

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Camp David, July 2000 [2]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. paper               | Subject: Palestenian Refugees. (4 pages)                                                | 07/2000    | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. paper               | Subject: End of Conflict. (2 pages)                                                     | 07/2000    | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. paper               | Subject: Fallback Summit Outcomes. (2 pages)                                            | 07/2000    | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. paper               | Subject: What if the Summitt Fails. (5 pages)                                           | 07/2000    | P1/b(1)     |
| 005. letter              | To Ehud Barak from Avrum Burg. (4 pages)                                                | 06/24/2000 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. memo                | For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Preparing for Camp David (II). (3 pages) | 07/2000    | P1/b(1)     |

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Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Kenneth Pollack / Kathleen Cooper)  
OA/Box Number: 3521

### FOLDER TITLE:

Camp David, July 2000 [2]

2008-0729-F  
vz1546

### RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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| 002. paper               | Subject: End of Conflict. (2 pages) | 07/2000 | P1/b(1)     |

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**II**

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1 NOVEMBER 1995

**FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A FINAL STATUS**  
**AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE**  
**LIBERATION ORGANIZATION**

THE ATTAINMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES, RESOLVES THE CORE PROBLEM AT THE HEART OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT AND COMMENCES AN ERA OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE CONTRIBUTING THEREBY TO THE STABILITY, SECURITY, AND PROSPERITY OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST.

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter "the P.L.O"), the representative of the Palestinian people;

WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991;

AIMING at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects;

REAFFIRMING their adherence to the commitments expressed in the Declaration of Principles (hereinafter "the DOP") signed in Washington D.C. on September 13th 1993, the Cairo Agreement of May 4th 1994, and the Interim-Agreement of September 28th, 1995;

REAFFIRMING their determination to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security;

DECLARING as null and void any agreement, declaration, document or statement which contradicts this Framework Agreement;

DESIROUS of reaching a full agreement on all outstanding final status issues as soon as possible, not later than May 5th 1999, as stipulated in the DOP;

HEREBY AGREE on the following Framework for a Final Status Agreement:

## **ARTICLE I: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL**

1. As an integral part of this Framework Agreement and the full Final Status Agreement:

- a. The Government of Israel shall extend its recognition to the independent State of Palestine within agreed and secure borders with its capital "al-Quds" upon its coming into being not later than May 5th 1999.
- b. Simultaneously, the State of Palestine shall extend its recognition to the State of Israel within agreed and secure borders with its capital "Yerushalayim".
- c. Both sides continue to look favorably at the possibility of establishing a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, to be agreed upon by the State of Palestine and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

2. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine (hereinafter: "the Parties") will thereby extend mutual recognition of their right to live in peace and security within mutually agreed borders as defined in Article II of this agreement and in the Final Status Agreement. In particular, the Parties shall

- a. Recognize and respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic independence;
- b. Renounce the use of force, and the threat of force as an instrument of policy and commit themselves to a peaceful resolution of all disputes between them,
- c. Refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts of violence, subversion or terrorism against the other party.
- d. Take effective measures to ensure that acts of or threats of violence do not originate from or through their respective territories, including their airspace and territorial waters, and take appropriate measures against those who perpetrate such acts.
- e. Undertake not to join, assist, or cooperate with any military or security coalition, organization, or alliance hostile to either Party.
- f. Exchange and ratify the instruments of peace between them as shall be defined in the full Final Status Agreement.

## **ARTICLE II: THE DELINEATION OF SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS**

1. The secure and recognized borders between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine are described in the attached Map's and in Annex One of the Final Status Agreement. The Parties recognize that these borders, including their respective subsoil, airspace and territorial waters shall be inviolable.

2. The Parties undertake to delineate the final border, to the extent possible, in accordance with the following principles (as reflected in the attached map's):

- a. No Palestinian cities, towns, villages, or hamlets to be annexed to Israel.
- b. Maximum number of Israelis to be annexed to Israel.

- c. Minimum of territory to be annexed to Israel, this territory is to include the existing settlements therein and will provide for the relocation of Israelis from Palestinian territory.
  - d. Minimum disruption of lines of communication.
3. Where border delineations affect the quality of land, the parties shall take into consideration economic and developmental needs, and shall endeavor to ensure that the resources, plans and mechanisms necessary for meeting such needs are made available.
4. The parties shall define the route and mode of implementation of, as well as the extent of territory to be yielded by Israel for the agreed extra-territorial passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (as described in Annex One of the Final Status Agreement).
5. The border in the Jerusalem area is to be delineated in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of this Framework Agreement.
6. The Parties shall recognize the final borders between the two states as permanent and irrevocable.

### **ARTICLE III: THE CREATION OF NORMAL AND STABLE INTER-STATE RELATIONS**

1. Upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty, the Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations between them and to promote economic and cultural relations including the free movement of people, goods, capital and services across their borders.
2. The Parties shall continue to cooperate in all areas of mutual interest and will seek to promote jointly and separately similar regional cooperation with other states in the area and the international community.
3. The Parties shall seek to promote mutual cultural relations and will encourage mutual programs for the dissemination of their respective national customs, folklore and traditions between them.
4. The Parties shall secure freedom of access to places of religious, and historical significance on a non-discriminatory basis. Access to, worship in, and protection of all holy places and sites shall be guaranteed by both Parties.

### **ARTICLE IV: SCHEDULE OF ISRAELI MILITARY WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS**

1. In implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Parties agree that the withdrawal of Israeli Military and Security Forces shall be carried out in three stages:

- a. Withdrawal from the Central areas of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip, (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement and attached Map's), to commence not later than May 5th 1999 and be completed not later than September 4th, 1999;
  - b. Withdrawal from the Eastern areas of the West Bank (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement), to commence not later than September 5th 1999 and be completed not later than January 4th, 2000;
  - c. Withdrawal from the Western areas of the West Bank (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement) to commence not later than January 5th 2000 and be completed not later than May 4th 2000.
2. Thereafter Israel shall maintain a minimal residual force within agreed military compounds and in specified locations. This residual force will comprise:
  - a. Three reinforced battalions, two existing Military Emergency Stores, and integral logistical forces (their location and terms of lease, duration, mode of deployment, function and numerical strength, are detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement).
  - b. Three Early Warning stations and three Air Defense Units as defined and agreed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement will be maintained until May 5th 2007 or until peace agreements and bilateral security arrangements between Israel and the relevant Arab parties are attained, whichever comes last.
3. The Parties agree to the formation of an Israeli-Palestinian Coordinating Security Commission (hereinafter "the CSC") to oversee the implementation of Israel's military withdrawal, establish the modalities governing its residual military presence, and coordinate all other security matters (its structure and authorities are detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement). The CSC shall also implement an agreed schedule for the introduction of Palestinian Security Forces (hereinafter "PSF") into Palestinian territories commensurate with and parallel to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Parties agree that the CSC shall commence its deliberations not later than May 5th 1998 (see Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement).
4. Joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols will be held along the Jordan River as well as along both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian border, in order to deter, prevent and combat the infiltration or organization of cross border terrorist and other forms of violent activities. The mandate and duration of these patrols shall be determined by the CSC, as detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement.
5. The Parties agree that the State of Palestine shall be demilitarized. The PSF shall remain subject to agreed limitations as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement. By mutual agreement, and not before May 5th 2007, Palestinian self-defense capabilities shall be negotiated by the Parties.
6. The Parties agree that the co-sponsors and other parties agreed upon, shall be invited to guarantee the arrangements for Israel's military withdrawal and other

bilateral security agreements as stipulated in this Framework Agreement. In their capacity as guarantors, the said third-parties shall also be invited to participate in observation, verification and other technical duties to be agreed in the CSC. The said third parties shall accordingly be requested to establish and finance an International Observer Force (hereinafter the "IOF") whose mandate and functions are described in Annex Two of the Final Status Agreement.

## **ARTICLE V: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS**

1. Subsequent to the establishment of the Independent State of Palestine and its recognition by the State of Israel as described in Articles I and III of this agreement:
  - a. There will be no exclusive civilian residential areas for Israelis in the State of Palestine.
  - b. Individual Israelis remaining within the borders of the Palestinian State shall be subject to Palestinian sovereignty and Palestinian rule of law.
  - c. Individual Israelis who have their permanent domicile within the Palestinian State upon its establishment, shall be offered the choice of Palestinian citizenship or alien residency, without prejudice to their Israeli citizenship.
  - d. Within the agreed schedule for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territories as described in Article IV and Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement, the Israeli Government and its security forces shall maintain responsibility for the safety and security of Israeli settlements outside the areas of Palestinian security jurisdiction, pending the transfer of said areas to full Palestinian rule.
  - e. The CSC shall establish the mechanism for dealing with security issues relating to Israeli citizens in Palestine and Palestinian citizens in Israel.

## **ARTICLE VI: JERUSALEM**

1. Jerusalem shall remain an open and undivided city with free and unimpeded access for people of all faiths and nationalities.
2. The Parties further agree that a reform of the current Jerusalem Municipal System and its boundaries shall be introduced not later than May 5th 1999, and shall not be subject to further change by law or otherwise, unless by mutual consent, prior to the fulfillment of the provisions of paragraph 9 below. This reform shall expand the present municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and shall define the city limits of the "City of Jerusalem", to include: Abu Dis, Eyzariya, ar-Ram, Az-zaim, Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev, Givon, and adjacent areas as in the attached map/s.
3. Within the "City of Jerusalem", neighborhoods inhabited by Israelis shall be defined as "Israeli boroughs"; and neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians shall be defined as "Palestinian boroughs". The exact borders of the "City of Jerusalem" and of the Israeli and Palestinian boroughs are delineated and described in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement and attached Map's. The number of Israeli boroughs and of Palestinian boroughs will reflect the present demographic balance of 2:1. This

proportion will be updated in accordance with the modalities, criteria and schedule as described in Annex Three to this Final Status Agreement.

4. The Parties agree to maintain one Municipality for the "City of Jerusalem" in the form of a Joint Higher Municipal Council, formed by representatives of the boroughs. These representatives will elect the Mayor of the "City of Jerusalem". In all matters related to the areas of the "City of Jerusalem" under Palestinian sovereignty, the Joint Higher Municipal Council shall seek the consent of the Government of Palestine. In all matters related to the areas of the "City of Jerusalem" under Israeli sovereignty, the Joint Higher Municipal Council shall seek the consent of the Government of Israel.

5. The "City of Jerusalem" shall consist of the Joint Higher Municipal Council, two sub-municipalities - an Israeli sub-municipality, elected by the inhabitants of the Israeli boroughs, and a Palestinian sub-municipality, elected by the inhabitants of the Palestinian boroughs - as well as a Joint Parity Committee for the Old City Area as described in paragraph 12 below.

6. The Parties further agree that the municipality of the "City of Jerusalem" shall:
- a. Delegate strong local powers to the sub-municipalities including the right to local taxation, local services, an independent education system, separate religious authorities, and housing planning and zoning, as detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement;
  - b. Develop a twenty-five year Master Plan for the "City of Jerusalem" with agreed modalities for its balanced implementation, including safeguards for the interests of both communities.
  - c. Provide for Israeli and Palestinian citizens resident within the jurisdiction of the City of Jerusalem Municipality and sub-municipalities to vote and seek election for all elected posts as shall be specified in the Jerusalem municipal bylaws.

7. Within the "City of Jerusalem" both parties recognize the Western part of the city, to be "Yerushalayim" and the Arab Eastern part of the city, under Palestinian sovereignty, to be "al-Quds" (see attached Map/s).

8. Upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty between them:

- a. The Government of the State of Palestine shall recognize "Yerushalayim", as defined under Article VI, paragraph 7 and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement, as the sovereign Capital of the State of Israel.
- b. The Government of the State of Israel shall recognize "al-Quds", as defined under Article VI, paragraph 7 and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement, as the sovereign Capital of the State of Palestine.

9. The ultimate sovereignty of the area outside "Yerushalayim" and "al-Quds", but inside the present municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, shall be determined by the parties as soon as possible. Each party maintains its position regarding the sovereign status of this area. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee for determining the final status of this area shall be established upon entry into force of this Framework Agreement and shall

commence its deliberations immediately thereafter. Without prejudice to the determination of the final status of this area:

- a. Palestinian citizenship shall be extended to Palestinian residence of this area.
- b. In certain matters Palestinian citizens residing in this area shall resort to Palestinian law (as detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement).
- c. The Parties shall enjoy free access to and use of the Qalandia Airport in this area. A new designated Palestinian terminal shall be constructed, to commence operation concurrent with the signing of the Treaty of Peace (for the modalities of operation, see Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement).

10. The Parties acknowledge Jerusalem's unique spiritual and religious role for all three great monotheistic religions. Wishing to promote interfaith relations and harmony among the three great religions, the Parties accordingly agree to guarantee freedom of worship and access to all Holy Sites for members of all faiths and religions without impediment or restriction.

11. In recognition of the special status and significance of the Old City Area (see map/s) for members of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths, the parties agree to grant this area a special status.

12. The Parties further agree that:

- a. The Palestinian sub-municipality shall be responsible for the municipal concerns of the Palestinian citizens residing in the Old City Area and their local property.
- b. The Israeli sub-municipality shall be responsible for the municipal concerns of the Israeli citizens residing in the Old City Area and their local property.
- c. The two sub-municipalities shall appoint a Joint Parity Committee to manage all matters related to the preservation of the unique character of the Old City Area (its structure and modalities are detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement).
- d. In case of a dispute between the two sub-municipalities on matters related to the Old City Area, the issue shall be referred for a decision by the Joint Parity Committee

13. The State of Palestine shall be granted extra-territorial sovereignty over the Haram ash-Sharif under the administration of the al-Quds Awqaf. The present status quo regarding the right of access and prayer for all, shall be secured.

14. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre shall be managed by the Palestinian sub-Municipality. The Joint Parity Committee, shall examine the possibility of assigning extra-territorial status to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre

15. Supervision of persons and goods transiting through the "City of Jerusalem" shall take place at the exit points. Other security matters related to persons, vehicles and goods suspected of involvement in hostile activity are dealt with in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement.

## ARTICLE VII: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

1. Whereas the Palestinian side considers that the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes is enshrined in international law and natural justice, it recognizes the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, and declares the Palestinian State to be the homeland of all Palestinians. It further declares its readiness to accept and implement policies and measures that will ensure, insofar as this is possible, the welfare and well-being of these refugees.

2. Whereas the Israeli side acknowledges the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the war of 1947-1949; It further acknowledges the Palestinian refugees' right of return to the Palestinian state and their right to compensation and rehabilitation for moral and material losses.

3. The parties agree on the establishment of an International Commission for Palestinian Refugees (hereinafter "the ICPR") for the final settlement of all aspects of the refugee issue as follows:

- a. The Parties extend invitations to donor countries to join them in the formation of the ICPR.
- b. The Parties welcome the intention of the Government of Sweden to lead the ICPR.
- c. The Government of Israel shall establish a fund for its contribution, along with others, to the activities of the ICPR.
- d. The ICPR shall conduct all fundraising activities and coordinate donors' involvement in the program.
- e. The ICPR shall define the criteria for compensation accounting for:
  - (1) moral loss;
  - (2) immovable property;
  - (3) financial and economic support enabling resettlement and rehabilitation of Palestinians residing in refugee camps.
- f. The ICPR shall further:
  - (1) adjudicate claims for material loss;
  - (2) prepare and develop rehabilitation and absorption programs;
  - (3) establish the mechanisms and venues for disbursing payments and compensation;
  - (4) oversee rehabilitation programs;
  - (5) explore the intentions of Palestinian refugees on the one hand and of Arab and other countries on the other, concerning wishes for emigration and the possibilities thereof.
  - (6) explore with Arab governments hosting refugee populations, as well as with these refugees, venues for absorption in these countries whenever mutually desired

g. The ICPR shall implement all the above according to the agreed schedule defined in Annex Four to the Final Status Agreement.

4. The ICPR shall be guided by the following principles in dealing with the "refugees of 1948" and their descendants as defined in Annex Four to the Final Status Agreement:

- a. Each refugee family shall be entitled to compensation for moral loss to a sum of money to be agreed upon by the ICPR.
- b. Each claimant with proven immovable property shall be compensated as per the adjudication of the ICPR.
- c. The ICPR shall provide financial and economic support, enabling the resettlement and rehabilitation of Palestinians residing in refugee camps.
- d. The refugees shall be entitled to financial and economic support from the ICPR for resettlement and rehabilitation.

5. The State of Israel undertakes to participate actively in implementing the program for the resolution of the refugee problem. Israel will continue to enable family reunification and will absorb Palestinian refugees in special defined cases, to be agreed upon with the ICPR.

6. The Palestinian side undertakes to participate actively in implementing the program for the resolution of the refugee problem. The Palestinian side shall enact a program to encourage the rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees presently resident in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, within these areas:

7. The PLO considers the implementation of the above a full and final settlement of the refugee issue in all its dimensions. It further undertakes that no additional claims or demands arising from this issue will be made upon the full implementation of this Framework Agreement.

#### **ARTICLE VIII: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN STANDING COMMITTEE**

1. The Parties shall establish an Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee (hereinafter: the "IPSC"), which shall commence activities upon the signing of this Framework Agreement.

2. The IPSC shall be authorized to deal with all matters related to the smooth transition between the Interim Agreement and Final Status Agreement.

3. The IPSC shall also coordinate activities related to the implementation of the Final Status Agreement.

#### **ARTICLE IX: WATER RESOURCES**

1. The Parties agree that they possess the same natural water resources essential for each nations' livelihood and survival.

2. Water rights and issues are laid out in Annex Five to the Final Status Agreement.

3. With a view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all water problems between them, the Parties jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources should not in any way harm or imperil the water resources of the other.

4. The Parties further agree to the following:

- a. The development of existing and new water resources to increase availability and minimize wastage;
- b. The prevention of contamination of water resources.
- c. The transfer of information and joint research and the review of the potential for water enhancement.

5. The Parties agree to prepare as soon as possible, but not later than May 5th, 1999, a coordinated separate and joint water management plan for the joint aquifers that shall guarantee optimal use and development of water resources for their mutual benefit.

6. The Parties agree to seek to extend their joint co-operation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in particular with regard to the waters of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea and to seek to promote wider regional understanding on the exploitation and management of water resources in the Middle East.

## **ARTICLE X: TIMEFRAME AND IMPLEMENTATION**

### **A. The Preparatory Period; Prior to the signing of the Final Status Agreement**

1. With the signing of this Framework Agreement and its entry into force not later than May 5th 1996, the Preparatory Period for Final Status shall commence.

Immediately thereafter, the Parties shall:

- a. Establish the IPSC (Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee) along the lines laid down in Article VIII.
- b. Establish technical committees to prepare the Annexes to the Final Status Agreement as described in this agreement.
- c. Extend invitations to donor countries to join them and the Government of Sweden in formation of the ICPR (International Commission for Palestinian Refugees).
- d. Establish the joint Israeli-Palestinian committee for determining the final status of the disputed areas in Jerusalem as in Article VI paragraph 9 of this agreement.

2. During this period it is agreed that the following shall be implemented:

- a. The Final Status Agreement with all Annexes shall be completed, based on the agreements and principles laid down in this Framework Agreement not later than May 5th 1999.
- b. Consequently, and based on the mechanisms for border delineation set out in Annex One to the Final Status Agreement, the joint delineation of borders and

- official extra-territorial and other passages shall be finalized.
- c. The Israeli-Palestinian Coordinating Security Commission (CSC) shall be established and commence its deliberation, not later than May 5th 1998. The CSC shall establish the mechanism for dealing with security issues relating to Israeli citizens in the State of Palestine, and Palestinian citizens in the State of Israel.
  - d. The Parties shall invite the co-sponsors to the Peace Process, the Government of Sweden and other agreed upon third parties, to establish an International Observer Force (IOF) as agreed upon in Annex two to the Final Status Agreement.
  - e. The Government of Israel shall establish a program to encourage Israeli settlers to resettle within Israel's sovereign territory. Settlers wishing to take part in this program shall be compensated by the Israeli government before January 1st, 1999, according to guidelines to be announced within three months of the entry into force of this Framework Agreement.
  - f. The agreed upon reformed Jerusalem Municipal System shall be inaugurated not later than May 5th 1999.
  - g. Both sides shall prepare and agree on a Jerusalem Master Plan as described in Article VI.
  - h. In accordance with Article VII of this Framework Agreement, the PLO shall establish a program to encourage the rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees presently residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, within these areas.
  - i. The Parties shall promote the work of the ICPR as stipulated in Article VII of this Agreement.
  - j. The Parties shall prepare an agreed upon coordinated, separate and joint water management plan for the joint aquifers.
  - k. The construction of the agreed extra-territorial passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank shall be completed.
3. As soon as possible, but not later than May 4th 1999, the interim period shall come to an end and a full Final Status Agreement shall be signed and a Peace Treaty shall be initialed.

#### B. The Implementation Period; After the signing of the Final Status Agreement

1. With the signing and entry into force of the Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement, the implementation of the Final Status settlement shall commence. The creation of the Independent State of Palestine within secure and recognized borders shall be promulgated by the PLO and its relevant agencies. Immediately thereafter, within a period not to exceed two months, the Peace Treaty shall be signed and ratified.
2. The Government of the State of Israel shall extend immediate and full diplomatic recognition to the State of Palestine and to "al-Quds" as its capital, as described in Article VI and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement.

3. The Government of the State of Palestine shall extend immediate and full diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel and to "Yerushalayim" as its capital, as described in Article VI and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement.

4. Provisions relating to the normalization of Israeli-Palestinian relations shall be implemented as described in Article III.

5. Upon entry into force of the Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement, the withdrawal of Israeli Military and Security Forces shall commence and the agreed security provisions shall be implemented according to the schedule described in Article II and Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement.

6. Within the "City of Jerusalem" elections for the two sub-municipalities shall be held. The two sub-municipalities shall appoint a Joint Parity Committee for the Old City Area (as outlined in Article VI paragraph 12 to this agreement), and a proportional (2:1) Joint Higher Municipal Council which shall elect the Mayor of the "City of Jerusalem".

7. The parties agree to continue to work jointly and separately within the framework of the multilateral working groups and other relevant fora towards:

- a. The establishment of a Middle East free from hostile coalitions and alliances;
- b. The creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction both conventional and non-conventional within the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable settlement.

#### C. The Post-Implementation Period:

1. Israeli residual forces shall remain on Palestinian territory. The CSC shall continue to coordinate Israeli and Palestinian security needs as shall be agreed.

2. The CSC shall maintain agreed mechanisms for dealing with security issues relating to Israeli citizens in the State of Palestine and Palestinian citizens in the State of Israel up to and not later than May 4th 2007.

3. Remaining Israeli residual forces shall withdraw from the State of Palestinian contingent on the attainment of peace treaties and security arrangements between Israel and the relevant Arab parties.

## APPENDIX I

LIST OF ANNEXES

*to be negotiated  
in PSF*

1. Borders:

Border Delineation Mechanism,  
Description of borders.  
Extraterritorial Passage Gaza-West Bank.  
Official Passages.

2. Security

Military Redeployment  
Residual Forces  
Security Arrangements  
CSC Structure and Function  
PSF size, structure and mode of cooperation  
Jerusalem Security Arrangements  
Mandate and Functions of the IOF.

3. Jerusalem

City of Jerusalem, definitions (including borders)  
Municipal Structure;  
Housing, Planning and Zoning;  
Legal Provisions  
Qalandia Airport, operational modalities

4. ICPR

Schedule of activities;  
Principles of operation.

5. Water

*Appendix I*  
*List of Annexes to FWA*

- 1) Map a Bus
- 2) Map a Terminal

*Appendix II*  
*List of Annexes to be  
Negotiated by FWA*

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Divider Title: \_\_\_\_\_ **B**

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'Palestinian entity' which would be 'less than a state', what emerges is a very clear conception of the permanent settlement: in the Jordan Valley army presence but no annexation, clusters of settlements close to Jerusalem and the Green Line annexed to Israel, Jerusalem united under Israeli sovereignty with respect for the religious rights of Muslims and Christians, and a Palestinian entity which is less than a state in that it is completely demilitarised. If there is added to this a solution to the refugee problem, as an issue entirely outside Israeli sovereign territory, and non-dismantling of the settlements, then the understanding that was taking shape in Stockholm may be said to conform to the Prime Minister's overall conception of the permanent settlement. The fact that Rabin addressed the principles of the permanent settlement in a speech supposedly devoted to the interim settlement was indicative of his keenness to advance the next step.

And what of Peres? I sensed that it was with him of all people that I would face the worst problems in presenting the results of the academic discussions. His conception of the permanent settlement sounded rather different. He made no secret of his preference for a Palestinian state in Gaza, or his belief that the future of the West Bank should be left open, a kind of long-term interim arrangement whereby the territory would be administered by Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian state of Gaza in a manner to be agreed by all parties. Listening to Peres, one gained the impression that his ideal permanent settlement consisted to a great extent of long-term extension of the interim settlement.

These were festival days and I had the leisure for lengthy consultations with the four academics in the run-up to the final draft. The meeting took place in my ministry in Tel Aviv and was also attended by Hasan Asfur. We sat for close on ten solid hours over the map, over the issue of the settlements, over Jerusalem as opposed to Abu Dis. At one moment it seemed that positions were drawing closer; the next the gulf between us looked as wide as ever. Finally I felt we were close to an agreement on principles.

The two Palestinians preferred to go into further detail and only then to agree on a draft which could be put on the table; this would entail a significant lengthening of the timespan. It was especially important to them that the Stockholm track be kept secret until after the elections to the Palestinian Council due to take place on 20 January 1996, on account of the Palestinian concessions. In my opinion we were already behind

schedule if we meant to keep the May 1996 deadline, and soon it would be too late. I instructed Yair and Ron not to wait on further detail and confine themselves to getting an agreement on principles.

Drafts came thick and fast: the 20 September draft, the 28 September, the 16 October. Towards the end of October Yair told me that the four of them were ready to present the fruits of their labours to Abu Mazen and to me.

The decisive meeting was held in Tel Aviv, the last day of October 1995. Abu Mazen arrived with Hasan Asfur and the two academics, I was accompanied by Yair and Ron. Abu Mazen was very emotional; when we embraced I saw tears in his eyes. Here for the first time we were touching the most sensitive points of the process. If the Oslo track was the breakthrough and the forum in which we got to know one another, in the Stockholm track we reached the very heart of the dispute. What was deferred in Oslo was the grist of Stockholm. Topics which to all appearances would never be susceptible to any kind of understanding were agreed here in principle. On the face of it, we had in our hands a document comprising a complete or almost complete solution to a dispute which had lasted at least twenty-eight years – or a century according to some calculations.

The four academics presented the final version. The rules of the game were clear, following the guidelines set out in the conversation held precisely two years previously in Tunis between Arafat and myself. The academics were supposed to reach agreement among themselves regarding the final draft, and inform Abu Mazen and me that as far as they were concerned the document was ready for signing. At the last moment there were still a few disagreements, regarding both the statement of principles and aspects of the border issue, and the two of us, Abu Mazen and I, recommended adjustments which were accepted by the foursome.

From this moment on, the Stockholm document became something to be recommended to the higher political echelons, ripe for presentation to the leaderships: Arafat on the Palestinian side, Rabin and Peres on the Israeli side. After so many years of exchanging slogans and declarations, speeches and promises, we were finally facing a moment of truth – a border line, Palestinian state, united Jerusalem, refugees with no right of return to Israel and exchanges of territory. Could we persuade our leaders to agree to these proposals? Would we encounter appreciation or rejection? At that stage there was no knowing, but it was clear to both of us that

'selling' the deal would be no less tough than any of the negotiations hitherto.

Abu Mazen glanced through the pages again and said that in his opinion if the two sides accepted the paper as a basis for negotiation, about a month would be needed to finalise a signed agreement. We knew that neither side would agree to adopt the document as it stood, and if the two leaderships would accept it as a basis for renewed and accelerated negotiation, this would be the most we could expect to achieve.

I presented the timetable as I saw it. My plan was to arrange a meeting with Peres, and put to him the consensus that had been achieved regarding the statement of principles and the border. If he showed interest in the plan, as I hoped, he would go with me to the Prime Minister and set the agreements before him; and if he wasn't interested, I was sure he wouldn't stop me showing it to Rabin. If the two of them saw the document as a basis for negotiations, despite the criticisms they would undoubtedly express over one point or another, rapid negotiation could begin, either immediately or after the elections in the territories scheduled for 20 January. This negotiation could be conducted as it had started, in the same framework, or through official channels, the only requirement being conclusion before 4 May 1996, the last date for the start of talks on the permanent settlement. That day, instead of the customary exchange of opening positions light-years apart, a key would be provided for the unlocking of all the subjects on the agenda of the permanent settlement, as agreed in the Oslo Accord, point by point.

The agreement would be initialled by both sides, and if in the elections due in October 1996 the Labour Party should win, the agreement could be signed in full. If not, it would be a sign that Israel was not yet ready for a permanent settlement, and the process would take a good deal longer. Abu Mazen agreed with the timetable and promised to take the document to Arafat as soon as possible and try to convince him this was a reasonable basis for negotiations in which neither side was dominating the other, in which both sides were paying an appreciable price but making significant gains in return. Whatever further work might be needed, this was in general terms the right and possibly the only way to reach a settlement. I was about to leave for the USA, and I promised that on my return and after consultations with Rabin and Peres, we would be in touch again.

Next day I flew to the USA, having first scheduled a meeting with Peres at his home for Saturday, 11 November. I told him I had a complicated

subject to discuss with him, and I would need two hours. No one could have foreseen the circumstances in which this meeting would take place.

I had planned a longer visit than the three days which would be normal for an American trip (Thursday morning to Saturday evening) as I was also scheduled to attend an event in Los Angeles. I spent a day in Washington, doing the rounds of the State Department and the White House, then went on to a series of meetings with Jewish organisations in New York. On the Saturday Colette Avital, our consul-general in New York, held a brunch-party in my honour, also inviting leaders of the Jewish community and some Israelis who happened to be in town, including renowned novelist Amos Oz. When asked about the situation at home, I said I would feel happier if I could be sure that the peace rally due to take place that day would be well attended and not marred by left-right confrontation.

It was a beautiful New York day, cool and sunny. Amos and I decided to walk to my hotel, where we went up to my room to continue our conversation. Amos was an enthusiastic supporter of rapid progress towards permanent settlement and was one of the few people who could influence both Rabin and Peres, and at one stage I had gone to see him at his home in Arad and heard his impressions of the state of play as it stood in early 1995. Now he asked me for an update. I was glad of the opportunity and proceeded to explain, in considerable detail, the final understanding just reached. Amos was very impressed by the scope and the creativity of the scheme, and promised to lend his support to the effort of persuading Rabin and Peres, should the need arise. He was on the point of leaving when reception called with a message from Orit Shani: 'Your Prime Minister has been attacked.'

It took a while for the news to sink in. *Attacked?* My first thought was that he had been barracked or abused again, but would that be worth a transatlantic call? I switched on CNN and we got the first inklings of what had happened. The next call from Orit confirmed that Rabin had been murdered.

It was impossible to believe it. It seemed like an episode from an implausible melodrama. We're sitting here discussing the most critical phase in the most critical negotiations, wondering how it's all going to be presented to Peres and Rabin – and suddenly we're told that Rabin is dead and the whole picture has been turned upside down at the last moment. We sat there and wept like orphaned children.

It was a sense of deep sorrow tinged with resentment. How could such a thing happen to us! I could see him clearly: angry, smiling, dismissing something with an impatient gesture, in the Knesset, on the hustings – and one particular memory of a helicopter landing at the base-camp of 8 Brigade in the desert, at the end of May 1967, and a man in a peaked cap emerging, the Chief of Staff arriving in person to inspect our dispositions, and the feeling that all is well now he is here.

This wasn't a Kennedy assassination. Not the act of a madman or a publicity-seeker, but political murder in the first degree. Yitzhak Rabin paid with his life for the handshake with Arafat. And now? Was there still a chance of progress? Would Shimon have the stamina to cope with the hatred unleashed, with the backlash? Would he agree to the permanent settlement? And how bizarre it was, sitting in New York and knowing that the whole world's attention was focused on Tel Aviv, seeing on CNN the government of which I was a member gathering in emergency session and unanimously electing Peres as acting Prime Minister. And how strange are the ways of history: Shimon had come to terms with his role as number two, with never again running for the premiership, until one finger on a trigger changes everything and he finds himself back in the role which he performed with such consummate skill ten years earlier, and in circumstances which had never been expected to arise in Israel. And yet arise they did, in Kings of Israel Square of all places, after all those years during which we had been asking: what happens if Hussein goes? What happens if Assad goes? If Arafat goes? And in the end it is Rabin who goes.

Ehud Barak was also in New York, and his aides and mine managed to wangle seats for us on an El Al flight to Israel the same night. The chief steward announced, for the benefit of those who didn't already know, that Rabin had been murdered and that as a mark of respect there would be no in-flight movies or video.

From Ben-Gurion airport I hurried to Peres's office in the Foreign Ministry. His face said it all. I shook his hand, took a seat and all he said was: 'I miss Yitzhak, miss him a lot.' I couldn't detect the slightest hint of satisfaction that he was back in the Prime Minister's chair, possibly for years to come. He was dejected and depressed; the almost perpetual sparkle in his eyes had disappeared. We discussed the division of the workload involved in meeting the world's leaders, due to arrive the next day for the funeral, and I asked him if our meeting at his house the following Saturday was still on. He assured me there would be no change.

But in fact the circumstances had changed completely. Instead of approaching the first mate, with whose help I might just succeed in convincing the skipper, it was now the skipper I was approaching. As a consequence of Shimon's new role, and in view of recent events, both he and I were surrounded by unprecedented levels of security – to say nothing of media attention. But as always, in the eye of the storm it was quieter and I was able to deliver to the Prime Minister without interruption the long speech that I had composed.

The parameters that I had prepared for this conversation, with Peres and then with Rabin, had also changed. The main political point that I had wanted to impress upon Rabin was that, in view of opinion polls showing equality or even a slight majority in favour of Netanyahu, only a 'bombshell' would break the deadlock. This 'bombshell' could be an agreed-upon plan with the Palestinians which would make it impossible for Likud to raise questions about the future – return of refugees to Israel, reversion to the 1967 borders or partition of Jerusalem.

I arrived at Shimon's house feeling like an army commander seeking cabinet authorisation for an operation, laden down with maps. I spread these out on the table and proceeded to tell him the whole story, starting from the meeting with Arafat in October 1993. I explained that I hadn't briefed him at the time because he would have been obliged to tell Rabin, and Rabin might well have ordered the cancellation or suspension of such a track. As long as they didn't know about the track, I could keep it going. This was a situation I would not have faced had Peres been Prime Minister, because in all probability he would have authorised the track. I told him about the feedback I had received over the course of the year, and the involvement of Amram Mitzna (a former general who had advised us on security issues), Amos Oz and Nimrod Novik.

I set out the rules of the game: this was a paper prepared by two Palestinian and two Israeli researchers. If Peres rejected the suggestions, this would turn out to have been just an academic exercise. If he found it interesting, it could be the basis for negotiation, either immediately or at a later stage – assuming, of course, that the other side also saw it as a basis for such negotiation.

I explained to him the advantages of the document I was putting forward: the River Jordan as a security border with no involvement of any foreign army. There would be hilltop observation posts and anti-aircraft batteries, and an Israeli detachment would be stationed on the river with

two commando-launches at its disposal. Israeli-Palestinian patrols would also operate jointly in the vicinity.

More than 100,000 settlers in fifty settlements would be annexed to Israel, while settlements remaining outside the border would not be dismantled and guarantees would be sought for their safety. Israeli citizens finding themselves outside Israel could choose between compensation or staying on under Palestinian sovereignty. Either way they would remain Israeli citizens with the right to vote in Knesset elections.

Jerusalem would remain undivided, with Israel not conceding its full sovereignty over all parts of the city. At this stage the Palestinians would recognise only West Jerusalem as Israel's capital while the disputed status of East Jerusalem would be unresolved pending the convening of a bipartisan committee to study the issue (with no deadline being imposed on its deliberations). On the Temple Mount the Palestinians would be granted an extra-territorial zone, which would in effect be a perpetuation of the present situation, as determined by the Wakf.

The Palestinian capital would be constructed outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, in the sector designated by the Palestinians and Jordanians as Al-Quds and incorporating villages such as Abu Dis. The city would be administered as a series of quarters, enjoying local autonomy in matters of local interest, under the overall civic authority.

The Palestinian state would be demilitarised, and could become part of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation if Jordan agreed to this; it would include the West Bank, with border arrangements to be agreed with Israel, the Gaza Strip and an extension of the Gaza Strip in the region of Holot Halutza, this last to be a symbolic exchange for the land to be annexed by Israel in the vicinity of the Green Line. Palestinian refugees who chose to do so could settle in the Palestinian state, but refugees would not be admitted to Israeli sovereign territory; an international commission was to be set up under Swedish sponsorship, its purpose being to rehabilitate the Palestinian refugees and assist their economic development. Israel would contribute to the financing of the commission's work, and once the settlement was in place the refugees would have no further claim on Israel.

Alongside this list of proposals, I handed Peres a paper prepared by Nimrod Novik regarding a new deal with the USA, which could accompany the permanent settlement with the Palestinians. This was only an idea, which had not been checked with the Americans. The paper spoke

of a memorandum of understanding to include promotion of Israel to 'equivalent NATO status' in areas such as technology and security co-operation, transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and a guarantee to uphold Israel's military and economic advantages.

Politically, the murder of Rabin turned everything upside down. My assessment, as I explained to Peres, was that in the short term support for the government would remain solid and opponents would moderate their attacks on it. It was very important not to turn this moment into a time of vengeance and settling scores with the right and the religious; rather, we should be talking to them. I suggested an attempt to reconstitute the previous coalition, this time with the external support of the religious parties and abstention of the National Religious Party in no-confidence votes. And we should try, in parallel, to institute political negotiations with the aim of reaching a permanent agreement to be initialled rather than signed in full. Further negotiations should be pursued with Syria, these too aimed at reaching initialled agreements. The elections due to take place on 29 October 1996 would amount to a referendum on full peace with the Palestinians, with Syria and with Lebanon. There would not at that stage be any questions asked, since the entire picture would have been made clear to the public. If there were no terrorist incidents and if we could complete the troop redeployments in the major Palestinian cities of the West Bank, this would be a glittering conclusion to the Rabin-Peres term. Victory in the elections would, in fact, bring peace to the entire region and if, God forbid, we should fail, we could say that we had done our absolute utmost in the cause of peace over the past four years and we still expected that some at least of our plans would be implemented eventually.

Peres didn't welcome the scheme with open arms. He didn't say a word about the way the talks had been conducted, although he must have found it hard to accept my explanation, he was informed about the Oslo channel two months after its inception. Now it was a story of two years! He agreed that now the remainder of the term should be exploited to the limit and it was worth trying to put together a coalition which would command support from the religious parties, but he intended to use his remaining time in office for implementation of the interim settlement with the Palestinians and trying to get an agreement on principles with the Syrians. He believed that a permanent settlement with the Palestinians was bound to come in time, and fiery speeches at the opening of nego-

tiations with them in May 1996 should not deter us. As for the document I had shown him, he confined himself to saying there were some interesting things in it as well as points he could not accept.

I didn't leave his house with the feeling that all our work had been in vain. On the one hand, I was conscious of an enormous sense of relief, like the removal of a great weight, the moment I told him the whole story; it had not been a comfortable experience keeping such a project secret for so long. On the other hand, I had left the full text of the document in his hands and I knew he would study it thoroughly in his own time. I reckoned he would assent to most of the points raised in it, original proposals capable of resolving the seemingly endless dispute between ourselves and the Palestinians, and after the elections he would give serious consideration to its implementation – perhaps even before them if his other plans came unstuck.

In any case I made haste to tell Yair and Ron, currently chewing their nails at home, that the conversation was over and that at this stage there would be no opening of negotiations on the basis of the document. I asked them to inform the Palestinians of this in order to forestall a different response on their part; even a positive response would not have led to the inception of official negotiation while a negative response would have killed the whole project prematurely. On 11 November, the status of this unsigned document was effectively determined: a consultative paper, to which neither side was committed and which neither side rejected out of hand, which could resurface at some time in the future as a first draft and a basis for negotiation, if and when such negotiation should begin.

The Stockholm document helped me to recognise the lines beyond which the other side would not go, and provided an incentive for trying to build understanding with the religious parties regarding the overall contours of the permanent settlement. My attempts to reach agreement with the NRP and the religious parties were not an unqualified success, largely because of reservations on the part of Meretz; so soon after Rabin's murder, it was felt this was no time to be awarding legitimacy to the religious-extremist camp in Israel.

For my part, the combination of completion of the Stockholm document and Rabin's murder changed my attitude towards the need for continuing dialogue with the rival political camp. I rejected the allegation that we had run too fast in the peace process. Far from it. I had been convinced it

was preferable to complete the entire process in one governmental term, following a profound dialogue with the hawkish forces in society, but that's never happened. The document produced in Sweden proved to me that there was something to talk about and only the peace camp could respond effectively to the concerns of the settlers *and* ensure the world's recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel. After all, no Likud government was going to annex significant areas of the West Bank unilaterally, for fear of American disapproval; on a bilateral basis, establishing sovereignty would depend on the waiving of Israeli control over most of the West Bank. A Labour government, if it could obtain agreement in the spirit of the Stockholm document, would enable most settlers to live their lives without fear of a future in which they would be uprooted, and without political restrictions on further building or expansion, while for the first time in our history Jerusalem would be recognised as the capital of Israel.

This was the message which I conveyed to members of the NRP (Mafdal) whom I met, members of Likud, settlers from Ofra and Efrat and many others who came to talk with me. It was also the basis of the agreement that I drafted with Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun on the eve of the elections. Many of my contacts were of the opinion that if these really were the contour lines of the permanent settlement, they could provide the most reasonable solution now that the vision of a Greater Israel, including the West Bank and Gaza, was clearly no longer attainable.

In retrospect, when the question is asked why Peres lost the May 1996 elections to Netanyahu by such a narrow margin, almost any answer will do; as to why he *lost*, there is no question at all. His defeat was the direct result of four terrorist outrages, following seven months of relative calm. This calm had created the feeling that Oslo had been the right course of action; terrorist attacks created the feeling that Oslo had been a terrible mistake, and Likud – rightly from their point of view – turned the terrorism into an ideological banner, raising questions about the partition of Jerusalem and other grim spectres. Would an agreement on the principles of permanence, alongside the Stockholm document, have meant victory for Peres? Or would the very prospect of a Palestinian state with Al-Quds as its capital have caused the polarisation of Israeli society and aroused the electorate to deliver an even greater snub to the Labour government and its leader?

This we shall never know. When Peres succeeded Rabin as Prime Min-

ister, he said that peace was more important to him than elections and if he could promote the peace-making process, elections would be a secondary issue. This was Shimon's genuine feeling and it was mine as well, but in the six months between Rabin's murder and the elections we didn't succeed in advancing the cause of peace beyond implementation of the interim agreement, and in the elections we lost power and with it the prospect of any further progress. When the Likud government took office, it announced as a fundamental principle that there would be no foreign sovereignty west of the Jordan. From that it followed that there could be no permanent solution agreed with the Palestinians. In retrospect, it could be that the risk involved in negotiating on the basis of the Stockholm document was smaller than it seemed in November 1995, and if we could have reached agreement at higher levels, this would have been a giant step forward.

The Stockholm document does not bind anyone – not the previous government nor the present one. We proved to ourselves that goodwill can produce solutions acceptable to both sides.

The best solution for either side is one that the other cannot accept. So, in the end, a solution has to be found whereby each side concedes part of its dream. Not all of it. We cannot have a solution requiring partition of Jerusalem; the Palestinians cannot have a solution without a Palestinian state and a capital at Al-Quds. We cannot accept a situation involving a Palestinian state with an army; the Palestinians cannot accept a situation in which their refugees are left in limbo and their state cannot absorb them. We cannot countenance entitlement of refugees to choose between compensation and return to Jaffa, Haifa or any other place under our sovereignty; the Palestinians cannot countenance an arrangement whereby all Jewish settlements remain under Israeli jurisdiction. We have no use for a solution whereby 140,000 people are evicted from their homes; the Palestinians have no use for a solution whereby Israel annexes most of the West Bank and leaves just a few scattered and isolated sectors at their disposal; and we cannot live with a solution that takes us back to the pre-Six Day War lines without suitable security guarantees.

In the Stockholm track we tried to square this circle. Our aim was to grant to each side what it considered most important, so long as this did not damage the interests of the other. Thus, regarding the refugee issue, the permanent settlement should create a situation where refugee status is no longer the lot of Palestinians anywhere in the world, and on this

basis the ultimate solution was presented: refugees who have citizenship (especially those resident in Jordan) will retain their citizenship; others will obtain citizenship of the countries where they currently live, or accept citizenship of the Palestinian state while continuing to reside *in situ* (in Lebanon for example), or be absorbed by the Palestinian state. They will be entitled to compensation from the international organisation that is to be established to replace the existing aid and development agencies, and within a relatively short space of time it should be possible to replace the refugee camps in Gaza, the West Bank and in Lebanon with proper housing.

Resolution 194 of the UN Assembly, determining that the Palestinians may choose between compensation and return (a resolution opposed, incidentally, not only by Israel but also by Arab states and the Palestinians), cannot be implemented. It is true that at the Lausanne Conference in April 1949 Ben-Gurion was prepared to accept 100,000 Palestinian refugees as part of a comprehensive peace, but it was the Arab world which rejected this; you can't come back fifty years later, after so many demographic and political changes have taken place, saying you've changed your mind and is the offer still open please? Anyone seeking to establish two states, one alongside the other, needs to be very wary of anything approaching binationality in either of them.

On the other hand, it isn't realistic to try restricting the number of citizens living in a neighbouring state. The phenomenon of 'quotas' has been a deep wound in our flesh ever since the British bowed to Arab pressure and imposed limits on the number of those entitled to immigrate to Israel. If a Palestinian state comes into existence, it will be impossible to impose immigration quotas on it. I assume that the majority of refugees will not choose to settle in the Palestinian state and will opt for rehabilitation in their places of domicile, but even if there comes a stage where the Palestinian population increases substantially as a result of immigration, I still don't see this as a threat to Israel. We know from our history the ludicrous predictions made in the past concerning the absorption potential of the Jewish state, and we have proved to ourselves and the world that we are capable of accommodating many more than was supposed by the statisticians.

An agreement whereby most of the settlers will be located under Israeli sovereignty will create a totally new situation for them, in which for the first time since 1967 they will be entitled to build as in any other town or

village in Israel, without having to obtain special permission or consider the political implications. This is a settlement that can be attained only when Israel gives up most of the territory of the West Bank, while anyone who prefers to retain the status quo will be unable to annex so much as a square centimetre. The situation can be changed for the better only on the basis of mutual agreement.

As for the other settlers, it may be that the majority will choose compensation and transfer to Israeli sovereign territory, but I don't subscribe to the view that living under another sovereignty spells perpetual danger. I well remember the fears expressed over the future of the synagogue and the rabbinical seminary in Jericho; after the transfer of authority to the Palestinians these fears proved groundless, with worshippers and students enjoying unfettered access to their facilities. What currently seems impossible can become eminently practicable in genuinely peaceful conditions.

Transfer of the region of Holot Halutza to the authority of the Palestinian state will enable the overcrowded Gaza Strip to expand a little, providing extra land for the construction of homes. From an Israeli perspective the concession is marginal in comparison with territorial gains in the east, while for residents of the Strip this will be highly advantageous; reducing population-pressure in the Strip will have positive knock-on effects for Israel too.

It is in the context of security arrangements that I see the broadest consensus. Israeli forces stationed along the Jordan will ensure that the river remains Israel's security border and that no foreign army can cross it. Observation posts will enable us to forestall any unexpected assault while the Palestinian state itself will be demilitarised, with only a police force at its disposal. These arrangements meet all our requirements without serious infringement of Palestinian sovereignty.

The settlement regarding Jerusalem is the most complex, the issue itself being the most sensitive. Even the Palestinians are not suggesting the physical partition of the city, a return to the situation preceding the Six Day War. Their demand is for a united city comprising two capitals, West Jerusalem being under our sovereignty and East Jerusalem under theirs. This we cannot accept, and our preferred solution is to allow them to establish their sovereignty in the region of Al-Quds, outside the city limits of Jerusalem as constituted in 1967 and annexed to Israel. Israel will recognise the Palestinian state and its capital; the Palestinians will recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel but will sign a protocol of recognition

referring to West Jerusalem only, while a bilateral committee will be established to discuss the status of East Jerusalem, without a time-limit. The extra-territorial zone on the Temple Mount will effectively perpetuate the status quo whereby Jews are not permitted to worship on this site, which is administered in accordance with the terms of the Wakf. From the Palestinian viewpoint this is certainly a symbolic achievement, while Israel will obtain Palestinian recognition, and subsequently the world's recognition, of Jerusalem as its capital. It may be assumed that following the agreement all embassies will soon be transferred from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and this in itself will have positive effects on the city.

Organising cities by urban quarters is popular in many places in the world. In Jerusalem there are natural quarters, and self-administering communities already exist in several neighbourhoods. The Palestinians will deal with the everyday interests and concerns of their neighbourhoods, as will the residents of other sectors, and above all of this there will be one city, headed by one mayor.

Of course, it is possible to criticise the fact that our sovereignty over the eastern part of the city will remain as it is today, that is imposed by us and recognised only by us, while the indefinite timespan written into the brief of the committee that will decide on the status of the eastern sector is decidedly less comfortable than a solution comprising all the elements. However, it is worth remembering that pending a solution the situation will remain as it is today, unchanged, and any solution agreed by both sides has to be an improvement. Anyone who favours the current situation should not forget that the world doesn't recognise Jerusalem as our capital; it doesn't make life any easier for us when even our best friends still refer in their official communiqués to Tel Aviv as the capital of Israel.

In the end we shall return to the solutions devised in the Stockholm version or something similar. In the end we shall arrive at a permanent solution. The question is – how much time will elapse and how much blood will be spilled before we reach the point that we reached that night in Tel Aviv, less than a week before the bitter and traumatic day of Yitzhak Rabin's murder?

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## **Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker**

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**III**

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Preparing for Camp David (I): Jerusalem

In the run-up to the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, I am gathering a set of background materials on all relevant issues. This first batch concerns Jerusalem and includes the following:

Tab A: A fascinating article by Professor Segal that tries to draw on current Israeli and Palestinian attitudes toward Jerusalem in devising a solution. **I strongly recommend you read it.**

(Segal draws on his surveys to argue for a two-city solution in which Yerushalayim consists of West Jerusalem, Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, plus the Old City and the Mount of Olives and Al-Quds consists of Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem plus the Old City and the Mount of Olives. In other words, joint sovereignty would cover only 1-2% of the entire city as currently defined. His surveys show popular resistance to such a solution can be decreased if Palestinians make clear that peace involves their renunciation of any further claims against Israel and if the broader Arab world took steps - opening embassies, establishing commercial relations - to convince Israelis that a long-term peace is possible).

Tab B: A chapter in a book by Menahem Klein, describing Beilin-Abu Mazen's solution for Jerusalem. **Also highly recommended.** (As becomes clearer by the day, Beilin-Abu Mazen provides an exceptional blue-print for resolution of all permanent status issues. On Jerusalem, the authors settled for an interim solution that Palestinians -- including Abu Mazen -- today decry as insufficient. Still, in its sophistication and ability to balance the parties' interests, even this section of the understanding is highly instructive).

Tab C: A chapter from a book by Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy mayor of Jerusalem, surveying the various solutions that have been proposed over the years.

Tab D: A chapter from a book detailing possible political solutions to Jerusalem ("The Search for a Political Solution").

Tab E: A paper cataloguing the various questions raised by the issue of Jerusalem and possible solutions.

Tab F: A paper surveying international cases of cities that straddle international borders.