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Folder Title:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994) [loose] [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Clarke, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

2986

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49	3	10	2	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Deputies Committee: Somalia Review Discussion Paper (5 pages)	01/20/1993	P1/b(1)
002. map	Status of Forces Ground/Air (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003. list	Planning Assumptions for US Military Presence in Somalia (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger, re: Report of Somalia Core Group of January 23, 1993 (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. paper	[Duplicate of 001] (5 pages)	01/20/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. map	[Duplicate of 002] (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005c. list	[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Somalia Policy: Near-Term Decisions (6 pages)	01/26/1993	P1/b(1)
007. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Decisions on Somalia (3 pages)	01/28/1993	P1/b(1)
008. memo	Richard Clarke to the Deputies Committee's Somalia Core Group, re: Summary and Conclusions of February 4, 1993 Meeting (2 pages)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1)
009. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, re: Lake/Christopher/Aspin Lunch: The US, The UN, and Somalia (1 page)	02/09/1993	P1/b(1)
010. memo	Samuel Berger and Anthony Lake to the President, re: Somalia Status Report (1 page)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F
ke4185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20072

January 20, 1993

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

By KDE NARA, Date 6/12/17
2012-0659-F

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting on Somalia, Saturday, January 23, 1993 at 10:00 a.m. in the White House Situation Room.

Tony Lake has reviewed the discussion paper (Tab B), which he asked me to prepare for a January 23 Deputies Committee on Somalia. If you approve, it would be circulated with the meeting notice (Tab I) and Agenda (Tab A).

Decision Track: What I discussed with Tony and is reflected in the discussion paper is a two-step plan for decisions on Somalia. Near-term decisions would be made at the DC meeting, to the extent that there was a consensus. (The vehicle for recording such decisions would be the Summary and Conclusions of the DC, which would be sent to Principals). Mid/long-term issues would be reviewed in a PRD, which the DC would launch.

PRD: We should circulate the PRD tasker after the DC meeting, so that we can incorporate the discussion from that meeting, but I recommend that we not coordinate the text of the PRD tasker with the agencies.

Core Group: Beneath the level of the DC, Somalia policy has been coordinated by the Somalia Core Group chaired by NSC. To preserve some continuity (especially at a time when Assistant Secretaries are not in place), I urge you to continue the Core Group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Neil O'Leary to forward the transmittal memo at Tab I to agency counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON D C 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (S)

Attached is the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on
Somalia, scheduled for Saturday, January 23, 1993, at 10:00 a.m.,
in the White House Situation Room. Attendance is limited to
principal plus one. (S)

Cornelius F. O'Leary
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 01/23/17

2012-0639-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: January 23, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.

SOMALIA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Sandy Berger
- II. Situation Report William Studeman
- III. Operational Report David Jeremiah
- IV. Diplomatic Update Peter Tarnoff
- V. Near-Term Decisions
 - Basic Policy Goals
 - Transition to UNOSOM
 - Security Council Resolution
 - Strengthening the UN
 - U.S. Military Contribution
 - Funding
- VI. Mid- to Long-Term Decisions (Presidential Review Directive)
 - Reconciliation Process and U.S. Role
 - Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
- VII. Summary Sandy Berger

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VOE NARA, Date 01/25/17

2012-6659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F
ke4185

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Major International Force Contributions in Somalia

<u>Nation</u>	<u>UNITAF</u>	<u>UNOSOM II (Estimates)</u>
Italy	2,500	3,900
France	2,600	Unknown
Egypt	245	750
Canada	1300	Unknown
Belgium	580	580
Pakistan	565 (500-UNOSOM)	4,000
India	7	4,000
Morocco	1,300	Unknown
Jordan	900	900
Australia	860	900
Nigeria	270	550
Botswana	330	330
Zimbabwe	150	150
Saudi Arabia	650	650
Turkey	300	500
Germany	50	1500 (logistics)
Indonesia		900
Kuwait	150	
Sweden	150	
Tunisia	130	
UK	90	
New Zealand	60	
Total UNITAF:	12,000	Total UNOSOM: 18,000
(plus 24,000 U.S.)		(plus several thousand US)

Considering: Argentina (750), Greece (350)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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002. map	Status of Forces Ground/Air (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO USLO MOGADISHU 0347-0348 IMMEDIATE
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TFSO01: DRAFT TEXT OF NEW UNSC SOMALIA
RESOLUTION

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 007788

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TEXT)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, EAID, UNSC, SO

SUBJECT: TFSO01: DRAFT TEXT OF NEW UNSC SOMALIA
RESOLUTION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DRAFT TEXT OF FOLLOW-ON SOMALIA RESOLUTION PROVIDED BELOW SHOULD BE VIEWED AND DISCUSSED IN CONJUNCTION WITH TALKING POINTS PROVIDED SEPTEL.
3. ACTION REQUEST: USUN SHOULD CIRCULATE THIS DRAFT TEXT, PARALLEL TO INSTRUCTIONS SEPTEL, INITIALLY TO PERM-5 MEMBERS AND JAPAN. FOLLOWING THESE INITIAL CONSULTATIONS, PERMREP MAY CONSULT MORE BROADLY IN THE COUNCIL ONCE A CONSENSUS APPEARS LIKELY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PERM-5 PLUS JAPAN. EMBASSIES IN PERM-5 COUNTRIES, TOKYO, AND ALL UNITAF COUNTRIES ON THE COUNCIL SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVELS OF THE CONSULTATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN NEW YORK.
4. BEGIN DRAFT TEXT:
--DRAFT RESOLUTION ON EXPANSION OF UNOSOM
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 794 (1992) OF 3 DECEMBER 1992
775 (1992) OF 28 AUGUST 1992, 767 (1992) OF 27 JULY 1992,
751 (1992) OF 24 APRIL 1992, 746 (1992) OF 17 MARCH 1992,
AND 733 (1992) OF 23 JANUARY 1992,
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF MEMBER STATES ACTING PURSUANT TO
RESOLUTION 794 (1992) TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT
FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA,
ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED FOR A PROMPT TRANSITION FROM THE
UNIFIED TASK FORCE TO UNOSOM,
NOTING WITH DEEP REGRET AND CONCERN THE CONTINUING REPORTS
OF WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND THE GENERAL ABSENCE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOMALIA,

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By YDE NARA, Date 01/25/17
2012-0659-F

DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA BEAR ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY, CONSIDERING THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN SOMALIA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS, RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND THE REHABILITATION OF SOMALIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, STRESSING THE DESIRE TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA TO PARTICIPATE IN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT, ENCOURAGING THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR WORK AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN REHABILITATING THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, WELCOMING THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE UN-SPONSORED PREPARATORY CONFERENCE ON SOMALI POLITICAL RECONCILIATION HELD IN ADDIS ABABA JANUARY 4-5, 1993. NOTING THE REPORT OF STATES CONCERNED OF 17 DECEMBER 1992 (S/24976) AND OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 19 DECEMBER 1992 (S/24992) ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 794 AND THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT SO AS TO ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISION FOR A PROMPT TRANSITION FROM THE UNIFIED TASK FORCE UNOSOM,

1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/24992);
2. URGES THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO WORK TOWARD THE DISBANDING OF ALL PARAMILITARY AND IRREGULAR FORCES IN SOMALIA;
3. DECIDES TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF UNOSOM AND ITS MANDATE TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS TAKING ALL APPROPRIATE ACTIONS AGAINST ELEMENTS THREATENING THAT SECURE ENVIRONMENT, AND TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOMALIA;
4. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND, THROUGH HIM, THE UNOSOM COMMANDER, TO TAKE ALL ACTIONS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THIS MANDATE;
5. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DIRECT THE COMMANDER UNOSOM, UPON A DETERMINATION BY THE COMMANDER OF UNITAF SUBMITTED BY THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED THAT A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN A PART OF SOMALIA, TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURED SECTORS AS PART OF A PHASED TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM;
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE SOMALI PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION;
7. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THROUGH HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR SOMALIA AND WITH ASSISTANCE, AS APPROPRIATE FROM UNOSOM AND ALL APPROPRIATE UN OFFICES AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES;

A) TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIGENOUS POLICE FOR

- TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND LAW AND ORDER IN SOMALIA;
- B) TO PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN SOMALIA;
- C) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE REHABILITATION OF THEIR ECONOMY;
- D) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS; AND
- E) TO RECEIVE, COLLECT AND PRESERVE INFORMATION RELATING TO SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SOMALIA;
8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN 15 DAYS CONTAINING HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXPANSION OF UNOSOM AND FURTHER REPORTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION;
9. REQUESTS UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, MEMBER STATES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXTEND, IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, FINANCIAL, MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA;
10. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

KANTER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003. list	Planning Assumptions for US Military Presence in Somalia (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

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004. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger, re: Report of Somalia Core Group of January 23, 1993 (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20006

CHRON FILE

January 21, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RL*
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting on Somalia, Monday, January 25, 1993, at 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room.

Tony Lake has reviewed the discussion paper (Tab B), which he asked me to prepare for a January ²⁵ ~~23~~ Deputies Committee on Somalia. If you approve, it would be circulated with the meeting notice (Tab I) and Agenda (Tab A).

Decision Track: What I discussed with Tony and is reflected in the discussion paper is a two-step plan for decisions on Somalia. Near-term decisions would be made at the DC meeting, to the extent that there was a consensus. (The vehicle for recording such decisions would be the Summary and Conclusions of the DC, which would be sent to Principals). Mid/long-term issues would be reviewed in a PRD, which the DC would launch.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Sean Darragh to forward the transmittal memo at Tab I to agency counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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Tab B Discussion Paper

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KOE NARA, Date 01/25/17
2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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20006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia ~~(S)~~

Attached is the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia, scheduled for Monday, January 25, 1993, at 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance is limited to principal plus one. ~~(S)~~

Sean Darragh
Deputy Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 01/17

202-0659-F

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: January 25, 1993

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

SOMALIA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Sandy Berger
- II. Situation Report William Studeman
- III. Operational Report David Jeremiah
- IV. Diplomatic Update Peter Tarnoff
- V. Near-Term Decisions
 - Basic Policy Goals
 - Transition to UNOSOM
 - Security Council Resolution
 - Strengthening the UN
 - U.S. Military Contribution
 - Funding
- VI. Mid- to Long-Term Decisions (Presidential Review Directive)
 - Reconciliation Process and U.S. Role
 - Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
- VII. Summary Sandy Berger

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By YDE NARA, Date 01/25/17
2012-0059-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. paper	[Duplicate of 001] (5 pages)	01/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F

ke4185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005b. map	[Duplicate of 002] (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

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2012-0659-F
ke4185

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Major International Force Contributions in Somalia

<u>Nation</u>	<u>UNITAF</u>	<u>UNOSOM II (Estimates)</u>
Italy	2,500	3,900
France	2,600	Unknown
Egypt	245	750
Canada	1300	Unknown
Belgium	580	580
Pakistan	565 (500-UNOSOM)	4,000
India	7	4,000
Morocco	1,300	Unknown
Jordan	900	900
Australia	860	900
Nigeria	270	550
Botswana	330	330
Zimbabwe	150	150
Saudi Arabia	650	650
Turkey	300	500
Germany	50	1500 (logistics)
Indonesia		900
Kuwait	150	
Sweden	150	
Tunisia	130	
UK	90	
New Zealand	60	
Total UNITAF:	12,000	Total UNOSOM: 18,000
(plus 24,000 U.S.)		(plus several thousand US)

Considering: Argentina (750), Greece (350)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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092345Z JAN 93

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<TO>

UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

INFO USLO MOGADISHU 0347-0348 IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>

TF5001: DRAFT TEXT OF NEW UNSC SOMALIA
RESOLUTION

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 007788

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TEXT)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, EAID, UNSC, SO

SUBJECT: TF5001: DRAFT TEXT OF NEW UNSC SOMALIA
RESOLUTION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DRAFT TEXT OF FOLLOW-ON SOMALIA RESOLUTION PROVIDED
BELOW SHOULD BE VIEWED AND DISCUSSED IN CONJUNCTION WITH
TALKING POINTS PROVIDED SEPTEL.

3. ACTION REQUEST: USUN SHOULD CIRCULATE THIS DRAFT
TEXT, PARALLEL TO INSTRUCTIONS SEPTEL, INITIALLY TO
PERM-5 MEMBERS AND JAPAN. FOLLOWING THESE INITIAL
CONSULTATIONS, PERMREP MAY CONSULT MORE BROADLY IN THE
COUNCIL ONCE A CONSENSUS APPEARS LIKELY BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND THE PERM-5 PLUS JAPAN. EMBASSIES IN PERM-5
COUNTRIES, TOKYO, AND ALL UNITAF COUNTRIES ON THE
COUNCIL SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY
HIGH LEVELS OF THE CONSULTATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN NEW
YORK.

4. BEGIN DRAFT TEXT:

--DRAFT RESOLUTION ON EXPANSION OF UNOSOM
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 794 (1992) OF 3 DECEMBER 1992
775 (1992) OF 28 AUGUST 1992, 767 (1992) OF 27 JULY 1992,
751 (1992) OF 24 APRIL 1992, 746 (1992) OF 17 MARCH 1992,
AND 733 (1992) OF 23 JANUARY 1992,

COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF MEMBER STATES ACTING PURSUANT TO
RESOLUTION 794 (1992) TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT
FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA,
ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED FOR A PROMPT TRANSITION FROM THE
UNIFIED TASK FORCE TO UNOSOM,

NOTING WITH DEEP REGRET AND CONCERN THE CONTINUING REPORTS
OF WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND THE GENERAL ABSENCE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOMALIA,

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KOE NARA, Date 01/25/17

DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA BEAR ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY, CONSIDERING THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN SOMALIA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS, RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND THE REHABILITATION OF SOMALIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, STRESSING THE DESIRE TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA TO PARTICIPATE IN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT, ENCOURAGING THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR WORK AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN REHABILITATING THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMY, WELCOMING THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE UN-SPONSORED PREPARATORY CONFERENCE ON SOMALI POLITICAL RECONCILIATION HELD IN ADDIS ABABA JANUARY 4-5, 1993. NOTING THE REPORT OF STATES CONCERNED OF 17 DECEMBER 1992 (S/24976) AND OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 19 DECEMBER 1992 (S/24992) ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 794 AND THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT SO AS TO ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISION FOR A PROMPT TRANSITION FROM THE UNIFIED TASK FORCE UNOSOM,

1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/24992);
2. URGES THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO WORK TOWARD THE DISBANDING OF ALL PARAMILITARY AND IRREGULAR FORCES IN SOMALIA;
3. DECIDES TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF UNOSOM AND ITS MANDATE TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS TAKING ALL APPROPRIATE ACTIONS AGAINST ELEMENTS THREATENING THAT SECURE ENVIRONMENT, AND TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOMALIA;
4. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND, THROUGH HIM, THE UNOSOM COMMANDER, TO TAKE ALL ACTIONS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THIS MANDATE;
5. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DIRECT THE COMMANDER UNOSOM, UPON A DETERMINATION BY THE COMMANDER OF UNITAF SUBMITTED BY THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED THAT A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN A PART OF SOMALIA, TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURED SECTORS AS PART OF A PHASED TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM;
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE SOMALI PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION;
7. CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THROUGH HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR SOMALIA AND WITH ASSISTANCE, AS APPROPRIATE FROM UNOSOM AND ALL APPROPRIATE UN OFFICES AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES;
 - A) TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIGENOUS POLICE FOR

TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND LAW AND ORDER IN SOMALIA;
B) TO PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN SOMALIA;
C) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE REHABILITATION OF THEIR ECONOMY;
D) TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS; AND
E) TO RECEIVE, COLLECT AND PRESERVE INFORMATION RELATING TO SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SOMALIA;
8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN 15 DAYS CONTAINING HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXPANSION OF UNOSOM AND FURTHER REPORTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION;
9. REQUESTS UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, MEMBER STATES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXTEND, IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, FINANCIAL, MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA;
10. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

KANTER

BT

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. list	[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F
ke4185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0050

January 26, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RA*
SUBJECT: Somalia Paper for Principals Meeting

Attached is the Somalia paper for the Principals meeting. Please provide me with your comments ASAP. Based on those and interagency comments received by Wednesday morning, we will do a final paper for Thursday's meeting.

Attachment
Tab A Somalia Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 6/15/17
2012-0059-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Somalia Policy: Near-Term Decisions (6 pages)	01/26/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F
ke4185

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 28 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS RE SOMALIA

ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 01 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE
NSC CHRON
ORDWAY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Dat 01/25/17
2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: PER LAKE, PRES APPROVED CY OF DOCUMENT.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0148

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 28, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SAMUEL R. BERGER *for (3 hrs) c/land*
FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RA*
SUBJECT: Somalia

Attached is the decision memorandum that you requested on Somalia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 6/25/17
2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Decisions on Somalia (3 pages)	01/28/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F

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February 5, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY *JM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Philip Johnston

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KOE NARA, Date 01/25/17
2012-0689-F

You are meeting with Philip Johnston on Tuesday, February 9 at 11:00 a.m.

Johnston is the chief executive of CARE who for the past several months has been on loan to the UN as head of their humanitarian operation in Mogadishu. Highly regarded in the U.S. NGO community, by all accounts he is an effective and imaginative manager. Ambassador Oakley, the head of our Liaison Office in Mogadishu, is highly complimentary about his performance there. Unfortunately, Johnston has been largely hamstrung by lack of cooperation from UN Headquarters in New York, and an inadequate and unqualified field staff in Somalia. The situation has been made worse by bitter bureaucratic warfare among competing UN organizations for control of the Somalia operation.

I suggest the following approach to the meeting:

- Express regret that the President was unable to meet with him as he had requested. (Johnston met with President Bush on December 18.)
- Draw Johnston out on several points:
 - The state of security for humanitarian operations and a turnover to UNOSOM II.
 - The overall humanitarian situation on the ground, and its prospects during and after the transition from UNITAF.
 - Problems associated with the UN's humanitarian operation and ways to overcome them.
- Confirm U.S. desire to help make the operation a success, including providing additional personnel, but without making it an overwhelmingly American show.

Concurrence by: Dick Clarke

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20082

February 5, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: RICHARD CLARKE *RC*
SUBJECT: Somalia Core Group Actions

You may wish to review the results of Thursday's Somalia Core Group, attached.

Attachment
Tab I Somalia Core Group Actions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 01/26/17

2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	Richard Clarke to the Deputies Committee's Somalia Core Group, re: Summary and Conclusions of February 4, 1993 Meeting (2 pages)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: CLARKE

DOC DATE: 09 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

UN

PERSONS: CHRISTOPHER, W

ASPIN, L

SUBJECT: LAKE / CHRISTOPHER / ASPIN LUNCH RE US / UN & SOMALIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 22 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By YDE NARA, Date 2/26/17

2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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009. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, re: Lake/Christopher/Aspin Lunch: The US, The UN, and Somalia (1 page)	02/09/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F
kc4185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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0596

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

FILE

February 17, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RA*

SUBJECT: The President's Questions on Somalia

Attached is a memorandum to the President, answering his questions about where we stand and what our plan is for the period ahead. It was submitted, in keeping with the 24 hour response policy, by 1:00 p.m. on Monday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Secretary Cheney's Remarks

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 01/26/17

2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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010. memo	Samuel Berger and Anthony Lake to the President, re: Somalia Status Report (1 page)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Clarke, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2986

FOLDER TITLE:

Peacekeeping - Haiti and Somalia (1993 and 1994)

2012-0659-F
ke4185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Secretary Cheney's Remarks
on a
US Residual Force in Somalia

New Briefing at Pentagon
4 December 1992

"At the very end of the operation, it may be necessary for some residual U.S. forces to remain for the simple reason that it is as austere an environment for the peacekeeping forces that will be staying there as it is for us. We have certain unique capabilities in the armed forces of the United States that don't exist in many other armed forces, so it may be necessary, in order to support our friends, to leave a few units, some residual personnel. But I don't think that would be very much, and I think it will be seen as simply an additional contribution to the UN effort. But I'm very, very confident that in a couple of months, two to three is my best guess, this will be completely over to UNOSOM, which is the code name for United Nations Operations in Somalia, for the most part consisting of troops from other nations with some minor US contribution, just as our C-130's are making a minor but vital contribution at this time."

"Meet the Press" Interview
6 December 1992

"I would expect, as General Powell said in our briefing the other day, that we're looking at an operation that'll take two to three months, but after we've done the basic bulk of our work, there still may be a need for various kinds of specialized units to stay. You may want to leave a Marine amphibious ready group off the coast for a while, because that would give the support to the UN blue-helmeted force so that you could deal with the situation if it got out of control. You may want to leave some of our logistics or our medical engineering people there for a longer period of time, because we've got capabilities there that other nations don't have."

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



16/2

Sandy Berger, NSC,
Re: Somalia Residual

1. Here's THE ANSWER:

- I MENTIONED IT IN
THE INITIAL PRESS CONF.

- Dick Cheney SAID IT
ON TV THAT WEEKEND.

2. SOMETIME LATER HE
STARTED SAYING "SEVERAL
THOUSAND." LET ME KNOW
IF YOU NEED THAT.

LA

News briefing with
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS
Friday, December 4, 1992 - 2:00 p.m.

Mr. Pete Williams, ASD/PA: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for coming.

Secretary Cheney will have a brief statement, followed by General Powell, then they'll both be pleased to answer your questions. Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Cheney: Thank you, Pete.

I'm sure all of you, by now, have seen the President's statement at 12:30 this afternoon. What General Powell and I want to do is to flesh out a bit specifically what's intended with respect to our carrying out of his direction that we should deploy U.S. military forces as part of a UN-sponsored force to Somalia in order to restore conditions so that the relief operations can occur there.

As the President made clear in his remarks at noon, the reason we now find ourselves in the position where we feel it's essential to deploy U.S. combat forces, is because all of the normal approaches for dealing with this kind of a crisis have failed. The relief organizations have been very active, but unsuccessful to date, because of the state of anarchy that exists inside Somalia. The U.S. military has been actively involved up until now in the relief operations as well, flying some 1400 relief missions into Somalia, but goods are unable to be distributed outside the airfields where we land them. And, of course, we've tried now the traditional route of sending in UN-sponsored peacekeepers when the U.S. flew in Pakistani forces a few weeks ago to try to restore some stability to the situation.

All of those efforts have been inadequate, and for that reason, we believe it's necessary to send in U.S. forces to provide U.S. leadership to get the situation stabilized and return it to a state where the normal UN peacekeeping forces can deal with the circumstances.

The situation today, as described by the President, is chaotic on the ground. Starvation, as you all know, is a fact of life for thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

The President has made it clear that he wants us to undertake this operation in as decisive a manner as possible, but also that he wants us to complete it and wrap it up as quickly as possible. We don't plan to stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary.

When I have to address the question of whether or not to advise the President to commit U.S. combat forces, there are four basic questions I always like to consider and answer in an affirmative fashion before I feel comfortable recommending the deployment of U.S. forces.

First, what is the mission? Secondly, is it a mission that can be achieved with military forces? Third, how does it end? How do we disengage? Fourth, what's the likely cost in terms of the risk to U.S. forces and in terms of U.S. casualties? I think, in this case, all four of those questions can be answered in a manner that I'm comfortable with.

Specifically, with respect to the mission statement, and this is the actual text of the mission statement, it boils down basically to saying that our purpose is to use U.S. forces to restore the situation so that relief supplies can be delivered, and so that once we withdraw, we can turn over responsibility for dealing with the continuing security problem to regular UN forces. The suggestion that somehow we don't have a clear-cut mission, that the mission is fuzzy, is not accurate. I've heard some comments from some of my friends to that effect, and I would take strong exception to that notion. The mission is very clear, indeed. It is a humanitarian mission.

Secondly, I do believe that it is militarily doable. The best advice I can get from General Powell and our other senior commanders is that this is, indeed, the kind of mission that can be performed admirably by those forces that will be part of the task force -- specifically the United States Marine Corps, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force; and the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York.

The question of how we withdraw is dealt with in the concept of operations for this activity. First of all, in phase one, as General Powell will explain in greater detail in a moment, the Marines will go ashore early next week and establish bases at Mogadishu, take control of the port, the harbor facilities, and the airfields, and at Baidoa airfield, inland.

Phase two involves U.S. Army forces joining the Marines, and then moving on to establish secure areas in other parts of the country. Phase three involves extending operations to the southern portion of Somalia, Kismayo down on the coast. And phase four, and this is important in terms of the question of being able to wrap up the operation, is that we will transition from a U.S.-led coalition involving U.S. combat forces, to a situation in which the United Nations observer forces in Somalia or regular UN peacekeeping forces will be able to take over.

It's important to emphasize that we are not seeking a confrontation. There always is, at a time like this when we talk about deploying U.S. forces overseas into a potentially hostile environment, I think, its a legitimate level of concern, but I would urge, especially our friends in the press, not to over-hype the situation. We are not seeking a confrontation. We are not going expecting that we will be engaged in heavy combat against well armed hostile forces.

There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that we are prepared for hostilities should they occur. There should be no doubt about who would prevail in the event there are hostilities. The rules of engagement for our forces will make it clear that they're authorized to take whatever steps they feel are necessary to defend themselves and their charges, including, if necessary, taking preemptive action to forestall hostile actions aimed at them.

We will do everything we can to reduce the risk to our people, but there should be no illusion, this is a potentially dangerous mission for those who are directly involved in it.

There's been a good deal of discussion about the timing of the operation. General Powell will talk in more detail in a moment about the operational aspects of it. But there's been some speculation in the press, some authentication by speculation from within the Administration -- I don't mean to cast aspersions on anyone -- that somehow we're working against a January 20th deadline. Certainly we are well aware here in the Defense Department that there is a transition that will occur a few weeks down the road. But it's important in terms of assessing how we're doing in this operation and in making judgments and decisions about when we begin the withdrawal process, that we be judged based upon how well we are doing on accomplishing the mission, and we don't want to be bound by an artificial deadline that is unrelated to circumstances that our troops face on the ground in Somalia.

We are sensitive to the fact of the transition. The President has made it clear that he wants us to keep President-Elect Clinton fully informed of all developments, and to ensure that the next Administration will be up to speed when they take over on January 20th. I would hope, and at this point it is expressed as a hope, that we will be able, by January 20th, to have begun the process of turning over responsibility for some of the areas of Somalia to UN peacekeeping forces. That is to say, having built up to our peak in January and undertaken operations, that we will then be able to hand off certain jurisdictions to the other nations who will be participating as UN peacekeeping forces. But I don't want to be bound by that any more than we can be bound by a specific date. We'll do our job as quickly as we can. We'll get out just as rapidly as we can. I do not expect that this is going to be a long term commitment of a large group of U.S. forces, but as I say, I think it's important that we be judged based upon the objective circumstances on the ground in Somalia -- not an artificial deadline established by our own political calendar here at home.

Finally, I have great confidence in the officers who will be commanding this operation. General Joe Hoar, of course, is the commander of Central Command -- a very able and talented four-star Marine officer, General Norm Schwartzkopf's successor. And Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, who will be the commander of the task force, a Marine lieutenant general with a great deal of experience in the area, including a tour as General Schwartzkopf's chief of staff throughout operation Desert Storm.

With that, I'd be happy to call on my colleague, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, and then we'll both be prepared to respond to your questions.

General Powell: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Let me first just put up a chart which might help you spatially in having an appreciation for the size of Somalia, in comparison to the size of a section of the Southeastern and Eastern United States. If you look roughly from Kismayo up to Mogadishu, it's about the distance from central Alabama to Atlanta, 260 miles. Another 700 miles, Mogadishu, up toward the north in the vicinity of Buffalo, New York, in terms of United States geography.

Let me pick up from where the Secretary left off by saying that what we are doing is in response to a UN resolution, and it is part of a UN strategy. We've been trying to follow the UN

strategy for a number of months. As you know, it was back in August that American C-130 aircraft began participating in the relief effort to transport food into Somalia from neighboring Kenya. Despite the best efforts of the UN and the private voluntary organizations and non-governmental organizations and our own airlift, it became clear, over a period of time, that the strategy was not working. We were not getting enough food in, and that food which was getting in, was not going to the people who needed it the most. A lot of it was being simply ripped off, and not getting to the neediest. So we were not getting ahead of the curve, and people were starving at an increasing rate.

The fact of the matter is that the level of violence was increasing faster than the humanitarian effort to try to deal with this situation. In fact, the humanitarian effort did not deal with the actual violence that was occurring in the country.

Last week it came to a head, really, when the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, came to the conclusion that a new strategy was needed. We came to that same conclusion about that time. We came forward with a plan, and it was a plan that was shared with the United Nations, and provided the basis for the resolution which passed last evening with a 15 to nothing vote.

That plan, essentially, says we have got to not incrementally add a few forces here and there, but go in with a fairly large force for the purpose of stabilizing this situation, and stabilizing it in a rather decisive way, so there will be no question in the mind of any of the faction leaders in Somalia that we would have the ability to impose a stable situation if it came to that, without their cooperation. We wanted them to understand that. We wanted them to see that.

We also wanted to put in a large enough force that we could dominate the entire country, and not just find ourselves trapped in a port or in a single city. Essentially, we wanted to seize the initiative away from those who might not wish to see the humanitarian effort proceed. That's why the force was sized the way you've heard it described over the last few days or so, beginning with the reports on Thanksgiving morning.

When we initially looked at this concept last week, we weren't sure what the reaction would be in Somalia. We are very pleased that the reaction has been positive. The various faction leaders and clan leaders in Somalia, rather than responding against the UN forces that were there or the volunteers that were there, in fact have welcomed the American troops who will be coming, and they have indicated they would try and make every effort to cooperate with us upon our arrival.

So I think the idea of having a large force has already begun to pay dividends. And after some initial trepidation on the part of some of the volunteer organizations, they all now also seem to be looking forward to the arrival of U.S. and other coalition forces as part of this renewed UN effort.

Let me turn to what the task force looks like in a little more detail. As the Secretary mentioned, it will be commanded from Tampa, Florida, by General Joe Hoar, commander of the United States Central Command, and his very able staff. The commander of the joint task force, Lieutenant General Bob Johnston, will be drawn from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He's the commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He will serve as the on-scene commander in

Somalia, with a joint staff consisting of representatives of all the services who will have a part to play in this.

From Camp Pendleton, California, and I'm sure, other locations of the United States Marine Corps as well, we expect some 16,000 Marines to participate in the operation -- the 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Air Wing, and supporting units. Air Force will have a major role to play, once again as you've seen them do so many times over the last several years, transporting the force some 7,500 miles from the continental United States to the theater. On the ground, in the theater, you'll probably see about 600 airmen operating our C-130 tactical airlifters -- those which belong to CENTCOM and are there now, and additional aircraft, tactical airlifters, we will bring in from the continental United States.

The major Army component will be the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York. Obviously, there will be other units drawn from other places within the United States, but we expect the Army contingent to total out at about 10,000.

The Navy element that is off-shore now, that has the Marines embarked, the Marines I count in this number, but if you add the sailors that are part of the MPS ships, the maritime prepositioning ships; the amphibious ships; and other units that will be coming in from the Pacific Fleet to help CENTCOM with this, put in about 1,550 at this point in time.

If you add these numbers up, it comes up to a little over 28,000. I know you love numbers, but don't concentrate so much on the numbers as on the fact that we will send what is necessary to accomplish the mission and to take care of our troops, and do it in the most efficient way we possibly can. So these numbers may go up considerably, they may be lower. One of the major challenges we have, as I'll show you on the map in a moment, is that unlike Saudi Arabia, we don't have a good set of facilities and infrastructure to fall in on. It is a very, very austere environment. We have to bring our own water purification systems, there's no water that's potable there. We have to bring in fuel, limited airfields. So we may have to bring in more logisticians and other sorts of support people than are reflected in the initial troop list. So concentrate on what the mission is more so than the specific numbers as the numbers go up and down.

Let me now turn to the map on my right and describe what our concept of operations will look like, as you see it unfold. At the moment, the maritime prepositioning ship and the Tripoli group is off the coast of Somalia opposite Mogadishu. We're also bringing down out of the Persian Gulf, the Ranger battle group. These numbers are not included in the ones that I mentioned earlier, because they're always in the region. We usually keep a carrier battle group in the region. But just as a matter of prudence, and to make sure there's no question about our determination and purpose, and to give us a little more flexibility inherent in naval forces, we brought the Ranger battle group down out of the Persian Gulf. It will operate off the coast of Somalia for awhile, we're not sure how long, until such time as the CENTCOM commander or General Johnston, on the scene, decide that it ought to return to another operating location within the theater. So those are the naval forces involved.

Sometime about early next week, I don't want to give a precise date or hour yet, because this is all being worked out, the operation will begin with United States Marine Corps personnel going ashore in Mogadishu to secure the airport, secure the port itself, secure the warehouses, and begin

the process of opening routes out of the city so that the food that is there can begin to flow out, and so that we can secure the port in a way that ships can come in to deliver additional supplies, provide security within Mogadishu and open up routes out of Mogadishu.

The Marines will also move to this location, Baidoa, where we have been flying C-130 flights into for the last several months. And, in fact, we have United States Air Force personnel who go in and out of here routinely to repair the runway surface. The Marines will go out there to provide a more secure environment.

While this initial phase you see in red is taking place, the air flow will begin bringing in the additional Marines from Camp Pendleton and elsewhere, and bringing in the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York. We would expect that the Army troops would go into Baidoa after it had been secured by the Marines, and they would operate out of Baidoa. We would suspect that the Marines would initially come into Mogadishu and then after this phase one has been completed with these two places secure and the flow going rather nicely, we would extend our operations in Oddur, Belet Wen and Gailalassi. Then in a later phase, go into Baidao.

I make note of the port of Kismayo. Along this entire section of Somalian coastline, we only have two C-141 capable airfields -- the one at Mogadishu, which will be our prime airfield to go into; there's another one at Kismayo; and there's a small port at Kismayo, and it may be necessary to use that as well, in order to have sufficient through-put for the forces, as well as all the support forces that come with them.

We expect that this buildup of roughly 28,000 troops will take place over a period of about three weeks -- three to four weeks max. So by the end of the month, and into the early days of January, the force that we've been talking about, the force I've just described, will be on the ground, and will be operating extensively throughout the section that I have described on the map here.

This is where the real problem is. This is where the starvation that you see on your television sets every night is so very, very awful -- the area in greatest need. There is a troubling situation to the north, as well, but it is not as severe as the south. Nevertheless, we will keep our eye on the north, and make an assessment once we get in theater, and from national technical means as well, as to whether there are any needs up here that should be addressed by us or some other coalition partner that is coming to join this effort.

I might also say that I am very pleased that quite a number of friends who are interested in this operation have offered forces. Over a dozen nations have come forward and said they would make a contribution either as part of our initial peacemaking effort, or be part of the subsequent peacekeeping effort. I will leave it to the State Department to identify those specific countries, because each one will announce it in the appropriate time, and I think it better that it come out of the State Department.

What I really expect to see happen is while we are flowing in and establishing this secure environment, the peacekeeping forces will also start to arrive and flow in as well. I would not be surprised to see that in early January, as we are reaching our peak strength, the peacekeeping forces are already starting to arrive, ready to take over certain sections from us, and we can start to withdraw. But it's very important not to tie us to a specific calendar date. I speculated earlier at a

congressional meeting in the White House that my own instincts tell me that this looks like about a two to three-month operation before we could have the bulk of our forces out.

After we have turned it over to a peacekeeping operation, we have as our mission turning it over in such a security environment, such a level of stability, that it will be fully within the capability of that peacekeeping operation to maintain the humanitarian effort. So that's how we get out. It's sort of like the cavalry coming to the rescue, straightening things out for awhile, and then letting the marshals come back in to keep things under control.

After the bulk of our forces are gone, we may well keep the MARG off the coast for awhile, so that the peacekeeping efforts know that there's a posse out there if they need one for the immediate future.

Because of the very fine response we have gotten from our friends around the world, not only our friends, but those who share the same concern for this terrible situation, I am feeling more and more comfortable that there will be adequate forces available to pick up this peacekeeping mission, and we can see our way clear of this operation in a few months.

At the very end of the operation, it may be necessary for some residual U.S. forces to remain for the simple reason that it is as austere an environment for the peacekeeping forces that will be staying there as it is for us. We have certain unique capabilities in the armed forces of the United States that don't exist in many other armed forces, so it may be necessary, in order to support our friends, to leave a few units, some residual personnel. But I don't think that would be very much, and I think it will be seen as simply an additional contribution to the UN effort. But I'm very, very confident that in a couple of months, two to three is my best guess, this will be completely over to UNOSOM, which is the code name for United Nations Operations in Somalia, for the most part consisting of troops from other nations with some minor U.S. contribution, just as our C-130's are making a minor but vital contribution at this time.

I think I'll stop there, Mr. Secretary, and throw it open to questions.

Q: General Powell, could I ask either of you if you view this as a precedent-setting operation? And how do either of you draw the line between being willing to go into Somalia and being unwilling to put military forces into some of the other places around the world where horrible things are happening, such as Bosnia?

Cheney: In terms of whether or not it's precedent-setting, we have, of course, on a number of occasions, previously used combat forces, U.S. military forces, to go in and provide humanitarian assistance. For example, in northern Iraq at the end of Desert Storm, we had a situation where U.S. forces went in and provided assistance to the Kurds in northern Iraq. We didn't know whether or not it would be a hostile environment. It turned out that the Iraqis backed off, and we were able to achieve our mission. So this kind of assignment, I don't see as precedent-setting in that regard.

I think it is precedent-setting in terms of United Nations activities. They've clearly made a decision, as an international organization in this case, to move in and try to restore order where none exists. That's an important, but I think a useful precedent.

With respect to the question of, if Somalia why not Bosnia, the response I'd have is that it harks back to those four questions I mentioned in my opening remarks about the things you have to consider when you recommend using force. The situation in Bosnia is different. You have to look at every single one of these circumstances in terms of its own unique characteristics. You have to look at it in terms of whether or not there is a well-defined military mission, a mission you can accomplish, a situation that you believe you can withdraw from once you've completed your assignment. I would argue that the situation in Bosnia is dramatically different, in terms of the depth of the animosity that exists there; in terms of the conflicts that are decades, century old conflicts; in terms of the executability of the mission because of the difficulty of the terrain and the level of armaments that exist, and the political complexities that we're faced with.

If we had 200,000 troops on the ground in Bosnia today, I'm not sure what I would tell them to do. What their assignment is, what their objective is, what the rules of engagement are, who the adversary is, how they'll know when they've achieved their mission, and how we can withdraw in the end. I think it's a big mistake for people to go out and sort of lump together all situations and automatically say, "well, you used force in situation A, why won't you use force in situation B?" The answer is, because they're different.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you've made pretty clear that you're going to try to do this decisively, and you've even suggested you would use preemptive action to keep people from getting hurt. What are you going to tell these troops to do? Are you going to tell them to shoot somebody hauling off a sack of grain? Are you going to tell them simply to shoot back at people who are shooting at them? Could you be a little more specific about the rules of engagement?

Cheney: We never reveal the precise rules of engagement. Those are always retained in a classified nature. But they will do what I said they will do. That is to say, the troops will be authorized to defend themselves. They will be authorized to take action to prevent harm to those who are under their care, if you will; to protect the relief workers, etcetera, the Somalis who are victims of the starvation; and they will also have the authority, if they see a situation that is potentially threatening, to take preemptive action to deal with that threat. That's a fairly good, I think, and sound concept. The exact wording of the rules of engagement will be part of the execute order that I'll sign out later this afternoon.

Q: Do you intend, or perhaps General Powell could speak to it, have you discussed with UN officials the possibility of setting up a system to disarm the local warlords? Would you offer bounties to pick up some of these AK-47's out of the teenagers' hands?

Cheney. We might.

Q: Is that what you mean by preemptive action, in order to stem any kind of potential violence?

Powell: By preemptive action, if I could add a word to what the Secretary said, we're just not going to ride shotgun waiting for people to shoot at us and then shoot back. If we see areas where it would be dangerous for our troops to operate without doing something about the cause of the danger beforehand, we'll do what's necessary to eliminate the danger.

Disarming is one method that could be used to ensure that you have a more secure environment, but there are other methods, and we're considering them. One suggestion kicking around that's been used before is to offer bounties for weapons that are unnecessary.

But I don't want to be too precise in a setting like this, because frankly, we are hoping to go in and achieve a level of cooperation with the faction leaders and others in Somalia that will make it clear to them that it is in their interest, their very great interest, to cooperate with us, and to take action which will reduce the potential for violence, the potential for confrontation, and cause a general improvement in the overall security situation so that it can be turned over to a peacekeeping force without us having a subsequent concern that that peacekeeping force would find itself at a military disadvantage after our departure.

Q: ...discussions, the military-to-military type that were set up in northern Iraq, for example?

Powell: We are looking into options. Not necessarily just military, but there will be State Department, AID, and other representation there in the theater with us.

Q: General Powell and Mr. Secretary, due to the fact that you're not really dealing with an established army, and you obviously have a military factor somewhere running around this country with increased weaponry, are we dealing with the possibility of a guerrilla warfare situation, and a really increased threat, as if you did have a defined army? And also, in the schedule of timing, because we're dealing almost with a transitional government, does that mean you may stay on longer as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or because of this timing? (Laughter)

Powell: I don't know about him! I do know about him!

Cheney: I don't think it's an option for me! (Laughter)

Powell: I don't see it as a guerrilla war. What I see it more like is just general lawlessness. There are some armed groups belonging to the different faction leaders, but there are also a large number of, frankly, youngsters, who are armed with weapons. So there is a degree of lawlessness, and I think that degree of lawlessness can be dealt with by sizeable forces -- U.S. and other nation forces being there and looking like they can handle anything that comes their way.

Secondly, my term, as you well know, is independent of the inauguration. My term continues through 30 September of 1993.

Q: General Powell, what makes you think, though, that after the U.S. troops are gone, and if there's a small UN peacekeeping contingent, that that level of lawlessness won't return?

Powell: There will always be a level of lawlessness in Somalia. There are guns all over the country. So there should be no expectation that either as a result of our effort, even if we were to triple that effort, and the effort of a very large UN peacekeeping force, would be successful in removing every AK-47 in Somalia so that there would never again be another shooting incident in Mogadishu or anywhere else.

I have a fairly high level of confidence, however, that as a result of our effort and putting in something other than just a token UN peacekeeping force, I think you'll see that when it comes

together and when it's announced, it is a fairly substantial force. I'm confident that they will be able to ensure the continued delivery of humanitarian supplies. They will not, I don't think, be able to say no one is going to take a potshot at us ever again, or there will be no fighting taking place between rival factions in Mogadishu. It is not an operation, either on our part or on the subsequent UN part, that will guarantee a weapons-free and violence-free environment, but I think it will be an environment that is manageable. Manageable for what purpose? For the purpose not of the UN having responsibility for putting Somalia back together, but to ensure the continued delivery of humanitarian supplies to save lives and to do something about the starving people that we're seeing on our television screens.

Q: What is the greatest military risk to this operation? What's the greatest...

Cheney: I think you've had two, right?

Q: This is my second.

Q: General Powell, you talked about the fact that you wanted forces positioned to dominate the country. How do you avoid, then, essentially having the U.S. military become an occupying force over the next two to three months in this country?

Powell: We will not try to exercise any political authority. We will not be giving orders to the various faction leaders except as may perhaps become necessary as a result of establishing a security environment. So we are not the United States Army occupying a devastated Europe after World War II or what happened in the Pacific. We hope that in working with the major faction leaders, they will see that it is in their interest to start to rebuild their country, and not just continue to fight against one another. And we hope that the UN efforts that will follow ours will also continue to build on that process. But I have no illusion, nor do I think the Secretary or General Hoar have any illusion that we are going in as an occupying Army.

If there are those in these areas we're going into who look to us for sustenance and medical care and dental care and protection, that is something we are prepared to do and are willing to do as part of our mission, but we are not trying to be an occupying Army. We are trying to be a helpful, supportive, humanitarian Army that will take care of human needs.

Q: ...perform those missions such as medical care and...

Powell: We always size our forces on the basis of the mission we find ourselves faced with, and the Secretary and I and General Hoar have been talking, we're liable to find some situations there when we first arrive that may cause us to do more than we can anticipate right now. One of the problems is disease, even as much as starvation. People are so weak that they're being ravaged by disease. So while we are starting to ensure that they are getting the right sustenance, we may have to do something about the diseases that they're suffering from and get some help there.

Q: Two questions. First, cost. Do you have any cost estimate, either on a per diem basis or for three months, what it's going to be and who's going to have to eat the cost? The second question, much of the support functions that you and the Chairman have talked about are basically found in the National Guard these days. Do you anticipate calling up National Guard units? And if so, can you give us any estimate of numbers and units?

Cheney: With respect to the cost, we have not worked out a precise cost estimate yet. That will depend, to a large extent, on how long we have to stay and how large a force we have to maintain there over time. Initially, certainly, it will come out of the Defense Department budget. It will come out of, primarily, our operations and maintenance account, and there will be, clearly, some incremental cost over and above what the forces would ordinarily require in terms of fuel for the lift and so forth. But I would expect, depending upon how long it lasts, that we're talking perhaps a few hundred million dollars. I don't mean to make that sound small, it's not, but I think it's certainly manageable.

With respect to the second part of your question in terms of Guard and Reserve, it is true that there are certain specialties that we have built into our force structure as part of the Guard and Reserve force structure. For example, some of our water purification units, and a lot of our medical capabilities, a lot of our logistical and cargo handling capabilities. We may have to call up some reserve units or individuals. I do not expect it to be a large number. We, clearly, will try to do this with active duty forces to the extent we can, but we also believe in the total force concept, and if we find that there are requirements that have to be met that can only be met by calling up some reservists, then we'll certainly do it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on getting out. A lot of people in Somalia and a lot of people in this country who are familiar with the area say that our end objective has to be not just to feed the people who are starving now, but to establish stability and help that country reemerge as a nation again. That's a political end. We have no interest at all in establishing that political end? Is that something we're going to leave to the United Nations and the Somalians themselves? Will we not have failed in our mission if we walk away and the country is in as much chaos as it was the day we went in?

Cheney: No, and let me be very precise on this. I think we share those hopes for Somalia. I think we would like to see the establishment of a stable government. We'd like to see the establishment of a regime that's capable of providing for the security of the nation. I don't think that that necessarily requires an open-ended commitment of U.S. combat capability to achieve. We oftentimes get into this when we...I remember a recent incident -- I won't name the operation, but where once we concluded our operation and achieved our objective we stopped, and now we've got a lot of Monday morning quarterbacks saying you didn't go far enough, you should have gone farther, you didn't accomplish your mission.

Our mission is very clear. Our mission is to create a set of circumstances that will allow the delivery of relief supplies -- food and medicine -- to the starving people of Somalia, and allow us, as part of that effort, to turn over to traditional UN peacekeeping forces, the responsibility for ongoing operations, and to withdraw.

The further objective of trying to establish some kind of secure, stable political environment, I think is best handled through the United Nations; best handled by us working through diplomatic channels in conjunction with the other nations that have an interest in the area; but there's no requirement, nor should there be one, that we maintain a large, U.S. combat force on the ground in Somalia until we've achieved that objective. Our military objective is very clear, and it's as I've stated and as is printed in our mission statement.

Q: The UN resolution expressly said "to create a secure environment." You seem to be stepping back from that.

Cheney: No, I think the environment will have to be secure for us to be able to guarantee the delivery of relief supplies. But as General Powell pointed out, I think we will consider that we have achieved our objective when the supplies can be delivered and a blue helmeted force of UN peacekeepers can come in and provide adequate security. Perhaps we leave a Marine Amphibious Ready Group off the coast, ready to come to the rescue if a more difficult circumstance develops, but it doesn't require continued U.S. force on the ground.

Now in terms of a secure environment, the kind of thing that is a truly stable society, I don't think that's likely in the short term, and I don't think we could achieve that unless we were willing to put a large number of U.S. forces on the ground there indefinitely. We clearly are not prepared to do that. We're going to go in and save starving people, and that's our mission. The political solution will have to be brought about by other means.

Q: General, both of you have noted, I think, that this happens at a time when U.S. forces are drawing down. Can you talk about, number one, whether this is a more difficult operation to mount at a time when there's some flux in the size of the forces and a lot of downsizing; and secondly, if you could go back to the infrastructure question and compare this logistically as a challenge to, perhaps, some other recent undertaking.

Powell: Thank you for that opportunity to give a paid political advertisement on behalf of the base force. (Laughter)

The nation is blessed that it has military capability during a period of historic drawdown that can respond at a moment's notice to this type of operation. And if another one popped up tomorrow, we could do that, too. And as you watch your television screens this morning and tonight and tomorrow, and you see those fine young men and women get ready to go, and you hear them say, this is a job I have to do, I know I'm missing Christmas, but this is a mission I have to perform." That's a treasure, and we've got to be very careful as we continue this drawdown, and we're still going down that first 25 percent, you'll recall, to make sure we don't do it too fast, and to make sure we don't go too far, that those youngsters start to lose faith in what we're doing and in the contract we have with them, that we don't start removing too much capability out of the force by those who want to size the force exactly plus one person against a threat they think exists now, but isn't the one we're going to have to deal with two days from now.

So I think we have to be careful in this drawdown. I think we have been careful. Thank you very much.

What was your second question?

Q: Logistically...

Powell: Logistically, it is enormously challenging. It is not anywhere near as challenging as Desert Shield/Storm, because it isn't 541,000 people, but when you say to somebody take 28,000

troops and send them 7,500 miles or so away, and by the way, there's no potable water there, and there are no gas stations, and there's only one, or perhaps two C-141 capable airfields, and the port facilities only hold one or two ships, that is very demanding. But we have planners who know how to handle this thing. We have a great family of logisticians in our armed forces. Further, General Bob Johnston, who is in charge of this, has had the mission from General Hoar for the last year to be thinking about this kind of humanitarian operation, in this part of the world, as a possible contingency -- things that we think about and plan for all the time.

Q: I'm still not certain of the approach you intend to take toward the more heavy and dangerous arms that are in the hands of private armies and individuals. We're talking about mortars, grenade launchers, some anti-aircraft weapons, possibly some armored vehicles. Are you going to be satisfied if, at the end of the U.S. mission there, when you're handing this off to a UN force, these weapons are still in the custody of the people that have them now?

Cheney: I think, as we've tried to make clear, it's our hope that we will be able to work in a cooperative fashion with those organized forces that do exist in the area, that are supposedly under the control of the clan leaders -- the ones that have crew-served weapons, or the ones that have the kinds of capabilities that you're talking about. If we can do that and avoid a clash between our forces and their forces, so much the better. But it will, ultimately, be a judgment that has to be made by our commander on the scene when he feels he's achieved the result that we've asked him to achieve. And if it were simply a question of all of the forces that are there today going underground, if you will, so to speak, for a couple of months and then being in a position to pop up again once we leave, that probably would not be sufficient.

On the other hand, I think as General Powell has pointed out, and we did to the congressional leaders this morning, we are not in the business of rounding up every AK-47 in the country; we're not in the business of disarming every teenager who's running loose in the streets of Mogadishu. But we will take whatever steps are necessary, hopefully through peaceful means, to reduce the risk, to reduce the threat environment, so that the ongoing relief operations can, in fact, occur.

Q: General Powell, the Secretary has said that you don't think a stable government is likely in the short term. What do you think the prospects are a little further down the road that there will be a stable government in place?

Cheney: I cannot claim to be an expert in the Somalian political situation. I, frankly, don't know. This is a nation that has been independent since 1960; that for a period of time was ruled by a president, and subsequent to that, after 1969, I believe, after a successful coup, by a dictatorship. Since January of '91, for nearly two years now, there has been no government in Somalia. It truly is in a state of anarchy. The chore of building viable political institutions in that country is going to be an enormously difficult one. I would expect it would take a long time. It's certainly something the United States is prepared to insist in, but it really falls within the jurisdiction of the State Department and our diplomats, rather than in the realm of the military.

Q: Do you see any likely leader who might be able to fill this vacuum?

Cheney: I'm not enough of an expert on the situation there. You'd better direct that question to the State Department.

Q: What would you say to those who would say that the situation is, as you say, going to be very difficult; that you are not going to have a clearly definable enemy; that the enemy is going to be, really, all around you, 360 degrees; that it may be easier to get in than to get out; and that what actually might be happening is that Clinton could inherit from Bush a situation that is reminiscent of Vietnam?

Cheney: I think this is dramatically different from Vietnam. Certainly, I'd yield to my colleague to talk about the military aspects of it. It's a situation, you do not have a guerrilla war underway against an established government. You've got no government at all. You've got armed gangs and individuals roaming the streets, but there are no deep divisions, from a religious standpoint in the country such as you'll run into, for example, in Bosnia. The country is 99 percent Sunni Muslim. There are no ethnic conflicts of the kind that you'll find in many places in the world. To compare this with a situation in Southeast Asia 25 years ago, I think is a total misreading of history, and of the situation there now.

There's no question that it's a potentially dangerous environment because there are a lot of people with weapons. But they are not that well organized. You do not have a coordinated military force. You're not up against the kind of formidable military organizations we faced in Iraq two years ago, or even the kind of situation I think that we faced in Panama in December of '89. But it will require some assertion of force on our part in order to stabilize the situation. I would hope and expect that those individuals that are currently causing the problem in Somalia will see the benefit of pursuing a more peaceful course once our troops arrive.

Q: The ugly scenes of children starving to death are making many people turn away and say we wish something could be done. The United States has now decided to do something with the UN. How long do you think it will take before we can begin to see pictures of young people with smiles on their faces?

Cheney: I don't have any way of controlling or predicting what kinds of pictures the press will broadcast from Somalia. I think the fact is that you will find very quickly, as we usually do in these circumstances, that our troops are proud to be there, have great sympathy for human suffering when they encounter it, and are prepared to do everything they can to help. I would expect that it's only a relatively short period of time before we'll see the kind of heartwarming interaction, if you will, between young Americans and the people of Somalia that we've come to expect when we undertake these humanitarian missions all over the world.

Q: You said it would take three to four weeks to get these troops in.

Powell: Right.

Q: I'm not too clear, on phase one you said the Marines would go in and secure Mogadishu and Baidoa.

Powell: Right.

Q: How long do you figure that will take, and when will the troops start arriving from the United States, the large number...

Powell: Without giving too much detail, I would say that within a week after this phase, you would begin to see large numbers of additional troops arrive from Camp Pendleton and from Fort Drum, New York.

Q: Who will decide when it's time to leave? Will it be the U.S. or the United Nations?

Cheney: The President will make the decision about when it's time to redeploy the force. I would expect that he would make that decision based upon the best advice he can get from his military advisers, General Powell and myself, and from our commander on the scene, as well as General Hoar. That's usually the way we handle these.

Thank you all very much.

(END)

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1992

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ANNOUNCER: From NBC News in Washington, this is "Meet the Press" with Tim Russert.

MR. RUSSERT: Welcome again to "Meet the Press."

Our issue today: Why Somalia? What is our mission? What precedents does it set? And what about the future of the US military and this man, our guest, the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney?

Mr. Secretary, welcome to "Meet the Press."

SEC. CHENEY: Good morning, Tim.

MR. RUSSERT: And joining me this morning, Albert Hunt of "The Wall Street Journal" and Fred Francis of NBC News.

Mr. Secretary, before we have some questions for you, we'd like to go live to Mogadishu, Somalia, where Tom Brokaw is there. Tom, good morning.

MR. BROKAW: Good morning, Tim.

MR. RUSSERT: Tom, you've been talking to the relief groups and some of the warlords. What are you finding over there?

MR. BROKAW: Well, I think the relief agencies are perplexed at this point why no one from the United States has been in touch with them. As they point out, they know this country better than any other outsider. They have been bringing in the food. They have been doing the best job that they can with the distribution process, and yet no Marines, no member of the armed forces from the United States have been in touch with the people on the ground here. They say, "If they've been in touch with our home office, our home office has not been in touch with us."

We find the same thing among some of the warlords. I talked with General Adid (ph) last night. He said he had heard from no official US representative. He is not the head of state here. He is just that, a warlord. There is no government in place, but I think that there's a fair amount of puzzlement on the part of a lot of people who are on the ground in this country wondering why there's been no communication with Washington.

MR. RUSSERT: Tom, the warlords and some of the "technicals," as their troops are called, are they staying in the city or are they heading for the countryside? What kind of reception can the US military expect when they arrive in Mogadishu and Somalia?

MR. BROKAW: Well, it's only a guess at this point, but I think that in the city that they'll get a very friendly reception, and over the technicals, as they are called -- they're really cowboys in American terms. These are young men, heavily armed with a wide range of weapons, riding around in pickup trucks. They seem to be under some form of control from General Adid (ph). Those that have gone out of the city, and a fair number of them have, we don't know whose control they're under, at this point, and they're scattered across the countryside. That does cause some concern to the relief people, because they think there could be isolated incidents that might have a domino effect and lead to a larger incident.

MR. RUSSERT: How heavily armed are they, Tom?

MR. BROKAW: Well, they're not in a position to stand up to the enormous military force that the United States can bring to bear on this kind of a situation, that I gather that Defense Secretary Cheney and others have in the planning here, but they could cause a lot of damage. They've killed a lot of each other over the years and there can be a lot of random sniper fire, and random fire kills you just as quickly and just as certainly as directed fire if, in fact, it hits you.

MR. RUSSERT: There've been reports over here about the cowboys, as you call them, taking a drug called qat (ph). How prevalent is that, and how much of a factor will it be?

MR. BROKAW: It's unbelievably prevalent. It's sold in the streets like batches of eucalyptus leaves. People chew on it all day long. It does not put them into a necessarily excited state. It keeps them kind of wired all day long at a fairly steady level, I'm told. I'm not personally familiar with it, but based on everything that we've seen here so far, I would say roughly 80 percent of the population is chewing on it at all times and, certainly, all those technicals, the cowboys with the guns, they've always got a mouthful of leaves.

And they bring this in on a daily basis, and it's one of the ways that they keep these people, we're told, in these various militia.

MR. RUSSERT: Tom Brokaw, you take care of yourself. We'll talk to you again tomorrow morning on the "Today" program.

MR. BROKAW: Okay, Tim.

MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Secretary, you just heard Tom Brokaw. Why haven't we been in touch with the relief organizations and the warlords, telling them what we plan to do in Somalia?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, we will, in fact, be in touch, but it's also important to make a point here that the Marines and the Army

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troops going in will not be the first Americans on the scene. We've flown over 1,400 missions, relief missions, into Somalia since August. We've had several hundred Air Force personnel involved in the effort from Mombasa into Somalia. We've had people in there periodically to repair runways. So we've got a pretty good idea of what the situation is like -- not perfect, by any means, and certainly we will want to be in touch with the appropriate people there.

There are no authorities. There is no structure. There is no government force to deal with, but we do have foreign ambassador Bob Oakley who is en route to the region even as we speak this morning who will be authorized to work with our senior military commander to be a diplomatic and political adviser who can, in fact, intercede with and have conversations with the appropriate people as we get closer to the time of actually deploying forces.

MR. RUSSERT: When will that time be? When the Marines hit the ground in Mogadishu?

SEC. CHENEY: I would expect early next week. We have, for obvious reasons, been a little reluctant to specify a particular hour, but certainly it'll be within a matter of days.

MR. RUSSERT: Tuesday?

SEC. CHENEY: I will leave it just at a matter of days.

MR. RUSSERT: The secretary-general of the United States has said that disarmament is essential for a lasting peace, and also, according to "The New York Times" today, American officials have told Security Council folks at the United Nations that we will, in fact, attempt to confiscate machine guns, mortars, artillery. Will that be part of our mission?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, again, we have to remember what the mission is. The mission is to go in and restore some semblance of order and make it possible for the relief supplies to be distributed and ultimately to turn things over to UN peacekeeping forces.

A means to achieving that objective or to carrying out that mission will be to reduce the level of violence and to deal with the arms that are there, but I would view it as a means to an end, not as an objective in and of itself. It's the kind of thing that our commander on the scene will have the authority to deal with. We may well want to go in and round up troops or weapons. We might want to offer a bounty, as we did when we went into Panama, where, in effect, we paid people to turn in their guns. That may be a very effective way to pacify a particular area.

Those are the kind of judgments that really ought to be made by the commander on the scene, but he'll have all the authority he needs to pursue those concerns.

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MR. RUSSERT: But you would agree there cannot be a lasting peace until much of that arsenal is confiscated?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, we're talking -- it's a relative in a sense, Tim. If you're saying our objective is to round up every AK-47 in Somalia, I'll say no, that's not our objective. There are going to be people left, irresponsible people left with weapons when we depart, but we will have reduced their capabilities to the point where the traditional blue-helmeted UN peacekeeping force can deal with the situation.

But, certainly, we will be concerned about any potential military threat to our own forces, to the relief workers, and we will, in fact, have to deal with some of those elements in order to achieve our objective. But, again, I want to let that local commander on the scene decide exactly how he should proceed, and this question of disarming really ought to be viewed as a means to carrying out our mission.

MR. RUSSERT: Some questions in Congress about the cost of this enterprise. How much have we budgeted for operation?

SEC. CHENEY: We don't know yet exactly what it'll cost. We're working on those figures now. It'll depend a lot on how long the force has to be there and how rapidly we can start to draw down once we deploy.

Of course, the troops would be carried on the budget yesterday. The cost of the deployments, the extra fuel, the operations and maintenance account gets hard hit for this kind of activity. I would guess that it's going to run us perhaps three [hundred million dollars] or \$400 million, but that's a guess at this point. I can't be more precise than that until our numbers crunchers have a chance to look at it.

MR. RUSSERT: Albert?

MR. HUNT: Mr. Secretary, why did we take so long to intervene? Three hundred thousand people have died over the last two years. And why did we wait until George Bush was a lame duck before starting to intervene?

SEC. CHENEY: I think it's important to go back, Al, and look at the sequence of events. There has been a problem for a long time in Somalia. We were there in January of '91. You may remember in the middle of the runup to the war in the Gulf, we sent a special Marine mission in to evacuate our people out of the embassy there, as well as a lot of other foreign nationals.

Since that time, as the situation deteriorated in Somalia, there've been humanitarian relief efforts. We've been part of that since August. We've been flying missions in, the US Air Force

personnel, to carry in food supplies. When that proved to be inadequate because of the chaos in Somalia, we then moved through the United Nations to fly in Pakistani peacekeepers, and the US airlifted in 500 Pakistanis, blue-helmeted forces, about two months ago in the hopes that that would be adequate.

A number of other countries promised that they would send in forces. They did not do that because of the chaos on the ground.

It was only recently that we arrived at the conclusion that the traditional approach would not work, relief organizations, peacekeepers were inadequate to the task, that the situation's so bad on the ground that it takes something more than that, that it takes US combat forces in conjunction with the forces of other nations.

MR. HUNT: Well, let me ask it the other way, then. There's a report in "US News & World Report" this week, a cable from US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone, who warns the State Department about getting entangled in what he calls "the Somalian tar baby," and he goes on to say -- this is a quote -- "I fail to see where the US vital interest is involved here."

Where is the US vital interest involved in Somalia?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I think it's fair to say that Ambassador Hempstone also opposed our humanitarian relief missions. He didn't even want us to fly missions into Somalia. He clearly disagrees with the policy.

I think this is best perceived as a humanitarian mission. It's the kind of situation where, clearly, you don't have the critical interest at stake that we had in the Gulf when Saddam Hussein threatened the world supply of oil, but it is a situation where the United States is the only nation that has the capability that will let us restore the situation to the point where we can deal with it by traditional international means through blue-helmeted forces under the auspices of the United Nations, and it was the president's judgment and concurred in by his advisers that the only way we could, in fact, stop the starvation that is rampant now in Somalia and create a set of circumstances in which those normal methods could work is for the US to intervene, and that's why we've taken (these steps?).

MR. HUNT: Sir, wouldn't that principle hold just as true for a number of other places -- Haiti, Sudan, Liberia? Why aren't we intervening there militarily?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, first of all, I'm always puzzled by this notion. It always comes up. You intervene one place, why don't you intervene everywhere? You have to make judgments. Circumstances differ from country to country. Sometimes you make a judgment based on what is in vital US interests, sometimes you make a judgment

based on the ability of the US to do it versus someone else to do it. Sometimes you do it based upon the cost.

There are sort of four questions I always like to ask when we talk about these kinds of things. First of all, what's the mission? Secondly, can you achieve it by military means? Third, how do you get out? What's the end game? And fourth, what's the cost, especially in terms of casualties. Any one of those might be answered in a negative fashion, and you would decide, then, not to proceed to use military force.

If you're talking about Bosnia, for example, I would argue that a military option probably doesn't make sense in Bosnia, in terms of it being doable. That's -- (inaudible; crosstalk) --

MR. HUNT: One final question about Bosnia, Mr. Secretary. Why does it have to be all or nothing? Why can't we, for instance, arm the Bosnians? Why can't we have some selective bombing of Serbian military targets? Why are we resisting doing even that?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, at this point, we are very actively involved in Bosnia. To suggest that we don't care about that situation or that we're not active there is just not accurate. We're flying humanitarian missions into Sarajevo. We've got medical units in Zagreb. We have provided a lot of logistical support. We're supporting the diplomatic efforts and the economic sanctions. There's a very active -- (inaudible; crosstalk) --

MR. HUNT: What about arming the Bosnians?

SEC. CHENEY: Arming the Bosnians is an option that has been debated. I expect it will be debated again. We have not made a decision at this point to go forward and do that.

MR. HUNT: Are you for it?

SEC. CHENEY: It's part of the UN sanctions at this point to prohibit arming anybody there. You'd have to change the UN policy in order for us to be able to arm the Bosnians.

MR. FRANCIS: Back to Somalia, Mr. Secretary. How do we get out? How do you -- you know, your method of getting out, your fourth criteria, is suspect. Do you really think that'll hold?

SEC. CHENEY: It's not suspect in my mind, Fred. It's one of the key questions we debated as we went through the process of deciding to commit troops. We've already had a large number of nations just in the last 48 hours that the president made his announcement who have committed to send forces, to participate alongside the US, to participate alongside the US in terms of the peacemaking operation and to be there so we can hand off responsibility to them when we leave. That's the key part of the process by which we get out.

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If you're looking for the US to stay until all the problems are solved in Somalia, that is not going to happen. We've been very, very clear on this. I'll go back and remind my friends six months from now when they say, "Well, you didn't accomplish the mission."

Our mission is very precise. Our mission is to restore conditions so that the humanitarian effort can go forward and then to turn over responsibility for securing the country to UN forces. That means that we will withdraw as soon as we can make that transfer -- (inaudible) --

MR. FRANCIS: But if you feed the people and get the supply lines open and then you leave and it breaks down again, what have you accomplished?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, but that's -- listen carefully to what I'm saying, Fred. Once we get through --

MR. FRANCIS: So you're saying any man-for-man UN replacement --

SEC. CHENEY: No, you don't need man for man at all.

Initially when you go in, you need a large US force, which is what we're sending, to make absolutely certain they can deal with the situation and reduce the prospects for violence, but once we reduce the threat, once we've dealt with the warlords and the clan leaders that are there, once we've stabilized the situation, then the normal UN peacekeeping force ought to be able to cope with that, and at that point, we will pass it on to them.

MR. FRANCIS: (Can they?)

SEC. CHENEY: I expect they will be.

MR. FRANCIS: Well, Ambassador Hempstone suggests right next door --

SEC. CHENEY: Ambassador Hempstone --

MR. FRANCIS: -- in Kenya --

SEC. CHENEY: -- was opposed even to providing humanitarian supplies -- (inaudible; crosstalk) --

MR. FRANCIS: But he knows the area --

SEC. CHENEY: -- I think he's wrong.

MR. FRANCIS: -- and he's suggesting --

SEC. CHENEY: No, he doesn't know the area.

MR. FRANCIS: -- a guerrilla conflict, a guerrilla conflict --

SEC. CHENEY: I think that's dead wrong. I don't see any prospect for that. The people I've talked with and that we rely on for advice in this area disagree with Ambassador Hempstone.

MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Secretary, just give us some end line here. Will the troops be out in six months?

SEC. CHENEY: The way we describe it, Tim, is to talk in terms of when we've completed our mission. We do not want to put an artificial deadline on it. We don't want to say that by February 15 or by March 1 the troops will be out. You need to make a judgment based upon, when you've accomplished a mission, what the objective circumstances are on the ground in Somalia. We would like to do it as quickly as possible.

I would hope that before the end of January, we will have been able to begin the process of turning over certain areas of the country to the UN forces. Hopefully, we can do that even before January 20, but, again, the point we've tried to make repeatedly is don't bind us by some artificial date or deadline that has absolutely nothing to do with what's going on on the ground in Somalia.

MR. RUSSERT: But in the same light, you can't perceive any circumstances where United States troops would still be there six months from now?

SEC. CHENEY: I wouldn't -- not in the numbers that we're putting them in now, certainly. I would expect, as General Powell said in our briefing the other day, that we're looking at an operation that'll take two to three months, but after we've done the basic bulk of our work, there still may be a need for various kinds of specialized units to stay. You may want to leave a Marine amphibious ready group off the coast for a while, because that would give the support to the UN blue-helmeted force so that you could deal with the situation if it got out of control. You may want to leave some of our logistics or our medical engineering people there for a longer period of time, because we've got capabilities there that other nations don't have.

But the idea of having a large US combat force on the ground in Somalia for a long time is not a valid one, (in my mind?)

MR. RUSSERT: What percent of the UN blue-helmet force will be Americans?

SEC. CHENEY: I would expect very few. I mean, the blue-helmeted force will come, I think, from nations like Canada and the others who've offered to send forces -- the French, the Italians, Algerians, Nigerians.

MR. RUSSERT: We're back with the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. Mr. Cheney, another issue confronting President-elect Clinton, gays and lesbians in the military. Governor Clinton quotes you as saying that that's a quaint little rule. What does that mean?

SEC. CHENEY: The Governor misquoted me. What I've said previously was the notion that gays constituted a security threat was, I believe I used the phrase, an old chestnut, a bit of an old chestnut.

I've looked at the question with respect to gays in the military. The policy that I inherited is the one that basically says an overtly gay lifestyle is incompatible with military service and having looked at it, I conclude that the best way to proceed was to leave the policy in place.

I think with respect -- ordinarily to gays, that peoples' private lives are their own business. The way I run the civilian side of the Pentagon is in accordance with that principle. But the military's different because you have forced association. People don't have choices about who they associate with. It's difficult to separate out your private life from your professional life in the uniformed military, and it's the judgment of our senior military commanders, which I concur in, that to force gays leading an overt, openly gay lifestyle into our military units would have a detrimental impact upon the cohesiveness of the units and our combat capabilities.

I think that's the correct judgment. Obviously Governor Clinton disagrees.

MR. RUSSERT: But you don't think that gays per se are a security risk?

SEC. CHENEY: No. My judgment is based on the study that was done not too long ago within the Department of Defense that showed that there's no greater proclivity for gays to be disloyal to the United States than there is for straights. That's what I described as a bit of an old chestnut. The problem I have is that -- that it does -- it is very difficult to organize a group and motivate them to serve in combat anyway. I'm not an expert in the subject. I've never done it. But everybody I've talked to who does have experience in this area talks about unit cohesion, the relationship among the members of the group as being absolutely crucial in terms of deciding on whether or not that's a unit capable of combat, of fighting and surviving a combat situation.

When you load extra burdens on those units because we want to pursue some kind of social experiment or some other principle that's

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important to the society, the danger is that you'll make it more difficult for them to do their basic fundamental job and the important thing for us to remember, I think, is that the reason we have a military is to fight and win wars and we should not do anything that makes it more difficult for the people who volunteer to serve in those units to do that.

MR. FRANCIS: It's never been a problem in Israel. Gays are openly gay in the Israeli army. They've never had a problem with unit cohesion --

SEC. CHENEY: Sorry, Fred, but I've given you my rationale. I've given you my judgment. You can argue all you want about the subject. I'm sure we've got gays serving in the military today. It's a question of whether or not you add that burden of having to accept in a unit openly gay individuals pursuing an openly gay lifestyle or homosexual relationships.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me just explore this notion of unit cohesion. There have been times in American history where some members of the combat unit may have objected to someone black being in the unit, someone Jewish being in the unit. I mean, where do we draw the line? Is being gay so unique and so different?

SEC. CHENEY: I think it is.

MR. RUSSERT: And so people can have objections to someone being gay and those will be understood and respected, but objections to other subgroups or other cultures in a society will be --

SEC. CHENEY: No, I think we've done an excellent job of integrating racial groups into our -- racial minorities into the force. That's gone very well. But Colin Powell has spoken to the subject. He's frequently confronted with the notion that this is -- the policy with respect to gays is somehow analogous to the policy with respect to blacks 50 years ago. And he makes the point that those are fundamentally different kinds of situations, that skin color is skin deep. It doesn't go to a person's basic orientation to members of the same sex. When you get into the military situation and you are forcing people to serve under others in terms of the chain of command forcing them to associate with (others?) (you will?) lose the freedom of association that does exist with respect to civilian life. And for those reasons, I think the policy's sound.

MR. RUSSERT: Are you -- (inaudible) -- debate it?

SEC. CHENEY: It is a controversial subject. It is a very difficult, complex subject. I basically don't like discrimination in any form. I don't think this is a question of discrimination. I think this is a question of the military effectiveness of the force and I don't feel that (as a?) secretary of defense that I have the

right to make the change in policy that's going to make life even more difficult for our young men who wear uniforms and go in harms way for the nation by forcing them to adapt to -- to that policy change.

MR. RUSSERT: Governor Clinton did promise during the campaign an immediate repeal on this ban. Would you suggest he not keep his commitment or if he is to keep his commitment, who would you suggest he go about it?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I'm not in the habit of advising Governor Clinton. He hasn't sought my advice --

MR. RUSSERT: (Inaudible) -- advise presidents --

SEC. CHENEY: I advise presidents -- so far only Republican presidents. I think that if he's going to proceed with a change in policy, it's very, very important that it not just be an edict handed down on high by -- by people who do not have to carry out the policy. I think it's very important that he consult closely with -- with the chiefs on the matter, with our military commanders, because they're the ones ultimately who would have to implement a change in policy. And it becomes enormously complex when you start to think about all the changes that have to be made and the way we do business in order to accommodate people who are avowedly gay as members of the US armed forces.

MR. RUSSERT: Albert?

MR. HUNT: Just so I understand, you would not have any problems with someone who is gay being secretary of defense, is that -- is that correct?

SEC. CHENEY: What I've said is that I think on the civilian side of the house, that we ought to operate the way I have operated in terms of my own staff over the years, that peoples' private lives are their private business, that their sexual orientation is not something that ought to be relevant with respect to employment. And I've said and repeated here this morning that I don't think that someone who's gay is automatically a security risk simply because they're gay.

Whether or not somebody ought to serve as secretary of defense who's gay, I mean that's a decision for presidents to make --

MR. HUNT: Let me turn to another issue. As you know, President-elect Clinton has proposed deeper cuts in defense than your administration. In particular, he wants to reduce the force level in Europe to 75 to 100,000 instead of 150,000 that you all have proposed. You've been quite critical of that. My question is with the Cold War over, with the Europeans so prosperous, why shouldn't they pick up the attendant cost of that extra person power over there?

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SEC. CHENEY: Well, I think they already do a great deal. I mean, I won't argue against more burden-sharing. We do everything we can to get our allies to pick up a larger part of the burden, but I -- this notion that somehow everything is now peaceful in Europe and that we don't have to be concerned about (developments?) inside the former Soviet Union or inside the Balkans, that the US can afford to draw down to minimal levels and everything will be fine, I think is a misjudgment. I think the situation in that part of the world is still of vital interest to the United States. I think there's enormous potential there for unrest, instability, problems, conflict --

MR. HUNT: Would it, therefore, be dangerous to go down to 75 to 100,000?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I can't say that. But I would make the argument that the key is to retain the security structure that NATO provides. That's the bedrock foundation of European security that US commitments to NATO basically are what make that work and if we get down to the point where we're pulling down to having a token force there, say, a force that's not a real go to war force, if we send a signal by virtue of our force levels that we no longer care very much about those arrangements, we'll lose our ability to influence events in a critical part of the world --

MR. HUNT: You're not saying 75,000 is a token force though, are you?

SEC. CHENEY: No, I think the important thing I would argue for is capability. It's got to be a real (mandate?) for capability. You've also got to look at our forces in Europe as the kind of forces that we could pull out of Europe to go elsewhere as we did when we took the Seventh Corps out of Germany and set up in the Gulf to defeat Saddam Hussein.

MR. HUNT: One more question, sir. Do you think -- as you know, one of your predecessors, Caspar Weinberger, has been indicted. Do you think President Bush in the next six and a half weeks should pardon Cap Weinberger?

SEC. CHENEY: I haven't advised the President on the question of a pardon for Cap Weinberger. I think the indictment of Cap Weinberger's a travesty. I look at that -- I know, I think, a good deal about the subject. I served on the Intelligence Committee when I was in Congress, I was the senior House Republican on the committee that investigated the Iran-Contra matter, I know personally that Cap opposed the Iran-Contra operation, and the fact that now six years after the fact, after he's retired on a fairly slim reed, the special prosecutor who has yet really to nail anybody and who's spent millions of dollars is out trying to prosecute Cap Weinberger, I think is an outrage. But I have not gotten into the

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business at this point of advising the President on whether or not he ought to issue a pardon.

MR. HUNT: Isn't that relevant, sir? I mean, if you feel so strongly about it, isn't it relevant to address the question --

SEC. CHENEY: If I were to give the President advice on the subject, it would be private anyway, Al. I wouldn't talk about it.

MR. FRANCIS: Let me go to one of the more enduring problems you have faced and the next administration will face, the disintegrating political situation in the Soviet Union and as it -- the security situation there. Example: In the Ukraine, they have Blacheck (ph) bombers that are for sale. Where does this end? What do you do about that? What happens in the out months? Should we buy them? Should we let them sell them to somewhere else? Are the nuclear weapons stable?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, there -- you've listed just a few of the items that we ought to be concerned about (inside Russia?) --

MR. FRANCIS: Some of the more important ones --

SEC. CHENEY: Yeah, the -- the -- I think we're -- what we're seeing in Russia and the former Soviet Union is a revolution of enormous consequence. I think it's going to run for a good many years to come. There's a bit of a tendency for us to think that what is there now has arrived at some stable, steady state that we can forecast will be there ten years from now. I think that's absolutely wrong. I think it's extremely volatile, unpredictable, unstable. We've just seen, just in the last 24 hours, a very close vote in the Congress of Peoples' Deputies. They came very close to stripping some of Boris Yeltsin's key powers away from him. The ethnic problems, the political problems, the economic problems, are enormous and all of these are going to get sorted out atop a stockpile of 30,000 nuclear weapons.

And I have made the case -- would argue again this morning that the challenge in terms of managing that process, in terms of trying to influence it from the standpoint of US policymakers is going to be at least as great if not greater over the next four years than it was over the last four. One of the things that I've been disappointed about this fall has been the fact that foreign policy played absolutely no role whatsoever in the presidential campaign. I would venture to guess this morning that President-elect Clinton will find that he'll spend a lot more time on these issues than he ever anticipated when he -- when he announced for president.

MR. FRANCIS: Should we offer to buy some of those weapons that seem to be on --

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SEC. CHENEY: Well, we are definitely interested, for example, in acquiring highly enriched uranium, weapons grade material. We've had discussions with the Russians about acquiring some of that. The Ukrainians are interested in similar kinds of transactions. I think that if it were my decision to make, I would say yes, we ought to buy it. We ought to get it off the market. We ought to --

MR. FRANCIS: Whether or not the Iranians buy it --

SEC. CHENEY: Rather than to let someone else buy it. Yes.

MR. RUSSERT: So, Mr. Secretary, that little sign down in Little Rock that said "It's the economy, stupid," should say, "It's foreign policy, stupid"?

SEC. CHENEY: I think -- certainly I understand perhaps the political strategy that the Clinton people wanted to pursue in emphasizing the economy, although I think it's important -- I'm not in the economic business, I'm not in the political business, but to point out that the economy is coming back very strong as a result of the President's policies before he leaves office --

MR. RUSSERT: A very political statement, by the way.

SEC. CHENEY: Very political statement. But it's also, I think -- I think it's very important for us to understand the notion that just because the Cold War is over now we can have an administration that can sort of turn its back on the rest of the world and focus just on our domestic economy is a badly flawed concept. You can't have a strong, healthy American economy if you don't have a strong US overseas and we are not going to have the luxury of ignoring developments in the rest of the world.

MR. RUSSERT: We have to take a break here. We'll be back with more from Secretary Cheney after this message.

(Commercial break.)

(MORE)

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MR. RUSSERT: Welcome back to the second half of "Meet the Press." We're speaking with the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. With me today, Al Hunt of the Wall Street Journal, Fred Francis of NBC News.

Mr. Secretary, your favorite part of the program. Now, this is Sunday, the Lord's day, so we place a premium on the truth here. A year ago I asked you about running for President of the United States and you said to me, quote, "The thought's never crossed my mind."

SEC. CHENEY: Right.

MR. RUSSERT: Today --

SEC. CHENEY: Yes, sir?

MR. RUSSERT: -- has the thought ever crossed your mind?

SEC. CHENEY: (Laughs) -- I will have to say in all honesty it has crossed my mind. But I think it's far too soon at this point to make a decision about that. We haven't even gotten the old administration out of town yet, the new Clinton administration sworn in. Clearly it's something I'll look at down the road when the time's right. But it's far too soon, I think, to speculate on that.

MR. RUSSERT: But you are considering running for president in 1996?

SEC. CHENEY: I think that's going farther than I would, Tim. I've had a lot of people raise the possibility with me, talk about it, reporters like you who ask me about it all the time, and what I've said is when the time's right I'll take a look at it.

MR. RUSSERT: But the thought has crossed your mind?

SEC. CHENEY: I cannot any longer say the thought never crossed my mind.

MR. RUSSERT: Who else do you think will run on the Republican side?

SEC. CHENEY: I wouldn't want to speculate. I think we've got a lot of great talented people out there, able individuals with a lot of experience, people like my friend Jack Kemp, Lamar Alexander, Governor Carroll Campbell of South Carolina, a lot of folks who would -- would I think make good candidates and good presidents.

MR. RUSSERT: What are your plans now? You are out of office January 20th. Will you go back home to Wyoming?

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SEC. CHENEY: I plan to spend a lot more time in Wyoming, that's still home and I'd like to be able to spend a significant amount of time there. It's a beautiful part of the world. I'll probably sign on for some corporate boards, be involved with one of the think tanks here in Washington, get out around the country and travel a good bit and speak, and probably dust off my fly rod and get a little bit of time relaxation as well.

MR. RUSSERT: Senator Malcolm Wallop's seat is open in 1994 or up in 1994. Would you think about running for the Senate?

SEC. CHENEY: I haven't ruled anything in or out. I -- really, I can have a pretty good idea of what I plan to do in '93. To look beyond that to 1994, '95, '96, is a little far down the road at this point. I enjoyed very much being Wyoming's Congressman, holding elective office in Wyoming. At some point I may well want to return to elective office in the future. But I have not at this point made any decisions about any of those questions or campaigns.

MR. RUSSERT: Last week we had the situation with Senator Tsongas, his recurring cancer, a lot of discussion about health records. You yourself have had three heart attacks, quadruple bypass. If you ran for president, would you release your medical records?

SEC. CHENEY: I -- certainly I would. I had to go through all of that to get confirmed as Secretary of Defense.

MR. RUSSERT: Also, one other question, is it true that you've been offered the commissionership of baseball?

SEC. CHENEY: I -- I think that would be overstating it. Somebody did, in fact -- (inaudible) -- inquire of me if whether or not I had an interest. I talked with a couple of friends and quickly concluded I did not have an interest.

MR. RUSSERT: You'd rather be president of the United States than commissioner of baseball?

SEC. CHENEY: Nobody's offered me the job, Tim. As I say, there were some people who were involved in the process who wanted to know if I had an interest and I made it clear that I did not.

MR. RUSSERT: Albert?

MR. HUNT: You know, up until 15 seconds ago, in 20 years I've known you, I always thought you were a very wise man. I'm stunned -- (laughter) -- that shocking sense of priority -- Mr. Secretary, let me look backwards, (if we can't?) get much on looking forward. Why did George Bush lose the election do you think?

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SEC. CHENEY: Well, we'll be arguing about that for a long time. I -- I don't think he deserved to lose. I thought he should have won the election. I think he's done an outstanding job, especially in the international arena and I think that the history books will show that he did a good job on the economy too, that in fact the policies he pursued for getting through and out of the recession were the right ones, that we didn't panic or do a bunch of dumb things in terms of pumping up the economy. But I would -- I guess if I had one thing to suggest it would be that we weren't very good about talking about economic policy in terms of describing what we were doing and why we were doing it. And that's extremely important if you're going to get people to sort of ride with you through a difficult period of time, through a recession, rising unemployment, that there be hope there at the end of that chain. And I don't think we were able -- ever able to articulate very well why they could have confidence, that we were, in fact, going to come out of it.

MR. HUNT: Was the President helped or hurt by the Houston convention?

SEC. CHENEY: I think the Houston convention gets a bum rap in many respects. I think a lot of the people who were critical of the convention would never have voted for George Bush anyway. I think -- as I look at it, I think what was different this year in terms of conventions is that usually the Democratic convention's a train wreck. I mean, they usually have chaos on the floor, major battles between various factions and it's portrayed as a group of somewhat flaky people. And our convention as Republicans always looked well organized by comparison. This year around, to give the Clinton people credit, they had a very well organized, well run convention. And the contrast worked against us this year, I think, instead of for us.

MR. HUNT: One final -- let me try one final question. In a number of states around the country, the religious right has become the dominant force in the Republican party, Iowa, Washington, other states. Is that a plus or is that a problem for Republicans?

SEC. CHENEY: I look at it, Al -- I'm always puzzled by this notion that somehow there's a war for the soul of the Republican party. That's nice sounding rhetoric. It's probably interesting news copy. I think there is a great deal of dynamism to the Republican party today, that we've got a wide range of views represented out there. We've got all kinds of folks, young and old, in cities and farms and rich and not so rich, middle income, who are part of the party. And we have great debates over the issues of the day. And it is a dynamic entity. And I think to suggest that we want to exclude anybody, whether it's the religious right or the moderates, is wrong. I don't think we can build a successful political strategy on that. I think we've got to be able to define a set of principles that we can agree upon as a party that represent

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what we stand for and what we want to pursue as national policy and then be able to appeal to the American people on that basis. And I don't think we ought to be in the business of writing off groups of the electorate. I mean, it's exactly the wrong way to proceed.

MR. FRANCIS: Let me switch back over to world security. You're putting your stamp on what Clinton inherits. Somalia being (demonstrated?) as one example. Over the next couple of years, take us through just a few of the more scenarios that you find most troubling. Start with Iran if you would.

SEC. CHENEY: Sure. Well, if you look at the Persian Gulf region, clearly it's very important to maintain our policies on Iraq, maintain sanctions, make certain that Saddam Hussein isn't able to regenerate his capabilities. Iran is worrisome. They are --

MR. FRANCIS: How worrisome?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, fairly worrisome. They've embarked upon a major program of retooling their military machine. They are buying a lot of military hardware various places around the world. They are -- dominate -- would like to dominate the Persian Gulf, I think see themselves as a dominant power in that part of the region, that part of the world, and they've taken some steps on some of the islands in the Gulf that there are disputes with, for example, the United Arab Emirates, where they, in fact, had done -- have undertaken aggressive actions that are worrisome. Clearly we have long-term problems vis-a-vis Iran. We'd like to, I think, to have a better relationship there, but that's a situation we will have to continue to watch.

But you can go on around the globe and find a lot of other potential trouble spots. You can look at North Africa, you can look at Southeast Asia. We've still got major problems in North Korea. There are enough problems out there in the international arena to keep several administrations busy for a good long time to come.

MR. FRANCIS: All right. One bit of advice for President Clinton as he picks a secretary of defense, someone to replace you, you think Aspin is a good choice for that?

SEC. CHENEY: I think Les Aspin would be a good choice. I'm not certain I help anybody's prospects by endorsing them. But clearly Les Aspin is a very able, talented member of Congress. We've served together. So is Sam Nunn.

MR. FRANCIS: Well, that would -- if it were Aspin, it would leave Ron Dellums as the head of that most powerful committee --

SEC. CHENEY: That's right.

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MR. FRANCIS: That a good idea?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, there's something I suppose, a certain sweet justice in the notion that Les Aspin would be secretary of defense -- would have to go back and deal with my good friend Ron Dellums -- (laughter) -- as chairman of the Armed Services Committee -- (laughter). But I found Ron Dellums over the years, although we violently disagree on most of the issues of the day, that he's been a good member of Congress, a straight shooter. He's always, always kept his word to me and he's been chairman of one of the key subcommittees of the Armed Service Committee now for a long period of time. So I don't automatically conclude that Ron Dellums would be a -- a problem from the standpoint of doing the job that needs to be done on defense.

MR. RUSSERT: How about Congressman Dave McCurdy?

SEC. CHENEY: Dave I don't think, in my view, has as broad a background as Les Aspin or Sam Nunn. He is -- he's worked the intelligence side of things, but I think Nunn and Aspin have a broader base of experience with respect to the Armed Services Committee.

MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Secretary, thanks for coming by. We hope you'll come back as candidate Cheney, Secretary Cheney, Senator Cheney or President Cheney or --

SEC. CHENEY: Lame duck --

MR. RUSSERT: -- lame duck Cheney -- (laughter) --

SEC. CHENEY: All right --

MR. HUNT: Baseball commissioner --

MR. RUSSERT: Or Commissioner Cheney -- (laughter) -- thanks very much for joining us this morning.

SEC. CHENEY: Thank you.

END

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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CHRON FILE

February 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RC*
FROM: SUSAN RICE *SR*
SUBJECT: Request for a Presidential Meeting with
Ambassador Robert Oakley

Attached is a Schedule Proposal for a Presidential meeting with Ambassador Oakley. We believe that an office call represents an opportunity for the President to thank Ambassador Oakley, but also to hear his impressions and insights from his time in Somalia. Please note that if it is impossible to schedule a presidential meeting, a meeting with you is the desired alternative.

Concurrences by: Dennis Jett, Randy Beers, Michael Sheehan *MS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab A List of Participants

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

	<u> </u> ACCEPT	<u> </u> REGRET	<u> </u> PENDING
TO:	Marcia L. Hale Assistant to the President and Director of Scheduling and Advance		
FROM:	ANTHONY LAKE		
REQUEST:	Meeting with Ambassador Robert Oakley		
PURPOSE:	To congratulate Ambassador Oakley for his service in Somalia and to glean his views of the challenges facing the U.S. and UN as the USG transfers leadership in Somalia to the UN.		
BACKGROUND:	Ambassador Oakley returns from Somalia on March 4, having completed his duties as U.S. Special Envoy.		
PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:	None.		
DATE AND TIME:	March 5 or anytime during the week of March 8, 1993.		
DURATION:	1/2 hour		
LOCATION:	Oval Office		
PARTICIPANTS:	List attached		
OUTLINE OF EVENTS:	Welcome, brief discussion and photo-op		
REMARKS REQUIRED:	To be completed by Randy Beers and Susan Rice.		
MEDIA COVERAGE:	No.		
FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE:	No.		
VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE:	Yes.		
SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE:	No.		
RECOMMENDED BY:	Anthony Lake		
CONTACT:	Robert Houdek, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs		

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President and Deputy
for National Security Affairs

Richard A. Clarke, Senior Director, Global Issues and
Multilateral Affairs

Robert Oakley, U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia