

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

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39	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. timeline	Timeline for Break-Down Scenario. (2 pages)	02/17/1999	P1/b(1)
002. letter	Supreme Allied Commander Europe to Secretary General Javier Solana. [NATO] (4 pages)	10/22/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Donald Bandler, Robert Bell et al. Subject: Kosovo/Massacre - SACEUR Report on January 20 (Cable USNATO 000128) [NATO] (7 pages)	01/20/1999	P1/b(1)
004. chart	Serb Compliance on Security Forces Withdrawals. (1 page)	10/28/1998	P1/b(1)
005. chart	[Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199]. (1 page)	10/28/1998	P1/b(1)
006. map	Kosovo: Internally Displaced Persons' Activity Since 23 September 1998. (1 page)	10/21/1998	P1/b(1)
007. draft	Discussion Paper for NSC Deputies Committee on Preparing for October 27th. (2 pages)	10/20/1998	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Memcon. Meeting with Jacques Chirac, President of France [Duplicate of 9901357 (kh446_001a, 1.56, 2009-1290-M)] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (5 pages)	02/19/1999	P1/b(1)
009a. memo	Meeting with Foreign Policy Team, February 1, 1999. [Record ID: 9900590] [Duplicate of ke5740_001b and vz6266_001a, this case] (5 pages)	01/30/1999	P1/b(1)
009b. list	List of Participants. [partial] (1 page)	01/30/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6350

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. report	[Description of the Operation at Racak, 15 January 1999]. (2 pages)	01/17/1999	P1/b(1)
010b. report	[Units Involved in the Racak Operation, 15 January 1999. With Annex I] (2 pages)	01/17/1999	P1/b(1)
010c. report	Status of VJ and MUP Forces in Kosovo. (2 pages)	01/17/1999	P1/b(1)
011. briefing paper	Advancing the Negotiations. (10 pages)	12/30/1998	P1/b(1)

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
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**ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD****NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION****LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL****BOULEVARD LÉOPOLD III
B-1110 BRUXELLES**

Sg(98)1066

23 October 1998

Dear President,

The deadline for the launching of airstrikes is approaching fast. I am therefore writing to you to inform you that insufficient progress has been made towards achieving full and unconditional compliance with UNSCR 1199. Much still needs to be done.

In this regard, the Alliance stands by the requirement as stated by the Contact Group that FRY security forces must return to their positions before March 1998 and heavy weapons must be withdrawn. This includes the withdrawal of security forces normally deployed outside Kosovo (including their heavy weapons) to their usual peacetime locations and the return to base (including heavy weapons) of security forces normally based in Kosovo. This is essential in order to create the conditions for refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes and for political negotiations to proceed. To this end, a full, effective and unconditional cease-fire must also be scrupulously observed.

I intend to send the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Naumann and SACEUR, General Clark to Belgrade on Saturday 24th October for military technical discussions with your military authorities aimed at achieving our requirements.

Yours sincerely,

Javier Solana

His Excellency
Mr Slobodan Milosevic
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 1999 2:49 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: KOSOVO: MOVING AHEAD ON OUR DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 270635Z JAN 99
MSGTO: ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE NIACT IMMEDIATE
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 5241
TOR: 990127021241 M3663801

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VL NARA, Date 5/2/2024
7008-0994-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 015241

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/09

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MARR, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MOVING AHEAD ON OUR DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

REP: STATE 13337

CLASSIFIED BY UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING. REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) NIACT PRECEDENCE REQUIRED IN ORDER FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES TO IMPLEMENT INSTRUCTIONS EARLY ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27 BEFORE MORNING MEETINGS AT NATO.

2. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. USNATO SEE PARAGRAPH 3-7. EMBASSIES PARIS, LONDON AND BONN SEE PARA 8. ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND INVITEE CAPITALS SEE PARA 9. EMBASSY HOME ALSO SEE PARA 10. ALL EMBASSIES SEE PARA 11-12.

FOR USNATO

3. (✓) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD CONVENE A MEETING AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON JANUARY 27 WITH THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN PERMREPS TO COMPARE NOTES ON POSITIONS FOR THE NAC BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE NAC (FYI, THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WITH HER BRITISH FRENCH AND GERMAN COUNTERPARTS ON JANUARY 26). IF ANY OF THESE PERMREPS IS NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS SEQUENCE, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SEEK A DELAY IN THE NAC UNTIL THAT AMBASSADOR OR AMBASSADORS CAN SEEK NEW INSTRUCTIONS. AGREEMENT ON THE ELEMENTS ON THIS APPROACH, INCLUDING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, THE WARNING AND THE ULTIMATUM (AND ITS GENERAL CONTENT) WILL ALLOW US TO GO AHEAD WITH THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING.

4. (✓) SUMMARY OF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

-- ON JANUARY 28, NAC APPROVES SYG SOLANA WARNING TO BE ISSUED TO THE FRY AND KOSOVAR ALBANIANS (BASED ON ELEMENTS

DISTRIBUTED BY SOLANA ON JANUARY 26, AS MODIFIED BELOW);
-- ON JANUARY 29, THE CONTACT GROUP AT LEVEL OF MINISTERS
ENDORSES THE HILL-PETRITSCH TEXT SUBJECT TO ANY CHANGES
MUTUALLY AGREED BY THE PARTIES. CONVOKES THE PARTIES
WITHIN FOUR DAYS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO LAST NO LONGER THAN
SEVEN DAYS;
- ON JANUARY 30, THE NAC ISSUES AN ULTIMATUM (REACTIVATES
ACTOROS). (SUMMARIZED IN PARA. 6 BELOW.)

5. (C) JANUARY 28 WARNING: THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO WORK
FROM THE SEVEN ELEMENTS PROPOSED BY SYG SOLANA ON JANUARY
26 AS MODIFIED BELOW:

DRAFT ELEMENTS OF A NATO WARNING TO PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND
THE KOSOVO ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP

-- 1. NATO FULLY SUPPORTS THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF AN
INTERIM POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO BE PROPOSED BY THE CONTACT
GROUP, WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN ENHANCED STATUS FOR KOSOVO,
PRESERVES THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE FRY AND PROTECTS
THE RIGHTS OF ALL ETHNIC GROUPS.

-- 2. PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC, AND OTHER FRY AND SERBIAN
AUTHORITIES MUST BRING VJ AND MUP FORCE LEVELS, POSTURE AND
ACTIONS INTO STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS TO
NATO ON 25 OCTOBER 1998 AND REFRAIN FROM THE EXCESSIVE AND
DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE
COMMITMENTS. ALL KOSOVAR ARMED ELEMENTS SHOULD CEASE ANY
PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS, INCLUDING HOSTAGE TAKING, AND EXERCISE
RESTRAINT.

-- 3. THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE AND
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOSOVO ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP MUST
AGREE TO THE INTERIM POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THE TIME
FRAME FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE PROPOSED BY THE CONTACT GROUP.

-- 4. THE PARTIES MUST COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(ICTY) INCLUDING BY GRANTING IMMEDIATE AND UNRESTRICTED
ACCESS TO ICTY REPRESENTATIVES AND BY ENSURING THE SAFETY
OF ITS PERSONNEL. WE DEMAND THAT THE FRY AUTHORITIES TAKE
IMMEDIATE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
RACAK MASSACRE ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

-- 5. NATO DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN
KOSOVO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE OSCE VERIFICATION MISSIONS
ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ITS PERSONNEL, PROVIDE FULL FREEDOM
OF MOVEMENT AND LIFT ALL RESTRICTION ON INSTITUTIONS
MONITORING THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO. WE DEMAND THAT THE FRY
AUTHORITIES CONFIRM AMBASSADOR WALKER'S UNINTERRUPTED AND
UNCONDITIONAL STATUS AS KVM HEAD OF MISSION.

-- 6. WE REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO
BRING PEACE TO THE REGION, INCLUDING BY THE UNITED NATIONS,
OSCE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION. NATO STANDS READY TO ACT AND
RULES OUT NO OPTION TO ENSURE FULL RESPECT BY BOTH SIDES
FOR THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING
IN PARTICULAR THE PROVISIONS OF ALL RELEVANT SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. NATO IS ALSO STUDYING MEASURE TO CURB
ARMS SMUGGLING INTO KOSOVO.

-- 7. IN ADDITION TO THE MEASURES IMPLEMENTED LAST WEEK,
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL HAS DECIDED TO CONTINUE MILITARY
PREPARATIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE DEMANDS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE MET. THE NORTH ATLANTIC
COUNCIL WILL FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND WILL DECIDE ON
FURTHER MEASURES IN THE LIGHT OF COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND IN SUPPORT OF THE CONTACT
GROUP'S DEMANDS.

6. (U) NATO ULTIMATUM: FINALLY, THE U.S. WANTS THE NAC TO MEET FOLLOWING THE CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL (E.G., NO LATER THAN SATURDAY, JANUARY 30) TO REVIEW THE WORK OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND TO ADD THE CREDIBLE THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE TO THE NATO WARNING ISSUED ON JANUARY 28 AND THE CONTACT GROUP ACTION ON JANUARY 29. WE SEE THE FOLLOWING TWO OBJECTIVES FOR NATO'S ACTION ON JANUARY 30:

-- AN ULTIMATUM BACKED BY EXISTING ACTORDS. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE THE LIMITED AIR RESPONSE AND PHASE 1 OF THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN, AS WELL AS SUPPORT FOR SUCH FOLLOW-ON AIR ACTION AS MAY BE REQUIRED, WITH A 10-DAY DELAY TO EVALUATE COMPLIANCE.

-- THE TERMS OF THE ULTIMATUM SHOULD INCLUDE STATUS QUO ANTE -- I.E., FULL COMPLIANCE WITH NATO AND OSCE AGREEMENTS FROM OCTOBER, INCLUDING CLARK-NAUMANN AGREEMENTS ON FORCE LEVELS -- AND PARTICIPATION IN INTENSIVE DAYTON-STYLE NEGOTIATIONS SPONSORED BY THE CONTACT GROUP, WITH ONE WEEK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ENDORSED HILL-PETRITSCH SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL.

-- THE ULTIMATUM MUST MAKE THREE OUTCOMES CLEAR:

FIRST, FAILURE BY BELGRADE TO COMPLY WITH LAST OCTOBER'S AGREEMENTS OR AGREE TO AN INTERIM AGREEMENT SETTLEMENT ENDORSED BY THE CONTACT GROUP AND AGREED BY THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS WOULD LEAD TO AIR STRIKES.

SECOND, FAILURE BY BELGRADE TO COMPLY WITH THE OCTOBER AGREEMENTS, EVEN IF NEITHER SIDE AGREES TO AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT, WOULD LEAD TO AIR STRIKES.

THIRD, FAILURE BY THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS TO AGREE TO AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT ENDORSED BY THE CONTACT GROUP AND AGREED BY BELGRADE, WHEN BELGRADE HAD COME INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE OCTOBER AGREEMENTS, WOULD NOT LEAD TO AIR STRIKES BUT RATHER TO INTENSIFIED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS.

7. (C) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW CAN AGREE THAT SYGEN SOLANA (IN INFORMAL CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES) BE GIVEN AUTHORITY BY THE NAC TO AUTHORIZE SACEUR TO EXECUTE THE ACTORS. IN ADDITION, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD PROPOSE AND SEEK ALLIED SUPPORT FOR A JOINT TRIP BY SOLANA AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO BELGRADE AFTER THE JANUARY 30 NAG TO DELIVER THE ULTIMATUM TO MILOSEVIC.

FOR PARIS, LONDON AND BONN

8. (C) AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON JANUARY 27, AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES ARE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE MOST SENIOR LEVEL MFA OFFICIALS POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS (SEE PARA. 4 ABOVE). EMBASSIES MAY DRAW ON POINTS ABOVE AS NEEDED TO CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SEQUENCE OF ACTION. EMBASSIES ARE ENCOURAGED TO CONTACT USNATO DIRECTLY WITH THE RESULTS OF THESE DEMARCHES TO HELP AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW PREPARE FOR HIS MEETING.

FOR ALL OTHER NATO AND INVITER CAPITALS

9. (C) DRAWING ON THE ABOVE POINTS, AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES SHOULD CONTACT SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS ON JANUARY 27 TO CONVEY OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ABOVE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, SHARE OUR TEXT OF A WARNING (BASED ON SOLANA'S PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF A WARNING), AND PROVIDE OUR PROPOSED POINTS FOR A NATO ULTIMATUM. IN DOING SO, AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES SHOULD NOTE WE HOPE THAT NATO WILL BE IN A POSITION TO BACK THE EFFORTS

TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THUS, FUTURE NATO ACTIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE COMPLIANCE ISSUES AND THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PROCESS AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF SYG SOLANA'S PROPOSED WARNING.

FOR EMBASSY HOME

10. ~~(C)~~ EMBASSY SHOULD BE AWARE THAT FM DINI RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO THE SCENARIO OUTLINED ABOVE WHEN THE SECRETARY PRESENTED IT TO HIM IN A PHONE CONVERSATION ON JANUARY 26. THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD NOTE IN DELIVERING THE ABOVE POINTS THAT WE HOPE AMBASSADOR DE FRANCHIS WILL HAVE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS AT NATO

FOR ALL EMBASSIES

11. ~~(C)~~ (IF RAISED) WE AGREE THAT WE NEED TO IDENTIFY POINTS OF LEVERAGE WITH THE KLA, BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE. WE ARE LOOKING AT THIS ISSUE CLOSELY AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS ON STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE IN A COORDINATED FASHION TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE KLA.

12. ~~(C)~~ (IF RAISED) THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT NATO'S STUDYING THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR ACTIONS TO INTERFERE WITH THE FLOW OF WEAPONS TO KOSOVO ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS.

13. (U) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
TALBOTT

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Sunday, January 24, 1999 1:46 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hurley, C. Michael; Schulte, Gregory L.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: KOSOVO: DEMARCHE ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 240619Z JAN 99
MSGTO: ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE NIACT IMMEDIATE
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 3337
TOR: 990124013031 M3659209

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 5/2/2024
2008-0994-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 013337

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/23/09

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MARR, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DEMARCHE ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

REFS: (A) STATE 10086
(B) STATE 12119
(C) USNATO 164
(D) LONDON 637

CLASSIFIED BY UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING; REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) NIACT PRECEDENCE REQUIRED IN ORDER FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES TO IMPLEMENT INSTRUCTIONS ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 24.

2. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE - SEE PARAGRAPH 4.

3. ~~(S)~~ WE PROVIDED U.S. THINKING ON NEXT STEPS IN KOSOVO IN REFTELS A AND B. THE NAC DISCUSSION ON JANUARY 22 (REFTEL C) DID NOT MOVE THE PROCESS NEARLY AS FAR AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED, ALTHOUGH WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY DISCUSSIONS AT THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON JANUARY 22 (REFTEL D). THE NAC WILL MEET THE AFTERNOON OF MONDAY, JANUARY 25, TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE U.S.-PROPOSED WARNING. OUR OBJECTIVE FOR THAT MEETING IS TO ACHIEVE NAC AGREEMENT ON A WARNING BASED ON THE U.S. ELEMENTS FOR A WARNING. THEY COULD THEN BE REVIEWED IN CAPITALS WITH THE AIM OF GAINING FORMAL NAC APPROVAL LATER IN THE WEEK. WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT A CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A PEACE AGREEMENT, OR ON ANY OTHER RELATED SUBJECT, WILL MAKE NO REAL CONTRIBUTION TO OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY AND ITS SUCCESS WITHOUT A CLEAR AND SUPPORTIVE NATO WARNING. U.S. AGREEMENT TO A CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL MEETING LATE IN THE WEEK, E.Q., ON JANUARY 29, IS THEREFORE CONTINGENT UPON NAC APPROVAL OF A STRONG WARNING WITH CLEAR CONSEQUENCES. WE WILL NOT AGREE TO A CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL MEETING UNLESS NATO HAS TAKEN THIS ACTION.

4. ~~(S)~~ GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING ALLIED SUPPORT AT THE JANUARY 25 NAC, AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES IN NATO CAPITALS SHOULD CONTACT SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 24, AND THE MORNING OF MONDAY, JANUARY 25, TO PRESS THE U.S. POSITION, DRAWING ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 5. USNATO SHOULD BRIEF SYG SOLANA AND STRONGLY ENCOURAGE HIM TO CANCEL HIS TRAVEL SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 25. USNATO SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT NATO CONTINUES TO USE PJC AND EAPC

MECHANISMS TO BRIEF THE RUSSIANS AND PARTNERS ON NATO DELIBERATIONS, AND ENCOURAGE SYG SOLANA TO CONTINUE TO BRIEF THEM INFORMALLY. MISSIONS IN NATO CAPITALS SHOULD BEGIN WITH A DESCRIPTION OF WHERE WE ARE ON THE NEGOTIATING TRACK, EXPLAIN WHAT WE PROPOSE IN ORDER TO KEEP THE KLA IN LINE, AND THEN EXPLAIN HOW WE SEE NATO FITTING INTO OUR OVERALL POLITICAL STRATEGY. THIS SHOULD HELP ADDRESS SOME ALLIED CONCERNS RAISED IN FRIDAY'S NAC DISCUSSIONS. A SUMMARY OF THE HILL-PETRITSCH DRAFT SETTLEMENT IS TO BE SENT SEPARATELY AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE. USNATO IS AUTHORIZED TO DISTRIBUTE THE SUMMARY TO ALLIES.

5. (S) POINTS:

OVERVIEW

-- WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THE NAC WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS AT ITS MEETING ON JANUARY 22, BUT BELIEVE THE DISCUSSIONS WERE USEFUL AND HELPED TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD.

-- TO BE CLEAR, OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE REMAINS ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN KOSOVO. THE CURRENT SITUATION OFFERS A REAL BUT PERHAPS BRIEF WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT BEING PROPOSED BY AMBASSADORS HILL AND PETRITSCH.

-- THE LONDON CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON JANUARY 22 SET A GOAL OF EARLY NEGOTIATIONS AND DECIDED TO INTENSIFY PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES TO SETTLE.

-- GIVEN THE VOLATILE SITUATION IN KOSOVO, WE MUST MOVE QUICKLY TO REINFORCE THIS DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE AS WELL AS TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. NATO'S CREDIBILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE TO BRING ABOUT REAL CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC IN KOSOVO ARE ESSENTIAL IN ACHIEVING THESE ENDS.

-- NATO'S THREAT TO USE MILITARY FORCE IS A SINE QUA NON FOR BRINGING THE FRY AND KOSOVAR PARTIES TOGETHER TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT. WITHOUT NATO'S CLEAR COMMITMENT TO ACT, A CONTACT GROUP PLAN WOULD BE ANOTHER HOLLOW APPEAL DESTINED TO FAIL.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT ONLY RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE IN KOSOVO IS NOT A SOLUTION. MILOSEVIC WILL CONTINUE CHEATING ON AGREEMENTS AND CHALLENGING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHILE WE WILL BE FACED WITH ADDITIONAL ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE SERBIAN SECURITY FORCES AND THE REAL POTENTIAL FOR A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER. AFTER THE RACAK MASSACRE, MERELY A RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE IS UNLIKELY TO PREVENT THE KLA FROM CONDUCTING REPRISALS.

-- WE NEED TO FACE FACTS. SIMPLY NEGOTIATING ANOTHER DEAL WITH MILOSEVIC IS NOT THE ANSWER. HE WILL RENEGE ON, AND MANIPULATE, ANY DEAL WE REACH WITH HIM.

-- THE SITUATION CALLS FOR NATO TO TAKE FORCEFUL AND RESOLUTE ACTION, WHICH CAN HELP OPEN THE WAY FOR A LONGER-TERM SOLUTION. THERE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES, SUCH AS REDUCING ARMS FLOWS AND INTERNATIONAL FUNDING, BUT ALL OF THESE ARE ISSUES TO RESOLVE IN A LONGER-TERM FRAMEWORK. NEED TO STAY FOCUSED ON RESOLVING THE CURRENT CRISIS AND PREVENTING A RETURN TO LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE, WHILE OPENING THE WAY FORWARD.

OVERALL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

-- OUR IMMEDIATE FOCUS MUST BE ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON A ROBUST SET OF ELEMENTS FOR A SERIOUS WARNING TO THE FRY, AS AID OUT BY AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW IN THE NAC ON JANUARY 20 AND 22. (SEE REF. B FOR ELEMENTS OF PROPOSED WARNING.)

-- ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED MORE PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT ON A TOUGH NATO WARNING THIS WEEK, THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE NAG HAVE SERVED BOTH TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS AND HELP TO GUIDE OUR THINKING.

-- ONE KEY ELEMENT OF OUR POSITION IS THE NEED TO REACH NATO AGREEMENT ON A WARNING BEFORE WE CAN AGREE TO A CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL MEETING WHICH WOULD PRESS AHEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE HILL-PETRITSCH PLAN. THIS IS A LOGICAL PROGRESSION OF EVENTS THAT WILL BRING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON BOTH THE FRY AND THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS.

-- A CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A PEACE AGREEMENT, OR ON ANY OTHER RELATED SUBJECT, WILL MAKE NO REAL CONTRIBUTION TO OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY AND ITS SUCCESS WITHOUT A CLEAR AND SUPPORTIVE NATO WARNING.

-- THUS, WE SEE THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

-- THE NAC SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON ELEMENTS FOR A SERIOUS NATO WARNING WITH CLEAR CONSEQUENCES IF IGNORED AT ITS MONDAY, JANUARY 25, MEETING. THIS DOCUMENT WOULD THEN BE CONSIDERED IN CAPITALS AND APPROVED FORMALLY BY THE NAC WITHIN A FEW DAYS.

-- THE WARNING SHOULD BE ISSUED PUBLICLY FOLLOWING THE NAC AND WOULD BE DELIVERED BY SYG SOLANA, SACEUR AND CMC NAUMANN.

-- APPROVAL OF THIS DOCUMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATION TO THE KOSOVARS THAT NATO IS SERIOUS ABOUT MAKING BELGRADE FULFILL ITS COMMITMENTS, AND WOULD AS WELL BE AN UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE TO BELGRADE OF THE PRICE IT WILL PAY FOR CONTINUED NON-COMPLIANCE.

-- THIS WARNING WOULD GIVE THE FRY ABOUT A WEEK TO COMPLY. OBVIOUSLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER EVACUATION OF KVM, BUT OUR PROPOSED TIMETABLE MEANS THAT EVACUATIONS NEED NOT START UNTIL AN AGREED TIME AFTER THE WARNING IS ISSUED.

-- ONCE THIS WARNING IS APPROVED AT NATO, THE U.S. COULD AGREE TO A CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL MEETING, PERHAPS ON JANUARY 29.

-- THIS MEETING COULD PROVIDE APPROVAL OF THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND CONVOKE A FACE-TO-FACE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES BEFORE THE NATO WARNING EXPIRES. AT THIS SECOND MEETING, THE PARTIES WOULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PREPARED BY AMBASSADOR HILL AND EU ENVOY AMBASSADOR PETRITSCH.

-- THE COMBINATION OF THE NATO WARNING AND THE CONTACT GROUP ACTION WOULD MAXIMIZE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC TO LIVE UP TO HIS COMMITMENTS AND ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY WITH KLA

-- CHRIS HILL AND WOLFQANQ PETRITSCH ARE RETURNING TO THE

REGION TO SHARE THE LATEST DRAFT. THEY WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT THE CONTACT GROUP ENDORSES ITS PRINCIPLES AND URGE THE PARTIES TO COMMIT TO THEM.

-- THEY WILL MAKE A PARTICULARLY STRONG PITCH TO THE KLA: KOSOVO CANNOT GET A BETTER DEAL BY WAITING. IF THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS WANT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND NATO ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN RESOLVING THE CRISIS THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IF THEY REJECT THIS APPROACH, THEY CANNOT EXPECT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. WE CAN ALSO FIND OTHER WAYS TO REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE.

-- THIS IS ALSO A WINNING ARGUMENT WITH THE ALBANIAN DIASPORA, ON WHICH THE KLA DEPENDS HEAVILY.

-- BY BUILDING A CRITICAL MASS OF SUPPORT FOR THIS APPROACH AMONG THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS, THE REMAINING EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WILL BE ISOLATED AND POORLY POSITIONED TO PLAY THE SPOILER ROLE.

-- INTERNATIONAL INACTION WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE MOST RADICAL KOSOVARS, WHO FEEL THAT THEIR ONLY HOPE IS TO FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE BECAUSE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS UNWILLING TO MAKE MILOSEVIC LIVE UP TO PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS, MUCH LESS MOVE TOWARD AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO.

-- MOREOVER, WE ARE PUSHING BACK. KVM AND OTHERS ARE WORKING TO KEEP THE KLA FROM MOVING INTO AREAS PROVOCATIVELY, SECURE RELEASE OF DETAINEES AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR LOCALLY BROKERED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

-- NEED NATO INVOLVEMENT TO BACK UP KVM AND SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO THE KLA. UNLESS WE MOVE DECISIVELY TO REDUCE SERB SECURITY PRESENCES WE LACK ANOTHER OPTION FOR PUSHING BACK KLA MILITANTS.

-- ONCE ACHIEVED, A WARNING WILL ALSO ENHANCE OUR KLA STRATEGY. KLA FAILURE TO ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN THAT THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS TO USE THE WARNING TO ACHIEVE MILOSEVIC'S ADHERENCE.

GROUND FORCES OPTIONS

(IF RAISED)

-- WE ARE AWARE THAT SOME ALLIES SAY WE NEED NATO GROUND FORCES FOLLOWING AIR STRIKES EITHER TO FORCE MILOSEVIC TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT OR TO IMPLEMENT AN AGREED SETTLEMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THESE POSITIONS AND THESE ISSUES ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

-- NEED TO WORK TOGETHER ON THIS, BUT CAN'T LET THE QUESTION OF A FORCE PRESENCE ON THE GROUND PREVENT US FROM MOVING AHEAD WITH WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE RIGHT NOW.

-- WE'RE IN A CRISIS SITUATION; NEED TO GET IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT ON A WARNING TO PREVENT AN ESCALATION IN VIOLENCE WHILE CREATING CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

RUSSIA

-- KEEPING THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD IS CRUCIAL TO OUR EFFORTS. KOSOVO IS A MAJOR PART OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S AGENDA FOR HER TRIP TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK.

-- IMPORTANT TO CONSULT REGULARLY WITH THEM IN THE CONTACT GROUP FORUM, IN THE PJC, ETC.

-- WE SEE THE OSCE PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT IN KOSOVO, SOMETHING WE BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS WOULD FAVOR.

-- WE SHOULD ALSO ENGAGE RUSSIA IN PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A SETTLEMENT AND WELCOME THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS, PROVIDED IT COULD BE MADE ACCEPTABLE TO THE KOSOVARS.

-- FRIDAY'S CONTACT GROUP STATEMENT, IN WHICH RUSSIA PARTICIPATED, LAID OUT CLEAR DEMANDS FOR SERB COMPLIANCE.

6. (U) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
ent: Wednesday, January 20, 1999 3:03 AM
o: Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Hurley, C. Michael; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Uyehara, Margaret A.; Witkowski, Anne A.
Subject: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 20 NAG
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 200736Z JAN 99
MSGTO: RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 0086
TOR: 990120024514 M3652222

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By W NARA, Date 5/2/2024
2008-044-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 010086

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/09
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAG, SR
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 20 NAG

CLASSIFIED BY MARC GROSSMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUR,
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ IN LIGHT OF THE UNSATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF THE JANUARY 19 MEETING BETWEEN MILOSEVIC AND GENERALS CLARK AND NAUMANN, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT MILOSEVIC IS CURRENTLY UNWILLING TO MEET HIS COMMITMENTS TO NATO AND OBLIGATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT NATO MUST DEMONSTRATE ITS RESOLVE TO ADDRESS MILOSEVIC'S DEFIANCE, AND WANTS TO WORK WITH NATO ALLIES TO DEFINE WHAT BELGRADE MUST DO TO AVOID NATO MILITARY ACTION. WHILE THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS WITH NATO, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT MILOSEVIC'S NON-COMPLIANCE WILL NOT GO UNANSWERED.

2. ~~(S)~~ WHILE WASHINGTON IS STILL CONSIDERING THE SPECIFICS OF A RESPONSE, DISCUSSIONS IN THE NAG SHOULD BEGIN TO DEVELOP THE REQUIREMENTS WE WOULD SEEK TO

IMPOSE UPON BELGRADE. MISSION SHOULD DRAW UPON THE POINTS BELOW AS THEMES FOR THE NAC DISCUSSION. MISSION SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PJC AND EAPC ON THE RESULTS OF THE JANUARY 19 CLARK/NAUMANN MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC.

-- MILOSEVIC'S DEFIANT REJECTION OF NATO'S DEMANDS AND HIS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE AND MUST ELICIT A FIRM RESPONSE FROM THE ALLIANCE.

-- WHILE GIVING OUR SUPPORT TO DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY RUSSIAN DFM AVDEYEV AND NORWEGIAN FM VOLLEBAEK, WE MUST BEGIN TO DISCUSS THE NATURE OF NATO'S RESPONSE.

-- WE ARE FACING AN ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION AFTER THE MASSACRE AT RACAK, BELGRADE'S UNACCEPTABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD KVM AND ITS DIRECTOR, AND MILOSEVIC'S DEFIANT REJECTION OF NATO'S DEMANDS. WE BELIEVE THAT NATO CANNOT ACCEPT A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. DOING

SO WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE BELGRADE TO CONTINUE ITS PREVIOUS INTRANSIGENT BEHAVIOR, WHILE REDUCING WHAT LIMITED LEVERAGE WE HAVE TO KEEP THE KLA IN CHECK. THE RESULT WILL BE A CONTINUED CYCLE OF PROVOCATION AND RETALIATION, LEADING TO EVER ESCALATING VIOLENCE.

-- ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE THAT NATO SHOULD INSIST THAT MILOSEVIC AGREE TO, AT A MINIMUM, A "STATUS QUO ANTE PLUS". THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE NOT ONLY TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH OUR PREVIOUS REQUIREMENTS BUT ALSO TO PURSUE JUSTICE AFTER RACAK, ENHANCE KVM'S EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY AND ADVANCE OUR EFFORTS TO CREATE POSITIVE CHANGE ON THE GROUND IN SUPPORT OF AN INTERIM POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY TO PURSUE THIS OBJECTIVE IS TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT OF AN ULTIMATUM, THAT WOULD BE BACKED BY OUR COLLECTIVE DETERMINATION TO EXECUTE THE EXISTING ACTIVATION ORDERS IF MILOSEVIC FAILED TO CARRY OUT ITS REQUIREMENTS. THE FIRST GROUP OF REQUIREMENTS ("STATUS QUO ANTE") INVOLVES COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS THAT MILOSEVIC HAS ALREADY MADE. THE SECOND GROUP ("PLUS") INVOLVES ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON FRY SECURITY FORCES AS WELL AS STEPS TO ACHIEVE

JUSTICE, IMPROVE COOPERATION WITH KVM, CREATE POSITIVE CHANGE ON THE GROUND AND ADVANCE PROSPECTS FOR AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

STANDING COMPLIANCE ISSUES ("STATUS QUO ANTE")

-- MILOSEVIC MUST UNCONDITIONALLY ACCEPT AMBASSADOR WALKER'S UNINTERRUPTED STATUS AS KVM HEAD OF MISSION.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST BRING VJ AND MUP FORCE LEVELS AND POSTURE INTO COMPLIANCE WITH HIS COMMITMENTS TO GENERAL CLARK AND NAUMANN, WHICH SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST FOLLOW THROUGH ON SERBIA'S UNILATERAL COMMITMENT TO GRANT AMNESTY FOR ALBANIAN KOSOVAR PRISONERS.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST COOPERATE WITH THE KVM IN ESTABLISHING LOCAL POLICE AND PREPARING FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNILATERAL COMMITMENTS.

ADDITIONAL ("PLUS") REQUIREMENTS (THESE ARE ILLUSTRATIVE, BUT ARE IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT RECENT ACTIONS AND NON-COMPLIANCE BY BELGRADE WILL NOT GO UNANSWERED)

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD AGREE TO TIGHTEN ELEMENTS OF THE CLARK/NAUMANN AGREEMENT, INCLUDING E.G. NO/NO MUP PATROLS, EMPLACEMENTS OR DEPLOYMENTS WITHOUT KVM CONSENT AND VERIFICATION; FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN MUP NUMBERS; AND NO/NO VJ DEPLOYMENTS OUT OF GARRISON EXCEPT IN THE BORDER AREA WITHOUT KVM CONSENT AND VERIFICATION.

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD COOPERATE WITH KVM AND ICTY IN INVESTIGATING THE RACAK MASSACRE, INCLUDING DIVULGING THE NAMES OF THE PERSONS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE MASSACRE AND THE NAMES OF THOSE WHO ORDERED THIS ATROCITY. THEY MUST BE HANDED OVER TO ICTY FOR PROSECUTION, IF ICTY SO REQUESTS, AND THEY MUST BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD GRANT IMMEDIATE, UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO ICTY FOR CHIEF PROSECUTOR ARBOUR AND A TEAM OF INVESTIGATORS. THERE MUST BE REAL COOPERATION FROM BELGRADE, INCLUDING THE RECOGNITION OF ICTY JURISDICTION IN KOSOVO.

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD FULLY AND IMMEDIATELY FACILITATE ALL KVM SUPPORT REQUESTS, INCLUDING MEDEVAC HELICOPTER, SIDEARMS (FOR OSCE CHIEF OF MISSION'S AND SENIOR STAFF'S SECURITY DETAIL), ACCESS, ETC.

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD REMOVE ALL VISA RESTRICTIONS FOR KVM, UNHCR AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOS WORKING IN KOSOVO.

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD APPROVE ASSIGNMENT OF A FREQUENCY FOR KVM BROADCAST RADIO.

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD AGREE TO PRE-NOTIFIED EXERCISES BY SFOR WITHIN KOSOVO.

-- MILOSEVIC SHOULD AGREE TO MEET, AT A DATE CERTAIN AND IN A MEETING FORMAT TO BE SPECIFIED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME BY THE U.S. AND EU NEGOTIATORS, WITH A KOSOVO ALBANIAN TEAM. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A MEETING WILL BE TO NEGOTIATE, WITH U.S./EU PARTICIPATION, AN "INTERIM" POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED BY MILOSEVIC AS SUCH. THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT WILL GRANT KOSOVO SELF-GOVERNMENT "WITHIN THE FRY," WITH THE FINAL STATUS OF KOSOVO TO BE DETERMINED THROUGH A PROCESS TO BE AGREED UPON IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Donald Bandler, Robert Bell et al. Subject: Kosovo/Massacre - SACEUR Report on January 20 (Cable USNATO 000128) [NATO] (7 pages)	01/20/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6350

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 1999 3:53 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Black, Steven K.; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hawley, Leonard R.; Hurley, C. Michael; McElDowney, Nancy E.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Uyehara, Margaret A.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt); Weiss, Andrew S.; Witkowsky, Anne A.
Subject: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 17 NAC

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 170645Z JAN 99
MSGTO: RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE NIACT IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
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TOR: 990117015121 M3649362

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 5/2/2021
2008-0944-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 009153

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/09
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAC, SR
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 17 NAC

CLASSIFIED BY MARC GROSSMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUR,
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) NIACT PRECEDENCE REQUIRED FOR OOB SUNDAY, JANUARY 17, DELIVERY AND ACTION BY AMBASSADORS/CHARGES AT HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL.
2. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE FOR USNATO AND ALL NATO CAPITALS.
3. (C) FOR USNATO: AT THE JANUARY 17 EMERGENCY NAC, MISSION SHOULD PRESS FOR AGREEMENT AMONG ALLIES ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS AND THEIR INCLUSION IN A POST-MEETING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA, ON BEHALF OF THE NAC.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST DIVULGE THE NAMES OF THE PERSONS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS AT RACAK AND THE NAMES OF THOSE WHO ORDERED THIS ATROCITY.

THEY MUST BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND HANDED OVER TO ICTY FOR PROSECUTION IF REQUESTED.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST GRANT IMMEDIATE, UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO ICTY, FOR CHIEF PROSECUTOR ARBOUR AND A TEAM OF INVESTIGATORS. THERE MUST BE REAL COOPERATION FROM BELGRADE, INCLUDING THE RECOGNITION OF ICTY JURISDICTION IN KOSOVO.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST BRING VJ AND MUP FORCE LEVELS AND POSTURE INTO COMPLIANCE WITH HIS COMMITMENTS TO GENERALS CLARK AND NAUMANN.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST COMPLY WITH ALL HIS COMMITMENTS TO NATO AND TO THE OSCE, WHICH ARE BASED ON UNSCR 1199.

-- MILOSEVIC MUST FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE COMMITMENT IN THE UNILATERAL 11 POINT STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT MILUTINOVIC INCLUDING AMNESTY FOR ALBANIAN KOSOVAR PRISONERS.

--MILOSEVIC MUST FULLY AND IMMEDIATELY FACILITATE ALL KVM SUPPORT REQUESTS, INCLUDING MEDEVAC HELICOPTER, SIDEARMS (FOR OSCE CHIEF OF MISSION'S SECURITY DETAIL), ACCESS, ETC.

-- RECALL THAT THE NATO ACTORDS FOR AIR OPERATIONS REMAIN IN EFFECT.

-- THE NAC HAS ASKED GENERAL CLARK TO REPORT ON UPDATED PLANNING FOR NATO AIR OPERATIONS.

-- THE NAC HAS DECIDED TO SEND GENERAL CLARK AND GENERAL NAUMANN TO BELGRADE IMMEDIATELY TO CONVEY ITS REQUIREMENTS TO MILOSEVIC AND REPORT BACK TO THE NAC.

-- MILOSEVIC IS OUT OF COMPLIANCE AND WE WILL HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THIS FACT IF HE STAYS OUT OF COMPLIANCE.

4. ~~(S)~~ FOR USNATO: IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE POST-NAC POINTS COVERED IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENT BY SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA, THE NAC SHOULD INSTRUCT GENERALS CLARK AND NAUMANN TO DELIVER TO MILOSEVIC A PRIVATE MESSAGE DEMANDING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE 9 KLA PRISONERS AGREED TO AS PART OF THE EARLIER RELEASE OF 8 VJ SOLDIERS.

5. ~~(S)~~ ALL NATO CAPITALS SHOULD ORALLY SHARE ABOVE POINTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND URGE THAT THEY SIMILARLY INSTRUCT THEIR NATO DELEGATIONS.

6. ~~(S)~~ FOR USNATO: WASHINGTON IS AWARE OF CONCERNS MISSION HAS CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE DOWNSIDES OF PUBLICIZING THE CLARK/NAUMANN AGREEMENT. WHILE DEFERRING TO MISSION'S JUDGEMENT, WE THINK THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE UTILITY OF PROPOSING TO THE NAC TO PUBLICIZE THE AGREEMENT TO HELP ESTABLISH A CLEAR BASE LINE FOR OUR PUBLIC MESSAGE ON FRY NON-COMPLIANCE. IN ANY EVENT, GENERALS CLARK AND NAUMANN SHOULD INSIST ON FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR AGREEMENT.

7. ~~(S)~~ FOR NATO CAPITALS THAT ARE ALSO CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS, IF ASKED ONLY: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS INTEREST IN HAVING A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS LEVEL. WE FEEL WE CAN BETTER JUDGE THE UTILITY OF SUCH A MEETING AFTER SUNDAYVS NAC.

8. ~~(S)~~ FOR NATO CAPITALS THAT ARE ALSO UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, IF ASKED ONLY: WE UNDERSTAND THERE IS A PROPOSAL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON THE ATROCITY IN RACAK. WE BELIEVE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WOULD NOT ADD ADDITIONAL VALUE AT THIS STAGE AND WOULD BE BETTER ONCE NATO HAS ESTABLISHED ITS POSITION CLEARLY. LET'S FOCUS OUR ENERGIES FOR NOW IN NATO, WHERE WE CAN HAVE A MATERIAL IMPACT.

TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT

**NATO****PRESS AND MEDIA
SERVICE****OTAN****SERVICE DE PRESSE
ET DES MEDIAS****NATO/OTAN, 1110 BRUSSELS/BRUXELLES • TEL. : 707 41 11
TELEFAX/TELECOPIEURS : 707 50 57 - 707 50 58**

**STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY NATO SECRETARY GENERAL DR. JAVIER
SOLANA FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON
27 OCTOBER 1998**

Two weeks ago, NATO issued an ACTORD for limited air operations and a phased air campaign against Yugoslavia. We took this decision in order to back up diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in Kosovo and open the way for a political solution to the crisis.

From the outset we have insisted on full and unconditional compliance by President Milosevic with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203.

Since the ACTORD was issued, we have continued to put President Milosevic under pressure. General Naumann, SACEUR and I have been to Belgrade to make it clear to him in person that he has no option but to comply. I have also written to President Milosevic twice to stress the gravity of the situation.

It is this pressure and our credible threat to use force which have changed the situation in Kosovo for the better. NATO's unity and resolve have forced the Yugoslav Special Police and military units to exercise restraint and reduce their intimidating presence in Kosovo. We have been able to reduce the level of violence significantly and to achieve a cease-fire which has held, despite some sporadic incidents.

This improvement in the security situation in Kosovo has first and foremost allowed an immediate improvement in the humanitarian situation. International relief organisations have re-started their operations in Kosovo. They now have unrestricted access for their convoys. Thousands of displaced persons have returned to their villages. At the same time, the improvement in the security situation is creating the conditions for a meaningful political dialogue to begin between Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians.

Over the past few days, NATO's aerial surveillance assets and the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission have been verifying whether Mr. Milosevic's actions match the commitments he has made to us.

I am pleased to report that over the past 24 hours, over 4,000 members of the Special Police have been withdrawn from Kosovo. Police and military units that are normally based in Kosovo are now moving back in their barracks together with their heavy weapons. Check points have been dismantled. In addition, most police and

military units that are normally based elsewhere in Yugoslavia have left Kosovo. The security forces are returning to the level they were at before the present crisis began.

Despite these substantial steps, NATO's objective remains to achieve full compliance with UNSC Resolutions 1199 and 1203. As a result, we have decided this evening to maintain the ACTORD for limited air operations. Its execution will be subject to a decision and assessments by the North Atlantic Council. We will also maintain our ACTORD for the phased air campaign and will continue our activities under Phase Zero. We have requested our Military Authorities to remain prepared to carry out these air operations should they be necessary and to maintain forces at appropriate readiness levels for the operations under both ACTORDs.

The North Atlantic Council will keep the situation in Kosovo under constant review. If we see evidence of substantial non compliance in the future with UNSC Resolution 1199, then we will be ready to use force. We know that President Milosevic only moves when he is presented with the credible threat of force. The burden of proof of compliance clearly rests with him.

The Kosovar Albanians must equally comply with the UNSC Resolutions and cooperate with the international community. I call on the Kosovar Albanian armed groups to maintain the ceasefire that they have declared.

Our immediate focus will now be on ensuring the effectiveness of the verification regime.

Our NATO verification flights over Kosovo are beginning. We welcome the possible association of Russia and other partner countries in NATO's air verification regime.

NATO and the OSCE have been working closely together to co-ordinate their activities in carrying out the verification mission. The Alliance is also expediting planning for a NATO force for the extraction of the OSCE verifiers on the ground in Kosovo. We welcome UNSC Resolution 1203 which endorses the establishment of the two verification missions.

Despite the progress we have made, this crisis is far from over. A lot of work remains to be done. It is high time that the two parties in the conflict understand that the international community will not tolerate a continuation of the status quo. There has been too much human suffering. Clearly, a political solution must be found. I urge both sides to take advantage of the opportunity that now exists to move the political process forward and to secure this unique opportunity to work for a better future for Kosovo, and also for Yugoslavia as a whole.

NATO Information is available on Internet: <http://www.nato.int>

Further information can be requested by e-mail: "NATODOC@HQ.NATO.INT"

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. chart	Serb Compliance on Security Forces Withdrawals. (1 page)	10/28/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6350

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. chart	[Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199]. (1 page)	10/28/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. map	Kosovo: Internally Displaced Persons' Activity Since 23 September 1998. (1 page)	10/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F

vz6350

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. draft	Discussion Paper for NSC Deputies Committee on Preparing for October 27th. (2 pages)	10/20/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6350

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Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
ent: Monday, October 19, 1998 3:01 PM
o: Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Witkowsky, Anne A.
Subject: KOSOVO/NATO TIMELINE FOR WEEK OF OCTOBER 19TH
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 191813Z OCT 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4509
ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2759
TOR: 981019145743 M3515488

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VL NARA, Date 5/2/2024
2008-0944-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USNATO 002759

STATE FOR D, P, EUR, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE, UN/W AND PM
NSC FOR BANDLER, FLANAGAN AND SCHULTE
SECDEF FOR USDP, KRAMER, LONGSTRETH, BTF, MCCONNELL
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS, FOGLESONG, J-5, ANDERSON & CASEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/00
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO/NATO TIMELINE FOR WEEK OF OCTOBER 19TH

REF: STATE 193308

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER VERSHBOW.
REASONS: 1.5(B) AND (D)

1. (U) LOOKING AHEAD TO THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 27, WHEN THE NAC WILL DECIDE WHETHER MILOSEVIC HAS COMPLIED WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WE NEED TO DECIDE HOW TO USE THE INTERVENING SEVEN DAYS IN WAYS THAT ENSURE THAT WE MAXIMIZE THE PRESSURE ON HIM TO DO SO.

2. (C) THE KEY POINT WILL PROBABLY BE TOWARD THE END OF THIS WEEK, WHEN NMAS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE NAC WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER OR NOT THE TRENDS IN KOSOVO ARE CLEARLY MOVING TOWARD FULL COMPLIANCE. IF THEY ARE NOT, WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE A DECISION AT THAT TIME TO BEGIN WITHDRAWING THE KVM AND THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WORKERS SO THAT THEY WILL BE OUT BY OCTOBER 27 (ALTHOUGH THE WITHDRAWAL WILL COMPLICATE THE FINAL COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT).

3. (C) THERE ARE A NUMBER OF EXISTING EVENTS ON THE NATO AGENDA THAT NEED TO BE INTEGRATED IN OUR OVERALL APPROACH (THE TUESDAY PERMREPS' LUNCH, THE REGULAR WEDNESDAY NAC) AS WELL AS OUR AGENDAS AT THE UN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AT THE OSCE (BOTH OF WHICH WILL AFFECT ALLIED POSITIONS AT NATO).

4. (C) THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 19 WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A STRATEGY TO SUPPORT THE U.S. OBJECTIVE (REFTEL) THAT "NATO CLEARLY AND DIRECTLY TELL MILOSEVIC THAT HE MUST FULLY COMPLY IN A VERIFIABLE MANNER WITH PROVISION OF UNSCR 1199, OR FACE NATO AIR STRIKES." WE WOULD PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OUTLINE:

MONDAY, 10/19

-- IN THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL NAC, AMBASSADOR HAS CIRCULATED A LETTER BASED ON REFTEL (SEE PARA 6 BELOW) URGING THE SYG TO REINFORCE HIS DEMANDS FOR FULL COMPLIANCE VIA A LETTER TO MILOSEVIC. THE LETTER (COPIED TO ALL PERMREPS) ALSO PROPOSES THAT NATO PRESS SPOKESMEN ISSUE STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE NEED FOR FULL COMPLIANCE AND THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE ACTORD.

-- PCG MET TO DEFINE PROPOSED POLITICAL GUIDANCE FOR TASKING NMAS TO DEVELOP A KVM EXTRACTION PLAN. AS PART OF PCG DISCUSSION, MISSION REPS EMPHASIZED POINTS CONTAINED IN REFTEL TO CONVINCE ALLIES OF NEED TO KEEP PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC. THE PCG WILL MEET AGAIN ON 10/20.

-- MC MET TO DISCUSS OPLAN 10602, AIR VERIFICATION MISSION (AVM). A REVISED OPLAN IS UNDER SILENCE UNTIL 1600 TUESDAY 10/20.

TUESDAY, 10/20

-- PERMREPS' LUNCH DISCUSSES STRATEGY FOR WAY AHEAD, INCLUDING TIMELINES FOR COMPLIANCE. AMBASSADOR LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE OVERALL STRATEGY IN THE RUN-UP TO OCTOBER 27; PERMREPS REACH CONSENSUS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE BENCHMARKS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF UNSCR 1199. AMBASSADOR RE-EMPHASIZES THE POINTS MADE IN 10/19 LETTER TO SYG. AMBASSADOR PROPOSES STANDING ACTORD FOR EXTRACTION OF OSCE MISSION.

-- IN PARALLEL, SACEUR GENERAL CLARK VISITS BELGRADE TO CONVEY FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE THAT SPECIFIC VJ AND MUP UNITS MUST BE WITHDRAWN.

-- AMB WALKER (HEAD OF OSCE KVM) VISIT TO NATO PROVIDES

REF: STATE 193308

OPPORTUNITY FOR PRESS STATEMENTS ABOUT TENUOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF KVM UNLESS COMPLIANCE OBSERVED BY END OF WEEK.

-- PCG MEETS AND AGREES (UNDER SILENCE IF NECESSARY) ON ADVICE TO THE NAC ON POLITICAL GUIDANCE TO NMAS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A KVM EXTRACTION PLAN.

WEDNESDAY, 10/21

-- AT THE NAC, HEAR THE REPORT ON SACEUR'S VISIT AND CMC'S REGULAR COMPLIANCE UPDATE, AUTHORIZE SYG SOLANA TO ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT AND/OR REDISPATCH SYG TO BELGRADE. NA APPROVES POLITICAL GUIDANCE AND TASKS NMAS TO DEVELOP A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR EXTRACTION. NC APPROVES OPLAN 10602 FOR IMPLEMENTATION IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. POSSIBLE PRESS STATEMENT BY SYG.

-- HEAD OF OSCE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER (CPC) BRIEFS OSCE TROIKA ON PLANS FOR KM IMPLEMENTATION (ADVERTIZED IOC BY 10/29). STATUS AS OF 10/21 WILL BE KDOM PLUS AT LEAST 150 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL IN THEATER.

THURSDAY, 10/22

-- SYG VISITS BLGRADE, REVIEWS PROGRESS OVER THE PAST WEEK AND, AS APPROPRIATE, WARNS MILOSEVIC COMPLIANCE IS STILL INADEQUATE.

-- (WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY) THE UNSC PASSES A NEW RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE VERIFICATION MISSIONS IN KOSOVO.

OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL APPROVES KVM CONCEPT. PESS SHOULD COVER KVM IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AND PLANNING.

-- IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO AVM. ASSESSMENT OF UNIT WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BE MADE TO THE MC. MC CONDUCTS ASSESSMENT (USING REFTEL CRITERIA).

-- COUNCIL RECEIVES ASSESSMENT OF AVM MODALITIES (I.E., DOES IT WORK? IS IT EFFECTIVE?)

FRIDAY, 10/23

-- NAC HEARS NMA'S ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE. THIS MAY BE COUPLED WITH U.S. INDEPENDENT INTEL ASSESSMENTS. NAC MEETS FRIDAY EVENING, REVIEWS COMPLIANCE TRENDS AND, IF NECESSARY, ISSUES NAC STATEMENT DEMANDING COMPLIANCE BY OCTOBER 27; SACEUR STEPS UP ACTIVITY UNDER PHASE ZERO. IF NON-COMPLIANCE OUTWEIGHS COMPLIANCE, NAC MAKES DECISION WHETHER TO RECOMMEND KDOM, OSCE, AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF WORKERS VACATE KOSOVO IN PREPARATION FOR A LIMITED AIR OPTION.

5. ~~(C)~~ LOOKING TO THE FOLLOWING WEEK, THE NAC WILL NEED TO MEET ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, TO EITHER RESCIND THE ACTORD OR PLAN FOR AIRSTRIKES. BY THAT TIME, IF THE LATTER COURSE OF EVENTS TAKES PLACE, EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL SHOULD BE WELL UNDERWAY, IF NOT ALREADY COMPLETED.

6. ~~(C)~~ BEGIN TEXT OF 10/19 LETTER FROM AMB VERSHBOW TO SYG SOLANA:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL:

THE COUNCIL TOOK THE RIGHT DECISION ON OCTOBER 16 TO EXTEND THE PAUSE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ACTORD UNTIL

REF: STATE 193308

OCTOBER 27. THERE IS A DANGER, HOWEVER, THAT MILOSEVIC (AS WELL AS OUR OWN PUBLICS) MAY MISINTERPRET OUR DECISION AS A SIGN THAT THE CRISIS IS EFFECTIVELY OVER. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CLEARLY AND DIRECTLY TELL MILOSEVIC THAT HE MUST FULLY COMPLY WITH UNSCR 1199 IN A DURABLE AND VERIFIABLE MANNER OR FACE THE REALITY OF NATO AIR STRIKES. WE MUST KEEP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC. OCTOBER 27 IS NOT JUST ANOTHER ROUTINE DATE ON THE CALENDAR; IT IS THE DATE BY WHICH WE EXPECT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199.

IN EXTENDING THE PAUSE IN EXECUTION OF THE ACTORD, WE HAVE GIVEN MILOSEVIC MORE THAN ENOUGH TIME FOR FULL COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199 AND THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE CANNOT ALLOW HIM TO DELAY OR SEEK TO GET BY WITH HALF-MEASURES. MILOSEVIC MUST GIVE CLEAR EVIDENCE NOW OF HIS COMPLIANCE BY MOVING TO CEASE ALL MILITARY AND POLICE OFFENSIVES IN KOSOVO; WITHDRAW VJ AND MUP UNITS NORMALLY BASED OUTSIDE KOSOVO; IMPLEMENT AGREEMENTS ON THE NATO AND THE OSCE VERIFICATION MISSIONS; ENSURE FREE MOVEMENT OF HUMANITARIAN SHIPMENTS INTO KOSOVO; ALLOW COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND WORKERS; SUPPORT THE SAFE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES; AND DEMONSTRATE A COMMITMENT TO PROSECUTE SECURITY FORCE

MEMBERS GUILTY OF ABUSES AND DESTRUCTION, AS WELL AS TO COOPERATE WITH THE ICTY.

IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE OF THE ACTORD ON MILOSEVIC, I SUGGEST YOU SEND A LETTER TO MILOSEVIC REMINDING HIM OF THE POINTS YOU MADE TO HIM LAST THURSDAY REGARDING THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199 ACROSS THE BOARD. YOU COULD REITERATE AS WELL THE ALLIANCE'S RESOLVE AND CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE FRY -- WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE COUNCIL -- IF BELGRADE FAILS TO COMPLY FULLY. THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE REITERATED TO THE PRESS BOTH NOW AND IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO OCTOBER 27, BOTH TO REINFORCE THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC AND TO DISPEL ANY PUBLIC SKEPTICISM OF OUR RESOLVE.

FINALLY, IN THE CONTEXT OF FURTHER TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN NATO AND FRY MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL, I DRAW TO YOUR ATTENTION THE POSITION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON DEMINING. THERE CAN BE NO DELAY IN COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199 TO FACILITATE MINE REMOVAL. FRY FORCES MUST REMOVE LANDMINES IMMEDIATELY. WE MUST NOT ALLOW MILOSEVIC THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE THE PRETEXT OF DEMINING IN ORDER TO LEAVE BEHIND LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS IN KOSOVO "FOR THE PURPOSE OF MINE CLEARING."

I AM CIRCULATING THIS LETTER TO COLLEAGUES ON THE COUNCIL AND LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSION OF OUR STRATEGY IN ANOTHER FORUM TOMORROW.

/SIGNED ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/

END TEXT.

VERSHBOW

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, October 19, 1998 2:34 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hawley, Leonard R.; Hurley, C. Michael; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Roberts, Michael W.; Saunders, Richard M.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Witkowsky, Anne A.
Subject: GUIDANCE FOR OCTOBER 19 NAC
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 190503Z OCT 98
MSGTO: RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 3308
TOR: 981019020202 M3514363

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 5/2/2024
2008-0994-X-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 193308

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/08
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, MAC, SR
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR OCTOBER 19 NAC

CLASSIFIED BY BARBRO OWENS KIRKPATRICK, DIRECTOR,
EUR/RPM, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(C)~~ WE ARE CONCERNED THAT MILOSEVIC MAY MISINTERPRET THE NAC'S OCTOBER 16 DECISION TO EXTEND THE PAUSE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE LIMITED AIR OPTION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT NATO CLEARLY AND DIRECTLY TELL MILOSEVIC THAT HE MUST FULLY COMPLY IN A DURABLE AND VERIFIABLE MANNER WITH PROVISIONS OF UNSCR 1199 OR FACE NATO AIR STRIKES. THEREFORE, MISSION SHOULD SEEK CONSENSUS AT THE OCTOBER 19 MAC ON STEPS TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC DURING THE PERIOD PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE PAUSE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE LIMITED AIR OPTION. WE BELIEVE THAT OCTOBER 27 IS NOT ANOTHER LINE IN THE SAND; IT IS THE DATE WE EXPECT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199.

2. ~~(C)~~ WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE FRY NEEDS THE FULL AMOUNT OF TIME BETWEEN NOW AND OCTOBER 2- TO COMPLY WITH UNSCR 1199 AND THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. NOR SHOULD MILOSEVIC BE ALLOWED TO DELAY. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES MISSION SHOULD ASSERT THAT MILOSEVIC MUST GIVE CLEAR EVIDENCE NOW OF HIS COMPLIANCE BY MOVING TO:

-- CEASE ALL OFFENSIVE POLICE AND MILITARY GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO. ALL PERSONNEL AND UNITS WITH MILITARY CAPABILITIES MUST COMPLY WITH THIS REQUIREMENT, INCLUDING REGULAR MILITARY FORCES, ARMED CIVILIAN GROUPS, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, RESERVES, MILITARY POLICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR POLICE (MUP -- BOTH REGULAR AND SPECIAL POLICE FORCES).

-- BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT AGREEMENTS ON AN OSCE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION (OSCE KVM) AND NATO AIR VERIFICATION MISSION TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199.

-- WITHDRAW FROM KOSOVO VJ AND MUP UNITS NORMALLY

BASED OUTSIDE OF KOSOVO. RETURN LOCAL VJ AND MUP TO GARRISON UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, PLACING HEAVY WEAPONS, INCLUDING ALL ARTILLERY AND OTHER HEAVY WEAPONS, IN WEAPON STORAGE SITES. (EXCEPTIONS: VJ TO RETAIN BORDER SECURITY ROLE UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL MONITORING. SERBIAN REGULAR POLICE TO RETAIN POLICING ROLE DURING TRANSITION PERIOD TO FULL OPERATION OF KOSOVO POLICE FORCE SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL MONITORING.) DISMANTLE MOST CHECKPOINTS AND REPORT TO KDOM THE PURPOSE AND LOCATION OF THOSE BEING MAINTAINED.

-- FREE MOVEMENT OF COMMERCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN FOODSTUFFS AND OTHER STAPLES INTO KOSOVO.

-- LIFT ALL EMBARGOES ON SHIPMENTS OF FOOD, FUEL AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID ITEMS TO KOSOVO.

-- FACILITATE IMMEDIATE RETURN TO OR ENTRY INTO THE FRY AND KOSOVO OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING OSCE KVM, ICTY INVESTIGATIONS, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS,

INCLUDING EXPEDITIOUS ISSUANCE OF APPROPRIATE TRAVEL, CUSTOMS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THEIR MISSIONS.

-- ALLOW COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE FRY OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING OSCE KVM, ICTY INVESTIGATIONS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.

-- INSTRUCT ALL FRY PUBLIC SERVICES AND INSTITUTIONS TO FACILITATE, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), THE SAFE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES.

-- DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT TO PROSECUTE SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS GUILTY OF ABUSES AND DESTRUCTION. PROVIDE ICRC A FULL ACCOUNTING OF THOSE DETAINED AND UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO THEM ON AN ONGOING BASIS.

3. (C) MISSION SHOULD SEEK A LETTER FROM SYG SOLANA TO MILOSEVIC SETTING FORTH THE ABOVE POINTS AS BENCHMARKS FOR COMPLIANCE. MISSION SHOULD ALSO OPEN DISCUSSION ON THE MEANS OF DELIVERING THE LETTER, E.G., HAVING SYG SOLANA RETURN TO BELGRADE LATER THIS WEEK TO HAND-DELIVER THE LETTER AND WALK MILOSEVIC THROUGH ITS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A LETTER SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SACEUR FOR DELIVERY TO MILOSEVIC, SINCE HIS MISSION SHOULD REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE MORE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS.

4. (C) MISSION SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT AN IMMEDIATE VISIT BY GENERAL CLARK TO BELGRADE TO WORK OUT SPECIFIC DETAILS OF VJ AND MUP WITHDRAWALS THAT WOULD PUT THE FRY INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THAT PROVISION OF UNSCR 1199. GENERAL CLARK SHOULD ALSO REITERATE NATO'S CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO ACT. AT THAT TIME, CLARK SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PRESENT TO MILOSEVIC SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF HIS NON-COMPLIANCE ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND UNDERSCORE THAT NO OPPORTUNITY EXISTS FOR FURTHER DISINGENUOUS BARGAINING. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES OF THE FRY FORCES IN KOSOVO AND THE FRY ORDER OF BATTLE GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR HILL ON OCTOBER 1- (BEING FAXED TO MISSION) WILL GIVE US A FIRM POINT OF

REFERENCE FOR EVALUATING FRY COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY
FORCE WITHDRAWALS. WE BELIEVE THAT GENERAL CLARK
SHOULD GO TO BELGRADE IMMEDIATELY, PREFERABLY ON
MONDAY IN ORDER TO KEEP MAXIMUM PRESSURE- ON MILOSEVIC.

5. ~~(C)~~ IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION ON TROOP
WITHDRAWALS, MISSION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RAISE OUR
POSITION ON DEMINING: WE WANT LANDMINES REMOVED
IMMEDIATELY. WE EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT MILOSEVIC MAY
USE THIS DEMAND AS A PRETEXT FOR LEAVING BEHIND LARGE
NUMBERS OF TROOPS "FOR THE PURPOSE OF MINE CLEARING."
WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY DELAY IN 1199 COMPLIANCE TO
FACILITATE MINE REMOVAL.

6. ~~(C)~~ AFTER THE OCTOBER 19 NAC, SYG SOLANA SHOULD
ISSUE A STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT OF NATO'S RESOLVE AND
CAPABILITY TO ALLOW HE AIR STRIKES ALREADY AUTHORIZED
TO PROCEED IF BELGRADE FAILS TO FULLY COMPLY. THIS
STATEMENT SHOULD BECOME STANDARD LANGUAGE TO BE USED
IN ALL BRUSSELS PUBLIC STATEMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND
OCTOBER 27.
TALBOTT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Memcon. Meeting with Jacques Chirac, President of France [Duplicate of 9901357 (kh446_001a, 1.56, 2009-1290-M)] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (5 pages)	02/19/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6350

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2009-1290-M (1.56)
RDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jacques Chirac, President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
for Economic Affairs
Steve Reichetti, Deputy Chief of Staff
Felix Rohatyn, Ambassador to France
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the
President and NSC Senior Director for
European Affairs
Lael Brainard, Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic Affairs
(expanded session and lunch only)
Donald Bandler, Special Assistant to the
President for the NATO Summit (expanded
session only)
K.C. Brown, NSC director for European
Affairs (expanded session only)

Jacques Chirac, President
Hubert Vedrine, Foreign Minister
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Finance Minister
Jean-David Levitte, Diplomatic Adviser
Hubert Bujon, Ambassador to the United
States

Oval Office Session

The President: Shall we discuss Kosovo first, since that's the pressing issue? (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Antony Blinken
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10 years

President Chirac: Yes.

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: The fact that we have been so strongly together on this is very important. It's impossible to know if Milosevic thinks he needs to absorb some airstrikes so he can make it seem he was "forced" to capitulate or whether this is simply brinkmanship. (C)

There will be a very brief period between the collapse of talks and the start of airstrikes. Then, it might be appropriate for you to make a last appeal. If we do something now, we could give Milosevic an opportunity to send the talks off on a tangent and force a delay. (C)

As to the carrot question and sanctions, let me let Madeleine address that. (C)

Secretary Albright: Yes, there are two layers of sanctions. Those we imposed in relation to Kosovo could be discussed but those imposed before -- what we call the outer wall -- we need to be very careful about. They would be hard to unpack and in any event, it would be premature. But we could do the first layer. (C)

The President: We could present it as a way to work the FRY back into the international community. Sanctions make Milosevic's internal situation more difficult. (C)

Now, through Milosevic's eyes, if he allows a NATO force to back up civil implementation, he will lose Kosovo. We need to make him see that the only chance he has to keep Kosovo within Serbia is to restore autonomy. (C)

Based on past experience, our best course is to hold a uniform line till the deadline. There's still a chance he will come around. At the same time, we need to keep the Kosovars in line. (C)

President Chirac:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Foreign Minister Vedrine:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: That's good. (C)

President Chirac: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Secretary Albright: With everyone gathering, it would be hard not to meet. But it must be clear -- no squabbling. Also, after the Contact Group makes a decision, it would be symbolically important to go to Brussels to hand over to NATO. (C)

Foreign Minister Vedrine: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Secretary Albright: Let's be clear, NATO has made decisions and Solana has them in his pocket. He must consult informally -- there is no formal decision to be made. (C)

President Chirac: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Has he said that? (C)

Secretary Albright: No, but others have mentioned it, like Dini. It is not acceptable. (C)

NSA Berger: In the strike scenario, the initial set of strikes must be sufficiently strong and decisive so that Milosevic understands their seriousness. If we pin prick and pause, he may think that he has won. (C)

President Chirac: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: We're thinking along similar lines. Let NATO do the job on the military side, do the planning for more strikes, the number of days and so on. If during that period there is an intensive effort to bring Milosevic back, good. We just need to be sure that we do not pause more than 24 to 48 hours -- it should be a natural lull that we fill with intense

diplomatic efforts without giving Milosevic a chance to drag things out. I'm encouraged by hearing you say a day or two. Any longer and our will could dissipate and we could let Milosevic exploit gaps. (C)

President Chirac:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: It would be a big mistake. When we met with him in Paris after Dayton, we thought we had him going in the right direction. And then Kosovo. If I call, he will see an opportunity to rewrite the terms of the negotiations. He must know that we do not want to bomb but we will. I don't think he thinks we have another agenda -- but he wants to avoid foreign troops in Serbia. (C)

Foreign Minister Vedrine:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

President Chirac:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Secretary Albright:

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

The President: We can't be naive about this; non-compliance by the UCK is a real problem. But I'm also worried that if they think they are getting a bad deal, they will do something to force us to withdraw, provoke Milosevic to commit new atrocities, and then we'd be faced with a free for all. We need to keep disciplined and keep focused on both sides. And one of the reasons we have to be ready to take risks is that there are so many other permutation that would be worse than where we are. (C)

President Chirac: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Foreign Minister Vedrine: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Well, the first thing we would have to do is to keep the conflict from spreading. Stabilize Macedonia, see where Albania is, and Bosnia. So stabilizing the perimeter would be first, then focus on the core. We've got to worry about a Balkan echo effect. (C)

By the way, I met briefly with the leaders of Albania and Macedonia at our Prayer Breakfast. They're young, energetic, earnest. And they've been supporting our efforts for their own stability. (C)

President Chirac: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

President Clinton: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

NSA Berger: I don't want to cut this short but I think it's time to move into the expanded session and to talk about some of the other items on the agenda. (U)

Expanded Session [Cabinet Room]

The President: Jacques, why don't we talk about the NATO Summit meeting in April, and also about the international financial

January 30, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Foreign Policy Team --
February 1, 1999

Attached at Tab I is a briefing memorandum to the President for the Foreign Policy Team meeting on February 1.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Issues to Discuss
Tab B Participants List

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: January 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RL NARA, Date 5/3/2021
2008-0494-F.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. memo	Meeting with Foreign Policy Team, February 1, 1999. [Record ID: 9900590] [Duplicate of ke5740_001b and vz6266_001a, this case] (5 pages)	01/30/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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2008-0994-F
vz6350

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. list	List of Participants. [partial] (1 page)	01/30/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Leon Fuerth, National Security Advisor for the Vice President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
William Cohen, Secretary of Defense
Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
John Podesta, Chief of Staff to the President
George Tenet, Director Central Intelligence
(b)(3) Chief of the Balkan Task Force
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Donald Kerrick, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Jack Lew, Director of Office of Management and Budget
Hugh Shelton, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
George Casey, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs for
Europe and Africa
Greg Schulte, Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

MKA

1

Points on Kosovo for Use in Briefing the Hill
February 2, 1999

- The current crisis in Kosovo is neither a sudden nor an unexpected event. Indeed, we have been focused on Kosovo as a potential flashpoint for more than a decade.
- Kosovo is a province of Yugoslavia about the size of Connecticut. Its two million people are 90% Albanian, most of whom are Muslim. There are also, however, significant Catholic and Orthodox Albanian communities in Kosovo. In addition to Albanians and Serbs, there are a number of other ethnic groups in Kosovo affected by the violence there, including ethnic Turks, Roma, Gorani, a community calling themselves Egyptians, and others.
- It was in Kosovo that Milosevic began his dramatic rise to power. One of his first acts upon taking office as President of Serbia in 1989 was to strip Kosovo of the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Yugoslav Constitution.
- The Yugoslav Constitution gave the region considerable control over its own destiny and over the government institutions that affected the daily lives of its citizens.
- Milosevic's decision to strip Kosovo of its autonomy ushered in a decade of police repression and human rights abuses. It was, in fact, the first step in the breakup of Yugoslavia.
- For ten years, the Kosovo Albanian population -- under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova -- maintained a courageous campaign for non-violent change. Their restraint in the face of serious provocations commands our deepest respect.
- The U.S. has been heavily involved in Kosovo over the years. We have maintained frequent high-level contacts with Dr. Rugova, including a number of meetings with President Clinton and myself. The United States led the efforts to engage the international Contact Group on Kosovo as well as on Bosnia and we have kept this issue on the agenda in the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council and other international fora. In 1997,

the United States opened an Information Center in Pristina -- the first international diplomatic office in Kosovo. Our extensive assistance program has provided nearly 30 million dollars a year in humanitarian aid from 1992 to 1997.

- Despite the U.S. and international concern over Kosovo, however, Milosevic upped the ante almost exactly one year ago. His police and military forces instituted a crackdown against the civilian population of Kosovo -- killing hundreds of people and driving hundreds of thousands from their homes.
- We responded with a mix of refugee relief, Contact Group diplomacy, and NATO threats. While this resulted in several agreements last October that averted a looming winter humanitarian catastrophe, the fundamental differences remained, and Milosevic's actions had left deep scars.
- Understandably, most Kosovo Albanians seek independence for Kosovo and were encouraged to fight for it. We, however, would abide by the key OSCE principles that borders should not be changed by force and human rights should be guaranteed for all individuals regardless of ethnic group.
- The United States and the rest of the international community believe that the people of Kosovo are entitled to a significant degree of self-rule within the existing international borders of the FRY. A negotiated autonomy settlement offers the best prospect for all the people of Kosovo and the wider Balkan region.
- Kosovo is not Bosnia. In Bosnia, our aim was to protect a struggling, fledgling state from outside aggression. In Kosovo, we are working towards a resolution of a serious problem within an existing state.
- In 1992, President Bush issued the so-called "Christmas Warning" -- a private but forceful message to Milosevic not to use military force against the civilian population of Kosovo.
- Last Fall, we used the threat of imminent NATO military action to force Milosevic to back down and accept an

intrusive international land and air verification regime under the OSCE and NATO and to cooperate with international agencies to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

- Milosevic's refusal to live up to his commitments and meet his obligations to the international community has rekindled the cycle of violence in Kosovo. This fire will not burn out of its own accord without international intervention.
- We have a clear and concrete national interest in promoting a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo crisis.
- The United States has a stake in protecting regional stability and our investment in Bosnia, as well as in averting a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo.
- A long, protracted conflict could turn Kosovo into a haven for criminals and terrorists with long term negative consequences for U.S. interests.
- Continuing violence in Kosovo threatens to destabilize other states in this conflict-prone region as well, regionalizing a conflict which until now has largely been confined within the borders of the former Yugoslavia. This in turn could generate a massive outflow of refugees which we and our allies would be forced to deal with.
- We also have a stake in preserving NATO's credibility as a guarantor of European stability and our own national credibility as the leader of the North Atlantic Alliance.
- The question that now confronts us is whether to commit U.S. troops as part of a post-settlement international military presence in Kosovo.
- The President has made no decision on this, and will not until he has a complete picture of your views.
- We have reached a stage in Kosovo where diplomacy requires the support of military force if we are to achieve success.
- Our approach to the Kosovo crisis is not -- and cannot be -- reactive. We need to stay ahead of the curve of

events in order to bring an end to the conflict in Kosovo.

- We have had successes to date reducing violence between the parties and making Kosovo an international issue by deploying the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), but have not achieved satisfactory compliance or progress towards an interim settlement agreement.
- The massacre in Racak was the last straw (45 Albanians were executed by Serbian security forces on January 15). We have been working with the Allies and Russia to develop a strategy not just to respond to that atrocity, but also to bring about full FRY compliance with previous commitments and achieve a political solution between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians.
- In London last Friday, my Contact Group colleagues and I told both sides to conclude agreement on a political settlement, end the violence in Kosovo and comply with all international obligations, including cooperation with the ICTY.
- On Saturday, NATO issued a "final warning" of air strikes if the demands of the Contact Group and the Alliance are not met. The NATO Council agreed that Secretary General Solana could authorize air strikes on FRY territory in light of an assessment of both parties' compliance.
- Representatives from Belgrade and of the Kosovo Albanian leadership will meet in Rambouillet, France on February 6 to come to closure on an interim settlement. These negotiations are not intended to be open-ended. The talks are to be completed within seven days, with the provision for an extension by another seven days.
- Although the full text of the agreement is still being worked within the Contact Group, we have circulated a copy of the non-negotiable principles agreed to in London. These principles are drawn from the text and provide a clear outline of key aspects of the settlement proposal.
- There are two possible outcomes to the talks in Rambouillet.

- One is that one side or the other fails to accept an interim settlement or meet the other international demands.

-- In this event, if Belgrade is the responsible party, NATO would initiate airstrikes against the FRY with the object of reducing Belgrade's ability to conduct repressive operations against the civilian population of Kosovo.

-- If the Kosovo Albanian side is responsible, Secretary General Solana will take this into account in his decision on airstrikes and we will look at ways to increase the pressure on the Kosovars.

- The other possibility is that the two sides agree on the political settlement, in which case we will need to concentrate our efforts on implementation.
- The Kosovo Albanian side has already indicated that its willingness to accept an agreement may depend on an armed international force presence.
- Many of our allies are also coming to the conclusion that a NATO force would be necessary to ensure implementation. Last Thursday, PM Blair and President Chirac announced their governments' willingness to contribute to a post-settlement force. Other allies, including Germany and Italy, have made similar statements.
- Indeed a willingness to support an international military presence in Kosovo to ensure implementation of a political agreement may be the deciding factor in achieving a lasting peace.
- Both the Kosovo Albanians and our Allies want American troops in a NATO force, the Albanians for our credibility and the Europeans for our military capability and trans-Atlantic solidarity.
- We are looking seriously at the options, but have made no decision. If you would like to get into some of the details on this, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton can provide more information on the various options under consideration.

- For the moment, I would only observe that we have identified a number of important base-line parameters if there were to be an international force with U.S. participation.
 - Any force should be NATO-led, with a clear NATO chain of command;
 - No force should be introduced into a hostile or non-permissive environment. We would require the full consent and cooperation of the parties;
 - The mission should be clearly articulated in terms of reducing the presence of Serb security forces;
 - The duration of the mission should be linked to an end state, not a deadline, including the establishment of multi-ethnic local police.
- These parameters are built into the settlement agreement itself. Under its terms, all Serbian security forces would leave Kosovo, except for a small number of police and a limited number of Border Guard. The KLA would also demilitarize, and KVM would supervise all these forces and the restrictions on weaponry, as well as build up communal police to replace the remaining Serb police.
- Of course, the President would hold off a final decision on U.S. ground forces until we have reviewed and approved the final text from the Rambouillet talks.
- We would expect the Europeans to provide the bulk of the post-settlement ground force.
- While we have made no decisions, time is clearly of the essence. The negotiations in Rambouillet are set to begin on Saturday.
- It is important that Ambassador Hill and his fellow negotiators understand what will and will not be possible.
- The negotiators need a clear picture of what prospects for international involvement in settlement implementation are on the table and what, if any, are ruled out.
- We would like to know your views on this before proceeding any further down the decision-making path.

Drafted:

Eur/sce:mpalmer

Cleared:

Eur:eawayne
Eur/sce:lrossin
S/p:jo'brien
H:mklosson
P:erubin
NSC:gschulte

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. report	[Description of the Operation at Racak, 15 January 1999]. (2 pages)	01/17/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6350

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010b. report	[Units Involved in the Racak Operation, 15 January 1999. With Annex I] (2 pages)	01/17/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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2008-0994-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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010c. report	Status of VJ and MUP Forces in Kosovo. (2 pages)	01/17/1999	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. briefing paper	Advancing the Negotiations. (10 pages)	12/30/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [4]

2008-0994-F
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