

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1708

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39	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. booklet	[Booklet] Trip of Secretary Madeleine K. Albright to the Kosovo Negotiations, Paris, France, Sunday, February 14, 1999. [missing page 8] [partial] (6 pages)	02/13/1999	b(7)(E), b(7)(F)
002a. telcon	Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, February 19, 1999. [Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526]. (2 pages)	02/22/1999	P1/b(1)
002b. form	Fax Cover Sheet. [partial] (1 page)	02/22/1999	P3/b(3)
003. paper	Rambouillet Endgame. (2 pages)	02/22/1999	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Some Thoughts from Rambouillet on Coping with a "No/No" on Tuesday. (3 pages)	02/00/1999	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Options for a "No-No" Scenario. (2 pages)	02/21/1999	P1/b(1)
005b. memo	No-No Next Steps. (2 pages)	02/21/1999	P1/b(1)
006. form	Fax Cover Sheet. [partial] (1 page)	02/17/1999	P3/b(3)
007. draft	Paper. Getting Albanians and Serbs to Say Yes. (2 pages)	02/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6349

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TRIP OF
SECRETARY
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
TO THE
KOSOVO NEGOTIATIONS

Paris
Sunday, February 14, 1999

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

7:50 a.m. Depart Intercontinental Hotel en route Quai d'Orsay
 8:00 a.m. Breakfast with French FM Vedrine
 9:00 a.m. Depart Quai d'Orsay en route Intercontinental Hotel
 9:05 a.m. PRIVATE TIME: 5 mins
 9:15 a.m. Meeting with Serbian President Milutinovic
 10:35 a.m. PRIVATE TIME: 5 mins
 10:45 a.m. Depart Intercontinental Hotel en route Rambouillet Chateau
 11:35 a.m. Meeting with Kosovo Albanian Negotiators
 12:10 p.m. Jt. Meeting with Albanian & Serbian Negotiators
 12:45 p.m. Meeting with Serbian Negotiators
 1:20 p.m. (T) Bilateral with Russian FM Ivanov
 1:55 p.m. Press Stakeout
 2:00 p.m. Depart Rambouillet Chateau en route Intercontinental Hotel
 2:50 p.m. PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 20 mins
 3:15 p.m. Depart Intercontinental Hotel en route Kleber Center
 3:30 p.m. Contact Group Ministerial
 4:35 p.m. PRESS PRE-BRIEF TIME: 5 mins
 4:45 p.m. Contact Group Press Availability
 5:05 p.m. Bilateral with UK FS Cook
 5:30 p.m. Depart Kleber Center en route Le Bourget Airport
 6:00 p.m. Depart France en route Bermuda
 Flight time: 8 hrs 15 mins
 Time change: -5 hrs
 9:15 p.m. Arrive Hamilton, Bermuda
 REFUELING TIME
 10:45 p.m. Depart Bermuda en route Mexico
 Flight time: 4 hrs 5 mins
 Time change: -2 hrs
 12:50 a.m. Arrive Merida, Mexico
 1:00 a.m. Depart Merida Airport en route Hyatt Hotel
 1:20 a.m. Arrive Hyatt Hotel

RON: Hyatt Hotel
 Merida, Mexico

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

- 2:30 p.m. BAGGAGE CALL. Place all luggage outside hotel room door.
- 2:30 p.m. CLASSIFIED BAGGAGE CALL. Place all classified and cabin materials outside S & S/S offices.
- 5:00 p.m. Proceed to hotel lobby and vans motorcade for transportation to airport.
- 5:15 p.m. Van departs Intercontinental Hotel en route Le Bourget Airport.

Staff Van 2 S. Mull
K. Moy
N. Tucker
L. Mitchell

EVENT: Breakfast with French Foreign Minister Vedrine

- 7:45 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.
- 7:50 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Intercontinental Hotel en route Quai d'Orsay.

(b)(7)e, (b)(7)f

Drive time: 5 minutes

- 7:55 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Quai d'Orsay and proceeds to Beauvais Room.

CAMERA SPRAY ON ARRIVAL

Met by: Foreign Minister Vedrine

8:00 a.m. Breakfast begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS

<u>U.S.</u>	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	<u>GOF</u>	Foreign Minister Vedrine
	Interpreter		Interpreter

WHISPER INTERPRETATION
(if required)

8:55 a.m. Breakfast concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Beauvais Room and proceeds to motorcade.

9:00 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Quai d'Orsay en route Intercontinental Hotel.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Same as on arrival

Drive time: 5 minutes

9:05 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Intercontinental Hotel and proceeds to Suite.

PRIVATE TIME: 5 mins

EVENT: Meeting with Serbian President Milutinovic

9:10 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds Room 2015.

9:15 a.m. Meeting begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

PARTICIPANTS

<u>U.S.</u>	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	<u>Serbia</u>	President Milutinovic
	Ambassador Hill		Others TBD
	Interpreter		
	Others TBD		

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION


10:30 a.m. Meeting concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Room 2015 and returns to Suite.

10:35 a.m. PRIVATE TIME: 5 mins

EVENT: Meeting with Kosovo Albanian Negotiators

10:40 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.

10:45 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Intercontinental Hotel en route Rambouillet Chateau.



Drive time: 45 minutes

11:30 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Rambouillet Chateau and proceeds to Albanian Delegation Room.

POOL SPRAY ON ARRIVAL

Met by: Protocol Official

11:35 a.m. Meeting begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

PARTICIPANTS

<u>U.S.</u>	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	<u>Kosovo Albanian</u>	Ibrahim Rugova
	Ambassador Hill		Rexhep Qosja
	Others TBD		Hashim Thaqi
			Jakup Krasniqi
			Xhavit Haliti
			Ram Buja
			Bujar Bukoshi
			Fehmi Agani
			Edita Tahiri
			Veton Surroi
			Blerim Shala
			Skender Hyseni
			Bajram Kosumi
			Adnan Merovei
			Mehmet Hajrizi
			Hydajet Hyseni
			Adem Syla
			Idriz Ajeti

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

12:05 p.m. Meeting concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Albanian Delegation Room and proceeds to Conference Room.

EVENT: Joint Meeting with Albanian & Serbian Negotiators

12:10 p.m. Meeting begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

PARTICIPANTS

<u>U.S.</u>	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	<u>Albania</u>	TBD
	Ambassador Hill		
	Others TBD		
		<u>Serbia</u>	TBD

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

12:40 p.m. Meeting concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Conference Room and proceeds to Serbian Delegation Room.

EVENT: Meeting with Serbian Negotiators

12:45 p.m. Meeting begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>			
<u>U.S.</u>	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	<u>Serb</u>	Ratko Markovic
	Ambassador Hill		Vladan Kutlesic
	Others TBD		Nikola Sainovic
			Vladimir Stambuk
			Vojislav Zivkovic
			Guljbehar Sabovic
			Refik Senadovic
			Zejnulahidin Kurejs
			Ibro Vait
			Faik Jashari
			Sokolj Cuse
			Ljuan Koka
			Cerim Abazi
			Zlatan Kikic
			Rodoljub Etinski
			Miodrag Mitic
			Branko Brankovic
			Miroslav Sestovic

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

1:15 p.m. Meeting concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Serbian Delegation Room and proceeds to Hold Room.

EVENT: (T) Bilateral with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov

1:20 p.m. (T) Bilateral begins.

CLOSED PRESS

<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>			
<u>U.S.</u>	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	<u>GOR</u>	Foreign Minister Ivanov
	Others TBD		Others TBD

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

1:50 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Hold Room and proceeds to motorcade.

PRESS STAKEOUT ON DEPARTURE

February 14

2/13/99

FINAL

2:00 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Rambouillet Chateau en route Intercontinental Hotel.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Same as on arrival

Drive time: 45 minutes

2:45 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Intercontinental Hotel and proceeds to Suite.

2:50 p.m. PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 20 mins

EVENT: Contact Group Ministerial

3:10 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.

3:15 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Intercontinental Hotel en route Kleber Center.

(b)(7)e, (b)(7)f

For. Min. Schuessel (Germany) For. Minister Vedrine (France)

SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION

Order of Events

- Foreign Minister Vedrine makes statement.
- Foreign Minister Vedrine takes Qs & As.

5:00 p.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Press Room and proceeds to Meeting Room.

EVENT: Bilateral with British Foreign Secretary Cook

5:05 p.m. Bilateral begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>			
<u>U.S.</u>	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	<u>UK</u>	Foreign Secretary Cook
	Others TBD		Others TBD

5:30 p.m. Bilateral concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Meeting Room and proceeds to motorcade.

EVENT: Departure from France en route Bermuda

5:35 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Kleber Center en route Le Bourget Airport.

	(b)(7)e, (b)(7)f	
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Staff Van 1

H. Hurlburt
L. Lineberry
L. Sweeney
K. Kirchgasser

Drive time: 20 minutes

5:55 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Le Bourget Airport and proceeds to aircraft.

CAMERA SPRAY ON DEPARTURE

6:00 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs France en route Bermuda.

Flight time: 8 hrs 15 mins
Time change: -5 hrs

EVENT: Arrival in Hamilton, Bermuda

9:15 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Hamilton Airport and proceeds to VIP Lounge.

REFUELING TIME

EVENT: Departure from Bermuda en route Mexico

10:40 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs VIP Lounge and proceeds to aircraft.

10:45 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Bermuda en route Mexico.


Flight time: 4 hrs 5 mins
Time change: -2 hrs

EVENT: Arrival in Merida, Mexico

12:50 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Merida Airport and proceeds to motorcade.

1:00 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Merida Airport en route Hyatt Hotel.

(b)(7)e, (b)(7)f



Drive time: 20 minutes

1:20 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Hyatt Hotel and proceeds to Suite.

RON: Hyatt Hotel
Merida, Mexico

ANNEX 2 - Contact Information

Brooke Darby - US US State Dept	cell: 06-08-71-99-32
TONY BANBURY - US Balkans Task Force (DOD)	06-85-67-28-36
MATT PRIMER - US STATE DEPT:	06-87-55-80-85
Kirsten Schultz US State Dept	06 08 75 16 91
COL BILL FISCHER US Delegation	06 85 67 29 28
Guillermo Christensen U.S. STATE DEPT	06 85 67 29 23
Gro Nysveen Norway/OSCE-char	+47 916 921 59.
JAN Braathen - " -	+47 907 862 84.
Tom Phillips UK FCO	0044 385 290 559
Michael Wood UK FCO	00 44 7887 801 518
David Austin UK FCO	00 44 468 926 926
GLAUBIERO RISTORI (BR.GEN.) IT MOD	0335/395055
LAURA MIRACHIAN IT F.A.	—
Werner Freers GE MOD	0049-172-8993656
LÉO M. AICHES Philippe FR MOD/DAS	06.14.64.97.99 06.14.64.97.99
MICHEL FOUCHER FR. MAE (Cabinet)	0143174056
Isabelle DERFAU FR. SGDN	cell 06-03-08-03-99
Régis de Belenot FR. MAE/DASD	cell 06.07.88.26.38
Salome Jannabichvili FR. MAE/DASD	cell 06.08.87.63.13
YA CELERIER FR. EMA	" 06.85.53.44.71
Cédric Pascal Vnichon FR. EMA	
Alexandre VULIC FR. MAE/ASD	06 85 55 36 74
Pauline CARBONA FR. MAE	06 43-17-45-54
Damien LORAS FR. MAE	07 43 17 53 20

DELEGATIONS

such

Colonel PASCAL VINCHON (EMA)

Roland GALHARAGUE, French Emb, Washington, DC

Thomas WAGNER (MAE)

Salim ZOURABICHVILI (MAE), Sous-directeur des Affaires stratégiques.

Régis de BELENET (MAE), Directeur des Affaires stratégiques.

Admiral CELERIER, for the CHOD

LtC YAKOVLEV, EMIA (FR JPS)

Isabelle DELFAU (SGDN)

Major-General BENTEGEAT (MOD/DAS)

~~E~~ LTC MAUVE (SGDN) -

COLONEL Pierre BOURLOT (MOD/DAS)

- Greg Schulte (U.S. National Security Council)

COLONEL JACK DONOVAN (US JCS)

Jonathan Levitsky (U.S. State Dept., Policy Planning Staff)

Theresa Whelan US. OSD/Balkan Task Force

Colonel Greg Kaufmann (US. OSD/Balkans Task Force)

COLONEL Bill FISCHER (US JCS)

Paul Tobin (Balkan Task Force)

David Kostelancik (US Mission to NATO, Brussels)

UK Delegation

TOM Phillips (FCO - Hd of Del)

David Austin (FCO)

Michael Wood (FCO)

Simon Marsh (MOD)

Col Jeff Cook (MOD)

Maj Peter Merriman (MOD)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
(Paris, France)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

February 20, 1999

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Press Conference
Rambouillet, France

Secretary Albright: (in progress) Ambassador Hill and his colleagues have bridged many major gaps and resolved most of the political issues which divided the parties. The Kosovar Albanians have negotiated with discipline and unity of purpose. They have not yet accepted every element of the interim political settlement, but it was my judgment and that of my Contact Group colleagues that the remaining issues can be resolved with a reasonable amount of effort.

Belgrade, in contrast, has taken every opportunity for evasion and delay. The Serb delegation bears the lion's share of responsibility for the difficulties we have experienced today. Belgrade has said that it can accept the political settlement although my sense is that this is not completely firm. However, the Serb refusal to even consider the presence of a NATO-led military implementation force in Kosovo is largely responsible for the failure to reach full agreement.

For this reason, we were extremely reluctant to offer the parties more time to reach an agreement, but the Contact Group believes the remaining differences can, with hard work and good will, be resolved, and the Contact Group has given them until 3 o'clock Tuesday afternoon to finalize the settlement.

Let me stress that we expect nothing less than a complete interim agreement including Belgrade's acceptance of a NATO-led force and a civilian mission building on the OSCE's Kosovo verification mission. Until the parties have accepted all provisions of the agreement, preparations for NATO military action will continue and if that agreement is not confirmed by Tuesday, Secretary General Solana will draw the appropriate conclusions. This is not the outcome any of us had hoped for, but our work is not over, and I haven't given up hope that faced with the bleak alternatives, both sides will agree to take yes for an answer on every element of this settlement. The objectives of the United States, of our Contact Group partners remain unchanged. We seek a solution that offers Kosovo Albanians the rights that have so long been denied, while protecting the security of all of Kosovo's people. We will not permit Belgrade to conduct repressive operations against the people of Kosovo, or to create a new humanitarian catastrophe, and we will build on the hard work done here by the Contact Group negotiators, and by the co-chairs Robin Cook and Hubert Vedrine. Their determination will be needed even more in the days ahead. When I spoke to President Clinton earlier this afternoon, he and I agreed that the international community and the United States must stay the course, and we will.

Q: Madam Secretary, if this is a fair construction, it would seem the Serbs gave enough on the political front to move the deadline, and keep you here, for instance, just short of a trip you have to make to Asia, that's an important trip. Given Milosevic's track record, given what's happened here, isn't it possible that he will give just enough on a NATO force to prevent a breakdown, but not enough to satisfy the United States and its partners? In a sense, I am asking you if he isn't, in a sense, playing you along a little bit?

A: Well, I think that today was a little bit more complicated than that, Barry. I think that what we said, and let me take a little time to explain this, is that the Kosovar Albanians, I think, needed and felt that they needed additional clarification on some of the political aspects of the interim accord, and from my perspective, the reason for extending the deadline had to do with that. That they felt that they needed more time and work and I am speaking only for myself in this, the others may have made different calculations. But that there needed to be additional clarification and that they had not given an unqualified yes, but that they had as a whole understood what was needed, and clearly, this is a very difficult issue. We are dealing with how they see the future of how their people will be able to govern themselves. As far as the Serbs were concerned, they basically, I think, were not focusing that much on the political agreement, and felt that on the whole, they could accept that. The problem was that they did not want to engage at all on the security part of it, and for us that is a complete non-starter, because a political agreement without the military annexes is just a piece of paper. The security annexes are needed in order to implement the political agreement, and be concerned about what we are concerned about, which is the security of the people and the ability of a lot of the aspects of the political agreement to take root -- all the local institutions that are supposed to take root -- and therefore, just making an agreement on the political part doesn't do any good. So, the question is, I believe that it will be possible to clarify some of the questions that the Kosovar Albanians have in the deadline given, but I do think that we are going to have to verify the bona fides and all of the Serbs as to whether they are willing to deal on the military annex.

Q: Madam Secretary, have you been in touch, have you or any of your other Minister colleagues been in touch with Milosevic today; do you expect to be in touch with him in the next 48 hours, is anybody going to Belgrade to talk to him directly? And, do we interpret from all of what's gone on the last hour that you will stay through the deadline?

A: First of all, let me say as far as I know, no one has been in touch with Milosevic today. It is unclear as to what plans are for people to or not to be in touch with him. I think my first order of business is to deal with the Kosovar Albanians to try to help in making and helping these explanations, helping them understand more what this document contains, so I have no plans to go to Belgrade. I think that there's a dynamic here that is a dynamic that develops in any kind of thing, so obviously, I don't rule anything in or rule anything out, as Jamie has taught me to say. But, there are no plans.

Q: Is it fair to say that the last version that you have invited the parties to consider as the final one is more accommodating to the Serbian demands?

Q: Just to follow up on that, why, since there have been all of these extensions, should he believe that this time you really are serious? And also, you are saying that you still don't have complete agreement with the Kosovo Albanians, but knowing your famous persuasive powers, it seems likely that you might have been able to get that today, and there are reports that in fact some of the European allies said were really politically here, we need to give this extension, and I wonder if you could comment on both those things.

A: Well, I think that, first of all, let me say that we are dealing with a very complicated document as far as the political issues are concerned, and the Kosovar Albanians as a delegation believe, and I agree with them, that they have a huge responsibility to make sure that they get what they can for their people and they want to be assured that this is an agreement that does provide, that it is an interim agreement, and that it does provide the best kind of ability for them to exercise their rights. And I think that, I thought we were pretty close today, but we weren't able to push it over the goal line. I think it's worth trying, and I think it's worth pushing again with Milosevic. I think that Milosevic would make a grave mistake to miscalculate about our intentions, and that we are not into endless extensions. As I said last time, as a Professor I don't like to do that. But I did think that there have been, from the Kosovar side, it was really worth giving an extra couple of days.

Q: Madame Secretary, do you believe that the International Community can expect a just and long-standing solution for Kosovo while democracy still is, and I'm afraid is going to stay, persona non grata in Serbia?

A: It is clearly part of the difficulty of the problem. I would think that at some stage the people of Yugoslavia and Serbia would see that their country keeps diminishing under this leadership, that it started out a fairly large country, and it is losing various pieces of it. We are very supportive of a free media and the possibilities for oppositions to function within Serbia, and I think our constant pressure on that line is something that is a part of what we are doing. I do think that it is possible for even this leadership to understand that it is in its interests to go forward with the kind of agreement that is being presented here. That the political aspect of it is a very carefully drawn-out document, as I have stated, and that the implementation, the military aspect, will provide security and the ability of not only Albanians but also the minorities in Kosovo to be able to pursue a normal life.

Q: Secretary Albright, you mentioned before and have repeated today that you see this agreement as being part of a process of creating new forms of sovereignty and new kinds of political structures. You've also mentioned questions that the Kosovo Albanian side has had with the political aspects. Can you go into any more detail about that? Can you at least tell us anything about the themes that have come up in their concerns?

A: I have not been part of all the deliberations with them, but I think that what is important here is that they wish to be able to have an identity that is respected, and that allows their people to have elections and local police and, as you know, one of the major issues in the

last years has been the ability of Albanians to get an education in their own language, and to be able to have the kinds of schools and worship the way they want to. So that those are some of the themes within the political document, one that creates an ability, and this is my belief about how many groups or many entities may function in the future is, that there is a great deal of autonomy at the local level, allowing people to be able to live their lives according to their (inaudible.)

Q: You express a great deal of confidence about getting Kosovar Albanian agreement by Tuesday, but apparently they are still insisting upon a referendum on independence after three years. Isn't that a pretty big obstacle?

A: Well, they are definitely, that is the point that they are concerned about, but I think that the language as it is being developed, makes it very clear that this is an interim agreement, that at its termination would take into consideration a number of different factors in determining what the permanent status of Kosovo would be. Among those things, to use the diplomatic word "inter alia," there is, in fact, how to assess the views of the people. And I think that it is a matter of how it is all worded in this document, but I think what is very important for people to know is that this is an interim document, and that, and this goes to the question the gentleman asked about Serbia. Three years in our very dynamic world can bring very different results, and after three years of people being able to elect their own officials, have their local police, their own schools, and relate differently to Belgrade, I think it is very hard to predict exactly what mechanisms would be the most useful for determining the status of Kosovo ultimately. This is an interim agreement that has a lot of dynamic aspects to it and I am sure that there will be many changes both in Kosovo and in Serbia in the next three years. Thank you.

###

*Rambouillet,
February 20, 1999*

ATT:
The Ministers of the Contact Group

Dear Sirs and Madam,

Concerning your request about our willingness to work within the Contact Group framework until the extended deadline now under consideration, we assure you that, yes, we are willing to work with your experts within that framework on the pending and unresolved issues to conclude the interim agreement.

Hashim Thaçi,

Head of the Presidency of the Kosova Delegation

Managing the Parties and the Allies at the Rambouillet Endgame

Assuming clear-cut and definitive answers from the FRY/Serb and Albanian delegations by the 3:00 pm Tuesday deadline, there are only 4 possible combinations: Yes-Yes, No-No, Yes-No, and No-Yes.

- "Yes-Yes" leads to implementation and the deployment of NATO ground forces;
- "No-No" would likely require another attempt at a later date in another venue - but if at all possible conserving and building off the progress made at Rambouillet;
- A "Yes" from the Kosovars and a "No" from the Serbs triggers possible NATO military action;
- A "No" from the Kosovars and a "Yes" from the Serbs is really little more than a theoretical possibility.

Preparing for the Most Likely Eventuality

The situation tomorrow and the answers from both sides are likely to be more ambiguous than a simple matrix can capture and open to varying - and even conflicting - interpretations. Even if the Kosovo Albanian delegation gets to "yes," it is likely to be a grudging and heavily-caveated acceptance. The KLA is clearly concerned about its future in a post-settlement Kosovo, and reluctant to endorse any proposal that requires its demilitarization.

While we will want to make clear that "a yes is a yes," our European allies will be working to characterize the Kosovo Albanian answer as "a qualified 'No.'"

Meanwhile, the Serb side has already indicated that Belgrade will accept the political aspects of the settlement and display a willingness to discuss "the modalities of implementation." This is a "No" which the Allies will seek to interpret as "a qualified "Yes".

We cannot allow Belgrade - or our European allies - to divide the political and security aspects of the proposal. It is a unitary document. Rejection of any component of the agreement constitutes rejection of the proposal as a whole. There can be no compromise on this point.

Our most important objective for tomorrow will be ensuring that the Contact Group statement is unambiguous in its assessment of the parties' answers and characterizes those answers in a way that would support possible NATO action against the FRY. The correct sequencing of actions tomorrow will be essential.

Objectives for tomorrow include:

- Locking in Kosovo Albanian support for the settlement. Need a signed letter from the leadership indicating that the Kosovo Albanian delegation accepts the CG settlement text in its entirety.
- A clear answer from the Serbs by the 3:00 deadline. There will be pressure from some CG Allies for an additional extension. We should block this, as further delay would risk shattering any consensus that might be reached on the Kosovo Albanian side.
- A CG statement that makes clear the Albanian "yes" is a firm "yes." And that the Serbian "No" is an equally clear "No." The Europeans will seek to nuance these answers. We cannot allow that.

-- This is certain to require multiple high-level interventions in CG and NATO capitals to shore-up Allied support and ensure that there is no backsliding from a solid CG statement.
- Shift the locus of action from Rambouillet to Brussels. Push back on any European efforts to engage the NAC in decision-making.
- Push for a Solana statement endorsing the CG decision and indicating that NATO is prepared to move forward with military action as previously authorized by the NAC. Solana statement should also indicate that Belgrade's repeated and ongoing violations of the terms of the October Clark-Naumann agreement would themselves justify military action.
- Initiate KVM and Embassy withdrawal plans in anticipation of NATO bombing. Milosevic will not take us seriously until the Europeans pull out of Belgrade.

How to Handle "No-No"

- CG statement to indicate that neither party could reach final agreement on the settlement proposal - but Serb side bears the bulk of the responsibility and we will hold Belgrade accountable.
- Announce a "cooling-off period" for further spade-work with the parties, and particularly with the KLA.
- Set a new deadline for completing the negotiations - including a signing ceremony by mid-March.
- Initiative planning for a new round of negotiations in a new venue - possibly in the United States.
- Maintain the NATO pressure on Belgrade. This will require careful and sustained efforts at Allied management.

Rambouillet Update a/o 0900 Local, Tuesday, February 23rd

1. Final, complete, CG-endorsed text presented to both sides last night. "Express" deleted prior to "will of the people" (see attached) and side letter taken off table. Parties given to 1300 local to accept/reject. Non-answer to be considered a rejection.
2. Venton Surroi told Secretary Albright that he would work to attain KA agreement, even without Thaqi. We are using multiple channels (including Shaun Byrnes in theater) to press for KA concurrence.
3. For "no-no" scenario, we have distributed gist of PC guidance in non-paper to key allies. We have incorporated key elements into a draft co-chairmen's statement and "undertaking" to be signed by parties, seeking to lock in agreed elements of settlement while warning Belgrade against mounting an offensive and keeping alive threat of NATO strikes.
4. We are working end-game with key allies, including at a 1000 meeting between MKA, Cook and Vedrine at the Quai d'Orsay. MKA arrives Ramouillet at 1200 for final discussions with Albanians and to prepare for a CG meeting at 1500.
5. Like US, allies wish to extract "partial success" from Rambouillet. As of last night, none were talking about extending the talks, but rather locking in what has been agreed and preparing for another round of talks to be scheduled next month. However "partial success" in their view includes avoiding prominent threat of air strikes. Allies will require a major push if we attain a "yes-no" and can therefore shift focus to NATO.

Chapter 8

Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses

Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment

1. Amendments to this Agreement shall be adopted by agreement of all the Parties, except as otherwise provided by Article X of Chapter 1.
2. Each Party may propose amendments at any time and will consider and consult with the other Parties with regard to proposed amendments.
3. Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.

Article II: Final Clauses

1. This Agreement is signed in the English language. After signature of this Agreement, translations will be made into Serbian, Albanian, and other languages of the national communities of Kosovo, and attached to the English text.
2. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

FOR

FOR

FOR

Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia

Republic of
Serbia

Kosovo

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

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TO (AGENCY)

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DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

Greg Schulte

REMARKS:

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2008-1944-F.3

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002a. telcon	Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, February 19, 1999. [Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526]. (2 pages)	02/22/1999	P1/b(1)
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION (Kosovo-related portions)

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT/BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE/TIME: 19 FEBRUARY 1999/1059-1124 EST

THE PRESIDENT: Tony? Hey Tony.

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Hi Bill.

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Anyway, you have all our best wishes, and you know that.
Bill, Kosovo.

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

Chirac is with you today?

THE PRESIDENT: He is here and I will meet with him in a few minutes.

1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me say—. Let's make sure we are on the same page. Our

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

Declassified in Part
Per ISCAP, E.O. 13526
Section 5.3.(b)(3)
Appeal No. 2013-090,
Document No. 43
10/14/2015THE PRESIDENT: Well, I agree with that. The trick is to give him some chance to come
around and not seem like we're going to unlimitedly.

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]
E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I agree with that. [REDACTED] 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]
E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d) You had
Schroeder there, didn't you? What was he like?

THE PRESIDENT: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]
1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with that. That is good. I think we are doing all right on getting the enabling force together. I don't know if Milosevic is playing brinkmanship or not. He seems to believe he loses Serbia if he lets NATO in there.

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yeah. [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]
E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me ask you a couple of questions. What is your sense on KVM? I know the EU is interested in a new structure, [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] 1.4(d) I think that can be accomplished by
the OSCE maintaining the lead with civilian implementation. [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d) I like the idea that the Europeans have been so forthcoming, and I want to be supportive, but I don't want to screw it up.

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]
E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: That is right.

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]
E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

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002b. form	Fax Cover Sheet. [partial] (1 page)	02/22/1999	P3/b(3)

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2008-0994-F
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SUBJECT: <u>NEGOTIATIONS BREAKDOWN TIMELINE/MATRIX</u>	PAGES: <u>cover + 2</u>	

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SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: KOSOVO NEGOTIATIONS TIMELINE/MATRIX - LATEST VERSION, 20 FEB 1700 hrs (EST). PLEASE PROVIDE COMMENTS/INPUTS TO MIKE HURLEY BY 1200 hrs (EST) 21 FEB.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	Rambouillet Endgame. (2 pages)	02/22/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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2008-0994-F
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	Friday 19-Feb	Saturday 20-Feb	Sunday 21-Feb	Monday 22-Feb	Tuesday 23-Feb	Wednesday 24-Feb	Thursday 25-Feb	Friday 26-Feb
Administration Actions	POTUS - Chirac Meeting	Principals/Deputies calls to Key Allies & Russians		POTUS approves Air Strikes		POTUS final go-ahead		
US Allied Diplomacy	POTUS calls PM Blair	SecState in Rambouillet	SecState in Rambouillet					
NATO			Solana consults allies on Air Strikes	Solana approves Air Strikes, notifies SACEUR		AIR STRIKES at night		
Negotiations		Deadline extended 3 days			Deadline Expires, Negotiations End (9:00am EST; 3:00pm Rambouillet)			
Russian Engagement		POTUS letter to Yeltsin				Notify Russia of strikes		
Pressing Belgrade					FMs in Belgrade?			
Pressing KLA					KVM and CG reminder to KLA			
Embassy Evacuation	FRY Bosnia: Authorized departure, Warden msg to AmCits; Begin evacuation coordination w/ UNHCR, NGOs, other IOs; AmCit Travel Warning			Ordered departure: dependents and non- emergency personnel; Coordinate evacuation of AmCits; Allied Embassies drawdown	Drawdowns Complete; Embassy at Core Staff; Core staff prepares Embassy for closure	Core Staff Departs via aircraft		
KVM Evacuation			KVM Alert Status 2&3	KVM Alert Status 4 (Begin Evacuation from FRY)	KVM Alert Status 5: All KVM personnel depart			
Congressional Consultations				Principals and Deputies calls to leaders	House Vote on KFOR			
Public Affairs	POTUS - Chirac press conference; NAC Statement	SecState Statement			SecState Statement	POTUS Statement; DoD Briefing		

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Rebounced

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FIRST LEGAL DIVISION

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Rambouillet

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Rambouillet,
23 February, 1999

Recognizing the importance of reaching a settlement for the Kosovo conflict, grounded in meaningful self-government for the people of Kosovo and the preservation of the rights of the members of all national communities, the Parties have convened at Rambouillet, France to seek a peaceful solution through dialogue. They have conducted their work under the auspices of Contact Group negotiators and the co-hosts of the conference, the governments of Great Britain and France. The Parties have proceeded on the basis of the Contact Group's Non-Negotiable Principles/Basic Elements agreed in London on January 29, 1999.

The Parties hereby affirm the completion of substantial progress on their work (which is reflected in the attaches mediators' text identifying areas of agreement and remaining areas for discussions).

The Parties further commit themselves to respect fully the cease-fire throughout Kosovo, to avoid all provocative actions, and to abide by their commitments and voluntary undertakings of last October. The Parties welcome the continued commitment of the OSCE to help stabilize the situation in Kosovo through the deployment of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), and they commit to full cooperation with the KVM in meeting its requests for support and safeguarding its personnel.

The Parties thank the co chairmen of the Contact Group and their negotiators, Ambassador Hill, Ambassador Mayorsky and Ambassador Petritsch, for their efforts at Rambouillet.

FOR

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Republic of Serbia

Kosovo Albanians

WITNESSED
(Negotiators)

Rambouillet Update a/o 1200 local, 2/23

1. Attached is the "no/no" paperwork emerging from this morning's meetings with the UK and France. It includes: Chairmen's Conclusions; an Undertaking by the Parties; and additional public points that we have provided for CG allies. These are subject to more revisions over the next three hours.
2. Chris Hill and USDEL are also still working on a "yes/no" outcome, although the Kosovars might condition their "yes" on a two-week pause for "consultations" in Kosovo. This would probably not lead to a renewed threat of air strikes, but to a negotiating "pause" as foreseen in the "no/no" scenario.

KOSOVO : RAMBOUILLET ACCORD CHAIRMEN'S CONCLUSIONS

1. Contact Group Ministers met in Rambouillet on 23 February at the end of more than two weeks of intensive efforts to reach an agreement on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, respecting the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2. Ministers noted the historic nature of the Rambouillet Conference, bringing together the basis of the principles and basic elements adopted by the Contact Group in London on 29 January, those long divided by deep and bitter differences.
3. These have been complex and difficult negotiations, as we expected. The intensive efforts of the parties and the unstinting commitment of our negotiators Ambassadors Petritsch and Mayorsky, have led to a high degree of consensus on all the aspects of substantial autonomy for Kosovo, including on mechanisms for free and fair elections, democratic institutions, for the governance of Kosovo, for the protection of human rights and the rights of members of national communities ; and for the establishment of a judicial system.
4. The goal we set ourselves on 20 February was to finalise as a whole the Rambouillet Agreement. We have received positive responses to the autonomy proposals set out in the Rambouillet Accords, and the groundwork has thereby been laid for finalising the implementation Chapters of the Agreement, including the modalities of the early invited international civilian and military presence in Kosovo. We welcome the commitment of the Parties to attend an implementation meeting in ... on 8 March, following consultation with the parties and relevant international organizations.
5. The parties must refrain from any action which would undermine the achievements of the Rambouillet. In particular, we expect the parties to honour fully and immediately the ceasefire which should be in place throughout Kosovo, to avoid all provocative actions and to abide fully by their commitments of October 1998. We fully support the mission of the personnel of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission, and we insist that the parties provide for the security of KVM and other international personnel.
6. We pledge ourselves to work together to achieve a settlement meeting the legitimate aspirations of all the people of Kosovo. Only such a settlement can create the conditions in which a humanitarian catastrophe can be avoided. Those who prevent the successful conclusion of the negotiations on an interim settlement for Kosovo, or who provoke further hostilities, will be held fully accountable for their actions.

Draft

a/o a.m. 2/23

Rambouillet,
23 February, 1999

Recognizing the importance of reaching a settlement for the Kosovo conflict, grounded in meaningful self-government for the people of Kosovo and the preservation of the rights of the members of all national communities, the Parties have convened at Rambouillet, France to seek a peaceful solution through dialogue. They have conducted their work under the auspices of Contact Group negotiators and the co-hosts of the conference, the governments of Great Britain and France. The Parties have proceeded on the basis of the Contact Group's Non-Negotiable Principles/Basic Elements agreed in London on January 29, 1999.

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The Parties thank the co chairmen of the Contact Group and their negotiators, Ambassador Hill, Ambassador Mayorsky and Ambassador Petritsch, for their efforts at Rambouillet.

FOR:

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Republic of Serbia

Kosovo Albanians

WITNESSED
(Negotiators)

Additional Public Points for Use by Allied Members of the Contact Group

- As this phase of the negotiations comes to an end, none of the parties should see this as an opportunity to launch military offensives or new provocations.
- We are particularly concerned at indications that Serb forces are mobilizing to launch new attacks against the Kosovar population. Belgrade must bring the deployment and activities of the Yugoslav Army and Special Police into compliance with its commitments to NATO of October 25th.
- NATO's Secretary General retains the authority to launch air strikes in light of the parties' compliance with their international commitments and requirements.
- We also expect all of the parties to support and safeguard the work of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission, and to give it full access throughout Kosovo.
- We will not tolerate threats to KVM verifiers. We also expect KVM requests for support to be fully met, including arrangements for emergency medical evacuation for KVM verifiers and protective security for KVM leadership and facilities.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

February 23, 1999

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

The Oval Office

9:15 A.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I'd like to make a very brief statement and then we'll take a couple of questions -- and as you know, you'll get to ask the leaders questions after the meeting, and we've got a lot of work to do.

But I think it's important to -- first of all, I want to say how pleased I am to have the whole leadership here, how much I appreciate their coming down. We've got a lot to discuss and I'm looking forward to it. I'd like to make just a couple of comments about the peace talks at Rambouillet on Kosovo. They made a lot of progress, they've got about a 40-page document, which describes in greater detail than ever before what the nature of an autonomous Kosovo within Serbia would be like. And that's the good news.

There are still some important disagreements. The Serbs have still not agreed to a NATO-led multi-national force to try to maintain the peace over a three year period. The Kosovars still want some sort of assurance of a referendum at the end of the three year period and neither side will agree to the other's position on that. And so we're working through that today, hoping for a resolution.

I talked to Secretary Albright last night. Whatever happens today and however they agree to proceed, I think it's very important that the Serbs exercise restraint on the ground and that the Kosovars respond in kind. They've made a lot of progress and they don't need to let this thing get away from them and we'll keep watching it and I expect there will be more news on it as the day breaks.

Q Will you extend the deadline again, sir, is that it?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: No, I don't know. That's up to the parties. I hope that they'll be able to resolve what they're going to do today. I think there will be some sort of resolution about where to go from here today and we'll just have to see.

Q But no bombings?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, whether NATO bombs or not, the Secretary General has the authority in his pocket now. That depends upon the actions of the Serbs. And what we need is continued restraint. But as I said, they made a lot of progress; they had these two big differences, each side having one condition the other won't agree to. So we'll just have to see where we go today.

Q Mr. President, Senator Lott expressed concern about a costly, open-ended, no-defined peace keeping mission. What kind of reassurances can you give him on that point?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that what we learned in Bosnia was that we shouldn't set a date certain and later find out we can't meet it and have people feel that they've been misled. I don't want to do that. So I think the important thing to do is to have an exit strategy based on benchmarks, on developments. And then if the Congress agrees with the benchmarks, that those are reasonable standards, then I think we can have an open relationship that has some credibility in the agreements between the Congress and the executive branch.

In terms of paying for it, I think in this fiscal year whatever we have to do we would need emergency funding because we're in a fiscal year where the Defense budget is already set. In the years ahead I would expect that we would have to work that into the budget and I think that's what the Congress leaders -- Congress, as far as I know in both parties -- have expected us to do, because they don't want the Pentagon to have to absorb these costs away from readiness and taking care of our people in the military.

Q Mr. President, these Republican leaders all voted to oust you from office. How can you work with them?

UPDATED 02/15/99 - 1.00PM

RAMBOUILLET Personnel List

NAME		Title	Cell Phone	Hot/Rm	TDY B	RAMBdg
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Visiting Personnel

Aliu	Bix	Translator	06 82 55 80 22	M-19		
Atkins	Chris	EUCOM		C-10	no	no
Banbury	Anthony Nathan	OSD	06 85 67 28 36	M-211	no	yes
Benton	Jonathan	Moscow	06 82 55 80 30	M-1	2	yes
Breca	Svetlana	Belgrade	06 87 60 26 72	M-203		
Brenner	Claudine	Paris		M-224		
Brink	Bridget	Belgrade	06 87 60 25 92	M-4	8	yes
Christiansen	Guillermo	Bonn	06 85 67 29 23	M-2	9	yes
Cobb	Joyce	OMS		C-20		
Cronin	Pat	OMS		C-18		
Crowder	Steven	Commo		C-75		
Dalton	Robert	L/T		M-104		
Darby	Brooke	INL (police)	06 08 71 99 32	M-107		yes
Decker	Karen		06 87 60 26 82	M -		
Dempsey (gon	Nora	Rome	06 08 72 03 24	M-17		
Donovan	Col. John	JCS	06 82 55 80 32	M-206		
Dudley	Sgt. Richard	JCS- Donovan		B	13	yes
Feierstein	Mark	AID (elections)		M-109		yes
Fisher	Col. Bill	JCS	06 85 67 29 28	M-208		yes
Fitch	Sgt. Lonnie	JCS- Donovan		B	14	yes
Friedman	Abigail	Paris	06 08 71 99 76	M-6		
Frowick	George	SCE	06.07.44.15.68	M-205		
Gabbard	Dave	IRM/CST/SPS/SC		C-11		yes
Gerhart	Eric	ORA		B-9		
Breca	Svetlana	Translator		C-36		
Hill	Amb. Christopher		06.82.55.80.76	Chateau		
Hurley	Mike	NSC		M-102		
Kaidenow	Tina		06.07.44.29.90	Chateau	20	
Kaiser (gone)	Sandra	USIA	06.07.88.61.59	M-7		
Kanin	David	BTF	06 82 55 80 36	M-112	6	yes
Kaufman	Col. Joseph Greg	OSD	06-41-79-20 7-6049	M-110		
Kostelancik	David (gone)	USNATO	06 87 60 26 82	M-105		yes
Krasniqi	Florina	Translator	06 08 75 12 33	M-21		
Levitsky	Jon	S/P	06 85 67 18 82	Chateau	3	yes
Monk	David	usia	06 07 88 61 55	M -		
Muskholai	Gjulieta	translator	06 87 60 26 78	M-3		yes
O'Brien	Jim	S/P	06 82 55 80 39	Chateau		
Palmer	Matt	SCE	06.82.55.80.85	M-204	10	
Reeker	Phil		06.82.55.80.64	Chateau	16	
Rossin	Larry		06.85.67.37.32	M-201		
Scandola	Jo Ann	USIA	06.07.42.52.08	M-9		
Schulte	Greg	NSC	06 82 55 80 69	M-8	17	
Schulz	Kirsten	Oslo	06 82 55 80 67	M-108	4	yes
Siebentritt	Carl		06 08 75 16 56	M-202	1	yes
Tobin	Paul	BTF	06 82 55 80 38	M-210	7	yes
Teirlynck	Mary	Brussels	06 07 44 16 66			
Walker	Steven	BTF		C-40		
Whelan	Theresa Marie	OSD	06 82 55 80 60	M-209		
Winters	Mark	ORA		B - 9		

M = MERCURE
B = BERGERIE
C = CAMPANILE
P = PAVILLON BLEU

AirForceCom

Barton	William			B-7	30	
Christopher	Michael			B-6	29	yes
D'Etcheverry	Mark			B-8		yes
Fetty	Ryan			B-3	28	yes
Isaacs	David			B-2	27	yes
Kern	Bernard			B-2	26	yes

UPDATED 02/15/99 - 1.00PM

Odle	Brett			B-4	21	yes
Ostoffie	Tracie			B-13	24	yes
Rigsby	Wade			B-30		
Robinson	Lee			B-3		yes
Williams	Charles			B-29		
MSGs						
Barger	Erin			P-242		
Boileau	Raymond			P-249		
Cox	Larry			P-240		
Deato	Edmyr			P-248		
Devin	Paul			P-70		
Johnson	Jamon			P-368		
Norvel	David			P-45		
Nowlin	David			P-43		
Toe	Travis			P-247		
Post 1	cell phone		06 82 55 80 32			
Post 2	cell phone		06 87 60 26 77			

Embassy Paris Support Personnel

For any Paris staff, dial the embassy switch board who will be able to connect you to their office, home or cell phone. Cell phone numbers are also provided to dial direct.

Switchboard number is: 01-4312-2222 staffed from 7 am to 11 pm daily

Name		Title	Cell Phone
Andre	Julien	Dispatcher	06 07 34 87 15
Berg	John	GSO	06 07 74 21 67
Blondelet	Jean-Francois	GSO	06 08 71 62 64
Bredat	Pascale	Computers	
Bush	Wayne	Admin Officer	06 07 53 91 96
Caruso	John	GSO	06 09 67 00 62
Carvalho	Virgilio		
Cobb	Joyce	OMS	
Colantonio	Andrew	RSO	
Cronin	Pat	OMS	
Davids	Sylviane	Cashier B&F	
Davison	Joe	DRSO	
Doxtader	Rick	MSG MSgt	
Goodrich	Rob	RSO	06 07 74 21 61
Graves	Earl	GSO	06 09 68 53 15
Hayden	Rebecca		
Herman	Dirk	B&F	06 08 95 17 62
Hoffmann	Doug	Tel Tech	
Hudson	William	Admin. Counselor	06 08 71 99 87
Hutcheson	Alan	GSO Asst	06 08 55 69 86
Insley	Allison	Con Off	06 09 67 03 28
Jaranyi	Karl	Asst AF Attache	06 07 45 53 94
Jones	Glenn	IPC Chief	
Ksionkowski	Christiane	IMO Asst/Tels	
Leroux	Christian	Electrician	
Masnere	Agnes	Nurse	
McDonald	James	AF Attache	
McGinnis	Sherwood	Pol Counselor	06 09 68 32 70
Mercier	Robert	Dispatcher	06 07 74 40 91
Millot	Roger	RSO FSN	
Noble	David	RSO/SEO	
Norris	Ray	IMO Asst/Tels	06 08 71 62 66
Pearson	Maggie	Press Officer	
Romine	Sheila	Admin Sec	
Syrett	Tony	Transportation Off	
Tamic	Claudie	For Phone Tech	

UPDATED 02/15/99 - 1.00PM

Tiffon	Alain	Warehouse	06 14 86 85 42
Waybright	Matt	Marine Staff Sgt	
Wiggins	Frontis	IMO Unclass Chf	06 09 78 16 24

KOSOVO MONITORING GROUP

Tel. 202-647-6614, 202-647-6616, 202-647-6617

Fax: 202-647-7094

Secure Tel. 202-647-0764, 202-647-0765, 202-647-0766

Secure Fax: 202-647-0764

Unclass e-mail: tfl@ssonwpoa.us-state.gov, tsfl@erols.com

XEROX TECHNICIANS**Mercier Robert Dispatcher 06 07 74 40 91**

Mr. Mormonceau	06 60 32 56 88
	01 34 83 03 33 (home)
Mr. Mahe	06 60 33 60 19

HOTELS**Hotel Mercure Paris Ouest Maurepas****Mercure Hotel Control room: CLOSED**1, Rocade de Camargue
78310 Maurepas

Tel. 01 30 51 57 27

Fax 01 30 66 70 14

Bergerie/Rambouillet Control Room

01 34 83 98 18 tel classified workroom

Hotel Campanile**01 34 83 98 19**ZA de l'Agot - Rue Louis-Lormand
St. Quentin-en-Yvelines
78320 La Verriere

01 34 83 99 86 - Press/next to Control Desk

fax: 01 34 83 98 80

Dispatcher : 06-07-74-40-91

Tel. 01 30 66 30 66

Fax 01 30 50 27 82

Chateau Work Room**01 34 83 98 42****01 34 83 98 41****Le Pavillon Bleu**

01 34 94 28 79

1, Route de Dreux
78190 Trappes

fax: 01 34 83 99 57

fax: 01 34 83 98 83

Tel. 01 30 62 97 58

Fax 01 30 62 70 61

stulll 01 34 83 99 69

class fax: 01 34 83 99 39

Medical at the Chateau**01 34 94 28 44****24 hours Doctor Fodel****06 07 02 38 80**



Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION
Beogradska Uljca br.32, Pristina

Tel: 00 381 (0) 38 500 162
Fax: 00 381 (0) 38 500 438

13-Feb-99

KOSOVO BORDER ISSUES

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. For several centuries the Kosovo border area has been used as a major smuggling route. The trade has and continues to be drugs, tobacco, money, people, cattle and more recently weapons and KLA. Even if the KLA disbands completely, the lack of law and order in Albania and the lack of proper Albanian border controls will force the legal authorities of Kosovo to secure its frontiers.

BORDER AREA

2. The length of Kosovan border presently designated as a security zone and patrolled by FRY security forces is 261 km. The border with Albania stretches for 132 km and with FYROM 129 km. In addition there is also 40 km of border with Montenegro through which incursions occur.
3. The 261 km of border is bounded by a 5 km deep security zone into which access is strictly controlled. The villagers who live within this zone are free to move and graze their cattle, within limits defined by the security forces, due to danger from minefields and set ambushes. The villagers have special permits.
4. The border which runs through mountainous terrain up to a height of 2600 m, is marked with concrete and stone posts, many of which are missing. There is no fence or other physical boundary. There are 32 border posts, observation towers. The towers are not usually manned as the Albanians use them for target practice. FRY patrols rarely patrol along the actual border as they are shot at. There are no electronic surveillance or intruder devices securing the border.
5. Access to the frontier is difficult and time consuming as there is no border perimeter track along which vehicles or patrols may move easily. To move from one section of border to another only a few km distant usually requires a journey of 20 km or more.

CURRENT VJ CONCEPT OF BORDER OPERATIONS

6. Within the border area the VJ man the 32 platoon sized border posts and 6 Company positions. The minimum strength of a patrol is 10 men. In addition there are 3 Quick Reaction battalions, held in barrack locations, which are ready to reinforce or deal with large scale border incidents/incursions. The minimum manning for the border, as seen from the FRY perspective, is 10 men per km of border. Therefore for the whole border, including Montenegro, there is a requirement for 3000 at any one time.
7. In addition to the patrols the VJ mount ambushes. The border area contains marked anti personnel minefields which channel intruders into prepared ambush sites.

8. There is no existing infrastructure within the border area. This means that all permanent accommodation and support has to be provided by the barracks in Pec, Djakovice, Prizren, Orachovac, sevac and Gnjilane.

9. The VJ estimate that in order to fully secure the border area they need between 6000 and 7000 troops. This would allow for three shifts leave and training.

10. The VJ also use conscripts which means that they arrive only partially trained. To complete their training takes 3 months.

KVM ESTIMATED MANNING LEVELS FOR BORDER SECURITY

11. There is a requirement of a minimum permanent presence of 1600 border guards, made up of the 32 border posts each at platoon level, giving 1000 men, plus the 6 company positions with 600-700 men.

12. The quick reaction force would contain 1500 men.

13. Logistic support and barracks infrastructure would require another 1000 men.

14. For a 3 shift system, training and leave to operate would require at least 2500 additional troops.

15. The total would therefore be closer to $1600 + 1500 + 1000 + 2500 = 6600$ Troops


RECOMMENDATIONS

16. Without any technological enhancements the border area would need at least 5500 troops to secure it. This is assuming that all leave and training is carried out in Serbia and not Kosovo. Thereby reducing the figure of 6600 by about a 1000.

17. That due to lack of existing border area infrastructure the border guard units retain just three barrack locations, Pec, Prizren and Urosovac.

18. In the longer term consider installation of fence and or intruder systems.

19. Insist on better border procedures on Albanian side of border.



RZA CIAGLINSKI
For DHOM/Chief Ops

Comments on OSCE Border Issues Paper

- Basis of Calculations is not always consistent, or clear.
- Basic recommendation is for a Border Guard Force of 5,500 ^{to run a 3 shift system.}
- 6,500
- Of these:
 - 1,600 on border in static positions
(32 x border posts = 1,000 men + 6 company positions = 600 men)
 - 1,000 Logistics troops
 - 1,500 quick reaction force
- Only the last point is not provided for currently.
- US Border Guards will have to change modes of operation to cover for this. 'force multipliers' will be required such as
 - electronic surveillance
 - helicopter transport for reaction forces
 - building a border track.
- None of the above are prevented by the agreement as it stands, however current US 'force multiplier' is ^{the} use of Card Units. At least these should be replaced with a 'non lethal' alternative.
- The above have been fed back to OSCE through David Wilson and discussed with the US delegation.

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: PJ

DTG: 10/10/84

MESSAGE NO.: 125

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: MILIAM SADIRO
(NAME)

(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: RAMBOUILLET END GAME

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

State - U/S Pickering and Jim Pardew
DOD - U/S Stocobma and Bear McConnell
JCS - Gen Ralston and Gen Casey
OMB - Bob Kyle - State Dept
COS - Steve Ricchetti - State Dept
USUN - for Amb Holbrooke, Amb Burtleigh and Alan Romberg
USNATO - Amb Vershbow
USDEL RAMBOUILLET - Greg Schulte

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VR Date: 5/2/2001

2008-0944-F-3

FEB 22 99 11:30 AM HENDERSON PARK 10.207 P.22

RAMBOUILLET ENDGAME

Goals: (1) Seek to make Rambouillet a partial success rather than a failure; (2) Head off a Serb offensive and KLA provocations; (3) Make KVM more secure; and (4) Keep open option of restarting talks. Our public approach would be to tell both sides and the media that the parties have moved farther than ever before on the nature of Kosovar autonomy, but important issues remain unresolved on arrangements after three years and the international implementation presence. Negotiators and Contact Group delegations are therefore returning to their capitals to consult, and negotiations will resume at the appropriate time. Characterizing the end of Rambouillet as the closure of one phase and the beginning of another may help calm tensions in Kosovo. → Co-ach still

Strategy: Our approach contains several elements that will need to be coordinated carefully, especially with the FRY and the Allies:

Pocket agreed elements of text: We should draw up a list of "agreed issues" (or text with brackets) for each side and get the delegations to initial it. Both sides should be willing to do this, on separate pieces of paper if need be. Avoiding formal signatures would minimize concerns about bifurcation of the political and military chapters and limiting the negotiators' flexibility. ✓

Get both sides' agreement to restraint: With a serious threat of a Serb offensive and strong KLA reaction looming, we must get an agreement on restraint. This could be simple affirmation of a cease-fire or a more elaborate "non-aggression pact". Characterizing the period ahead as a period of consultations and making it clear that whichever side provokes the other will bear the consequences (i.e., bombing on the Serb side and either tightening the arms embargo or "abandonment" on the Kosovar side). ✓

Secure Serb reaffirmation of October commitments: Bringing the Serbs into compliance with obligations they have already undertaken, such as the withdrawal of MUP, VJ and heavy equipment that arrived after February 1998 and the cantonment of VJ, would be a big step forward and decrease KLA's justification for a renewal of fighting. Because Milosevic will view closing down Rambouillet as a victory, he may be in a magnanimous mood. If not, we'll need to find a carrot to entice him, such as the lifting the March sanctions. ?

Ensure Allies on board to use force if Serbs launch an offensive: We need an explicit confirmation from at least the British, French and Germans that the ACTORD will be deployed if the Serbs undertake an assault. We should be able to get the Allies to accept this position because under current NAC decisions Solana is authorized to turn the key for noncompliance with the October agreement or failure to accept a settlement.

→ Co-chairman
st-hat

Improve KVM's security: ^{Leverage?} Given the security threats that KVM has been confronted with in the past few days, it is essential that we find ways to improve its situation. At a minimum, the Medevac capabilities of KVM must be improved. We would urge the OSCE and the Swiss government to maintain their package (helicopter, crew, ambulance, and medical personnel) on standby. Further, Ambassador Walker confirms the importance of previous requests to the FRY and adds the need for greater overall cooperation from the Serb side. Specifically, we should seek Milosevic's reinterpretation of the October agreement to allow:

?

- Walker's personal security detail to be armed (consistent with normal diplomatic entities);
- the international and local guards for KVM facilities to be armed (consistent with normal diplomatic entities);
- Swiss Medivac package to be on standby, in the FRY or nearby with guaranteed access;
- Frequency for KVM radio to broadcast (at present limited to intra-KVM communications); and
- Greater cooperation and access to border areas, military bases and political prisoners.

~~SECRET~~

D019

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(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	Some Thoughts from Rambouillet on Coping with a "No/No" on Tuesday. (3 pages)	02/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6349

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE~~SECRET~~RELEASER: *D. J. C.*DTG: *211613*MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: _____ TOTAL: *36*
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)FROM: *WHSR* _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: _____

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBE</u>
<i>Ramballet</i>	<i>Greg Scholte</i>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: *vr* Date: *5/2/04**208-0041-F.3*

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Options for a "No-No" Scenario. (2 pages)	02/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6349

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A

WASHFAX
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SITE

4

8

Message No. 016565 Classification ~~SECRET~~ NODS No. Pages Attached 2From: STATE OPS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Phone number) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: KOSOVO SUTS 1600

TO: (Agency)

NSCCIAJCSOSD

DELIVER TO: (Person/Office)

FOR SUTSPARTICIPANTS

Phone no.

Room no.

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Initials: VR Date: 5/2/2021
201-0944-7.3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	No-No Next Steps. (2 pages)	02/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6349

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Civil Implementation in Kosovo

Goal

To design a civilian structure for implementation of the civilian aspects of an interim political agreement in Kosovo that takes into account the following principles.

Principles

- Maximize efficiency and effectiveness
- Streamlined, clear, practical political control and chain of command
- Maximize use of existing structures
- Ensure immediate on-the-ground response to signing of peace agreement
- Effective funding mechanism
- Substantial roles for OSCE and EU
- Smooth transition from KVM to new civilian implementation organization
- Strong Mission leadership

Concept

In order to achieve the above goal, there is a need for a new Kosovo civilian implementation mission that would replace the current KVM, and would be responsible for carrying out virtually all the civilian aspects of the Interim Political Agreement (IPA).¹ The Head of the OSCE Mission (HOM) or his Principal Deputy would be an EU national who would be nominated by the EU, and appointed by the OSCE CIO. The HOM would report to the CIO. In determining political direction for the Mission, the CIO would consult with a Civilian Advisory Board, which would be comprised of the EU Troika, the OSCE Troika, the Contact Group, and other members invited by the Advisory Board. The CIO would Chair the Advisory Board.

There would be several functional Deputies to the HOM, one of whom would be an EU national responsible for reconstruction issues.

The mission's budget would be funded by the OSCE through assessed contributions.


In Kosovo, there would be a Principal's Committee, Chaired by the HOM, which would coordinate day-to-day implementation of the IPA. The Committee would be comprised of HOM and his Principal Deputy, COMKFOR, UNHCR, ICRC, and other members invited by the Committee.

¹ Some well defined responsibilities would be vested in organizations such as ICRC and UNHCR.

Draft

15/2/99 17:20

OSCE Mission In Kosovo




* The Head of Mission or Principal Deputy to be nominated by the EU and approved by OSCE/CIO.

Stakeholders Group*
- OSCE-Troika - EU-Troika - Contact Group - Mission Chief (Chair) - Canada - Japan - OIC
open for others actually establishing stakes

Implementation Group**
EU Troika OSCE CIO/GE HOM

NOTES

- Mission Chief nominated by EU, appointed by OSCE; funded 50:50 OSCE:EU.
- Deputies for Pillars 1+2 are OSCE appointments and OSCE funded, Pillar 3 is an EU-appointment and EU funded



* sugg. meetings every 6 months, or as necessary; level: political directors

** sugg. meetings every 1 or 2 months, or as necessary; level: political directors

CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION IN KOSOVO

GOAL

To design civilian structure for implementation of the civilian aspects of an interim political agreement in Kosovo that takes into account the following principles:

PRINCIPLES

- Maximise efficiency and effectiveness
- Streamlined, clear, practical political control and chain of command
- Maximise use of existing structures
- Ensure immediate on-the-ground response to signing of peace agreement
- Effective funding mechanism
- Substantial roles for OSCE and EU
- Smooth transition from KVM to new civilian implementation organisation
- Strong Mission leadership

PROPOSED STRUCTURE

See attached organigram

CONCEPT

In order to achieve the above goal, there is a need for a new Kosovo civilian implementation mission into which KVM would fold, and which would be responsible for carrying out virtually all the civilian aspects of the Interim Political Agreement. The Head of the OSCE/EU Mission (HoM) would be an EU national who would be nominated by the EU, and appointed by the OSCE CiO. The HoM would report to the OSCE Permanent Council and the EU Council of Ministers. The mandate of the HoM would be endorsed and approved by the Permanent Council of the OSCE and the EU Council of Ministers. In determining political direction for the Mission, the HoM would consult with an Implementation Group meeting every month or as appropriate. The membership of this Group would be very limited - no more than three people, including the HoM.

An Advisory Board consisting of the OSCE Troika, EU Troika, Contact Group, HoM and others who were playing a major role in implementation would meet every 3-4 months or so to promote co-ordination with a dotted line relationship to the Implementation Group. The HoM would chair the Advisory Board. Neither the Implementation Group nor the Advisory Board would be at Ministerial level.

There would be several functional deputies to the HoM, one of whom would be an EU national responsible for co-ordination of reconstruction assistance. The deputies would be appointed by the OSCE. The deputy responsible for reconstruction would be nominated by the EU.

Crisis Management

In a crisis the Head of Mission would report to/call on the OSCE C-in-O.

BUDGET

Chief of Mission

Salary, staff and support arrangements to be funded on a 50:50 basis by OSCE (on the basis of existing contribution scale) and by EU (on the basis of existing EU procedures, possibly joint action).



Overall costs of Mission

Pillars 1 and 2 to be funded by OSCE on the basis of relevant scales.

Reconstruction co-ordination pillar to be funded by the EU.


Common Costs (car pool etc)

To be apportioned 50:50 OSCE/EU, with the possibility of funding from other contributors on a project basis (cf Annex 5, Article II, d).



NOTES

- Mission Chief nominated by EU, appointed by OSCE; funded 50:50 OSCE:EU.
- mandate of Mission Chief to be endorsed and approved by OSCE Permanent Council and EU-Council of Ministers
- Deputies are OSCE - appointed, Pillar 3-Deputy is EU-nominated and funded



* sugg. meetings every 3/4 months, or as necessary; level: politic. directors

** sugg. meetings every month, or as necessary; level: political directors

Feb 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Following Up on Chris Hill's Trip to Belgrade

Chris Hill returned from Belgrade early this morning. After three hours of talks with Milosevic, Chris is grim and discouraged.

Chris was accompanied on the trip by representatives of the UK and French co-chairs, who joined him with the Serb side for the first 45 minutes. Chris then met alone with Milosevic and Milutinovic. Chris characterized the meeting as extremely difficult, with the Serb side unyielding and discussion periodically degenerating into shouting.

Milosevic's main objection was the deployment of NATO forces, particularly under the threat of air strikes. Repeatedly pushed by Chris, the only flexibility that Milosevic showed was a suggestion that we be "more imaginative" in designing the force. Pressed by Chris for specifics, Milosevic suggested that we consider an international force under joint NATO-FRY command. Needless to say, Chris rejected this outright.

Other suggestions from Milosevic were to (1) extend the talks beyond Saturday and (2) focus for now on the political aspects of an interim settlement. Chris rejected both suggestions, saying that the Saturday deadline was firm and that a NATO force was an integral part of the deal. Milosevic also pressed for an immediate lifting of sanctions and normalization of relations.

Chris will be calling Secretary Albright prior to today's breakfast to make his recommendations on the way ahead. That said, he agreed with the US delegation's assessment that we now need to move forward with preparations for embassy/KVM evacuation and air strikes. Chris is no enthusiast for air strikes -- indeed he is very concerned about the chaos that could follow -- but he sees no other way to press Milosevic into accepting an agreement in the days ahead.

The Saturday deadline is now three days away. We need to act now to set up the end game. USNATO reports allied concern that any preparatory steps for air strikes could upset the talks. We need to engage allies in Brussels and in capitals today to explain that a successful outcome requires not being passive but taking and publicizing military preparations. This probably means SecState calls today and POTUS calls tomorrow.

We also need to engage allies and the OSCE on steps to be taken to prepare for the drawdown and evacuation of KVM and our embassies. Our embassy in Belgrade has repeatedly requested guidance on evacuation planning; State owes them an answer today.

Yesterday's meeting in Belgrade demonstrates that trying to negotiate with Milosevic will bring few results. Rather than sending more envoys and making more phone calls, we would recommend confronting him with a growing prospect of air strikes and isolation if he fails to accept the deal on the table.

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006. form	Fax Cover Sheet. [partial] (1 page)	02/17/1999	P3/b(3)

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION:

RELEASER:

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

DATE/TIME:

MESSAGE #:

[Handwritten signature]
 171715
 0112

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: *VL* Date: *5/2/2004*

2008-0811-F-3

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY PH: 703 456 9105 ROOM: OEOB 471
 SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS BREAKDOWN TIMELINE/MATRIX PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

LOCATION	DELIVER TO	ROOM	PHONE
STATE/EUR/TM S	JIM PARDEW		
STATE/EUR/SCE	CHRIS HOH		
JCS-J5	BG GEORGE CASEY		
OSD/BTF (SITE 12)	BERND MCCONNELL		
CIA/BTF			
CIA (b)(3)	(b)(3)		
USNATO	VERSHBOW		011-322-707-9300
USUN, NY	SODERBERG/HOLBROOKE		212-46-4178
RAMBOUILLET	SCHULTE/ROSSIN/WHELAN		011-33-134 ⁸³ -99-68
STATE	KOSOVO MONITORING GROUP		
STATE/EUR/TM S	RAFFI GREGORIAN		

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

KOSOVO NEGOTIATIONS TIMELINE/MATRIX - LATEST VERSION, AS OF 1145 HRS EST,

Urgent Feb 17
 1200

Security Annexes: Areas for "More Imagination"?

Military Annex

Change title to "Military Assistance"

Add pre-amble:

- inviting international community to deploy force ("mission");
- reaffirming FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- acknowledging role of VJ in securing FRY's borders;
- acknowledging importance of providing public security for all national communities;
- underscoring cooperative nature of deployment.

Change name from KFOR (sounds like "IFOR"). Possibilities include:

- Kosovo Assistance Mission;
-

Allow VJ to provide "vice chair" for Joint Military Commission, but with KFOR commander still taking final decisions.

Create VJ liaison officer, to be located at KFOR HQ, to provide advice to KFOR Commander in carrying out his mission.

State that post-K+90 reassessment of VJ border security requirements will take into account "advice" from the VJ general staff.

Reduce "bulk" of Annex by making two appendices (approved cantonment sites and NATO SOFA) into side agreements signed at same time as main agreement.

Police and Civil Public Security Annex

Add pre-amble:

- stressing need to protect all national communities;
- reaffirming FRY responsibilities on border (e.g. border police and customs).

Create MUP liaison officer, to be located at KVM HQ, to provide advice to Head of KVM in carrying out his mission.



Department of State
Executive Secretariat
Operations Center
Room 7516
Washington, D.C. 20520-7512

~~SECRET~~

Fax Transmission

Classification: ~~SECRET~~/NODIS

From: Kosovo Task Force (PENIGAN)
TF/MG: _____
Phone: 202.647.6614
Fax: 202.647.7064

To: Larry Rossin
Office: _____
Phone: _____
Fax: 33-1-34-83-4968

No. of Pages including Cover: 3

Date: 2/21/99

Subject:

Please also pass to Asst. Secretary Grossman.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 5/2/01
202-0994-6

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. draft	Paper. Getting Albanians and Serbs to Say Yes. (2 pages)	02/21/1999	P1/b(1)

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