 60,000 MT per month needed to feed the southern Somali population. The U.S. delivered another 338,000 metric tons of relief supplies by 15 common use ships and 2 Fast Sealift Ships (FSS).

C. UNOSOM I

As the relief efforts labored against the drought and the interference of the warlords, the Security Council established the first UNOSOM mission, consisting of 50 unarmed cease-fire observers. The authorized strength was raised to 3,500 in August, although only Pakistan provided a force of 500 for the mission.

Once the Pakistani contingent arrived in Mogadishu in late September, however, they immediately came under fire from heavy caliber weapons. Having undertaken a traditional peacekeeping mission, which only allowed for the use of force in self-defense, and faced with superior numbers and firepower from the warlords controlling Mogadishu, the Pakistani commander made the decision to hunker down at the airport and not directly confront the warlords.

In the meantime, as more food became available through the airlift and NGO activity increased, relief supplies were increasingly hijacked by armed bandits and extortionist Somali "officials." By November 1992, an estimated 60-80 percent of the relief food was being looted by bandits or diverted by corrupt authorities before reaching the desperate population. Faced with the uncertain security situation, many voluntary relief organizations tried to operate from neighboring Kenya or Ethiopia, but large segments of the population were isolated from the aid. As December approached, it became clear that unless the security situation in Somalia improved, relief efforts would be wasted and deaths would continue.

D. UNITAF

UNOSOM I had failed in its mission. The Pakistanis remained held up at the airport by the forces of Aideed. After consultations with the UN, the Bush Administration volunteered to lead an international coalition into Somalia to ensure delivery of relief supplies. In December 1992, under authorization of UN Security Council Resolution 794, over 20,000 American troops were sent to Somalia.

Among its other provisions, Resolution 794 called for the Secretary General to develop a plan to ensure that a strengthened UNOSOM would be able to promote political reconciliation once UNITAF withdrew.

Upon arrival in Mogadishu, UNITAF forces quickly secured the city's port, enabling the arrival and unloading of relief ships. Under military escort, relief food and other humanitarian supplies began to move out of the Mogadishu port for distribution in the Mogadishu area and to Baidoa, Bardera, Hoddur, Wajit, Gailalassi, Belet Uen and Merca. Extensive road repair and mine clearing operations on the major distribution routes by UNITAF forces further accelerated the movement of food.

E. UNOSOM II

UN Security Council Resolution 814 of March 26, 1993, returned control of the Somalia operation on May 4, 1993, to UNOSOM II. Its mandate was to provide security, help implement the Addis Ababa agreements, assist in political reconciliation, and support relief activities. The mandate also authorized UN agencies to facilitate refugee repatriation, reestablish the police and judiciary systems, and create a demining program. Finally, UNSC Resolution 814 cited Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gave UN personnel the right to use force, if necessary, to carry out their mission. UNOSOM II forces took command of the Somalia operation on May 4, 1993. The U.S. logistics support command in Mogadishu provides management expertise for the rest of UNOSOM forces and other U.S. forces in Somalia. The U.S. is contributing support to other national contingents that they cannot presently provide for themselves. U.S. soldiers provide communications support and distribute petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), potable water, and combat rations. They are also conducting some administrative functions and performing limited medical support services, including ground and air ambulance evacuation. U.S. logistics support troops will be withdrawn as more of the support functions are turned over to civilian contractors or other national contingents, but no later than March 31, 1994.

The U.S. logistical support command (USLSC) functions under U.S. command but under the operational control of the Commander of UNOSOM II Force Command, Turkish Lt. General Cevik Bir. U.S. Major General Thomas Montgomery is the Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II Force Command and, as the senior American military officer in Somalia, is the Commander of all U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM). All American forces in Somalia remain under the command of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

Given the continuing presence of well-armed private militias that had thwarted the original, lightly-armed UN peacekeeping mission (UNOSOM I) as well as the UN's inexperience in conducting a peace enforcement operations, the President, decided to make available to the UN a Quick Reaction Force to reinforce UNOSOM's combat capabilities in emergencies as needed. The QRF was to respond to hostile threats and attacks that exceeded UNOSOM military force capabilities. As security conditions improved, and when directed by the U.S. National Command Authorities, the QRF was to move off-shore from Somalia and out of the area.

The U.S. QRF and other U.S. combat personnel in Somalia are not in the UNOSOM chain of command. They serve under the command and operational control of the USCINCENT (Commander in Chief, Central Command). Tactical control of the QRF is delegated from USCINCENT to General Montgomery, who is authorized to utilize the QRF in situations within Somalia that require emergency

employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or for show-of-force operations. Requests to use the QRF for purposes other than these narrowly-defined missions require explicit CINCCENT approval.

F. The Recent Violence

The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM appeared to be moving smoothly until June 5. Supplies were being delivered, talks among the factions had started, and progress had begun towards creating local and district councils. UNOSOM's plans were proceeding on track, and U.S. forces had drawn down from their peak of over 25,000 in January to less than 5,000, when on June 5, forces loyal to General Mohammed Aideed ambushed Pakistani peacekeepers, killing 24. This began a running conflict between UN forces and militiamen loyal to Aideed. Aideed apparently believed he could force the UN from Mogadishu, and thereby gain control of the capital and maintain a military and political edge over his rivals. Aideed's attacks seem designed to create divisions between the various national contingents, to sap UNOSOM's will to engage militarily, and to erode public support among the contributing countries.

UNSC Resolution 837 of June 6, 1993, condemned the premeditated armed attacks by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against UNOSOM II personnel on June 5, and the use of radio broadcasts to incite attacks against such personnel. The resolution also stressed the importance of restoring law and order and authorized the Secretary General, again under Chapter VII of the Charter, to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the attacks, including arrest, detention, trial and punishment. At the request of the UN, U.S. aircraft destroyed heavy weapons that the Aideed group had assembled in Mogadishu in violation of the Addis Agreement for use in further attacks against the UN.

Forces loyal to Aideed escalated their campaign against the UN using command-detonated mines, sniper fire and mortar attacks. Because his forces control much of south Mogadishu, through which most supplies and traffic must pass from the port, his attacks on the UN have appeared to greatly magnify his presence. Yet, due to the importance of the roads in that area, the continuing toll on UN peacekeepers, and the growing frequency and audacity of the assaults, Aideed's attacks could not be ignored. Aideed mixed his fighters among women and children to inhibit the response of the peacekeepers, and added women as combatants to his forces.

At the request of the UN, the U.S. sent Rangers to Mogadishu to help apprehend those responsible for the attacks on peacekeepers. The Rangers mounted several raids in August and September, netting arms caches and several leaders of the forces hostile to the UN.

G. Progress and Setbacks

o Making a Large UN Force Work: While there have been many serious problems for UNOSOM in Mogadishu, its successes throughout Somalia have been both impressive and substantial. There have been command and control difficulties within UNOSOM that have hampered its effectiveness, but it should be recalled that UNOSOM II is the first UN peace enforcement operation where the international community sought to impose an end to fighting on recalcitrant parties. The difficulties have stemmed from several sources.

The novelty of learning together under a new system has resulted in significant mis-steps. Except for the members of NATO, the world's militaries have little experience in working within large multilateral organizations. While the UN is working to correct the problems of coordination, there will continue to be difficulties due to language, different procedures and incompatible equipment.

More problematic has been the fact that some countries have arrived in Somalia with clearly differing perspectives on what would be required of them. Some contingents view UNOSOM as an extension of traditional peacekeeping operations, where the peacekeepers take great pains to avoid using force or appearing to take sides in the conflict. Other contingents have little real combat experience and are reluctant to take on the warlords, even when ordered to do so. Still others recognize more clearly that UNOSOM is a unique experiment that requires the skills of both traditional peacekeeping and the more robust efforts of peace enforcement. Closer consultations between the UN and the troop contributing countries before they arrive and continuing close consultations both in the field and in New York are necessary to overcome these differences. Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan has instituted periodic meetings of troop contributing countries in New York; the U.S. has encouraged him to make these more frequent and more consultative.

Nations also arrived with differing opinions of how their forces will relate both to the UN Force Commander and their national capitals. In some cases, this has meant referring almost all orders to capitals for agreement, which has caused delays and, in some cases, mutual recrimination. Kofi Annan's consultations in New York with representatives of troop contributing countries are aimed in large part at clarifying these positions.

UNOSOM II has suffered as well from public relations difficulties. The UN and U.S. response to the assaults on UN peacekeepers by forces loyal to Aideed have made it appear that all of UNOSOM's efforts are focused solely on a vendetta against one warlord. This has ignored the UN's progress outside of

Mogadishu on political institution-building and rehabilitation. Moreover, the press and others have portrayed UNOSOM as an American, rather than UN, operation. The larger story of the end of starvation and the beginnings of political reconciliation has largely been lost. UNOSOM, and the UN in general, need to do a better job of communicating developments to the people of Somalia and to the world at large.

o UNOSOM-Political Operations: Despite the problems of UNOSOM, progress is being made in areas outside of Mogadishu that have traditionally been controlled by Somali warlords. Of Somalia's 84 districts, 30 now have working district councils. More will be established shortly. These councils are broad based organizations that will oversee the reconciliation process in their areas and, eventually, take on full responsibility for local administration. In addition, peace talks have been successfully concluded under UNOSOM sponsorship in Kismayu, where two factions had engaged in heavy combat last spring.

The Addis Ababa peace accord remains the basis for ensuring political reconciliation and the eventual restoration of the Somali government. However, attacks on UN peacekeepers and the need to respond to these attacks have complicated efforts to form the "Transitional National Council" called for in the Addis Ababa agreement.

o UNOSOM-Political/Judiciary Program: The UN Secretary General's August 17 report on Somalia requests \$45 million to fund the initial costs of reestablishing a Somali justice system comprising police, judicial and prison components. In response to the urgent need, the U.S. will provide a \$6 million grant to UNOSOM which will cover all initial costs of reestablishing the judicial system, including: salaries of judges and other personnel of the various courts, the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General; rehabilitation of facilities, provision of vehicles, supplies and equipment; and support for UNOSOM personnel. As called for in UNSC Resolution 814, these are voluntary contributions and not part of the UNOSOM II assessment.

As many as 5,000 Somali police have assumed local security roles now covered by the UN, but they need equipment and training, which UNOSOM will provide. To support the police component, the President after consulting with Congress directed on September 30, a drawdown of up to \$25 million in DoD commodities and services for the UN for these purposes. The drawdown could include vehicles, vehicle maintenance packages (using non-U.S. personnel), radios, uniforms and weapons. While this will respond to some of the equipment requirements of the police component, the President also authorized provision of an additional \$2 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to help cover police personnel costs.

Beyond the direct benefit to the UN effort that will come from this package of assistance, the U.S. commitment will provide leverage for the UN, with U.S. diplomatic support, to induce other donor countries to contribute to the UN plan.

In a continuing effort, a UN working group has commitments from a number of nations to donate money, equipment and trainers to set up Somalia's police force, including Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have also expressed interest in assisting.

o UNOSOM-Relief/Operations: Humanitarian efforts in Mogadishu have been severely hampered by the violence in the capital. To assist the displaced population of Mogadishu, CARE continues to provide dry food rations thrice weekly through 23 distribution centers, reaching almost 300,000 people. Outside of Mogadishu, humanitarian conditions have improved, and the UN reported recently that 42,000 fewer MT of food are now needed to support humanitarian programs than was required at the height of the famine.

More than 200,000 refugees have been registered by UNHCR for voluntary repatriation. It is estimated that some 50,000 refugees have spontaneously returned during the last few months and UNHCR has directly assisted some 15,000 refugees with organized transport by land and air. UNHCR also is assisting displaced persons in Kismayu and Bardera to return to their homes. They report that 2,624 families from Mogadishu and Kismayu have returned to 35 villages surveyed in Lower Juba.

The gradual reduction of feeding programs all over southern Somalia will have to take into account the reality, however, that certain groups in Somalia continue to be blocked access to food and relief supplies due to inter-clan rivalries. Vulnerable groups, particularly displaced persons, women and children under five, continue to exist in significant pockets of suffering. In Kismayu, for instance, the UN halted food distribution programs in displaced camps to encourage the displaced persons to return home, but when they did not move out of the camps, malnutrition resurfaced. In Bardera, a poor harvest in September forced many displaced who had gone home to return to the city only to find that food distributions had stopped. The population of a relief camp there recently grew from 2,000 to 9,000. While the UN and NGOs moved quickly to respond to both these situations when they

arose, these examples serve to illustrate that humanitarian progress made in Somalia remains fragile and dependent upon a secure environment.

ANNEX II:

LOCATION AND FUNCTIONS OF U.S. FORCES IN SOMALIA
(AS OF OCTOBER 11, 1993)

Quick Reaction Force (QRF)

As of October 9, the QRF consisted of 1,358 personnel, including:

- a brigade level headquarters unit of the 10th Mountain Division;
- a helicopter task force of 48 aircraft;
- a battalion of the 10th Mountain Division, with an engineering platoon, a military police platoon, a psychological operations team, a civil affairs team, a truck section, a bulldozer team and a Special Forces team, and;
- the 46th Forward Support Battalion with a platoon of MP's;
- a mechanized infantry team of 14 Bradley fighting vehicles and 4 tanks.

Rangers

A Ranger Task Force of approximately 950 personnel supporting U.S. forces in Somalia.

47 U.S. military personnel currently serve in UNOSOM II force command staff.

507th Corps Support Group (CSG)

Headquarters: University Compound, Mogadishu
Personnel: Officers: 33, Enlisted: 224.
Military
Specialties: Command and control/management functions

561st Corps Support Battalion

Headquarters: Hunter Base, Mogadishu
Personnel: Officers: 13, Enlisted: 41.
Military
Specialties: Command and control/management functions, materiel management, transportation management

102nd Quartermaster Company (POL)

Mission: Provides receipt, issue, and storage of petroleum for U.S. and UNOSOM Forces in Theater. The company maintains the bag farm and the Inland Petroleum Distribution System, which transfers fuel from docked ships to the bag farm.

Location: Airfield

Customers supported: U.S. and UNOSOM Forces.

- (a) Mogadishu: JP-5 capacity is 2,620,000 gal./MOGAS capacity is 300,000 gal.
- (b) Baledogle (Morocco): JP-5 capacity is 40,000 /MOGAS capacity is 20,000 gal.
- (c) Baïdoa (France): JP-5 capacity is 120,000
- (d) Bardera (Botswana): JP-5 capacity is 40,000/MOGAS is 20,000 gal.
- (e) Belet Uen (Germany): JP-5 capacity is 100,000/MOGAS is 20,000 gal.
- (f) Waajid (Zimbabwe): JP-5 capacity is 76,000/MOGAS is 26,000 gal.
- (g) Balcad (Korea): JP-5 capacity is 34,000 gal.
- (h) Totals

JPS:	3,030,000
MOGAS	412,000

Personnel: Officers: 6, Enlisted: 119

Military Specialties: Petroleum Specialist, Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic, QM Shipment Repairman

594th Transportation Company

Mission: Provides light transportation support for messengers and general cargo for both local and line haul missions.

Equipment: 48 ea. H923 (5T TRK, CGO), 10 ea. M931A2, 17 ea. M871 (30ft. trl.)

Location: Hunter Base (as of 30 Aug 93)

Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces.

Personnel: Officers: 5, Warrent Officers: 1, Enlisted: 120

Military Specialties: Truck Drive, Heavy Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic

196th Quartermaster Detachment (Water Purification Section)

Mission: Provides purification, issue, storage, distribution of bulk water for U.S. and UNOSOM Forces. Operates and maintains a tactical water distribution system (TWDS).

Location: Airfield.

Customers supported: The unit is operating five production sites (see below), producing potable and non-potable water with the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification system (ROWPO). Bulk water is delivered to Baledogle, Baidoa, Bardera, and Belet Uen.

(a) Mogadishu:

1. Airfield (capacity): 80K.
 2. Embassy (capacity): 40K.
 3. New Port (capacity): 210k.
 4. Reservoir (capacity): 260k.
 5. University (capacity): 40k.
- Total: 630k

- (b) Baledogle, Morocco (capacity): 76k.
- (c) Baidoa, France (capacity): 60k.
- (d) Bardera, Botswana (capacity): 56k.
- (e) Belet Uen, Germany (capacity): 70k.

Personnel: Officers: 22, Enlisted: 40.

Military

Specialties: Water Purification Specialist, OM Equipment Repairman, Preventive Medicine Specialist

79th Quartermaster Company

Mission: Provides graves registration and Theater Mortuary Evacuation Point (TMFP) services for U.S. Forces.

Location: Airfield.

Customers supported: U.S. Forces in Theater are supported. While the Terms of Reference (TOR) identify the processing of remains as a national responsibility, to include Somalis' remains incident to hostile action with UNOSOM II Forces, the TMEP has processed most of the remains in Theater.

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 16.

Military

Specialties: Mortuary Affairs Specialist

40th Transportation Company

Mission: Provides transportation for bulk water and fuel for local and line haul missions.
 Equipment: 60 ea 2A2 (Trac.), 20 ea. M967 (5K fuel tankers). and 40 ea. M1098 (water tankers)
 Location: Hunter Base.
 Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
 Personnel: Officers: 5, Enlisted: 120
 Military
 Specialties: Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic, Supply Specialist, Truck Driver

POL LAB (managed by the 561st CSB/individual augmentees)

Mission: Test fuel samples to ensure quality
 Location: Hunter Base
 Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
 Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 4
 Military
 Specialties: Petroleum Lab Specialist

568th/362nd Construction Support Equipment (CSE) Company

Mission: Primarily responsible for MSR maintenance repair
 Location: Hunter Base
 Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces
 Personnel: Officers: 6, Enlisted: 195
 Military
 Specialties: Heavy construction Equipment Operations, Heavy Construction Shipment Mechanic, Truck Driver

TF 24/10th Terminal Battalion

Headquarters: New Port, Mogadishu

567th Transportation Company

Mission: Provides terminal service support for Mogadishu New Port. The service includes the discharging and handling of cargo from ships at dock.

Equipment: Crane and MHE capability (includes RTCH capability)

Location: New Port

Customers supported: All U.S. Forces are supported. The unit has provided limited support to UNOSOM forces and NGOs when available.

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 75

Military

Specialties: Port (terminal) Operations Specialists

551st Cargo Transfer Company

Mission: Provides ADACG support for passengers and cargo on all U.S. incoming and outgoing flights.

Equipment: MHE capability

Location: Airfield International Terminal

Customers supported: All U.S. Forces are supported. (UNOSOM Forces' services are handled by UNOSOM at the north ramp.)

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 38

Military

Specialties: Warehouse Specialist

13th Corps Support Battalion

Headquarters: Sword Base. The Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP) laboratory and the Logistics Assistance Office (LAO) are at this location.

Personnel: Officers: 15, Enlisted: 31

Military

Specialties: Command and control/management function, Automated Supply Specialist, Supply Specialist

227th Quartermaster Company

Mission: Provides direct support of Class I rations to all U.S. Forces. Receives, stores, and issues perishable rations to all U.S. Forces.

Location: Sword Base

Customers supported: U.S. Forces (5,167 personnel)

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 79
 Military
 Specialties: Class I Warehouse Specialist

598th Maintenance Company

Mission: Provides Direct Support and back-up unit level maintenance support for U.S. forces under UNOSOM II. Provides class IX management and support for U.S. Forces

Location: Sword Base

Customers supported: All U.S. Forces in Theater supported. While the TOR does not require it, the unit has provided repair, repair technical assistance, and class IX technical assistance to UNOSOM forces.

Personnel: Officers: 5, Enlisted: 176

Military

Specialties: Wheeled Vehicle Repairman, Track Vehicle Repairman, Power Operation Repairman

533rd Transportation Company

Mission: Provides general cargo transportation for local and line haul missions

Equipment: 50ea. M915A1, 80 ea. M872 (40 ft. trl.)

Location: Sword Base (as of 30 Aug 93.)

Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces

Personnel: Officers: 4, Warrant Officers: 1, Enlisted: 116

Military

Specialties: Petroleum Specialist

57th EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) Detachment

Mission: Provides explosive ordnance disposal and demolition for U.S. and UNOSOM Forces in Theater

Location: University Compound

Customers supported: U.S. and UNOSOM Forces

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 11

Military

Specialties: EOD Specialist

406th Quartermaster Company

Mission: Provides direct support of class I semi-perishable rations, packaged rations, and bottled water to U.S. Forces. It also provides packaged rations and bottled water to UNOSOM Forces. The unit receives, stores, and issues to all UNOSOM Forces that are not self-supporting.

Location: Sword Base.

Customers

supported: U.S. and UNOSOM Forces (3,730 personnel)

The following UNOSOM Forces are supported outside Mogadishu:
(The class I manager maintains a current status of the UNOSOM Forces supported for rations and bottled water.)

<u>Site Supported</u>	<u>UNOSOM Force</u>	<u>Item</u>
Baledogle	Moroccans	Bottled Water
Baidoa	French	Bottled Water
Bardera	Botswanans	Rations/Bottle Water
Belet Uen	Germans	Bottled Water
"	Nigerians	Rations/Bottle Water
Waaqid	Zimbabwe	Rations/Bottle Water

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 46

Military

Specialties: Ration Storage Specialist

508th Ordnance Company, Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)

Mission: Operate an ammunition supply facility (CSA/TSA) for receiving, storing, re-warehousing, combat configuration, and issuing conventional ammunition.

Location: Airfield

Customers

Supported: All U.S. Forces

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 45

Military

Specialties: Ammunition Supply Specialist

Task Force II, Signal

Mission: Provide all switching/relaying and communication equipment for areas away from Mogadishu. 507th provides all communication and equipment for the Mogadishu area.

Location: University Compound (Headquarters). Note sites are operated throughout the Theater.

Customers supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces

Personnel: Officers: 13, Enlisted: 185

Military Specialties: Communication Specialist

18th AG Detachment

Mission: to provide direct postal services to include receipt, distribution, sorting, routing and dispatch, and directory assistance.

Capabilities: Processing and handling 35,000 lbs daily

Location: University Compound/Airfield.

Customers Supported: All U.S. Forces in Theater

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 15

Military Specialties: Admin Specialist

546th Personnel Service Company (PSC)

Mission: Provide personnel and finance support to include record updates, check cashing, casual payments, claims, travel and contract payments.

Location: University Compound

Customers supported: All U.S. Forces in Theater

Personnel: Officers: 2; Enlisted: 6

Military Specialties: Admin Specialist

13th PAO (Public Affairs Office)

Mission: To provide public affairs support to all U.S. Forces in Theater; specifically, a command information program and media relations support.

Location: University Compound

Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 3

Military
Specialties: Photojournalist, Broadcaster

Army Materiel Command (AMC)

Mission: Provide assistance in all areas of logistics. Can perform DS/GS maintenance on the majority of U.S. Force equipment in Theater.
Location: Sword Base
Customers
Supported: All U.S. and UNOSOM Forces in Theater in accordance with the Terms of Reference.
Personnel: 10 GS 12/13, Supply and Maintenance Technicians

Medical Support by the Combat Support Hospital Requirements of the Subordinate Supporting Units

46th Combat Support Hospital (CSH)

Location: The headquarters is at the Embassy Compound.
Personnel: Officers: 42, WO 1, Enlisted: 127
Military
Specialties: Doctors, various specialties; nurses, various specialties; other health care providers; administrators

82nd Medical Company (Air Ambulance)

Mission: Provide medical evacuation for U.S. Forces with six UH-60 helicopters.
Location: Airfield, international airport
Personnel: Officers: 4, Warrent Officers: 10, Enlisted: 29

528th Combat Stress Psychologist (CSC)/Individual Augmentees

Mission: Provide treatment/counselling for U.S. Forces suffering from combat stress related-illnesses
Location: Embassy compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 1

32nd Medical Logistics

Mission: Provide Medical Task Force 46 with all necessary
Class VIII Medical Supplies for all U.S. Forces.
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 9

248th Medical Detachment (Vet)/Individual Augmentees

Mission: Inspect food items and living conditions for U.S.
Forces
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 2

261st ASMS

Mission: Conduct sickcalls and provide ambulance drivers for
all U.S. personnel
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 4, Enlisted: 34

926th Medical Detachment

Mission: Operate vehicle mounted insect spraying unit
Location: Embassy Compound
Personnel: Officers: 1, Enlisted: 3

Military Specialties for all subordinate CSH Units:

Officer Specialties:

Air Ambulance Pilots
Ground Ambulance Administrators
Preventive Medicine Physician
Environmental Medicine Physician
Environmental Science Officer
Social Worker
Veterinarian

Enlisted MOSS

Practical Nurses
Medical Specialist

Operating Room Specialist
Respiratory Specialist
Pharmacy Specialist
X-Ray Specialist
Biological Medical Specialist
Medical Technician (Air Ambulance)
Medical Technician (Ground Ambulance)
Veterinary Technician
Behavior Science Specialist
Preventive Medicine Specialist

Other support MOSs: Patient Administration; food service, communications, medical supply, vehicle maintenance, laundry and bath, administration, etc.

Deploying Augmentation Forces
(as of 8 October 1993)

- an additional light infantry battalion
- an armor battalion task force
- 4 AC-130H gunships
- two Marine Expeditionary Units
- a carrier strike force
- a self-propelled artillery battery
- 9 additional helicopters
- special operations personnel, including PSYOPs, civil affairs and others
- a heavy combat engineer battalion

ANNEX III

UNITAF FORCE CONTRIBUTORS
(as of March 23, 1993)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>	<u>Type of Forces</u>	<u>Location</u>
Australia*	931	Infantry	Baidoa
Belgium	761	Air Inf	Kismayu
Botswana	206	Infantry	Mogadishu
Canada**	1164	Mech Inf	Belet Uen
Egypt	235	Mech Inf	Mogadishu
France	1578	Mech Inf	Oddur
Greece	110	Med/Log	Mogadishu
India***	5	Advance	Mogadishu
Italy	2558	Air Inf	Gialalasi
Kuwait	138	Infantry	Mogadishu
Morocco	126	Mech Inf	Baledogle
New Zealand	67	Air Trans	Mogadishu
Nigeria	565	Recon	Mogadishu
Pakistan	880	Infantry	Mogadishu
Saudi Arabia	680	Infantry	Mogadishu
Sweden	180	Medical	Mogadishu
Tunisia	133	Infantry	Mogadishu
Turkey	300	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.A.E.	640	Infantry	Mogadishu
Zimbabwe	160	Infantry	Mogadishu

Total Non-U.S. 12,555

On January 19, U.S. troop strength hit its peak at 25,074.

* Australia withdrew its infantry battalion at the conclusion of UNITAF, leaving in place a traffic control unit.

** Canada withdrew its infantry contingent at the end of UNITAF.

*** Indian forces did not arrive in time to take part in UNITAF.

ANNEX IV

UNOSOM FORCE CONTRIBUTORS
(as of October 6, 1993)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>	<u>Type of Forces</u>	<u>Location</u>
Australia	30	Log Staff	Mogadishu
Bangladesh	948	Inf/Sig	Mogadishu
Belgium	952	Infantry	Kismayu
Botswana	247	Infantry	Bardera
Canada	4	Staff	Mogadishu
Egypt	539	Infantry	Mogadishu
France	1117	Infantry	Oddur
Germany	1727	Eng/Log	Belet Uen
Greece	110	Med/Log	Wajid
India	3606	Inf/Log	Belet Uen
Ireland	80	Trans	Mogadishu
Italy	2663	Infantry	Gialalasi
Korea	250	Infantry	Mogadishu
Kuwait	138	Infantry	Mogadishu
Malaysia	870	Inf/MP	Mogadishu
Morocco	950	Infantry	Baledogle
New Zealand	43	Air Trans	Mogadishu
Nigeria	614	Infantry	Belet Uen
Norway	130	HQ staff	Mogadishu
Pakistan	5003	Infantry	Mogadishu
Romania	236	Fld Hosp	Mogadishu
Saudi Arabia	678	Infantry	Mogadishu
South Korea	252	Engineer	Mogadishu
Sweden	148	Medical	Mogadishu
Tunisia	142	Infantry	Mogadishu
Turkey	320	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.A.E.	663	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.S.A.	2781	Log	Mogadishu
<u>Zimbabwe</u>	<u>894</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Baidoa</u>
Force HQ	297		
Prvt Mrshl	143		
SSG	<u>63</u>		
Subtotal	26,645		
U.S. QRF	1,358		
U.S. Rangers	<u>600</u>		
Total	28,603		

Expected additional arrivals

India	2820	Inf/Log	Belet Uen
Nepal	320	Inf/MP	Mogadishu
Tunisia	463	Infantry	Mogadishu
Uganda	300	Infantry	Mogadishu
Zambia	570	Infantry	?
Egypt	1500	Medic Infantry	Mogadishu
Pakistan	1500	Medic Infantry	Mogadishu

ANNEX V

U.S. AND UNOSOM FATALITIESUNOSOM II FATALITIES STATUS
COUNTRY-WIDE STATISTICS

(As of October 11)

<u>Country</u>	<u>KIA</u>
France	1
Italy	6
Morocco	7
Nigeria	7
Pakistan	34
Turkey	1
USA	25
Malaysia	1
Total	82

** UNITAF KIA included four Americans and four coalition partner soldiers killed in action.

ANNEX VI: REMARKS OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON
ON U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA OCTOBER 7, 1993

Today I want to talk with you about our nation's military involvement in Somalia.

A year ago, we watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands -- dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country.

This past weekend, we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot -- all of these soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people themselves.

These tragic events raise hard questions about our effort in Somalia. Why are we still there? What are we trying to accomplish? How did a humanitarian mission turn violent? And when will our people come home? These questions deserve straight answers.

Let's start by remembering why our troops went into Somalia in the first place. We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time. A third of a million people had died of starvation and disease. Twice that many more were at risk of dying. Meanwhile, tons of relief supplies piled up in the capital of Mogadishu because a small number of Somalis stopped food from reaching their own countrymen.

Our consciences said: enough. In our country's best tradition, we took action with bi-partisan support. President Bush sent in 28,000 American troops as part of a United Nations humanitarian mission. Our troops created a secure environment so food and medicine could get through. We saved close to one million lives. And throughout most of Somalia -- everywhere but in Mogadishu -- life began returning to normal. Crops are growing. Markets are reopening. So are schools and hospitals. Nearly a million Somalis still depend completely on relief supplies, but at least the starvation is gone. And none of this would have happened without American leadership and America's troops.

Until June, things went well with little violence. The United States reduced our troop presence from 28,000 down to less than 5,000, with other nations picking up where we left off.

But then in June, the people who caused much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani and other troops who were there just to keep the peace. Rather than participate in building the peace with others, these people

sought to fight and to disrupt, even if it means returning Somalia to anarchy and famine. And make no mistake about it: if we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The relief effort would stop. And starvation would soon return. That knowledge has led us to continue our mission.

It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society, or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help. But we -- we in the United States -- must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance.

We started this for the right reasons. And we're going to finish it in the right way.

In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We have nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave now, those embers will reignite into flames and people will die again. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place.

We also have to recognize that we cannot leave now and still have all our troops present and accounted for. And I want you to know that I am determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or held captive. Anyone holding an American right now should understand, above all else, that we will hold them strictly responsible for our soldiers' well-being. We expect them to be well-treated. And we expect them to be released.

So now we face a choice. Do we leave when the job gets tough or when the job is well done? Do we invite a return of mass suffering, or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a decent chance to survive?

Recently, General Colin Powell said this about our choices in Somalia: "because things get difficult, you don't cut and run. You work the problem and try to find a correct solution."

I want to bring our troops home from Somalia. Before the events of this week, we already had reduced the number of our troops there from 28,000 to less than 5,000. We must complete that withdrawal soon -- and I will. But we also must leave on our terms. We must do it right. And here is what I intend to do.

The past week's events make it clear that, even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there. We need more armor, more air power, to ensure our people are safe and that we can do our job. Today, I have ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and complete our mission. I also have ordered an aircraft carrier and two amphibious groups with 3,600 combat Marines to be stationed offshore. These forces will be under American command.

Their mission -- what I am asking these young Americans to do -- is the following.

First, they are there to protect our troops and our bases. We did not go to Somalia with a military purpose. But those who attack our soldiers will pay a very heavy price.

Second, they are there to keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communication that are essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely through the country, so that starvation and anarchy do not return.

Third, they are there to keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people -- not to personalize the conflict, but to prevent a return to anarchy.

Fourth, through their pressure and their presence, our troops will help make it possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so they can solve their problems and survive when we leave.

That is our mission.

I am proposing this plan because it will let us finish leaving Somalia on our own terms and without destroying all that two Administrations have accomplished there.

For, if we were to leave today, we know what would happen. Within months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets. Our credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world.

And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.

That is why I am committed to getting our job done in Somalia not only quickly but also effectively. To do that, I am taking steps to ensure troops from other nations are ready to take the place of our soldiers. We have already withdrawn some 20,000 U.S. troops, and more than that number have replaced them from over two dozen other nations. Now we will intensify efforts to have other countries deploy more troops to Somalia to assure that security will remain when we are gone. And we will complete the replacement of U.S. military logistics personnel with civilian contractors who can provide the same support to the UN.

While we are taking military steps to protect our own people and help the UN maintain a secure environment, we must pursue new diplomatic efforts to help the Somalis find a political solution to their problems. That is the only kind of outcome that can endure. For, fundamentally, the solution to Somalia's problems is not a military one. It is political. Leaders of neighboring African states such as Ethiopia and Eritrea have offered to take the lead, in efforts to build a settlement among the Somali

people that can preserve order and security. I have directed my representatives to pursue such efforts vigorously. And I have asked Ambassador Bob Oakley, who served effectively in two Administrations as U.S. representative in Somalia, to travel to the region immediately to advance this process.

Obviously, even then, there is no guarantee Somalia will rid itself of violence or suffering. But we will have given Somalia a reasonable chance. This week some 15,000 Somalis took to the streets to express sympathy for our losses and to thank us for our effort. Most Somalis are not hostile to us, but grateful, and they want to use this opportunity to rebuild their country.

It is my judgment and that of my military advisors that we may need up to six months to complete these steps and conduct an orderly withdrawal. We will do what we can do to complete the mission before then. All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31th, except for a few hundred support personnel in non-combat roles.

If we take these steps, if we take the time to do the job right, I am convinced we will have lived up to the responsibilities of American leadership in the world, and we will have proven that we are committed to addressing the new problems of a new era.

When our troops in Somalia came under fire this last weekend, we witnessed a dramatic example of the heroic ethic of the American military. When the first Black Hawk helicopter was downed this weekend, the other American troops didn't retreat, although they could have. Some ninety of them formed a perimeter around the helicopter, and they held that ground under intensely heavy fire. They stayed with their comrades. That is the kind of soldiers they are. That is the kind of people we are.

So let us finish the work we set out to do. And let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right.

Let me express my thanks and my gratitude and my profound sympathy to the families of the young Americans who were killed in Somalia. My message to you is, your country is grateful, and so is the rest of the world, and so are the vast majority of the Somali people. Our mission from this day forward is to increase our strength, do our job, bring our soldiers out, and bring them home. Thank you, and God bless America.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 12, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *MR*
FROM: SEAN J. DARRAGH *SJD*
SUBJECT: Report to the Congress on Somalia

Attached is a memorandum to the President requesting that he sign the enclosed cover letter. The cover letter will accompany each copy of the Report to Congress. Each member of Congress will receive a copy of the report.

Concurrences by: Jennifer ~~Ward~~ *JE*, Susan Rice

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I requesting that he sign the enclosed cover letter of the Report to Congress on Somalia.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab II Cover Letter of the Report to Congress on Somalia