Case Number: 2006-0191-F

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Transnational Threats Chron Files, September 1998 [5]
Staff Office-Individual: TNT-Clarke
Original OA/ID Number: 1758

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	3	8	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Office of National Drug Control Policy Report on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act12 (1 page)	09/10/1998	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Statement of Administration Policy on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/15/1998	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Revised - Statement of Administration policy on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/15/1998	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Defense - Report on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/08/1998	P1/b(1)
005. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Treasury - Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/15/1998	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Justice - Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/14/1998	P1/b(1)
007. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Office of National Drug Control Policy Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/14/1998	P1/b(1)
008. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Revised Transportation - Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/14/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [5]

2006-0191-F
jp244

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806291
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 98 06

TO: DAVIES

FROM: KENNEY, K

DOC DATE: 10 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ576

KEYWORDS: DRUGS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OFFICE OF NATL DRUG CONTROL POLICY RPT ON HR 4300 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG

DUE DATE: 14 SEP 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
ROSA	BAKER	CLARKE
		DOBBINS

9/16

Carolyn -
Please close all these out by annotating: "Telephone comments provided; NFAR"...
I do not need any copies...
Tx,
Fred

COMMENTS: ** DEADLINE IS 11:00 AM MONDAY 14 SEP 98 **
9/16/98 NFAR - Telephone comments provided
F Rosa

DISPATCHED BY ________________ DATE ________ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

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National Security Council
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Christopher S. Johns
Andrew W. Kleine
Edward H. Chase
M. Jill Gibbons
Charles W. Fox
Pamula L. Simms
Ellen J. Balis
Jim Jukes

LRM ID: REJ576 **SUBJECT:** Office of National Drug Control Policy Report on HR4300 Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

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RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM

If your response to this request for views is short (e.g., concur/no comment), we prefer that you respond by e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is short and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistant.

You may also respond by:
(1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); or
(2) sending us a memo or letter
Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

TO: Ronald E. Jones Phone: 395-3386 Fax: 395-3109
Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454

FROM: ______________________ (Date)

______________________ (Name)

______________________ (Agency)

______________________ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No Objection

_____ No Comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: ______________

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this response sheet

Draft

September 11, 1998

The Honorable Lee Hamilton
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Hamilton:

The purpose of this letter is to respond to your request for ONDCP's view of H.R. 4300, The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. The effort and concern invested in the Bill reflects our shared objectives of making our national drug control programs more effective. The Bill contains many policy initiatives and additional budget authorities that could prove worthwhile. The Bill, however, would authorize $2.6 billion for counter narcotics programs in a manner that is inconsistent with the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*. The drug control budget transmitted by the President to Congress details the means by which our long-term strategic vision can be implemented, measured, and adapted to secure our shared goal of reducing drug use and its consequences.

The President's international drug control strategy and programs have been quite successful over the last two years and include the following successes:

- **Source Zone.** Source country programs contributed to a 40 percent reduction in coca cultivation in Peru from 1995 to 1997 and an overall 15 percent reduction in global potential cocaine production in 1997.
- **Transit Zone.** U.S. supported programs achieved record cocaine seizures in the transit zone (86 tons) in 1997.
- **Domestic U.S.** Cocaine prices rose in the United States during 1997 at both the wholesale and retail level for the first time in six years.

Despite these successes, we face significant source and transit zone interdiction challenges. Traffickers continue to move significant quantities of illegal drugs into the United States using a great variety of routes and methods. Their use of fast boats and commercial maritime traffick continues to increase. The expansion of cultivation into Colombia offers both international drug control and national security challenges to the United States.

The Administration has been working to build on these successes and address these challenges . Under ONDCP and the United States Interdiction Coordinator's leadership, the interagency has identified asset requirements to produce an optimum, flexible force which is more efficient and effective than the current force structure. Through rigorous analytical methodology, the recommended force structure responds to the existing drug trafficking threat and supports a comprehensive strategic vision and operational concept. In contrast, the proposed legislation is not directly linked to the existing drug trafficking threat, nor is it tied to a strategic vision or operational concept. In all too many instances, the Bill provides authority to procure material that will prove to be of marginal utility in implementing the strategy.

The Administration has also been working to streamline interdiction command and control. This year the interagency review of the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) resulted in a major revision to the NICCP which improved coordination and planning of joint, combined, interagency, and international counterdrug operations. This evolution in command and control continues with current planning efforts to consolidate JIATF-East and South and to institutionalize force planning procedures on an annual basis. However, we believe the Bill unduly micro-manages interdiction command and control structure in the Executive Branch to an unprecedented degree. Including JIATF-West and JTF-6 in the consolidation would be counterproductive.

The Bill also intrudes inappropriately on well established, effective procedures for United States foreign military assistance programs. The specificity of the Bill would impair the ability of the Executive to consult with affected foreign governments and conform U.S. assistance to evolving requirements. It would also intrude on the Secretary of State's flexibility in personnel matters and the President's appointment prerogatives.

The President has set the course for the Nation's drug control effort through the establishment of Impact Targets. In the area of supply reduction, the Impact Target is: *Reduce drug availability in the United States by 25 percent by 2002, and by 50 percent by 2007 compared with that in the 1996 base year*. In contrast, H.R. 4300 calls for an 80% reduction of cocaine and heroin flow into the United States in three years. The performance targets of the Bill are simply not achievable and are disconnected from much of the budget authority. For example, much of the equipment procurement the Bill would authorize requires greater than 3 years to reach the field.

Accomplishment of our national drug control goals and performance targets in the source and transit zone requires long term commitment of resources to support a unifying strategic vision. However, the *National Drug Control Strategy* recognizes that the strategy must operate in a changing environment against a thinking opponent. Changes in the strategic environment or in trafficker operations could require us to rapidly reassess and alter our own response. In contrast, H.R. 4300 identifies specific resources for use in specific locations. Such congressional micro-management takes away the flexibility necessary to move forces in response to a shifting threat. Other concerns with the Bill are outlined in the attached paper.

We can substantially reduce the availability of drugs in the United States over the next ten years. We currently enjoy in the cocaine source countries proven programs supporting host governments with the political will to inflict long term damage to the illegal cocaine industry. We should continue to build on this source country success through bipartisan support of the President's FY 1999 Budget Request for international drug control strategy.

Sincerely,

Barry R. McCaffrey
Director

ENC. Analysis of H. R. 4300

The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act
H.R. 4300

I. General Comments.

- **Performance targets**. H.R. 4300 calls for an 80% reduction of cocaine and heroin flow into the United States in three years. Yet much of the equipment procurement the Bill authorizes requires longer lead times to reach the field. The performance targets of the Bill are simply not achievable and are disconnected from much of the budget authority.

- **Outyear funding risks**. The short term (three year) nature of the Bill brings significant out year funding risks. Investment in capital assets without operating funds for those resources beyond expiration of the Bill would require short term work force growth without long term support.

- **Budget discrepancies**. Funding levels in many cases do not represent annualized resource requirements or include start-up costs.

- **Unbalanced force structure**. Since the Bill is not tied to an operational concept, the capabilities of the resulting force would be unbalanced. For example, the Bill does not address increased intelligence collection and support and deployable logistics required to support pulse operations, capabilities critical to interdiction success.

II. Enhanced Source and Transit Country Coverage

- **Observation aircraft in source and transit countries**. While additional observation aircraft may be useful in the source and transit countries, the Schweizer aircraft should not be identified in law and the observation/spray contract Schweizer aircraft for eradication should be transferred to the Department of State. The J-31 observation aircraft does not exist and there is no clear requirement for that aircraft.

- **P-3 aircraft**. The Bill authorizes procurement of 10 P-3 Airborne Early Warning aircraft and 10 P-3B long endurance trackers (Slicks). This procurement far exceeds any Administration assessment of needs. The authority for the Operations and Maintenance funding stream for these aircraft ends just as the aircraft are entering operational service.

- **USCG MEC**. The Bill authorizes $300 million for construction of six USCG medium endurance cutters. Construction of such cutters will require long lead times and must be integrated into the overall USCG five year plan. The existing USCG Five Year budget calls for procurement of six High Endurance Cutters with the concept of converting retiring Perry Class Frigates to fill the resource gap in the Eastern Pacific. The USCG plan is far superior and will result in more capable platforms, with a better suite of sensors, that is synchronized with existing support and aviation infrastructure, entering service sooner. In addition, purchase of any new cutters would require outyear OE funding.

- **DoD ROTHR.** The Bill authorizes $15 million for deployment of an additional Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar. (ROTHR). Deploying the system to provide coverage in the Eastern Pacific and South America could prove beneficial but may not be worth the additional costs given the increasing shift from air to maritime smuggling modes.

III. Enhanced Eradication and Interdiction Strategy in Source Countries

- **Upgrading Colombian UH-1H Helicopters.** DoD does not provide support to any helicopters in Colombia. The Department of State currently is upgrading such helicopters and this authority should more appropriately be provided to the Secretary of State.

- **Mexico:** Both opium eradication in Mexico and securing diplomatic immunity and the right to carry a weapon for federal agents in Mexico are important in their own right. Efforts to secure privileges for law enforcement agents stationed in Mexico should not be limited to DEA agents. However, it is inappropriate to link these privileges to the procurement of helicopters in the manner set forth in the Bill. In addition, Mexico has not requested Bell 212's, nor indicated what it might use such helicopters for if they were purchased.

- **Operation and maintenance funding for five riverine operations maintenance platforms in support of Columbia**. This expanded authority could prove helpful to administration efforts to expand source country riverine interdiction operations.

- **Foreign Military Sales**. The Bill gives sole responsibility to the Department of Defense for implementation and processing of Foreign Military Sales requests providing the Department of State a consultative role. This provision is confusing and counterproductive. If Congress were to direct State to restart Counterdrug Foreign Military Financing in cocaine source countries, their purposes would be better served and the Administration should support such a request.

- **INL-DEA**. Transferring INL operational responsibilities to DEA would impose on DEA foreign assistance functions which may be inconsistent with their statutory responsibilities.

IV. Enhanced International Law Enforcement Training

- **Maritime training vessels**. The Bill authorizes funds for the Department of Transportation to establish, operate, and maintain maritime training and maintenance vessels. This initiative supports commitments made at the Barbados summit and should be supported.

- **Maritime Law Enforcement Training Center.** This should be a part of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) . FLETC was created to standardize federal law enforcement training, and maritime law enforcement training should be no exception.

- **Training with the Coast Guard in Panama and to support the Counterdrug Intelligence Center in Venezuela.** This is a valid requirement.

V. Enhanced Drug Transit and Source Zone Law Enforcement Operations and Equipment

- **Positioning Navy assets in support of an Operation FRONTIER LANCE-style surge operation and a nonlethal technology program to enhance countermeasures against go-fast boats**. This is a valid requirement.

- **JIATF consolidation**. The Bill authorizes consolidation of the Joint Interagency Task Forces East, West, South and JTF-6 in Key West Florida to help streamline interdiction command and control. Planning for the consolidation of JIATF-East and South is already in progress. Including JIATF-West and JTF-6 in the consolidation would be counterproductive and result in the reduced interdiction effort in the Eastern Pacific and less intelligence and training support to confront the Asian heroin problem. The Bill intrudes on the traditional prerogatives of the National Command Authority ability to establish the most effective and efficient chain of command based on operational military considerations.

- **Acquisition and construction of an airbase for counternarcotics support in the Southern Caribbean, Northern South America, and Eastern Pacific**. The Department of State and Southern Command are working with Honduras, Costa Rica, Curacao, Peru, and Ecuador to find an appropriate location. We estimate the acquisition, buildup, and operation of such a base to be $165 million in Fiscal Year 1999, $171 million in Fiscal Year 2000, and $125 million in Fiscal Year 2001.

- **Forward Looking Infrared and Global Positioning System in support of Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos.** This is a valid requirement

- **USCG sensors**. The funding authority for USCG GPS and FLIR enhancement ($11.1 million) is inefficient and does not support Coast Guard Five Year budget plans. Purchase of a single sensor component is not consistent with USCG strategy to build a standardized capability throughout the fleet. It is more operationally efficient and cost effective to procure sensors as part of a integrated package tailored to aircraft and mission and not as separate components.

UNCLASSIFIED
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RECORD ID: 9806339
RECEIVED: 15 SEP 98 12

URGENT

TO: DAVIES

FROM: WEINBERG, J

DOC DATE: 15 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ582

KEYWORDS: DRUGS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF ADMIN POLICY ON HR-4300 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG DUE DATE: 15 SEP 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA LOGREF: 9805366 9806195

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
ROSA	BAKER	CLARKE

9/16

Carolyn -

Please close all these out by annotating: "Telephonic comments provided; NFAR"...

I do not need any copies...

Tx,
Fred

URGENT

COMMENTS: *** URGENT: DUE 15 SEP AT 4:00 P.M. ***
9/16/98 NFAR - Telephone comments provided
F Rosa

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Statement of Administration Policy on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/15/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [5]

2006-0191-F
jp244

RESTRICTION CODES

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Vernetta Tanner
David J. Haun
Christopher S. Johns
Andrew W. Kleine
Edward H. Chase
M. Jill Gibbons
Charles W. Fox
Pamula L. Simms
Ellen J. Balis

LRM ID: REJ582 **SUBJECT:** Statement of Administration Policy on HR4300 Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM

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Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

TO: Ronald E. Jones Phone: 395-3386 Fax: 395-3109
Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454

FROM: ______________________ (Date)

______________________ (Name)

______________________ (Agency)

______________________ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No Objection

_____ No Comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _________

_____ Other: ______________________

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this response sheet

September 15, 1998
(House)

H.R. 4300 - Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act
(McCollum (R) Florida and 54 cosponsors)

The Administration supports the objectives of H.R. 4300 and shares the Congress' commitment to reducing the supply of drugs coming into the United States from other countries in the Western Hemisphere. However, the Administration has a number of concerns about H.R. 4300 and cannot support the bill as currently drafted. These concerns include:

- Funding enhancements that are not tied to a coherent strategy. The bill simply enumerates a series of specific procurement and funding actions without indicating how they relate to one another or to existing drug interdiction activities. The Administration has proposed a comprehensive and integrated approach to reducing the flow of drugs into the United States in its National Drug Control Strategy.

- Establishing goals that are unrealistic and unattainable. For example, H.R. 4300 would establish a goal of total eradication of the coca and opium poppy in the western Hemisphere in four years.

- Proposing authorizations that are far in excess of expected appropriations and the President's Budget without specifying where these funds will come from. H.R. 4300 would authorize \$2.6 billion in appropriations in addition to those already authorized for FYs 1999-2001.

- Infringing on the authority of the President and the Secretary of States. H.R. 4300 would infringe on the President's appointment powers and the Secretary of State's flexibility in personnel matters and intrudes upon well established procedures for providing foreign military assistance.

- Suggesting the transfer of the Bureau of international Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs from the State Department to the Drug Enforcement Administration. The clear assumption of Section 207 is that certain foreign assistance activities of the State Department could be better carried out by a law enforcement agency. This assumption is neither substantiated nor soundly based.

- Imposing inflexible requirements that could quickly become useless. The bill would authorize funds for two mobile x-ray machines to be placed along a specific highway in Bolivia. The locations of such machines should not be specified by statute but left to the discretion of the commanders on the ground.

- Reducing the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies by consolidating joint interagency task forces (JIATF). Consolidating all JIATFs would reduce DoD support to law enforcement agencies attempting disrupt the flow of drugs from Asia and the Southwest Border.

The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress to implement a drug control strategy that is realistic, comprehensive, coherent, and flexible.

* * * * * * *

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806356
RECEIVED: 15 SEP 98 16

TO: DAVIES

URGENT

FROM: WEINBERG, J

DOC DATE: 15 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ585

KEYWORDS: DRUGS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REVISED STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON HR-4300 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG   DUE DATE: 15 SEP 98   STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA   LOGREF: 9805366   9806195

FILES: WH   NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
ROSA	BAKER	CLARKE

9/16

Carolyn -

Please close all these out by annotating: "Telephone comments provided; NFAR"...

I do not need any copies...

Tx,
Fred

URGENT

COMMENTS: **** URGENT: DUE 15 SEP @ 5:00 P.M. ****
9/16/98 - NFAR - Telephone comments provided. per F Rosa

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OPENED BY: NSTSM   CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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Michael F. Crowley
Kimberly A. Maluski
Kenneth L. Schwartz
Vernetta Tanner
David J. Haun
Christopher S. Johns
Andrew W. Kleine
Edward H. Chase
M. Jill Gibbons
Charles W. Fox
Pamula L. Simms
Ellen J. Balis

LRM ID: REJ585 **SUBJECT:** REVISED Statement of Administration Policy on HR4300 Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

**RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM**

If your response to this request for views is short (e.g., concur/no comment), we prefer that you respond by e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is short and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistant.

You may also respond by:

(1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); or

(2) sending us a memo or letter

Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

TO: Ronald E. Jones Phone: 395-3386 Fax: 395-3109
Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454

FROM: ______________________ (Date)

______________________ (Name)

______________________ (Agency)

______________________ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No Objection

_____ No Comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _______

_____ Other: ______________________

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September 15, 1998
(House)

H.R. 4300 - Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act
(McCollum (R) Florida and 54 cosponsors)

The Administration supports the objectives of H.R. 4300 and shares the Congress' commitment to reducing the supply of drugs coming into the United States from other countries in the Western Hemisphere. However, the Administration *opposes* ~~has a number of concerns about~~ H.R. 4300 ~~and cannot support the bill~~ as currently drafted. ~~These~~ *The Administration's* concerns include:

- Funding enhancements that are not tied to a coherent strategy. The bill simply enumerates a series of specific procurement and funding actions without indicating how they relate to one another or to existing drug interdiction activities. The Administration has proposed a comprehensive and integrated approach to reducing the flow of drugs into the United States in its National Drug Control Strategy.

- Establishing goals that are unrealistic and unattainable. For example, H.R. 4300 would establish a goal of total eradication of the coca and opium poppy in the western Hemisphere in four years.

- Proposing authorizations that are far in excess of expected appropriations and the President's Budget without specifying where these funds will come from. H.R. 4300 would authorize $2.6 billion in appropriations in addition to those already authorized for FYs 1999-2001. *To date, Congress has not aappropriated funds for many of the Administration's anti-drug abuse requests.*

- Infringing on the authority of the President and the Secretary of State. H.R. 4300 would infringe on the President's appointment powers and the Secretary of State's flexibility in personnel matters and intrudes upon well established procedures for providing foreign military assistance.

- Suggesting the transfer of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs from the State Department to the Drug Enforcement Administration. The clear assumption of Section 207 is that certain foreign assistance activities of the State Department could be better carried out by a law enforcement agency. This assumption is neither substantiated nor soundly based.

- Imposing inflexible requirements that could quickly become useless. The bill would authorize funds for two mobile x-ray machines to be placed along a specific highway in

Bolivia. The locations of such machines should not be specified by statute but left to the discretion of the commanders on the ground.

- Reducing the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies by consolidating joint interagency task forces (JIATF). Consolidating all JIATFs would reduce DoD support to law enforcement agencies attempting disrupt the flow of drugs from Asia and the Southwest Border.

The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress to implement a drug control strategy that is realistic, comprehensive, coherent, and flexible.

* * * * * * *

RECORD ID: 9806195
RECEIVED: 09 SEP 98 09

TO: DAVIES

FROM: WEINBERG, J

DOC DATE: 08 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ574

KEYWORDS: DRUGS
CARIBBEAN
LATIN AMERICA
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEFENSE RPT ON HR-4300 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG   DUE DATE: 10 SEP 98   STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA   LOGREF:

FILES: WH   NSCP: CODES:

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ROSA	BAKER	DOBBINS

9/16/98

Carolyn -
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Tx, fred

COMMENTS: DUE THU 10 SEP AT NOON
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RECORD ID: 9806195
RECEIVED: 09 SEP 98 09

SUSPENSE

TO: DAVIES

FROM: WEINBERG, J

DOC DATE: 08 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ574

KEYWORDS: DRUGS, CARIBBEAN, LATIN AMERICA, LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEFENSE RPT ON HR-4300 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG   DUE DATE: 10 SEP 98   STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA   LOGREF:

FILES: WH   NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

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ROSA	BAKER	DOBBINS
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Defense - Report on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [5]

2006-0191-F
jp244

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Edward H. Chase
M. Jill Gibbons
Charles W. Fox
Pamula L. Simms
Ellen J. Balis

LRM ID: REJ574 SUBJECT: DEFENSE Report on HR4300 Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM

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FROM: ______________________ (Date)

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______________________ (Agency)

______________________ (Telephone)

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_____ Concur

_____ No Objection

_____ No Comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _________

_____ Other: ______________________

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this response sheet

Dear Mr. Chairman: (to be sent Rep. McCollum, chairman of the H. Judiciary Crime Subcommittee)

This is in response to your request for the views of the Department of Defense with regard to H.R. 4300, 95th Congress, a bill "To support enhanced drug interdiction efforts in the major transit countries and support a comprehensive supply eradication and crop substitution program in source countries."

The Department of Defense supports enhanced drug interdiction but has several concerns with the manner that H.R. 4300 would require that program to work. While we support additional observation aircraft in source and transit countries, we do not think legislation should specify the platform. The Schweizer aircraft should not be identified in law and the observation/spray contract Schweizer aircraft for eradication should be transferred to the Department of State. The J-31 observation aircraft, for which H.R. 4300 would authorize $12 million does not exist and we have no clear requirement for that aircraft.

The Department supports the authority for the acquisition and construction of an airbase for counternarcotics support in the Southern Caribbean, Northern South America, and Eastern Pacific. The Department of State and our Southern Command are working with Honduras, Costa Rica, Curacao, Peru, and Ecuador to find an appropriate location. We estimate the acquisition, buildup, and operation of such a base to be $165 million in Fiscal Year 1999, $171 million in Fiscal Year 2000, and $125 million in Fiscal Year 2001.

We cannot support H.R. 4300's authority to the Department of Defense for an over-the-horizon radar for Eastern Pacific and South America (the threat in part of this area is nonexistent and we have sufficient coverage in the other areas), for an aerostat at Georgetown, Exuma in the Bahamas (we operated an aerostat in this area prior to 1995 and it did not contribute to interdiction operations; such an aerostat would cost $15 million to prepare the site and procure the equipment (FY 99) and $3 million per year thereafter to operate the site), for a DoD ground based radar in Guantanamo Bay (such a radar in this area would provide limited capability in a low air threat area and the Federal Aviation Administration will operate and maintain a ground based radar in 1999), or for our upgrading Colombian National Police UH-IH helicopters to Huey II configurations (we do not provide support to any helicopters in Columbia; the Department of State currently is upgrading such helicopters and this authority more appropriately should be provided the Secretary of State).

We do support operation and maintenance funding for five riverine operations maintenance platforms in support of Columbia (we request the language in the bill be changed to "up to five riverine operations maintenance platforms"), and such funding for riverine small boat maintenance in support of Peru (we also need funds for operation of the craft). We support section 402 (c) and (d) with regard to training with the Coast Guard in Panama and to support the Counterdrug Intelligence Center in Venezuela. The authority for deployment of acoustic buoys in the Florida Straits and the Bahamas (section 501(c)(1)) directly supports Drug Enforcement Agency operations and accordingly should be provided to the Justice Department. We support positioning Navy assets in support of Frontier Lance and a nonlethal technology program to enhance countermeasures against go-fast boats. The Forward Looking Infrared and Global Positioning System in support of Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos is a valid requirement.

We do not agree with merging or consolidating the joint task forces as provided in section 501(c)(4). USCINCSOUTH is currently merging JIATF-E and JIATF-S. This will provide a single counterdrug headquarters (unity of command) responsible for both the source and transit zones, for which this authorization/funding could be used. JIATF-W and JTF-6 have separate and distinct missions and areas of responsibility. They support and are supported by CINCPAC and CINUSACOM, respectively. JIATF-E/S, JIATF-W, and JTF-6 should remain in alignment with the Unified Command Plan and in accordance with the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP).

We defer to other agencies with regard to the specific authorities that would be provided by this legislation. We look forward to working with your Committee to eliminate drug production and transportation in this area.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of these views for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

Judith A. Miller

Message Sent To: ______________________________

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RECORD ID: 9806340
RECEIVED: 15 SEP 98 12

TO: BERGER

URGENT

FROM: WEINBERG, J

DOC DATE: 15 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ584

KEYWORDS: DRUGS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TREASURY TESTIMONY ON HR-4300 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG   DUE DATE: 15 SEP 98   STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA   LOGREF: 9805366   9806195

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9/16/98

Carolyn -
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Tx, Fred

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COMMENTS: *** URGENT: DUE 15 SEP @ 5:00 P.M. ***
9/16/98 NFAR No comments provided
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Treasury - Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/15/1998	P1/b(1)

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DRAFT

Statement of Samuel H. Banks
Deputy Commissioner
United States Customs Service

Before the
United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and
Caucus on International Narcotics Control

September 16, 1998

Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committee and Caucus, I would like to thank you for your continued support and interest in the efforts of the U.S. Customs Service against the global scourge of drug trafficking.

It is a pleasure to appear before the distinguished Committee and Caucus today to discuss S.2341, the "Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act," as it relates to the United States Customs Service, particularly our air and marine interdiction programs.

As one of the agencies primarily involved in the Nation's drug interdiction and enforcement efforts, our mission is not only to disrupt the flow of illegal drugs through seizures and arrests, but also to dismantle drug organizations via investigations throughout our assigned areas of responsibility. Customs remains at the forefront of our Nation's narcotics interdiction and investigative efforts. Our foremost priority continues to be narcotics interdiction.

AIR PROGRAM

Comprised of 114 operational aircraft, the mandate of the U.S. Customs Air Program is to disrupt organizations that are smuggling drugs and other contraband into the United States by aircraft. This is accomplished through the utilization of a three-pronged, intelligence, interdiction and investigative approach. To this end, the Air Interdiction Division dedicates its resources throughout the hemisphere to detect, sort, intercept, track and ultimately apprehend traffickers and seize their contraband.

Drugs coming to the United States from South America pass through a six million square-mile area that is roughly the size of the United States. This area, referred to as the Transit Zone, includes the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific Ocean.

Customs Double Eagle missions, a P-3 AEW flying in tandem with a P-3 Slick, provide the most effective detection and monitoring package available. Flying together, these aircraft have effectively worked both air and maritime targets ranging from South American air bridge movements to high-speed go-fast boats in the Caribbean.

For optimum coverage of known drug smuggling routes, we believe that a comprehensive deployment of long-range, radar-equipped, detection aircraft P-3 AEW is required. These aircraft should be placed in all three drug smuggling zones (Arrival, Transit, Source). Coordinated operations must be conducted in all zones to attain best interdiction results and track changes in smuggling trends.

The P-3 [Slick] is used in Double Eagle missions to provide simultaneous air and maritime interdiction mission support as well as other special mission capabilities such as the Customs Airborne Stabilized Optical System (CASOS).

Any concept of operations requiring detection and monitoring should also address tracking assets. The U.S. Customs "Double Eagle" concept is still the best suited package for all three drug smuggling zones. Although a fleet of P-3AEW aircraft would suffice for detection purposes, operational "tracker" requirements suggest that the P-3 Slick is one of the most cost effective assets available. Additionally, the P-3 Slick (P-3 with forward looking infrared and interceptor radar) has been used effectively to intercept and track both aircraft and vessels and to conduct stand-off surveillance against drug facilities. Key to the success of the P-3 Slick is its endurance, small deployment footprint, and extensive sensor array. The aircraft can operate from most 8,000 foot runways and is supported by a ground maintenance team of only three people. The ratio of P-3AEWs to P-3 Slicks should ideally be one to one.

Should new aircraft be authorized, we have determined that the time line to modify and provide the 10 AEW and 10 SLICK aircraft if started first quarter 1999, should be completed in the second or third quarter of 2003. This equates to four airplanes per year.

Advance funding would be needed to recruit, hire, and train additional aircrew before the aircraft become available. This equates to approximately 11 aircrew per aircraft and the addition of approximately 46 management and support positions for a total of 264 people to fully support the 20 more P-3 aircraft. If this process was not started early enough, we would be unable to fully utilize the additional aircraft as they become operational.

Further, once all aircraft became operational, the total estimated annual operation and maintenance cost would be approximately $81 Million.

In addition, funding of associated support facilities such as hangar space, overhead cranes, training, and perhaps a training facility, including simulators, or year-round access to such facilities would be needed.

Of note, our current P-3 facility at Corpus Christi, Texas, is not sufficient to handle 20 additional aircraft. Even with construction of a second hangar, expected in the near future, space for additional growth is extremely limited.

To address space and coverage requirements, it makes sense both operationally and logistically to return to a split-base concept. Split P-3 bases could be utilized to better facilitate coverage across the entire Southern border of the United States. In this regard, historical P-3 operations demonstrate the value of creating a second P-3 air branch along the Southeast coast of the United States. This would allow relatively short transits to the Bahamas, Central Caribbean, and Puerto Rico.

The opening of a second P-3 base operation would require funding to construct and furnish a two or three bay hangar/office facility. Ground support equipment, tools, etc., would also be needed. Cost of such a facility would need to be determined, but for comparison, the additional hangar at the Surveillance Support

Branch in Corpus Christi would cost approximately $5.5 Million to $6.0 Million.

There are two places in Florida that are being evaluated as possible bases. They are NAS Jacksonville and Cecil Field, Jacksonville, Florida. Either of these locations would lower the cost of the split-base concept implementation.

NAS Jacksonville is wholly suitable for P-3 operations. All P-3 maintenance and parts supply lines are in place. USCS P-3 operations are already supported by Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, Intermediate Aviation Maintenance Depot, Naval Aviation Supply Depot and Fleet Replacement Squadron 30. There is an existing aircraft wash rack; all necessary Air Traffic Control requirements are fully functional; and from a quality of life viewpoint, NAS Jacksonville is outstanding. Jacksonville is a relatively low cost of living area and is not a hurricane prone area of Florida.

The second option reviewed is Cecil Field. Cecil Field is not as advantageous as NAS Jacksonville but certainly could be made to work and it does have runways sufficient for P-3 operations.

An expanded logistical capability to support foreign based detachments would be required. This is especially critical if such a large fleet of aircraft is required to operate without access to facilities at Howard Air Force Base. An aircraft capable of serving as a "flying tool box" would greatly extend our reach; it could carry extra parts, ground support equipment, and maintenance personnel. We would plan to deploy this support aircraft to operational sites along with two or three P-3's. A total of two transport category aircraft [i.e., C-130] would be best, with one being based at each USCS P-3 branch location.

Additionally, S.2341, the "Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act" provides for the operation and maintenance support for 10 United States Customs Service Citation Aircraft to be dedicated to the Source and Transit Zones.

With our personnel shortages and the 10 Citation Lot 3 aircraft we currently have available, the U.S. Customs Service could not support this tasking without additional aircraft and personnel.

If Customs provided the 10 full-time trackers as requested, we would be unable to provide quick reaction interceptor capability along our U.S. borders.

(Note: Lot 3 Citation aircraft are the most capable of our Citations given the weight limitations/restrictions of the Source Zone mission. With Lot 3 aircraft, we are still on occasion, required to download fuel but to a much lesser extent).

Funding for the procurement and operations and maintenance costs of an additional seven interceptor/tracker aircraft and crew/support personnel would be required.

The aforementioned assets for the U.S. Customs Service as depicted in S.2341 would increase our interdiction and detection and monitoring capabilities. This would allow the Customs Service sufficient assets to perform its traditional interdiction mission along our U.S. Borders and simultaneously provide Interceptor and D&M support to the source and transit zones. With these added capabilities, our assets would be able to fill D&M shortfalls caused by other D&M equipment failures, allowing Customs the capability to significantly reduce the air smugglers ability to move drugs across our borders.

Throughout the Transit and Arrival Zones Customs aircraft and marine assets play a critical role in the apprehension of drug trafficking aircraft and vessels.

MARINE PROGRAM

Beginning in 1980, the Customs Service implemented a national marine program in response to the tremendous number of narcotics smuggling ventures being conducted in the U.S. Coastal waters. Comprised of 84 vessels, the mandate of the U.S. Customs Marine Program is to disrupt organizations that are smuggling drugs and other contraband into the United States by vessel. Customs has primary responsibility for interdicting illegal contraband in the arrival zone. Through its investigative efforts the Customs marine interdiction effort has targeted and disrupted various well organized and financed international smuggling organizations smuggling illegal contraband into the United States.

Although the Customs Service coordinates with the U.S. Coast Guard and INS Border Patrol in conducting marine smuggling investigative and interdiction efforts, the Customs Service remains the only federal agency tasked with the primary goal of disrupting and dismantling smuggling organizations that are utilizing vessels to smuggle drugs and other contraband into the 19,943 kilometers of coastline around the U.S.

In FY 1998 to date, the marine Program has been instrumental in the seizure of 37,222 pounds of cocaine, 38211 pounds of marijuana, 39 pounds of heroin and 85 pounds of methamphetamine.

TECHNOLOGY

Technology plays an important role in all Customs counterdrug activities. It provides new capabilities to allow inspections to keep up with changing smuggling techniques, acts as a force multiplier, increases enforcement effectiveness and efficiency and allows us to cope with growing trade and traffic.

The Administration has developed a comprehensive and structured 5-year Customs technology plan to deploy counterdrug technology to the port of entry, subject to budget resources, to significantly increase the smugglers' risk of detection all along the entire Southern Tier of the U.S. This technology includes: non-intrusive technologies (e.g. fixed and mobile truck x-ray systems, gamma-ray inspection systems for trucks and railcars, and higher energy heavy pallet x-ray systems); technology for outbound currency and weapons at ports along the Southern Tier; dedicated commuter lanes which depend on technologies such as voice recognition biometric identification, "smart cards" (a chip on a credit card-sized card which stores information about the individual), and vehicle movement control technologies along the Southwest border; investigative; intelligence, and encrypted, digital, voice communications technology; and automated targeting systems. In addition, over the next 5 years, we intend to deploy similar non-intrusive inspection technology to high-risk airports and seaports which are not located along the Southern Tier, such as John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York and the Newark Seaport in New Jersey. Recent accomplishments in the development of new and larger-scale non-intrusive inspection systems will provide Customs with the opportunity for unprecedented improvement in the intensity and number of inbound inspections of cargo and conveyances.

Customs currently operates five truck x-ray systems in El Paso, Ysleta, and Pharr, Texas and Otay Mesa and Calexico, California. In addition, prototype mobile truck x-ray systems are operating in Laredo, Texas and Miami, Florida. One prototype gamma-ray system is in place at Santa Teresa, New Mexico. The prototype gamma-ray system uses gamma-ray radiation to penetrate the structure of heavier-bodied trucks, such as propane tankers, to allow Customs to examine both the conveyance and some cargoes for the presence of contraband. Since the first truck x-ray system became operational in July 1994, this system and the four others that have become operational since March 1997 have been involved in 315 drug seizures totaling over 70,000 pounds of narcotics. By December of 1998, Customs will have three additional fixed site truck x-ray systems operational in Laredo and Brownsville, Texas, and Nogales, Arizona.

We believe this type of technology is invaluable in enhancing Customs narcotics enforcement capabilities without impeding the flow of legitimate commercial traffic. The fixed site truck x-ray and mobile truck x-ray can inspect approximately eight full size tractor trailer trucks per hour. The gamma-ray system can inspect 12-15 tractor trailer trucks per hour. Both of these systems can inspect any vehicle that is legal for operation on public roadways. Mobile x-ray systems will also be available for use at border patrol checkpoints along the Southwest border. The first mobile x-ray has been responsible for seizing over 6,000 pounds of narcotics in the past year.

The addition of these assets would allow Customs a significant increase in land and maritime interdiction support. This combination of flexible interdiction support would force the smugglers to utilize other, less desirable, means of smuggling and would contribute to the national goal of reducing the flow of drugs across our borders by 80% over a 3 year period.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, absent an effective air interdiction program, general aviation aircraft provide almost an ideal means for smuggling narcotics. Air transportation maximizes control of the load while minimizing the time and frequency of exposure and theft. S.2341 provides the resources needed to successfully battle this threat to the nation.

This concludes my statement for the record. Thank you again for your continued support and the opportunity to appear before the distinguished members of the caucus and committees on behalf of S.2341.

9/14/98

DRAFT

RECORD ID: 9806329
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 98 18

TO: DAVIES

FROM: WEINBERG, J

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ580

KEYWORDS: DRUGS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: JUSTICE TESTIMONY ON S-2341 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG DUE DATE: 15 SEP 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA

LOGREF: 9806325 9806327

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

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ROSA	BAKER	CLARKE

9/16/98

Carolyn -
Pls close out all these by annotating: "No comments provided; NFAR" ...
I do not need any copies ...
Tx,
Fred

COMMENTS: *** URGENT: DUE 15 SEP AT 1:00 P.M. ***
9/16/98 NFAR No comments provided
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Justice - Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/14/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

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September Chron - 1998 [5]

2006-0191-F
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Charles W. Fox
Pamula L. Simms
James J. Jukes
Vernetta Tanner

LRM ID: REJ580 **SUBJECT:** JUSTICE Report on S2341 Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM

If your response to this request for views is short (e.g., concur/no comment), we prefer that you respond by e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is short and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistant.

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Remarks by

Donnie Marshall

Acting Deputy Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice

before

The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism and The Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control

regarding

The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

Dirksen Senate Office Building
Room 450
Washington, D.C.
July 16, 1998

NOTE: This is the prepared text and may not reflect changes in actual delivery

Statement of
Donnie Marshall
Acting Deputy Administrator,
Drug Enforcement Administration
before
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism
and
The Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
September 16, 1998

Chairman Coverdell, Chairman Grassley, and members of the Subcommittee and the caucus: I appreciate the opportunity to appear today at this hearing on the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, which makes a number of proposals intended to increase funding for interdiction and interdiction-related activities. My testimony will provide you with an objective assessment of the law enforcement issues involving international organized criminal groups, drug trafficking problems associated with these groups, and how DEA participates in drug interdiction. During my testimony, I will attempt to provide the members with a full picture of how organized crime groups operate, harming so many aspects of life in America today, and how the DEA takes action to counter these groups.

Interdiction, in its narrow sense, -- physically stopping drugs moving through the transit zone, across international borders, and into the United States -- is more properly the responsibility of the other agencies testifying here today. DEA's primary mission is to target the highest levels of the international drug trafficking organizations operating today. It is through targeting the command and control elements of international drug syndicates that DEA makes its major contribution to the overall interdiction effort. Moreover, DEA makes significant contributions to drug interdiction with its law enforcement efforts within the United States. I will, therefore, discuss in some detail DEA's role in the interdiction of drugs both overseas and domestically and how those efforts interface and contribute in our joint efforts to counter these organize crime groups.

International Organized Crime

It is important to demonstrate at the outset why the threat posed by international drug syndicates is so ominous. The United States must be able to attack the command and control functions of the international syndicates which are directing the flow of drugs into this country. Focusing the attention of law enforcement on the criminals who direct these organizations is the key to combating international drug trafficking. DEA directs its resources against the leaders of these criminal organizations, seeking to have them located, arrested, prosecuted, and given sentences commensurate with the heinous nature of their crimes.

Many phrases have been used to describe the complex and sophisticated international drug trafficking groups operating out of Colombia and Mexico, and frankly, the somewhat respectable titles of "cartel"or "federation" mask the true identity of these vicious, destructive entities. The Cali organization, and the four largest drug trafficking organizations in Mexico --- operating out of Juarez, Tijuana, Sonora, and the Gulf region — are simply organized crime groups. They are not legitimate businessmen as the word "cartel" implies, nor are they "federated" into a legitimate conglomerate. These syndicate leaders --- the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in Colombia to Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, Juan Garcia -Abrego, Miguel Caro-Quintero, and the Arellano-Felix brothers --- are simply the 1990's versions of the mob leaders U.S. law enforcement has fought since shortly after the turn of this century.

International organized crime leaders are far more dangerous, far more influential and have a greater impact on our day-to-day lives than did their domestic predecessors. While organized crime in the United States during the 1950's through the 1970's affected certain aspects of American life, its influence pales in comparison to the violence, corruption, and power that today's drug syndicates wield. These individuals, from their headquarters locations, undeniably influence the choices that too many Americans make about where to live, when to venture out of their homes, or where they send their children to school. The drugs ---and the attendant violence which accompanies the drug trade ---have reached into every American community and have robbed many Americans of the dreams they once cherished.

Organized crime in the United States was addressed over time, but only after Americans recognized the dangers that organized crime posed to our way of life. But it did not happen overnight. American organized crime was exposed to the light of day systematically, stripping away the pretense that mob leaders were anonymous businessmen. The Appalachian raid of 1957 forced law enforcement to acknowledge that these organized syndicates did indeed exist. As a result, strong measures were taken to go after the top leadership, a strategy used effectively throughout our national campaign against the mob. During the 1960's, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy was unequivocal in his approach to ending the reign of organized crime in America, and consistent law enforcement policies were enacted which resulted in real gains. Today, traditional organized crime, as we knew it in the United States, has been eviscerated, a fragment of what it once was.

At the height of its power, organized crime in this nation was consolidated in the hands of few major families whose key players live in this nation, and were within reach of our criminal justice system. All decisions made by organized crime were made within the United States. Orders were carried out on U.S. soil. While it was not easy to build cases against the mob leaders, law enforcement knew that once a good case was made against a boss, he could be located within the U.S., arrested, and sent to jail.

That is not the case with today's organized criminal groups. They are strong, sophisticated, and destructive organizations operating on a global scale. In places like Cali, Colombia, and Guadalajara, Mexico, even operational decisions are made, such as where to ship cocaine, which cars their workers in the United States should rent, which apartments should be leased, which markings should be on each cocaine package, which contract murders should be ordered, which officials should be bribed, and how much. They are shadowy figures who send thousands of workers into the United States who answer to them via daily faxes, cellular phone, or pagers. Their armies carry out killings even within the United States---one day an outspoken journalist, one day a courier who had lost a load, the next, an innocent bystander caught in the line of fire---on orders from the top leadership. These syndicate bosses have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment, and weapons in quantities which rival the capabilities of some legitimate governments. Whereas previous organized crime leaders were millionaires, the Cali drug traffickers and their counterparts from Mexico are billionaires. They must be located, arrested, prosecuted, and given sentences commensurate with the heinous nature of their crimes.

The international drug syndicates who control drug trafficking today from the source zone, through the transit zones in the Caribbean and through Mexico, and into the United States, are interconnected. We cannot discuss the trafficking situation today without looking at the evolution of the groups from Colombia --- how they began, what their status is today, and how the groups from Mexico have learned important lessons from them, thereby becoming major trafficking organizations in their own right.

During the late 1980's the Cali group assumed greater and greater power as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel self-destructed. Where the Medellin cartel was brash and publicly violent in their activities, the criminals, who ran their organization from Cali, labored behind the pretense of legitimacy, by posing as businessmen carrying out their professional obligations. The Cali leaders --- the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, Jose Santacruz Londono, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera-Buitrago--- amassed fortunes and ran their multi-billion dollar cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in Colombia. Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates composed what was, until then, the most powerful international organized crime group in history. They employed 727 aircraft to ferry drugs to Mexico, from where they were smuggled into the United States, and then return to Colombia with the money from U.S. drug sales. Using landing areas in Mexico, they were able to evade U.S. law enforcement officials and make important alliances with transportation and distribution experts in Mexico.

With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali leadership by the brave men and women in the Colombian National Police during 1995 and 1996, all of the top leadership of the Cali syndicate are either in jail, or dead. Since the Cali leaders' imprisonment, on sentences that in no way matched the severity of their crimes, traffickers from Mexico took on greater prominence. The alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the organizations from Mexico benefited for both sides. Traditionally, the traffickers from Mexico have long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine into the United States, and had established solid distribution routes throughout the nation. Because the Cali syndicate was concerned about the security of their loads, they brokered a commercial deal with the traffickers from Mexico, in order to reduce their potential losses.

This agreement entailed the Colombians moving cocaine from the Andean region to the Mexican organizations, who then assumed the responsibility of delivering the cocaine to the United States. Now, trafficking groups from Mexico are routinely paid for their services in multi-ton quantities of cocaine, making them formidable cocaine traffickers in their own right.

Drugs at The Source

The international drug syndicates discussed above control both the sources and the flow of drugs into the United States. The vast majority of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. According to DEA's Heroin Signature Program, which provides a chemical analysis of domestic heroin seizures and purchases to determine the geographic sources of origin, South American heroin comprised 75 percent of all heroin seized in the United States in 1997. Virtually all of the six metric tons of heroin produced in Colombia in 1997 was destined for the U.S. market. For nearly two decades, crime groups from Colombia have ruled the drug trade with an iron fist, exponentially increasing their profit margin by controlling the entire continuum of the cocaine market. Their control ranged from the coca leaf production in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, to the cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) production and processing centers in Colombia, to the wholesale distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United States.

Colombian traffickers continue to dominate the movement of cocaine from the jungles of Bolivia and Peru to the large cocaine HCl conversion laboratories in Southern Colombia. An estimated fifteen percent of the world's coca leaf is grown in Colombia and the vast majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl is produced in these laboratories throughout Colombia. Many of these activities take place in the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of Colombia. Most of the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo. Also, cultivation occurs in areas of high insurgency that are effectively beyond the control of the Colombian Government. Cocaine conversion laboratories range from smaller "family" operations to much larger facilities, employing dozens of workers. Once the cocaine HCl is manufactured, it is either shipped via maritime or aircraft to traffickers in Mexico, or shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including the Bahamas Island Chain, to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami, and New York.

Drugs in Transit

Over half of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from Colombia through Mexico and across U.S. border points of entry. Most of the cocaine enters the United States in privately-owned vehicles and commercial trucks. There is new evidence that indicates traffickers in Mexico have gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian middlemen. In addition to the supply of cocaine entering the U.S., trafficking organizations from Mexico are responsible for producing and trafficking thousands of pounds of methamphetamine. They have been major distributors of heroin and marijuana in the U.S. since the 1970's.

Drug trafficking in the Caribbean is overwhelmingly influenced by Colombian organized criminal groups. The Caribbean had long been a favorite smuggling route used by the Cali and Medellin crime groups to smuggle thousands of tons of cocaine to the United States. During the late 1970's and the 1980's, drug lords from Medellin and Cali, Colombia established a labyrinth of smuggling routes throughout the central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamian Island chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling techniques to transfer their cocaine to U. S. markets. Smuggling scenarios included airdrops of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off the coast of Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000 kilograms, and the commercial shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the port of Miami.

Our focus on the Calli organization's command and control functions in the U.S. enabled us to build formidable cases against the Cali leaders, which allowed our Colombian counterparts to accomplish the almost unimaginable-- the arrest and incarceration of the entire infrastructure of the most powerful crime group in history. Although Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his confederates continue to direct a portion of their operations from prison they are no longer able to maintain control over this once monolithic giant. Now, independent groups of traffickers from the Northern Valle dal Cauca, and splinter groups from the Cali syndicate have risen to prominence and are responsible for huge volumes of cocaine and heroin being shipped to the United States through the Caribbean. These groups, who have replaced the highly structured, centrally controlled business operations of the Cali group, tend to be smaller and less organized, however, they continue to rely on fear and violence to expand and control their trafficking empires.

DEA has identified four major organizations based on the northern coast of Colombia that have deployed command and control cells in the Caribbean Basin to funnel tons of cocaine to the United States each year. Colombian managers, who have been dispatched to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, operate these command and control centers and are responsible for overseeing drug trafficking in the region. These groups are also directing networks of transporters that oversee the importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distribution of cocaine destined for the continental United States.

Drug Trafficking Organizations in the U.S.

However powerful these international organizations appear to be, the very feature of their operations which makes them most formidable -- the ability to exercise effective command and control over a far flung criminal enterprise -- is the feature that law enforcement can use against them, turning their strength into a weakness. The communications structure of international organized crime operating in the United States is, therefore, the prime target for drug law enforcement. Information on drug flows developed during investigations of these organizations, which mostly take place in the United States, underscores the seamless nature of the continuum of international drug trafficking from foreign sources to markets in the United States.

The organizational structures we target resemble those set up by the Colombians in the 1980s. The Colombians organized their cocaine trafficking groups in the U.S. organized around "cells" that operate within a given geographic area. Some cells specialize in a particular facet of the drug trade, such as cocaine transport, storage, wholesale distribution, or money laundering. Each cell, which may be comprised of 10 or more employees, operates with little or no knowledge about the membership in, or drug operations of, other cells.

The head of each cell reports to a regional director who is responsible for the overall management of several cells. The regional director, in turn, reports directly to one of the drug lords heads of a particular organization or their designate based in Colombia. A rigid top down command and control structure is characteristic of these groups. Trusted lieutenants of the organization in the U.S. have discretion in the day-to-day operations, but ultimate authority rests with the leadership abroad.

Upper echelon and management levels of these cells are frequently comprised of family members or long-time close associates who can be trusted by the drug lords to handle their day-to-day drug operations in the United States. They report back via cell phone, fax and other sophisticated communications methods. Drug traffickers continually employ a wide variety of counter-surveillance techniques and other tactics, such as staging fake drug transactions, using telephones they suspect are monitored, limited-time use of cloned cellular telephones (frequently a week or less), limited-time use of pagers (from 2 to 4 weeks), and the use of calling cards. Organized crime groups continue to show an active interest in acquiring secure communications capabilities. The communication systems which make the top-down command and control of these organizations possible is the exact target for both intelligence analysis and law enforcement operations against the organizations, working hand in hand with interdiction efforts.

A hemispheric Response

DEA's role in countering the threat posed to the American way of life by these international drug trafficking organizations has been, and will continue to be to target the most significant drug traffickers and their organizations. It is in this area that we make our contribution to interdicting the flow of drugs into the United States. Naturally, we cooperate fully with other elements of the United States government, and foreign authorities, that are directly involved in physically interdicting smuggled drugs and in eradicating drugs at the source.

Our law enforcement experience shows us that, over time, the United States has been able to effectively counter organized crime, both domestic and foreign, by attacking the command and control systems of the syndicates through the use of court approved intercepts. Successful investigations against the leaders of international drug trafficking groups most often originate from investigations being conducted in the United States. Through what was originally designated our Southwest Border Initiative, has become a strategy employed throughout the hemisphere, DEA and our counterparts direct their resources against the communications systems of the command and control functions of the organized crime groups in both the Caribbean and South America.

The continuum of domestic investigations and international drug trafficking

Some of our efforts within this Hemispheric response point to the connection between domestic law enforcement in the United States and the problems posed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. Operations RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT, are two examples which clearly prove the interrelation between high level traffickers headquartered in Mexico and their organizations in many U.S. cities. The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization was deeply involved in a sophisticated drug operation that stretched from Mexico to New York, Chicago, Grand Rapids, Tucson, and other parts of the U.S. At one point, several independent and seemingly unrelated investigations were being conducted in Texas, Arizona, Illinois, Michigan, and New York. Eventually these separate cases were combined under the umbrella investigations known as RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT.

These operations show, as do most of our investigations, that arresting the leaders of international organized crime rings often ultimately begins with a seemingly routine event in the United States. For example, two troopers from the Texas Department of Public Safety stopped a van with New York plates on Interstate 30. They became suspicious when they learned that one man was from New York while the other was from El Paso, and they were not well acquainted. Neither man owned the van and their stories conflicted regarding where they were going and where they had been. The troopers found 99 bundles of money hidden in the vehicle's walls.

It took three hours to count the $1.3 million they had found. As the officers continued their search, they discovered another $700,000, bringing the total to $2 million. On December 3, 1996, after receiving an anonymous call, the Tucson Police Department and drug task force officers raided a warehouse containing 5.3 tons of cocaine. On December 13, 1996, the same Texas troopers stopped a northbound tractor trailer and seized 2,700 pounds of marijuana. Follow-up investigation connected this interdiction to their previous seizure of money, to the cocaine warehouse in Tucson, and to ongoing investigations in Texas, Arizona, Illinois, Michigan, and New York.

All of these investigations provided our Special Agents and federal prosecutors with the key to investigating the operations of the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization. This powerful Mexican syndicate was apparently using U.S. trucks and employees to transport huge amounts of cocaine to various U.S. destinations. The resulting investigation, Operation LIMELIGHT, secured 40 arrests, the seizure of $11 million in cash, 7.4 tons of cocaine and 2,700 pounds of marijuana.

A parallel investigation, Operation RECIPROCITY, resulted in the seizure of more than 4,000 kilos of cocaine, almost 11,000 pounds of marijuana, over $7 million in cash, and 48 arrests. RECIPROCITY showed that just one Juarez-based organized crime cell shipped over 30 tons of cocaine into American communities and returned over $100 million in profits to Mexico in less than two years. Distribution of multi-ton quantities of cocaine, once dominated by the Cali-based drug traffickers, was now controlled from Mexico in cities such as Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. The Carrillo-Fuentes organization was also beginning to make inroads into the distribution of cocaine in the East Coast, particularly New York City, the traditional stronghold of the Cali drug cartel.

These operations support that the Mexican transportation groups have added the United States East Coast to their sphere of influence and now deliver cocaine directly to New York City and other East coast markets. This role was once reserved for traffickers from Colombia and the Dominican Republic. These two operations show that law enforcement can strike major blows against foreign drug syndicates through the combination of interdiction efforts and by targeting their command and control functions.

Through our domestic drug investigations, such as RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT, and with the assistance of our country office in Mexico, DEA has been able to build cases that have led to the indictment of the leaders of every major drug trafficking organization in Mexico. More than one-half of the priority requests for provisional arrest for extradition filed by the Department of Justice are for major drug traffickers.

The Hemispheric Response in the Caribbean

As part of the hemispheric response to the threat posed in the Caribbean, DEA has put a number of initiatives in place. In July 1997, DEA put into practice the Caribbean Regional Operational Plan (CROP) which combined the joint law enforcement resources of DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This plan includes a multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional effort, coordinating the counter-drug operations of the DEA offices in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Miami, Florida with activities of the U.S. Embassy Country Teams, and the law enforcement agencies of the Caribbean nations. This plan was built on the successful strategies implemented in Operation BAT, Operation GATEWAY, and the Southwest Border Initiative. From an organizational perspective, DEA enhanced its Caribbean Field Division by 25 Special Agents. In fiscal year 1997, the Caribbean Division arrested 652 defendants, initiated 124 criminal cases and documented over $13 million in asset seizures.

In July, 1997, to disrupt the flow of drug traffic in the Caribbean, DEA initiated Operation Summer Storm and Operation Blue Skies. Both operations were coordinated with Caribbean law enforcement personnel to target air, land, and maritime smuggling networks. More recently, in April 1998, Operation Frontier Lance began to focus investigative resources on air and maritime smuggling throughout the Southern and Northern areas of Hispaniola in an effort to enhance the interdiction of drug trafficking through Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

The Hemispheric Response: Domestic Interdiction

There is of course a domestic component to our hemispheric strategy, which should also be understood as part of DEA's contribution to the overall national strategy to reduce drug smuggling into the United States. The United States has initiated a wide range of law enforcement and intelligence programs that aim to prevent illicit drugs from entering the country. One of the nation's most effective drug interdiction programs -- Operation Pipeline -- has been carried out on its highways for over a decade, and has been responsible for seizures that match or exceed those of other, more costly programs. Operation Pipeline is a highway drug interdiction program led by state and local agencies, and supported by DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC]. Through EPIC, state and local agencies can share real-time information on arrests and seizures with other agencies, obtain immediate results to record check requests, and receive detailed analysis of drug seizures to support investigations.

Beginning in the early 1980s, the rate of seizures and arrests signaled to State and local law enforcement officers that the nation's highways had become major arteries for drug transportation. Tons of illicit drugs were flowing North and East from Florida and the Southwest border, while millions in drug money returned South and West -- as if traveling through a pipeline. During annual conferences and other multi agency gatherings, officers shared their experiences in highway interdiction, which the state and local police communities termed "Pipeline" investigations. DEA retained this name in 1984 when it established *Operation Pipeline*, which targeted only private passenger vehicles. In 1990, *Operation Convoy*, Pipeline's sister operation, was created to target the commercial operations of drug transportation organizations.

Operation Pipeline is now active along the highways and interstates most often used by drug organizations to move illicit drugs North and East and illicit money South and West. During the first nine years of the program, the following seizures were made on the nations highways: $ 379,000,000 in U.S. currency; 696,000 kilograms of marijuana; 94,000 kilograms of cocaine; 642 kilograms of crack; 278 kilograms of heroin, and 1,943 kilograms of methamphetamine. In the last year alone, from September 1997 through August 1998, Pipeline Seizures totaled: $451,000,000 in U.S. currency; 801,610 kilograms of marijuana; 104,742 kilograms of cocaine; 724 kilograms of crack; 346 kilograms of heroin; and 2,975 kilograms of methamphetamine. These increasingly more effective interdiction results dramatically show the high value of this interdiction program. The results were achieved with no more than the initiative of state and local police officers and the cost of training provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

With support from DEA Agents across the country, state and local highway officers are able to execute controlled deliveries of the drug shipments they seize, thereby furthering their own criminal investigations and contributing to federal and international investigations. By identifying and arresting members of the transportation cells of drug trafficking organizations, along with the U.S. customers, law enforcement authorities are better positioned to target the command, control, and communication of a criminal organization, and arrest its leadership.

It is important to note that these interdiction operations form an integral part of DEA's over-all strategy. As was the case with RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT, a seemingly unconnected series of seizures on America's highways can turn into a major investigation, leading to a significant blow against an international drug trafficking organization. With its strategy of mounting strategic strikes on command and control, DEA is able to degrade the ability of the organizations to conduct business and impede their ability to import drugs into the United States. Each time we demolish an organization as part of this strategy, we will further facilitate the intelligence collection process which is critical to the interdiction of drugs. DEA will gain vital intelligence about the rest of the organization to use both in further strikes and in increasing the accuracy of information provided to interdiction operations conducted by other agencies.

The Problem Continues

Recent events highlight the ever-changing nature drug law enforcement efforts against international drug traffickers. The Mexican-Central American corridor has been the primary smuggling corridor for cocaine destined for the United States since the 1980s. Events in Mexico and along the border bring emphasis to the fact that trafficking groups from Mexico are a significant force in international organized crime. These organizations are no longer simply middlemen in the cocaine transportation business. With the disruption of the Cali syndicate, groups such as the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization, the Arellano-Felix cartel, the Amezcua-Contreras brothers, the Guzman-Locra organization, and the Caro-Quintero group have consolidated their power and now dominate drug trafficking along the U.S./Mexico border and in many U.S. cities. These organizations can reach even into the very elements of the Mexican government which are intended to fight drugs, as the traffickers continue a reign of terror and violence along the border with the United States.

The violence that is an essential part of these ruthless and powerful organizations impacts innocent citizens who live in the Untied States. The traffickers' willingness to murder and intimidate witnesses and public officials has allowed these organizations to develop into the present day threat they are to the citizens of the United States and Mexico. Drug traffickers continue their brazen attacks against both U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials and their sources of information.

For example, on June 3, 1998, as two Border Patrol Agents responded to a ground sensor detection of a possible illegal entry shortly after midnight two miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border they encountered five men carrying backpacks full of marijuana. During the initial encounter the Border Patrol Agents identified themselves and instructed the men to sit down. As Agent Alexander Kripnick was preparing to arrest two of the men, one got up and began running. When Agent Kripnick turned around, Bernardo Velardez Lopez shot him in the head. The suspects then fled the scene. Agent Kripnick was pronounced dead four hours later. Manuel Gamez, one of the smugglers, was arrested by U.S. authorities several hours later. Mexican authorities arrested Velardez Lopez in Nogales on June 11th. U.S. officials have begun an extradition request for him.

The traffickers' ability to corrupt government officials is highlighted by events during the week of August 9, 1998, when twenty (20) Mexican military officials assigned to a "Grupo Armado de Fuerzas Especiales" (GAFES) unit were arrested in Mexico City on charges of drug trafficking and alien smuggling. Among the arrested officials were several military personnel, captains and majors, all of whom had been aasigned to the Attorney General's Office as anti-narcotics agents of the Federal Judicial Police. In addition, on August 11, 1998, another sixty (60) officials were removed from the unit which was based at the Mexico City international airport and remain in custody for questioning. The arrests were conducted by elements of the Attorney General's Office and from the Secretariat of National Defense (SDN). These officials had been pursing this investigation for several months, based on information indicating that GAFE officials assigned to the international airport were involved in protection of drug shipments.

The reign of terror, as drug traffickers use violence, intimidation, and assassination to protect their turf, continues along the border. On September 9, 1998, Rafael Munoz Talavera was abducted, tortured and murdered in Ciudad Juarez, in close proximity to the residence occupied by Munoz's father. This could have possibly been a message to other members of the Munoz Talavera organization. Munoz was a lieutenant of the late Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, and was fighting to gain control of the ACF organization. Evidently, he was assassinated as part of the on-going power struggle, the outcome of which will clearly influence who controls the flow of drugs across the Mexican border through the Juarez corridor. Munoz' rivals will now seek to divide control between them.

Not only in Mexico, but in other nations the level of violence against law enforcement personnel continues to be high, demonstrating the deadly power of the trafficking organizations that control the flow of drugs into the United States. Just last month, in Colombia, leftist rebels handed Colombian authorities another in a string of defeats, raising concern about the Colombian government's ability to contain trafficking within its borders. In the final days of the Samper Presidency, rebels launched attacks in 17 of Colombia's 32 states, killing an estimated 140 soldiers and police officers and scores of civilian bystanders. The most stunning attack was that on August 3-4 at the base at Miraflores (275 miles south of Bogota) used for coca eradication operations. Three police officers were killed, eight wounded, and 54 were taken prisoner. Fortunately, no Americans were based at any of the locations attacked by the rebels, not were any Americans harmed in Colombia during the attacks. For the Colombians, however, the terror continues. Only last week, 20 policemen were taken prisoner in a National Liberation Army (ELN) attack on Las Mercedes, a small town in Norte de Santander province. According to press reports, this incident brings to about 270 the number of security force officers now being held by the ELN and the larger Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), both of which are closely associated with Colombian trafficking organizations.

CONCLUSION

The DEA remains committed to targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners throughout the world in support of their efforts and to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806327
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 98 18

TO: DAVIES

URGENT

FROM: WEINBERG, J

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 98
SOURCE REF: REJ579

KEYWORDS: DRUGS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ONDCP TESTIMONY ON S-2341 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO WEINBERG   DUE DATE: 15 SEP 98   STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSA   LOGREF: 9806325

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Office of National Drug Control Policy Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/14/1998	P1/b(1)

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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M. Jill Gibbons
Edward H. Chase
Charles W. Fox
Pamula L. Simms
James J. Jukes
Vernetta Tanner

LRM ID: REJ579 **SUBJECT:** Office of National Drug Control Policy Testimony on S2341 Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
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If your response to this request for views is short (e.g., concur/no comment), we prefer that you respond by e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is short and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistant.

You may also respond by:
(1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); or
(2) sending us a memo or letter
Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

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Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454

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09/14/98 3:17 PM

Draft for OMB Clearance

TESTIMONY OF BARRY R. MCCAFFREY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
AND THE SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL,
ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT
SEPTEMBER 16, 1997

Introduction

Chairmen Coverdell and Grassley, Caucus and Committee members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. All of us at the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) appreciate your longstanding support and interest in all aspects of drug control policy, as well as the guidance and leadership of the Caucus and the Committee. We appreciate this opportunity to share our views of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.

As you know, goals 4 (Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat) and five (Break drug sources of supply) of the ten-year *1998 National Drug Control Strategy* focus on reducing the availability of illegal drugs within the United States. The *Strategy's* mid-term goal is to reduce illegal drug availability by 25 percent by the year 2002; our long-term goal is to reduce availability by 50 percent by the year 2007.

In March, we submitted to you a detailed set of *Performance Measures of Effectiveness*. The nucleus of the system consists of twelve targets that define specific results to be achieved under each of the *Strategy's* five goals. Eighty-two supporting performance measures delineate mid-term and long-term outcomes for the *Strategy's* thirty-two supporting objectives. These measures of effectiveness were developed in full consultation with all federal drug-control program agencies. The *Strategy's* mid-term Goal 4 objective is to reduce the rate at which illegal drugs entering the transit and arrival zones successfully enter the United States 10 percent by the year 2002. The long-term objective is a 20 percent reduction in this rate by the year 2007. The *Strategy's* mid-term objective for Goal 5 is a 15 percent reduction in the flow of illegal drugs from source countries. Long-term objectives include a 30 percent reduction in the flow of drugs from source countries. ONDCP also submitted for the Congress' consideration the first-ever five year federal drug control budget. It is our view that the *Strategy*, the *Performance Measures of Effectiveness*, and the *Budget Summary* outline a credible program for reducing drug use and its consequences and drug availability.

An Update on Cocaine-Control Efforts in the Western Hemisphere

- **Potential cocaine production declined significantly in 1997.** Successful interdiction programs in South America have disrupted the cocaine economy of much of Peru. Peruvian coca cultivation declined by 27 percent last year, and is down 40 percent in the last two years. Bolivia has achieved modest decreases in coca cultivation and potential cocaine production over the last two years. However, these gains have been partially offset by surging coca cultivation in Colombia. Colombia now has more hectares of coca under cultivation than any other country. The area under cultivation has increased by 56 percent in the past two years. Nonetheless, total Andean cultivation declined seven percent and estimates of total potential cocaine production declined by 15 percent from 760 to 650 metric tons in 1997. This is the lowest figure this decade.

- **Cultivation is decreasing in Bolivia and Peru, expanding in Colombia.** Through June, Peru's manual eradication program had met 75 percent of its 1998 target of 4,800 hectares. The overall impact on production has been limited because efforts have focused on semi-abandoned fields in national forests. Bolivia eradicated 3,934 hectares in the first six months of 1998, compared to 2,858 for the same period in 1997, consistent with the Banzer administration's resolve to confront the coca trade. Earlier this year, President Banzer released a national strategy entitled *Con Dignidad* that establishes the objective of eliminating illicit coca cultivation within five years. In Colombia, the U.S. Government believes that we will see continued expansion of coca cultivation, especially in areas outside of the Colombian Government's effective control. The aggressive aerial eradication campaign being conducted by the Colombian national Police and U.S. State Department is unlikely to prevent this expansion. Colombian trafficking organizations appear to be determined to offset declines in Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine production with increased domestic production. The recent national guerrilla offensive and significant military defeats suggest that Colombian security forces will not be able to conduct effective anti-drug operations in regions where guerrilla forces are sizeable.

- **1997 saw record cocaine seizures in the transit zone.** Drugs coming to the United States from South America pass through a six-million square-mile area that is roughly the size of the continental United States. This transit zone includes the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Approximately 430 metric tons of cocaine passed through the transit zone in 1997. In 1997, a record 85 metric tons were seized in the transit zone; 60 percent more than in 1996. 1997 was the third consecutive year of increased transit-zone seizures. Coast Guard supported cocaine seizures in 1997 reached a record of 47 metric tons. U.S. interdiction operations in the Caribbean focused on Puerto Rico with good results. Thirteen metric tons of cocaine were seized in the Puerto Rico area, a 12 percent increase over 1996. Interdiction operations contributed to a reduction in the flow of cocaine to the island, temporarily doubling the wholesale price of cocaine there, and forcing traffickers to change routes and methods. Drug-related crime in Puerto Rico plunged by 37 percent.

- **1998 cocaine seizures are on a par with 1997's record levels.** An estimated 127 metric tons of cocaine were seized worldwide (excluding U.S. internal seizures) during the first six months of this year. This amount is slightly less than the corresponding 1997 figure of 131 metric tons. Transit zone seizures were about 45 metric tons compared to 43 metric tons during the same time in 1997. Seizures in Central America totaled 19 metric tons, nearly double the ten metric tons seized during the same period in 1997. Mexican seizures of 15 metric tons are below last year's corresponding figure of 24 metric tons. Seizures in the Caribbean totaled about 11 metric tons, slightly above the nine metric tons for the same period in 1997. Within the arrival zone, U.S. law enforcement agencies have seized thirty-six metric tons, compared with twenty-four tons during the same time in 1997.

- **Trafficking trends: January – June 1998.** Within the source zone, Peru remains the largest exporter of cocaine base. Most is shipped to Colombia for processing into cocaine HCl. Traffickers are exploiting the plentiful waterways in northern Peru to move cocaine base. The movement of cocaine HCl from processing locations to international departure points within Colombia is mostly undetected. An estimated 232 metric tons were smuggled out of South America destined for the United States:

  - 52 percent (121 metric tons) of the cocaine destined for the United States is estimated to have been routed along the Mexico/Central America corridor. Fifty-two metric tons were seized along this corridor, thirty-two in the transit zone and twenty in the arrival zone. Sixty-nine metric tons were estimated to have entered the United States via this corridor.

  - 32 percent (73 metric tons) is estimated to have passed through the Caribbean. Ten metric tons were seized along this corridor, seven in the transit zone and three in the arrival zone. Sixty-three metric tons were estimated to have entered the United States via this corridor.

  - 16 percent (37 metric tons) is estimated to have proceeded directly from South America to the United States. Sixteen metric tons were seized in the arrival zone. Twenty-one metric tons were estimated to have entered the United States via this corridor.

  In summary, an estimated 232 metric tons of cocaine departed South America in the first six months of this year. Thirty-nine metric tons were seized in the transit zone, while thirty nine were seized in the arrival zone. An estimated 153 metric tons were smuggled into the United States during this period. One third of the cocaine destined for the United States was interdicted in either the transit or the arrival zones. This interdiction performance is consistent with previous years, but it is not enough. We need to do better.

- **Smuggling techniques continue to change in response to interdiction efforts.** Traffickers continue to move cocaine via a wide variety of modes and conveyances and to adapt their methods and routes to avoid detection and apprehension.

  - Mexico/Central America corridor. Containerized commercial cargo is a common method for smuggling cocaine into the Duty Free Zone in Colon, Panama. Cocaine is transported in smaller quantities in both commercial and private vehicles along the Pan-American Highway in Central America to reduce the risk of detection. Cocaine is also introduced throughout Central America via maritime commerce. Seizure data along the U.S. –

Mexico border suggests that cocaine is evenly distributed between commercial cargo and private cars.

> Caribbean corridor. Traffickers mostly use non-commercial aircraft and non-commercial maritime vessels to smuggle cocaine into Caribbean islands. Haiti has become a more prominent transshipment point despite our efforts to develop capable law enforcement agencies. "Go-fast" boats travel with virtual impunity between Colombia and Haiti. Airdrops off the southern Haitian coast are common. Cocaine passing through Haiti either is smuggled directly to the United States and Western Europe or is routed through the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, or Puerto Rico. Traffickers also use small aircraft and go-fast boats to deliver cocaine to Puerto Rico. There are reports that traffickers track U.S. Coast Guard movements and select the time and location of deliveries to avoid interdiction. Recent interdiction operations illustrate how traffickers are operating.

- ✓ On July 9th, the *USS John L. Hall (FFG 32)* intercepted two go-fast boats off the coast of Panama and seized 2,000 pounds of cocaine.

- ✓ On July 24th, the Coast Guard Cutter *Gallatin* conducted a consensual boarding of the coastal freighter *Apemagu* and discovered numerous suspicious items. The *Apemagu* was escorted to Guantanamo Bay where a detailed search found 1500 pounds of cocaine.

- ✓ On August 4th, a Coast Guard aircraft from Air Station Miami tracked a 42-foot go-fast boat with three 200HP outboard engines as it rounded the eastern corner of Cuba and proceeded through Cuban territorial seas toward Long Island, Bahamas. Two helicopters from Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos detected the boat near Long Island and dropped off law enforcement agents who seized the vessel, a vehicle that linked up with it, 1600 pounds of marijuana and an undetermined amount of cocaine.

- ✓ On August 14th, the *USS John L. Hall* detected and intercepted a 35-foot speedboat off the coast of Panama and recovered forty-one bales of cocaine jettisoned by the speedboat's crew.

- ✓ Also on August 14th, the Coast Guard Cutter *Valiant* located and boarded a suspected drug smuggling boat (the *Isamar*) off the coast of Haiti, detecting numerous indicators of drug smuggling. *Valiant's* boarding team requested and received permission to remain onboard the *Isamar* until it docked in the Miami River. A joint Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, and FBI team boarded the vessel in the Miami River and found 5,100 pounds of cocaine.

> Direct Transportation. Commercial cargo (both air and maritime) and air passengers (human mules) are frequently used to smuggle cocaine and heroin from South America to the United States. Traffickers route mules through third countries (e.g. Argentina and

Chile) to minimize U.S. Customs' attention and avoid fitting "profiles." "Motherships" bearing cocaine have been detected in the Straits of Florida. Cargo containers and agricultural shipments are commonly used to conceal cocaine in commercial vessels.

- **The need for improved capabilities in the arrival zone.** We face considerable drug-control challenges along our air, land, and sea frontiers. Drug seizures along the Southwest border, for example, are declining. Total 1998 cocaine seizures are projected to be less than half of the annual average seized between 1991 and 1996 and account for just a fifth of the cocaine crossing the border. Heroin seizures have declined by about a third since 1996. ONDCP has submitted a White Paper with recommendations for addressing these challenges to the President's Drug Policy Council. The *Concept for Analysis* I have provided for your review outlines our basic ideas. We intend to present a coordinated set of recommendations for President Clinton's consideration this fall.

- **Cocaine price in the United States rose last year.** Wholesale and retail level cocaine prices rose in the United States during 1997 for the first time in six years. We can increase the price of illegal drugs and reduce their purity by making it more difficult for trafficking organizations to smuggle them into the United States and to distribute them to our communities. Higher prices can be expected to suppress demand. However, as demand shrinks, prices will only rise if drug availability is decreased at greater rates.

Analysis of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (H.R. 4300 & S. 2341).

The energy members of Congress and their professional staff have invested in this Bill reflects our shared commitment to ensuring our supply-reduction programs are effective. The Bill contains many useful ideas and budgetary initiatives. However, we have concerns with certain aspects of the Bill, including:

- **Its goals are unattainable.** The legislation sets the following goals:

  a. **Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by not less than 80 percent by December 31, 2001 (S. 2341).** It is unlikely that the amount of cocaine departing South America for the U.S. market will decline appreciably before December 2001. Given that historically combined interdiction rates in the transit and arrival zones have averaged about 33 percent, it is unlikely that this figure will change so dramatically in the next three and a half years. Consequently, reducing the flow of cocaine by 80 percent is an unlikely outcome. Furthermore, much of the equipment buys the legislation would authorize would not be fielded for several years and could not be deployed in time to work towards this objective. It is impossible to develop over the next four years political, criminal justice, and law enforcement institutions that are capable of standing up to the pressures exerted by drug trafficking international criminal organizations in all major source and transit countries. Absent such essential partners, the United States cannot unilaterally achieve this success rate.

b. **Total eradication of coca and opium poppy in the Western Hemisphere by not later than December 31, 2002 (H.R. 4300).** The Bolivian and Peruvian governments seek only to eradicate illicit coca cultivation. They will continue to tolerate cultivation to address the demand of indigenous peoples.

- ➢ The Government of Bolivia has estimated in their anti-drug strategy that the total financing requirement to meet their objective of completely withdrawing from the coca-cocaine circuit between 1998 and 2002 would require 952 million dollars to support alternative development, eradication, prevention and rehabilitation. Thirty-five thousand Bolivian families currently depend on the illegal cocaine trade for their livelihood. It is unlikely that the international community will provide Bolivia the support its government believes is required to attain this ambitious objective.

- ➢ Peruvian Drug Czar Marino Costa Bauer stated in June that record-low coca leaf prices combined with continuing eradication efforts would result in the virtual elimination of illicit coca cultivation in Peru within five years. It would seem unlikely that coca leaf prices will remain low if demand in consumer nations exceeds the available supply.

- ➢ It will be difficult to achieve a decrease in cocaine production in Colombia in the short term. The current conditions conducive to drug trafficking (weak government and security not in control of substantial areas of the country, growing guerrilla and paramilitary forces, weak legitimate economy, broken judicial system, and official corruption) will take time to reverse. The new Pastrana administration has stated its commitment to tackling all these issues, but it would not be realistic to expect a complete turn around in a short period of time.

- **Interdiction success is not the main determinant of illegal drug consumption.** The reason that 50 percent of high school seniors smoke marijuana before graduation is not because foreign drugs are drowning the United States. Societal acceptance of illegal drug use, low risk perception, peer example, and drug availability -- much of it from domestic sources -- are all contributing factors. Marijuana usage accounts for about 90 percent of all juvenile illegal drug use. We are responding to this problem appropriately with the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, by addressing shortcomings in the Safe and Drug-free Schools program, by supporting community anti-drug coalitions, and by expanding treatment availability. In the end, we will solve the drug problem in America only be decreasing demand for them. Supply reduction is also crucial, but only by taking a multi-pronged and balanced approach to the nation's drug problem can we hope to succeed.

- **The specific enhancements proposed are not tied to a coherent strategy.** The Bill fails to develop an overarching concept. It is neither linked to the existing drug threat nor tied to a clear strategic vision or operational concept. Instead, it enumerates a series of tactical resource allocation decisions. ONDCP suggests that the Bill should specify a desired end-state and then task the Executive Branch to identify the specific resources required to attain that goal. The drug-control budgets the Executive Branch has submitted for congressional consideration are tied to the goals, objectives, and performance measures elaborated in the ten-year *National Drug Control Strategy*. In too many instances, the Bill directs the procurement of material that does not fit the operational concept agreed to by the interagency.

- **The legislation lacks flexibility.** Some of the Bill's provisions are too specific. For example:

  - "2 Schweizer observation/spray aircraft (to be piloted by pilots under contract with the United States)."
  - "Acquisition of concertina wire and tunneling detection systems at the La Picota prison of the National Police of Colombia."
  - "Forward deployment of 5 riverine operations maintenance platforms."
  - "Establishment of a third drug interdiction site at Puerto Maldonado, Peru."
  - "2 mobile x-ray machines ...for placement along the Chapare highway."
  - "...operation and maintenance of 1 J-31 observation aircraft." ***No such aircraft exists.***

  Wisely, the Congress never thought to tell General Norman Schwarzkopf where to deploy his armored forces during operation *Desert Storm* or when and how to attack. It would be inappropriate for the Congress to interfere in decisions that are properly those of duly appointed leaders, law enforcement officials, U.S. diplomatic personnel, unified commanders, the Secretary of State, and other responsible officials within the Executive Branch.

- **Consolidation of all joint interagency task forces (JIATF) would reduce effectiveness.** We are streamlining the existing interdiction command and control structure and have reviewed the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. Planning is underway to consolidate JIATF East (based in Key West) and South (based at Howard Air Force base, Panama) as it becomes more likely that all U.S. military forces will be withdrawn from the Republic of Panama next year. Closure of JIATF West (based in Alameda, California would disrupt DoD support to law enforcement agencies involved in heroin control efforts in Asia and cocaine interdiction efforts in the eastern Pacific. Closure of the El Paso based Joint Task Force 6 would also disrupt military support of drug-control operations along the

Southwest border. ONDCP has presented specific recommendations regarding accountability and coordination of drug-control efforts along the Southwest border to the President's Drug Policy Council.

Conclusion

We share the Congress' view that drug availability in the United States can and must be substantially reduced. However, the goals proposed by the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act are unattainable. The ten-year *National Drug Control Strategy* developed in consultation with the Congress contains realistic goals. It proposes reducing drug availability in the United States by 25 percent by 2002, and by 50 percent by 2007 (1996 is the base year for comparative purposes).

ONDCP believes that the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act should not contain tactical-level directives to those who have legal responsibility for deciding where, when, how, and why to employ equipment and personnel to accomplish the goals of the United States Government. It is appropriate for the Congress to provide oversight. It is also appropriate for the Congress to examine specific aspects of the administration's drug-control efforts anywhere in the world. Indeed, this bill represents a clear communication of congressional concern with international aspects of drug-control policy and of your intent for U.S. hemispheric efforts.

The Administration has submitted a FY 1999 drug control budget that includes 1.8 billion dollars for interdiction efforts, an increase of more than 36 percent since FY 1996. Proposed interdiction resources for the Coast Guard are 35 percent higher than they were in FY 1996. The 526 million dollars requested for DoD support of interdiction is 27 percent increase over FY 96 spending. We would welcome the opportunity to explain in greater detail how each agency is organizing its programs to attain the objectives established in the *National Drug Control Strategy* and to debate the sufficiency of funding for any aspect of our supply-reduction campaigns.

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KEYWORDS: DRUGS

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SUBJECT: REVISED TRANSPORTATION TESTIMONY ON S-2341 WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT

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008. memo	Jeffrey Weinberg to Legislative Liaison Officer; re: Revised Transportation - Testimony on Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1 page)	09/14/1998	P1/b(1)

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Christopher S. Johns
Andrew W. Kleine
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Edward H. Chase
Charles W. Fox
Pamula L. Simms
James J. Jukes

LRM ID: REJ577 **SUBJECT:** REVISED TRANSPORTATION Testimony on S2341 Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

RESPONSE TO
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Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454

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STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, USCG
ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG ELIMINATION ACT
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
UNITED STATES SENATE

SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Committee and Caucus members. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to comment on Coast Guard drug interdiction and the proposed Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.

I applaud the Act's goal of strengthening our Nation's counterdrug effort. This legislation recognizes that the security of our maritime borders is a critical component of a balanced national strategy to reduce drug use and its destructive consequences. The National Drug Control Strategy's supply reduction target looks to reduce drug availability in the United States 25 percent by 2002, and 50 percent by 2007 as compared to a 1996 base year. The Coast Guard has developed a comprehensive maritime interdiction strategy, Campaign STEEL WEB, designed to meet the Coast Guard's portion of these national goals. This Coast Guard strategy is supported by a 5-year drug control budget that is submitted to the Office of Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) annually as required by law. Fully implementing this strategy will require that adequate resources be provided over the next several years. The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act includes many policy initiatives and budget authorities that could be used to increase counterdrug performance. In many instances, the Act does address valid Coast Guard requirements and identifies the types of capabilities required to implement STEEL WEB. However, I do have concerns with the legislation as currently drafted.

While this bill authorizes funding for increased Coast Guard counterdrug operations in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, first and foremost the Coast Guard must be able to

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maintain current services for all mission areas in fiscal year 1999 as requested by the President.

As a 3-year authorization, this legislation could result in outyear funding risks. Without adequate outyear funding I will not be able to operate additional assets or to sustain the operational increases for assets now in the Coast Guard inventory. I am also concerned, from a personnel management perspective, about the potential for a relatively large increase in work force strength that may only be authorized for 3 years.

I am also concerned about the executability of some items specified in the Act. For example, new construction of cutters would require long lead-time and significant personnel increases. Additionally, the goal to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States 80 percent by the end of 2001 is overly optimistic and is not achievable.

Finally, we face significant source and Transit Zone interdiction challenges. The Act does not include some key resources that would be necessary to meet these challenges. For example, the Act does not address increased intelligence collection and support or the deployable logistics required to support expeditionary pulse operations, capabilities critical to interdiction success.

The task of maintaining a comprehensive overview of activity and sorting targets of interest from legitimate air and surface traffic is daunting. Equally difficult is the logistical challenge of supporting our forces in such an expansive theater of operations, particularly in the Eastern Pacific. As previously stated, Campaign STEEL WEB is the Coast Guard's multiyear plan to position the requisite interdiction forces where they best counter the ever-evolving drug trafficking threats. The strategic concept is to deny drug smugglers access to maritime routes by a sequence of operations in which interdiction forces are concentrated in high-threat areas of the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to significantly disrupt drug traffic. Coast Guard operations in these high threat areas complement and support Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East and JIATF West operations. Once a credible law enforcement presence is established, interdiction forces will be redeployed to other high-threat areas, leaving an enhanced presence to deter and interdict subsequent smuggling. Ultimately, successful pulse operations in each high-threat area will systematically reduce drug flow through the Transit Zone. This concept was successfully demonstrated during the Coast Guard's Operation FRONTIER SHIELD. In addition, STEEL WEB is focused on strengthening ties with source and transit zone nations to increase their capacities to reduce internal production and trafficking, and supports interagency efforts to combat drug smuggling. Continued success of Campaign STEEL WEB requires resource investments and the flexibility to employ resources where they can have the most impact.

The Coast Guard received a $34.3 million increase in budget authority for fiscal year 1998, an investment in the long-term campaign to satisfy obligations under the National Drug Control Strategy. Fiscal year 1998 drug funding has allowed the Coast Guard to institutionalize FRONTIER SHIELD, and continue Operations GULF SHIELD and BORDER SHIELD to anchor the flanks of the Southwest Border.

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The fiscal year 1999 budget request includes operating expenses and capital investments necessary to maintain the current law enforcement presence in the transit and arrival zones. As long as more than 400 metric tons of cocaine are moving through the Transit Zone, the value of, and necessity for, agile interdiction forces is undeniable.

The Coast Guard shields America's sea frontiers from a broad spectrum of threats and challenges, with the scourge of drugs being perhaps the most visible right now. The need for effective control of America's seaward borders, territorial sea, and Exclusive Economic Zone extends well beyond the drug threat and will become even more essential in the first decades of the 21st century.

Future threats to U.S. security interests will be even more varied than they are today. The dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity. Terrorism, drugs, illegal migrants, organized crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns that transcend national borders, and environmental damage and rapid population growth undermine economic prosperity and political stability in many countries.

Since these challenges to America's maritime security are not strictly military in nature, they underscore the importance, relevance, and vitality of the Coast Guard's law enforcement role – a core competency developed during more than 200 years of service to America – and a core competency that addresses more than drug interdiction.

The multimission Coast Guard has traditionally provided a high rate of return to the public. In fiscal year 1997, overall interdiction efforts resulted in a record year for Coast Guard drug seizures. The Coast Guard seized (or assisted in the seizure of) 103,617 pounds of cocaine and 102,538 pounds of marijuana products. Cocaine seizures easily surpassed the previous record set in 1991 -- 90,335 pounds.

Through effective interdiction efforts last year, the Coast Guard kept more than 468 million cocaine "hits" and 100 million marijuana "joints" off our streets, preventing those drugs from poisoning schools and destroying homes. The estimated street value of these seizures is more than $4.2 billion -- $1 billion more than the Coast Guard's entire 1997 discretionary budget.

In order to meet future drug interdiction obligations, the Coast Guard will need the full support of Congress for its budget requests. As Commandant, however, I feel a keen sense of responsibility to effectively perform the Coast Guard's many other mission requirements, such as protection of fisheries stocks and the marine environment. To do this, the Coast Guard must at least be funded at current services level through annual appropriations.

As we approach the 21st century, many of our existing assets are nearing the end of their service lives. Loss of capability and increased operational costs concern us greatly, as the threats we must counter are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and capable. In short, our ability to remain *Semper Paratus* - Always Ready -- to carry out our many missions is a major Coast Guard concern. We must be ready to meet tomorrow's challenges.

In closing, I would like to recognize your leadership and commitment to strengthening the national counterdrug effort. As America moves into the next century, the Coast Guard stands ready to meet our responsibilities in this important effort. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss Coast Guard drug interdiction concerns. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.