

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

POTUS-Way Ahead [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1709

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	7	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Framing the Next Decisions on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9903808] [Duplicate of rs1039_001, (1.34, 2014-0547-M)] (7 pages)	05/19/1999	P1/b(1)
002a. note	To Sandy from Jim. (1 page)	04/08/1999	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	More "Out-of-the-Box" Thinking. [Duplicate of vz6353_006, this case] (2 pages)	04/08/1999	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Kosovo Strategy. (10 pages)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)
004a. paper	Backing Force with Diplomacy. (5 pages)	03/28/1999	P1/b(1)
004b. chart	Kosovo Notional Timeline, March / April 1999. (2 pages)	03/28/1999	P1/b(1)
005. draft	Memo. For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo -- "The Day After". [Record ID: 9900383] [Duplicate of ke5731_001a, vz6264_006, and vz6295_001a, this case.] (5 pages)	01/00/1999	P1/b(1)
006. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo -- Preparing NATO's response to the Massacred at Racak. [Reord ID: 9900341] [Duplicate of ke5726_001a and vz6264_001, this case] (2 pages)	01/19/1999	P1/b(1)
007. briefing paper	Kosovo Day After Considerations. (6 pages)	01/18/1999	P1/b(1)
008. chart	Implications of 27 Oct Decision. [page 8 only. Annotated on the back] (2 pages)	00/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS - Way Ahead [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6355

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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009. draft	Paper. Post-Airstrike Strategy Options. (6 pages)	01/18/1999	P1/b(1)
010. draft	Issues for a Kosovo "Meltdown" Strategy. (2 pages)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)
011. draft	Paper. Backing Force with Diplomacy. (4 pages)	03/26/1999	P1/b(1)
012. draft	Kosovo Diplomatic Strategy: Moving from Phase 1 to Phase 2. (2 pages)	03/26/1999	P1/b(1)

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To: SCHULTE

~~Passport~~
~~Copy~~
~~Page~~
Sandy
Not for
my meeting
w/ Tony Blair
I think we can
most of our work
PK

→ GREG S.

5-3-99

NOTE FROM MY
MEETING W/ TONY
BLAIR. I THINK
WE'RE DOING
MOST OF THIS
NOW

copied
Berger
Podesta

AIR CAMPAIGN REQUIREMENTS

THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO FULFILL THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND OPTIMIZE OUR OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES:

- **PROVIDE ASSETS TO GO TO 24-HR OPERATIONS**
- **OBTAIN AIR SPACE AND BASING RIGHTS FOR 360-DEGREE DIRECTION OF ATTACK**
- **APPROVE/ATTACK PHASE III-TYPE TARGETS TO CONVEY TO THE PEOPLE OF YUGOSLAVIA THEY ARE AT WAR. MUST INCLUDE:**
 - **ELECTRICAL POWER GRID**
 - **ECONOMIC TARGETS**
 - **MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE**
 - **LINES OF COMMUNICATION (INCLUDING WATERWAYS) THAT LINK YUGOSLAVIA TO THEIR NEIGHBORS**
 - **LEADERSHIP NODES -- CIVIL/MILITARY STRUCTURE IN BELGRADE AND THROUGHOUT SERBIA**
- **STREAMLINE/SPEED UP THE TARGET APPROVAL PROCESS**
- **INCREASE THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ISOLATION ACROSS THE BOARD**
 - **CONDEMN HIS ACTIONS**
 - **ISOLATE MILOSEVIC POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY:**
 - **SHUT DOWN PIPELINES/ROADS/FUEL DELIVERIES**
 - **SCREEN HUMANITARIAN DELIVERIES**
 - **DENY UNINSPECTED AIR PASSAGE**
- **RAISE COLLATERAL DAMAGE TOLERANCE (NEED TO TRANSITION TO LESS PRECISION MUNITIONS)**
- **TAKE THESE ACTIONS NOW ... OR BE PREPARED FOR A WINTER REFUGEE CRISIS IN FYROM AND ALBANIA, AND AN IDP PROBLEM IN KOSOVO**

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002b. paper	More "Out-of-the-Box" Thinking. [Duplicate of vz6353_006, this case] (2 pages)	04/08/1999	P1/b(1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

LIMITED ACCESS/2603

April 13, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Foreign Policy Team --
April 14, 1999

Attached at Tab I is a briefing memorandum to the President for the Foreign Policy Team meeting on April 14.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Issues to Discuss
Tab B Participants List

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: April 9, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By vr NARA, Date 5/6/2024
2008-0494-f3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY TEAM
DATE: April 13, 1999
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 12:45-1:45

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0547-M (1.16)
5/6/2024 v2

I. PURPOSE

To review ongoing military, humanitarian and diplomatic efforts related to Kosovo and to discuss: (1) Madeleine's idea of placing Kosovo under international protection and (2) whether and when NATO we should have NATO update its assessment of deploying ground forces into a non-permissive environment.

II. BACKGROUND

My memorandum of yesterday describes the Foreign Policy Team's latest thinking on how to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions and alternative strategies should it become apparent in the weeks ahead that he will not accede to our demands.

As you will have read, we are being to consider the idea of seeking to make Kosovo into an "internationally-protected area" within the borders of the FRY but under the authority of the UN or OSCE and protected by a international security presence organized by NATO. Ideally, this concept would be mandated by the UN Security Council with support and participation from Russia. This concept would move away us away from Rambouillet and defer a political settlement to an indefinite future, when we have entered a post-Milosevic era. Madeleine has discussed this concept with her NATO counterparts and Russian Foreign Minister and will be able to give you their reactions.

To be effective, international protection for Kosovo would probably need to be imposed on Belgrade rather than negotiated. This means sustaining NATO's air strikes until Milosevic realizes that he has little alternative but to allow an international force and international administration into Kosovo, or to lose his control over it completely. This could also mean a willingness to deploy NATO ground forces into an

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 9, 2009

environment made "submissive" by NATO air strikes, if Milosevic refuses to give his explicit agreement.

As I mentioned in yesterday's memorandum, there is no great enthusiasm in the Foreign Policy Team for the deployment of NATO (and U.S.) ground forces into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment. That said, we should consider whether now is the time for NATO to update its assessment of such options and bring preliminary planning to a point that we and our allies can more fully evaluate the requirements and risks involved.

Hugh Shelton will meet with his NATO counterparts in Brussels on Thursday, providing an appropriate opportunity to initiate this work. You will also be giving a major foreign policy address in San Francisco on Thursday, in which you could present the concept of an internationally-protected area.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See attached list.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Official photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

I will ask Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton to report on military operations, and Brian Atwood for an update on humanitarian relief efforts. I will then ask Madeleine Albright to report on her meetings with the NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers and to present her concept for placing Kosovo under international protection.

Attachments

Tab A Issues to Discuss
Tab B Participants List

ISSUES TO DISCUSS FOR MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY TEAM

- What more can be done to get humanitarian relief to displaced persons in Kosovo?
 - Air drops?
 - Humanitarian corridors?
 - Third-party assistance?
- Should we pursue the concept of an internationally-protected area for Kosovo?
 - Allied views?
 - Russian views?
 - Prospect of support from the UN Security Council?
- Should NATO update its assessment of introducing ground forces in a non-permissive environment and take planning to the point where we can assess requirements and risks?
 - Allied views?
 - Congressional and public reaction?
 - Signal to Milosevic?
- Should we reposition our rhetoric on ground forces? E.g.:
 - *We are committed to prevailing in this conflict and creating conditions in which people of Kosovo can return to their homes and live with security and self-government.*
 - *We are confident that NATO's sustained air campaign can achieve this objective. However, to ensure that our military commanders have every reasonable option at their disposal, I have asked that General Shelton work with our allies to update NATO's previous assessments on the possible use of ground forces to impose a settlement.*
- Themes for Thursday's foreign policy address in San Francisco?

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0547-m (1.11)

5/6/2024 v2

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 9, 2009

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003. paper	Kosovo Strategy. (10 pages)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)

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Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Sunday, March 28, 1999 4:03 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: Hurley, C. Michael; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: Updated Strategy Paper for Kosovo ~~SECRET~~

Sandy/Jim/Don -

I attach an updated strategy paper with a notional timeline. I have not shared it interagency.



Backing Force with
Diplomacy 2...



Planning Calendar.doc

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By W NARA, Date 6/6/2024
208-0994-53

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~~SECRET~~/NODIS

3/27 DC

KOSOVO DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY**Strategy**

Our diplomacy over the next week should have two main lines:

- First, reengagement with the Contact Group leading to possible Contact Group Ministerial if necessary conditions are established.
- Second, engagement with Frontline States with a view to bolstering their support and cooperation in an effort to bring more pressure to bear on Milosevic.

Track one: Contact Group

As our bombing campaign proceeds, it will be important to give visibility to some parallel diplomatic efforts. In doing so, we must be sure that any initiative does not inhibit or run at cross purposes to military efforts, or lead us into situations where we will be forced to stop the bombing without having attained our objectives.

We should take up the Russian proposal for a Contact Group Ministerial, but turn it in an way so that at a minimum, renewed Contact Group discussions do not interfere with NATO operations, and optimally, produce desirable diplomatic results and a improved situation on the ground.

The Russians have proposed a Contact Group Ministerial in Moscow conditioned on a halt to bombing. In our judgment, this is not an absolute condition. The Russians are sufficiently interested in demonstrating they are still players, that they might agree to a Contact Group meeting even while bombing continues.

After appropriate bilateral consultations with the Quad, Secretary Albright would respond to Ivanov proposal that the United States is prepared to hold a Contact Group meeting provided that Moscow is prepared to accept either of two conditions:

- no pause in bombing; or
- Ivanov succeeds in advance in getting Milosevic to halt the offensive in Kosovo and to return VJ and MUP to barracks.

Qu-d ph-ll
Ivanov

tomorrow

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0547-M (1.42)

2/27/2017 KBA

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

If (as seems doubtful) Ivanov were able to persuade Milosevic to halt the fighting and return his forces to barracks, we might be left with an indefinite pause without prospect of any lasting settlement. Provided the decision to resume bombing was left to SACEUR or Solana alone, based on an assessment of compliance with the October limits on units out of garrison, the pause would be unlikely to last long.

Assuming Ivanov agreed, we would insist that any ministerial-level meeting be preceded by one at the political director level (by Quad political directors as well) to ensure that there was a solid basis for expecting the Ministerial to produce a useful result. Minimal acceptable result would be agreement on a statement providing (1) re-endorsement of Rambouillet and (2) call for halt to attacks on civilian population.

Second Track - Front line states

Cooperation from front line states is a key element of bringing pressure on Milosevic. Aware of this, Milosevic has used intimidation and threats to seek to curtail cooperation. Frontline states, particularly Macedonia and Albania, are alarmed about the impact of greater refugee flows. NATO security assurances to date have not succeeded in assuaging their fears.

To provide a visible demonstration of U.S. support, Deputy Secretary Talbott will lead a small interagency team to Tirana, Skopje, Sofia, Bucharest and Brussels next week. Timing will coincide with Contact Group track, reinforcing sense of diplomatic activity even as bombing proceeds. This visit will precede Madame Ogata's April 6 "High-level" meeting on humanitarian assistance to frontline states and Kosovo and reinforce UNHCR efforts.

ST Ws
Thurs/Fri
(TBD)

We are developing a package of new U.S. economic bilateral assistance (reallocated from existing SEED fund). Central themes for visit include:

- Reiteration of U.S. commitment to no new sanctions against FRY that would damage frontline states.
- Strengthened ties with NATO, Summit Open Door package.
- Formulation (to be worked out with Solana) of assurance that NATO will respond to FRY attacks on frontline states.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. draft	Memo. For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo -- "The Day After". [Record ID: 9900383] [Duplicate of ke5731_001a, vz6264_006, and vz6295_001a, this case.] (5 pages)	01/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS - Way Ahead [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6355

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0341

January 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
SUBJECT: Kosovo - Preparing NATO's Response to the
Massacre at Racak

At your request, I attach a proposed memorandum to the President describing the results of the Clark/Naumann visit and this afternoon's meeting of NSC Principals.

Concurrence by: Jamie Baker *JB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Memorandum to the President

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 1/19/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *12* NARA, Date *5/6/2021*
2008-0994-F.3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo -- Preparing NATO's response to the Massacred at Racak. [Reord ID: 9900341] [Duplicate of ke5726_001a and vz6264_001, this case] (2 pages)	01/19/1999	P1/b(1)

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Kosovo "Meltdown":
Strategy Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 5/6/2024
2008-944-F.3

Scenario

Possibly sooner than might have been expected only a few weeks ago, hostilities in Kosovo could escalate beyond the point of any realistic hope of sustaining the three-track strategy. Already we are witnessing increasing levels of armed confrontation, widespread violence against noncombatants, threats to KVM personnel, mounting IDP and refugee flows, and no appreciable progress on the diplomatic/political front. Unless we achieve progress quickly, we are likely to face a "meltdown."

Before fighting escalates to uncontrollable levels, we should reinvigorate our efforts to achieve positive movement on the ground and a negotiated solution. Per the agreed "Kosovo Strategy" paper, we should seek to empower the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team (in part by achieving positive change on the ground) and leverage Milosevic to both accept the agreement and live by all of his commitments to the international community. At every available opportunity senior officials should emphasize to both KLA and Serbian representatives that KVM personnel must be protected.

In spite of our best efforts, however, continued deterioration may force KVM withdrawal, NATO military action, and/or a reevaluation of Kosovo's status. This paper addresses three approaches to a potential meltdown.

Option One: Disengagement and "Ripening"

If the fighting continues to escalate, eventually the threat to international personnel will become too great, and KVM will have to be withdrawn. Although the conflict may not yet be "ripe" for a negotiated settlement, international disengagement followed by intensive fighting could eventually exhaust the parties' will to fight and set the stage for a compromise settlement. Milosevic's economy is in shambles, and it is unclear that it can bear the cost of a prolonged, intensive counter-insurgency campaign. After a period of wide-scale fighting, Milosevic may seek a face-saving retreat. As for the KLA, its radical elements have not been discredited, but a punishing war may cut into their popularity, as was the case last summer. Until the fire of combat burned itself out, a containment strategy to prevent destabilization of the region would be necessary.

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Pros

- prospect of prolonged war and military stalemate generates leverage on both parties
- enhances accountability and "buy-in" to an eventual accord by placing responsibility on the parties
- gives us more flexibility in using airstrikes as a military option

Cons

- ensuing humanitarian disaster
- danger of regional destabilization from refugees, arms flows, criminal activity, etc.
- international perception of NATO and OSCE failure

Option Two: Air Strikes, Possible Further Military Action

Another alternative would be to use the threat or the reality of Western military force to gain the leverage currently missing from our diplomatic efforts that could compel the sides to negotiate seriously. Western military engagement presupposes that the KVM and other international personnel have been withdrawn. A number of options are possible (assuming the political will), from airstrikes to commitment of Western ground forces. In the short to medium term, Belgrade has the military advantage on the ground; airstrikes could eliminate its superiority. Because the KLA is a guerrilla force with nothing greater than man-portable weapons, applying equal pressure against the KLA would be difficult from the air. Ground forces would likely be necessary -- either as an interpositional force cutting off supply routes or as a peacemaking/peacekeeping force in Kosovo itself.

Pros

- provides maximum leverage over both parties
- restores NATO's and the USG's credibility
- rapid restoration of order alleviates refugee and crime problems associated with the instability in Kosovo
- show of force may deter others in the Balkans from pursuing political ends through violence

Cons

- requires forceful NATO decisions; not clear these will be possible
- strong Russian, Chinese opposition

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- most Western Europeans unlikely to support unless grave human rights violations by the Serbs tip the balance of public opinion
- restraining radical elements of the KLA would be difficult using traditional military means

Option Three: Independence

We could make clear to Milosevic that we are prepared to consider changing our stance on independence as a means of pressuring him to get serious about autonomy. With the KLA we could take the position that we will not/not support any change in sovereignty or boundaries by force, but we would be prepared to consider a negotiated settlement which moved promptly through a transitional autonomy phase to independence so long as this status was the result of negotiations, not war. Although it violates the principle of respect for the borders of a sovereign state, independence may be justified on the principle that sovereignty resides with the people, and any state that violently and systematically oppresses its people may lose its claim to sovereignty.

Pros

- co-opts radical elements of the KLA, increases Kosovo Albanian "buy in"
- in longer term, denies Milosevic an opportunity to manufacture crises in order to generate nationalist support
- makes Milosevic more dispensable; his cooperation in Kosovo would no longer be needed
- maximizes the effectiveness of airstrikes (airstrikes cannot force Serb compliance in implementation of a complex autonomy arrangement, but they can force complete withdrawal of Serb forces)

Cons

- will be strongly opposed by Russia and China
- most European states opposed
- may have spillover effects, particularly in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro
- without an accompanying threat of airstrikes, Milosevic would likely press to rapidly eliminate the KLA and/or ethnically "cleanse" Kosovo

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pmisp/kosovo/kosmelt4.doc
1/12/99

Drafted: PM/ISP - SWatts (7-0389)
Cleared: PM - EDNewsom
PM - RMBecroft

703-684-9624

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. briefing paper	Kosovo Day After Considerations. (6 pages)	01/18/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS - Way Ahead [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6355

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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008. chart	Implications of 27 Oct Decision. [page 8 only. Annotated on the back] (2 pages)	00/00/1999	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. draft	Paper. Post-Airstrike Strategy Options. (6 pages)	01/18/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. draft	Issues for a Kosovo "Meltdown" Strategy. (2 pages)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. draft	Paper. Backing Force with Diplomacy. (4 pages)	03/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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012. draft	Kosovo Diplomatic Strategy: Moving from Phase 1 to Phase 2. (2 pages)	03/26/1999	P1/b(1)
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Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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Russia Strategy

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0547-m (1.48)
5/6/2024 n

Objectives

- Insulate U.S.-Russian relationship from impact of NATO airstrikes.
- Attempt to moderate Russian rhetoric over NATO action. Ensure Russian people and decision-makers have access to unbiased information on situation and U.S. rationale.
- Blunt unhelpful Russian diplomatic moves vis-à-vis Belgrade or at UNSC.
- Keep option open for further cooperation on interim agreement and Russian participation in KFOR.
- Lay strict markers on Russian military cooperation with FRY.

Key Events

Thursday, March 25, 1999

- MKA-Ivanov phone call
- MKA calls to other Contact Group countries, soliciting high-level calls and increased public diplomacy with Russians
- Talbott call to Mamedov to gauge temperature in Moscow, encourage closure on CFE principles by March 30
- Charge Tefft meeting with Dep FM Mamedov. Marker on military assistance to FRY.
- Jim Collins arrives in Moscow
- Embassy Moscow presents rationale for strikes to MFA, Presidential Administration, politicians, opinion-makers. Marker on UN embargo. Solicit help curbing violence in Republika Srpska, front-line states. (continuing)
- Check-in call with Ushakov (Talbott/Sestanovich/Pascual)
- SFOR follow-up actions with Russian brigade
- Possible announcement of Camdessus Moscow, return of IMF Mission?
- Vershbow/Clark call to Amb. Kislyak (continuing)

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- Pickering ORT or WorldNet appearance
- Talbott backgrounders on U.S.-Russia relationship
- Updates, backgrounders for Russian Washington press corps
- Public diplomacy efforts by Embassy Moscow
- Fuerth review with Ushakov Binational Commission business finished and pending and how to advance agenda.

Friday, March 26, 1999

- Possible POTUS call (pending SRB decision)
- Talbott-hosted small group on status of U.S.-Russian relations
- Review status of above measures in run-up to Phase 2
- Fuerth, et al press backgrounders to explain continuation/accomplishments of Commission work
- Embassy Moscow call on Primakov international affairs aide Kosachev
- State, NSC, OVP Congressional staff briefs to explain status of U.S.-Russian relations
- Albright call to Ivanov
- Check-in calls with Ushakov

Monday, March 29, 1999

- POTUS to Yeltsin letter to explain rationale to build on mutual interests.
- Talbott call to Mamedov, incl. review of CFE status.
- Check-in calls with Ushakov

Tuesday, March 30

- VP call to Primakov (schedule permitting) to underscore need to sustain cooperation, propose continuation of Commission work.
- Possible IMF announcement of mission to Russia.
- Albright op-ed on next steps in US-Russian relations.

Wednesday, March 31

- Republication of Albright op-ed in Russian press

Tuesday, April 6

- Foreign policy team review with POTUS and VP on Russia relationship

Early April

- Small interagency delegation to Moscow to review positive areas for cooperation

For POTNS on
2/24/99

KOSOVO

Main Points

- Rambouillet is a significant step forward but we are not there yet. We intend to keep working with the parties. Ambassador Chris Hill will continue his engagement over the next three weeks. I hope the Kosovars will move quickly to accept our draft formally. If they agree, this will step up pressure on the Serbs to sign.
- In the meantime, all sides must exercise restraint and avoid provocations. NATO SYG Solana retains authority to launch air strikes against FRY if necessary.
- More broadly, let's remember what has been accomplished over the past few months. In response to the Serb offensive last year, we brokered a deal that provided for a cease-fire, returned 250,000 displaced persons to their homes and internationalized Kosovo with 2,000 civilian verifiers and an intrusive air inspection system.
- We managed to avert a major humanitarian disaster over the winter, but it became increasingly clear that without a real peace agreement that provides for substantial self-government in Kosovo, fighting would resume on a wide-scale this spring.
- For the past several months we've been working with all elements of the Kosovar Albanian community to try to forge a single negotiating team and to develop a proposal with substantial self-government for Kosovo.
- Three weeks ago, the Albanians would not sit together in the same room, much less with the Serb delegation. The Albanians would accept nothing short of immediate independence. As a result of our efforts, they came together for the first time as a single team, met with the Serb delegation and Secretary Albright present and have agreed in principle to sign our proposed peace agreement after two weeks of consultations in Kosovo.
- The Serbs have not agreed to sign, but they have agreed to substantial parts of the "political" agreement on Kosovo self-government.

- So we've taken a significant step forward. Of course we're not there yet and have much work to do in the days ahead.

What happened to American leadership? Weren't you snubbed at the talks?

- American leadership made a difference in ending the bloodshed last October and getting the parties to take this important step forward. What we have is an agreement that for the first time is negotiated between the Serbs and Kosovars which gives the province a significant measure of autonomy.
- We are not there yet. But there is an important step forward that could not have been done without the credibility and force of will of the United States. I am proud of the work our negotiators have done in France and am cognizant of the work that is left.
- But the American people should know that our leadership and strength are key elements in moving this process forward and that in the absence of the US, there can be no final peace agreement for the people of Kosovo.

Exactly what have parties agreed to?

- Much progress was made. Albanian side showed great courage and adopted the agreement in principle. Want a few weeks to check with leadership at home but have expressed their clear intention to sign it. Understandable position, as they represent a broad range of opinion and are not an official government negotiating team with a clear mandate. Unlike Serb delegation, there's no autocratic leader.
- Serb side accepted major elements of substantial autonomy for Kosovars, but did not soften its opposition to NATO-led implementation force. But that is only way to enforce the agreement. Without a NATO force, it's just another piece of paper.
- We'll press both sides to sign when they reconvene on March 15.

What if the Serbs will only sign the political part? Will you bomb them?

- The agreement is a package. Neither party can pick and choose what it wants.
- And without a military implementing force, it's not a serious agreement.
- We've made it clear to the Serbs that it's in their interest to agree. They know that NATO stands ready to take military action if necessary to end their repression of -- and violence against -- the Kosovar Albanians.

Do the Kosovars get a referendum?

- One of the most difficult issues concerns what will happen at the end of the three-year interim period. Some of the Kosovars wanted a binding referendum to decide.
- Neither we nor Allies could agree to this, because it was tantamount to accepting Kosovo's independence - which we think could destabilize the region.
- Agreement does provide for an international meeting at the end of the three years "to determine a mechanism for a final settlement " based, inter alia, on "the will of the people."
- So the agreement does not preclude a referendum, and the Kosovars have indicated that they intend to conduct one to determine the will of the people. However, it would not be binding under the agreement.

What's the point of further talks -- won't the process just drag on?

- Rambouillet ended the first phase of talks and has moved the parties closer toward the goal of a peaceful settlement. To give up now would be a mistake and is not in the national interest of the United States. The parties have never before come so close to a peace agreement.

- Such an agreement is the only way to end the violence and bloodshed, stop Serb repression of the Kosovar Albanians and create genuine self-government for Kosovo.

You said on Friday that you didn't think the talks should be extended. Then you reversed yourself, we hear because of the Allies. And now you've got less than an agreement and fallen off threat to bomb the Serbs. Didn't your statement and the subsequent extension undermine U.S. credibility?

- You can't shut down talks when the parties want to keep talking. Negotiators have to be flexible at times, hard-nosed at others and it was the recommendation of the team on the ground to support a limited extension. I'm glad we did, as the parties have come a long way towards signing the agreement we presented them. Will take more time, but beats using battlefield to get results.
- The Serbs are on notice that NATO is watching them very carefully, and that NATO SYG Solana already has the authority he needs to launch air strikes if necessary.

What if fighting starts again?

- We've called upon both sides to observe the cease-fire and honor the commitments they made to the international community back in October.
- Remain very concerned about indications of an offensive by Serb forces. If Milosevic does this, NATO stands ready to respond. As SYG Solana said yesterday, NATO "will remain ready to use whatever means are necessary to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo and to prevent further human suffering."
- The Kosovars too must show restraint. If they do not, they will lose NATO's support and we are prepared to look at other measures if they provoke any fighting.

Why does the U.S. care about Kosovo?

- Three important interests are at stake:
 - First, clear interest in protecting regional stability and our investment in Bosnia. If we don't try to stop conflict now, it will spread. And if it spreads, we won't be able to stop it except at far greater risk and cost.
 - Second, we've got an important interest in averting another humanitarian catastrophe and more Serb atrocities this spring.
 - Third, we have a key interest in preserving NATO's credibility as a guarantor of European stability and U.S. credibility as the leader of NATO.

Will you seek Congressional support for NATO deployment?

- We welcome broadest possible support for any deployment and will work with Congress to that end.

[Note: In our view Congressional authorization is not required for a permissive/consensual ground deployment or the air strikes contemplated. Thus we would welcome an expression of support but would not seek it.]